Representation of the People Bill (Seventh sitting)

Ellie Chowns Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Holmes]

That is the only time the Liberal Democrats have ever cheered me on, so I am glad we are in agreement.

The Minister gave a comprehensive outline of the proposals in clause 60. I will briefly talk to amendment 34, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) but moved by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove. The Conservatives think the amendment is well intentioned, but one of my big concerns—I think the Minister outlined this, but perhaps she will return to it in winding up—is the burden that would be placed on businesses, which already have quite extensive regulatory burdens placed on them by Government. I think all parties in this Committee have intimated that everybody wants more transparency and wants to talk more about donations to ensure that we really tighten up the regulatory regime on political party donations. However, although I am not averse to being radical, I think amendment 34 is probably a bit over-burdensome and we do not support it, but we are content to support clause 60.

[Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Sir Desmond. In clause 60, we are considering company donations in UK politics, and I ask the Minister to consider outright banning them, as happens, for example, in France and Canada. There is no real reason for companies to be permitted to make donations, particularly when we are concerned, as in this Bill, with ensuring that company donations are not a mechanism for channelling funds from outside the country into British politics. Why not make the situation clear and allow only individuals, whose connection to the country can be clearly tested, to donate? Company donations have been nearly half the size of individual donations in UK politics in recent years. These are really significant sums.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

The hon. Member is speaking about company donations. I am not saying I agree with this, but does she feel that the same logic should apply to trade union donations? If she feels that companies cannot donate, does she still feel that trade unions can?

[Dr Chowns]

I consider companies and trade unions to be completely different entities. One is a profit-making organisation, and the other is a membership association designed to represent the interests of its members. The two are not parallel, and I am completely fine with trade unions making donations.

Company donations have a huge influence on our politics. There is also a tax advantage for companies; there is effectively a taxpayer subsidy to them, and the advantage can be up to about 40% for companies making donations from company funds, compared with individual funds. I would therefore like to hear why the Minister thinks it is important to retain the ability for companies to make donations and does not want to follow the example of France and Canada in stopping such donations. Individuals can still make donations.

On a couple of specific points, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove referenced the fact that there is a clear problem in the Bill as currently drafted. A loophole permits companies to give donations up to the limit multiple times, both to a party and potentially to every single one of its candidates. Surely the limit should be set so that it reflects the total value of donations to all recipients. That has been argued for by the Electoral Commission and in Philip Rycroft’s recommendation 4, and it is also covered by amendments 36 and 37 in the name of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington.

It is also clear that the test should be post-tax profit, not revenue. It is far too easy for companies to inflate their revenues by engaging in what is sometimes called transfer pricing in other sectors, effectively enabling them to completely bypass the intended restrictions. Surely it is in the spirit of the Bill, and should therefore be put into the letter of it, that the test should be post-tax profit, not revenue. If we are going to permit company donations, we should be really clear that they are derived from profit made in-country, because using the revenue test provides a huge loophole. Again, that is called for in Philip Rycroft’s recommendation 2, and by the Electoral Commission and many others, so I very much hope the Minister will respond positively.

Amendments 34 and 35, in the name of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, would make the donor criminally liable. The Minister responded by saying that the onus should all be on the recipient of those donations, but that is not how the law operates in other areas when it is broken: the commissioners of the offence, as well as the recipient of the funding, are guilty. So I ask the Minister to think again. If we are talking about large companies making huge donations, they arguably have greater capacity, and certainly just as much responsibility, as the recipient to check that they are operating within the law. I refer the Minister to my comments on a previous clause about establishing a donor register, which would enable us to deal with these issues and involve the Electoral Commission in ensuring that these checks are in place.

I will briefly touch on new clause 13, in the name of the hon. Member for North East Hertfordshire (Chris Hinchliff), new clause 32, in the name of the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), and new clause 52, in the name of the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon). They all recognise the widespread concern in UK politics, and among all of us to some extent, about how company donations risk twisting, and in some cases have twisted, our politics. Each of those Members has tabled a new clause seeking to ban donations from particular categories of company donor. The first seeks to exclude property development and construction undertakings, the second seeks to exclude those who have had public contracts at any time in the last 10 years, and the third seeks to exclude any companies involved in oil and gas extraction.

I have huge sympathy for the arguments and for the broad thrust of those new clauses. I am not necessarily convinced that, in their current form, they are ready to be incorporated in the Bill, but they highlight a key concern. For example, there has been widespread concern about cases where large donations by a property developer were associated with planning decisions under a previous Government that went in favour of that property developer. There have also been serious concerns about the revolving door between the Government and the legislature, and profit-making companies. I would really like to hear the Minister’s response to those three new clauses tabled by Labour Members, which highlight concerns about the influence of particular groups of companies on our politics.

However, the issues I really hope the Minister will respond to are, first, stopping all company donations, because people who want to make donations can still make them as individuals; secondly, adopting the post-tax profits test, rather than the revenue test; and, finally, ensuring that the donations limit applies to the total value of donations, not just single donations.

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

I will keep my remarks brief. As we start the afternoon sitting, it is worth putting on the record that clause 60 goes a significant distance towards finally tightening up the rules around corporate donations, which many campaigners, including in civil society, would argue have been left unaddressed for far too long. What clause 60 seeks to do is effective.

That said, and I will not repeat in too much detail the points made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, it is worth reflecting on the recommendations in Philip Rycroft’s review around revenue versus profits, and how we can tighten things up. So I am keen to understand how, as the Bill progresses, we can potentially take his recommendations into account.

It is worth remembering some of the big case studies that have been a cause for concern. We therefore know that, in some cases, corporate donations can carry a significant risk of nefarious interference in the democratic process. There was much media coverage and speculation about the idea that Elon Musk, the California-based billionaire, could legitimately make a donation to a UK political party via a UK subsidiary of Tesla.

When we look at some of the research conducted by CenTax or Transparency International, we see that around £1 in every £10 that comes via a company as a donation could be because the individual in question could not donate directly themselves. According to that same research, around a quarter of money donated by companies is completely untraceable. So these measures are really welcome.

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[Samantha Dixon]

In the interests of time, I will continue.

