Voting Eligibility (Prisoners)

David Davis Excerpts

Thursday 22nd November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s comments. I think it is worth recalling that when the convention was written, back in the 1950s, Stalin was in power in Russia and people were being sent to the gulags without trial. That is what the convention was all about, but over the past 50 or 60 years the Court has moved it away from those fundamentals, and into a territory that many of us find deeply unsettling and wrong. I think there is a compelling case for reform, but while the current situation continues, we must none the less respect the laws of which we are part, and put to Parliament the questions that I am putting to it today.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

As the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) has just demonstrated, this is a non-partisan, parliamentary issue—a matter of debate across the House. In that context, I congratulate my right hon. Friend on doing exactly the right thing in the Bill and handing the decision back to Parliament. I am sure, given the debate that the right hon. Gentleman and I secured some time ago, that the House will effectively decide on the status quo, but that is for the House to decide. If that is what the House decides, does he accept that it will set a precedent, and that every time the European Court goes beyond the remit set by the treaty, to which we did sign up, Parliament will reserve the right to correct it and put things back into proper law?

[Chris Grayling]

My right hon. Friend has set out clearly the legal position: Parliament has that right. It has been endorsed in the comments made to a Committee of this House by the Attorney-General, as it was in the House of Lords 13 years ago by Lord Justice Hoffmann. That is the legal position—Parliament is sovereign, and long should it remain so.

Oral Answers to Questions

David Davis Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Herbert]

I would be very happy to meet the hon. Lady to discuss that issue.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

On 4 September, the European Court of Human Rights will hear the case of Nadia Eweida v. the United Kingdom Government. I understand that the Government are resisting the case. Miss Eweida is the lady who effectively lost her job with British Airways for wearing a cross, a symbol of her religion, at work. Is it any part of the British Government’s policy to support the denial of people’s religious rights at work? If not, will we reconsider our position on that case?

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I will consult the Attorney-General, who is no doubt preparing the Government’s defence in this case. This is obviously a hugely difficult issue; the case has gone through the courts here and is now going to be heard in Strasbourg. Whatever one’s feelings about the narrow facts of the individual case, there are wider issues about the enforcement of religious rights in employment, and I have no doubt that they will be properly canvassed. I will consult my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General.

Defamation Bill

David Davis Excerpts

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

I shall try to swivel in your direction more frequently, Mr Speaker. In case you missed it: if you ever have to bring a defamation action, it is unlikely to be heard before a jury. But I do apologise.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I, like my right hon. and learned Friend, am hoist with two petards: one is my belief in the principle of jury trial; the other is the practicalities that he quite rightly outlines. What I want to understand in his description of the Bill is under what circumstances a jury trial will be triggered. What are the criteria that will trigger a jury trial instead of a judge-only trial?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sadiq Khan]

I associate myself completely with the hon. Gentleman’s comments. I will come to Dr Wilmshurst, the cardio surgeon he mentioned, shortly.

I pay tribute to the work done by the Joint Committee that considered the draft Bill under the chairmanship of Lord Mawhinney. I will come later to some of the excellent conclusions reached by the Committee, some of which have not been adequately addressed in the Bill. I also recognise the hard work of Lord Lester in his original private Member’s Bill.

Finally, I pay tribute to this Government for running with libel reform despite a change of Administration. New Administrations do not often stick with plans that are not wholly their own; this one has. This is not a partisan issue but a problem that needs rectifying. I commend the way in which the Government have gone about doing so and the pre-legislative scrutiny that has been carried out. I commend the Justice Secretary for taking on the baton of reform and ensuring that time was made available in this Session for a Bill to be brought before us.

Time in this House is precious, and using that time for legislation should be done only when there is a clear and demonstrable problem that needs new laws or a change in existing laws, especially when the subject is uncontroversial. Our libel laws deserve this attention, and it is right that we seek to update them. Libel laws were first established in statute through the Libel Act 1843. Since then, only limited changes have been made through the Defamation Act 1952 and the Defamation Act 1996. The law on defamation has primarily been developed by judges via case law.

As with many elements of our legal system, legislating on defamation is about calibration. We must calibrate correctly the balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation. Freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a free and open democratic society: citizens must be free to express their opinions and views on issues, people and organisations. However, there are limits to the freedom to express opinions. Freedom of expression does not trump everything else. Indeed, in the Human Rights Act 1998, it is a qualified right. It must be balanced against the impact that the expression may have on the reputation of those affected. That is obvious.

