Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
Ellie Chowns
Main Page: Ellie Chowns (Green Party - North Herefordshire)Department Debates - View all Ellie Chowns's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
Representation of the People Bill (Ninth sitting)
Ellie Chowns ExcerptsThursday 16th April 2026
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Representation of the People Bill 2024-26 View all Representation of the People Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 April 2026 - (16 Apr 2026)
Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 23, in clause 80, page 100, line 35, at end insert—
“(ha) Section (Report on electoral online harms)”.
Dr Chowns
I will briefly speak to the new clause, because it is important, and has clearly garnered support from a large number of Government MPs—indeed, the second signatory is the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah).
The new clause is quite reasonable; it simply would require the Electoral Commission to publish a report setting out its assessment of the risk of electoral online harms. As we have already discussed in Committee, there is clear evidence of electoral online harms, so it would be useful to ask the Electoral Commission to produce such a report to set the risks out clearly and the measures it intends to take to address them.
I will not press the new clause to a vote. I am open as to whether this necessarily needs to be in statute or simply in Government guidance, but it is an important element of improving the safeguards against online harms in our electoral system. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I thank the hon. Member for North Herefordshire for her comments. We have seen this over the last couple of elections in ’19 and ’24, and we are going to see it again in local and national elections: our regulatory framework is not keeping pace. As far as I am aware, there is no electoral framework—I would love to hear from the Minister on this—for anyone to systematically map the risks posed by deepfakes and associated online issues. Voters deserve to make free, informed choices, not tainted by some of the things that are seen online. I hope that the Government will take this forward.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Samantha Dixon)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. The Government do not believe that the new clause is the right or effective way to address these concerns, although we acknowledge the seriousness of the issue that our hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) is raising.
The new clause would risk blurring regulatory boundaries between two rightly independent regulators. The Electoral Commission and Ofcom have distinct statutory roles, with Ofcom responsible for regulation and enforcement of online safety duties on services. Requiring the Electoral Commission to make proposals for amending the Online Safety Act 2023 would cut across that, and risk duplication in an area where clarity is essential.
Secondly, the Electoral Commission already has the power under section 6 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to produce and publish reports on matters relating to elections where it considers that appropriate. We therefore do not consider it necessary or proportionate to mandate a further statutory report.
I would also note the risk of duplication with the recent Speaker’s Conference report, which examined these issues and included evidence from the Electoral Commission. The Government welcomed the conference’s findings, and our response was published on 5 March. Under the Online Safety Act, Ofcom is the independent regulator responsible for overseeing the risk-based framework, including publishing codes of practice and requiring the largest services to provide transparency reports about their systems and processes for addressing online harms. That framework provides an appropriate basis for regulatory oversight and platform accountability.
The Online Safety Act also places clear duties on services that host user-generated content to tackle illegal content online, including illegal abuse, threats and incitement of violence. Ofcom is now implementing and enforcing that framework, and the Government will work closely with Ofcom, the Electoral Commission and law enforcement through existing arrangements. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for North Herefordshire to withdraw the new clause.
Dr Chowns
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 24
Repository of digital political advertising
“(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as set out in subsection (2).
(2) After section 61 insert—
‘Part 6A Repository of digital political advertising
61A. Establishing a repository of digital political advertising
(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to require the Electoral Commission to establish a repository of paid-for digital political advertising.
(2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must—
(a) provide for the repository of political advertising to be publicly accessible;
(b) specify that a provider of a Category 1 service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023 must ensure that prescribed information relating to such advertising is submitted to the repository as soon as reasonably practicable, and, in any event, within 72 hours;
(c) set out the types of information to be prescribed; and
(d) provide for material in the repository to be transferred to the National Archives for preservation after a certain period.
(3) Before making any regulations that make provision for the matters under subsection 2(c), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Electoral Commission;
(b) the Information Commissioner’s Office; and
(c) OFCOM.
(4) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.’” —(Paul Holmes.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to require the Electoral Commission to establish a publicly available repository of political advertising.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Dr Chowns
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Government to establish and publish a transparent protocol for responding to election information incidents and place that protocol on a statutory footing. That is important, because there is currently no clear, publicly accountable mechanism in the UK for informing voters about serious information incidents during election periods, such as co-ordinated disinformation campaigns or foreign interference.
Although there may be internal processes, under the radar, in Government, those are not transparent, they lack clear triggers for action and they are not subject to democratic oversight. Their absence creates uncertainty about how and when the public would be notified if there were such attacks or threats to the integrity of an election. That potentially undermines trust, and leaves voters without information and potentially exposed to unchallenged misinformation at critical moments during an election. We can all recognise that that is a growing threat.
The new clause would address that gap. It would establish a clear, publicly accessible protocol that would set out how, why and when election information incidents would be identified, assessed and communicated to the general public. The rise of disinformation has shown that co-ordinated online campaigns, bot campaigns and so forth can spread very rapidly during election periods, and can influence public perception before corrective action is taken. I will not name particular electoral processes, but we can all call examples to mind. It is a problem that we lack a transparent framework for dealing with public notification when such incidents occur.
Other democracies have taken steps in this regard; most notably, Canada has already introduced a formal mechanism to respond to these risks. That highlights the gap in the UK. We should look at international best practice on this issue. We should be trying to stay ahead of—or at least catch up with—the threats that our democracy faces, as fast as possible.
The new clause is clearly directly related to the Bill, so I would welcome the Minister’s response. To clarify, I do not intend to press it to a vote—I should have mentioned that it was tabled by the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central—but I move it because it raises an important issue that is crucial to the safety of our elections.
Samantha Dixon
These are important issues, and I thank the hon. Member for raising them.
Earlier today, I described the work of the Joint Elections Security and Preparedness Unit, which exists as an enduring function to protect our elections and our democracy; that includes monitoring for mis and disinformation. The JESP election cell brings together Whitehall Departments, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as key stakeholders to agree monitoring thresholds and response options where necessary. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is a core member of JESP’s election cell, as is the Electoral Commission.
Dr Chowns
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 30
Cap on political donations
“(1) Part 4 of PPERA 2000 (control of donations to registered parties and their members etc) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 54B (Declaration as to whether residence etc condition satisfied) insert—
‘54C Power to set cap on political donations
(1) A registered party must not accept a donation from a person if the value of donations from that person during the course of that calendar year exceeds the maximum amount specified by regulations made under subsection (3).
(2) Where a registered party receives a donation which would cause the limit for the purposes of subsection (1) to be exceeded, the amount by which the limit is exceeded is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as a donation received from a person who is not a permissible donor.
(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations specify the donation limit for the purposes of subsection (1) within three months of the day on which this act is passed.
