Ukraine

Dave Doogan Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dave Doogan (Angus) (SNP)]

I would like to begin by reinforcing the parliamentary unity that is enjoyed on this issue. We have discussed it between the Government and official Opposition; well, the same applies to the third party in this Chamber. The SNP stands fully behind the Government’s actions with regard to Ukraine—and that is really something. We do not agree with the Government on very much, so when we do, it is obviously an issue of significant importance to our constituents in Scotland. Even more important is the message that that delivers to international stakeholders, not the least of whom are in Kyiv and Moscow, about the United Kingdom’s position on this.

Consensus is important, but I am certainly no British nationalist, as I have gone to some effort to demonstrate to the House over the last four years. As an impartial observer, perhaps, of the UK’s ambitions and activities in Ukraine to date, I would summarise them as follows: a strong start, but flagging and showing some limited ability to endure. Not all these activities are financial. I point to some tremendously effective decisions that were taken by the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace), to issue Challenger tanks to Ukraine. They were of very limited tactical use, but tremendously important to the message sent out. I would like to see the UK Government —whichever Department—manifest equally important signals into this conflict that do not command particularly huge budgetary sums.

The war continues to be central to Putin’s narrative that Russia is under threat, as he seeks to divert attention from his failing economic and social policies. We should expect no let-up in that rhetoric from the Kremlin—to the bitter cost of Russian and Ukrainian civilians alike. Russia has violated almost all significant agreements with Ukraine and NATO; if the war were to end on unfavourable terms for Ukraine, there is every likelihood that Russia would subsequently be emboldened to use force where it sees fit elsewhere. It therefore remains essential for European and western security that Russia’s war of aggression fails.

With the current state of the war set as broadly stalemate, with neither side able to attain air superiority, both struggling to carry out mechanised manoeuvres at scale, and challenges in artillery ammunition supplies, Russia’s wholesale war footing and mobilisation of its industrial base should be a cause for growing concern. We should be concerned that the combined industrial might of the west cannot keep pace with Russia’s ability to manufacture and distribute artillery shells.

Russia therefore continues to press Ukraine along the frontline. Ukraine has made strategic gains in the Black sea, causing the withdrawal of the Russian national naval assets there and opening up western Black sea grain routes—doubtless positive, but of limited impact on its territorial defence in the east of the country. Ukraine’s recently passed mobilisation law, which came into effect yesterday, makes it easier to draft conscripts and provide financial incentives, and does not include provisions to demobilise troops that have served for more than three years. That law should be instructive to us in the west about the pressure Ukraine foresees in the months ahead.

As I said, Russia has significantly mobilised its defence industry, increased labour capacity and expanded production lines of existing facilities, and has brought back previously mothballed plants. That is a statement of intent if ever we saw one. Russia’s defence spending in 2024 is expected to consume 30% of Government spending—very instructive indeed. That has led to significant increases in production output, where Russia is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year, along with 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles. Those are figures many of us in the west could only imagine being able to stand up. According to the Royal United Services Institute, 80% of those stocks are refurbished and modernised; nevertheless, that is an extraordinary undertaking for an economy apparently under sanction. The number of systems held in storage means that Russia can maintain consistent output through 2024 and into 2025, but it should be subject to inventory attrition over the period thereafter. It would be interesting to know whether the Government are factoring that into their thinking.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

This is a very realistic speech. The trouble with this war, as with Russia’s previous wars, is that early incompetence has now been replaced by a ruthless authoritarian determination to win at any cost by mobilising the entire economy and being utterly impervious to the loss of human life. I put to the hon. Gentleman the same question that I have put to the House: although we may breathe fire and brimstone about how we are determined to win, what is actually happening is stalemate, and we have to work out how the west will navigate itself around a possible peace negotiation with Russia. I am not saying that I want that—it is thoroughly unpalatable and not a very popular thing to say—but we have to be realistic.

[Dave Doogan]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution, but I do not share the logic that he applies to the potential outcome in Ukraine. I began in a position of consensus, and I do not think that the Deputy Foreign Secretary would join the right hon. Gentleman in his summation—and nor would I. Whatever the size of the bite that Russia takes out of Ukraine, if Ukraine does not get it back, that is a Russian victory whatever way we cut it and whatever wrapper we put on it, and where Russia prevails, aggression and the tearing up of the rules-based international system also prevail. We cannot allow that to happen.

The strides that Russia has made in regenerating its heavy armour should serve as a wake-up call to UK and western partners. To counter that, Ukraine must have serious supplies of anti-armour weapons. I note that Russia’s missile capabilities are being regenerated at significant cost to Ukraine, and that raises serious questions about the efficacy of sanctions, which I will come to shortly. We must ensure the most accurate calibration in the reconciliation of that which Ukraine needs and in how the UK and NATO allies can satisfy that unmet demand.