The besmirching of reputations without supporting evidence, perhaps for vindictive reasons, is something that society should rightly guard against. That is why we have defamation laws. They are a deterrent against the unwarranted or vindictive expression of opinion, and provide recourse for those who have suffered damage to their reputation. Exactly where the line is drawn between what causes injury to reputation and what is simply the expression of free opinion is not clearly defined, nor could it be. There will always be the need for discretion at the interface of those two opposing tenets.

That said, there has been growing concern in recent years that our libel laws have not kept pace with the changing nature of society. Some have expressed concern that the balance has become too tilted towards protecting reputations, at the expense of free speech, leading to a chilling effect whereby the legitimate right to speak freely and openly is inhibited or discouraged by the threat of legal sanction. Others are worried that England and Wales have become a destination for libel tourists because our perceived claimant-friendly environment attracts litigants who are unwilling or unable to pursue cases in Europe or the USA. Technology, through the expansion of the internet, has transformed the way in which comment and opinion are disseminated in a way that the world has never before witnessed.

Our overriding objective must be to ensure that people from all backgrounds have access to the legal system, should they be genuinely defamed. The chilling effect is underpinned by the system appearing to be out of reach for many people. We therefore risk a dangerous skewing of the balance away from freedom of expression and towards those seeking to protect reputations. The Defamation Bill should leave us with laws that are clearer and more proportionate.

I will now discuss specific provisions of this relatively short Bill, which contains only 16 clauses. Clause 1 will introduce the hurdle of “serious harm” and states that a statement does not defame

“unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause”

serious reputational harm. That is sensible. That hurdle is intended to prevent mundane actions that can cost considerable amounts of time and money to head off. We want to discourage trivial claims.

However, how does “serious harm” differ qualitatively from harm? On that, the Bill is not clear. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) has illustrated some of the problems. Case law refers to a “threshold of seriousness” in determining what is defamatory. To provide genuine protection against trivial cases, we need greater clarity. Otherwise, vexatious claims will not be tackled. The Law Society, of which I am still a member, is concerned that this higher hurdle is likely to inhibit many people in making valid attempts to protect their reputation. That is one issue that I hope the Committee will clarify when the Bill moves upstairs.

[Mr David Davis]

This matter was raised with my right hon. and learned Friend, the Secretary of State by the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley). Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the measure of serious harm for a corporation or large profit-making body should be very different from that for a small company or less well-off individual, and that as a result the provision should act as a deterrent against big companies using libel laws as a bullying mechanism?

[Sadiq Khan]

As the right hon. Gentleman will know, the Joint Committee looked into that issue and wanted a first hurdle before a corporation could sue. The Government decided not to accept that recommendation. He raised the example of corporations. The use of defamation laws by corporations has a chilling effect, especially given the inequality of arms. I am sure that that issue will be teased out and clarified in Committee, given the expertise that it will have.

As has been said, clauses 2 to 7 set out the defences that will be available to a claim for defamation. Some simply replace and codify common-law defences, while others provide new defences. I wish to touch on some of those defences.

Clause 4 is intended to address responsible publication of matters of public interest, the so-called Reynolds defence. That is a defence of responsible journalism in the public interest. The clause will abolish Reynolds and codify the factors that a court may consider when judging whether a defendant has acted responsibly.

I am aware that some groups, including the Libel Reform Campaign, are unhappy with the clause, believing that the Government have not gone far enough, that the defence is too time-consuming and expensive, and that it is unreliable because defendants are often required to clear a series of complex hurdles to gain legal protection. They also believe that it will simply freeze the Reynolds defence at the current point in time. There is genuine concern that subsequent case law may develop based on what is in the Bill. Would a “son of Reynolds”, as it were, be in the best interests of our defamation laws? We will need further debate and discussion on that important issue, and I look forward to that in Committee.

As has been said, clause 5 is intended to address defamation involving websites. It creates a new defence for operators of a website when a defamation action is brought against them in respect of a statement posted on that website by a third party.

Data Protection in the Areas of Police and Criminal Justice (EU Directive)

David Davis Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Crispin Blunt)]

I beg to move,

That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 5833/12 and Addenda 1 and 2, relating to a Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data; and supports the Government’s recommendation not to exercise its right to opt out of this draft Directive under Protocol 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (The Schengen Protocol).

The motion stands on the Order Paper in my name and that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor.

