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Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDuke of Montrose
Main Page: Duke of Montrose (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Duke of Montrose's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the last listed Back-Bench speaker, it has been encouraging to hear the great support all around the House for the purposes of the Bill and to listen to all the experience and wealth of statistics being brought forward.
I shall talk about some of the peripheral effects of the Bill. It has a simple title but, as we see from its 48 pages, it is far from easy to have workable legislation on this topic. It is endlessly complicated by having to allow for three devolution settlements, with special sections peppering the text. I am most encouraged to read in the accompanying notes that the Scottish Parliament has passed a legislative consent Motion. I should be interested to know whether, if amendments are passed in this House, we will have to go back to legislative Assemblies around the country to see whether they approve.
The rural life that I have led, rather in parallel to that of my noble friend Lord Lucas, has been full of what are described as corrosive substances, offensive weapons and firearms. In all of these, one was given instruction in their use and the dangers that they could pose. One is conscious that is not available to those who live in urban areas and the use to which they tend to put the weapons which fall into their hands.
I declare an interest as an office-bearer of the National Sheep Association and of the National Farmers Union of Scotland. In that context, I draw the attention of the House to the fact that the rural scene has changed radically since the main legislation in this area was framed. Many of the rules which will apply refer to “a public place”. As we see in Clause 6(9), a public place is no longer confined to what one normally thinks of—a road, a highway or a building—but includes anywhere where the public are permitted access. This now includes large sections of the countryside.
Another element that has changed is that, in many parts, traditional farmhouses, which used to be the focus and constantly manned part of the business, have been sold off, and farmers are managing their business from a house somewhere else. A lot of the time, there may be no one on the site of the farming activity. That begins to bear some relevance when we talk about the supply of corrosive substances or weapons to the farming community. There may be a question, too, whether your supplier is prepared to regard your house as of a sufficient size to be your place of business. Problems will arise for those taking delivery of the substances required by the business. The Bill rules out delivery to a locker, but will that mean that deliveries will have to be received by somebody in person? Who knows what time of day a delivery man or courier will appear? We have all experienced waiting for their non-appearance.
I have similar concerns to those of my noble friend Lord Lucas on corrosive substances. I hope that the Minister can give the House more of an indication of how wide the interpretation of the given definition is envisaged to go. Clause 6(9) defines them as anything capable of “burning human skin”, but Schedule 1 goes on to list specific compounds, mainly of an inorganic nature, and says that they might give rise to chemical abstracts. Is that definition considered fairly wide, or is the schedule designed to limit the products to which the ruling can be applied? Formic acid is one of the things listed; I am aware that it is used in farming to preserve silage. I have also had experience of another extremely aggressive organic acid—propionic acid—used to preserve moist grain. It gives rise to a product known as Propcorn, which is not at all the sort of thing you might buy in the cinema. Will these organic acids be covered by some definition?
On a slightly lighter note, but in a similar vein to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Singh, I notice that for some reason only in Scotland is there a focus on bladed weapons when they come into your possession if the defence is used that they were required for theatrical performances, films or television programmes. Of course, those also occur in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. I happen to be a member of the Royal Company of Archers, which parades around the country with swords and arrows. I wonder where this regulation will leave it and other bodies, such as one known as the Atholl Highlanders—the private army of the Duke of Atholl—which are given to producing weapons that would certainly be considered dangerous.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDuke of Montrose
Main Page: Duke of Montrose (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Duke of Montrose's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI can utterly appreciate the noble Baroness’s point. When I look at legislation, I have to refer to other legislation, and it can be a minefield, but such is the nature of legislation built up over time. The guidance will help people in that endeavour and, as I said on Monday with reference to another issue, it will be very helpful to members of the public in knowing exactly where the offences are and what aspects of the Bill strike out other aspects of legislation.
The noble Baroness was on her feet very quickly but I hope that I can still ask a question. As was said a few minutes ago, this is a bit like a Russian doll—you uncover one thing and it leads to another. Having been rather green on this subject, I would like to know where these exceptions are contained, as I cannot find them in Section 141.
They can be found in regulations associated with the Acts I have just mentioned.
I am sure that I could point to such cases if I had them in front of me. What I can point to is the evidence I have just given to the Committee that young people have said it is easier to buy knives online. I am not saying those young people are the ones going on to commit crimes, but the fact that it is easier for an under-18 to purchase online says to me that it is an easier route, should that person have criminal intent, to make that purchase online. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.
