Ukraine

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It is deeply encouraging to hear what unites the two Front Benches on support for Ukraine. Whatever differences there are, those differences and concerns are expressed by people from all political parties and from no political parties. I very much welcome the tone of the debate.

The Prime Minister was right to warn that the next few years will be some of the most dangerous that our country has ever known, and to refer to an axis of authoritarian states—Russia, Iran, North Korea and China—as a direct threat to global stability and global peace. Whether we like it or not, war has returned to Europe. Our eastern NATO allies are right to warn that if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, they might be next. After all, Putin is explicit that his war in Ukraine is against NATO and the west.

The strategic situation is far from satisfactory, but we are at a turning point that hinges on how US policy now develops. That was something the Deputy Foreign Secretary did not address in his remarks; I would be grateful if it could be addressed in the summing up.

The Russian military may be running out of equipment more rapidly than we think, and its economy is more fragile than its hydrocarbon revenue would make it appear. However, Russia is still able to sustain massive casualties, and the Russian population still supports the war. Russia has accepted a subservient position in its relationship with China in order to ensure continued Chinese economic and technological support for the duration of the war.

The US and Europe are distracted from Ukraine by Gaza and other theatres, such as the Sahel and New Caledonia, where Azerbaijan appears to be manoeuvring against French interests. US domestic politics delayed aid to Ukraine by six months—a delay that Russia is exploiting, albeit with massive losses in personnel and equipment.

The delay has offered Putin an opportunity to gain an advantage on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine, but the biggest danger is that Putin will win the war on the diplomatic battlefield, which is more a contest of wills than of military supremacy. Putin still believes that he can wear down the west’s will to support Ukraine before the Russian will to fight fails. Ukraine is now under significantly increased military and political pressure.

However, the re-establishment of US aid and strong statements from the UK and others, coupled with the battlefield losses, have forced Putin to take domestic measures to enable Russia to continue fighting indefinitely. The appointment of the economist Belousov—I hope that I am pronouncing that correctly—as Defence Minister marks a decision to increase the level of militarisation of Russia’s economy, putting it further on to a war footing. The new Minister will have the job of doing that, and of ensuring that the measures do not destroy Russia’s economy, as they did in Soviet times.

Any change programme—and Belousov’s appointment indicates a significant change in Russia—creates a temporary weakness in the organisation being changed. Russia is compensating for that weakness by stepping up hybrid warfare attacks on the west, which could include assassination. I do not think that we should rule out some Russian involvement in the recent attempt on the life of the Slovakian Prime Minister, Robert Fico, who may be widely identified as pro-Russian but who is not.

Official US policy is still not robust enough. President Biden does not want to allow Ukraine to lose, but nor does he want to empower Ukraine to the extent that it could inflict a crippling and destabilising defeat on Russia. The US is treating this like a regional crisis that has to be managed, but war is war, not just a crisis, and this war is part of a global conflict. A war must be won, or far more than the war will be lost.

Ukraine rightly complains that the US will not allow the weapons that it supplies to Ukraine to be used to hit targets on Russian soil. I am sure that the shadow Foreign Secretary and the shadow Defence Secretary encountered that frustration when they were there. Before the recent advance towards Kharkiv, the Ukrainians had to watch the Russians build up their forces on the Russian side of the border without being able to use US weapons to disrupt them. The Russian advance on Kharkiv demonstrates—this is the elephant in the room—that the US policy of limiting weapons use is totally illogical. It puts into jeopardy President Biden’s own policy of preventing Ukraine from losing. It makes this a critical turning point.

During a visit to Kyiv on 15 May, US Secretary of State Blinken said in a speech that

“Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war”.

Did that indicate a tacit change of policy? When my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary announced that Ukraine could use British weapons to hit Russian soil, it provoked a huge reaction from Russia, obviously designed to put others off saying the same thing. Blinken’s statement produced no reaction at all, except Russia’s advance stopped when it could have made further progress. Two days after Secretary of State Blinken’s statement, on Friday 17 May, the Ukrainians launched one of the largest drone and missile attacks on Russian targets in occupied territory and also in Russia itself, accompanied on the 16th and the 18th by massive attacks on Crimea.