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(5) Before laying a draft statutory instrument containing regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must commission an independent review of the level of the cap on political donations.
(6) The review must consider and make recommendations on the level of the cap in light of—
(a) the prevailing economic conditions;
(b) the effect of the cap on democratic participation and political competition; and
(c) any other matters the Secretary of State considers relevant.
(7) The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person or panel with relevant experience to conduct the review.
(8) The person or panel appointed under subsection (7) must—
(a) consult the Electoral Commission and any other persons the person or panel considers relevant; and
(b) prepare and publish a report of its findings.
(9) The Secretary of State must lay the report under subsection (9)(b) before both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after receiving it.
(10) No later than three years after a report under subsection (10) has been laid the Secretary of State must commission a new review under subsection (5) for the purposes of determining whether the cap under subsection (1) should be amended.’”— (Zöe Franklin.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to set an annual cap on permissible political donations from a person, following an independent review to be conduct every three years.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Zöe Franklin
The new clause, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella), goes to the heart of this basic question: who does our democracy serve—voters or those with the deepest pockets? It would introduce a cap on political donations from any one individual or entity each year, with that cap set following independent review and approved by Parliament. It would ensure that the level is kept under regular review so that it remains appropriate over time. At present, there is no upper limit on political donations in the UK, which is a striking gap in our system that allows vast sums to be given by a single donor, creating the risk of disproportionate influence by an individual.
Already, too many people across the UK look at our politics and see a system that appears to be tilted towards those with wealth and access. They question whether decisions are made in the public interest, or in the interests of those who can afford to make the largest contributions. That is unsustainable, and it undermines our democracy. My hon. Friend wishes to be clear that the new clause is not about stopping people supporting political parties; it is about drawing a reasonable line to ensure that no individual or organisation can dominate political funding simply because of the scale of their resources.
There is also a clear issue with integrity and security. While there are rules on permissible donors, there remain loopholes that allow money to be routed through UK-registered companies and complex structures, which creates a real risk of foreign or opaque influence on our politics. A cap alone would not resolve that problem, but it would significantly limit its scale. The new clause seeks to take a careful, balanced approach to the issue. It does not impose an arbitrary figure, but instead requires an independent, evidence-based review to recommend the level of the cap, considering economic considerations, democratic participation and political competition. It would place that decision firmly within a transparent and accountable process.
Ultimately, elections should be decided by voters persuaded by the strength of arguments, the quality of ideas and the credibility of leadership—I do not think that any member of the Committee would disagree with that. They should not be about the scale of financial backing. If we allow money to operate without meaningful limits, we undermine the fundamental democratic principle that every voice should carry equal weight. I do not wish to press the new clause to a vote, but I would like to hear the Minister’s thoughts on it.
With your permission, Sir Desmond, I will also speak to new clause 54, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove. The Committee has established that, unfortunately, public trust in political funding—and sometimes in democracy itself—is at a very low point. With donations in the millions from a handful of wealthy individuals, spending wars between parties and loopholes that undermine the spirit of the rules, there is a public perception that politics can be bought and that elections can be won through the donations of the few. I think we would all agree that that is not a place we want to be.
New clause 54 calls for a royal commission to look at the evidence properly and make recommendations, which would allow for a level of independence and cross-party process. The current system allows single donors to give millions to a party, which raises legitimate questions about whose interests are being served. There are limited financial provisions on long campaigns; significant money is spent well before the official period begins and the limits do not catch that.
The Liberal Democrats have long called for greater transparency in political spending; the real-time disclosure of donations, a cap on political donations and annual expenditure limits sits squarely within that agenda.
Dr Chowns
I will speak to new clauses 30 and 54, tabled by the hon. Members for Stratford-on-Avon and for Hazel Grove respectively, which both deal with the important topic of a cap on donations. I will then speak to new clauses 58 in my name and new clause 65 in the name of the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), which both deal with limits on campaign expenditure, as the two topics are closely related.
First, as the hon. Member for Guildford just set out, there is a very strong case for having a cap on political donations, which the Government have recognised to some extent in promising to take forward the Rycroft recommendations on instituting a cap on donations from British citizens living abroad. However, on the broader question of donations from any British voter, the issue of the total amount of donations, and the number of very large donations, has significantly increased over time. The public widely recognise the extent to which political parties—some, in particular—are reliant on funds contributed by a small handful of very wealthy donors, and it is a rightly a cause for concern for a large majority of them. As the public understand, that carries the risk that individuals with very deep pockets can potentially have a disproportionate influence on our politics.
Back in 2011, the Committee on Standards in Public Life produced a report addressing precisely this risk, the problem of increased reliance on significant donations, and recommended a donations cap. That was 15 years ago. The problem has only become more and more significant since then, as we have seen just within the last year with several donations in the many millions of pounds to one political party. This is clearly a problem and a risk to our politics—and a risk that has been recognised worldwide.
As I understand it, about half of countries globally and well over two thirds of European countries impose some sort of limit on donations. The UK was one of I think 22 signatories to a UN resolution in December 2025 that identified the risk of corruption in politics from large donations and called for countries to consider instituting a cap on donations. It would only be consistent with our signing that UN resolution for us to take action on this ourselves.
Philip Rycroft, if I may quote directly from page 29 of his report, identified this problem too. He talked about his worries that the lack of year-round spending limits on campaign expenditure plus the lack of limits on donations could lead to an
“arms race among political parties and actors to out-raise and out-spend their competitors.”
Although he felt that this issue fell beyond his remit, he pointed out that it was
“something that could be usefully debated during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill”,
so I am very glad that a number of colleagues have tabled amendments to allow us to discuss it and to hear from the Government.
This proposal is widely supported by a large number of individuals and organisations that submitted evidence to this Committee—the Electoral Reform Society, Transparency International, Spotlight on Corruption, Open Britain and a whole range of others—and by a number of academics who specialise in this area: Sam Power, who gave evidence to us, Alan Renwick and a number of others. Transparency International points out:
“Other comparable democracies have sought to curb the corrosive influence of big money in politics by setting donation caps…Canada caps donations to political parties at CA$1,750 annually; France caps donations to political parties at €7,500 annually and €4,500 for presidential campaigns; Italy’s cap is €100,000…and Australia has introduced AU$50,000 caps per donor per year, due to apply from July 2026.”
This proposal has been recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, as I have said, and by the Hayden Phillips review, and it is supported by a majority of voters. YouGov polling published in December 2025 showed that 67% of UK voters say that there should be a cap of £50,000 or less, or indeed no private donations at all—some people feel the system should be dealt with like that.