On the other remarks made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, I hear her point about profit and revenue, and it is highlighted in the Rycroft review. As I said many times this morning, we will carefully consider the Rycroft review and respond to it appropriately.

The hon. Members for North Herefordshire and for Hazel Grove both highlighted the Government’s view that the responsibility rests with the donor. The Government strongly believe that. The onus is on the person or organisation receiving the donation to consider its origins very carefully. They can and should decline donations if they cannot satisfy themselves that those have come through the proper and legitimate channels.

Let me turn to the issue of why we should not ban donations from companies altogether. Political parties and other campaigners will remain able to raise sufficient funds because they need to communicate their views to the electorate about protecting our democracy better against those who seek to covertly undermine it. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire referenced the Canadian model. I have had the pleasure of meeting the Leader of the House from Canada. While it is tempting to suggest that there should be a ban on corporate donations, I remind the hon. Lady that 60% of their political campaigning is funded by the taxpayer—and it is a brave politician who would enter that particular plea to the British electorate at this time.

[Dr Chowns]

I thank the Minister for her engagement with my point. In UK politics, about 22% of donations into politics over the past few years have been from companies. We are not talking about requiring the Government to step in and put 60% of the funding into politics; we are talking about the risks associated with a specific form of donation.

Under the measures the Government is putting forward in clause 60, we are putting in place requirements to ensure that persons of significant control are clearly allowable donors. However, it is possible for a company to restructure so that it just goes underneath that and does not meet the 25% threshold. So that could still be a channel for illicit or foreign funding to come into British politics. Would it not be simpler to require any persons who have significant control in a company and who wish to make political donations to make them as individuals?

[The Chair]

This is a very long intervention.

[Dr Chowns]

I do apologise, Sir Desmond. I think I have made my point.

[Samantha Dixon]

The hon. Member has made her point. The Government believe that there is a place for company donations from UK companies. We just feel that we should be much stricter about the arrangements by which they do these things. We have set that out in the legislation, which is what we are discussing this afternoon.

Turning briefly to the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset, I remind all Members that these measures are not designed to prevent a specific individual or company from donating. Those who follow and meet the three tests and successfully meet the “know your donor” and section 54A requirements should be able to enrich our democracy by donating as they do. I therefore commend clause 60 to the Committee—

[Dr Chowns]

I apologise, but I have not heard the Minister respond to the point that I and the hon. Member for Hazel Grove made about donations being counted cumulatively, which is also one of the Rycroft recommendations.

[Samantha Dixon]

We will consider those points. The Rycroft recommendations are being considered very carefully. We will respond to them in due course and we will come back to Parliament with our recommendations as they come forward. I hope that gives the hon. Lady the assurance she is seeking.

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[Paul Holmes]

I welcome the Minister’s comments on the clause. It is important that when we have been discussing the nature of this legislation, particularly regarding donations, we have outlined a clear stance that if people want to participate in our political process and make donations, they should have a physical stake in it. Any removal of the ambiguity around campaigners having to look to see whether it is permissible is welcome. It is a reasonable expectation from the Government that there has to be some level of participatory engagement in the political process. We have no problem with the clause; indeed we support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62

Unincorporated associations making political contributions

[Dr Chowns]

I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 62, page 83, line 17, leave out “£11,180” and insert “£500”.

This amendment, together with Amendments 89 to 94, would bring the reporting threshold for donations from Unincorporated Associations in line with the permissibility threshold for donations to political parties.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 89, in clause 62, page 83, line 26, leave out “£2,230” and insert “£500”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.

Government amendment 79.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 90, in schedule 9, page 165, line 23, leave out “£11,180” and insert “£500”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.

Amendment 91, in schedule 9, page 165, line 25, at end insert—

“1A For sub-paragraph (1) substitute—

(1) Where in any calendar year an unincorporated association falling within section 54(2)(h) makes a political contribution of more than £500, not having previously made any political contributions in that year, the association must notify the Commission accordingly within the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which the contribution was made.”

See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.

Amendment 92, in schedule 9, page 165, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.

Government amendments 80 to 84.

Amendment 93, in schedule 9, page 170, line 26, leave out “£2,230” and insert “£500”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.

Amendment 94, in schedule 9, page 170, line 26, at end insert—

“(aa) omit sub-paragraph (5)”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.

Government amendments 85 to 87.

Schedule 9.

[Dr Chowns]

The clause contains the welcome measure of preventing donations from impermissible donors being made through the mechanism of unincorporated associations and reducing the level at which they have to register with the Electoral Commission and report gifts. That is very positive. The current situation really cannot continue, so I am pleased that, through these measures, the Government will try to manage and block malicious interference and ensure democratic safety.

Although unincorporated associations are used legitimately by some, they can be an opaque vehicle for funds of unknown origin, so there is potential for them to be used to introduce foreign interference in our political system. Interesting Transparency International research published last year found that, of the £40.4 million in donations made by unincorporated associations since 2010, a huge £38.6 million was unaccounted for. More than 95% of donations from unincorporated associations came from those that have not reported the source of their income, so it is clearly time for change Despite those concerning statistics, the previous Government increased reporting thresholds for unincorporated associations in the Elections Act 2022, so I am very glad that this Government are reversing that decision through the Bill.

Under normal regulations, donations to political parties must come from a permissible source if they are over £500, but if the donations are made by an unincorporated association, even with the lower threshold, the reporting requirements are not triggered until donations reach over £11,180 in a calendar year. Even with the new rules, it is possible for an unincorporated association that does not meet the threshold and is therefore not required to register to make donations without any checks. That is clearly an undesirable and unnecessary loophole, so I support the amendments that have been tabled by the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Lauren Edwards), which aim to close this loophole, and I urge the Minister to consider reducing the permissibility threshold for unincorporated associations to £500, equal to the permissibility threshold for other sources of donation.

[Samantha Dixon]

I will speak now to clause 62 and Government amendments 79 to 87, which were tabled in my name. I will come to the other amendments later.

The clause introduces measures that have long been called for by the Electoral Commission, the National Crime Agency and the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which is now known as the Ethics and Integrity Commission, to tighten the rules around unincorporated associations. Under the current framework, unincorporated associations are permitted to make political contributions provided their main office and activities are based in the UK, but there are no restrictions on the sources of the funds behind those contributions. Existing rules therefore do not provide sufficient transparency or assurance about who is ultimately funding the political contributions made through such bodies.

