Ivory Bill (Fifth sitting)

David Rutley Excerpts

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Sue Hayman (Workington) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 12, page 7, line 40, at end insert—

“(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person facilitates a breach of the prohibition if he or she, whilst not directly engaged in the process of a sale, acts in such a way as to allow that sale, or other form of dealing, to occur.”

This amendment defines ‘facilitate’, which is not defined in the Bill, using the text from the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.

During the evidence sessions we discussed enforcement and implementation, and the potential for mis-selling and misleading behaviour. The exact definition of “facilitate” in the Bill was also discussed. The amendment is designed to clarify that. The explanatory notes give details on page 22. They state:

“This offence would apply to anyone who, whilst not directly engaged in the process of a sale, acted in such a way as to allow that sale, or other form of dealing, to occur. For instance, this could apply to the owners of an online sales forum if they were found not to have taken reasonable steps to ensure that an item was a) exempt from the ban, and b) had been registered as such. Further, anyone found to have advertised an item in order to facilitate a sale may be found to be in breach of this clause.”

We thought that it would be helpful to include the definition of “facilitate” in the Bill, and the form of words used in the amendment is based on the explanatory notes.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (David Rutley)]

I thank the hon. Lady for her careful consideration of the Bill and for this amendment, which seeks to define “facilitate” in the context of a sale of an item of ivory in breach of the prohibition on sales of ivory. I would like to reassure her, and the Committee more generally, that the amendment is not required. No definition for facilitating a breach of the prohibition was provided in the Bill, as the term “facilitate” shall have its natural meaning.

The amendment would also be misleading, as it refers solely to the sale of ivory, whereas the Bill is concerned with the broader concept of commercial dealing in ivory. The facilitation of the illegal purchase, hire or acquisition of ivory for valuable consideration—that is, bartering—is also prohibited. The wording used in the amendment is taken from the explanatory notes, as the hon. Lady set out, but those are intended to provide guidance and steer on the meaning of the Bill, not to prescribe provisions.

I share the hon. Lady’s intention that the Bill should be as clear as possible, but on this occasion I do not believe that the amendment is necessary. The current wording in the Bill is sufficient to define when an offence of breaching the prohibition through facilitation has been committed. Furthermore, the Bill’s explanatory notes are not intended to set a direction in the prohibition on dealing in ivory; they are there to assist the reader. With that explanation, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendment.

[Liz Twist (Blaydon) (Lab)]

During the evidence sessions I asked a number of question about cyber-crime and how we can ensure that people seeking to deal in ivory online are properly captured, with regard to enforcement and making it clear that attempting to sell ivory items on the internet will be covered. The wording suggested by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister would enhance our ability to capture that cyber-dealing and ensure that we do not allow the illegal trade to continue online. I know that is often a challenge, but I wonder whether those words would strengthen that ability.

[David Rutley]

I thank the hon. Lady for that point, and I understand her concerns. We all want to make sure that cyber-crime is cracked down on more generally, and specifically in the Bill. As I said to the hon. Member for Workington, the Bill as drafted will tackle the issue of facilitation, so we do not need a further definition. We will also debate later today the role of internet service providers, which is included in the Bill. We heard from non-governmental organisations that they are satisfied that there are strong measures in the Bill and that the ban will be strong. I assure the hon. Member for Blaydon that the provisions will tackle the concern that she rightly raises.

[Sue Hayman]

On the understanding that it is clear what “facilitate” means, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lisa Cameron (East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) (SNP)]

I think that this measure has to be strengthened, and we heard clear evidence along those lines from the experts. Like my colleague, the hon. Member for Redcar, I want to know what “ought to know” will be taken to mean in such a situation. Will it be based upon a person’s experience or history of dealing with such artefacts? I have concerns about how a person can prove that they did not know something. Proving a negative is difficult judicially. This measure should be strengthened, but I have concerns and would like to hear more from the Minister in that regard.

[David Rutley]

I thank the hon. Member for Workington for her amendment, the effect of which would be to make the commercial dealing of prohibited ivory items a strict liability offence. The hon. Member for Redcar and other hon. Members also made comments along those lines, and I will answer some of their questions in due course.