I will briefly pre-empt a point that I suspect the Minister will raise in her response, the fact that some other countries have greater state funding of politics. A balance has to be struck. My case is not that there should be no ability for voters to contribute to politics; arguably, that is an important part of the democratic process. The problem is that in a democracy, in which by definition one person has one vote, money can buy huge amounts of influence that outweigh and hugely influence many of those votes. If a party has received many millions of pounds just in the past six months, it is not surprising that it will have a capacity to spend that in the non-regulated period in a way that is highly likely to influence voting.
There is therefore a strong case for introducing some sort of annual donation cap now. Transparency International advocates for that being £50,000 a year. The CSPL, I believe, advocated for £10,000 a year, although that was 16 years ago; if we multiply that by inflation, it is about £15,000 a year now. Others have talked about £100,000 a year, which would bring the cap in line with the system that the Government have already committed to putting in place for donations from British voters overseas.
There is clearly a problem with the distortion of our political system caused by the influence of big money, big donations in politics, and we have a crucial opportunity, in the passage of this Bill, to take action to address it. On many of the other issues that we have talked about—company donations, the influence of foreign money, crypto donations—I have repeatedly drawn a connection with the need for a cap on all political donations, because those things cannot be completely divorced. We will not be able to address the issues that concern us in relation to the distorting effect of money on our politics if we do not implement a cap on political donations. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that.
Samantha Dixon
I would prefer to press on; the hon. Lady will be able to respond later.
To better protect against those who seek to covertly undermine UK elections, we are instead strengthening rules and closing loopholes at all stages of the political donations process. I have described the measures in some detail earlier today: “know your donor”, the three steps for foreign companies, and the consideration we are giving to the Rycroft review.
A cap is not being placed across all donations because currently the majority of funding for political parties in the UK comes from private, corporate or other organisational sources. State funding accounts for around 10% of the total income of UK political parties. There is no public or political appetite to increase the level of state funding. I urge hon. Members of this Committee to reject this new clause.
New clause 54 proposes that the Secretary of State shares plans for establishing a royal commission to consider the effectiveness and merits of political expenditure controls and, in particular, a cap on political donations. A public inquiry is an extremely costly and lengthy process. Instead, we have already sought to ensure that our democracy is strengthened by considering recommendations from authorities and expert bodies in this area, including the Electoral Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the National Crime Agency.
Those risks and recommended solutions were taken forward and set out in our strategy for modern and secure elections, published on 17 July last year. Those commitments are now set out in full in this Bill. To ensure no stone was left unturned, the Secretary of State commissioned the independent Rycroft review to see where we could strengthen our laws and what could be recommended to protect against covert funding and foreign interference. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove will withdraw new clause 54.
The purpose of new clause 58 is to require the Electoral Commission to conduct a review of the feasibility of a cap on annual expenditure by political parties, candidates and third parties, and then for the Government to issue a response containing proposals informed by that review. The Government agree that transparency and fairness are vital principles to be upheld in elections. Further, it is of the utmost importance to limit the risk of foreign interference.
We are committed to ensuring that we have robust systems to protect the UK from foreign interference, and this Bill reinforces electoral legislation against foreign interference. The commitment of the hon. Member for North Herefordshire to fairness and transparency in elections has been clear throughout the parliamentary process, and I share that commitment. The Government note the recommendations of the Rycroft review and will respond to those measures in due course.
New clause 65 would substantially cut national spending limits for political parties and would, for the first time, bring most campaign staff costs within scope. National spending limits were intended to strike a careful balance, allowing parties to communicate effectively with voters across the country while preventing money from dominating elections. In practice, parties generally campaign within the cap, which operates as a ceiling rather than a target. Those limits were set by Parliament in 2000 and have been uprated over time to maintain their real-world value.
Periodic uprating helps avoid eroding parties’ ability to communicate effectively with the electorate, so is consistent with the original policy intent that Parliament approved. The proposal to include campaign staff costs would represent a significant change to the regulatory framework, introducing additional complexity in how parties define roles and apportion costs. There is not currently clear evidence of a problem with this arrangement.
The Government note the issues raised about the level of the spending limits, including those highlighted by the independent Rycroft review. As Members know, we are considering those very carefully and will respond in due course. On that basis—and to allow that work to be completed first—I invite the hon. Member to seek to withdraw the new clause.
Dr Chowns
I have three quick points. First, the Minister implied that any limit on donations is unacceptable to her. That seems a very extreme position for the Government to take. Is that really the Government’s position in responding to new clause 30, tabled by the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon? The Minister seems to be taking that position, yet that new clause does not specify a particular level but that a cap should be set after a review, which is itself regularly reviewed. That seems a very reasonable approach. Does the Minister not recognise at all even the theoretical possibility that large donations can skew our politics? I would find that an extraordinary position for the Government to take.
Secondly, this seems to be completely inconsistent with the fact that last year the UK and at least 59 other countries co-sponsored a resolution passed at the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption that calls on states parties to consider limitations on donations
“with a view to combating corruption”.
The Government have already recognised that large donations into the political system carry a risk of corruption.
I do not expect the Minister to put a number on the table today, but to be consistent, would the Minister please take this away for consideration alongside the other issues that have come out of the Rycroft review? It is clear through this Bill Committee process that we need amendments to come forward that are not just driven by Rycroft, but also by some of the issues that Rycroft himself has highlighted as relevant yet outwith the specific terms of reference of his report—certainly including caps on political donations, expansion of the regulated period and reform of political advertising.
Thirdly, there is the point about how politics in the UK is largely funded through private company and trade union donations—I tried to pre-empt this, but the Minister did come back with it as well. I have not at any point argued for more state funding of politics—that could be a separate debate, but I am not arguing that. By discussing the arguments in favour of a cap on donations, together with the arguments for stronger limits on expenditure, I am arguing for a politics in which money skews politics less overall.
We can surely recognise that if one person can contribute—for the sake of argument—£9 million to an organisation or political actor then that will inevitably have a hugely skewing impact on our politics. Do the Government really not recognise that? Will the Government really not take any steps to limit political donations and that skewing and pollution of our politics?
Zöe Franklin
New clause 31 would require the Secretary of State to use regulations to ensure that the Electoral Commission established a fund to help disabled candidates meet additional disability-related campaign costs in England. Historically in England, the access to elected office fund and the EnAble fund provided funding for practical support and reasonable adjustments to remove barriers for disabled candidates standing for election. That could include help with communication, transport or personal assistance, not general campaign costs.
The interim £250,000 EnAble fund was launched in 2018. It involved a two-stage approval process, with an independent panel of experts on disability as well as the political groups of the Local Government Association. In total, 41 candidates were awarded funding and 45% of those were elected. In the 2022 Scottish local elections, 46 people got support from a similar fund available in Scotland; of those, 22 were elected.
