Lord Mandelson: Response to Humble Address

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

On Palantir, I refer my hon. Friend to the methodology statement at the start of each of the three volumes, where it is made absolutely clear that there is a recognition that Palantir is a matter of interest to the House; indeed, there are references to Palantir within the documents. As I am sure the House will understand, I will not speculate on the contents of the documents that remain with the Metropolitan police, but certainly I invite everyone to look at the references to Palantir in the tranche of documents before the House—indeed, the public can do so as well.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I am interested in the mitigations, which are the reason we have this great gap between what would seem to be a security threat and Peter Mandelson being appointed. I cannot find any documents about that, but I have found that in written evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in September 2025—after the appointment, and when it was about to be withdrawn—Ian Collard said that he had requested a copy of the vetting summary. He made some notes based on the summary as an aide-mémoire, in case it was needed, and submitted them for the Humble Address. I am interested in seeing what the notes are of the mitigations: the man responsible for the mitigations took a note—presumably of what he had seen—and put it in for the Humble Address, yet it is not in the papers.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Officials leading the process will have heard the exchange—and this exchange—in relation to that specific point about Ian Collard. As the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister set out in his statement on Monday, the documents with the Metropolitan police fall into several categories: internal correspondence relating to Peter Mandelson, and documents in relation to conflict of interest and national security vetting. I appreciate the point that my right hon. Friend makes and officials will have heard the exchange between her and me.

[Emily Thornberry]

I want to make it clear that the document I referred to is not part of the original decision making; it is an aide-mémoire that Ian Collard made. If I cannot see the original documents, can I at least see that later one?

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

As ever, my right hon. Friend makes her case forcefully. I am treading carefully in my language because this process has been led by officials working with the ISC. The officials working on it will have heard the request that she just made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

To the right hon. Gentleman’s direct question, I have not been part of the process or been given precise dates for when the Metropolitan police said what. However, I will say this: the documents with the Metropolitan police have been viewed by the chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), so within the confines of not wishing to undermine the ongoing investigation we have tried to be as transparent as we can be with Parliament at this stage. In addition, the summary document of the vetting has been shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee, so to the extent that we have been able to share documents, we have. The request in this debate from the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islington South and Finsbury, will no doubt have been heard as well.

Let me turn to the issue of redactions, which I started to develop in earlier answers to interventions. I will not repeat what the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister said on Monday, nor the methodological note that is available for right hon. and hon. Members to look at, but I want to clarify some issues so that there is no doubt about the process that was followed. As I have said, no material was redacted on grounds of prejudice to national security or international relations without the ISC’s approval. The redactions agreed with the ISC are all triple-asterisked throughout the publication. When you see the three asterisks, that material was agreed with the ISC to be redacted.

On my point about precedent in the earlier exchange with the right hon. Member for New Forest East, the redactions were limited to the names of junior officials, contact details such as telephone numbers and email addresses, the personal or commercially sensitive data of third parties not relevant to the motion, and some cases where there was legal professional privilege. That is in line with the process that has been followed by successive Administrations in relation to Humble Address motions. Those redactions are clearly labelled in the publication. To reconfirm, no Government Minister or special adviser has determined any of the redactions; that was done by the official-led process. I echo the comments made by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister on Monday in thanking the Chair of the PACAC, the hon. Member for North Dorset, who is not in his place, for reviewing our approach to the third-party redactions and the material withheld, so as not to prejudice the ongoing police investigations and to ensure that we are being transparent with Parliament, as we should be.

Let me turn to the specific point about the Metropolitan police. Everyone across the House will appreciate the need not to prejudice the investigation, and will understand that I am unable to answer questions about certain documents that have been withheld. They include questions to Peter Mandelson by the Prime Minister’s then chief of staff and Peter Mandelson’s responses. The remaining documents, as I said a moment or two ago, fall broadly into the following categories: national security vetting material, conflict of interest process material and relevant internal correspondence with Peter Mandelson. Such information will be published in due course, either at the conclusion of the investigation, or at a point, if there were one, at which publication would no longer be prejudicial to the police investigation.

On 4 February, the House made its will clear.