Will the Minister tell us what sanctions have been imposed on people failing to obey the law in this way? It seems to me that there is plenty of scope for people to be charged. That will still apply. On the trusted trader scheme, perhaps the one point that has not been mentioned is that the designation could be taken away were there any doubt that somebody was not complying with the law, rather than having to go through some legal process that might deter people or make them more certain to check.
I hope that I have outlined what the Government have found through these test purchase failings. They have improved over recent years, but there is undoubtedly a basic failure in the system of the online purchase. Regarding the sanction for current failures in the system, it is a criminal offence, although it has been shown not to be a terribly compliant environment. It is far easier to have robust arrangements in place at a central delivery point rather than on each and every doorstep. That is the thinking behind the delivery point rather than the residential address.
I echo the noble Lord’s comments. We want to do whatever it takes to reduce the availability of knives for use in knife crime. I hope that, in all our discussions, it has not gone unnoticed that we oppose this group of amendments and the previous group.
I will probably be disciplined by my party for saying so but, presumably, if you are buying from a supplier outside the customs union, there needs to be a customs declaration on the package as to what is contained in it. That is a legal requirement. It is not about trying to get a foreign supplier to comply with British law; rather, it is internationally accepted that you need to put a customs label on a package describing what is inside. I do not know whether that applies if the supplier is within the European Union, but certainly if you buy something from the United States of America, for example, there has to be a visible customs declaration on the outside to say what the product inside the parcel is. That would enable whoever is delivering the parcel to the end delivery point to take the appropriate action in accordance with Clause 20, if the label describes that it is a bladed product.
If noble Lords will allow me, rather than pointing out what might be missed by this legislation, I want to draw to the attention of the Committee places where people will be caught. One that strikes me, given my background of having been responsible for the sheep industry, is this. In the clipping of sheep, we use largely foreign clippers, often from New Zealand. They come here and stay in bed and breakfasts. As they move around, their blades have to be sharpened and replaced. I am sure that, in the current system, they just ask the company to supply it by post, but they do not have a residential address. They could probably work their way round it, but I want to highlight the problems that people will have.
Is it the noble Lord’s wish to withdraw his amendment?
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining these amendments. I do not think we are far apart in what we want to achieve in relation to deliveries to residential premises. I hope that I will be able to clarify our intentions and assuage any concerns that might remain.
Clause 17 makes it an offence for a remote seller of bladed products to send them to residential premises or a locker. When developing the offence, we were keen to ensure that it did not apply to the delivery of products to residential premises from which a business was run—the noble Baroness gave the example of a craftsperson in a shed. We heard during the consultation from builders, plumbers and others who ran businesses from their homes. These people sometimes needed to have tools and other bladed products delivered to them quickly to allow them to carry on their businesses. We were also keen to ensure that farms would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to residential premises. This point was made on Monday by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and again today by the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose.
To achieve this, the definition of a residential premises at Clause 17(5) is limited to those that are,
“used solely for residential purposes”.
This means that anyone who runs a business from their home can continue to have bladed products delivered there. To put this beyond any doubt, Clause 17(6) explicitly states that, where a business is carried on from a premises, it is not to be regarded as a residential premises. I hope this addresses the example that the noble Baroness gave; her face suggests that she is not entirely convinced.
Amendments 43A, 43B and 43C would achieve the same effect but are unnecessary. Where a person runs a business from residential premises which they own or occupy, the Bill already ensures that they can have bladed products delivered to such premises. It will be for the seller to satisfy themselves that they are not sending the bladed products to an address that is used solely for residential purposes. The noble Baroness raised the earlier example from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of UPS, the delivery company. The noble Lord is right that there is no fool-proof way of establishing whether a property is a genuine business address. However, we are creating in Clause 17 a new offence for the seller, and in Clause 18(1) we set out the defences to that offence. We hope that these together will motivate the seller to take “all reasonable precautions” in verifying the address, although we acknowledge that there is no fool-proof way of doing that.
There are various ways that a seller could ascertain whether a premises is used as a business. The buyer could provide evidence that the house was registered for business purposes or they could provide confirmation in writing of the business entity and confirmation that the business is run from home. In many cases the seller will also have a relationship with the buyer as a business, possibly having supplied them with bladed products over many years. I hope this provides the clarity sought on these provisions and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendments.