Based on those numbers, I would suggest that the types of funds that provide support make a tangible difference. However, the English fund was discontinued in 2020 and, although I understand the Government have indicated that they wish to do something about that, it has not yet been reinstated and an alternative has not been put forward. That leaves a distinct inequality between the different nations of Britain—Wales and Scotland both have funded schemes; England does not.
Representation in politics is crucial, whether here in Parliament or in our council chambers across the country. The House of Commons Library estimates that 25% of the UK population is disabled, with 24% of working adults stating that they are disabled. A truly representative parliamentary House would have 156 MPs indicating that they have a disability, yet only 12 declare themselves as having a disability—less than 2% of Parliament. According to the Local Government Association’s 2022 census, approximately 15% of local authority councillors in England declared a disability or long-term health condition. Essentially, we are consistently not returning a set of councillors or MPs that is truly representative of the people we seek to serve.
In my view, that is a wrong that needs to be corrected. Establishing a new fund in England to provide that support is absolutely crucial. That change is supported by Elect Her, Centenary Action, the Jo Cox Foundation, Unlock Democracy, the Fawcett Society, the Disability Policy Centre and others. This Bill is the opportunity to right this wrong. I would welcome hearing whether the Minister agrees with the new clause. I hope that she will but if she does not, will she outline how the Government plan to support candidates with disabilities and to address this glaring disparity between the nations? We really must do better when it comes to representation of people with disabilities in our politics.
The other new clauses are also important; they continue the theme of ensuring that our democracy is truly representative of the people we serve. New clause 34 would require the Secretary of State to bring section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 into force within three months of Royal Assent.
New clause 35 would place a duty in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which is the main law governing political parties, campaign finance, donations and so on, requiring the Electoral Commission to publish the information in an accessible form. It would also give Ministers the power to require registered political parties to publish anonymised information about the diversity of the people coming forward as candidates—for example, information about protected characteristics among applicants, selected candidates and elected candidates. This duty applies only so far as it is possible to publish characteristics while, of course, retaining the privacy of the people it is referencing.
For a long time, we have as a nation talked about ensuring that that information is made available. In March 2026, the Minister for Equalities, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) stated:
“The Government is committed to commencing section 106 of the Equality Act 2010, requiring registered political parties to publish anonymised data relating to the diversity of their candidate selections…officials are currently exploring when and how to commence the provision under section 106.”
She said that there would be an update “in due course”. That was then repeated in the House of Lords. That statement took place a while ago, yet we have not seen any movement as yet.
Again, I personally feel that this Bill gives the opportunity to enact that section of the Equality Act. I would therefore like to hear from the Minister whether she supports the amendment and, if she does not, when the Government will bring into force section 106 of the Equality Act.
Dr Chowns
I will speak very briefly in support of the three amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Guildford, which highlight really important issues. It seems extraordinary, really, that we have such inequality between England, Wales and Scotland in relation to support for disabled candidates. Clearly, with such huge levels of under-representation of disabled people in our politics, it is imperative that support is put in place to try to rectify that. I fully support the call for the reinstatement of the access to elected office fund.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I appreciate that the main focus of these amendments has been around disability. However, I was proud of the work that my party did in Government to try to improve the diversity of candidates, particularly in local elections.
Has the hon. Member given any consideration to the broader concept of diversity in terms of candidates? We know that disability can present some specific challenges, but one of the issues for political parties is about engaging those much wider communities, from which sometimes very few people feel willing to put themselves forward as candidates. Does she have a view about that that she would like to share with the Committee?
Dr Chowns
I absolutely do—indeed, that is what the next two amendments are specifically about. That clearly should be the next step; the provision was put in place in the Equality Act, so it is just about commencing something already there under section 106 that would apply to reporting on diversity with a range of protected characteristics, not just in relation to disability.
I completely agree that our politics should be representative of our population as a whole; we should all be challenging ourselves constantly, as individuals and as parties, to ensure that we are doing everything possible to address under-representation of certain groups. The lack of representation of women is particularly brought into focus by the fact that it is now nearly 100 years since the franchise was fully extended, yet women are still seriously under-represented in this House—and even more under-represented in local politics nationally. But there are many other dimensions of under-representation; while the first amendment relates specifically to support for disabled candidates, the next two amendments relate to that much wider spectrum. That is crucially important.
Samantha Dixon
New clause 31 would require the Electoral Commission to establish a fund to provide financial assistance to disabled candidates standing for election in England. It is the Government’s ambition to see more disabled people in public office, and we know that some disabled people still face additional financial barriers when contesting elected office. To address that, we are currently developing a new fund to support disabled election candidates with the disability-related extra costs they can experience, to enable participation on an equal basis.
We put the lived experience of disabled people and lessons learned from previous funds at the heart of our work to develop that new fund. We have engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, including MPs and disabled local councillors. We have heard how ensuring ongoing support is important to providing the reassurance people need to plan for the long term, as it can take a number of attempts to get elected. The Government are able to provide that type of support without this amendment, as they have done in the past, with the access to elected office fund from 2012 to 2015 and the EnAble fund from 2018 to 2020.
As part of our work to develop the new fund, we are considering how design elements might better support longevity, retaining the flexibility needed to ensure that the fund provided is fit for purpose. Given the ongoing work that the Government are doing in this area to establish a fund, I gently ask the hon. Lady not to press the new clause.
I now turn to new clause 34. The Government are committed to improving representation in politics. We encourage increased diversity in Government and political candidates, and have taken action to address that. Section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 is an uncommenced provision that would require registered political parties to publish anonymised data about the diversity of their candidate selections, in accordance with regulations. The Government are committed to commencing section 106 of the Equality Act. However, careful consideration needs to be given to how it might be implemented, the supporting regulations and whether any phasing might be needed in implementation. Officials will consult with stakeholders, including political parties, in due course.
Paul Holmes
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. This is not about whether one political party—or one party in government—is more trustworthy than the other; we leave that to the voters. This is about trusting in the integrity of the voters. He is absolutely right that the greatest influence and first right of every citizen in this country should be their ability to participate in the democratic process, pick their Government and pick the elected representatives who stand up for them, but there needs to be integrity.
My hon. Friend is right to outline that this should be seen not in a party political way, but in a process way. The new clause would contribute to that aim by giving powers to the independent Electoral Commission, which, as the Minister reminded us in the previous sitting of this Committee, is governed by Parliament, not the Government. This is a step that the Minister could take, seeing that they are very keen to give the Electoral Commission increased power.