The clause introduces a strengthened framework to ensure that political contributions from unincorporated associations come from permissible sources and are subject to stricter and more consistent transparency requirements. The clause lowers the thresholds at which UAs must register with the Electoral Commission and report the gifts they receive, ensuring that significant contributors provide the same level of transparency as other regulated campaigners. It also extends transparency rules so that contributions to candidates count towards the registration threshold, and it requires UAs to appoint a responsible person, improving clarity about who stands behind such associations.

Finally, clause 62 introduces new controls to ensure that funds used for political contributions come from permissible sources. UAs will be required to verify political gifts they rely on, and they will be prohibited from using unverifiable or impermissible funds for political activity. I commend clause 62 to the Committee.

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[Paul Holmes]

I have already said that I think the Government are being sensible in creating a unified or level playing field between companies and unincorporated associations. I was not an expert on the previous Act when it was passed, but in my view it is sensible for the Government to be taking this action, now that its consequences are clear, because the Act obviously did not work. If Members across the House look at some of my previous remarks on some of the proposals brought forward by the last Government, I am not ashamed to say that sometimes—I only say sometimes—we got it wrong. That is the nature of democracy.

The changes that the Government are making are sensible and my contention is that some of the amendments—especially amendments 88 and 90—use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. They create an overburden compared with the Government’s good intentions and what they want to get out of the proposals.

We would not support amendment 88 and we certainly would not support amendment 90, but we do welcome the strides that the Government, and the Minister, are trying to take in tightening up the regime.

[Dr Chowns]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 79, in clause 62, page 83, line 28, at end insert—

“(h) create offences of—

(i) giving an unincorporated association false information about a gift that may be used to make a political contribution, and

(ii) withholding information about such a gift with intent to deceive.”—(Samantha Dixon.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 85.

Clause 62, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS MAKING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Amendments made: 80, in schedule 9, page 168, line 2, at end insert

“, unless it already has one (see sub-paragraph (6A))”.

This amendment, and amendment 81, amends the new provisions on responsible persons for unincorporated associations to make it clear that an association is not required to appoint a responsible person when it already has one in place, but that the Commission must be notified that the responsible person is willing to continue to act.

Amendment 81, in schedule 9, page 168, line 30, at end insert—

“(6A) Where an unincorporated association would be required by sub-paragraph (2) to appoint an individual to be the responsible person in relation to the association but an appointment of such a person is already in force, the notice under sub-paragraph (3) must inform the Commission that the responsible person is willing to remain as the responsible person in relation to the association (and sub-paragraph (4)(a) is to be read accordingly).”

See the explanatory statement for amendment 80.

Amendment 82, in schedule 9, page 170, line 7, after “within” insert

“any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of”.

This amendment prevents unincorporated associations from being permissible donors in relation to other unincorporated associations: it is intended as an anti-avoidance measure to prevent gifts being channelled through chains of unincorporated associations.

Amendment 83, in schedule 9, page 170, line 20, leave out from “within” to end of line 22 and insert

“any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of section 54(2),”.

This amendment makes similar anti-avoidance provision to that in amendment 82.

Amendment 84, in schedule 9, page 170, line 24, at end insert—

“(4) Section 162 (meaning of exempt trust donation) applies for the purposes of this paragraph as if, in subsection (2)(a), for ‘27th July 1999’ there were substituted ‘7th April 2026’.”

This amendment modifies the meaning of “exempt trust donation” for unincorporated associations by providing that a trust set up before 7th April 2026 (i.e. the date of tabling this amendment) is a permissible donor to an unincorporated association.

Amendment 85, in schedule 9, page 173, line 11, at end insert—

“(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(3A) A person commits an offence if—

(a) they knowingly give an unincorporated association any information relating to—

(i) the amount of any gift to the association, or

(ii) the person or body making such a gift,

which is false in a material particular, or

(b) with intent to deceive, they withhold from an unincorporated association any material information relating to a matter within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii),

in circumstances where they believe that the unincorporated association may use the gift for the purposes of making a political contribution.’”

This amendment creates a new criminal offence where a person knowingly provides an unincorporated association with false information, or withholds information with intent to deceive, about a gift that they believe the association may use for the purposes of making a political contribution.

Amendment 86, in schedule 9, page 173, line 15, at end insert—

“(b) in sub-paragraph (2)(b)(iii), at the end insert ‘or 3A’.”

This amendment inserts a missed consequential amendment so that paragraph 7(2)(b)(iii) of Schedule 19A to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 refers to the new paragraph 3A inserted into that Schedule by paragraph 9 of Schedule 9.

Amendment 87, in schedule 9, page 174, line 9, at end insert—

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 64 stand part.

New clause 10—Guidance on the law relating to digital communication offences in relation to elections—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament guidance on certain digital communication offences, including digital manipulation and artificially generated content in relation to candidates and elected officials.

(2) Any guidance issued under section (1) must include guidance on the following—

(a) the operation of section 106 (false statements as to candidates) of the RPA 1983 in relation to digital communications;

(b) the operation of section 114A (undue influence) of the RPA 1983 in relation to digital communications;

(c) the interaction between the operations of sections 106 and 114A of the RPA 1983 and the duty of providers under the Online Safety Act 2023, including in relation to priority offences during election periods.

(3) Within 12 months of the publication of guidance under subsection (1) and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament either—

(a) a statement that no updates to the guidance are required, or

(b) an updated version of the guidance.

(4) Before issuing—

(a) any guidance under subsection (1) or subsection (3) (b), or

(b) a statement under subsection (3)(a),

the Secretary of State must consult OFCOM and such other persons as they think necessary.

(5) For the purposes of this section “priority offences” means an offence listed in Schedule 7 (priority offences) of the Online Safety Act 2023.”

This new clause would require the Government to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences relating to digital communications as they relate to candidates and elected officials.

New clause 18—Information to be included with electronic material: generative artificial intelligence—

“(1) Section 41 of the Elections Act 2022 (requirement to include information with electronic material) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3)(b) insert—

“(c) where the electronic material consists of or includes image, audio or video content that has been generated or materially altered by means of generative artificial intelligence, a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used.”

