(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do not believe that to be the intention of the United States. President Obama has made his purpose very clear, but in any case he has now referred this to the United States Congress so I think we have to allow, as the US Administration has called for, the US Congress to make its decision. We had our vote last week, and the US Congress will have its vote, but President Obama is very clear that any action proposed by the United States would be to deter the further use of chemical weapons. I think we can take him at his word on that, and I am not going to criticise him for putting that forward.
Let me return to the diplomatic initiatives the Foreign Secretary mentioned. Will he first offer the House an assurance that the British Government will be urging the attendance of Lakhdar Brahimi at the G20 meeting in order to facilitate a discussion that many of us would judge necessary on Syria? Secondly, will he consider the establishment of a Syrian contact group so that not just Iran but Russia and, indeed, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could, as principal sponsors of the respective sides of this conflict, be engaged in trying to find a way towards Geneva?
To be clear, we expect the discussion on Syria at the G20 to be in a series of bilateral meetings. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the formal agenda of the G20 is set by Russia working with the rest of the G20 and is about a wide range of trading and economic issues. But Syria will dominate the bilateral meetings during the G20, and we would expect it to do so. Of course, we want Mr Brahimi to be involved; we usually facilitate and support his involvement in all critical discussions that take place around the world on these matters, but the right hon. Gentleman must remember the point about the bilateral meetings in St Petersburg, and we continue to work with the core group of the Friends of Syria to promote dialogue in Syria, to try to bring about a peaceful settlement. Ultimately, as other hon. Members have said, there has to be a political solution, and so, of course, we will continue with that work.
I think that the House will be disappointed by an admission from the Foreign Secretary that Lakhdar Brahimi will apparently not be in attendance in St Petersburg and nor will this be on the formal agenda of the grouping of the 20 countries. May I urge the Foreign Secretary to consider requesting the Russian Government to place the issue of Syria at the top of the multilateral agenda? Secondly, does he not accept that there is a fundamental difference between Friends of Syria—those only supporting the rebels—and a contact group, which would contain parties to both sides of the conflict?
I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does understand, from experience, how these meetings are conducted; it is in the bilateral meetings that Syria will be a dominant issue in St Petersburg—and should be. The Prime Minister will, of course, be pursuing it at every possibility and through every channel in St Petersburg, as he has done and as I have done in a whole series of bilateral and multilateral meetings in the past few months. Our problem is not being unable to discuss these things in the international community; it is being unable to agree how we bring about a transitional Government in Syria, formed from the Government and the opposition by mutual consent. There is no shortage of venues and platforms for discussing those things—we have had two and a half years of discussion on this; it is agreement that is elusive, not a forum for discussion.
Yes, absolutely—I give my right hon. Friend that assurance. Notwithstanding the vote last week, the United Kingdom remains highly active in many ways, as we have already discussed in questions, including through our humanitarian assistance and our diplomatic work, in pushing forward the middle east peace process, in our determination to bring about a political settlement in Syria, and in helping the stability of Lebanon and Jordan. The United Kingdom must always play a strong role in international affairs, including by helping to bring stability to the middle east.
A few moments ago, the Foreign Secretary mentioned his support for the drafting of a new constitution in Egypt. What is the view of the British Government on recent reports that the interim Government in Egypt are considering a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood?
I merely referred to the fact that the constitution is being drafted, rather than expressing my support for it; we will have to see what is in it. Attempts in Egypt and elsewhere to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood will be a mistake in the long term. Quite apart from the obvious considerations about human rights and democracy, I do not think that they will bring long-term stability to Egypt. It is important that Egypt’s democracy is inclusive. Egyptian leaders, in a very polarised society, have to find a way towards that. We hope that the constitution will be drafted in an inclusive way that allows for a participatory democracy in which a wide range of views can be represented.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it.
I come first to events in Egypt. Although the events of the past two weeks have been a major setback for democracy, they need not represent an irreversible trend. The role of the military in any democracy must be both clearly defined and subject to Executive oversight, so the priority must now be a return to civilian rule through a credible transition process that results in swift, fair and free elections. I welcome the recent statement by interim president Mansour setting a deadline for new elections to be held before February 2014. However, recent reports suggest that not all parties have accepted that process, and there have been recent statements from the Muslim Brotherhood apparently refusing to take part. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that it is vital that the transition process from interim to full civilian government must be inclusive and representative if it is to be seen to be legitimate?
Recent reports of the arrest and imprisonment of political activists, representatives and journalists in Egypt are deeply concerning, including reports today about Egypt’s prosecutor’s office issuing warrants for a number of people affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Will the Foreign Secretary make clear the British Government’s position on political prisoners in Egypt?
Egypt’s long-term future will be secured not simply by an end to violence but also by the start of economic recovery. The Foreign Secretary spoke of the Deauville partnership. How much of the $38 billion originally intended from that fund, as cited in his answer to me in October 2011, has now been allocated? If he cannot give the figure this afternoon, will he place a note in the Library setting out the allocation figures?
I turn to the ongoing crisis in Syria. I welcome, of course, the confirmation of the uplift in the UK’s commitment to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis, but the situation is none the less deteriorating. Only this morning, the Intelligence and Security Committee published a report that expresses “serious concern” about al-Qaeda elements gaining access to the “vast stockpiles” of chemical weapons within Syria. It is therefore a matter of real regret that the recent G8 summit in Northern Ireland, hosted by the United Kingdom, failed to deliver the breakthrough that we all wanted to see in relation to Syria. We all hoped that a firm date would be set for the start of Geneva 2, but even that was missing from the final communiqué. Will the Foreign Secretary set out a little more specifically what he judges the prospects to be for Geneva 2 being convened in the weeks and months ahead? I welcome his commitment that the Prime Minister intends to recall Parliament and call for a vote on a substantive motion if any decision is taken by the Government to send lethal military equipment to the Syrian opposition.
May I ask the Foreign Secretary about Jordan? It seemed a curious omission from his statement. Jordan has been a long-standing ally of the United Kingdom. I am aware that humanitarian support is being provided to Za’atari and other camps in Jordan. May I press him on what consideration the Government are giving to what other practical assistance and support can be provided to Jordan, beyond humanitarian support? The country is feeling the strain, given the extraordinary generosity it has shown during the crisis.
On the middle east peace process, we welcome the recent efforts by US Secretary of State John Kerry to bring parties together and reinvigorate the stalled talks. On departing from Israel last week, after the last of his five visits to the region alone this year, Secretary Kerry spoke of important, though not irreversible, progress that has already been made. We welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement of support for this process, but will he set out what specific steps the British Government are taking to ensure that negotiations are urgently begun as part of Secretary Kerry’s efforts?
These negotiations take place at a time of great upheaval and uncertainty in the wider region. We welcome the election of President Rohani, but there are key steps he must now be prepared to take if the ongoing nuclear crisis is to be resolved. I echo the sentiments expressed by the Foreign Secretary: a nuclear-armed Iran is not simply a threat to Israel, but a risk to all nations. The Government will have our support in pushing the E5 plus 1 talks that have regrettably so far not yielded sufficient progress.
In conclusion, the Foreign Secretary’s statement comes at a time of almost unprecedented uncertainty across the middle east and north Africa. This transformative time of upheaval, revolution and conflict poses fundamental questions not just for the Foreign Secretary, but for policy makers across the region. That should therefore add to the urgency of efforts being made to try to resolve the ongoing and apparently intractable conflicts that have for too long defined the history of the region.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. On most if not all these subjects, there is strong agreement across the Floor of the House.
I absolutely agree with the way in which the right hon. Gentleman put the Opposition’s attitude on Egypt. What has happened may be a setback for democracy, but it need not be an irreversible trend. That is absolutely right. He is right to point out that some parties in Egypt have not agreed to the timetable of parliamentary and presidential elections set out by the new president in the constitutional declaration. In fact, worryingly, most of them have not agreed, including the National Salvation Front, which was one of the prime movers behind last week’s events. There were widespread objections to the details of the announcement. As he said, this cannot be resolved in any other way than an inclusive legitimate process inside Egypt. We therefore call on all parties to do that.