We all agree that the enforcement of the Bill should be rigorous, but I assure the Committee that the amendment is not required. Clause 12(2) makes provision for a person found to have breached the prohibition to demonstrate that they genuinely and reasonably did not know that the item was ivory. That could be, for instance, because they were unaware of ivory as a substance, or because the ivory in question could reasonably have been assumed to be something else.

If clause 12 offences were to become strict liability offences because of the amendment, the person accused of the offence would not be able to rely on the defence that they had taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence. The strict liability offences that would be created as a result of the amendment mean that, for the offence to have been committed, there is the need only for the actus reus—the act itself—to have been committed. There is no need for the mens rea—the intention. That would mean that subsections (2) and (3) would effectively be deleted.

It is good that clause 12(2) is in the Bill, because it allows for instances of genuine mistakes, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset said, where there is unlikely to be a malicious intent to breach the Bill. For instance, a member of the public might sell in a car boot sale an item they found in their grandmother’s attic without realising that the material in question was elephant ivory.

[Anna Turley]

I would like a bit more clarification on the point I raised about the phrase

“ought to know or suspect”.

When we pass the Bill, I hope the Government will share the news far and wide, because it will be a fantastic achievement. Surely everybody will think, even if they see something in their attic, “That could potentially be ivory.” Ivory is pretty distinct, and I would have thought that everybody—even a little old lady at a car boot sale or in a charity shop—would look at it, wonder what it is made of and think, “That could be ivory.” They will know, because hopefully the Bill will be widely heralded, that they ought at least to double check and find out whether it is something they should know about. I do not think the emphasis on

“ought to know or suspect”

goes far enough.

[David Rutley]

I thank the hon. Lady for that point, which was similar to that made by the hon. Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow. As currently drafted, the Bill gives a degree of discretion to the enforcement agency. It allows the officer to consider the position of the defendant and ascertain whether they should have knowledge of ivory—for example, an antiques dealer, which we will come to shortly—or whether they are a member of the public who has genuinely made a mistake. So there are points about proportionality and discretion.

An individual or organisation could, for example, show that they took reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence through checking that the item had been registered prior to the purchase, or listed on an online platform, and that the registration or listing appeared to them to be authentic. Additionally, the enforcement bodies will consider the person’s position when taking a view about whether they should have known or suspected that an item was ivory. As I have explained before, there is a difference between a fully trained and experienced antiques dealer and a member of the public who could be young and inexperienced. The enforcement agencies need to have clearer discretion, as in many other forms of legislation. I will provide more details later. If we removed that provision, there would be no such defence. Further, doing so would place the sale of prohibited ivory in the same bracket as illegal transactions such as the sale of alcohol to a minor, where, as we know, a shopkeeper or a member of bar staff can be sanctioned for a sale on the ground of protecting public health. Strict liability must be used with considerable caution, and we do not think it would be proportionate to make these offences analogous.

[Dr Cameron]

Something has just come to my mind about how to strengthen the measure. It is about experience and having a connection to the industry. Might there be a loophole for unscrupulous people to try to engage the services of those who perhaps have no history of or direct connection to online sales? If someone is connected directly with individuals who ought to know, might we strengthen the legislation, because I would not like people to be able to use that as a loophole?

[David Rutley]

The hon. Lady makes a good point. Whatever people’s views are, nobody in Committee is seeking loopholes. We are trying to close them down. Her point would be covered by facilitation, which we have talked about previously.

It is very important in criminal law that we establish both the intent and the act itself, which need to be present for the offence to be committed. Strict liability is the exception as only the act itself needs to be present for the offence to be committed, for example, the sale of alcohol to minors and health and safety matters. With that explanation, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the Minister’s generosity in giving way. I want to push him on what the words “ought to know” or “suspect” mean in this context. In the case of a police officer trying to convict someone, how can they prove that someone ought to know? He gave the example of someone being an antiques dealer or in the sector, in which case we can say that they ought to know, but how otherwise can a police or enforcement officer prove that someone ought to know? Public awareness ought to be sufficient, but how will a police officer be able to prove that someone ought to know?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Rutley]

As I have already described, enforcement agencies do such work all the time. They work through quite tricky situations where they have to work out the intent as well as the act itself: for example, the difference between murder and manslaughter. I am no lawyer, but there are differences in degrees. The key thing is that the Bill will push forward strict legislation. The NGOs were clear that the ban will be tough. The provisions in the Bill will enable people to be held to account. The enforcement agencies will be able to do that. As I have said, an element of proportionality and discretion is required, and that is true for the vast amount of law that enforcement agencies need to enforce.