(2A) In this section, "generative artificial intelligence" means a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined prompts or objectives, generate new image, audio or video content.”

This new clause amends the digital imprint rules in the Elections Act 2022 to require that any political campaigning material which contains images, audio, or video generated or materially altered by AI must include a statement that such artificial intelligence has been used.

New clause 24—Repository of digital political advertising—

“(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) After section 61 insert—

“Part 6A Repository of digital political advertising

61A. Establishing a repository of digital political advertising

(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to require the Electoral Commission to establish a repository of paid-for digital political advertising.

(2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must—

(a) provide for the repository of political advertising to be publicly accessible;

(b) specify that a provider of a Category 1 service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023 must ensure that prescribed information relating to such advertising is submitted to the repository as soon as reasonably practicable, and, in any event, within 72 hours;

(c) set out the types of information to be prescribed; and

(d) provide for material in the repository to be transferred to the National Archives for preservation after a certain period.

(3) Before making any regulations that make provision for the matters under subsection 2(c), the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Electoral Commission;

(b) the Information Commissioner’s Office; and

(c) OFCOM.

(4) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.””

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to require the Electoral Commission to establish a publicly available repository of political advertising.

New clause 25—Electoral Commission: powers to obtain information outside of a formal investigation—

“(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as follows.

(2) After Schedule 12, insert—

“SCHEDULE 13: Electoral Commission powers to obtain information outside of a formal investigation

1 The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to allow the Electoral Commission to issue a notice requiring certain information from a regulated user-to-user service or search service, at any time during any regulated election period.

2 Any regulations made under paragraph 1 must specify that a person to whom a notice is given under this paragraph must comply with it within such reasonable time as is specified in the notice.

3 Any regulations made under paragraph 2 must specify the information which may be requested by the Electoral Commission, and include the following where they relate to elections—

(a) information relating to paid-for political advertising;

(b) algorithmic systems;

(c) coordinated inauthentic behaviour; and

(d) automated or bot accounts (whether domestic or foreign).

4 Any regulations made under paragraph 2 must also provide for any safeguards considered necessary by the Secretary of State as regards data protection or commercial confidentiality.

5 Any regulations made under paragraph 2 must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.

6 For the purposes of this Schedule, “user-to-user service” has the meaning given by section 3 (“user-to-user service” and “search service”) of the Online Safety Act 2023.””

New clause 27—Government review of the “regulated periods” in relation to elections—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, commission a review of the adequacy of the current regulated periods for elections and referendums.

(2) The review must consider the following—

(a) the impact of campaign activity outside the relevant regulated period on elections;

(b) whether the length of the regulated periods are sufficient to tackle the prevalence of—

(i) manipulated content,

(ii) misinformation,

(iii) disinformation,

and their potential influence on elections.

(3) The review may make any recommendations it feels necessary for legislative or regulatory reform as a result of its findings.

(4) For the purposes of this section, “campaign activity” includes—

(a) digital campaigning;

(b) targeted advertising; and

(c) automated content distribution.

(5) For the purposes of this section “regulated period” means any period regulated under the Representation of the People Act 1983.

(6) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament, together with their response to any recommendations for legislative or regulatory reform.”

This new clause requires the government to establish a review of the “regulated periods” in relation to elections which would consider whether the length of the regulated periods are sufficient in relation to the prevalence of manipulated content, misinformation and disinformation.

New clause 28—Information to be included with electronic material: data provenance—

“After Section 41 (requirement to include information with electronic material) of the Elections Act 2022 insert—

“Requirement to include information with electronic material created through generative artificial intelligence

(1) This section applies to electronic material which—

(a) meets the conditions in section 42 (paid for electronic material), or

(b) meets the conditions in section 44 (other electronic material),

and has been generated wholly through generative artificial intelligence.

(2) Electronic material to which this section applies must not be published unless it includes the following information—

(a) a statement that content was wholly generated by a generative artificial intelligence system;

(b) the name of the system used to generate the content.

(3) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, specify—

(a) additional requirements for information to be required under subsection (2);

(b) the form in which the information required under subsection (2) is to be provided.

(4) The form prescribed by regulations under subsection (3)(b) must be a form which can be detected and processed by regulated user-to-user services for the purpose of providing the required information to users of such services.

(5) Any regulations made under subsection (4) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.

(6) For the purposes of this section, “generative artificial intelligence” means computer system or software that—

(a) is capable of producing text, images, audio, video, or other content autonomously, wholly or substantially, based on prompts or instructions provided by a user;

(b) uses machine learning or other algorithmic techniques to generate content that mimics human-created material; and

(c) may produce content that is not pre-existing but is synthesized based on patterns learned from existing data.””

This new clause requires campaign material which has been generated by generative artificial intelligence to include a statement to that effect along with the name of the system used. It creates a power for the Government to make regulations about the information to be included.

Amendment 4, in clause 80, page 100, line 35, at end insert—

“(ha) Section (Guidance on the law relating to digital communication offences in relation to elections)”.

This amendment is consequential on NC10.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

Does anyone on the Committee intend to speak to new clauses 10 or 24?

[Dr Chowns]

indicated assent.

[Paul Holmes]

In that case, I reserve my right to speak until after the hon. Member for North Herefordshire.

[Dr Chowns]

I will speak to new clauses 10, 24, 25, 27 and 28—I will rattle through them. First, new clause 10—tabled by the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), whom I thank for her work on this—relates to guidance on the law regarding digital communication offences in relation to elections. We need this clause and, although it is more complex, one word explains why: deepfakes. This new clause is, to a significant degree, about deepfakes.

Tackling deepfakes is complex, but we can take practical steps now to modernise election law and improve our ability to regulate in this area. Both the Electoral Commission and the Crown Prosecution Service have highlighted the need for clearer guidance on whether deepfakes fall within existing election offences. Unfortunately, the law on digital election offences is currently unclear. That uncertainty creates confusion for candidates, platforms and law enforcement, weakens democratic protections and leads to inconsistent enforcement.