This new clause is crucial and non-partisan, and it would allow us to have a tangible effect on the trust in and integrity of our system. Nobody is bigger or better than the system that we have, but that system can be improved, and we should not be shying away from allowing ourselves to improve it, no matter who is in government, to make sure that every time that a voter walks into a polling station, they know that their vote will be cast in the most secret and best way possible. I hope the Minister will look kindly upon the new clause, although I am sure she will not. I look forward to her remarks in response.
Dr Chowns
Ballot secrecy is extremely important. The shadow Minister has talked about family voting. I am deeply disappointed and concerned by the implicitly discriminatory accusations made by some parties in relation to family voting in recent weeks. I wish we saw as much passion about the far greater threat to our democracy posed by the skewing effect of huge donations.
Conservative members of the Committee made no contribution in the discussion on caps on donations or limits on expenditure earlier this afternoon, but have devoted considerable airtime to this particular topic. I ask all of us to consider: what is the greatest threat to the integrity of our political system?
David Simmonds
There is a crucial distinction that I am interested in with the hon. Member’s reflection on—
Dr Chowns
I think that I have made my point. Let us consider what the greatest threat to the integrity of our democracy is. I am concerned about the ways that concerns such as those articulated in these amendments have been weaponised by some political actors, so I will abstain if they are pressed to a vote.
Samantha Dixon
New clause 36 and amendment 25 would place a new legal duty on the Electoral Commission to produce guidance for returning officers on how to enforce the offences introduced by the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023. I stress at the outset how seriously the Government take all forms of electoral fraud or coercion, including family voting. It is illegal and unacceptable, and polling staff should feel confident to challenge and report any incidents.
However, I have serious concerns about these amendments. It is essential to point out that the commission can already issue guidance, and it already provides extensive guidance for returning officers. Putting the requirement into legislation would set a new precedent, allowing Parliament to direct how the commission produces its guidance in the future. The Commission’s independence, as we discussed earlier, is central to public confidence in how elections are run. Because the amendments would require Ministers and Parliament to approve or even change the guidance, there is a real risk that people would see that as political interference and involvement in something that should remain an operational matter for the commission.
The extra approval steps could also delay clear guidance for returning officers. If Parliament rejected the draft guidance, the commission would have to start again, creating uncertainty for those responsible for enforcing ballot secrecy. For those reasons—concerns about independence, ministerial involvement, added complexity and the precedent they set—the Government cannot support the amendments.
Paul Holmes
The hon. Member for North Herefordshire made some comments that, I think, questioned my integrity in making my speech.
Paul Holmes
The hon. Lady says it is my judgment. It is interesting that I am being accused of weaponising an issue because of one aspect where I think there is an imbalance, or a different interpretation of ways of overseeing voting at polling stations. First, that is a subjective term—
Paul Holmes
No, it would not. I have a lot of respect for the hon. Lady; we get on, and I believe we are both in this for the same reasons. My explanatory note is very clear about what the new clause would protect, and where it would not have an impact. It states:
“It would not ban campaigning in native languages of the British Islands such as in English, Welsh, Cornish, Ulster Scots, Irish, et al. Nor would it prevent campaigning via the likes of BSL or Braille.”
So no, because that is officially known as a minority language within the British Isles. We have been very careful to ensure that people in Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, and those who read Braille or rely on sign language, will not be excluded by the new clause. Communities that are not learning English should be able to read the English through translation services, which are encouraged by the social cohesion strategy.
We also have to think about the other side: many people living in multi-ethnic communities receive leaflets in a foreign language, and they cannot read what is being said by a party. That is not a level playing field in the voting system, and I think it is wrong. We have seen examples where that has been used in an exploitative way in recent months, and there is no doubt that we will see it used in an exploitative way in future. That happened in Tower Hamlets, it happened in Gorton, and it will happen again.
If the Minister will not support the new clause, will the Government look at how to streamline the voting system in this country, so that we have, at least, guidance on languages? She may say that it already exists, but we need to toughen the regulations to prescribe, or describe, how parties should treat British languages versus foreign languages. I look forward to her Minister’s response on new clause 37.
Dr Chowns
I am going to rise above the party political aspects of the shadow Minister’s comments, but I want to engage with his extraordinary claim that communicating with people in their mother tongue is, in some way, exploitation. He expressed concern about the inclusion of diverse communities in our country. He talked about social cohesion, but what he is proposing is essentially a nativist policy. As was highlighted by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch, Gaelic speakers are accepted but Urdu speakers are not. I fundamentally disagree.
Of course, as a country we should provide support to assist people to learn English, but we should not force them, as the shadow Minister argued. If they are not yet fluent, it seems perfectly reasonable—in fact, clearly helpful for inclusion and participation—to provide election materials in the language in which they can be best understood. Indeed, that is what returning officers do. Election officers provide information in multiple languages, so why should parties and candidates not also be free to do so?
Let me quote from the guidance for returning officers on the Electoral Commission’s website:
“Some voters may need assistance in another language because of their limited English (or English or Welsh) language skills. You should consider what support you are able to provide to those voters in your area, such as providing translations of the polling station notices.”
In Gorton and Denton, the polling station provided information in multiple other languages. The effect of the new clause would be exclusionary and discriminatory, and I strongly oppose it.
Samantha Dixon
New clause 37 would ban the use of foreign languages in campaign material during the regulated period—it would make it a criminal offence. A primary purpose of the Bill is to encourage more people across society to engage and participate in our democracy. The new clause would not serve that purpose. It is not for the Government to prescribe the languages that campaigners are permitted to use to engage voters who come from a wide range of diverse backgrounds across the constituencies we represent. It is certainly not for the Government to criminalise the use of certain languages.
Various electoral and non-electoral offences protect against malicious forms of campaign material, which is, in essence, what the hon. Member for Hamble Valley was talking about. For example, it is an offence to publish or distribute threatening, abusive or insulting material that is intended or likely to stir up racial hatred. It is also an offence to improperly influence someone to vote in a particular way or refrain from voting. That would include, for example, a leaflet that threatened to make use of force or place undue spiritual pressure on a person in order to induce them to vote in a particular way or refrain from voting. Those offences apply regardless of the language used in the campaign material.
The Government have no plans to regulate the use of foreign languages in campaign material. We are seeking to minimise barriers to participation while safeguarding the integrity and security of elections. The measures in the Bill are intended to restore faith in our politics and ensure that the UK continues to be a thriving and diverse democracy. The new clause is entirely incompatible with those intentions. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Paul Holmes
I wholly accept the Minister’s comments; I did not expect that she would be looking into this. I acknowledge the comments made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, too. She used the example of returning officers. They are filling things in and conducting a process; they are not using foreign languages to exploit a section of our society against a policy or a party in this country with which they happen to disagree. That is the clear and distinct difference, and that is the example that I used in moving the new clause. Her example is about the process; my example is about using foreign language to exploit a political message in an advantageous way. That is why I tabled the new clause, and I wish to press it to a vote.