[Emily Thornberry]

It may be that I am just lacking in imagination, but I do not understand why the police would not allow us to see the letter from the Foreign Office to Peter Mandelson saying, “You are given this job subject to not having anything to do with x, y and z”, or whatever the mitigations were. At the moment, we just do not have anything at all and so it is very difficult to understand why he was appointed. We are told that we need to wait for some time in the future—there is no date by which that will be disclosed—and at that stage all will become clear. It is as if the central point of the investigation and all these thousands of pages do not amount to anything until the police eventually decide to give us those crucial documents.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

It is, quite rightly, for the police and not for Ministers to determine the way in which they want their investigation to proceed and to identify documents that they feel are reasonable lines of inquiry. However, to give the House reassurance, even that class of documents was viewed by the Chair of PACAC—obviously, under particular controlled circumstances —because we wanted for Parliament the level of transparency that we could provide at that stage, despite the ongoing investigation.

The Government have discharged their duty to the House in complying with the Humble Address motion, aside from that small amount of information that will be subsequently published in a final tranche. As Members will have seen, Monday’s publication complies with the spirit and the letter of the motion, as well as being one of the largest ever publications laid in this House. Members have had some time to consider the document—certainly, since Monday—and I am grateful to the Leader of the House for making further time to debate the issue today. I know that throughout the course of the debate, Members will be conscious of not prejudicing the ongoing criminal investigation. I am grateful to the House for understanding the position the Government have taken and my position on answering questions on that.

I look forward to the debate before the House. The Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister will close and respond to points made during the debate. I commend the motion to the—

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

We are a very long way from one of the original aspects of this scandal, which was an allegation that the Prime Minister knew when appointing Peter Mandelson that he had failed his developed vetting. We have moved a long way from that, but one thing we have not moved away from is that the man who was appointed was a “best pal” of the world’s most notorious paedophile, that he remained his “best pal” when he was in prison, and that he stayed in his house. Personally, I found it so profoundly shocking when I heard that was what happened. It is a matter of good character to stand by friends when they are in trouble, but when they are convicted of a terrible crime like that, you do not stand with them, you do not stay in their house and they should not be your “best pal”. It is not just that: we have also learned that Peter Mandelson was friends with Russian oligarchs, Chinese Finance Ministers and former Israeli security chiefs; he had a loan of £1 million from an unknown source, which he used to buy shares in a secretive Israeli company; and, of course, there are all the issues in relation to his business dealings.

Given that it is the job of the Foreign Affairs Committee to try to ensure that the Foreign Office is as good as it possibly can be, the Committee has tried to remain focused on why it was that a man like that—when it came to developed vetting, it was decided that he was a case of high concern and that his clearance for vetting should be denied—was nevertheless appointed. There is a lot of gossip and other stuff, the tittle-tattle and things that obviously the Westminster village loves, but the serious point is: how could we have got it so wrong and how did this happen?

[Sir Julian Lewis]

At the beginning of her speech, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said most powerfully that what happened in relation to Epstein should alone have been a sufficient bar for anything to go further, but even if that had not happened, it was already in the due diligence document, purely on foreign policy grounds: the Prime Minister was told that Mandelson gave a speech at the University of Hong Kong where he claimed that the rule of law and independence of the judiciary remain intact there. In November 2024, I personally challenged the proposed appointment on the grounds that Mandelson had said in a radio interview that the basis for a settlement with Ukraine would be that Ukraine should give up to Russia all the land that Russia had so far occupied, and that Ukraine should give up any hope of ever belonging to the NATO alliance. These were political grounds that should have ruled him out. The Prime Minister knew about them, but nothing seemed to prevent him from following through on his intent to appoint such an unsuitable individual.

[Emily Thornberry]

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me down a path that I was not going to go down, although I have gone down it for quite some length in the Committee hearings. It seems to me that all these papers tend to show one thing: the Prime Minister was not particularly interested in the appointment of the ambassador to the United States. He was certainly not a good friend of his: there is no correspondence between them, there are no chatty messages and there is no attempt to get the Prime Minister to vote for Mandelson when he was standing for chancellor of the University of Oxford—I mean, there is not a friendship at all.