Secretary of State Blinken’s statement could indicate the first steps towards a significant change in US policy to allow Ukraine to use US weapons against targets on Russian soil, reflecting the realisation of at least some within the Administration that Ukraine must be enabled to win in order to expel Russia from its territory. We do not know. I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Minister for Armed Forces could address that question in his reply. There could be other reasons, such as record daily Russian casualties in their recent attacks. If US policy is not changing, there will be a de facto stabilisation of the frontline, with Russia in a stronger physical and psychological position than before, despite having achieved little of operational importance in terms of territory, and at significant cost in lives and equipment.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Nothing justifies what Putin has done, but what worries me about all this is what will happen if the most likely outcome materialises: namely, a stalemate. Many people in Europe, such as President Macron and others, will say that we have to start negotiations, so what will our attitude be then?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

It is an unthinkable prospect. A stalemate would be a defeat. A stalemate would be a victory for Putin, who would be holding territory that he has claimed illegally. I thought the Deputy Foreign Secretary was very clear on that, supported by the shadow Foreign Secretary in the same terms. I do not think we should talk about defeat; we should be concentrating on how to ensure that we can expel Russia from all occupied Ukrainian territory.

If the Ukrainians’ hands are tied and they cannot use US weapons to strike targets in Russia itself, they will remain vulnerable to further Russian attacks. Russia will appear stronger than it really is, having obscured its growing deficiency in weaponry. Russia will be able to continue to keep up moderate military pressure on Ukraine, to prevent the Ukrainians being able to benefit from an operational pause—in other words, I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), the Russians will have the upper hand. Russia will also step up its information warfare and influence campaign in Europe, employing hybrid and grey zone attacks.

Worse, with the US’s failure to call Russia’s nuclear bluff—that is what this policy amounts to—other states, most immediately in the middle east, will increasingly see nuclear weapons as conferring invulnerability. In the last few days it has been reported that Iran is willing to share nuclear technology with neighbouring countries, proving that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is ineffective. We should be more honest about that. Too many Governments in the west cling to the illusion that the treaty can lead to a world free of nuclear weapons, but even European countries beyond the UK and France may soon have to consider acquiring nuclear capability, or at least accepting US tactical nuclear weapons on their soil once again.

Gaza has put western influence in the middle east into freefall, while tying up western political attention and US military supplies and helping the Russian narrative to become dominant in the global south. Russia’s information efforts have played their part in making Gaza a debilitating issue for the west and interventions in other theatres, such as New Caledonia, keep the west on the back foot. The axis of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran is strengthening. The temporary stabilisation on the frontline in Ukraine means that western European countries have still not yet had sufficient stimulus to make them appreciate the importance and urgency of going on to a wartime footing themselves and increasing their own defensive capacities.

If the US is, in fact, changing its policy, as I indicated it might be, that is a serious game changer and we must encourage it. It gives notice to Putin that eventually he will lose the war; the US can re-establish the credibility of its leadership of the democratic world and of NATO; the Chinese will draw an important lesson about US resolve, which will have significant implications for Taiwan; the Russian model will appear much less attractive to the global south and Russian influence will wane; and the impetus towards nuclear proliferation will lessen. Sadly, some European countries will feel let off the hook, and it will be harder to galvanise a united European defence effort.

What can the UK do? Sadly, even in the UK we are still reacting too slowly. The Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee in December that the Ukraine war was

“existential for Euro-Atlantic security”,

but there is little sign of that understanding in our day-to-day politics. The Defence Secretary has said that the UK defence industry must be put on to a war footing, which means that the whole of Government must be mobilised for that effort, and our voters must understand that the sacrifices to fund victory in Ukraine will be far less than the costs of defeat for Ukraine in the longer term.

The UK should build a cross-party assessment, which I think has already been built in this debate, of what needs to be done to move the UK by stages on to a war footing and to increase defence capability and capacity, rather than just talking about increasing the defence budget.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Leigh]

This is a very realistic speech. The trouble with this war, as with Russia’s previous wars, is that early incompetence has now been replaced by a ruthless authoritarian determination to win at any cost by mobilising the entire economy and being utterly impervious to the loss of human life. I put to the hon. Gentleman the same question that I have put to the House: although we may breathe fire and brimstone about how we are determined to win, what is actually happening is stalemate, and we have to work out how the west will navigate itself around a possible peace negotiation with Russia. I am not saying that I want that—it is thoroughly unpalatable and not a very popular thing to say—but we have to be realistic.