It would be a terrible mistake for the authorities in Egypt to act in a way that drives the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other legitimate party, out of democratic politics. That mistake must be avoided at all costs. It would also be a mistake, however, for the Muslim Brotherhood to now refuse, under all circumstances, to take part in democratic politics in the months and years ahead. All nations who hold dear the stability and future of Egypt, as we do, have to encourage people, whether the Muslim Brotherhood or the new authorities, to resolve these differences and counsel against making those mistakes. Part of that is about releasing prisoners. I agree about that and I made that point to the acting Foreign Minister of Egypt. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire, pursued the point with the Egyptian ambassador just this morning. Prisoners should be released unless criminal charges are to be laid. The holding of prisoners for political purposes after these events does not help the process.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the Deauville partnership. I am happy to provide to him, or to the Library, more details. The $38 billion was not a fund, but the total financing from all global institutions available to the countries of the region if and when they pursue economic policies that give them access to it. One of the problems of the outgoing Government in Egypt was that they did not agree an IMF programme, and therefore did not win international financial support. The part of the Deauville partnership that involves funds that can be given away is much smaller. We have been determined, during our presidency of the G8, to make a tangible difference, and this year the Deauville partnership transition fund has started to deliver practical support. Projects of more than $100 million have been approved, and these principally support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. This is the part that is a fund, but potential international financing is vastly greater, if the right economic reforms are undertaken.
I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s comments on Iran. Again, I think there is strong agreement across the House and support for a further round of E3 plus 3 negotiations with its new Government. There is also strong agreement on the middle east peace process. I have set out in the House previously that we have to be ready, in the UK and in other European countries, once negotiations get going, to offer incentives or even disincentives at times during the negotiations for Israelis and Palestinians to try to make them a success, working with the United States. First, we have to get the negotiations going. We have been urging Israeli and Palestinian leaders to take the opportunity to work with John Kerry, stressing that there is no alternative. No one other than the United States has the necessary authority to bring Israel to the necessary agreements, to enter negotiations and make a success of them. Working with John Kerry is essential, and we await further announcements in the coming weeks.
On Syria and a date for Geneva, there is no date at the moment. After the G8, a trilateral meeting was held between the US, Russia and the UN in Geneva on 25 June, which again did not produce a date. The fundamental problem is that while the regime is engaged in military offences, as it is now in Homs, it does not have an incentive to come to meaningful negotiations, and neither is the opposition in a frame of mind to come to negotiations. Those military offences are making it harder for either party to come to Geneva.
Jordan was not an omission from my statement—I referred to our humanitarian assistance. I have also referred in the past to the other assistance we are giving Jordan. We have sent military equipment to help the Jordanian armed forces operate on the border, collecting refugees and bringing them to refugee camps. We have £1.5 million going to Jordan through our Arab Partnership fund to support civil society. We are in regular contact with Jordan. I spoke to the Jordanian Foreign Minister earlier this week, in particular to thank him for Jordan’s assistance with the recent mutual legal assistance treaty. I also made it clear to him that we are happy to give further assistance from the UK, if the Jordanians ask for it.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberLet me begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Stockton South (James Wharton) on achieving first place in the ballot and on introducing this Bill.
Any judgment about an in/out referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union has to be based on what is in the national interest. We do not believe that an in/out referendum in 2017, as anticipated in the hon. Gentleman’s Bill, is in the national interest. The Bill reflects an arbitrary date unrelated to the likely timetable of major treaty change, it represents an unrealistic and uncertain negotiating strategy, and it is brought forward by a party divided between those seeking consent and those seeking exit.
I will give way in a moment or two, but let me make a little progress.
Only this week, the hon. Member for Stockton South faced criticism from none other than one of his own Conservative councillors, who called it
“a cynical, pointless stunt, nothing more”.
The Conservative councillor for Yarm and Kirklevington went on to say:
“I think it should have been something to get the economy moving or to speed up help to get women into work.”
I could not have put it better myself.
Surely the right hon. Gentleman and his party must accept some responsibility for this uncertainty. In 2012 they cheated the British public with a tidying-up exercise on the Lisbon treaty, and now, again, there has been a broken contract with the British public. This Bill is a full contract with the British public that they have confidence in. I hope that he would at least go back and establish a bit of trust with the public on this matter.
I sense that the hon. Lady is so used to attacking the Government of 2012 that she has forgotten it was a Conservative Government.
Let me keep going and make a little progress.
Let us get to the nub of the argument advanced by the hon. Member for Stockton South about why this Bill is before the House today. The Bill is not being debated because Conservative Back Benchers trust the public; it is being debated because Conservative Back Benchers do not trust the Prime Minister. That is the reality.
Can the shadow Foreign Secretary explain why he believes that a Scottish independence referendum is not in the national interest but voted for the Bill to allow it to happen, yet believes that this Bill is not in the national interest and will not vote for it to become law? Where is the consistency there? He is saying that it is good enough for the people of Scotland to have a referendum but not good enough for the rest of the country.
Let me try to help the hon. Gentleman with his understanding of devolution and, indeed, democracy. The last time I checked, there was an election in Scotland in 2010 that resulted in the Scottish National party, which had committed to a referendum in its manifesto, securing a majority in the Scottish Parliament. By contrast, not one of the principal political parties that stood at the last general election in the United Kingdom and secured representation in this House advanced what is proposed in this Bill. There is a fundamental difference because a majority was secured in the Scottish Parliament.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give this House an absolute assurance on behalf of the Labour party that it will not change its mind about opposing a referendum for the British people before the next election?
We have maintained our position that any judgment in relation to an in/out referendum has to be based on the national interest. Our judgment is that the national interest is not served by this Bill, and that is why we do not support it. If there is a leader of a political party who has changed his position on a referendum, I think I am looking at him right now.
I am keen to make a little progress, and then I will happily take further interventions.
I just mentioned the Prime Minister, so let us remember how far he has travelled. This is what he said at the Conservative party conference when he became leader:
“For too long, we were having a different conversation. Instead of talking about the things that most people care about, we talked about what we cared about most. While parents worried about childcare, getting the kids to school, balancing work and family life—we were banging on about Europe.”
Three years into government, this is a Conservative party still banging on about Europe—a party talking to itself and not to the country.
Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an indication of what a Labour Government would do, were this country to have the misfortune of him and his colleagues assuming power in 2015, if this Bill becomes law, which the British people want, and many of his hon. Friends want, as well as us? Will he undertake that they will not seek to repeal legislation passed today?
Many people who have advocated the position taken in this Bill have argued in the past that, given the sovereignty of Westminster, no Parliament can bind its successor. There are a number of stages of scrutiny that the Bill needs to go through, so it is a little presumptuous to presume that it will reach the statute book today.
Let me try to make a little progress.
For many years, Conservatives have argued for national Parliaments to have a greater say in European affairs, yet since 1997 all previous Bills that legislated for referendums that actually took place have had their stages debated on the Floor of the House, including a Committee of the whole House. Instead of that, with this private Member’s Bill the Conservatives are apparently planning to try to cut short the time that we have to debate it. It seems that the Government are willing to let it progress without going through these vital stages. That should be a matter of regret for all Members who continually assert the importance and sovereignty of Westminster.
The right hon. Gentleman says that he does not want a referendum in 2017. When does he want a referendum? Why did his party support a referendum on a monkey in Hartlepool but will not support a referendum for the British people on the European Union?
If there is a significant transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Brussels, there will be a referendum; that is the law of the land. It is not a matter of opposition to referendums in principle.
I had better try to make a little progress.
No doubt when the Foreign Secretary gets to his feet in a few moments’ time he will make a characteristically witty and engaging speech; there is certainly material available to him. However, we all know that he has been drawn into supporting this Bill out of weakness, not strength. In November 2011, he argued that committing then to an in/out referendum would put the economy at risk, undermine jobs and growth, and compromise vital British interests. This is what he said on that occasion—
I think it is important that hon. Gentlemen listen so that they understand where their Front Benchers were then and so that we might understand where they have ended up.
In November 2011, the Foreign Secretary said:
“a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, especially at this time of profound economic uncertainty, is not the answer.”
At that time, he also said at the Dispatch Box:
“The deficits of recent years, and the slowness of growth in all western economies, make this a difficult and uncertain time for many individuals and firms. The eurozone is clearly in crisis, and to pile on that uncertainty the further uncertainty of a referendum on leaving the European Union, when half the foreign direct investment into Britain comes from the rest of the European Union, and half our exports go out to the rest of the European Union, would not be a responsible action for Her Majesty’s Government to take.”
Further to that, does my right hon. Friend agree that, although many Conservative Back Benchers say they support the Prime Minister, in reality they do not want renegotiation; they want us to get out?
I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. The difficulty for the Prime Minister was that his attempt to secure brittle unity in his January speech was achieved only through the device of obscurity. We have heard it again today in relation to employment and social rights. We have all read the Beecroft report and know that the real agenda is to bring powers home to take rights away, but the Prime Minister could not even find it in himself to talk about unemployment and social rights in his speech at the end of January. The fact is that he knows and understands that the gap between what his Back Benchers want and what Europe could possibly countenance remains achingly wide.