Ukraine’s key foreign military aid requirements are air defences, long-range missiles and artillery ammunition. Its shortages in air defence over the past weeks have allowed Russia to conduct a destructive missile campaign against national infrastructure, civilian populations and military targets, including the largest thermal power plant in the Kyiv region. Long-range missiles are required to strike Russian supply depots, command-and-control centres and military infrastructure, and artillery ammunition is essential for offensive and defensive action on the frontline, but they remain in short supply.

The United States Agency for International Development package passed only on 23 April, as we all watched months of delay take their toll on the war effort. The battle to pass that Bill has sparked fresh fears that a Republican election victory—a matter, of course, for the US electorate—could significantly reduce essential US aid to Ukraine, so it is important that the UK, along with the rest of Europe, has contingency plans in place for a potential reduction in the US footprint in aid to Ukraine. That also highlights the need for long-term planning in the military aid pipeline, as opposed to pulsing batches.

Are sanctions working, and who is suffering? Russian oil products are getting through to the UK despite the UK officially banning the import of Russian oil from 5 December 2022. A loophole in the legislation allows Russian oil to continue to flow into the UK provided that it has been refined into fuel in a third country, after which it is no longer considered to have originated in Russia. That is deeply disingenuous to domestic and commercial energy bill payers across the UK, who are facing huge increases in their energy bills because of the rise in gas prices caused by the conflict, while aviation fuel and other distillates from Russian oil continue to pour into the UK’s economy unabated. What do the Government say to UK taxpayers, who are funding billions in military aid to Ukraine so that it can defend itself from a Russian aggression that is, if we follow the money, part-funded by UK purchases of fuel refined from Russian oil? It is desperate stuff, Madam Deputy Speaker, and you do not need to be a forensic accountant to figure it out.

UK purchases of fuels from China, India and Turkey—much of which originates from Russian oil—have increased considerably since the sanctions regime began. From 2021 to 2023, purchases from India went up from £402 million to £1.5 billion, those from China rose from £30 million to £663 million, and those from Turkey from £1.8 million to £60 million. How do the Government explain that loophole? Will they close it off and, in so doing, close off the revenue to Putin and his war machine?

Not unrelatedly, UK businesses continue to see record growth in exports to Russia’s former Soviet state neighbours. That manifold spike coincides precisely with the introduction of sanctions on goods to Russia. Are the Government even interested—let alone concerned—by that patent economic blip and reality? They should be, given the possibility that such exports could contain important components for military purposes. That matters, because although Russian missile production has increased since the war began, Russia faces a serious vulnerability: its most complex weapons, such as missiles, are heavily dependent on western-sourced components. Against the backdrop of a 1860% increase in the export of UK-manufactured vehicles to Azerbaijan, is anybody in the Government really under any illusions about what is happening there?

Russia has maintained a steady supply of the necessary components to make high-end missiles because of the incoherent approach to sanctions adopted by western states. A less laissez-faire approach to countering the Russian defence industry will help to disrupt Russian military supply chains and, in turn, Russian supply lines. That must be a strategic priority for all of us who care about the integrity and future of Ukraine.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (The Cotswolds) (Con)]

I think this House is at its best when we get serious issues of this kind, and those on all sides of the House are in agreement—broad agreement—about what needs to be done. We have heard some excellent and informed speeches from both sides. I think the announcements made at the beginning of this debate by the Deputy Foreign Secretary are very welcome, particularly the £3 billion this country is going to give Ukraine this year and every year thereafter, while some of the significant sums—for example, on artillery and drones—are very welcome.

We have reached a critical point in the Ukraine-Russia war when we, along with our allies, need to decide how far and for how long we can take our support. In recent weeks, Russian forces have made slow but important advances in the area of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, compounding their advances by stretching the Ukraine army along a wide front. Opening up new fronts as well as widening those in the south-east Donetsk and Luhansk regions will stretch Ukrainian forces in a battle of resources, as Ukraine awaits the delayed US aid and equipment.

The UK and US have provided strong support for Ukraine, but there have been limitations and critical delays, as others have said, in providing the weapons and equipment needed. We are at a point where this war is dragging on, with limited and slow advances on both sides. The west has provided enough support for the Ukrainians to defend themselves, but not enough to make decisive advances, let alone enough to end the war. We must decide with our allies whether we will step up this support to persuade the Russians to withdraw from Ukraine. What we should not do is allow a war in Europe to drag on for many years and become a frozen conflict. That would cause an increased death toll, damage Ukrainian infrastructure and impact on our own and other western economies. Not only would it continue to prolong the suffering of the brave Ukrainian people, but it would make the job of rebuilding the country in the longer term much more difficult.