Again, going back to my problem of sheep-clippers, or itinerant workers, do the business premises being delivered to have to be in the name of the person carrying out the business? If you happen to land with somebody who is running a business, could you have something delivered there?
There is no restriction on delivering to a business premises.
I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation of these amendments which relate to the provisions in Clause 22, updating the prohibition on flick and gravity knives. Amendment 64 seeks to widen the defences for those charged under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 or the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 to cover conduct relating to a weapon for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, for the purposes of theatrical performance or filming, or in relation to a weapon of historical importance or which was manufactured before 1945. It may be helpful if I describe briefly the current legislation and the changes provided for in the Bill.
Section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or a gravity knife. The importation of such knives is prohibited by Section 1(2) of the Act. Clause 21 amends the 1959 Act to update the definition of a flick-knife. The current definition is quite old, and new designs are available that mimic the speed with which a flick-knife can be opened, but do not strictly fall under the existing definition. For example, in many models currently on the market, the mechanism that allows the blade to open at great speed may not be in the handle—as required by the current definition—but the knives nevertheless mimic a flick-knife.
Clause 22 extends the current offence of possession of a flick-knife or gravity knife in a public place to cover any possession, whether in a public or private place. These weapons have no legitimate use, and we believe that it is appropriate that they are prohibited both in public and in private. This will ensure that the police will be able to seize these weapons if they come across them.
Clause 22 provides a defence for a person charged with an offence under the 1959 Act if the person shows that they have the weapons in their possession for the purpose of making the knives available to a museum or gallery, or if the person is acting on behalf of a museum or gallery. We have included this defence following responses to the public consultation that informed the Bill. In relation to whether a defence should be provided for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, flick and gravity knives have been prohibited for a long time. As my noble friend would expect, we have consulted the Ministry of Defence about these provisions and it has advised us that there is no need for such a defence to cover the Armed Forces. In relation to a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, new subsection (2F) already allows the lending and hiring of flick-knives and gravity knives by museums or galleries for cultural, artistic or educational purposes.
Nor am I persuaded that a defence should be provided for items of historical importance or which were manufactured before 1945. I am concerned that this defence may be used by people who want to use these weapons in crime. Such a person may deliberately seek to acquire a knife made before 1945, or they may argue that the knife belonged to their parents or grandparents and that the weapons were manufactured before 1945. I believe that we need to be cautious and should not provide defences under this legislation that could be easily abused. I hope that my noble friend agrees with me on this point.
Amendment 65 also seeks to exclude from the ambit of the law flick and gravity knives manufactured before 1945. As I understand it, my noble friend’s intention is also to future-proof the legislation to ensure that, irrespective of the passage of time, a flick or gravity knife manufactured after 1945 can never acquire the status of an antique. Again, I hope I can persuade my noble friend that this amendment is not needed. The 1959 Act does not provide an exemption for antique flick and gravity knives. The antique exclusion applies only to weapons to which Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies, which brings me to the beginning of my noble friend’s earlier words. I accept that there is a disparity between these two provisions, but it is one that has been in place since 1988. Moreover, the prohibition on flick and gravity knives has now been in place for 60 years and has operated successfully without an exception for antique knives. That being the case, I am unpersuaded that we should now alter this approach by merging the regimes under the 1959 and 1988 Acts as the amendment seeks to do. I hope I have been able to persuade my noble friend that these amendments are unnecessary and that he will be content to withdraw them.
The question of exception for use for theatrical purposes was included in the 1988 Act under Section 141. Is it necessary to repeat it here?
The advice I am getting is that it is necessary because they are subject to different legislation. If that is not entirely clear I am happy to write to my noble friend.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDuke of Montrose
Main Page: Duke of Montrose (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Duke of Montrose's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as I moved the original amendment in Committee, I will intervene first. I am grateful to the Government and the Minister for coming up with these amendments, which give me and the people I am interested in more than I asked for. That is a very good start. The wording is much clearer and more elegant than that of the amendment I tabled at the previous stage, which I described as “rather obscure”. The key phrase, which will be totally intelligible to anyone reading the Act is:
“References to a corrosive product … do not include a substance or product which is contained in a battery”.