The Chair
The hon. Gentleman has concluded his speech, but the hon. Lady is entitled to speak again if she wishes.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 61—Code of Conduct for Political Campaigning—
“(1) The Electoral Commission must prepare and publish a Code of Conduct for Political Campaigning (‘the Campaign Code’).
(2) The Campaign Code must set out principles and guidance relating to political campaigning and must in particular include provisions relating to—
(a) honesty in political debate and reasonable efforts to not mislead voters, and
(b) the avoidance of intimidation, harassment or abusive conduct.
(3) In this section ‘political campaigning’ means any conduct, communications or other activity which can reasonably be regarded as intended, directly or indirectly, to influence public support for, or opposition to—
(a) a registered political party,
(b) a candidate or prospective candidate at a general election, by-election, local election or mayoral election, or
(c) an outcome in a referendum.
(4) Before preparing or revising the Campaign Code, the Electoral Commission must carry out such consultation as it considers appropriate and must in particular consult—
(a) representatives of parties appointed to the Parliamentary Parties Panel in accordance with section 4 (parliamentary parties panel) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and
(b) such other persons as the Electoral Commission considers appropriate.
(5) The Electoral Commission may revise the Campaign Code from time to time, and subsections (1) to (4) apply to a revised Campaign Code as they apply to the original.
(6) Electoral advertising as defined in this Part is regulated under the Electoral Advertising Code of Practice and subject to enforcement by the Electoral Advertising Code Committee.
(7) This Part applies in relation to elections and referendums for which provision may be made by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament.”
This new clause would establish a Code of Conduct for Political Campaigning. It is connected to NC62 to NC64. The reference in this new clause to “this Part” is a reference to a new Part which would be formed of NC62 to NC64.
New clause 62—Electoral Advertising Code of Practice—
“(1) The Electoral Commission must prepare and publish an Electoral Advertising Code of Practice (‘the Advertising Code’).
(2) The Advertising Code must include principles and guidance relating to electoral advertising and must in particular include provisions relating to—
(a) ensuring the accuracy of factual claims,
(b) the need for relevant and reliable evidence to substantiate factual claims,
(c) the need to clearly identify the political party affiliated with an advert,
(d) transparency in the use of artificial intelligence, and
(e) issuing prompt public corrections to address mistakes.
(3) In this section ‘electoral advertising’ means any factual claims in marketing communications, whenever published or distributed, whose principal function is to influence voters in a local, regional, national or international election or referendum.
(4) Before preparing or revising the Advertising Code, the Electoral Commission must carry out such consultation as it considers appropriate and must in particular consult—
(a) the Electoral Advertising Code Committee,
(b) representatives of parties appointed to the Parliamentary Parties Panel in accordance with section 4 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and
(c) such other persons as the Electoral Commission considers appropriate.”
This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to produce an Electoral Advertising Code of Practice. It is connected to NC61, NC63 and NC64.
New clause 63—Electoral Advertising Code Committee—
“(1) The Electoral Commission must establish an Electoral Advertising Code Committee (‘the Committee’).
(2) The functions of the Committee are—
(a) to advise the Electoral Commission on the preparation and revision of the Advertising Code,
(b) to adjudicate on alleged breaches of the Advertising Code, and
(c) to oversee the operation of and monitor the effectiveness of the Advertising Code.
(3) In exercising functions under this Part, the Committee must have regard to the importance of freedom of political expression and open democratic debate, and will not determine matters of political opinion unless they fall within the scope of factual claims in electoral advertising.
(4) The Committee is to consist of—
(a) a Chair,
(b) a member nominated by the Electoral Commission,
(c) a member nominated by the Advertising Standards Authority or its successor body,
(d) a member nominated by the Office of Communications, and
(e) a member nominated by the United Kingdom Statistics Authority.
(5) Nothing in this Part limits the powers of the bodies identified in subsection (4) under any other enactment.
(6) The Chair is to be appointed by the Electoral Commission following a fair and open competition conducted in accordance with the Public Appointments Code, with a majority of independent members on the assessment panel and a senior independent panel member.
(7) The appointment of the Chair requires the consent of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, which must not be unreasonably withheld or delayed.
(8) In making the appointment, the Electoral Commission must have regard to the need to secure the independence of the Committee.
(9) A person appointed as Chair holds office—
(a) for a single non-renewable term of five years from the date of appointment, and
(b) in accordance with terms and conditions (including as to remuneration and pension) specified by the Electoral Commission.
(10) The Chair may resign from office by giving written notice to the Electoral Commission.
(11) The Electoral Commission must pay to the Committee the sums determined by the Chair as appropriate for, or in connection with, the carrying out of the Committee’s functions.
(12) The Secretary of State must, within the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, carry out a consultation on a levy on registered political parties’ election advertising spend for the purpose of funding the Electoral Advertising Code Committee.
(13) In carrying out the consultation, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Electoral Commission,
(b) representatives of registered political parties, and
(c) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to establish an Electoral Advertising Code Committee. It is connected to NC61, NC62 and NC64.
New clause 64—Status of the Campaign Code and enforcement of the Advertising Code—
“(1) Persons engaged in political campaigning must have regard to the Campaign Code.
(2) A registered political party must prepare, publish and keep under review a code of conduct relating to its political campaigning.
(3) A code under subsection (2) must be consistent with the Campaign Code and must in particular include provisions relating to—
(a) honesty in political debate and reasonable efforts to not mislead voters, and
(b) the avoidance of intimidation, harassment or abusive conduct.
(4) The following persons, when engaged in electoral advertising, must comply with the Advertising Code—
(a) registered political parties,
(b) members of the House of Commons,
(c) members of any local authority in any part of the United Kingdom,
(d) members of the Greater London Assembly,
(e) candidates or prospective candidates at a United Kingdom general election, by-election, local authority election, Greater London Authority election or mayoral election,
(f) recognised third parties within the meaning of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and
(g) election agents within the meaning of the Representation of the People Act 1983.
(5) The Committee may, by written notice, require a person to provide information or documents reasonably required for the purposes of investigating a suspected breach of the Advertising Code.
(6) A person must comply with a requirement under subsection (5) unless the person has a reasonable excuse.
(7) If, on an application by the Committee, a court is satisfied that a person has failed to comply with a requirement under subsection (5), the court may make an order requiring the person to provide the Committee with—
(a) information referred to in the notice, and
(b) other information which the court is satisfied the Committee requires.