The criticism that I make, and I make openly, is that I think the decision was subcontracted to others who were close to Mandelson. The criticism that one can level at the Prime Minister is that he delegated and he did not watch sufficiently what was going on, essentially giving power to others who then abused it—I think that is central. That is not very flattering to the Prime Minister, but it is an honest assessment of the evidence that I have heard. I think the appointment was being pushed and I think that it was being pushed by his then chief of staff, who has a style—and that style is, “When I want to do something, I will go for it hard, I will go for it fast and I will push everybody out of the way.” Once Mandelson had not been elected chancellor at Oxford, someone who should have been a marginal candidate—and had been, as I understand it, just in November 2024—suddenly, within two weeks, moved from being a borderline candidate to being the main person in the frame.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady persuades us that there is a good hypothesis, as she has described, for how this has happened, although we will never know—only the Prime Minister will know. However, does she accept that there is another hypothesis: that the Prime Minister was convinced early that this was the right thing to do, that the system accepted that that was his judgment, and that nobody sought sufficiently strongly to try to persuade him otherwise, until the appointment was finally confirmed?

[Emily Thornberry]

We may be talking about the same thing. Another way of putting it is that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff had taken responsibility for it on his behalf and was pushing it, and the power that the chief of staff had was because he was the chief of staff to the Prime Minister. It is borderline one way or the other.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I disagree with the right hon. Lady’s analysis because the whole point of what we have been saying from the Opposition Benches is that the Prime Minister himself knew about these points: he knew what Mandelson had done in relation to Epstein; he knew what he had said in relation to justice in Hong Kong; and he knew what Mandelson had said in that radio interview because I had challenged him about it. I must say, although it may not meet the high standards of court litigation, that when the Prime Minister brushed aside my challenge to him on 21 November, he sat down with a very notable and ingratiating grin, and I turned to the person sitting next to me and said, “He’s definitely going to appoint Mandelson.” It was his decision.

[Emily Thornberry]

I will move on, but before I do so, I will say something that I think any fair-minded person will know. Presumably the job of being Prime Minister means that there is so much on your desk, and if someone comes to you and says, “Don’t worry about this, I’ll take it and sort it”, there is a temptation to go, “Okay, you do that, because I have 7,000 other things that I have to deal with today.” I do not know—I have never been Prime Minister—but I would assume that that is the reality of the situation.

The question is how somebody who is so manifestly inappropriate gets appointed. It may be that those behaving in this way did so because they felt under huge amounts of political pressure, but how does someone whose case was of high concern and for whom it was recommended that clearance be denied become interpreted as a borderline case, leaning against? How do we bridge that gap? The only way that gap is bridged is through mitigations, so I spend my time looking for mitigations, and I cannot find any. Ian Collard, who was one of the security men speaking to Olly Robbins—who, at the time, was the permanent under-secretary—mentioned the importance of mitigations 10 times in his written evidence to us, and Olly Robbins talked about it six times. It is at the forefront of their evidence.

I have already referred to an aide-mémoire that Ian Collard made in September. He says that he looked again at the summary. He accepts that UKSV’s statement was

“‘this case presents as a high concern’ with a recommendation of ‘clearance denied or withdrawn’”,

and he

“noted that, as well as the tick boxes”—

red tick-boxes, which were ticked—

“UKSV stated in the final case assessment: ‘Overall, I believe that this is a very borderline case…If a clearance was awarded to the individual by the Department, it is recommended that a very robust risk management model is put in place’”.

I do not know whether that is just Ian Collard’s memory of what he may or may not have read—well, I know that he did not read it, because he says that he did not read it at that stage. I do not understand how the UKSV paper can say, “Don’t give him the job”, and then it can also be believed to be a very borderline case with robust risk management recommended. I suspect that the latter bit is an interpretation—a way in which, it was hoped, the difficulty that Mandelson was essentially being refused vetting could be slid over into “He can be given the job, so long as there are robust mitigations.”

But where are those mitigations? When Sir Olly gave evidence to our Committee, I said to him,

“I do not really follow why you would not know the contents of the UKSV document and their concerns or even that they said that there was high concern about Peter Mandelson. I do not understand how you can not know that if you are considering what the mitigations are. You cannot have the mitigations without knowing what the problem is.”