I am grateful to the Government for coming up with that simple phrase.
I am also grateful to noble Lords who supported me in Committee and for all the lobbying which must have been going on outside Parliament. I support this amendment.
My Lords, I will probe whether the amendment fully does what the Government intend on one or two points, and look at the issues surrounding wet batteries. I declare an interest as a farmer with numerous occasions to use batteries, both in vehicles and outside them. When I first read the amendment I was surprised. Noble Lords will be aware that Schedule 1 says that sulphuric acid is permitted if it is under 15% concentration. Batteries are 32%, so they contain a very corrosive substance. I recognise the problem raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, in Committee and with the Government, for those who sell batteries. The Bill mainly tries to deal with the remote ordering and delivery of weapons and corrosive substances. By their very nature, batteries are unlikely to be sold remotely—they are normally sold in a face-to-face meeting—but it is still worth looking at what the law requires to police that.
From what the Minister said a minute ago, the new phrasing means that Clause 1(1) will not be implemented for the sale of batteries. Does this mean that anybody under 18 will be able to buy a battery, or do the Government wish to prohibit those under 18 buying wet batteries? I can also see that, in everyday use, issues might arise with Clause 6(2). How would you get around someone using a car for social or, particularly, recreational purposes having to prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority for having a battery with them? With any luck, the Government’s wording will cover that.
There is a danger in the phrasing of the clause excepting sulphuric acid in a battery. Somebody might contend that they were allowed to extract the acid from the battery and carry it as a weapon. Would the Minister wish to address this at a later stage? Rather than saying,
“product which is contained in a battery”,
should the amendment say, “product while contained in a battery”? You could, admittedly, say that extracting the acid was a stupid thing to do, but you never know what interpretation people will put on these things.
Clause 6(1) refers to having a corrosive substance in a public place. The Bill does define what constitutes a public place: in Scotland, particularly, it is anything other than a private residence. My concern is, perhaps, slightly wide of the immediate issue but will this clause entail that ordinary garages or agricultural engineers, which usually have a site for monitoring and recharging batteries, will be required to install that in a secure room, so that no member of the public can access the liquid while visiting the premises and find themselves in possession of a corrosive substance in a public place?
My Lords, I spoke in support of the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, in Committee. I thank the Government for coming forward with an eminently practical amendment to address a consequence of the Bill that was surely never intended. This is the House of Lords doing its job quickly and properly. I thank the Minister for orchestrating this and look forward to hearing her response to my noble friend’s questions.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Duke of Montrose for his detailed questions about the use of batteries. I can reassure him that under-18s will be allowed to buy batteries. He also asked about having a good reason to have a battery in a public place and about extracting sulphuric acid from batteries. I am not a battery expert but, as I understand it, all batteries are sealed and you would have to cut one open to remove the acid. The acid has never been used—
I am sure that my noble friend the Minister has looked into this in more up-to-date detail than I have. Car batteries and anything of that size are sealed, but I think there are larger batteries, with a capacity of around 100 amps, which have individual cells with a screw top. You can probably get at those rather more easily.
I think this is above my battery expertise. I was advised that even open vent batteries have caps which are sealed for home delivery, but I hope we are not going to argue with my noble friend about this. The principle behind the logic of many of the clauses is that we are trying to prohibit access to acid that has been used in attacks; there is no evidence that acid has been extracted from batteries of any type and then used in attacks. Indeed, I think I am right in saying that my noble friend Lord Goschen pointed out in Committee that this was an extremely expensive way of accessing sulphuric acid. I hope that reassures my noble friend.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the rationale of these amendments, which would change the new offence of sending a corrosive or bladed product to residential premises or a locker so that no offence is committed if a product is delivered into the hands of a person over the age of 18. This would mean that sellers could continue to dispatch products to residential premises providing that they are sure that the products will be delivered to a person over 18. The amendments for corrosive products also amend the defence of having taken all reasonable precautions, to include that they believed that the products would be delivered to a person over 18 and they had either taken reasonable steps to establish the person’s age—for example, relevant age-verification documents such as a passport or driving licence had been provided—or it was clear that the person was not under the age of 18. It would also be a requirement for a delivery company acting on behalf of the seller to confirm they had checked the person was over 18 at the point of delivery. In effect, the amendments in this group say that if a seller meets the first of these requirements, they can go ahead and sell the items to residential premises.