Let me return to the Foreign Secretary, who back in November went on to say about a referendum:
“It would not help anyone looking for a job. It would not help any business trying to expand. It would mean that for a time, we, the leading advocates of removing barriers to trade in Europe and the rest of the world, would lack the authority to do so.”
That last point seemed to pass the Prime Minister by when he made his point in County Fermanagh 10 days ago. The Foreign Secretary went on to say:
“It would mean that as we advocate closer trading links between the EU and the countries of north Africa as they emerge from their revolutions, helping to solidify tremendous potential advances in human freedom and prosperity, we would stand back from that. That is not the right way to respond to this dramatic year of uncertainty and change.”—[Official Report, 24 October 2011; Vol. 534, c. 55.]
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon), he actually clarified Labour’s position a little. If I heard him correctly, he said that his view was that if there was a substantial change in the relationship, the law provided for a referendum. Will he therefore confirm that if there were a Labour Government and there were no substantial change to the relationship, there would not be a referendum on our membership of the European Union?
I was simply making the straightforward point that, given the terms of the sovereignty clause, there is no objection in principle to referendums, because we are mandated—indeed, it is the law of the land—in such a way that if there is a transfer of sovereignty a referendum will take place.
When the Foreign Secretary makes his speech, will he provide a view on the following quotation? We heard from his Department back in November 2011, in answer to a parliamentary question I posed him:
“European markets account for half of the UK’s overall trade and foreign investments and as a result, around 3.5 million jobs in the UK are linked to the export of goods and services to the EU.”—[Official Report, 12 July 2011; Vol. 531, c. 256W.]
When I asked the Foreign Office the same question last week, it decided to pass it to the Treasury—I see that the Chancellor has left his place on the Front Bench—which came back with the intriguing reply that the Government have made no estimate. Well, there we are—that’s leadership for you.
What is to be made of that answer? The Government have gone from such a positive estimate just 11 months ago to being unable to give any estimate of the economic benefits of Europe today. One would almost think that they are frightened of facts, because facts are intolerable to their own Back Benchers.
Incidentally, I have a further point for the Foreign Secretary to consider when he makes his speech. Do he and the Prime Minister agree with their Cabinet colleague the Secretary of State for Education, who is also not in his place on the Front Bench but who said the following—this is a direct quote—about our membership of the European Union:
“Life outside would be perfectly tolerable, we could contemplate it, there would be certain advantages.”
Is that the view of the Government? Perhaps that is the answer being passed to the Foreign Secretary.
Then, as now, our judgment is that the priority must be to deliver stability, jobs and growth for the British economy. In fact, the irony is that even the Bill’s proposer has himself acknowledged that Parliament should be focusing on more important things. In a press conference on 15 May in Westminster, he said:
“I think the reality is that we need to be seen to be talking about the things that matter to people in places like Stockton South that I represent on Teesside, which is the cost of living, immigration, jobs, the economy, things that we need to get right to improve people's lives.”
I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. There has been a lot of talk this morning about the national interest. I have been listening to the director general of the CBI, who has said that the most important thing in the British national interest is to bang the drum for Britain’s interests in Europe. Does my right hon. Friend think it would be easier to hear that drum if we were in the room fighting for British interests or if we ran away after shutting the door, as some in the Government seem to want to do?
I find myself in agreement with my hon. Friend. It is not simply the head of the CBI who is saying that. Some of the most distinguished leaders of British business, including Richard Branson, WPP and a range of others, wrote to the Financial Times in January in response to the Prime Minister’s speech. They made very clear their deep concern about the reality of the negotiating strategy, which the Prime Minister cannot even be explicit about with his own Back Benchers, because if he is explicit on this side of the channel it is deemed unacceptable on the other side of the channel.
My right hon. Friend has paid tribute to the impeccable oratorical skills of the Foreign Secretary and I agree with him on that, but is he looking forward, as I am, to hearing him argue his way out of the impeccable logic he has displayed in the past—his quotations apply as much today as they did back then—not least when 3.5 million jobs in the UK are dependent on our membership of the EU? I look forward to hearing the Foreign Secretary deploy his impeccable rhetorical skills to explain how black is now white.
I think we are all looking forward to that, but let us stick to the theme of the economy. Since November 2011, when the Foreign Office was at least willing to answer my question about the economic benefits—it now seems to have lost its nerve in the face of Tory intransigence—the number of people claiming jobseeker’s allowance for two years has increased by a staggering 173%. In the past six months alone, there has been zero growth in the economy. Since the Chancellor’s first spending review of 2010, the UK economy has grown by just 1%, compared with the 6% forecast at the time and the growth of nearly 3% in Germany and nearly 5% in the United States. Today almost 1 million young people are unable to find work and long-term unemployment is up by more than 100,000 since the last general election. This is the slowest economic recovery in the United Kingdom for more than 100 years. That is the reality of what people are talking about in constituencies the length and breadth of the country.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary seem to be prepared to put at risk the jobs and investment that Europe brings just to satisfy the obsessions of their Back Benchers?
None of us doubts that Europe needs substantive change or that there needs to be reform; the tragedy for the United Kingdom is that the intransigence of the Conservative Back Benchers behind the Prime Minister means that he cannot address those needs in a sensible, straightforward manner. He did not wake up in January with a sudden democratic impulse that had somehow eluded him in the preceding years. He is being driven by weakness, not strength. This is about external electoral threats and internal leadership threats. This is not about trusting the people; it is about these Back Benchers not trusting the Prime Minister.
I will not give way, because I want to make progress. The Conservative approach to Europe undermines the prospects for growth, because, as my hon. Friend has just made clear, it creates unnecessary uncertainty that could undermine investment, because it risks Britain sleepwalking to the exit of the European Union precisely when the economic benefits of membership are most needed, given the stagnating economy. At least we have the courage to acknowledge that membership of the European Union is vital to the economy of the United Kingdom, not least because of the benefits of free trade and integration in the world’s largest trading bloc.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. He is a reasonable fellow, but what he does not seem to grasp is the fact that this debate—this issue—is about the principle of a referendum, not the relative merits of in or out. He also seems to fail to understand that this is about trust between politicians in general and the British electorate, given that too many promises have been broken in the past, including Labour’s promise of a referendum when it came to the EU constitution and Lisbon. Why will the Labour party not trust the people on this issue?
Why does the Conservative party not trust the Conservative Prime Minister? When will it release the Downing Street One? That is the question. He is sitting on the Front Bench like a hostage, not a leader.
Let me address the hon. Gentleman’s point. He was generous enough to describe me as a reasonable fellow and I return the compliment. As a reasonable fellow, he will be keen to defend and protect the jobs of his many constituents who work at places like Ford’s Dunton technical centre. I am sure that he is concerned for those jobs. Perhaps when he has the opportunity to speak he will explain to them why the European chief executive of Ford has said:
“All countries should have their sovereignty, but don’t discuss leaving a trading partner where 50pc of your exports go… That would be devastating for the UK economy.”
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman’s constituents will be very interested in that.
I am keen to make a little progress.
I believe that the case for membership of the European Union is clear and, as I have acknowledged, that the case for change is clear. That is why reform and not exit is the right road for the UK.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
I am keen to make a little progress. I have been generous in taking interventions.
In the face of such a severe economic crisis, Europe needs to be better focused on promoting growth across the continent. That is the priority for national Governments and that should be reflected at a European level. There is of course pressing work to be done, on which I hope there is cross-party agreement, such as the completion of the single market and its extension into digital, energy and finance. The rescue of the currency, protections for the single market and the revival of the prospects for growth should be Europe’s priorities for change.
On so many issues that matter—jobs, growth, trade and security in central Europe and the middle east—the EU remains an indispensable force multiplier for all its members. That includes the United Kingdom. Our membership gives us access to the single market, a stronger voice on international trade and amplified influence on international diplomacy. That is why, when today’s spectacle of a Tory party talking to itself is long forgotten, we will continue to make the case for Britain’s place in Europe and for change in Europe.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a valid point, but it is possible to argue that in both directions. As I said a moment ago, it is important to have at Geneva sufficient groups and sufficient powers to be able to make a workable and sustainable settlement of the conflict in Syria, but there is a balance between that and including those powers or groups that would make a settlement to the conflict impossible. None of Iran’s actions to date on Syria has been in the interests of promoting a solution or political settlement.