I welcome the opportunity to debate the proposed data protection directive, which the European Commission published on 25 January. The directive would repeal and replace the 2008 framework decision on data protection in the police and criminal justice sector. It is an important instrument for law enforcement in this country and across the European Union, and it is right that this House is given the opportunity to consider the effect of the proposals on both the security and the freedoms of UK citizens. The debate fulfils the commitment made by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe to seek Parliament’s views on an opt-in decision in justice and home affairs matters, as well as opt-out decisions under the Schengen protocol, and I am keen to hear the views of right hon. and hon. Members.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

In the Ministry of Justice’s impact analysis, the summary is that the overall impact is

“likely to be substantially negative”.

Given that, can the Minister explain why he does not want to opt out?

[Mr Blunt]

I will deal with that, but in deciding whether to exercise the opt-out, the Government looked at the most pessimistic reading of events. The conclusion to which my right hon. Friend refers has been before the European Scrutiny Committee, but that impact assessment does not take into account some of the consequences that would flow if we exercised an opt-out. I shall talk about those consequences later in my speech, but they include negotiating all the bilateral data protection arrangements that would be required were we not party to the directive.

Having held the responsibility of Europe Minister, my right hon. Friend, of all people in this House, will understand the complexity of the legal basis—complexity that has increased considerably since he and I were serving in the Foreign Office together, I as a special adviser and he as a Minister. If he will forgive me, I will get my arguments on the record, give right hon. and hon. Members the opportunity to contribute in the light of that, then respond to their remarks at the end of the debate. I will therefore resist taking too many interventions. This area is complex enough without adding further to that complexity—

Justice and Security Green Paper

David Davis Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

The right hon. Lady is also a member of the ISC, so I am grateful for her support for our proposals. She is quite right to stress the need for public confidence generally. The present situation is wholly unsatisfactory. The Guantanamo Bay case, which we settled recently, showed exactly what can go wrong. I had to come to the House to announce that we had paid out a total of £20 million, together with costs, because we had ceased to defend the action. Everyone who was inclined to believe the detainees thought that there was secret information that would confirm everything they said, and everyone who was against the detainees thought that the security services had been crippled, that they could have defended themselves and that we were paying money to worthless people. Every conspiracy theory could flourish, depending on temperament, before we even started. That is no way to retain public confidence. In our view that definitely requires closed material procedures, which means that we must have special advocates, so we welcome views on how to improve the way in which they carry out that very difficult task.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

The purpose of state secrecy is to protect the safety of citizens, not to cover up criminality or to avoid embarrassment. In the Binyam Mohamed case, which led to the Gibson inquiry, the very senior judges involved went to a great deal of trouble to balance the requirements of security and open justice, but, from what I understand of this Green Paper, I am concerned that had my right hon. and learned Friend’s proposals been in place a few years ago, what we learned from the Binyam Mohamed case would not have been put in the public domain, that we would not have had the Gibson inquiry and, indeed, that we would not have been able to resolve the issues arising from it. Other nations—Canada, Australia, Germany, France and Italy; all our major allies other than America—are able to be very robust about that. Why can we not be?

[Mr Clarke]

If my right hon. Friend will excuse me, I shall not comment on the Binyam Mohamed case in detail. The judges take one view and others take another, but the Green Paper addresses the problem. One would need the facility for closed material procedures, so the starting point would be a decision, confirmed by the judge, that in the interest of national security the case should take place in closed proceedings and, therefore, not be revealed afterwards. That is an altogether better way of resolving the issue than allowing an argument to break out between judges, the Security Service and everybody else afterwards about whether something has been revealed that should not have been. That was where we were in the case of Binyam Mohamed.

I cannot remember my right hon. Friend’s second point, but we have got the balance right. Members of the Intelligence and Security Committee have said that confidentiality vis-à-vis allies is absolutely crucial, and it is no good currying favour by trying to get behind that, because in fact the safety of people in this country would be endangered if we did not have the full and frank co-operation of allied countries providing us with their intelligence, just as we provide them with ours.

Anonymity (Arrested Persons) Bill

David Davis Excerpts

Friday 4th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Philip Davies]

I am not a fan of restricting the information that people can give when it comprises simple fact. The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South made the point particularly well. These things normally work through reports such as “A 25-year-old man from Hastings has been arrested for a crime.” I do not understand how that damages the judicial system. In many respects, the Bill is a solution looking for a problem because, in the vast majority of cases, crimes tend to be reported in the way in which my hon. Friend wants.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

My hon. Friend probably acknowledges that I yield to nobody, not even him, in defending people’s rights against unlawful arrest. His case would stand up better if what was being argued was for no naming whatsoever rather than naming at the point of charge. Since we have limitations on detention without charge—about which I am quite expert—my hon. Friend’s case would fall after two or three days.