The Government’s approach to the sale of corrosive products, bladed articles and products in relation to UK remote sellers is twofold. First, we want to drive an improvement in the age-verification and dispatch processes of remote sellers. We are doing this by saying that unless they meet certain minimum conditions, they will not be able to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence if they are prosecuted for the offence of selling a corrosive product or a bladed article to a person under 18. These conditions include that they have suitable age-verification systems in place at the point of sale, that they clearly label the items when they are dispatched and that they have arrangements in place to ensure that when finally delivered, the items are delivered into the hands of a person over the age of 18. Many of the requirements covered by the amendments in this group are already reflected in the Bill.
Secondly, we believe that in addition to stronger checks by remote sellers, the dispatch of corrosive and bladed products to a residential premise or locker should be banned and that instead, buyers will need to pick them up from a collection point. This will ensure that the items are not delivered to a person under 18. There are two reasons why the Government believe that, in addition to age checks at the point of sale, sellers should also be prohibited from sending the products to a home address. First, it will be possible for buyers to get round any age-verification systems at the point of sale in relation to remote sales, for example by using a borrowed credit card or using another person’s passport or driving licence. Until we are confident that online age-verification systems are robust, we do not want to depend on them entirely.
My Lords, I have a series of amendments later on to do with the delivery of bladed articles to residential premises. One of the matters that will always arise is that the Government say that if you can get your house classified as a place of business, then you come into the permitted category. However, I have two questions: first, what constitutes designating your premises as a place of business and secondly, will that affect the local authority’s view as to the level of rates that it would impose on the premises?
Turning to my noble friend’s question, if your home is also your registered business address, then clearly is it both. The noble Lord actually raised that point in Committee. The residential address can be either just a residential address or both a business and a residential address.
Returning to my other point about someone being prohibited from selling a product to a home address, we want to avoid any liability regarding checking age falling on the delivery company when the item is handed over. This is because delivery companies indicated in our discussions with them that they might simply refuse to deliver items on behalf of sellers if the legal responsibility for checking age falls to them. We are willing to accept this risk in relation to overseas sales because we are less concerned about the impact on overseas sellers, should their trade be affected, but for UK sales we do not want to place a liability on deliverers because there is a risk that they will then refuse to deliver any bladed items. The Government position is therefore that any liability for ensuring that any remotely sold corrosive and bladed products in the UK are not sold and delivered to under-18s should fall solely on the seller.
I have one final point to make, about a meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and I had with the Sheffield knife manufacturers. As a result of that meeting, I want to satisfy myself of the position in relation to a couple of major delivery companies to ensure that that has not changed. Nothing in the meeting led me to doubt the position, but I just want to clarify that. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lucas, because it gives us the opportunity to consider the requirements that remote sellers need to meet if they are to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling bladed articles to a person under 18.
Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to sell a bladed article to a person under 18. It is a defence that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence—for example, that they had asked to see proof of a person’s age.
Clause 15 provides that, in relation to remote sales—for example, online sales—of bladed articles, the seller can rely on the defence only if they can prove they have met certain conditions. These conditions are: that they have systems in place at the point of sale for verifying the age of buyers; that they clearly mark the package containing the article when it is dispatched, and have taken steps to ensure that the package is finally delivered is delivered to someone over 18; and that they did not arrange for the article to be delivered to a locker.
The amendment concerns the second of those conditions, which is that that when the package is dispatched it must be clearly marked to indicate that it contains a bladed or sharply pointed article, and that when finally delivered it should be into the hands of someone over 18. The amendment would remove the first part of this condition, so the package would need to be labelled to say that it must be handed to a person over 18, but it would not need to say it contained a bladed or sharply pointed article.
Before I turn to the amendment itself, it might be worth saying a bit about the purpose of Clause 15, which is to drive a change in behaviour by remote sellers. It sets out the minimum requirements we would expect sellers to meet if they wanted to be confident that they were not selling to under-18s, but it is mainly aimed at individual transactions—young people trying to buy knives online—rather than large business transactions. It is not aimed, for example, at a seller of kitchenware that deals exclusively with restaurants and hotels.