The Foreign Secretary has just reiterated the Government’s support for a Geneva II conference. Will he set out for the House whether he believes that the UK’s supplying arms to elements of the Syrian opposition would increase the likelihood of those talks taking place—or, indeed, succeeding—and how, if he and the Prime Minister decided to pursue that course of action, he would be able to provide assurances to the House on the likely end use of UK-supplied weapons?
We have not taken any decision about that, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. As he also knows, I have said in the House before that if we did so, it would be in certain circumstances: in conjunction with other countries, in carefully controlled circumstances and always in accordance with international law and our own national law. But we have taken no such decision to do so. We are clear that to save lives and promote a political solution it is necessary to give more support to the national coalition of the sort we have announced before in the House. That remains our position, and we believe it helps a political solution.
We always knew the Foreign Secretary was a brilliant man; now we know he is also psychic.
The Foreign Secretary said in answer to an earlier question that he would judge President-elect Rouhani on his actions. What specific actions will he be seeking from the Iranian regime and the newly elected Iranian President himself, in order for them to demonstrate in the months ahead a renewed commitment to resolving the nuclear crisis by peaceful and diplomatic means?
There are two main aspects to that. One is to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency’s transparency requirements, some of which I mentioned in detail when answering the urgent question in the House yesterday. That includes addressing the issue of the heavy water reactor at Arak and meeting the requirements for information across a wide range of matters that the IAEA has set out. The other thing is to respond constructively to the offer from the E3 plus 3 that has been on the table since February, and which would allow us to make a very significant start to defusing the tensions over the nuclear issue and resolving it. The new Administration in Iran will be judged on those two things.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it this afternoon. The House will be aware that on Saturday the Opposition, along with other Members of this House, called for the Foreign Secretary to address Parliament today, and we welcome his decision to do so in recognition of the depth of public concern that has arisen in recent days.
I begin my remarks by echoing the words of the Foreign Secretary and put on record the support and admiration of the whole House for the important—indeed, vital—work that is done by our country’s intelligence and security services. Theirs is some of the most important but inevitably least recognised work undertaken to protect the security of our nation, and it is right that we take the opportunity to offer our thanks and praise for their efforts. Our intelligence agencies’ work would be made more difficult if levels of concern about the framework under which they operate were to compromise the active support of the public for their efforts. In the light of that, I shall quote back to the Foreign Secretary his words in a BBC interview yesterday:
“if you are a law abiding citizen of this country going about your business and your personal life, you have nothing to fear—nothing to fear about the British state or intelligence agencies listening to the contents of your phone calls or anything like that.”
This assertion, however, assumes that the state is either incapable of error or incapable of advertent or inadvertent wrongdoing.
Surely, on reflection, the Foreign Secretary will accept that law-abiding citizens of this country also want to know and be assured of the fact that the agencies of government are themselves law-abiding. Back in 2011, the Foreign Secretary seemed to recognise the importance of this point when in a speech on the role of the Security Services he said that
“the need for secrecy places additional importance on the Foreign Secretary’s accountability to Parliament for GCHQ and SIS. This is one of the indispensable foundations of public confidence, and one that I will personally strive to strengthen.”
Today presents him with a clear opportunity to deliver on that pledge, and I hope that in his answers to my specific questions he will be able to do so.
The Foreign Secretary is right to assume that lawyers, some law-makers and the members of the ISC may be very familiar with the framework of legality and accountability, but the general public, for understandable reasons, are not. In the light of that, will he take the opportunity of his response to remind the House of the steps we in Parliament have taken to preserve privacy, and set out whether all steps taken by our agencies are, to the best of his knowledge, compliant with those laws? It is in this spirit, not of condemnation but of concern, that I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary some questions about the recent allegations first revealed by The Guardian on Friday of last week about the existence and operation of the so-called Prism programme administered by the NSA.
Let me first make it clear that the Opposition support the principle of information sharing across international borders with allies. Indeed, the people who want to do harm to the UK work across international borders, and those people working to keep us safe have to be able to work with allies across international borders if they are to tackle these threats effectively. But that needs to be within that established framework of both law and accountability. The Foreign Secretary is right to say that full disclosure on this issue is not possible nor appropriate, so let me focus my questions not on the specific operational aspect of the allegations, but on the broader legal and policy frameworks that would apply in these circumstances.
Earlier this morning, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), gave his account of the legal framework that would govern British intelligence agencies’ use of intercept data. He said:
“If the British intelligence agencies are seeking to know the content of emails about people living in the UK then they actually have to get lawful authority. Normally that means ministerial authority. That applies equally whether they are going to do the intercept themselves or whether they are going to ask somebody else to do it on their behalf.”
Will the Foreign Secretary confirm whether that account of the current legal framework is both complete and accurate?
In his statement, the Foreign Secretary has just stated: “Any data obtained by us from the United States involving UK nationals are subject to proper UK statutory controls and safeguards, including the relevant sections of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.” Will he now set out the relevant sections of those Acts, and confirm whether this explanation means that any data obtained by us from the US, involving UK nationals, are authorised by ministerial warrants and overseen by the intercept commissioner, as set out by RIPA?
Specifically, what legal framework applies in the following two cases? First, when a request is made by the UK to an intelligence agency of an international ally for the interception of the content of private communications, will he confirm whether this process is governed by individual warrants signed by the relevant Secretary of State and approved by the intercept commissioner as set out in part I of RIPA? Secondly, will he address the specific issue of when a request is made by the UK to an intelligence agency of an international ally, not to seek intercept, but instead to search existing data held by that agency on the contents of private communications, and, in particular, the legal process that will be adopted in such an instance? In that circumstance, will he confirm whether this process is also governed by individual warrants signed by the relevant Secretary of State and approved by the intercept commissioner as set out in part I of RIPA?
Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that, with respect to intelligence sharing with allies, the UK Government operate on the basis of the assumption that information held by, for example, the US Government, has been obtained in accordance with the law of that country? If that is the case, what steps has he taken, or will take, to confirm that any processes currently in use by the NSA continue to adhere to this legal safeguard?
Order. The shadow Foreign Secretary has now exceeded his allotted time, so I feel sure that he is in his last sentence.
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
To conclude, all of us in this House have an interest in sustaining public confidence in the work of the intelligence agencies. Those agencies, each and every day, do outstanding work on behalf of and for the sake of us all. That is why Ministers and the ISC now have a heavy burden of responsibility to oversee and scrutinise their work, so as to reassure the public.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman and pleased that he began his remarks by expressing the support and admiration across the House for the work of the intelligence agencies. Many former Ministers from the previous Government—indeed, there are some specific ones here today—know that well. He was right to say that the work of those agencies is among the most important and least recognised that goes into protecting this country, so there is strong common ground across the House on that.
The right hon. Gentleman said that we should be able, now and in future, to give people assurances about the law-abiding nature of the work of the agencies, which of course is a large part of the purpose of what I have just explained to the House. I am not saying that the agencies, anyone who works in them or, indeed, Ministers are incapable of error—that can happen in any organisation—but I am arguing that there is a strong system of checks and balances. A combination of ministerial oversight, independent scrutiny, parliamentary oversight, the legal framework and the strong ethical framework of the agencies themselves minimises the chance of errors happening in any sinister way.
Sometimes people can get the impression, when reading discussions in the media about this, that there is a danger of a “deep state” that is in some way out of control. There is not that danger in the United Kingdom. Of course everyone is capable of error, but the protection of this country’s citizens from such error is very strong indeed. I must stress that there will always be ways of improving procedures—many improvements have been made in recent years, under successive Administrations—and there are always new situations that arise in intelligence gathering that require additions to or the refinement of the legal basis of what we do and the practices and procedures by which we do that work. I do not argue at all that everything is definitely perfect, and certainly not for all time, with regard to whether in future there could be any improvements in procedures in some areas, because I am sure that there could be. The Intelligence and Security Committee will be able to look at that and make recommendations if it so wishes, and of course within the Government that is something that is constantly looked at and subject to change.
The right hon. Gentleman is right that there is no reason why the general public would be familiar with the framework I have set out for the House. I was the first Foreign Secretary to make a speech, in November 2011—it might have been widely unnoticed in the House—about the role of secret intelligence in foreign policy, in which I set out for the public what the guarantees are and what the legal framework is. This, in a way, is an opportunity to set that out clearly to the country.