New clause 10 would require the Government to address that gap by publishing clear guidance within 12 months of the Bill’s passage, setting out how digital communication offences apply during elections, so that expectations are clear and enforcement is consistent. In terms evidence for why this is needed, we all know that deepfakes and manipulated content targeting politicians are already circulating, including outside election periods. Existing laws may technically cover those harms, but their application in digital context remains unclear.

Recent examples include a deepfake video in October last year of a Conservative MP, the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman), which falsely claimed that he had defected. I was part of an event where he explained that, under the Online Safety Act 2023, he could potentially make a complaint about that, but would have to demonstrate that he was psychologically terribly damaged by it. That is not really what this is about—it is politics that is damaged by the proliferation of such material, so we should take our collective responsibility to deal with it very seriously.

In October 2023, a deepfake audio of our current Prime Minister went viral and has repeatedly resurfaced. In Ireland last year, an AI-generated video disrupted a presidential election. Those cases and many others demonstrate the growing risk. Clear guidance is needed to ensure that the law can be effectively applied during election periods. The new clause is very reasonable. It does not require the Government to commit absolutely to something right now; it simply requires the Government to publish guidance to clarify the situation.

The Government, in their response to the Speaker’s Conference report published recently, said:

“The Government recognises that there are potential issues with Section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. We are reviewing how this legislation should apply in a modern electoral setting. Where necessary, we will take appropriate action to clarify the scope of Section 106, particularly to ensure that it captures emerging technologies (such as deepfakes and other AI technologies) and is future-proofed.”

Where better to do that than in this legislation? This is the point when the Government should action the commitment that they have already made.

New clause 24 proposes a repository of digital political advertising. Such advertising plays a key and increasingly central role in election campaigns, but remains significantly less transparent than traditional campaign materials. Voters are often unable to see who is targeting them, how much is being spent or whether messaging is consistent across audiences. Campaigners are able to use targeting on social media platforms, for example, to make very targeted adverts, so that nobody can see what material is going to whom.

That lack of transparency creates real opportunities for misinformation. It undermines trust in the democratic process and leaves the system vulnerable to manipulation by foreign or domestic actors, as well as opaque funding sources. While the Bill, as it stands, makes progress on digital imprints, it does not go far enough to ensure meaningful, real-time transparency.

New clause 24 would address those gaps by requiring the creation of a comprehensive, publicly accessible repository of digital political advertising and strengthening existing disclosure requirements. The reasons for that are well understood. Digital adverts can be micro-targeted to specific groups without wider scrutiny and there is currently no single public record of what ads are being run, by whom, at what scale or with what funding. International evidence, including from elections in the US and Europe—and, I would argue, in the UK—has shown how online political advertising can be exploited to spread disinformation and obscure funding sources.

That issue was addressed by Philip Rycroft in his very useful report; I note that, on page 47, he says:

“Strictly speaking, this issue of advert libraries strays beyond my remit”,

but that he has

“heard enough evidence to suggest that there would be considerable benefit”

from establishing this practice, and he calls on the Government to take action. I welcome that point and very much hope that the Government will consider this new clause, a practical and proportionate transparency measure that would align digital campaigning more with offline political advertising.

New clause 25 relates to the Electoral Commission’s powers to obtain information outside formal investigations. That is something we heard about in oral evidence and Philip Rycroft speaks about it specifically in his recommendations 9 and 10. The regulation of digital campaigning requires timely access to information, especially during very fast-moving election periods. At the moment, the Electoral Commission can effectively gather information from online platforms only through formal investigations, which can be initiated only once there is sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation there—a significant gap.

The Commission cannot proactively monitor or respond to emerging risks in real time, including the risk of foreign interference or bot activity—a growing problem that we have seen in previous elections. As election campaigns increasingly take place online, that reduces the effectiveness of enforcement. Philip Rycroft has made a clear case for that change, so I do not need to labour the point. I very much hope that that is one of the recommendations that the Government will take away and come back on, and I would welcome some warm words from the Minister on that.

New clause 27 would require a Government review of regulated periods in relation to elections—again, something addressed in the Rycroft report, which covered the need to ensure that transparency requirements apply year round. Philip Rycroft is clearly seriously concerned about the risk of gaming the system. Currently, because regulation applies only within the regulated period, but expenditure applies during the entire year, there are strong incentives for political actors to front-load expenditure just before the regulated period kicks in. There is huge evidence of that; I have seen it from another party in my own area, with huge chunks of spending coming in just before the regulated period. That is a clear loophole.

Philip Rycroft draws attention to that issue, stating that high spending limits,

“combined with unlimited spending possibilities outwith the regulated period, drives a sort of arms race among political parties and actors to out-raise and out-spend their competitors.”

The net effect is extremely problematic for our politics. He goes on to state:

“Reducing the spending limits and introducing such limits across the whole electoral cycle could potentially relieve some of the fund-raising pressure, in turn diminishing the inducement to look to non-permissible sources to stay ahead.”

Rycroft acknowledges that the issue was beyond his direct remit, but it is useful that his report comments on where issues to do with foreign influence overlap with broader questions about how we regulate finance in our system. He states:

“The issue of spending limits and wider caps is one for the political class as a whole to consider if it wishes to restore confidence in the political process and to keep big money out of UK politics. This might be something that could be usefully debated during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill.”

Indeed—so today is our opportunity to debate it. I am saddened that the Bill, as it stands, does not address the need for year-round spending limits or for caps on overall donations—we will come to that a bit later—but this is the moment when we can and should respond to Philip Rycroft’s call to discuss this issue. I challenge the Minister on this: there is a clear need for regulation outwith the regulated period—for year-round regulation of political expenditure—and I hope that she will address that and take it forward.

Finally, new clause 28, also in the name of the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central, is essentially about labelling AI-generated material. Just in the past 24 hours we have seen a global controversy over the use of an AI-generated image, posted by a person who shall perhaps remain nameless. It is clear that AI-generated material is widespread in politics. Sometimes it is easily spottable, as in the case I have just referenced, but at other times it may not necessarily be so. Legislation has not yet caught up with that issue. This new clause, like new clause 18 on the same topic, which I suspect the hon. Member for Hazel Grove may speak to shortly, is a much-needed step to improve transparency so that we know when material is produced using AI.

