Sanctions

David Davis Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

The House is as one on the wish and the need to apply these measures as expeditiously as possible. But of course my right hon. Friend is right to say that we have to do it properly, not least because a number of perfectly legitimate and lawfully acting UK businesses would be affected by these sorts of measures. It is right that they should not be injuriously affected by what occurs. It is right that, when we are imposing sanctions of up to 10 years’ imprisonment for a violation of these measures, we are also cautious in seeing that they are done properly. I can assure the House that we are working through names, but it takes time. There is a high burden of proof and we will work through it.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

The reason we co-ordinate with our allies is to make our policies effective. If the process of co-ordination takes so long that people can remove their assets beyond our reach and prepare their legal defences so that we cannot overwhelm them, we are defeating ourselves—we are pursuing headline actions without effect. Surely we should limit the extent to which we delay those things and get on with it straightaway.

[Michael Ellis]

I am so pleased that my right hon. Friend says that, because that is exactly what we are doing. The greatest expedition is being applied to this matter.

The legislation follows the made affirmative procedure, as set out in section 55(3) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. I know the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) is familiar with that and supported it strongly in this House both in 2018 and before. The legislation follows the process of that Act, so I have no doubt he will support it. These statutory instruments amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced, the powers they contain will prevent Russian banks from accessing sterling.

This is a significant and new measure for the United Kingdom. Russian banks clear no less than £146 billion of sterling payments into and out of the United Kingdom’s financial system every year. Without the ability to make payments in sterling, designated banks will not be able to pay for trade in sterling. They will not be able to invest in the United Kingdom. They will not be able to access the UK’s financial markets. This measure matches the power the United States already has to prohibit access to the US dollar, and shows our joint resolve with our American allies to remove Russia from the global financial and trade system. Around half of Russian trade is denominated in dollars or sterling.

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[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. The Minister can be assured of our co-operation in getting these measures through quickly. He has already heard some suggestions for ways in which we might name individuals more quickly; I hope we will hear back from him about them.

We believe that we need to go further to widen financial and banking sectoral measures beyond Sberbank. My second question is about whether the Minister can explain why measures on corresponding banks have not been applied to all Russian financial institutions today, rather than just to Sberbank. Indeed, we understand that the measures have been expanded to include sovereign debt. The Opposition have called for that to apply to UK subsidiaries of entities as well. Will the Minister confirm the position?

[Mr Davis]

I am going to pose a question for which I seek an actual answer—an unusual thing in this House. The Minister spoke about the problem of speed and co-ordination, and indeed the question of which banks were excluded from this process, which strikes me as a key issue.

These financial measures are like a hand grenade—a weapon that can kill or do damage to both sides: they will undoubtedly do damage to Germany, they will do some damage to us, and so on. We must seek financial weapons that do much more harm to the other side than to us because we may keep this up for years, and if we are to maintain support behind it we need to design it in that way. The Minister did not answer in those terms when I asked him the question, so I am interested to know whether the Opposition spokesman can.

[Stephen Doughty]

It will clearly be necessary for us to propose and potentially impose measures for quite some time—for a number of years, according to the explanatory notes—and we have agreed to work with the Government on that. Obviously, as I have said, we hope that they are acting robustly, deeply and broadly now. It is crucial to send a very strong signal, not least given what we have seen. I certainly hope that Russia turns around and ends this illegal invasion, but at the moment we have to send that very strong signal.

Thirdly, there are some exemptions in the legislation, and it is not clear on the surface why they apply. For example, there is an exemption for correspondent clearing services relating to aviation assets. Can the Minister explain the reasoning behind that? There are other exemptions that clearly make sense, relating to humanitarian affairs and extraordinary circumstances, and I can understand why they are there, but can the Minister provide a fuller explanation?

Fourthly, the Government have previously referred to an intention to limit the deposits that can be made by Russian nationals. Do they still intend to introduce such a measure, which is not part of the package that we are discussing today?

Fifthly, we think that there are additional things that the Government could do. For example, the US immediately introduced a ban on all imports from Donbas regions controlled by Russia. Have the Government considered that? We have also proposed a ban on the export of luxury goods, comparable with what has been in place against Syria. If that were undertaken with our partners and allies, it could have a major effect in putting

the squeeze on those around Putin who enjoy their luxury lifestyles.

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[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I found much to agree with in the comments from the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), as I did in those of the Minister. Today’s moves to prevent Russian banks and businesses from accessing our financial system and to ban key exports to Russia are much-needed and, frankly, long overdue. We should have been doing some of these things—not all of them—some time ago.