[Dave Doogan]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution, but I do not share the logic that he applies to the potential outcome in Ukraine. I began in a position of consensus, and I do not think that the Deputy Foreign Secretary would join the right hon. Gentleman in his summation—and nor would I. Whatever the size of the bite that Russia takes out of Ukraine, if Ukraine does not get it back, that is a Russian victory whatever way we cut it and whatever wrapper we put on it, and where Russia prevails, aggression and the tearing up of the rules-based international system also prevail. We cannot allow that to happen.

The strides that Russia has made in regenerating its heavy armour should serve as a wake-up call to UK and western partners. To counter that, Ukraine must have serious supplies of anti-armour weapons. I note that Russia’s missile capabilities are being regenerated at significant cost to Ukraine, and that raises serious questions about the efficacy of sanctions, which I will come to shortly. We must ensure the most accurate calibration in the reconciliation of that which Ukraine needs and in how the UK and NATO allies can satisfy that unmet demand.

Ukraine’s key foreign military aid requirements are air defences, long-range missiles and artillery ammunition. Its shortages in air defence over the past weeks have allowed Russia to conduct a destructive missile campaign against national infrastructure, civilian populations and military targets, including the largest thermal power plant in the Kyiv region. Long-range missiles are required to strike Russian supply depots, command-and-control centres and military infrastructure, and artillery ammunition is essential for offensive and defensive action on the frontline, but they remain in short supply.

The United States Agency for International Development package passed only on 23 April, as we all watched months of delay take their toll on the war effort. The battle to pass that Bill has sparked fresh fears that a Republican election victory—a matter, of course, for the US electorate—could significantly reduce essential US aid to Ukraine, so it is important that the UK, along with the rest of Europe, has contingency plans in place for a potential reduction in the US footprint in aid to Ukraine. That also highlights the need for long-term planning in the military aid pipeline, as opposed to pulsing batches.

Are sanctions working, and who is suffering? Russian oil products are getting through to the UK despite the UK officially banning the import of Russian oil from 5 December 2022. A loophole in the legislation allows Russian oil to continue to flow into the UK provided that it has been refined into fuel in a third country, after which it is no longer considered to have originated in Russia. That is deeply disingenuous to domestic and commercial energy bill payers across the UK, who are facing huge increases in their energy bills because of the rise in gas prices caused by the conflict, while aviation fuel and other distillates from Russian oil continue to pour into the UK’s economy unabated. What do the Government say to UK taxpayers, who are funding billions in military aid to Ukraine so that it can defend itself from a Russian aggression that is, if we follow the money, part-funded by UK purchases of fuel refined from Russian oil? It is desperate stuff, Madam Deputy Speaker, and you do not need to be a forensic accountant to figure it out.

UK purchases of fuels from China, India and Turkey—much of which originates from Russian oil—have increased considerably since the sanctions regime began. From 2021 to 2023, purchases from India went up from £402 million to £1.5 billion, those from China rose from £30 million to £663 million, and those from Turkey from £1.8 million to £60 million. How do the Government explain that loophole? Will they close it off and, in so doing, close off the revenue to Putin and his war machine?

Not unrelatedly, UK businesses continue to see record growth in exports to Russia’s former Soviet state neighbours. That manifold spike coincides precisely with the introduction of sanctions on goods to Russia. Are the Government even interested—let alone concerned—by that patent economic blip and reality? They should be, given the possibility that such exports could contain important components for military purposes. That matters, because although Russian missile production has increased since the war began, Russia faces a serious vulnerability: its most complex weapons, such as missiles, are heavily dependent on western-sourced components. Against the backdrop of a 1860% increase in the export of UK-manufactured vehicles to Azerbaijan, is anybody in the Government really under any illusions about what is happening there?

Russia has maintained a steady supply of the necessary components to make high-end missiles because of the incoherent approach to sanctions adopted by western states. A less laissez-faire approach to countering the Russian defence industry will help to disrupt Russian military supply chains and, in turn, Russian supply lines. That must be a strategic priority for all of us who care about the integrity and future of Ukraine.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Nothing I will say in this short speech in any way approves of what President Putin has done—he is an appalling man; a tyrant who has caused massive damage to infrastructure and countless deaths—but we have to be realistic in these debates. We cannot just will what we want. There is a mismatch between our determination, our interest and our will, and those of the Russian state.