The right hon. Gentleman was right to say that he supports information sharing with our allies. The position on the legal framework is exactly as I set out in my statement: any data obtained by us from the United States about UK nationals are subject to the full range of Acts, including section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the RIPA provisions, set out in sections 15 and 16, which regulate that information gathering must be necessary and proportionate and regulate how the agencies must handle information when they obtain it.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s further questions about how authority is given, I cannot give him, for reasons that I cannot explain in public, as detailed an answer as he would like. I would love to give him what could actually be a very helpful answer, but because circumstances and procedures vary according to the situation, I do not want to give a categorical answer—in a small respect circumstances might differ occasionally. But I can say that ministerial oversight and independent scrutiny is there, and there is scrutiny of the ISC in all these situations, so, again, the idea that operations are carried out without ministerial oversight, somehow getting around UK law, is mistaken. I am afraid that I cannot be more specific than that.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it? However, may I begin my remarks by asking him about a procedural point: why, given a Minister’s obligation to the House and the importance of this announcement, were the details, including the wording of the statement of regret, the scale of the quantum agreed and details of the legal background to the settlement, all provided to the newspapers yesterday before they were to the House of Commons today? A full report appeared on The Guardian website at 6.42 yesterday evening and on The Times website at 7.30 yesterday evening. I hope that in his response the Foreign Secretary will offer the House a candid explanation as to why that occurred.
Let me turn to the substance of the matter in the Foreign Secretary’s statement. First, may I place on record the cross-party consensus that exists on this issue and offer my support for the Foreign Secretary’s efforts in seeing a legal settlement being agreed? Much has already been said of the suffering on all sides that lies at the heart of today’s announcements. On 20 October 1952, Governor Baring signed an order declaring a state of emergency in Kenya. The violence that followed, carried out by both sides in the conflict, has been well documented, not least thanks to the brave and tragic testimony of many survivors who lived through it. As the Foreign Secretary said, there were hundreds of casualties among the British soldiers, police and officials, but during the period of emergency in Kenya most of the victims and casualties were Kenyan, with many thousands of Mau Mau members killed, and thousands more imprisoned and displaced. It is therefore right that the Foreign Secretary recognised the challenges and dangers that British personnel in Kenya faced at that time, but the mass detention camps, the forced resettlement and the levels of brutality that characterised that period in Kenyan history must also be recognised. The numbers of dead and those not accounted for is, of course, still debated, but I think there is broad consensus in all parts of this House that the scale of the suffering was profound and deeply regrettable.
That is why I welcome today’s statement by the Foreign Secretary and want to echo his words acknowledging that Kenyans were tortured and mistreated by the colonial administration. I also want to support further today’s expression of deep regret and unreserved condemnation of those actions. The British Government are right to reflect on our country’s colonial past, not simply because the legacy of our past is still being felt today, but because we must look to history, learn its lessons and use them to help chart a course going forward. All parts of this House share an interest in seeing this issue resolved, which is why today I wish to put on record my support for the right hon. Gentleman’s work over recent months to press for a fair resolution as Foreign Secretary.
So we support the announcements made today in the Foreign Secretary’s statement, but I seek his clarification on a number of issues that arise as a result. First, could he confirm to the House which departmental budget is funding the £19.9 million of which he spoke, which makes up the full and final settlement announced today? Will he also set out what meetings his Department has had with representatives of the Mau Mau claimants, and could he update the House as to their collective view of and response to today’s announcement? Indeed, will he further explain what he anticipates will be the response of the Kenyan Government, in particular, to today’s announcement?
The British Government must continue, of course, to be categorical in their condemnation of torture and ill treatment, which are abhorrent violations of human dignity. It is right that current and future relations with Kenya are not overshadowed by the past. So, along with the Foreign Secretary, I hope that today’s announcement will encourage even stronger ties between our two nations going forward, despite, but not ignoring, our shared and, at times, troubled past.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I agree that the cross-party approach is important. These claims were first made in 2009, under the last Government, and the last Government decided to contest them in the courts. That was the right decision, because all of us together contest the liability of British taxpayers in the 21st century for what happened under colonial administrations. However, we are also right to support this settlement together, because it is the best outcome all round for both the British taxpayer and the claimants. Many of the claimants are of course very old, and further protracted legal proceedings would not necessarily be in their interests.
The right hon. Gentleman asked, quite rightly, about reports in the press. As I think he and the House recognise, I am an enthusiast for announcing things to Parliament. While I am not in a position to point a finger of accusation at anyone, I note that, in view of the nature of the settlement, information about it had been circulated beyond the Government before today. I also note that some of the figures given in newspaper reports are different from the figures that I have given today, and have clearly not come from the Foreign Office. However, the right hon. Gentleman was absolutely right to make the point that such announcements are best made to Parliament in the first instance. He was also right to join in the sincere regret that the Government have expressed: it will mean a great deal in Kenya that regret has been expressed by the Opposition as well as by the Government.
Let me turn to the specific questions that the right hon. Gentleman asked. The claim will not be met by any departmental budget; it is a claim on the Treasury reserve. That is what the reserve is for—to provide lump sums that cannot be anticipated or budgeted for.
The right hon. Gentleman asked what meetings the Government had had. This matter has been a subject of legal proceedings for four years, and the meetings that have been held with the aim of reaching a settlement have taken place with the lawyers of the claimants. From that it can be deduced that the claimants are happy with the settlement. Certainly the lawyers have expressed satisfaction on their behalf.
The Kenyan Government called for a settlement, and it is now for them to react to this settlement in whatever way they wish, but I hope that they will welcome it. The British high commissioner in Nairobi has met the Kenyan human rights commission and representatives of the Mau Mau in recent weeks, and, as I said in my statement, he will be speaking to Mau Mau veterans today, in particular about our plans for a memorial. However, all the contact in London has been with the lawyers.
Let me say again that, like the right hon. Gentleman, I believe that stronger ties between our countries are very important. Kenya is an important partner of this country in trade and tourism, and also—this is particularly important—in countering terrorism and seeking stability in east Africa. We work with Kenya closely in trying to bring stability to Somalia, for instance. I hope that the settlement will make it easier for us to do all those things in the future.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Foreign Secretary for coming to the House and giving his statement, and for advance sight of that statement. We have all watched events unfold in Syria with increasing horror, yet the whole House has not had the opportunity to discuss the conflict in Syria for some weeks.
Let me begin my questions with the key issue of arming the rebels, which in recent months the Prime Minister has suggested is key to “tipping the balance” and creating peace in Syria. Indeed, in his statement today the Foreign Secretary added: “The case for further amendments to the EU arms embargo on Syria is compelling, in order to increase the pressure on the regime and give us the flexibility to respond to continued radicalisation and conflict. We have to be open to every way of strengthening moderates and saving lives”. This signal should not surprise us. Indeed, in recent weeks, there have been newspaper reports of a confidential document that sets out a range of options that would allow the UK to send lethal support to Syria’s opposition. The Foreign Secretary has again chosen his words carefully today, but I believe that the risk of a decade-long sectarian civil war in Syria, fuelled in part by weapons supplied by the UK, should give him serious pause for thought before embracing that course.
The struggle in Syria today is between forces funded and armed by outside sponsors, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran. Also participating are foreign religious groups that are not directly controlled by their sponsors, namely the Sunni Salafist and Iranian-aligned militias, together with intensely anti-western al-Qaeda fighters. I would therefore be grateful if the Foreign Secretary addressed himself to this point: if, as he states, his priority is a negotiated end to the conflict, is contemplating arming the rebels the crucial question? Surely the crucial question is how to create a sustainable political settlement in a complicated and fractured country. The conflict is so vicious today in part because the stakes are so high for each of the communities involved. Does the Foreign Secretary accept that Syria is awash with weaponry? What is his assessment of how much weaponry would be required to tip the balance against Assad, and how, in practical terms, will the Foreign Secretary ensure that weapons supplied do not fall into the arms of al-Qaeda-supporting jihadists?
The choice for the international community is not between sending military support to Syria’s opposition and doing nothing at all. Assad is sustained by external support from Russia and Iran and the foreign cash that allows him still to pay his forces. Will the Foreign Secretary explain why he did not place more emphasis in his statement on the practical steps that could be taken to choke off Assad’s finances and the country’s energy supplies through effective enforcement of sanctions? Any future actions or policies of the UK Government should be adopted only on the basis of their capacity to contribute to a peaceful outcome.
I agree with the Government that they should seize the opportunity afforded by the proposed US-Russia conference to try to end the fighting and prevent the Lebanonisation of Syria. That is exactly the type of engagement with the Russians that the Opposition have urged for many months, as the Foreign Secretary will recollect.
Syria has experienced minority rule for 40 years, so any comprehensive peace settlement for Syria must, by its nature, be inclusive. It would be wrong to underestimate the fear, particularly in the Alawite community, that a change from minority rule to democracy provokes. Will the Foreign Secretary therefore assure the House that that is the approach he will advocate in Jordan tomorrow and in his further discussions ahead of the conference?