To give another example, a person might have inherited an ornament thinking it was bone, as family members had always said that it was. The person then sells it without realising it is elephant ivory. It is difficult to say that they should have known. The enforcement agency will need to test that and work through it. Over time, it will be able to work out, through precedent and judgment, how appropriate it would be to use the range of enforcement measures that we will discuss line by line. Those measures are there to help work out proportionately how serious that particular crime is.

[Sue Hayman]

I have listened carefully to everything the Minister has said, and I thank the hon. Member for North Dorset for his suggestions, but the idea of little old ladies being imprisoned for finding things in their attics is a little beyond the point I was trying to make. The National Wildlife Crime Unit will be directly responsible for investigating, and for enforcing the legislation once it passes, so we should take seriously what the chief inspector said. To remind the Committee, she confirmed that the unit had only 12 members of staff, so it is pretty limited in what it can investigate. She said that if the convention on international trade in endangered species brings something to the unit, it can tie them up for several months. She also said:

“We deal with the ones who have a complete disregard for policy protocol legislation. We deal with the ones who are deceptive, who lie and who want to make money out of this.”

It is not about people who find things in their attics. She continued:

“The burden of proof has to be manageable and has to be able to be enforced”.––[Official Report, Ivory Public Bill Committee, 12 June 2018; c. 39, Q79.]

We need to take seriously what she is saying. The Minister said that enforcement services should be able to take a view about whether someone should have known, but Chief Inspector Hubble said that was difficult from an enforcement perspective.

Earlier in our proceedings, the Minister committed to a rigorous education programme. If we have an effective education programme, people should know to check for ivory. We need a law that is enforceable and will make a difference. Otherwise, what is the point?

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Assessment of enforcement resources—

‘(1) Within 12 months of section 12 of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must make an assessment on the resources available to enforce the prohibition.

(2) The report shall consider in particular—

(a) the resources allocated or planned to be allocated towards enforcing the prohibition,

(b) the potential impact of any change in resources so allocated or planned to be allocated, and

(c) the impact on other law or border enforcement activities of the resources so allocated or planned to be allocated.

(3) The Secretary of State shall lay a report of the assessment under this section before each House of Parliament as soon as practicable after its completion.”

This new clause requires an assessment to be made and laid before Parliament regarding the level of resources allocated or proposed to be allocated to enforcing the prohibition against ivory dealing.

[David Rutley]

The clause provides for the new offences to be created under the Bill. The new offences have been developed to capture the likely chain of actions pertaining to commercial dealing in ivory or that support commercial dealing. Directly breaching the ban, causing it to be breached or facilitating a breach are all offences under the Bill. In practice, directly breaching the ban would include dealing in a prohibited item or dealing in ivory without an exemption certificate or registration for that item. That applies equally to the seller and the buyer. Causing a breach would include someone acting under the discretion of another person, such as an auctioneer, or someone otherwise engaged on behalf of another—a person selling an item on behalf of a friend, for instance. That relates partly to the point that the hon. Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow raised earlier. The offence of facilitating a breach discussed under amendment 9 would apply, for example, to those responsible for an online sales platform if they were found not to have taken reasonable steps to prevent an illegal sale. It would also include anyone found to have advertised an item to facilitate a sale, for instance a newspaper.

Clause 12(2) ensures that it is an offence to deal in an item of ivory if the person knows, ought to have known or suspects that the substance is ivory, as we discussed at length under amendment 10. That will mean that it is less likely that a defendant can rely on a claim that they did not know that an item was ivory because the item was mislabelled. The enforcement bodies will consider the position of the person in taking a view on whether they should have known or suspected the item was ivory, for instance whether the person is an antiques dealer or a member of the public, as I have said several times.

Clause 12(3) ensures that actions taken by individuals and organisations to exercise due diligence and avoid committing an offence should be taken into account and can be used as a defence. For example, a buyer of a prohibited ivory item may be able to demonstrate that they checked that the item was registered and that the registration appeared authentic before they making purchase, and an organisation that listed a prohibited item for sale, for example online or in a sale room, may be able to demonstrate that it had taken steps to check that it had been registered and that the registration appeared authentic.