The requirements under Clause 15 are therefore the minimum requirements that a seller has to meet if they want to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, should they ever be prosecuted for selling to an under-18. Where a seller knows their customers, they may decide not to comply with the conditions under Clause 15 because they are sure they will never be prosecuted. Examples would be: where a seller sells only to a wholesaler; where a seller has traded with the same customer for years; or where a seller knows the individual they are selling to—for instance, where they make hand-made items for particular customers, they will know the buyer is over 18 and may decide that complying with the conditions is unnecessary.
Turning to the amendment, our discussions with delivery companies and those who provide collection point services indicate that they want any packages that they are going to handle to be clearly marked by the seller so that the risk that they inadvertently hand them over to a person aged under 18 is reduced. You cannot expect staff working for a delivery company or at a collection point to ensure that the package is handed over to an adult unless it is clear from the packaging what it contains and what the restriction is on delivery. It makes sense that those working for delivery companies and at collection points know what they are handling. This will enable them to treat the package with due caution. This is particularly the case where the package contains sharp objects or corrosive substances.
Finally, the amendment applies only to Clause 15 and not to Clauses 16 and 17, which deal with the same matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to Clause 2, which sets the same conditions in relation to corrosive products where these are sold remotely.
I hope I have provided the noble Lord with sufficient explanation around the purpose of Clause 15 and the labelling requirement and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, perhaps my noble friend can clarify on the record to what extent an article is regarded as pointed. I am afraid I am the one who is always raising the virtually impossible but it would be possible to extend this provision to a packet of screws or an order of nails—which are not all that sharp but they are sharply pointed articles—and anything else of that nature.
I will write to my noble friend with an accurate answer on that. I am confident that there is a tight definition of this but at this hour I cannot recall it exactly.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDuke of Montrose
Main Page: Duke of Montrose (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Duke of Montrose's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move this amendment and speak to others standing in my name—namely, Amendments 80, 83, 84 and 85. For those of us who have not had the good fortune to spend our days looking at the wording of the various Acts introduced since 1953 to control unruly public behaviour, I must express my gratitude to Mark Wilcox for giving general access to the Keeling schedule he produced following our amendments in Committee. I am sure this was aimed at Members of your Lordships’ House who are much more familiar with these documents than I am, but it provided some enlightening weekend reading for me, such as what is currently defined as a public place and how this legislation will affect sharply pointed articles—it explained that this is limited to those,
“made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person”,
as stated in Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
There are other provisions which might answer some of my concerns as well, but I wish to enlarge on the problem which my amendments focus on; this looks at what we have just been discussing from the other end—the purchases end. As I have mentioned before, I approach this legislation as someone who has had to carry on a variety of businesses in a rural context, where many sharp instruments and corrosive substances are involved—an area which has been subject to immense changes, both in its purpose and in how it is envisaged. A current complication arises in that there are fewer and fewer people available and there is less access to public transport and other essential services. The strong message we get is that the Government expect us to carry on most of our business digitally and online. As the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, pointed out, it appears that this has not been thought through from the point of view that this Bill could limit the effect of that.
I again declare my remaining interest as the recent president of the National Sheep Association.
I am grateful to my noble friend for his amendments, which return us to the proposed prohibition on the dispatch of bladed products to residential premises and lockers.
I hope I can quickly provide my noble friend with some reassurance on the point he has raised but, before I do so, I would like to answer the point he raised on Report, on 26 February, about the definition of “pointed articles” and whether it includes things like screws carried in someone’s pocket. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to possess in public,
“any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed”,
without,
“good reason or lawful authority”.
Section 141A of the same Act prohibits the sale to under-18s of articles with a sharp point that are,
“made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person”.
The wording “sharply pointed” is used in various parts of the Bill, including Clauses 15 to 17 and Clause 31.
The new offence of arranging delivery to residential premises or a locker is limited to “bladed products”—that is an article which is, or has, a blade and which is capable of causing serious injury by cutting the skin, so does not include pointed articles. It will be for the courts to decide whether an article is sharply pointed, or has a sharp point, in each specific case, but the legislation was clearly never intended to include screws, which are not generally considered to be offensive weapons and which have not been made or adapted for the purposes of causing injury. We are not aware that the definition of pointed articles has caused any problems with the operation of existing offences over the past 30 years.