In conclusion, we have learnt from recent history that when a country with such a range of religious and ethnic identities emerges from a bloody war, communities are slow to trust one another again. Will the Foreign Secretary explain the Government’s assessment of the scale of post-conflict planning currently under way by the international community? What role are the UK Government playing in facilitating that?
The Opposition strongly support and welcome the Government’s humanitarian funding for the Syrian people, but does the Secretary of State accept that Britain alone cannot take on the burden of upscaling the humanitarian response in Syria in the wake of any peace agreement, which all hon. Members wish to see? It is therefore vital that he delivers on the pledge he made at the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting, which he chaired: he said that his immediate priority was
“ensuring that donors who generously pledged their support at the Kuwait conference fulfil their commitments”.
How will he ensure that all those commitments are indeed turned into payments to help to rebuild Syria?
There is common ground between the Government and Opposition on supporting humanitarian efforts to assist the people of Syria; supporting the work of the human rights observers; supporting UN investigations into the use of chemical weapons; and encouraging a diplomatic resolution to this continuing conflict. However, if the Government wish to take the step of arming the rebels, I ask and urge the Foreign Secretary to come back to the House before that decision is made and make the Government’s case to Members on both sides of the House who, along with the President of the United States, continue to have concerns about the wisdom of that proposed course of action.
I am grateful, as always, to the right hon. Gentleman. While there are some differences—I will reply to his questions—there is also a great deal in common across the House. As he knows, I regularly come back to the House whenever there is the slightest variation in the situation, so if there are any developments in the Government’s policy I would certainly seek to do so. He said that we had not had the opportunity to discuss this matter for a while. I must just make the observation that, most unusually, the Opposition chose not to devote any day of the debate on the Queen’s Speech to foreign affairs. We could have discussed Syria and all other issues at great length. That was a mysterious decision and I do not want to speculate on the reasons for it, but the opportunity was there.
There is a lot of agreement on many issues. The right hon. Gentleman asked about humanitarian support. Since the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting, far more countries have supplied the funding they committed to at Kuwait. As I mentioned in my statement, the UN appeal for $1.5 billion is now 71% funded. However, that was an appeal to cover the period from January to June. We have to expect, in the near future, a new UN assessment of the humanitarian aid that will be required, which could be well above the previous appeal of $1.5 billion. This is already the biggest ever UN humanitarian appeal, demonstrating the scale of what we are dealing with. I pay tribute to my colleagues in the Department for International Development—the Minister of State is here—for all their efforts to get other countries to meet their commitments, as we in the UK have.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about post-conflict planning. We have led the way internationally, with the conference earlier this year at Wilton Park. Understandably, many minds in the opposition, and in the regime for that matter, are turned to the conflict rather than post-conflict planning. It would be good if all sides could spend more time on post-conflict planning, but we continue to give advice and discuss the matter with our partners on the Security Council. It may well be that we will hold other events ourselves to ensure that that planning exists.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the need for a political settlement to be inclusive—that is absolutely critical. The compact we made with the National Coalition at our Istanbul meeting includes a clear commitment to a democratic and non-sectarian Syria; a Syria without retribution, other than against those who have committed war crimes; and a Syria in which the institutions of the state are not dismantled. The Syrian National Coalition is concerned to learn lessons from Iraq, where too many institutions of the state were dismantled. On all those points, I think I can entirely satisfy him and be in accord with him.
The right hon. Gentleman was, however, going too far to suggest that there is somehow an alternative policy by which sanctions could be better enforced. The European Union enforces its sanctions tightly, but the House must remember that the EU is alone in the world, as a grouping, in enforcing sanctions. The United States and some of the other Arab states enforce sanctions on Syria, but there are no UN sanctions of that kind, and there are routes around such sanctions over time. It is not within the power of the EU to change that; it is within the power of the UN Security Council, but Russia and China have never supported resolutions on that subject, so that is not an available alternative policy.
I did indeed choose my words carefully on the question of arms. We are seeking amendments to the embargo, not immediately to use those amendments. The discussions we will have in the EU in the coming week, will be very important in making the Geneva negotiations take place, let alone be a success. We need more pressure on the regime. We need more encouragement to the opposition that they will not for ever have to endure, if all negotiations fail and there is no way forward, people—who may be described as rebels, but are men, women and children sitting in their communities—suffering virtually every kind of weapon that man has ever invented being dropped on them while most of the world denies them the means to defend themselves. If we come to a choice about that, it is a very important foreign policy and moral choice, which of course should be discussed fully in this House. It is a very important choice indeed. We have to bear it in mind, however, that one of the drivers of radicalisation is the availability of weapons to extremist groups and to the regime, but often not to moderate opposition groups. Of course there are legitimate differences over all such issues, and it would be a very difficult foreign policy choice. We are clear that we need amendments to the arms embargo to take EU policy in the right direction, which is what I will be working for over the coming week.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it. The G8 Foreign Ministers meeting covered a range of subjects, as the Foreign Secretary made clear in his statement, but I will focus on Syria and North Korea.
First, however, it would be remiss of me to do anything other than express my personal congratulations to the Foreign Secretary on his leadership on the issue of sexual violence in conflict zones. His steps to bring the international community together to tackle the horrific use of sexual violence in conflict have rightly received warm support from Members in all parts of the House. I also pay tribute to the civil society groups that have campaigned tirelessly on the issue, and on whose significant efforts the Foreign Secretary’s engagement has been built.
The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have speculated in recent weeks about the need to ensure that the Syrian rebels are armed and trained. The Foreign Secretary will be aware that the G8 communiqué made no reference to international efforts to stem the flow of arms into Syria, but did he raise the transfer of weapons at the meeting or, indeed, in any bilateral meetings with G8 Foreign Ministers in attendance, in particular with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov? In his statement, the Foreign Secretary stated that the UK has “taken no decision” on arming the Syrian rebels, but in the Liaison Committee on 12 March the Prime Minister struck a rather different tone, as he was keen to stress that the UK
“might have to do things in our own way.”
He added that the UK was “still an independent country”.
Will the Foreign Secretary clarify those earlier remarks from the Prime Minister, and will he further clarify whether the Government’s approach to arming the rebels has altered in any way in the light of recent evidence of radical Islamist militants operating on the ground? That includes the al-Nusra Front, which only last week confirmed its affiliation to al-Qaeda. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary will be aware of a letter that I sent to him on 20 March raising questions about the British Government’s decision to
“fund training to help armed groups understand their responsibilities and obligations under international law”.—[Official Report, 6 March 2013; Vol. 559, c. 963.]
I have not yet received a reply from the Foreign Secretary, so in the light of the upcoming deadline for the renewal of the EU arms embargo, will he kindly confirm his intention to reply to that letter?
I also welcome the fact that the Foreign Secretary said that one of the immediate priorities arising from the meeting was ensuring that donors provide the funding that they have promised for Syria. Will he confirm whether all the states represented at the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting last week have provided all the funding that they have promised?
A key priority on Syria as we approach the G8 summit must be to build influence with Russia, and encourage it to stop its continued sponsorship of the Assad regime. Given that, I found it a little curious that the Foreign Secretary restricted his observations about discussions with Russia to a single line in a statement of six pages. Will he clarify what, in the light of the final communiqué from the Foreign Ministers meeting, is the British Government’s strategy to help to bring an end to the violence in Syria? If it is the Geneva accords, what practical steps have been taken to secure the anticipated negotiations?
Finally, I should like to turn to the points made by the Foreign Secretary on the ongoing situation in the Korean peninsula. We support the agreement reached by Foreign Ministers following the G8 meeting to condemn the continued aggressive and provocative actions of the North Korean regime. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that China’s role as an historic supporter of North Korea is key to defusing the crisis, so will he join me in welcoming its constructive engagement on the issue to date?
The efforts of others will not absolve the North Koreans of their own responsibilities, so does the Foreign Secretary agree that the responsibility is now on the North Korean leadership to accept an open offer that has been extended from the international community to initiate meaningful negotiations in relation to this troubling and dangerous situation?
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his questions and for his strong endorsement of the initiative that I have been pursuing on preventing sexual violence in conflict. This is a cross-party issue that is of concern to people in all parties in the UK, and we can all enthusiastically get behind it. We are, as he said, building on the efforts of people in civil society, many NGOs and people who have already worked at the United Nations for some years, but it is time for the most powerful, active Governments of the world to get behind the initiative, make major international diplomatic progress, and show that we can change the situation on the ground. I will keep the House updated throughout the year on our efforts.