The Electoral Commission briefing raises some questions about the specifics of how the issue is addressed, and makes the point that there is a need for similar approaches to be taken across digital and non-digital formats. I take that point broadly, but I do not think it is beyond the wit of civil servants to come up with a form of words that will address the issue. The use of generative AI has been particularly prevalent in the digital space, so this is a real opportunity for regulation to catch up. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on all these very useful new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I hope that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire did not mind that I gave up speaking to enable her to do so, but I wanted to check whether someone would speak to those new clauses. I wanted to allow her to elaborate the argument so that I could come in with some of my thoughts at the end.

As the shadow Minister, I was intrigued, in various meetings that I have had, as we have all had, with outside organisations about the Bill, by the ideas outlined in new clauses 10 and 24. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central for tabling them; they are substantive new clauses that I think are very well intentioned. The number of Members who have supported them on the amendment paper shows the importance of tackling some of these issues in a cross-party and urgent way.

On new clause 10, on the guidance on law relating to digital communication offences in relation to elections, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire outlined the problems that we are currently having. Digital communication offences are becoming a bigger problem, and they cause harm to people. The current duty is to demonstrate that the person has been harmed emotionally. She used the example of the deepfake that went out of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Norfolk, showing him saying that he was leaving the Conservative party and going to Reform. Although that has not necessarily been a strange development in the last couple of months, anyone who knows my hon. Friend knows that that is incredibly unlikely. It would also cause a great deal of distress to many of us moderate Conservatives for it to ever be thought that we could go to Reform. There is serious point behind that, which is that for anyone harmed by something like that, there should be laws relating to digital communication offences.

We do not think that new clause 10 would be arduous on the Government. It asks them to publish guidance on the operation of certain offences, and it does not ask for immediate action. It allows the Minister and the Government to go away and provide guidance. The Minister has said many times today that she is considering, for example, the Rycroft review, and that she will come back with suitable guidance and proposals. The new clause is in that spirit. It would allow her to go away and look at what we need to do in this increasingly concerning area of election campaigning. The call from the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central is eminently sensible, and so we will support new clause 10 if it is pressed to a vote because we want that guidance to be brought in.

New clause 24 proposes a repository of digital political advertising. I do not expect Committee members to remember the questioning in the oral evidence sessions—particularly my questions—but I was really quite fascinated by the proposal. Like the hon. Member for North Herefordshire and other members of the Committee, I have met some organisations that have advocated for it. I do not think that we should be fearful, as politicians and members of any political party, or of none, of standing by the things that we put out in elections. Therefore, instead of going in the bin, as some of mine do, they should be kept online to ensure transparency and accountability through a simple repository regime.

The Government have repeatedly proposed to put more burdens—more regulatory responsibilities, I should say—on the Electoral Commission. I do not think this proposal would be a particularly bad burden to place on it. There is a question about resourcing the Electoral Commission, but I know that the hon. Lady and the various organisations that are advocating for new clause 24 are pretty relaxed about who would manage holding the information and transferring it to the National Archives, so I think that is something that the Government should explore.

I was interested that the hon. Lady outlined that she is concerned about misinformation, manipulation and the exploitation of the electoral process by foreign actors. I hope that when we come to new clause 37, she will be equally concerned about the exploitation of votes using foreign languages in electoral literature. I hope she will look as favourably on that proposal as I am on this one, because I believe that is equally exploitative of various communities in the country.

We support new clause 24, which we think is radical, but sensible and transparent. If we stand by what we put out there, we should not fear the people who elect us holding us to account for what has been put out, so I think that is actually quite an exciting prospect for democracy.

That is where the consensus between me and the hon. Members for Milton Keynes Central and for North Herefordshire ends. I have a number of concerns about new clause 27, not because I am opposed to having a general conversation about the regulatory period. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire is right that parties of all colours front-load and send out a lot of stuff before the regulated period starts. The regulated period is inherently there to protect the smaller parties from the bigger parties and to give everybody a level playing field.

I know that when the regulated period starts—and we are all currently going through the start of one—every party has equal right to put out an equal amount of election literature to people in our constituencies, boroughs or counties. All parties are held to the same standard and it can be proved if there has been—I hope not—manipulation of the election expenses. The regulated period is there to protect parties.

Do not get me wrong: in my constituency five Liberal Democrat “in touch” communications go out every year. It drives me mad. I do not like it. I do not like its content, but the Liberal Democrats have every right to communicate with their residents. Putting an annual limit on the amount of literature that can be put out is anti-democratic. It is quite good to have some element of competition, where many parties can put out election communications throughout the year. I worry that having an arbitrary annual cap on the amount of literature that we can put out will harm independent candidates and local parties—they may exist: we have the Eastleigh borough independents, of whom three were successfully elected councillors. They should not be held to the same standard as national parties, which can absorb the cost. I am slightly concerned about the unintended consequences of that.

New clause 27 does not outline whether it covers material related to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which some of we elected representatives, choose to put out. We have a budget to communicate to our constituents. Are we going to be held to the same reporting threshold for those IPSA communications, which are not party political but are elected literature? [Interruption.] Would the hon. Member for North Herefordshire like to intervene to correct me?

[Dr Chowns]

I will pick up the hon. Member’s points in my summing up.

[Paul Holmes]

I am not being adversarial; there is an argument that although the literature that goes out via IPSA is not party political, as an elected official, IPSA is giving me the ability to send out literature that would not be included within the threshold. Other parties that oppose me at the next general election should be entitled to put out resources to match those, and I do not think that should be governed within an annual spending limit.

It worries me that if we get to a period in which we are controlling smaller, larger, regional and local political parties and holding them to the same standard in election spending as national, established parties such as those that hon. Members on the Committee represent, that would start to erode free and fair democratic access to the people who elect us and elect our colleagues in local government across the country. I am uncomfortable with that, although we could have a conversation about the lengths of regulated periods.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedule 10.

Clause 66 stand part.

Schedule 11.

Clauses 67 to 69 stand part.

New clause 41—Electoral Commission: civil penalties and enforcement—

“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) In Schedule 19C, in paragraph 1, after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

‘(1A) When deciding whether to impose a fixed monetary penalty under this Act, the Commission must have regard to whether the penalty will—

(a) change the behaviour of the offender;

(b) eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance;

(c) be appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue;

(d) be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused;

(e) restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and

(f) deter future non-compliance.’”