Recognising that offences committed under the Bill will vary in severity, a mixed regime of criminal and civil sanctions will apply. Clause 12(4) details the criminal sanctions that are applicable to the offences. We are committed to setting a high bar for sanctions for illegal wildlife trade activities and, as such, the maximum criminal sanction of five years’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine will be applied in line with existing sanctions under the Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997—COTES.

The clause also provides for summary convictions through a magistrates court to be applied in line with the maximum sanctions applicable in each of the devolved Administrations. The regulatory body, the Office for Product Safety and Standards, and the police will be responsible for identifying and investigating breaches of the ban. Criminal breaches will be dealt with by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service and the specific nature of the breach will be considered when a sanction is applied, to ensure a proportionate approach is adopted, as discussed earlier.

We recognise that the defences under existing legislation, such as the Serious Organised Crime Act and Police Act 2005 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, may apply to illegal dealing in ivory. The Bill will rely on the existing offences, where the appropriate criteria are met. For example, it would be an offence under the Fraud Act 2006 to make or use a fraudulent exemption certificate or registration.

New clause 3, which the hon. Member for Workington tabled, raises the critical issue of ensuring effective enforcement, a theme she has understandably been keen to raise this morning. I can assure the Committee that the issue is of foremost concern to the Government, as reflected in the strength of the powers we have conferred on the police, customs and the civilian enforcement body—the Office for Product Safety and Standards—to ensure compliance with the ban and to prosecute those who breach it. Effective enforcement is, of course, reliant on the appropriate resources, and I give credit to the police, including the National Wildlife Crime Unit and the Border Force for their efforts to date in tacking the abhorrent trade.

In the oral evidence to the Committee we heard that the CITES Border Force team is recognised as one of the best in the world at enforcing controls against the illegal wildlife trade. Moreover, both the Border Force team and the National Wildlife Crime Unit share their expertise with countries all over the world. It is paramount that the available resources are effectively used to enforce the ban.

Our proposals go further than the current regime by putting a civilian regulator in place to enforce the ban, alongside the police and the Border Force. The regulator will raise awareness of the ban and the compliance provisions and assess whether businesses are operating in compliance with the legislation. That will reduce the burden on the enforcement agencies by increasing compliance. The regulator will also be responsible for issuing civil sanctions, which are new in the Bill.

In developing and implementing the compliance processes necessary for the ban, the Government will assess the resources required and monitor their effective application over time. It will be a matter for the Home Office to allocate and monitor the police resources necessary for the enforcement of the ban, and the National Wildlife Crime Unit will play an important role. It will also be critical to assess the enforcement of the ban over time, including the number of cases successfully brought and the sentences applied.

We do not believe that the resources assessment should be included in the Bill. It would also be unhelpful for a single assessment to be made 12 months after clause 12 comes into force. That is because it is likely that different levels of resources will be required in the early stages of enforcement and as implementation progresses, for example, as awareness-raising exercises are carried out to improve awareness among those affected. Such an assessment would also not capture a sufficient period following the Bill’s coming into force. For example, it would not cover an assessment of court cases and rulings brought forward as a result of the ban.

The Government will assess the implementation of the ban over time, in particular its enforcement, as a matter of course. Much of this information will be in the public domain and open to civil society and to public scrutiny.

In summary, we do not believe this matter needs to be addressed in the Bill and a one-off assessment will not be sufficient. With this explanation, I ask the hon. Lady not to press her new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Sobel (Leeds North West) (Lab/Co-op)]

I, too, rise to support new clause 3 in relation to resources. The evidence from the NWCU and the Border Force was compelling. At the moment, they are unbelievably stretched, and when I asked what would happen if the funding were not continued, it was made clear that the whole operation would effectively cease and the work would just be about disruption, as my hon. Friend the Member for Workington said. In another country with a similar legal basis to ours—the United States—enforcement is carried out by the equivalent of our NWCU, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement, which has 383 staff. Were we to be equivalently resourced—our population is about a fifth of the United States’—we would have about 75 officers. We have 12, so it is not just an issue of retaining staff. We are at about a fifth of where we should be, in comparison with countries with equivalent laws and enforcement. New clause 3 is therefore vital if we are to do a proper and robust stock-take of where we are, and identify the resources needed to properly enforce the law that we will pass. Hopefully it will be a robust and world-leading law, but if we cannot enforce it, what point is there in having it?