On Syria, the right hon. Gentleman asked about discussions on the transfer of weapons. We had a long discussion about Syria at the G8 and with the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministers when they made a bilateral visit here on 13 March. So in the past month we have had two substantial rounds of discussions with Russian Ministers—indeed, three rounds in just over a month. Of course we discussed the continued flow of weapons to the regime in Syria. Part of the problem is that the regime can continue to receive weapons, but many moderate figures in opposition groups say that they cannot obtain them.
What the Prime Minister said last month about the possibility that we might have to do more is very much what I am saying here and what I said in my last statement—that our policy cannot be static. He said, and I repeated in the statement, that we have not taken any decision about arming the opposition ourselves. There are legitimate arguments against that. They have sometimes been put in the House, and the right hon. Gentleman has raised some of them. If we were to take that step, we would have to assure ourselves to the maximum degree possible not only of the international legal position, but that the weapons could not be misused by others for whom they were not intended. Those are major considerations.
It must also be a major consideration that we currently face a humanitarian catastrophe, with tens of thousands of people being killed and millions in desperate need. A regime that is not bringing the conflict to an end can get weapons and extremists can get weapons, but people who are in favour of a free, democratic and moderate Syria find it very difficult to do so. We all have to ask ourselves how long we can go on with that situation if the conflict continues and if it continues to get worse. Of course, what we need most of all is a diplomatic and political settlement. Giving additional assistance to the National Coalition is part of putting pressure on the regime to come to a political settlement.
To expand on our discussions with Russia about that, we have discussed with our Russian colleagues several times in the past month how to try to come together to bring about the Geneva communiqué—a transitional Government drawn from regime and opposition, with full executive authority—but no one in other western or Arab nations, nor the UK, has yet succeeded in agreeing with Russia the mechanism to bring that about. A United Nations Security Council resolution would, in our view, be the appropriate mechanism, but Russia and China have vetoed that in the past and would do so again under current circumstances. It could come about through each of the countries involved—through us, the United States, the Russians and others—putting pressure on all the parties involved to negotiate that. We are ready to do so. We are always doing that with the national coalition, but sufficient pressure has not been put on the regime to do that, so we will always work hard on a diplomatic and negotiated way forward. In the absence of that, we have to do what we can to save lives and to try to make a resolution of the conflict more likely.
I agree with the thrust of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions about China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. China’s position of agreeing to UN Security Council resolution 2094, which put additional sanctions on North Korea, is welcome. I will discuss that with the new Chinese leadership over the next couple of days to see how we can work together on it. The message should be clear, as it is from the whole House and from the whole UN Security Council: North Korea has a choice, and with the choice it is making at the moment it will end up with a country that is even more broken and even more isolated, even from China. It is not too late to make an alternative choice; the path of multilateral negotiations and greater engagement with the international community is still open.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it this morning.
This month marks the second anniversary of the start of this brutal conflict. As the Foreign Secretary rightly pointed out to the House, two years on, the death toll is now estimated at some 70,000 and is rising by the day. Only today the United Nations announced that the number of Syrian refugees had now reached 1 million. Half are children. More than 400,000 have become refugees since 1 January 2013 alone. More than 7,000 are now reported to be fleeing every day. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees today declared:
“Syria is spiralling towards full-scale disaster”.
As the number of casualties rises, frustrations too have been growing. That has understandably led to renewed calls for the international community to do more. The primary responsibility for the crisis rests with Assad and his regime, but does the Foreign Secretary accept that the deteriorating situation in Syria also represents an abject failure by the international community and that it shares a collective responsibility for that failure? It is right that efforts must now intensify, but the key issue is the breadth of those efforts, how they are channelled and how likely they are to deliver results.
There are some vital areas where the international community must better co-ordinate and target its efforts. First, on international diplomatic efforts, the stalemate at the United Nations Security Council is more than just frustrating: it is deplorable. The case must be made to Russia and China that supporting or aiding Assad not only harms Syria but harms their own interests, and indeed their standing in the wider region. Will the Foreign Secretary set out what representations he will make to Foreign Minister Lavrov when he is in London next week on this issue and the prospects of a change of position in the Security Council?
Secondly, 11 separate rounds of sanctions against Syria have already been agreed. The issue at present is not necessarily new sanctions, but effective enforcement of existing ones. Given the Foreign Secretary’s recent visit to Lebanon, does he agree that more must be done to ensure that countries fully comply with the existing sanctions to which they have already signed up?
Thirdly, on international accountability, the responsibility for the crisis primarily rests with the Assad regime, as I have made clear, and the perpetrators must ultimately be held to account. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that efforts to collect and publish the names of Syrian army officers ordering the ongoing atrocities are vital? Such efforts could serve as a clear signal of intent that those officers will face the full force of international justice for their crimes—and of course that includes the use of chemical weapons.
Fourthly, on the issue of peace talks, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, the leader of the Syrian National Coalition, last month reportedly offered to engage in talks on a political settlement without demanding Assad’s resignation. In an interview last week, Assad claimed that he was
“ready to negotiate with anyone, including militants who surrender their arms.”
Neither of those offers has yet been accepted, nor can we make a judgment as to the spirit in which they were intended, but will the Foreign Secretary offer his assessment of whether they constitute even a slight narrowing of the gap between the Syrian authorities and opposition forces?
Finally, let me turn to the central issue of the UK’s support for the Syrian opposition and the announcements in today’s statements. It is right that the UK is at the forefront of co-ordinating international efforts to deliver aid to those most in need, both within and beyond the Syrian borders, and I welcome recent announcements to that effect. Beyond humanitarian assistance, when it comes to our support for the Syrian opposition forces, it is vital that all our support must continue to be targeted and accountable if it is to be effective.
The Foreign Secretary has today said that the Government will move towards
“more active efforts to prevent the loss of life in Syria.”
It is right that the international community must increase its efforts, but it is vital that the parameters of those efforts are clearly set out, defined and understood. Indeed, on this issue, the Foreign Secretary’s statement at times raised more questions than answers as to the real direction he is suggesting for British Government policy.
The Foreign Secretary has today spoken of the amendments to the EU arms embargo. I welcome the fact that those changes were collectively agreed at the EU Foreign Affairs Council. Those amendments were focused on ensuring that the right to non-lethal equipment and technical assistance could be delivered to opposition forces, but the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the right hon. Member for East Devon (Mr Swire), seemed to add confusion to an already complex issue when he told the House on Monday that this
“is not about lifting any arms embargo.”
However, he also said that the recent amendments to the existing EU arms embargo were about
“ensuring that all options are on the table and that EU countries have maximum flexibility to provide the opposition with all necessary assistance to protect civilians.”—[Official Report, 4 March 2013; Vol. 559, c. 674-76.]
Given those statements, it is understandable that there is some confusion over the Government’s position that requires further clarification. Will the Foreign Secretary say more about the next steps that he mentioned in his statement? Will he confirm whether the Government will push for an EU arms embargo to be lifted? Will he also set out what, if any, further amendments to the embargo he will call for?
The Foreign Secretary has recently admitted that, when it comes to lifting the arms embargo, the risk of arms falling into the wrong hands is
“one of the reasons we don’t do it now.”
We agree that that risk is, indeed, very serious, so will he set out what would have to change on the ground in Syria for him to change his view on the relative risks involved in such a strategy? Does he accept the reality that today’s Syria is replete with arms, and does he also accept the great difficulties involved in guaranteeing the end use of weapons, given the lack of clarity today about the identity, intent and, indeed, tactics of some of the rebel forces? Does he accept that it is perfectly possible that, if Europe or, indeed, the west more generally, were to decide to arm the rebels, Russia or, indeed, Iran, which he referenced in his remarks, would simply increase its provision of arms to the Assad regime? Rather than pushing for the EU arms embargo to be relaxed, amended or lifted altogether, may I urge the Foreign Secretary to direct his efforts towards getting the Russians and Chinese to agree to impose a UN-mandated arms embargo? This would undeniably be the most effective way of cutting off a key lifeline to the Assad regime that it is currently relying on.
Curiously, having previously mentioned the fact that al-Qaeda is known to be operating in Syria, the Foreign Secretary was silent on that issue in his remarks today. In the light of potentially increased UK support for the opposition forces, will he set out the British Government’s assessment of the present level of activity by al-Qaeda and related jihadist groups in Syria?
The Foreign Secretary spoke about the Syrian National Coalition, but is he able to give any assurances about the degree of authority and control exercised by the SNC over the wide range of opposition forces operating on the ground?