This new clause would put the ‘Macrory principles’ for regulators on to a statutory footing as regards the Electoral Commission.

New clause 46—Power of Electoral Commission to require disclosure from financial institutions—

“In Schedule 19B of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (investigatory powers of Commission), after paragraph 1 insert—

‘Power to require disclosure from financial institutions

1A (1) The Commission may give a disclosure notice to a financial institution requiring the institution—

(a) to produce, for inspection by the Commission or a person authorised by the Commission, any documents which—

(i) relate to the income and expenditure of an organisation or individual to which paragraph 1 applies, and

(ii) are reasonably required by the Commission for the purposes of carrying out their functions; or

(b) to provide the Commission, or a person authorised by the Commission, with any information or explanation which relates to that income and expenditure and is reasonably required by the Commission for those purposes.

(2) A financial institution to whom a disclosure notice is given shall comply with it within such reasonable time as is specified in the notice.

(3) In this paragraph, “financial institution” has the same meaning as in Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 6 of that Schedule).’”

This new clause gives the Electoral Commission the power to require information from a financial institution relating to the income and expenditure of political parties and associated individuals.

New clause 53—Electoral Commission: pre-investigation decision notices—

“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) In Schedule 19B, paragraph 3, subparagraph (5), at end insert—

‘or;

(b) relevant to determining whether to start an investigation.’”

This would enable the Electoral Commission to require information before launching a formal investigation.

New clause 57—Electoral Commission fining power—

“(1) Schedule 1, paragraph 5, to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) For ‘is £20,000’, substitute ‘is the greater of—

(a) £500,000, or

(b) 4% of the total campaign expenditure incurred by the person or organisation during the relevant regulated period.’

(3) At end of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 16 of Schedule 19C to PPERA 2000 insert—

‘(1A) Notwithstanding sub-paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may only make a supplementary order which amends the percentage of campaign expenditure incurred by the person or organisation during the relevant regulated period which can be used as a maximum monetary penalty by the Electoral Commission, if the condition in sub-paragraph (1B) has been met.

(1B) The condition in this sub-paragraph is that a recommendation for the amendment has been made to the Secretary of State by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission.’”

This new clause amends the Electoral Commission’s power to fine, increasing its maximum from £20,000 to £500,000 or 4% of campaign spending, whichever is higher. It further prevents the percentage used being changed through Order unless a recommendation has been made by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission.

[Dr Chowns]

On a point of order, Sir Desmond. Do we need to check whether any of the amendments debated with the previous clauses need to be moved, including the ones that I tabled?

[The Chair]

While it was convenient to debate those new clauses with the last group, it will not be convenient to reach a decision on them until much later in our proceedings.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lloyd Hatton]

I will keep my remarks brief in the interests of avoiding repetition. It is important to put on the record the changes in the Bill, which are hugely welcome. One of those is massively improving the information sharing and investigatory powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure closer working with regulators and law enforcement.

It should go without saying that the commission is the key watchdog in our democratic process and that it ensures that our elections and our political parties operate with integrity day to day. That is why it is particularly important that we look at some of the points being made as part of new clause 46. As has been said often today, that is touched on in some detail as part of Philip Rycroft’s review; the need to ensure that the information-sharing and investigatory powers of the Electoral Commission are as effective as they need to be, and that they work in a two-way direction to ensure that that work is undertaken.

I note that the Minister already touched on this at the start of this grouping, and that her and her officials will be wanting to look at it in more detail. I look forward to that, because it is important that we get this right as we make these positive steps forward in this part of the Bill. We must ensure that the Electoral Commission, as our key national watchdog for elections and the democratic process, has the powers and information at its fingertips to operate as effectively as possible.

[Dr Chowns]

I strongly support measures to strengthen the capacities and powers of the Electoral Commission, which plays a crucial role in regulating our politics. I will speak briefly to new clauses 46 and 53. As has already been highlighted, they are basically fully in line with Philip Rycroft’s recommendations 9 and 10, so I hope that Government amendments will be tabled in due course to address those recommendations, the justification for which has been clearly outlined.

My new clause 57 concerns the Electoral Commission’s fining power. I very much welcome the Government’s announcement that they will bring forward secondary legislation to increase the commission’s maximum fine to £500,000 from £20,000, which is clearly peanuts and no disincentive at all. That will be a significant improvement, and of course will bring the measure in line with the penalty that can be imposed for breaches of electoral finance rules in relation to referendums in Scotland.

[Lloyd Hatton]

Does the hon. Member share my view that the old system that we inherited meant that foul play by a political party was essentially priced into the system, because the fine was so small? What the Government are doing, by increasing the fine to £500,000 for a single offence via secondary legislation, means that that type of culture, in any political party, will come to an end—no party can simply say that these fines are the cost of doing business.

[Dr Chowns]

Absolutely. It is clear that the previous level, £20,000, was utterly inadequate, so I welcome the Government’s commitment to strengthen that. The purpose of my new clause 57 is to suggest ways in which it could be strengthened further, namely by putting the maximum fine into primary legislation, and by providing that the maximum fine would be £500,000 or 4% of campaign spending, whichever was the higher. I will explain why.

Most other regulators in the UK can impose unlimited fines, a high multimillion-pound fine or a fine as a percentage—for Ofcom, for example, 10%—of annual turnover. In its 2021 review of electoral finance, the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that the fine should be 4% of the value of campaign spending or £500,000, whichever was the higher. My new clause simply calls for what the Committee on Standards in Public Life argued for.

Analysis from Spotlight on Corruption has shown that the currently proposed increase to a £500,000 maximum fine would amount to a mere 1.5% and 2.1% of the campaign spending of the Labour and Conservative parties respectively, as the two largest-spending parties. If those parties had committed an egregious offence during the 2024 general election and the 4% measure had been in place, the maximum fines would have been £1.2 million or £955,000 respectively—double the current maximum. Arguably, it should be even higher—Ofcom can fine 10%—but my new clause simply puts forward the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life.