He said,

“The risks were explained to me, but I have not seen the underlying documentation. That is what I am saying. That obviously strikes members of the Committee as odd”—

well, it certainly did—

“but in all my years as a civil servant—many of them as a relatively senior one—I have never seen a UKSV document, other than the ones that I have filled in myself.”

It is ridiculous. If he is putting down mitigations in order to deal with legitimate concerns and a security threat, he needs to know what that security threat is, and to understand that UKSV is saying that it is very serious and that Mandelson should not be given the job—yet he says, “I didn’t know. I just thought it was borderline, leaning the other way.” I mean, this is Alice in Wonderland.

[Alex Burghart]

The right hon. Lady is making an important series of points. Does she not also think that the fact that the vetting was not done before Mandelson arrived in Washington, as we now know, means that somebody was in post in Washington seeing highly classified information which he was not fit to see, because there were no mitigations in place, even though the process subsequently threw up the fact that he would need them? Of course, as she is saying, he probably should not have had the job, given that the mitigations were warranted.

[Emily Thornberry]

I really do not know. The Foreign Office got the UKSV clearance on 29 January 2025, and it says that it did something about it, but we cannot see what that is. An email on page 72 of part I is the nearest thing to mitigations I have been able to find, and Ian Collard referred to it in his evidence. It is an email he wrote on 30 January, and I think it is the mitigations, but I just do not think it is a robust set of mitigations to deal with serious security concerns. The email states:

“As part of the usual clearance policy process, UKSV identified some areas in his application for ESND to review”—

that is the security man.

“I understand that Lord Mandelson’s private sector engagements are being managed by HRD”—

that is human resources—

“and the Legal Directorate through the conflict of interest process.”

Who knows? It continues:

“With regard to personal conduct”—

I think that is hanging out with oligarchs, being friends with the Finance Minister, borrowing money and who knows what else—

“I understand that Lord Mandelson has received a letter from Mervyn Thomas, informing him of his responsibilities as an FCDO employee, including under the Diplomatic Service Regulations.”

Is that it? He got a letter from a man telling him to behave himself! We have not seen the letter, and I do not know what it is. The email continues:

“Matters pertaining to his overseas contacts will certainly be reviewed by the STRAP authorities.”

STRAP is another issue, and we should not be distracted by STRAP. Mandelson needed to follow the developed vetting before getting anywhere near the latest STRAP stuff.

It is important that we take these things in order. We have that email, which is about as pathetic as it can be. There might be something in the nine-page summary that some Members sitting in this Chamber have seen. It might be that that summary showing the security concerns has a page or so at the end—it is a blank page—asking the Foreign Office for its response. UKSV is giving a recommendation saying, “Mandelson should not be given the job, he is a security risk.” The process might be that the Foreign Office has to write something on that form saying, “We have read this. We don’t agree with you. We think he should be appointed, and we’re going to put in the following mitigations”, and then list them. It might be that the Foreign Office did not fill that in properly, and it might be that that bit of the form remains blank. I do not know whether anybody is in a position to be able to enlighten me one way or the other, or whether we will have to wait for the police to give us the document.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Emily Thornberry]

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is one of the people I am referring to, but I give way.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Surely that information would be precisely the kind that could be safely entrusted to the ISC, and it ought to have been entrusted with it.

[Emily Thornberry]

I suspect that the ISC may have been entrusted with it—that is what I am trying to say. I am hoping that if the form is blank, it is not necessarily the case that anything of particular security interest was being disclosed, and it is just a process issue, where the Foreign Office did not follow process as it should have and at least put on that form, “Yes, we have done these things.”

I am just trying to do my job, holding the Government to account. Why did Britain employ a man who was a security risk to this really important job? We did so because of the mitigations, but nobody will tell us the mitigations. After all these thousands of bits of paper, and after my poor right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West coming to the Chamber 11 times, we still cannot get to the root of it.

[Sir John Hayes]

It would be entirely inappropriate for me, or for any other member of the ISC, to say what we have received, which has now been sent to the police, but given that following an urgent question just before the recess I challenged the Chief Secretary on the issue of mitigations, asking him whether there were mitigations in place and whether they would be made known to us, it would not be unreasonable for a diligent member of the House such as the right hon. Lady to conclude that I would not have asked that question if I had known the answer to it.