The amendments in this group would enable bladed products that are used for agricultural or forestry management purposes to be sent by the seller to a solely residential premise. Some agricultural and forestry management items will be caught by the definition of bladed product, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they will no longer be able to be sent to solely residential premises or a locker. However, the definition of residential premise is limited to those premises that are used solely for residential purposes. My noble friend eloquently set out a number of ways that one could demonstrate whether something was also a business address. It will be a matter for the seller of a bladed product to satisfy themselves that the delivery address is not used solely for residential purposes.
This means that bladed products will still be able to be sent to business premises and this includes, importantly, where a business is run from a residential premise. Therefore, bladed products could be sent to a farm, an agricultural supplier or a forestry centre. They could be sent to the home of a person who runs a self-employed forestry business from their home. We have been clear from the outset that deliveries to farms will not be prohibited under the Bill and, in most cases, agricultural and forestry tools will be related to business activities and should not be affected.
Clause 19 also includes a regulation-making power which will enable further defences to be added by secondary legislation if it becomes clear that the prohibition on home delivery is having a particularly negative impact on certain types of business or not-for-profit activities. A defence for agricultural and forestry equipment could therefore be provided if it becomes clear that there is a detrimental impact on this type of trade or activity. However, for the reasons I have set out, we do not currently think that this is necessary.
I hope I have given my noble friend sufficient reassurance that the deliveries of agricultural and forestry equipment should be largely unaffected by the measures in the Bill. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for all her efforts in answering the questions which I have raised from time to time. What she has said has been much more reassuring. It sounds as if a letter to your supplier is critical to whether or not you have a registered business. It does not have to be certified in any way; you can just say to your supplier: “This is my business address”. Maybe that situation is adequate, though there are obviously loopholes.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an interesting point. The amendments were attached to different parts of the Bill. I thought the wording was a little more appropriate in each case, but I would not stand by it terribly much.
I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. We are in a happier position, for those who require blades and pointed instruments, than we were when it started. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, we having been discussing this issue in the Digital Policy Alliance’s age verification and internet safety working group. Being clear on definitions is absolutely essential.
The Minister said in the previous debate about pointed items that it will be up to the courts to decide. Who can afford that? How can people afford to go that far? That is the trouble. The natural reaction of business will be to be overly cautious. That will close down entire avenues of business and inhibit normal people’s ability to carry on with their normal lives. A lack of clarity will cause so much trouble and you will get an awful lot of flak in the papers. I suggest that this group of amendments be taken together so that we can sort something out and produce absolutely clear guidance. We are trying to legislate for only a few outrageous incidents. The trouble is that regulations never prevent what they seek to prohibit. You cannot stop all of this by regulation. Let us make reasonable regulations, which allow normal people to continue with their normal lives. Given that, clarity in the definitions is absolutely essential.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has raised the question of pointed articles possibly being used by troubled people to cause injury. I should like further confirmation of my reading of the Keeling schedule that we were offered. I took great comfort from that. The part of the 1988 Act to do with supplying knives and blades to people aged under 18 refers to,
“a blade which is sharply pointed and which is made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person”.
That, to my mind, rules out an ordinary pointed article. You would have to prove that it had been used or adapted to cause injury.
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Lucas and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for these amendments. My noble friend has been clever about weaving back into last week’s debate on statutory guidance and the one that we have just had on the trusted trader scheme.
I can see that Amendments 81 and 82 attempt to provide further clarity for manufacturers and suppliers of kitchen utensils and to limit the impact of Clause 18 on such companies. As noble Lords will know, I met representatives of some knife manufacturers in Sheffield and I heard at first hand their concerns about this provision. Amendment 81 seeks to assist manufacturers, retailers and others by providing for statutory guidance on which items are covered by the definition of a bladed product. Amendment 82 clearly goes further and excludes from that definition any product “intended for domestic use” that requires a blade to function. As I understand it, the intention is that items such as food processors, and perhaps bread knives and steak knives, could be sent to residential premises if they have been sold remotely. Food processors and similar items are clearly not the sort of things that can be used as offensive weapons and it is not intended that they will be covered by the prohibition on arranging delivery to a residential premises or a locker. Products such as table knives are also excluded from the definition of bladed products because they are not capable of causing serious injury by cutting a person’s skin.