[David Rutley]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The argument advanced by the hon. Member for Workington was characteristically thorough, and I will do my best to answer her questions, along with everybody else’s.

The first point the hon. Lady made was about clarifying the situation on fines. Hopefully I can do that. It is important to remember, because the Bill is new legislation, how it will be structured. First, there will be criminal sanctions. For a summary conviction in a magistrates court and so forth, the fine will be a statutory maximum of £5,000; for indictable offences, the fine is unlimited. That is under criminal sanctions. The other thing to remember is that we are also introducing in the Bill—I feel strongly about this, because we will be able to put in place a wide range of measures to take care of lots of different types of breaches— a fine of up to £250,000 under the civil sanctions. There are many different tools. Hopefully that answers the question.

I think we mentioned in our previous sitting that the form of the education programme is yet to be decided, but the focus will be on raising awareness in the most relevant areas. We talked last week about how we will need to work with the music industry; we will need to work with the antiques industry as well, and with members of the public. That is where the Office for Product Safety and Standards will play an important role.

The hon. Lady talked about the very good work being done in Angola. Sentencing guidelines are generally issued in the UK by the Sentencing Council. We are delighted with the work undertaken in Angola with the illegal wildlife trade challenge fund money, but we should note that that worked within the specific circumstances of Angola. None the less, we need to learn from best practice, which I think is the point that the hon. Lady made. We agree with that in principle.

Points were raised about guidance. The Secretary of State will prepare statutory guidance for offences imposed under clause 12. That means that there will be a public consultation on the guidance, which will include getting information from NGOs. The hon. Member for Workington was keen to see that happen. Of course, that would also involve the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. All relevant parties involved in that process will want to make the guidance robust and appropriate.

Comments were made by the hon. Members for Redcar, for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow, for Blaydon, and for Leeds North West—almost a full house—about the role of the NWCU. Everybody is keen to sing the unit’s praises for the great work that it does. We fully accept that we need proper funding in place for regulatory and law enforcement agencies to tackle wildlife crime. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs currently co-funds the NWCU with others, including the Home Office and the police. Decisions on the ongoing post-2020 deployment of police resources are a matter for the Home Office and individual police chief constables.

Questions were raised about future funding. Clearly, we have the IWT in mind. We want to show people that we are serious about the work that we are doing; that is very clear from the feedback from the NGOs. However, the specific, longer-term funding, post-2020, will be part of the normal spending review process, notwithstanding ongoing dialogues. That is where the more sustainable approach to funding, or the future funding, of the NWCU can be reviewed. That process will be kicking off very soon. That will be an important way of engaging with that debate and looking at the resources that are in place.

We should not forget the role of the regulator. It is easy to focus on the things we know, but we are paving the way for a new regulator—the OPSS—to come into force. The funding for the additional work it will undertake as a result of the sales ban will not be an insignificant amount of money. It is important to note that we are appointing the regulator to enforce the Bill and issue the civil sanctions, which I talked about in relation to the fines. That will constitute the bulk of the work. We are focused on criminal sanctions, but the vast bulk of the work will relate to civil sanctions. That will constitute the work that the OPSS will do. We therefore do not expect the burden on the strategic intelligence-led NWCU to increase significantly. The OPSS is designed to take out the volume of activity. Given those explanations, I hope the hon. Lady will withdraw her new clause.

[The Chair]

I remind hon. Members that votes on new clauses come at the end.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Civil sanctions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Sue Hayman]

Amendment 13 is pretty straightforward. It was designed to clarify the circumstances in which the Secretary of State will consider criminal sanctions to be more appropriate than civil sanctions. We propose to insert it into paragraph 21 of schedule 1 in order to be absolutely clear about why a criminal sanction would come into play, as opposed to a civil sanction. The Minister said that the bulk of cases will come under civil sanctions, but what is the tipping point? We feel that anyone involved in this will need to understand properly the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would consider a case to have tipped into a criminal sanction.

