Bernard Jenkin
Main Page: Bernard Jenkin (Conservative - Harwich and North Essex)Department Debates - View all Bernard Jenkin's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is deeply encouraging to hear what unites the two Front Benches on support for Ukraine. Whatever differences there are, those differences and concerns are expressed by people from all political parties and from no political parties. I very much welcome the tone of the debate.
The Prime Minister was right to warn that the next few years will be some of the most dangerous that our country has ever known, and to refer to an axis of authoritarian states—Russia, Iran, North Korea and China—as a direct threat to global stability and global peace. Whether we like it or not, war has returned to Europe. Our eastern NATO allies are right to warn that if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, they might be next. After all, Putin is explicit that his war in Ukraine is against NATO and the west.
The strategic situation is far from satisfactory, but we are at a turning point that hinges on how US policy now develops. That was something the Deputy Foreign Secretary did not address in his remarks; I would be grateful if it could be addressed in the summing up.
The Russian military may be running out of equipment more rapidly than we think, and its economy is more fragile than its hydrocarbon revenue would make it appear. However, Russia is still able to sustain massive casualties, and the Russian population still supports the war. Russia has accepted a subservient position in its relationship with China in order to ensure continued Chinese economic and technological support for the duration of the war.
The US and Europe are distracted from Ukraine by Gaza and other theatres, such as the Sahel and New Caledonia, where Azerbaijan appears to be manoeuvring against French interests. US domestic politics delayed aid to Ukraine by six months—a delay that Russia is exploiting, albeit with massive losses in personnel and equipment.
The delay has offered Putin an opportunity to gain an advantage on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine, but the biggest danger is that Putin will win the war on the diplomatic battlefield, which is more a contest of wills than of military supremacy. Putin still believes that he can wear down the west’s will to support Ukraine before the Russian will to fight fails. Ukraine is now under significantly increased military and political pressure.
However, the re-establishment of US aid and strong statements from the UK and others, coupled with the battlefield losses, have forced Putin to take domestic measures to enable Russia to continue fighting indefinitely. The appointment of the economist Belousov—I hope that I am pronouncing that correctly—as Defence Minister marks a decision to increase the level of militarisation of Russia’s economy, putting it further on to a war footing. The new Minister will have the job of doing that, and of ensuring that the measures do not destroy Russia’s economy, as they did in Soviet times.
Any change programme—and Belousov’s appointment indicates a significant change in Russia—creates a temporary weakness in the organisation being changed. Russia is compensating for that weakness by stepping up hybrid warfare attacks on the west, which could include assassination. I do not think that we should rule out some Russian involvement in the recent attempt on the life of the Slovakian Prime Minister, Robert Fico, who may be widely identified as pro-Russian but who is not.
Official US policy is still not robust enough. President Biden does not want to allow Ukraine to lose, but nor does he want to empower Ukraine to the extent that it could inflict a crippling and destabilising defeat on Russia. The US is treating this like a regional crisis that has to be managed, but war is war, not just a crisis, and this war is part of a global conflict. A war must be won, or far more than the war will be lost.
Ukraine rightly complains that the US will not allow the weapons that it supplies to Ukraine to be used to hit targets on Russian soil. I am sure that the shadow Foreign Secretary and the shadow Defence Secretary encountered that frustration when they were there. Before the recent advance towards Kharkiv, the Ukrainians had to watch the Russians build up their forces on the Russian side of the border without being able to use US weapons to disrupt them. The Russian advance on Kharkiv demonstrates—this is the elephant in the room—that the US policy of limiting weapons use is totally illogical. It puts into jeopardy President Biden’s own policy of preventing Ukraine from losing. It makes this a critical turning point.
During a visit to Kyiv on 15 May, US Secretary of State Blinken said in a speech that
“Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war”.
Did that indicate a tacit change of policy? When my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary announced that Ukraine could use British weapons to hit Russian soil, it provoked a huge reaction from Russia, obviously designed to put others off saying the same thing. Blinken’s statement produced no reaction at all, except Russia’s advance stopped when it could have made further progress. Two days after Secretary of State Blinken’s statement, on Friday 17 May, the Ukrainians launched one of the largest drone and missile attacks on Russian targets in occupied territory and also in Russia itself, accompanied on the 16th and the 18th by massive attacks on Crimea.
Secretary of State Blinken’s statement could indicate the first steps towards a significant change in US policy to allow Ukraine to use US weapons against targets on Russian soil, reflecting the realisation of at least some within the Administration that Ukraine must be enabled to win in order to expel Russia from its territory. We do not know. I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Minister for Armed Forces could address that question in his reply. There could be other reasons, such as record daily Russian casualties in their recent attacks. If US policy is not changing, there will be a de facto stabilisation of the frontline, with Russia in a stronger physical and psychological position than before, despite having achieved little of operational importance in terms of territory, and at significant cost in lives and equipment.