I turn to the wording of Amendment 82. The term “intended for domestic use” perhaps lacks clarity. Although most people would accept that kitchen knives are intended for domestic use, there may be some doubt as to whether hobby knives, camping knives and DIY tools can also be said to be intended for domestic use. I worry that amending the definition in this way could lead to sellers of fairly nasty knives marketing them as purely for domestic use to get around the delivery prohibition. That said, if a prosecution was brought for this offence, it would be for the seller to show that the product did not fall within the scope of the offence as it was intended for domestic use. The approach in Amendment 82 is therefore not without risks and there may be issues around defining what is meant by “domestic purposes”. However, I agree with my noble friend that this is certainly an area where guidance for retailers and others will be beneficial and it is our intention to provide such guidance, exercising the power conferred by Amendment 106, which we debated last week.
I am grateful to my noble friend, Lord Lucas, for these amendments. As he mentioned, we had a very useful discussion on the issues covered by them on 13 February that went through in detail the concerns of collectors and theatrical suppliers.
These amendments would create new defences for the supply and possession of weapons covered by Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, namely flick-knives and gravity knives. The amendments would provide defences for Crown functions and visiting armed forces, for theatrical, film and television production purposes, and for flick-knives and gravity knives made before 1945. As I set out in Committee, Section 1 of the 1959 Act makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or gravity knife and prohibits their importation. Clause 23 extends that prohibition to cover the possession of flick-knives and gravity knives.
I turn first to the proposed defence for Crown functions and visiting armed forces. I am afraid we are not persuaded that a defence is needed in this area. The supply, including importation, of flick-knives and gravity knives has been prohibited for a long time and the Ministry of Defence has advised that there is no need to provide defences for this purpose. We are also not aware of any Crown function that would use flick-knives or gravity knives, unlike under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act where curved swords may be an issue. In any event, the general principle in law is that statutes do not bind the Crown unless by express provision or necessary implication. Where acting as agents or servants of the Crown, the military will benefit from the Crown exemption. The Government are therefore not persuaded that any defence for the Crown or visiting armed forces is needed.
On a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, it was clear at the meeting that the supply of flick-knives and gravity knives for such purposes has not been an issue in the past 60 years, despite their supply being banned. The supplier at the meeting suggested that most of the items used for these purposes are blunt, so it is doubtful they meet the knife definition in the 1959 Act. Given this, again, we are not persuaded that any defence is needed for flick-knives and gravity knives for theatre and film purposes.
I have more sympathy for the proposed defence for flick-knives and gravity knives made before 1945. We are aware that there are collectors of these weapons and we also know that families sometimes inherit them from relatives who fought in the war. Possession of the weapons will be banned under the Bill, so collectors and families will need to surrender any weapons they own and claim compensation, or gift them to a museum where they are of historic importance.
Our concern in accepting a defence for pre-1945 weapons is that it will be difficult to operate on the ground. In contrast to what my noble friend suggested, the police will not know with any certainty which knives had been made before 1945 and which are more modern. I appreciate this is not the answer that my noble friend would like to hear, but given that the supply of the weapons has been banned in this country since 1959 we remain of the view that there is no good reason why anyone should possess them.
Can the noble Baroness reassure me on a question that I raised at Second Reading? Does the Royal Company of Archers, the Queen’s bodyguard in Scotland, qualify for the Crown’s exemption on weapons? I also asked about a rather shady area, which the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is probably more familiar with than I am. Are the Atholl Highlanders taken to be doing historical re-enactments, or are they likely at some point to take up weapons as a legal army?
Given that they are the only private army, but are sanctioned by Her Majesty, after Queen Victoria, I find it a very interesting question.
My Lords, much is being made of the definition of a kirpan. It was said in a meeting with Home Office people that a kirpan is simply a Punjabi word for a sword, and that there is no other need for a definition as it is nothing very different. This has been said again and again, yet the definition is being used as a reason for delay and further consideration, which completely confuses me.
Before my noble friend the Minister sits down, can she give us any examples of how the current legislation allowing for religious reasons has worked out? Have there been cases where it has been cited, and was it effective?
My Lords, following exactly from that point, the Minister has relied on the wording “for religious reasons”, which would be substituted in the Bill by “in religious ceremonies”. By saying that the Government will continue to work on this, is she in fact suggesting that that is inadequate? While I understand the concerns, it seems to me that there is a lot in support of what she has been saying about the use of that phrase.