[David Rutley]

I set out in our discussion on clause 12 that a mixed regime of criminal and civil sanctions will be applied to the offences under the Bill. In line with that approach, clause 13 ensures that civil sanctions may be applied to breaches of the ban. The civil sanctions are detailed in schedule 1. We recognise that offences made under the Bill may vary in severity. Overly harsh sanctions should not be applied in a way that could be deemed to be disproportionate. For example, where members of the public have genuinely made every effort to abide by the ban or are genuinely of the belief that the item is not ivory, it would clearly be inappropriate to levy criminal sanctions.

However, compliance with the ban cannot be seen as optional. Acts of non-compliance must be deterred and penalised with the appropriate level of sanction. That is critical if we are to meet our objective of ending the link between the UK ivory market and elephant poaching. The clause ensures that, where a criminal sanction is unwarranted, a range of civil sanctions may be applied. The regulatory body and the police will be responsible for identifying and investigating breaches of the ban. The regulatory body will be responsible for issuing civil sanctions, as I described earlier.

If an offender does not comply with a civil sanction imposed against them—for example, if they do not pay the monetary penalty imposed against them within the necessary period—they may be subject to criminal sanctions. The Government believe that the range of available sanctions reflects the seriousness of the ban, while allowing it to be proportionate. I commend the clause to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sue Hayman]

I thank the Minister for providing that detail. Schedule 1 states that the Secretary of State must

“prepare and publish guidance as to”—

this is in paragraph 21(1)(c)—

“the circumstances in which the Secretary of State is likely to take any such action.”

Does that clearly explain whether he would consider criminal sanctions to be more appropriate than civil questions? Perhaps further clarification could be given in the guidance that accompanies the Bill, because it is important for people to understand whether these are criminal or civil sanctions. Could the guidance be elaborated to make that clear?

[David Rutley]

I understand the hon. Lady’s concern about getting this right. I can assure her that there will be further clarification on these points in the guidance. The point is well made, but it will be in the guidance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 14

Power to stop and search persons

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 15 and 16 stand part.

[David Rutley]

These clauses all refer to powers of stop-and-search to be conferred on police and customs officers. They refer to persons, vehicles, and vessels and aircraft respectively. Clause 14 confers on police and customs officers the power to stop and search persons. There is no power to stop and search where an officer suspects that a person has in his or her possession an ivory item that is not intended for dealing. In order to use the powers, an officer will need reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed or is committing an offence. That might include intelligence gathered about a planned sale of ivory, or information from the registration database that an item has been falsely registered. A police or customs officer may also detain a stopped person for the purpose of carrying out a search. The stop-and-search powers in clause 14 are exercisable in any place to which a police or customs officer has access, including any public place.

Clause 15 confers on police and customs officers the power to stop and search vehicles. Again, the power is engaged where an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a “relevant offence”, as defined in clause 14(4). The power does not apply where the vehicle is a dwelling. A dwelling is not defined but is intended to be given its natural meaning—the exclusion would, for example, apply to a residential caravan. The power will apply to vehicles whether or not a driver or other person is in attendance of the vehicle.

Where it is impractical for a stopped vehicle to be searched in the place it was stopped, an officer may require the vehicle to be moved to another place before conducting the search. That provision would apply, for example, where a vehicle was stopped on a busy road and it would be safer to conduct the search in another location. Clause 15(4) places a duty on any person travelling in the vehicle, or the registered keeper, to facilitate the exercise of an officer’s power under the clause. For example, the driver of the vehicle may be required to open a locked glove box or boot. Again, those stop-and-search powers are exercisable in any place to which the officer has lawful access. That would enable a vehicle parked in a garage on premises that were the subject of a search warrant under clause 15(7) to be searched.

Clause 16 will confer on police and customs officers a power, analogous to that in clause 15, to board and search vessels or aircraft. A vessel is defined in clause 36(4) and includes any ship, boat or hovercraft. However, the power does not apply where a vessel or aircraft is used as a dwelling—a houseboat, for example.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 15 and 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Powers to enter and search premises

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 18 and 19 stand part.

That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

The hon. Member for Workington has put it very well. I have nothing to add but, for obvious reasons, endorse the remarks she has made.

[David Rutley]

The hon. Lady makes some important points. I will wait for a little inspiration to help with some of them. It is important to recognise that accredited civilian officers are members of the OPSS and already have powers of entry and search under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in relation to products subject to trade.