[Philip Davies]

My right hon. Friend knows that no one in the House admires him more than I do, although we do not always agree. Indeed, many people have said that he did not become leader of the party because my support for him was disclosed far too early. There is some truth in the assertion that his candidacy went downhill from the very moment that I declared my support for him. The fact that he still talks to me is testimony to his courtesy.

However, if it is damaging to someone who is arrested that their name is mentioned, because they can be vilified through a “no smoke without fire” approach, that applies not only to them, but to those who are charged with an offence, those who go to court and those who are acquitted. I am sure that my right hon. Friend would acknowledge that, in many cases, people go to court and are acquitted, and local people still say, “He must have been up to something; they wouldn’t have arrested him for no reason.” In dealing with the “no smoke without fire” issue and in arguing that people should not be vilified just because they have been arrested, the ultimate logic of the Bill is that we should not name anybody charged with something until they have been convicted. My right hon. Friend might consider that desirable, and it is a perfectly respectable view to hold—although I do not know whether he does hold it—but it is not one I agree with. It would not be a positive, but a negative development.

The thing that I most wish to defend is not just the freedom of the press—although that is important—but the important principle of open justice in this country. A Government research paper last November entitled, “Providing anonymity to those accused of rape: an assessment of evidence”, helpfully included the reasons why an open justice principle is so important to this country. It is important because it

“helps ensure that trials are properly conducted”,

it

“puts pressure on witnesses to tell the truth”,

and it

“can result in new witnesses coming forward”,

which is an important point made by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South. It also

“provides public scrutiny of the trial process”,

which is also an important factor, and

“maintains public confidence in the administration of justice”.

I am a big believer that the more information the public know the better. Finally and crucially, it

“reduces the likelihood of inaccurate and uninformed comment about proceedings”.

That final point is one of the most crucial. Following a high-profile case, no matter what laws the House decides to pass, we cannot prevent people from speculating on what has happened, on who was involved, on who might be guilty or on who they think it is. I am sure it happens in many households around the country following a crime; I am sure that every household has its resident Inspector Clouseau listing who they think is guilty—“It must be somebody they knew,” “It’s probably a relative,” and all that kind of thing. That is not going to stop, no matter how many laws we pass.

Libel Law

David Davis Excerpts

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

If the world has a capital of free speech, it is Britain. If it has a centre of free speech, it is this Chamber, as you know well, Mr Speaker. Yet in the last few years, Britain has become a watchword for something else—the use of our libel law to suppress free speech.

This is not an esoteric philosophical issue. Free speech is the mother of freedom of thought and freedom of thought is the mother of many virtues, including integrity, individualism and creativity. That is why Britain has a vigorous and successful tradition of high culture and science, as well as of democracy. As I will demonstrate, all those virtues of British culture have been suppressed, to a greater or lesser extent, by our libel law.

As a Parliament, we have failed to defend one of our nation’s primary virtues—free speech. We have also failed in the duty to protect the weak and vulnerable from the rich and powerful. More often than not, it is the rich and powerful who use the libel laws to intimidate the less wealthy and the less powerful, as I shall demonstrate. Perhaps the best demonstration that English libel law has become a weapon of the rich and powerful is the extent to which they choose to use the English courts over any other option and over the courts of any other country. When Boris Berezovsky sued a Russian TV company, he did so not in Russia, where the deed occurred, but in England. Similarly, Roman Abramovich chose to sue an Italian newspaper not in Rome, but in London.

In 2004, the Saudi billionaire, Khalid bin Mahfouz, launched a libel action against Rachel Ehrenfeld, the American author of “Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed—and How to Stop It”. The book claimed that Mahfouz financed al-Qaeda. It was not published here, but it was available online. Mahfouz brought the case not in America or Saudi Arabia, but in Britain, and the court awarded him substantial damages. As a direct result, New York law was changed to prevent British judgments applying in the US and American national law is undergoing the same change.

Those rich men each brought their cases under the English judicial system, rather than in the appropriate forum, because English libel law is complex, clumsy, expensive and draconian. It is 140 times more expensive to defend a libel case in England than in other European nations. As a result, it favours the wealthy man who has the most financial stamina and can afford the most expensive lawyers. Although libel tourism is not the most important weakness in English libel law, it is the starkest symptom of how unfair it can be, compared with every other jurisdiction in the modern world.