(8) Where the Committee considers that electoral advertising is inconsistent with the Advertising Code, it may take the following steps which it considers reasonable to secure compliance—
(a) issuing a notice requiring the person responsible to amend, withdraw or substantiate the advertising within a specified period,
(b) publishing a formal finding of non-compliance on its website [and in the repository of political adverts],
(c) requiring the publication of a correction, clarification or updated version of the advertising with similar prominence where practicable,
(d) notifying relevant online services or publishers and requesting prompt suspension or removal of advertising during the regulated period, and
(e) referring repeated or serious breaches to the Electoral Commission to impose civil sanctions in accordance with its powers under Schedule 19C to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.
(9) In deciding whether to impose a civil sanction under subsection (8)(e), the Electoral Commission must have regard to—
(a) the findings and recommendations of the Committee, and
(b) any enforcement action taken in relation to the same conduct under any other enactment.
(10) Where the Electoral Commission imposes a civil sanction following a referral from the Committee, it must publish a notice setting out—
(a) the nature of the breach,
(b) the sanction imposed, and
(c) the reasons for the sanction.
(11) A person on whom a civil sanction is imposed under subsection (8)(e) may appeal in accordance with the appeal provisions under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.
(12) Failure to comply with the Campaign Code or the Advertising Code does not of itself give rise to criminal liability.”
This new clause is connected to NC61 to NC63.
Dr Chowns
The new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer), proposes creating a new offence of misleading the public by candidates in a parliamentary election campaign. We are witnessing a proliferation of disinformation with a concurrent rise in distrust among the public. A recent survey by Ipsos MORI found that just 11% of the UK public trust politicians to tell the truth. That is clearly problematic and, unlike in advertising, finance or medicine, there is no legally enforceable standard of requiring truthfulness from those who hold or seek public office.
Ministers are not allowed to lie, but, under the current situation, candidates can. This lack of accountability does, unfortunately, create an incentive to deceive. As the old saying goes, a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes. This legal vacuum has, unfortunately, enabled far-right figures to weaponise disinformation. It has enabled foreign powers to covertly manipulate elections and policy, and manipulation of voters through false factual claims has changed the landscape of the nation. There are already examples of that, including Brexit and campaign tactics in previous elections.
New clause 59 aims to protect voters from political deception by holding parliamentary candidates accountable for acts intentionally designed to mislead the public or manipulate voting in their favour. A similar measure is already provided for in the Government’s Public Office (Accountability) Bill. That creates a new offence of misleading the public, which will cover public officials. The parallel measure in new clause 59 will ensure that candidates are included in a similar provision and cannot use deliberate deception to win public office.
As it happens, the Welsh Government have recently introduced equivalent legislation to create an offence of deliberate deception by candidates. Westminster would not be acting alone, and the new clause would provide consistency across Britain.
This would not be a law to punish genuine mistakes, misspeaking and so forth, or to restrict legitimate political rhetoric. It would not cover manifestos, as a manifesto is a statement of intent. It would not create a new area of law, but merely extend it to plug the gaping loophole of political deception by applying existing legal principles.
The new clause includes safeguards to ensure fairness, such as a high legal threshold for wrongdoing and a defence for those acting with reasonable excuse. Its phrasing ensures that the threshold for wrongdoing is high. It applies only to conduct that is “seriously improper,” so it targets deliberate misinformation campaigns, major false claims that could influence voters and manipulative or dishonest campaign tactics that are falsely used to steer voters towards a particular decision.
There is overwhelming public support for this measure. A petition on this issue has more than 200,000 signatures, and polling by Opinium shows that 72% of voters support it. Further research by Survation found that a majority of voters in every single party is in favour of it. This measure would go some way to help repair trust in our politics, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
I will briefly speak to new clauses 61 to 64, tabled by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough (Justin Madders). New clause 61 would introduce a code of conduct for political campaigning and put that on a statutory footing. There is already widespread agreement that we need a code of conduct for political campaigning—that was a recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference last year. The Government have committed to establishing a code of conduct for campaigns following that recommendation, and the Electoral Commission has absolutely welcomed this.
I draw colleagues’ attention to one of the evidence sessions at the Speaker’s Conference last year, in which Labour’s executive director of governance and legal highlighted the question of whether the code of conduct should be statutory. He said:
“A code might be helpful in setting a public benchmark of acceptable behaviour…ultimately, you would probably want it to be enforceable in some way, and then the question would be, is it appropriate to put that on a statutory footing? Is there a possibility of agreeing something?”
I ask the Minister to consider that we have an excellent opportunity to put it on a statutory footing in this Bill to ensure that that code of conduct, which is so widely recognised as being absolutely necessary as per the recommendations of the Speaker’s Conference, has the force of primary legislation behind it.
New clause 62 is about an electoral advertising code of practice. We have already discussed issues relating to electoral advertising, and I have shared with the Committee my huge concerns about the regulation of online political advertising in particular and the urgent need for a real-time political adverts library. This new clause is more general. It is frankly unclear why ads for commercial products are held to greater account than ads that move votes and affect election outcomes. Fundamentally, that seems weird, unequal and deeply problematic.
The organisation Reform Political Advertising has been campaigning very effectively, long and hard, in this area. In the 2024 London mayoral election, for example, it trailed a factual accuracy code, which seven London mayoral candidates, including Sadiq Khan and the Green and Liberal Democrat candidates, signed up to, and others supported.
International precedent also exists. Regulation of factual claims in electoral advertising has been in place in New Zealand for several decades, with cross-party support.
David Simmonds
For the benefit of the Committee, will the hon. Lady briefly set out who—it could be a body or an individual—would be the appropriate judge of factual accuracy? I am sure all political parties have been on the receiving end of the famous Lib Dem bar chart, which says, in tiny letters underneath, “Survey of 10 people we asked in the pub last night.” It could be argued that it was factually accurate, based on that very dubious source. How will we ensure that, where there is some dispute about the facts, there is a sufficient degree of independence in arbitrating that question?
Dr Chowns
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the very next new clause on the selection list, which engages with precisely that question.
In addition to New Zealand, there are similar rules about the regulation of political advertising in Australia. On the question of who will adjudicate, there is currently no independent body with the power to adjudicate on the truthfulness or accuracy of non-broadcast political advertising. That is an issue. Provision has been made in the new clauses for a separation: the code of practice would be established by the Electoral Commission and the oversight of the decision making—the adjudication—would be done by a different body.
The 2020 report by the Lords Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee, “Digital Technology and the Resurrection of Trust”, called for a regulatory committee on political advertising that would involve relevant experts from the Advertising Standards Authority, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the UK Statistics Authority, who would co-operate through a regulatory committee on political advertising. Political parties would then work with those regulators to develop a code of practice, along with appropriate sanctions, that restricts fundamentally inaccurate advertising during a parliamentary or mayoral election or referendum. The Lords Committee recommends that that regulatory committee should adjudicate breaches of the code, and that is effectively what new clause 63 would put in place.