Order. I am mildly alarmed by my sight of a further full page of text in front of the right hon. Gentleman, but I know he will put my mind at rest when he tells me that, in fact, it relates to something entirely different and he does not intend to deal with it.
One of my missions is to always seek to put your mind at rest, Mr Speaker, so I will endeavour to keep my remarks as short as possible. In my own defence, I would simply say that, by way of introduction, I indicated that the Foreign Secretary’s statement prompted more questions than it answered. I am, however, mindful of your view, Mr Speaker, so I will conclude shortly.
I understand that the frustrations of Government Members are growing, but a strategy born of frustration is less likely to deliver than one based on clear thinking and strategic insight. Surely the priority now for Britain should be to work to unify the Syrian opposition, not to arm it. The continuing loss of life underlines the fact that Syria needs to see a de-escalation and a political resolution. Although the Government have our support for their actions to provide the humanitarian and non-lethal assistance to Syria announced today, it is far from clear that taking steps to intensify this conflict in the months ahead would do anything to reduce the present level of violence being suffered by the Syrian people.
The right hon. Gentleman correctly draws attention, as I have done, to the extent of the human suffering. The fact that the United Nations has launched the largest ever financial appeal for humanitarian assistance underlines the catastrophic scale of that suffering. We must all remember that that is the background to the situation and to deciding what we have to do.
The right hon. Gentleman made some recommendations towards the end of his remarks, some of which we have done, including work to unify the Syrian opposition, which, of course, is what we did for many months. They have been unified, to the extent that it can be practically achieved, in the Syrian National Coalition and we have recognised that group as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. I do not suppose that any opposition or political grouping will be perfect in the eyes of this or any other country, but I do not believe that there will be a better attempt or greater success at unifying the Syrian opposition than the national coalition.
It would be wonderful if some of the right hon. Gentleman’s other recommendations could be achieved, including Russian and Chinese agreement to impose an arms embargo by the whole world on Syria. We would, of course, support that—we will go over this ground in our meetings with the Russians this afternoon and next week—but I have not seen any prospect of Russia agreeing to such an arms embargo. It is a good thing to wish for, but in practical, diplomatic terms there is no possibility at the moment of it being achieved. That is the background to the decisions that we have to make. Many things would be far preferable, such as an immediate agreement on a negotiated political transition in Syria.
The right hon. Gentleman asked, rightly, how seriously we should take the offers to negotiate. Having talked to President al-Khatib of the national coalition last week, I believe not only that his offer is sincere but that he would love it to be taken up and that he really would negotiate with members of the regime without prior insistence on the departure of Assad. However, President Assad’s insistence during his weekend interview that the regime is ready to negotiate is something that we have heard for two years but that has never turned into actual substance. Of course, we will discuss with Mr Brahimi again this afternoon whether those statements can be used to bring both sides closer together. It is part of his job to try to do that. The evidence of the past two years, however, is that, in current circumstances, offers to negotiate by the regime are not sincere, are not followed up and do not lead to the sort of progress that we all want to see.
It is against that background of diplomatic deadlock and political stalemate while tens of thousands die that I argue that we have to do what we can in a very cautious, considered and clearly thought-out way to try to change that situation and to save human lives as best we can, working at all times with our partners and allies, including those in the Arab world. There is a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League today.
We will continue to use every diplomatic effort, but the situation that the right hon. Gentleman and I are describing cannot remain static. He is quite right to say that the international community has been an abject failure collectively. The United Nations Security Council has not shouldered its responsibilities. We have tried many times to put that right, but our resolutions have been vetoed. We have been working in the last month since Mr Brahimi’s last briefing to the Security Council to find a new common way forward for the council—we will discuss that again with the Russians in the coming hours—but that common ground has not emerged in a month of discussions behind the scenes in New York.
Given that situation, we all have to ask ourselves whether we are going to hold our policy completely static or show that we are prepared to change as the situation deteriorates—reluctantly perhaps, and cautiously at all times. I argue that we must be prepared to show an increased level of support for the opposition, and that it has to take a practical form if we are to exert any pressure on the regime—and, indeed, on Russia as well—to successfully negotiate on this matter. The parameters have, I hope, been clearly set out in my statement. They are clearly set out in the amendment to the United Nations arms embargo. It is amended, not lifted. The arms embargo remains in place; these are specific exemptions for non-lethal military equipment and for technical assistance for the protection of civilians. I have just given examples of what that means in practice.
As for the future, the EU sanctions have now been rolled over, with that amendment, for three months. There will therefore be a further discussion in May about the renewal of such sanctions, and the Government—and every Member of this House—will be able to form their views on what we should do, in whatever situation we have arrived at in May, about further amendments to the embargo, if they are necessary. I think the parameters are clear. The policy is clear, and above all I want to make it clear that its direction is clear: we must be prepared to do more in a situation of such slaughter and suffering, and a more static policy would not measure up to the gravity of the situation.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe United Kingdom made that distinction and we believe that those wings are organisationally distinct, even if they both come under the same overall leadership. It is important to recognise that Hezbollah’s political wing is and will remain an important part of Lebanon’s political scene, and we have to be able to act in the interests of the stability of Lebanon. We do not believe that an EU consensus could be arrived at on the designation of the whole of Hezbollah.
I have listened carefully to the answers offered by the Foreign Secretary, and on this matter I sense that there is genuine cross-party agreement across the House. He says that active discussions are under way with European partners on the proscription of Hezbollah’s military wing, but that some countries are looking at further evidence. Given the terms of the report published by the Bulgarians on 5 February and the discussions that the Bulgarian Minister has had with other European colleagues, will the Foreign Secretary tell the House what further discussions he is going to have, particularly with the French and with others? What assurance would they need in order to be able to match the action that, with our support, the British Government have taken?
Of course, we are in active discussion with other European partners, including France. As I say, some are immediately supportive of designation, as we are, but some want to look in more detail at the evidence, although plenty of evidence is available. Some have concerns about the impact on the stability of Lebanon—concerns that I think are unfounded—on EU relations with Lebanon or on European troops serving in the UN mission in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon. So there are a variety of reasons for this, which I do not agree with, and it is clear that the right hon. Gentleman does not agree with them either. I shall, thus, quote the strong cross-party support in this House in the Government’s further discussions about this issue.
In a very short answer, Mr Speaker, we do indeed have serious concerns about the recent wave of self-immolations and urge the Chinese authorities to show restraint towards Tibetan protestors. As my hon. Friend knows, we believe in meaningful dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Chinese authorities as the best way to address and resolve the underlying grievances. There is no change in our policy towards Tibet, which we regard as part of the People’s Republic of China. However, we are always concerned about human rights issues and—in the interests of brevity, Mr Speaker—we will take an additional look at the points that my hon. Friend raises.
In the light of the latest round of the P5 plus 1 talks held last week in Kazakhstan, will the Foreign Secretary update the House on progress? In particular, will he share with the House, if he feels able, some of the specific guarantees that the UK Government would be looking to achieve from the Iranians as part of these important discussions, given that being clear about the objectives increases the likelihood of success in the negotiations?
These discussions took place in Almaty last week, on 26 and 27 February, and they were successful enough for further meetings to be agreed. Meetings of officials will take place in early April, also in Kazakhstan. Of course, it is pleasing that it is worth while having those further meetings. In the E3 plus 3 we have put a revised offer to the Iranians. However, that revised offer would involve both sides taking actions that then build confidence for further negotiations, without our thinking that we can resolve the entire problem in one move—one negotiation. We hope that Iran will continue to take a strong interest and a constructive role in these negotiations. It is too early to tell whether the Iranian position is to do that or to play for time, as has often happened in the past.
I note that the Foreign Secretary says that it is too early to tell about these negotiations and that the issue cannot be resolved in one go. I certainly recognise both those points. In recent days there has been quite a lot of speculation about the prospects for bilateral negotiations between the United States and Iran. Will he share the Government’s thinking as to the likelihood of a grander bargain between those two powers taking place in the months ahead?
The United Kingdom is, of course, open to bilateral discussions, which are difficult in our case because of the unavoidable closure of embassies. Nevertheless, I have from time to time met the Iranian Foreign Minister and we are open to the idea of other members of the E3 plus 3 having bilateral discussions with Iran. Such discussions sometimes take place at the margins of the E3 plus 3 meetings. It is important for Iran to know that we are seeking to settle the nuclear issue—Iran would, of course, have all the rights of a country under the non-proliferation treaty—and that the western world is not embarked on regime change in Iran. That sincerely is what we are trying to do. Any bilateral discussions that make that clear and allow negotiations to proceed more successfully on that basis would, of course, be welcome.