Perhaps the best domestic example of this grotesquely expensive system is the Naomi Campbell case. A newspaper wrote about her drug problem. It was sued and lost on the grounds of breach of confidentiality. Although the story was true, the legal fees alone cost more than £1 million.

How did all that come about? English libel law was largely developed centuries ago by English judges, as an alternative to duelling to protect the honour of gentlemen. I am sure that no Member wants to see Hampstead heath littered with the bodies of dead journalists, but I am not sure how much of an improvement that new law was. It has been compounded with undoubtedly well intentioned European Union and European Court of Human Rights law, and we have ended up with dreadful unintended consequences.

One of the most egregious consequences has been the rise of the so-called super-injunction, which bans any reporting of a case at all. The most extreme of those was the Trafigura case, which you will remember, Mr Speaker. Trafigura was accused of dumping toxic waste on the Ivory Coast, and for a while its lawyers secured a ban on the reporting even of questions in Parliament. In so doing, they overturned the absolute right to free speech fought for and won more than two centuries ago by John Wilkes. That is a suppression of free speech in this country that no one in the House should countenance or tolerate.

There is worse yet: the crushing of free speech in science and medicine. Both those disciplines advance by conjecture and refutation, through the advancing of theories and the testing of them by experiment. Free dispute and unfettered argument are essential to that process. Yet we are witnessing, time and again, the use of English libel law by powerful commercial interests to suppress legitimate discussion of scientific fact and medical effectiveness.

That is not entirely new. A famous member of this House, William Cobbett, was bankrupted by a lawsuit in 1797 after he pointed out that the practice of bleeding victims of yellow fever probably killed a number of them. He fled the lawsuit and the victims continued to be bled, and of course continued to die.

In modern times, the starkest example was the thalidomide case. For some time, The Sunday Times was prevented from publishing articles alleging negligence in the manufacture and distribution of the drug, which, as Members will remember, caused terrible deformities in the children of women who took it in pregnancy. That judgment was eventually overruled, and the law was rebalanced slightly to favour free speech in the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Unfortunately, however, there are still actions by commercial companies and other vested interests to suppress criticism of medical products and practices.

I shall give an example. Henrik Thomsen, a Danish radiologist, raised concerns that Omniscan, a drug used to enhance medical scanner images, was causing crippling pain and even death in a few patients. Despite the fact that medicine advances by a process of critical appraisal, the maker of the drug, GE Healthcare, sued him in the British courts, clearly in order to silence him. The suit has been resolved, but another medical specialist, the eminent cardiologist Peter Wilmshurst, has faced similar treatment. At a cardiology conference not in Britain but in Washington DC in 2007, he criticised a product made by an American company, NMT Medical, to deal with symptoms of hole-in-the-heart syndrome. NMT sued Mr Wilmshurst not in America but in the English courts. He courageously decided to fight the case, specifically to defend free speech.

Time and again, commercial companies take such action to silence critics. The proper, responsible, scientific way of dealing with criticism in medicine is tousb present the data and confront the argument. Using the law to silence legitimate criticism is to put shareholder interest above public health and, sometimes, public safety.

The best known case in England, of course, is that of Simon Singh, who essentially called some of the claims of chiropractors bogus. The British Chiropractic Association sued him and, after a protracted legal battle, lost. Nevertheless, he ended up hundreds of thousands of pounds out of pocket in addition to losing two years of his life—two years of stress, anxiety and the prospect of financial ruin. A less courageous man would have buckled, and indeed most do. That, of course, is the purpose: to intimidate critics out of saying anything, or to force a humiliating retraction, effectively gagging the press from reporting such criticism.

The tactics used are carefully refined. They are known as “lawfare” and are designed to focus the financial intimidation on the individual who is least able to bear it. The most recent demonstration of that nasty tactic would be ludicrous—bordering on the farcical—were it not so serious in its wider implications. It involves a product, elegantly called “Boob Job”, sold at £125 a jar and produced by a company called Rodial. The Daily Mail sought the advice of a leading consultant plastic surgeon, Dr Dalia Nield, of the London Clinic. As one might expect, she questioned its effectiveness and suggested that if it had the physiological effects claimed for it by its producers, it might be dangerous.

Rodial threatened Dr Nield with legal action. It has not threatened the Daily Mail, which carried her comments, because it has the resources to fight back, just Dr Nield, to get the maximum intimidation for the minimum risk. The proper response of any self-respecting company would be to publish the detailed composition of its product and the data supporting its claims, and engage experts to test those claims and carry out safety tests. That would be the approach of a respectable company, but I am afraid that Rodial has not taken such an approach—it has taken instead the approach of a charlatan and a bully.