Nothing justifies what Putin has done, but what worries me about all this is what will happen if the most likely outcome materialises: namely, a stalemate. Many people in Europe, such as President Macron and others, will say that we have to start negotiations, so what will our attitude be then?
It is an unthinkable prospect. A stalemate would be a defeat. A stalemate would be a victory for Putin, who would be holding territory that he has claimed illegally. I thought the Deputy Foreign Secretary was very clear on that, supported by the shadow Foreign Secretary in the same terms. I do not think we should talk about defeat; we should be concentrating on how to ensure that we can expel Russia from all occupied Ukrainian territory.
If the Ukrainians’ hands are tied and they cannot use US weapons to strike targets in Russia itself, they will remain vulnerable to further Russian attacks. Russia will appear stronger than it really is, having obscured its growing deficiency in weaponry. Russia will be able to continue to keep up moderate military pressure on Ukraine, to prevent the Ukrainians being able to benefit from an operational pause—in other words, I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), the Russians will have the upper hand. Russia will also step up its information warfare and influence campaign in Europe, employing hybrid and grey zone attacks.
Worse, with the US’s failure to call Russia’s nuclear bluff—that is what this policy amounts to—other states, most immediately in the middle east, will increasingly see nuclear weapons as conferring invulnerability. In the last few days it has been reported that Iran is willing to share nuclear technology with neighbouring countries, proving that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is ineffective. We should be more honest about that. Too many Governments in the west cling to the illusion that the treaty can lead to a world free of nuclear weapons, but even European countries beyond the UK and France may soon have to consider acquiring nuclear capability, or at least accepting US tactical nuclear weapons on their soil once again.
Gaza has put western influence in the middle east into freefall, while tying up western political attention and US military supplies and helping the Russian narrative to become dominant in the global south. Russia’s information efforts have played their part in making Gaza a debilitating issue for the west and interventions in other theatres, such as New Caledonia, keep the west on the back foot. The axis of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran is strengthening. The temporary stabilisation on the frontline in Ukraine means that western European countries have still not yet had sufficient stimulus to make them appreciate the importance and urgency of going on to a wartime footing themselves and increasing their own defensive capacities.
If the US is, in fact, changing its policy, as I indicated it might be, that is a serious game changer and we must encourage it. It gives notice to Putin that eventually he will lose the war; the US can re-establish the credibility of its leadership of the democratic world and of NATO; the Chinese will draw an important lesson about US resolve, which will have significant implications for Taiwan; the Russian model will appear much less attractive to the global south and Russian influence will wane; and the impetus towards nuclear proliferation will lessen. Sadly, some European countries will feel let off the hook, and it will be harder to galvanise a united European defence effort.
What can the UK do? Sadly, even in the UK we are still reacting too slowly. The Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee in December that the Ukraine war was
“existential for Euro-Atlantic security”,
but there is little sign of that understanding in our day-to-day politics. The Defence Secretary has said that the UK defence industry must be put on to a war footing, which means that the whole of Government must be mobilised for that effort, and our voters must understand that the sacrifices to fund victory in Ukraine will be far less than the costs of defeat for Ukraine in the longer term.
The UK should build a cross-party assessment, which I think has already been built in this debate, of what needs to be done to move the UK by stages on to a war footing and to increase defence capability and capacity, rather than just talking about increasing the defence budget.
I am going to bring my remarks to a close, if that is all right.
Even if we do not have enough kit to send to Ukraine, we could help the Ukrainians to make more kit themselves and significantly improve our training effort, which we now know is not providing the Ukrainians with the breadth or depth of training needed to win this war—I hope the Government will respond to that point. We must press the White House to understand that Ukraine must be enabled to win this war, or the war is lost. We must also keep encouraging our European allies to follow suit. We can all learn from the way that countries such as Finland and Poland have moved on to a war footing and are building much increased military capacity at less cost.
I welcome the debate, and I thank Ministers for making time for it. My right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary and I wanted to respond to it together rather than delegating the task to others, in order to underline the importance that we attach to the United Kingdom’s support for Ukraine. This has also given us the opportunity to draw some lessons, as my right hon. Friend did earlier, from our visit to Ukraine last week. Like my right hon. Friend, I thank the Foreign Secretary for his help in facilitating that visit. We would be grateful if the Deputy Foreign Secretary passed on our thanks.
While my right hon. Friend and I were in Irpin, we met three Ukrainian teenagers. We talked about their families and friends, about possible careers and about their hopes for the future—but these young people had been through something so horrific that it belongs in the 1940s. After Putin’s full-scale invasion began, they were kidnapped and sent to camps in Crimea and Russia. Every morning they had to sing the Russian national anthem, and they were sent into isolation if they did not do as they were told. One, a diabetic, was refused insulin and became very sick. Those who were running the Russian camps told those Ukrainian children, “No one cares about you”, “Your families are dead”, and “Ukraine no longer exists”. I want to praise the work of the Ukrainian charity Save Ukraine, which is doing vital work to rescue the stolen children, reunite them with their families and help the survivors to deal with their trauma.