The Minister touched on the question of whether to have the limit in primary or secondary legislation. She argued—I think I am paraphrasing accurately—that one of the advantages of having it in secondary legislation is that it can be easily updated. However, the previous level of the fine, which was £20,000, was set out in secondary legislation—it was in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010—and it was never updated. The Minister said that the level of the fine might need to be set out in secondary legislation so that it could be more easily updated to make it higher, but the historical record shows us that we have had fines that are far too low and that they are not adapted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Samantha Dixon]

I will speak to each of the new clauses, beginning with new clause 41, which seeks to place the Macrory principles on a statutory footing in relation to the Electoral Commission’s use of civil sanctioning powers.

We fully recognise the importance of the Macrory principles and agree that regulatory enforcement should always be flexible, transparent and proportionate. These principles were designed to guide the construction of regulatory systems and sanction regimes. As such, the Macrory principles directed the development of the Electoral Commission’s regime of civil sanctions, which was introduced by the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 and therefore is already embedded in the commission’s regulatory practices. That includes the ability to issue fines for a wide range of offences, the use of stop notices and enforcement undertakings, and provision for representations and appeals.

The Electoral Commission is also required to publish guidance on its use of such powers, which it must have regard to when exercising its functions. It does this through its enforcement policy. Therefore, fairness and proportionality are already central to how the Electoral Commission operates. Indeed, the commission’s enforcement policy explicitly states that it will impose sanctions where appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. For that reason, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to apply the Macrory principles as the new clause proposes. The Electoral Commission is, and must remain, an independent regulator. It is vital that it retains the flexibility it needs to decide how best to use its enforcement powers, rather than being tied to a rigid statutory checklist for individual enforcement decisions.

The Government have been clear in our commitment to strengthening the Electoral Commission’s independence, including through the repeal of the strategy and policy statement, which the commission was previously required to consider in the exercise of its functions. Introducing further statutory requirements of this kind risks cutting across that principle and altering the balance of the commission’s operational autonomy. There is a very real risk that amending PPERA to codify these principles in this way is unnecessarily duplicative and could lead to legal uncertainty. Enforcement decisions could become a quagmire of legal challenge, which would delay action and weaken the commission’s overall effectiveness as a regulator. Having given these assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley will not press new clause 41.

I turn now to new clause 53, which seeks to provide the Electoral Commission with powers to request information from any person where such information is relevant to determining whether to open an investigation. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the right tools it needs to make informed decisions about potential breaches of political finance rules. The commission already has substantial information-gathering powers to support its regulatory functions, including the enforcement of political finance and imprint rules. That said, the Government recognise that we cannot be complacent, which is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference.

Although we do not support the amendment, we are carefully considering relevant recommendations from the Rycroft review that reinforce measures already included in the Bill to ensure political finance rules and their enforcement remain robust and fit for purpose. There will be a full Government response to the review, and we will consider whether further amendments to the Bill are appropriate in the light of that work. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.

New clause 57 seeks to increase the Electoral Commission’s maximum fine from £20,000 per offence to a new maximum of £500,000 or 4% of campaign expenditure, whichever is greater. It also requires that any order seeking to amend the suggested percentage can be made only if recommended by the Electoral Commission following consultation with the Ethics and Integrity Commission. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has robust enforcement powers. A strong and proportionate civil sanctions regime is essential for securing compliance with the rules and upholding trust in our democracy.

The current maximum fine of £20,000 does not provide a meaningful deterrent against rule breaking. The Electoral Commission has argued for a long time that it risks becoming a mere cost of doing business for the largest political parties and campaigners. The Government agree that increasing the maximum fine is essential, so that sanctions reflect the scale of modern political campaigning and ensure that all campaigners, no matter how large, face significant repercussions when the rules are broken. That is why we intend, through secondary legislation, to increase the commission’s maximum fine significantly to up to £500,000 per offence.

The reason why the change will be made through secondary legislation is that Parliament has already provided the Secretary of State with the power to make supplementary orders in relation to the Electoral Commission’s civil sanction regime. Any such order is subject to parliamentary approval under the affirmative procedure. It was through the exercise of that power, and through that process, that the existing maximum fine was established in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums (Civil Sanctions) Order 2010, which is referenced in the new clause. It is therefore appropriate to follow the same process for making changes to the commission’s regime of civil sanctions where it is already provided for in legislation.

In terms of adding statutory requirements that must be met before the Secretary of State can make a supplementary order, the Government have seen no evidence that such conditions are necessary. We have worked closely with the Electoral Commission through the development of the measures in the Bill, and we will continue to work collaboratively as we develop the detail of proposals for increasing the maximum fine that it can impose. Those details will be set out in secondary legislation in due course, and at that time Parliament will rightly have the opportunity to scrutinise and debate the Government’s approach and consider whether to approve the legislation. For those reasons, and with those reassurances in place, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.

[Dr Chowns]

The Minister will forgive me, but I did not hear her respond to the reference in my new clause to the 4% of campaign spending. Did I briefly drop off? Will she consider that when introducing secondary legislation?

[Samantha Dixon]

We have considered it, and we have decided to opt for a fine of £500,000. However, when we introduce the secondary legislation, the debate may flesh out that argument, and the figure may change, should secondary legislation and the debate lead to that conclusion. However, at this stage, we will not accept the amendment.

New clause 46 seeks to give the Electoral Commission powers to compel financial institutions to disclose information related to income and expenditure of regulated entities, such as political parties and candidates, where it is reasonably required by the commission to carry out its functions. The Government fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the commission has the tools it needs to enforce compliance with political finance rules. The commission already has substantial information gathering powers to support its regulatory functions, including the enforcement of political finance and imprint rules.

That said, the Government recognise that we cannot be complacent, which is why we commissioned the Rycroft review to consider whether political finance rules and their enforcement can be strengthened in the light of emerging risks, including covert funding and foreign interference. As Members know, we are considering the relevant recommendations of the review that could reinforce measures already in the Bill to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remains robust and fit for purpose. I note that new clause 46 draws on a recommendation from the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy and covers very similar ground to one of Mr Rycroft’s recommendations. We will revert with a full Government response to the review and consider whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clauses 67 to 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Deirdre Costigan.)