Of course, Rodial is not alone. When NMT threatened Peter Wilmshurst with a lawsuit, it did not threaten the BBC, which broadcast his comments, because the BBC can fight back. When the chiropractors sued Simon Singh, they did not sue The Guardian, which published his comments, because The Guardian can fight back. That is why it is called “lawfare”—it is the deployment of judicial shock tactics against the most defenceless part of the opposition. It is a disgraceful tactic, and it should not be possible under any decently balanced judicial system.

The effect of “lawfare” is to chill free speech in science, medicine and many other areas. In this age of the internet, that chilling effect does not stop at our borders. We should remember that English is the language of science. The impact of our dysfunctional laws will become more global as more corporations come to understand what they can do to use our laws to suppress criticism.

[Fiona Mactaggart (Slough) (Lab)]

I wanted to highlight the fact that “lawfare” operates not merely in science. My constituent, Hardeep Singh, has been battling for four years in the ludicrously named case of His Holiness v. Singh. He has been accused by a sect leader in the Sikh tradition of libel, and it has taken up four years of his life and thousands of pounds to defend his claim in a religious dispute that, in my view, is not able to be decided by the courts.

[Mr Davis]

The hon. Lady is entirely right. I used science and medicine to demonstrate the starker effects of “lawfare”, but she has demonstrated one of the reasons why we debated the law on religious hatred: to allow unfettered discussion of religion, which is another great tradition of British democracy. I apologise to her constituent because I think of his case as Singh II, but it is just as important as the Singh case I cited, because both demonstrate only too clearly that we must get a grip on British libel law to prevent it damaging every aspect of our culture and tradition of free speech.

That brings me to what we should do. Regrettably, there is no single, simple solution. This week is the first anniversary of the Libel Reform Campaign, which encompasses campaigning organisations such as PEN, Index on Censorship, Sense About Science and others. There are a variety of issues that we need to address.

The cost of defending libel cases should be brought down. One step would be not to remove jury trial, but to introduce a tribunal process to deal with all but the most serious cases. The Minister might also care to tell us about his Green Paper—published a few weeks ago, I think—in which he talks about contingent fee arrangements and their possible reform, which might be another way of reducing costs. The law should focus on protecting individual reputation, without allowing heavy-handed commercial intimidation. One step towards that might be not to allow commercial companies above a certain size—in fact, really rather a small size—to bring such suits unless they can, in advance, demonstrate financial damage.

The public interest defence—again, this is something that the hon. Lady will be interested in—is too vague and unhelpful to authors of legitimate criticism. A stronger and clearer defence than that provided by the so-called Reynolds defence should be instituted. In particular, there should be a broader definition of what constitutes fair comment. In the light of what I have said about scientific and medical concerns, such a definition should be designed to exclude scientific and medical dispute from the courts completely. There should be intelligent limits on what constitutes multiple publication. For a court case to be brought in Britain, a significant proportion—certainly more than 10%—of the publication should have been in Britain. As the House can see, there are many proposals—I have given only a short list—that need to be considered. I should like the Minister to confirm that the Government will be introducing a Bill in 2011; that he will consult Index on Censorship, PEN, Sense About Science and other campaigners before publishing it; and that the Government will correct this unintended and unwanted systemic failure in our judicial system.

I shall finish by quoting the Appeal Court judges in the Simon Singh ruling. Speaking about the words used by Simon Singh in his criticism of the chiropractors, they said that his

“opinion may be mistaken, but to allow the party which has been denounced…to compel its author to prove in court what he has asserted by way of argument is to invite the court to become an Orwellian ministry of truth.”

The judges went on to quote Milton, writing about his visit to Italy, from 1683 to 1689:

“I have sat among their learned men…and been counted happy to be born in such a place of philosophic freedom, as they supposed England was, while themselves did nothing but bemoan the servile condition into which learning among them was brought…that nothing had been there written now these many years but flattery and fustian. There it was…I found and visited the famous Galileo, grown old a prisoner of the Inquisition, for thinking in astronomy otherwise than the Franciscan and Dominican licensers thought.”

When the judges had finished quoting Milton, they said:

“That is a pass to which we ought not to come again.”

I say to the Minister: it is a pass that the coalition Government ought not to allow to come again. To achieve that, we need clearly thought through and thorough reform of this bad law, to put free speech back at the pinnacle of public life in Britain.