Despite those young people being told “Ukraine no longer exists”, more than 800 days on from Putin’s full-scale invasion it is still standing, and civilian and military alike are still fighting with huge courage. We toured a factory and spoke to the wives, mothers and fathers who had fled from the east to Kyiv in the face of Putin’s invasion, and are now working together to support the Ukrainian war effort. While their loved ones are on the frontline, everyone in Ukraine is fighting to defeat Putin.
The shadow Foreign Secretary and I had one simple message to convey during our visit: the UK continues to be united for Ukraine. If there is a change of Government after the election this year, there will be no change in Britain’s resolve to stand with Ukraine, confront Russian aggression and pursue Putin for his war crimes. We told the Ukrainian Defence Minister, President Zelensky’s chief of staff and the parliamentarians whom we met that this was our Labour guarantee to Ukraine. That is why we have fully backed the Government’s increased military aid to Ukraine, for this year and the years ahead.
The Deputy Foreign Secretary said that in his speech the shadow Foreign Secretary had shown the unity of the House. He was right, and all the speeches tonight have shown the unity of this House. In fact, this House has shown a unity behind Ukraine that goes beyond the debates in this Chamber. As UK parliamentarians, my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) and for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin), and the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), have all been involved in gathering aid and driving it to Ukraine over the past couple of years. Other Members have taken in Ukrainian families. Like tens of thousands of big-hearted Britons, we have offered, through the Homes for Ukraine programme, shelter, refuge and a life in this country to over 140,000 Ukrainians fleeing Putin’s invasion.
I turn now to the contributions to the debate. Characteristically, the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) made a deeply reflective speech with a wide sweep that recognised that, as he said, this war is part of a global conflict. He quoted Secretary of State Blinken, who, as he rightly said, was in Kyiv on the second day that my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary and I were there, which was 15 May. The hon. Member quoted Blinken as saying that
“Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war”.
In fact, the rest of what Blinken said is important. He said that Ukraine is conducting the war
“in defence of its freedom, of its sovereignty, of its territorial integrity. And we will continue to back Ukraine with the equipment that it needs to succeed”.
The hon. Member for Angus (Dave Doogan), who speaks for the SNP from the Front Bench, added the SNP’s voice to the all-party consensus, although I was puzzled when he described himself as an impartial observer of the UK’s activities in Ukraine. However, he was dead right when he said that it is essential for western European security that Putin’s full-scale invasion fails. If he prevails, he will be tearing up the rules-based system. That is why it matters so much to us, as well as to the Ukrainians, that they win.
The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) has so many innovative defence companies in his area that he speaks as someone with quite a lot of technical expertise. He described how, and with what kit, the Russians are stepping up their rate of successful fire on the frontline. He said that defence of Ukraine today is defence of the UK tomorrow, and I liked that argument. It is an argument that I consistently put in different terms in saying that the UK’s defence starts in Ukraine, and we need to do more on both sides of the House to convey a sense of importance and urgency to the British public so that we can help reinforce their continuing support for the war.
Characteristically, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Dan Carden) made an argument as well as a speech, which I always like to hear. He said that we think about this war in terms of values, sovereignty, territorial integrity and democracy, but that we think less than we should about making the long-term partnership with Ukraine valuable to the UK. That seems especially important, as a successful Ukraine will become, in partnership with the democratic west, central to wider European security and prosperity in the future.
The hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) rightly urged, as I will in my remarks, more attention and effort on the diplomatic front to build what he called the “coalition of the willing”, and he pointed the attention of his own Government and the House towards countries in south-east Asia and the middle east that should be part of such a coalition. Like the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex, he also warned about the increasing co-operation between China and Russia.
My hon. Friend the Member for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer) reinforced the argument that my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary made in his speech: we in the UK are still too often playing catch-up on sanctions, and on tackling the dirty money of Russian oligarchs in our country. She urged the Government to demonstrate more action and greater leadership in directing frozen Russian state assets towards the much-needed reconstruction help for Ukraine.
The right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) said that he wanted to inject some realism into the debate, and he was right to say that we cannot just will what we want. He said that if what we want is a Ukrainian victory, we must will the resources. However, I say to him that the Ukrainians can cope with what he described as the mismatch with Russia, as long as we and other nations maintain our backing for them.
That point was picked up immediately by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West, who said that the importance of our ramping up production lies in the fact that if we and other allies of Ukraine provide ammunition and weaponry, Europe and the US can, between us, easily counter the levels of increased Russian production. He showed a really extraordinary grasp of the history of Ukraine and of the reality of Ukrainian history, rather than the Russian revisionism that we sometimes hear. I pay tribute to him and the other officers of the all-party parliamentary group on Ukraine for their work.