[Emily Thornberry]

Well, that is very helpful; I thank the right hon. Gentleman very much.

Let us move on. Is there a record of the decision? When Sir Oliver Robbins appeared before the Committee, and indeed when other people appeared before it, I kept coming back to the same question: “Where is the record of your decision? What was the process that you went through before doing this? Why are there no notes? Why is there no record? How can we hold you to account if you really, genuinely are not making any notes at all?” Given that a decision was made to give Peter Mandelson the job subject to mitigations, where is the record of the decision? Do the police have it? Is it in the papers and I have missed it? I do not think so. Was there never a written record of the decision? Surely someone would have made a record of the action taken—or is that the email? Is that it? Is that the action that they took, or is there something else?

Surely there was a letter written to Peter Mandelson saying, “You have the job, but only if you do x, y and z.” This cannot be dealt with by way of a WhatsApp message or a phone call. This is very serious. This is about the security of our nation, and it should be in a letter. I certainly hope that the reason that I have not seen it is that it exists but the police have it, but I do not know one way or the other.

I know that others will be dealing with this later, and I want to draw my remarks to a close, but the Foreign Affairs Committee has been trying to do its job to the best of its ability to try to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again, and we have been doing that in good faith. It has been difficult. We have been “mandarined”; we have been given partial answers; we have been given nonsense by people believing that it is not for us to know. Well, it is for us to know, and it is for us to know because we are trying to make our Government better, and it is our job as Back Benchers to do that.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Hayes]

That is true. Indeed, that might have been reflected in some of the messages that I have suggested to the Department that it might, even at this late stage, make available to our Committee—perhaps that is the most sensible thing given the terms of the Humble Address—and subsequently, in a redacted form, more widely. Even if it were true that because of the pace of the appointment, a full plan could not be drawn up, I find it inconceivable and—I would go as far as to say—unbelievable that there were no communications of any kind associated with the measures referred to by Sir Olly Robbins and Ian Collard.

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way—I hope this is helpful. In the written evidence that Collard gave to us, on point 6 in answer to the question, “When was the report received by the department?” he said that they had

“received an email from UKSV at 1.52pm on 29 January informing PST that the report was ready for the FCDO to review.”

That was the date he heard about the developed vetting. The email, which is the nearest thing we have to anything that has any mitigations, is dated 30 January at 10.12 am.

[Sir John Hayes]

The right hon. Lady will know furthermore that Ian Collard, through a letter sent on his behalf to the Foreign Office, told MPs that he had sent an email

“recording the fact of the decision (but not any of the underlying discussions or reasons for doing so) and mitigations”.

She is absolutely right, and when she said earlier that she was unknowing of why this had occurred, I think the whole House would share her view. None of us quite know why on earth that material does not exist or, if it does exist, why it is not being made available.

My fourth point—I am coming to my exciting conclusion; I know you will be pleased to hear that, Madam Deputy Speaker—concerns the declaration of interests form. We know from the first tranche of documents that were relayed to the House that a blank template on declaration of interests for Peter Mandelson to complete was made available, but the completed declaration of interests, from which presumably detailed actions could be derived, has never been made known. I understand that this is another document that may have found its way into the hands of the Metropolitan police. If so, when did that occur, when did the Metropolitan police request it and, again, why? Greater clarity from the Government on the declaration of interests would be most welcome.

Finally, thanks to the learning of the Paymaster General, we were able to speak a little earlier of Gladstone and Disraeli. I carry a picture of Benjamin Disraeli with me at all times. Many people carry pictures of their children or grandchildren; I carry a picture of Disraeli—

--- Later in debate ---

[Fleur Anderson]

My hon. Friend raises another good point. The rules around redactions were mentioned earlier, and we should ensure that they are consistent between inquiries. We can learn many things from this, and we should build in those things for the future.