“What then would happen about sanctions?” I hear hon. Members ask. Well, that takes us on to new clause 64, which again creates a separation. It would establish an enforcement framework and enable the Electoral Commission to impose civil sanctions for breaches of the advertising code, basically according to a ladder of increasing seriousness.
I warmly recommend the new clauses to the Government and the Committee. Despite the rapidity of my speech, given the shortness of time, the way that advertising can distort our politics is a crucial issue. I very much hope that the Government will warmly consider the issues, alongside all the other ones that they will hopefully come back to us on at a later stage.
Samantha Dixon
New clause 59 would create a new offence of misleading the public in a parliamentary election campaign, which could be committed by candidates in election campaigns. Unfortunately, that approach risks turning the courts into political fact checkers. It risks undermining public confidence in the judiciary and would create significant freedom of expression concerns. In line with the recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference, we will work with the Conference, the Electoral Commission and political parties to develop a campaigning code of conduct that is fit for purpose and reflects the need of candidates across the political spectrum.
I also draw the hon. Member’s attention to section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, which makes it an illegal practice to make or publish a false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate the effect of which impacts the election result.
I will speak to new clauses 61, 62, 63 and 64 together. These new clauses would amount to a significant expansion of the regulatory framework governing political campaigning and electoral advertising. They would introduce a statutory code of conduct for political campaigning, a statutory electoral advertising code and a new electoral advertising code committee to oversee, adjudicate and enforce compliance with the advertising code, funded through a levy on political parties.
We welcomed the recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference to develop a code of conduct for campaigning. We are working with the Speaker, the Electoral Commission and political parties on an approach that is fit for purpose, and that works across the broad range of candidates and campaigners.
That work is already under way. Ahead of the May 2026 elections, the Electoral Commission has published a first set of advisory principles for campaigning respectfully and safely. The published principles already address key issues that these new clauses try to address. The Electoral Commission has also made it clear that these principles are the start of that work, rather than the end of it, and, after the May elections it will assess how the principles operated in practice, and use that assessment to inform development of a fuller code of conduct.
A non-statutory approach offers the best opportunity for the code to be developed collaboratively, with strong cross-party engagement and sufficient flexibility to ensure that it remains meaningful, and can be refined in the light of experience and developments in campaigning practice over time. It would be better to allow that work to continue and to be evaluated in practice, rather than to prescribe the content and process for an evolving set of codes in the Bill.
New clauses 62, 63 and 64 would place regulators in the position of adjudicating factual claims made in the course of political campaigning, an area that is inherently contested and closely connected to political opinion. Although safeguards are included, there remains a real risk of regulatory creep, drawing independent regulators into disputes around policy or political arguments, which can be rebutted by rival campaigners and scrutinised by the press as part of the normal course of political debate.
Any reforms in this space must be considered carefully and developed in consultation, in order to ensure that changes to the regulation of political advertising are proportionate, protect freedom of expression and maintain public confidence in the independence and impartiality of regulatory bodies.
Therefore, I respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw new clause 59.
David Simmonds
On a point of order, Sir Desmond, may I seek your guidance? I know that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire said earlier that, for reasons of time, she did not wish to go into sufficient detail. Can you just confirm to the Committee that we have two further full days of consideration, which are already in everybody’s diaries? I know that the Government Whip declined my suggestion of an adjournment earlier; however, Members should not feel constrained in fully setting out the concerns that they have or the issues that they wish to raise about the Bill, given that—as I understand it and as I have just said—we still have a further two days of consideration available to us.
Dr Chowns
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission’s instituting criminal proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland—a capacity that the Electoral Commission previously had, which was removed by the Elections Act 2022. We currently have a bizarre situation where any individual or organisation other than the Electoral Commission can make a private prosecution against breaches of political finance law but the Electoral Commission cannot. That gives rise to a criminal enforcement gap, which is not helped by a lack of investigatory and prosecutorial lead capacity, especially for UK-wide offences. Other similar regulators in the UK can bring criminal proceedings in areas under their auspices, so there is a real question: why not the Electoral Commission?
I note that Philip Rycroft dealt with that question in his report and recommended an alternative approach. I have tabled the new clause as a probing amendment to ask the Government to provide more clarification. If we are not going to give these powers to the Electoral Commission, who should take the lead? The status quo is clearly not working. There is an alarming lack of prosecution in this space, going back quite a number of years. The net effect is essentially that people can escape from prosecution. If it is not going to be the Electoral Commission, we need much more investment in the capacities and powers of the police. I understand that we have a situation where the police might not feel that investigations are necessarily in their interest, because the fines that can be charged are not proportionate to the huge amount of police time that might be required to investigate the issues.
I would like to hear from the Government how they will address the clear gap in the capacity of the system overall to initiate criminal proceedings on breaches of electoral law. An obvious solution would be to put it through the Electoral Commission. I recognise that Philip Rycroft has a somewhat different view. Will the Government please explain their view?
Samantha Dixon
New clause 66 would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission bringing criminal proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland that was introduced in the Elections Act 2022. To be clear, the Electoral Commission has never brought criminal prosecutions, even prior to the changes introduced by the Act. It has a wide range of investigatory powers and is able to impose a variety of civil sanctions for certain offences. The Bill already extends and strengthens those powers to promote more robust and proportionate enforcement.
Where criminal investigation and prosecution is required or thought appropriate for certain offences, the Commission refers those cases to the police and the relevant prosecuting authority, who are experts in this domain. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that electoral law is enforced effectively, and that there is there is public confidence in the system of regulation governing political finance. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review.
As the hon. Member for North Herefordshire pointed out, the review looked specifically at criminal enforcement arrangements and concluded it entirely appropriate that criminal investigations are handled by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland. The review noted that it would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive for the Electoral Commission to have a prosecutorial role; it would require significant investment in specialist expertise that might be deployed only sporadically.
Furthermore, although the Electoral Commission must enforce electoral law without fear or favour, it must also engage constructively with campaigners to help them to comply with the rules. Rycroft noted that it would be difficult for the Electoral Commission to maintain that constructive regulatory role with political parties if it were also pursuing criminal prosecutions.
Given the review’s findings on this issue, we do not think that any changes are needed to the Electoral Commission’s role. We will respond fully to the Rycroft review in due course and consider whether any other legislative changes are necessary in line with its findings. I request that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire withdraw the new clause.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 76 to 81 stand part.
Government amendment 21.