Would it not also be sensible to emphasise that if we want this war to go on forever, we should allow Russia to stay in control of sovereign Ukrainian territory? If we want to have a clean and clear end to this conflict, the only way to do so is to expel Russia from illegally occupied territory.
I will come to some of the military challenges faced by Ukraine in a moment, if I may; the hon. Gentleman made that point very powerfully in his speech earlier.
The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord) echoed what we have declared as Labour’s intent: to try to take the politics out of the UK’s support for Ukraine in the run-up to the election. I trust that the Government will respond in the same way. Like the hon. Member for The Cotswolds, the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton said that more diplomacy is required with countries that he described as having yet to declare their position, alongside the military aid that the UK is supplying.
I think my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Kevan Jones) was the only one who reminded the House that the Ukrainians have not just been fighting Russia since February 2022; they were fighting it for over eight years before that, after proxy forces invaded parts of the Donbas and Russia seized Crimea. One of the things that my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary and I found most moving about both of the visits we have made to Ukraine is the wall of remembrance for fallen heroes, which has the photographs and details of all those who died before February 2022. Over 13,000 Ukrainians lost their lives through fighting the Russians on Ukrainian soil. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham also reminded us, in his role as a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, that the Parliamentary Council at NATO had established relations with Ukraine way back in 1991. He asked what would happen if we failed in Ukraine. He was right to say that the Baltic countries and the former eastern bloc countries all know that they will be next.
Finally, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) reminded us about the pattern of military aggression from Russia, not just in Ukraine but in Georgia. It is exactly what the UN charter is designed to prevent: big nations redrawing international boundaries by force. It is exactly why it is so important that Putin does not prevail. When we were in Kyiv last week, the message of those we met was consistent. They described the conflict in Ukraine as being at a critical moment, with new offensives around Kharkiv and new attacks along the length of the frontline. That is an easy thing to say, but the length of the frontline for the Ukrainians is 800 miles. That is as far as London to Aberdeen and back. The scale of the challenge they face is huge.
It is tough for Ukraine at the moment, and it is set to get tougher still in the months ahead. Its most urgent and complex challenge is to stabilise the front in the coming weeks and prevent what are local tactical gains by Russia from becoming a wider operational success. Stabilising the front depends on the prompt delivery from the west of air defence, artillery and long-range strike systems. Also, it depends not just on the western allies; it depends on the Ukrainians to construct effective defensive fortifications, to boost their own military manpower, to maintain the quality advantage that they have in training their forces and also to restore morale.
Alongside this, the Ukrainians have also scored significant successes with their own offensive operations, and we must not lose sight of that, particularly outside the land war. These have involved long-range strikes with indigenously produced weapons systems, partisan warfare in parts of Russia and the occupied territories, special forces operations and maritime operations. These are no longer symbolic; they are increasingly substantial in their effect. They have destroyed one third of the Russian Black sea fleet. Notwithstanding Putin walking away from the Black sea grain initiative, they have opened up freedom of navigation in the western side of the Black sea and Ukraine is now exporting more grain than it did under the initiative when Putin gave it the go-ahead. It is also exporting many other goods. For the large majority of Ukrainians, it is quite clear that the stakes are nothing less than the survival of the state and the nation. People in Kyiv told us, “Even if the west stops supporting us, we will not give up fighting.”
This has also become a war about the survival of Russia as a state and the survival of its elites. Too often, the western view has been that this is somehow a war of choice for Russia, but that has underplayed how Russia has once again become a country whose primary vocation is war. In that vein, Putin has now moved his industry on to a wartime footing. He is now spending a total of 40% of his Government’s budget on defence. This war is not only military; it is also diplomatic and economic, and Putin will not make peace if he thinks he can win on the battlefield. He will not stop at Ukraine if he succeeds there.
Our recent military aid packages from the UK and allies have been really warmly welcomed and received in Kyiv, but more is needed. Deliveries of air defence, ammunition and long-range missiles need to be speeded up, and further diplomatic and economic action must be taken to isolate Putin further. We have to be able to show him that things will get worse for Russia, not better.
That is why we are asking Ministers and allies to take three immediate steps. First, deliveries of military support need to speed up and reach the frontline. As NATO’s Secretary-General Stoltenberg has said, any country that can send more should send more. Training for Ukrainian troops should also be expanded.
Secondly, UK diplomacy should be accelerated leading up to the G7, with the NATO 75th anniversary, the European Political Community meeting and Ukraine’s peace summit all taking place in the next few weeks. The purpose will be to strengthen support for Ukraine, seize frozen Russian state assets and close sanction loopholes. All those must be the outcomes of successful summits over the next few weeks.