It is about recognising the new role. The regulator is new and, therefore, we are trying to understand what it can do. They already have a pre-existing role and within that they have these powers to enter and search. They also have powers under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. These are specific servants given a particular role and they do have pre-existing powers that they could use in trying to prohibit the sale of ivory, or commercial activity relating to it, that does not qualify for exemption. I hope that answers the hon. Lady’s question.

[Alex Chalk]

Will my hon. Friend be kind enough to indicate the training that takes place before someone is qualified to use these important powers? Bearing in mind that the individual would be entitled under the legislation to enter premises—albeit non-dwelling premises—and to search in an intrusive way, we need to ensure that the people exercising those important powers have been fully trained, so that civil liberties are protected.

[David Rutley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Of course, there will be a strong training regime to ensure that these individuals are able to carry out their current role and we want to ensure that they have adequate training to take on new roles related to the ivory prohibition. I will write to him with details of how that will be moved forward.

[Sue Hayman]

Further to that point, the situation has been described as possibly unprecedented. How often does the Minister see these civilian officers taking part in investigations? Would that be rare or a regular part of the enforcement process? That would clearly affect resources and training. I would be grateful for clarification on that.

[David Rutley]

The Bill is clear that the powers given to the body and its members will be strictly controlled. The relationship with customs officers and police officers is tightly defined. As for the number of times it will be used, we are putting more focus on civil sanctions. The key point is that officers or members of the OPSS will need these powers to carry out their work and move matters through. The hon. Lady will note that clause 17 requires the OPSS to issue reasonable notice of intent to enter. The move to enter premises is not just to search; it can also be to ensure compliance. It is important to remember that the job of the OPSS is to help educate and train as well as ensure compliance and enforcement. It is a matter of thinking about their role more broadly. In many situations, as set out in the Bill, reasonable notice will be required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 18 and 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clauses 20 to 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

I wish simply to underline a point that has been made already. Clause 27 creates offences of obstruction if anybody, without a reasonable excuse,

“obstructs an officer in the performance of any of the officer’s functions under sections 14 to 24.”

That includes an accredited civilian officer, so it is all the more important, given the potential criminal sanctions that can apply, that the individual who possesses these significant powers of search, seizure and requiring the production of documents is truly competent and capable of that task. I wanted to take this opportunity to underscore the point, given the severity of the sanctions, that this is not something that should be skimped.

[David Rutley]

I reassure my hon. Friend that we are not looking to skimp, and we must of course ensure proper training. I will write to him, as I have already promised. We are all getting our heads around a new regime, but I assure the Committee that it is not unprecedented for OPSS to exercise powers under legislation; it falls under the remit of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and, as I have said, it has these powers already in relation to the Consumer Rights Act 2015. We want to ensure that it has the proper powers and that there is proper training, because of the implications.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 28 to 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Meaning of “ivory”

[Sue Hayman]

I beg to move amendment 11, in page 20, line 40, leave out “an elephant” and insert “a hippopotamus, elephant, killer whale, narwhal, sperm whale, or walrus.”

This amendment would include in the definition of ivory all the ivory-bearing species listed in an Appendix to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

[Sue Hayman]

Amendment 11 would include under the definition of ivory all the ivory-bearing species listed in an appendix to CITES. We have discussed the definition of ivory at length at every stage of the Bill, so I want to consider some of the discussion that we have had.

On Second Reading, the Secretary of State said that there would be an opportunity in Committee to consider whether the scope of the Bill was absolutely as it should be. He said:

“A number of Members have previously indicated their interest in extending its scope to other forms of ivory, such as narwhal horns, and there will indeed be an opportunity to debate precisely that matter in Committee.”—[Official Report, 4 June 2018; Vol. 642, c. 92.]

With amendment 11, I am taking the Secretary of State up on that generous offer and considering it in more detail.

[David Rutley]

Very kind.

[Sue Hayman]

I know how the Minister appreciates it.

Several hon. Members, some of whom are members of the Committee and others who are not but took part in the Second Reading debate, have spoken about why they feel it is really important that we look at extending the Bill’s scope. They include my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East, who I believe is paired today, the hon. Members for Mid Derbyshire and for North Dorset, who are both here today, the right hon. Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson), and the hon. Members for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith), for North East Hampshire (Mr Jayawardena), for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mrs Trevelyan), for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman), for Witney, and for Southend West (Sir David Amess). They all raised the specific issue of extending the scope on Second Reading.