Let us go back in history. When people in the west discuss Ukraine, they often assume this is a simple case of a large state invading a small country that has always been independent. That is not the view of the Russian state or most people who live in Russia. Ukraine means “borderland”, and for centuries, since Catherine the Great, Ukraine was effectively part of Russia. Even under the Soviet Union, Crimea was part of the Russian Federation, and it was only willed to Ukraine by diktat in the 1950s. Not a single Member of Parliament objected to that and the Crimean people were not consulted.

I am not in any way defending the Russian position—what they have done is appalling—but from that historical reality, and it is a reality for the Russian state, they are absolutely determined to pursue their objectives, as wrong as they may be. As we have heard, Putin is a tyrant. He has put the entire Russian economy on a war footing. He is apportioning a part of the economy to defence that we have not been spending since the second world war. Although we may want to win the war, we have to be realistic. Given the mismatch in resources between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and given all the difficulties that the Ukrainian state has been trying to cope with in the management of its economy for many years, with corruption and many other issues, it is extremely unlikely, sadly, that Ukraine can win this war.

As I said earlier, this war is following the pattern of earlier wars that Russia has engaged with: early incompetence replaced by an utter determination to win that is completely impervious to the loss of human life.

[Jim Shannon]

Does the right hon. Member not agree that if the battle in Ukraine is lost, then it will go to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and eventually the whole way back to us? The battle in Ukraine has to be won. It is not a matter of giving in; we have to win it.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

If we are going to win this war, we have to be prepared to give the resources necessary to do so. The truth is that such is the overwhelming predominance of the American industrial military estate that it could have won the war by now. America could have armed Ukraine to such an extent that it could have won. America could have allowed the Ukrainians to use its weapons to bombard Russian forces within Russia. America does not want Ukraine to humiliate Russia and win this war. America does not want Ukraine to lose the war. America could have won this war by now, as it won the second world war, but apparently it is not prepared to will the resources. We may not agree with that or like it, but that is the reality. We all know the strength of the American economy, and we all know that for months weapons deliveries were delayed.

All that I am trying to do is inject a note of reality into this debate. We cannot keep having these debates, saying, “We are determined to win this war. We must win this war”, when we are not willing the resources. I therefore ask the House these questions. Are we determined to put our own economy on a war footing? Are we determined to spend less on health, education, justice, and all the other good things in which we believe, in order to win this war? Are we prepared perhaps to put our own troops into Ukraine? Are we prepared for our own young men to die, or are we just prepared for thousands of young Ukrainian men to die and not have a single casualty ourselves? Those are the realistic questions.

The most likely outcome is that there will be horror and stalemate, and eventually somebody in Europe—President Macron or that sort of statesman—will then say that we have to conduct peace negotiations. What do we do then? Will we be part of a movement to have peace negotiations? Will we reward Putin for his aggression? Will we accept that there is a stalemate, and therefore Russia is enabled to grab part of Ukraine? What is our attitude? Nobody yet in this debate so far has seriously addressed those questions. All they have said is that we will win this war.

Members should look deep down into their hearts. Is there anybody sitting in this Chamber—I mean not what they say publicly, but what they think privately—who actually thinks now that Ukraine will win this war? [Hon. Members: “Yes.”] They say that, but how? Given the huge mismatch in resources between Russia and Ukraine, and given the fact that America is not prepared to furnish Ukraine with sufficient armaments to ensure that we win, how will we? I am with you all. I am prepared to put our own economy on a war footing. I am even prepared to send our own troops to Ukraine. I am prepared to spend less on all the things I value, such as health, justice and all the rest. But we have to be realistic, and at the moment we are not being realistic. As a result, Europe is trembling in a sort of arthritic way, neither pursuing the war with full vigour, which is how we won the second world war, nor prepared to conduct peace negotiations. The result is a stalemate, which is deeply damaging to our reputation, our economy and everything else.

I just pose the question. I am not saying that we should give in or that we should have peace negotiations, but I ask those on the Front Benches to be realistic in this debate.