I will make three points—only three. First, we need scope and limits. Motions should set out the subject, the time period and the type of documents sought much more rigorously than this Humble Address did. Secondly, we need a proportionality check. When we voted on this Humble Address, we were not given financial information. Before the House votes, we should have an estimate from the Government of the likely cost, staff time involved and how long compliance will take. That should be part of our measured judgment. We can weigh that against the public interest and use that information when voting. Thirdly, we should use the right tool for the job. There are Select Committees, as we well know—the Foreign Affairs Committee has been rigorously looking at this issue—as well as written questions, freedom of information requests, police investigations, as there are in this case, and evidence under oath. There are other routes to transparency, too. I am not saying we should have used those things in this case—this is the right one for this matter—but we should be prepared to check with future Humble Addresses whether those other routes should not be used.

[Emily Thornberry]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on her thoughtful and important contribution. We need to ensure that if we use a Humble Address again, we use it as effectively as we can. We have talked about the amount of money, but will she also highlight the opportunity costs? We heard in the Committee from the Foreign Office and the Cabinet Office about the amount of time that civil servants were spending on this. One particular gentleman had come back from Iran and was an expert on that, but he was spending his time on this issue, rather than being able to give the right sort of assistance to the Foreign Office on what we should be doing on Iran.

[Fleur Anderson]

I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Foreign affairs money is being spent on this, when it could have been spent on humanitarian aid or ensuring that our systems and processes are supporting those worldwide to make sure that we are all safer. The Intelligence and Security Committee has been looking at this issue a lot, but we face many other intelligence and security issues in the world. Huge amounts of senior civil servant time has been spent on the Humble Address, too, and those people have been reflecting on the process. I am sharing some of the frustrations that they are feeling, because they have had to look through an enormous amount of papers that are well outside the focused questions we are asking, such as, “Why was Peter Mandelson ever employed in the first place?” We should be looking at that with a laser-like intensity, but we have wide-ranging other bits of paper. I accept that we can never know what we do not know until we have looked at it all, but the civil servants—the ones in the middle of the process—have seen that there could be a far better process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Fleur Anderson]

I thank the right hon. Member for his comment about the ISC. I will continue to take advice from that vetting process: it needs to be even more hermetically sealed. We need to take real care over this. Any over-sharing will have an effect on everyone who is asked to sit down and give the frankest and most private information, and we need to make sure that they are doing that so that their potential risk to our security as a country is very well known. We cannot allow self-censoring because of this process. We do not need those far-reaching unintended consequences.

[Emily Thornberry]

Is there not another argument? Certain people are thinking again about applying for jobs for which they may need to undergo developed vetting. Those people may well be women, people from ethnic minorities or people who are gay, for whom any disclosure would be so profoundly embarrassing that they would rather just not get the job.

[Fleur Anderson]

My right hon. Friend has made the point very well. There are minority groups. There are people who do not know whether what they are worried about in respect of their past will be an issue, and they will not share that. They will not even go for the developed vetting, which means that they cannot rise within the Foreign Office. They may not even go for the job for fear of it.

We cannot allow that to be the unintended consequence of this process today. We cannot hear about it in 10 years’ time. There have been other issues that may have compromised our national security because they have not been shared, or have robbed us of serious talent and opportunity from across the country because people have not joined the ranks of our civil servants because of the things that we are sharing or not sharing within this process. It is not about more transparency; it is about less. It could potentially leave Ministers with less honest advice. It could potentially weaken accountability, and put unfair pressure on civil servants who serve Governments of all colours with impartiality. What the public need is the outcome of the vetting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

Does the Minister appreciate that there may be a difference between conflict of interest information and national security mitigations, and that he may be able to tell us about some of that information but not able to tell us whether or not there were mitigations to defend national security?

[Darren Jones]

I share the expectation of my right hon. Friend that there would be a difference between commercial mitigations—for example, what investments there may be in particular companies—and mitigations that may have arisen from national security considerations. What I do not know is whether that was the case and how they were dealt with in any particular instance, because I do not have that information to hand.

Lastly on this first group of questions, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) asked me to confirm the relevant detail in relation to the Metropolitan police dates and documents. As I have set out previously, I have been advised that I am not permitted to put that on the public record, but I am happy to go back to the Metropolitan police to see if there is anything further that we can add in due course.