There is a strong possibility that, if we are not sufficiently determined to oppose Russia now, its aggression will not cease with Ukraine. We have only to look at what is happening in Georgia at the moment. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the demonstrations against the foreign agents law, it is clear that the majority of people in Georgia want a closer alignment with Europe and NATO than with their historical ties to Russia. That will be a cause for thought in Moscow. I use those words carefully.

In Europe, there is the possibility of risk to a Baltic state or Moldova. What would it mean if a NATO state were targeted next? Estonia’s Prime Minister urged NATO allies at the security conference in Tallinn to follow their response by stepping up support for Ukraine, while Moldova has recently defied Russia with a EU security pact deepening defence co-operation. Of course, one of the outcomes, whatever happens in the war in Ukraine, is that both Sweden and Finland have become members of NATO. Those deeply independent, non-aligned, neutral countries joining NATO must be a real slap in the face for the Russians. European countries have a huge vested interest in continuing to provide considerably more equipment and training. As I have mentioned, some countries such as Germany and Poland are to be commended for what they have done.

As I have said, the UK is sending an extra £500 million on top of the £2.5 billion in military aid that it had already pledged to give Ukraine in 2024. In February, the EU agreed to a further £42 billion package, but by March it had failed to meet its targets on sending shells to Ukraine. After the US and Germany, the UK is the third largest supplier of weapons and equipment to Ukraine.

As I said in my intervention on the Deputy Foreign Secretary, who made an excellent speech, I think we must do much more on the diplomatic front to encourage a coalition of the willing. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) said, the consequences of the Russians winning in Ukraine are huge in the longer term. I think it would mean that a number of non-aligned nations will decide that they are perhaps better off with the coalition of Russia and China, rather than with the west, which would be an utter disaster. It is important that we try to build that coalition of the winning, and I am not just thinking of Europe and America. There are countries in south-east Asia and in the middle east that we should be trying to persuade to join this coalition.

The US has been a huge supplier of arms and financial support, and its contributions to the war have far outweighed what has been sent by all other countries put together. In a recent visit to Kyiv, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, pledged ongoing US support for Ukraine after Congress approved the $61 billion aid package. Arriving at the frontline, as my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) has said, are the ATACMS—army tactical missile systems—which are long-range precision-guided missiles. Of the $61 billion-worth of aid being provided, about $8 billion will be used to resupply Ukraine with missiles and ammunition. That is a crucial point, because these missiles are absolutely critical.

The US has also been stepping up its own arms manufacturing, as we heard on the Public Accounts Committee visit to the Pentagon two months ago. That is critical. Europe needs to step up its arms manufacturing, which it has pledged to do, but it seems to be doing that far too slowly. This is not, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said, just about manufacturing. Huge volumes of hardened shelters are required to store the shells. There is a lot attached to building up this capacity, and my hon. Friend was right to indicate those figures. Furthermore, after that first year, the step-up in the second year will be even greater, which is good news.

As the Prime Minister said, we are facing some of the most dangerous and yet transformational years to come. Others have mentioned that the Ukrainians must be free to make decisions on how they use the arms that we supply, and they should not be hampered by conditions imposed by us. It is utter nonsense to watch Russian troops massing on the border near Kharkiv, and then to expect the Ukrainians not to use the vital weapons we have supplied to prevent that from happening.

An important area that has not yet been discussed is that, as any military tactician knows, to win a ground war air superiority is needed. Therefore, if the west really wants to help Ukraine, it must be far more generous in providing fighter aircraft, complete with trained Ukrainian pilots and anti-aircraft missiles. Ukraine has consistently asked the US for fighter jets to counter Russia’s air superiority. In May 2023, the US agreed to let other nations supply Ukraine with US-made F-16s. However, the US has hundreds of those aircraft, which are being rapidly superseded, and it could well afford to donate some of them. Instead, it says that the F-16s must be supplied by Denmark, the Netherlands and other nations, and we must train those pilots in how to use them. As others have said, our missiles have been very effective at deterring Russian ships in the Black sea.

I am not really criticising, but the hon. Member for Angus (Dave Doogan) slightly dismissed the fact that grain was getting out of Ukraine. It is not only good in itself, but important—others have touched on this—that small businesses are able to flourish in Ukraine. It is important that they are able to generate profits, and even more important that they are able to employ people who are not able to fight in the war, such as women who are not at the front. It is important that the Ukrainian economy is beginning to flourish again.

[Dave Doogan]

I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman at all. I was very specific in what I said, and I talked about a “tactical advantage”, which is minimal.