Yesterday, the Foreign Secretary said that this legislation would immediately be applied to Sberbank, VEB, Sovcombank and Otkritie. These measures will undoubtedly inflict damage on the Russian economy and punish the Russian state, but we must go further. It may be that I have not completely comprehended the Minister’s intentions, but why are we applying this immediate legislation only to those specific banks? The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) made a good point on this. Why not immediately apply it to VTB, Gazprombank or Alfa-Bank—Russia’s second, third and fourth biggest banks? I note that the Americans have sanctioned the same banks in the same way, and I assume that this is to protect the operation of fundamental European infrastructure such as oil and gas.

That was the point I was trying to draw from the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth when I asked whether he thought we were trying to ensure we did the maximum damage to Russia but the minimum damage to our allies if we had to maintain this for a long time. I am interested to hear the Minister’s answer, because by excluding those banks in the immediate term, we will to some extent undermine our strategy. Time is against us and troops are bearing down on Kyiv as we speak. The longer we wait, the longer Ukraine and her people will be subject to indiscriminate missile strikes and the terror of Putin’s forces.

Similarly, I would like to hear what the Government are doing to stop these measures being bypassed by Russia’s erstwhile friends, allies and fellow travellers: China, India and Brazil. Again, if we allow 30 days and those countries are willing to facilitate it, Russia could bypass a very large component of what we are trying to do. There might be rouble-support operations by China, for example. How would we cope with that? If we do not succeed in this strategy, frankly, we risk Ukraine being turned into a European Vietnam, a prospect too horrible to countenance.

As damaging as today’s measures are to the Russian financial system, they will not hit Putin where it hurts most. For that we need to target many more of his allies and facilitators who have bought their way into British society. That is what is missing from these statutory instruments.

We need to target those who own businesses on our stock exchange. We need to target those who own London homes that we can no longer afford because of Russian operations in London. We need to target oligarchs who own football clubs that many of our citizens can no longer afford to attend because they are so expensive. For too long, we turned a blind eye to dirty money flooding into the City of London. The right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), my successor as Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, has a very strong record on this, and she will know that we have failed to use the tools we already have.

For example, we have had unexplained wealth orders at our disposal since 2017. In theory, they force a suspect to reveal the source of their wealth, and failure to do so results in the property under consideration being seized. Since 2017, only nine of those orders have been presented against four people, and only two of them succeeded.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I am very much enjoying the right hon. Gentleman’s contribution, and I thank him for what he said. Does he agree that, until we target the enablers—the accountants, lawyers and banks—supporting individuals or companies in laundering dirty money, we will not hit the heart of the dirty money industry that we are trying to attack with this legislation?

[Mr Davis]

The right hon. Lady makes a point that will be made by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and others, and I have a lot of sympathy, but we have to be careful that we do not take away ordinary citizens’ rights—indeed, the proper rights of any individual—in how we deal with the lawyers, the accountants and so on.

Particularly in the lawfare area, a huge industry of enormous margins and enormous profits has been developed by various law firms, in particular, that have developed the tactics for defeating the Government’s imposition of proper laws.

[Bob Seely]

My right hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) raise a very important point. CMS took instruction from a Ministry of the Interior official who was actually a front for organised crime in the Magnitsky case. Should organised crime have legal representation? Yes. Should foreign organised crime have legal representation? Potentially. Does foreign organised crime have the right to hire companies such as CMS to try to use lawfare to attack freedom of speech and Bill Browder in this country? I would argue not, and that is the debate we should be having.

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend and I sponsored the lawfare debate four weeks ago, and he played a sterling part—he made probably the most informative speech in the whole debate. Yes, we have to address lawfare, but it is a difficult area. There are quicker areas we can work on right now, bearing in mind that time means lives. We have to work faster than we have been.

As I said, the NCA was able to bring successfully only two unexplained wealth orders out of nine, but the truth is that it has 100 targets sitting in its files—not two or four—and it cannot pursue them. Its evidence was given to the Intelligence and Security Committee and is reflected in the Russia report, but Lynne Owens, who was then head of the NCA, said that it simply could not afford the huge legal bills that it faced. The truth is that frankly it does not have the huge calibre of skills—no agency can say that they have— that oligarchs with virtually infinite quantities of money can employ.

How can we get the Serious Fraud Office, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Crown Prosecution Service and the NCA all to use this legislation properly? First, we must ensure that the costs of unexplained wealth orders are brought under control from the state point of view. Again, we must be careful that we do not undermine the rights of ordinary citizens, so we may say that the rules will apply only to unexplained wealth orders of, let us say, more than £50 million or something like that—that will not worry the ordinary citizen—and put a cap on expenditure. We must also use the private sector. We must say, “This is a national emergency” and ask everybody to put their shoulder to the wheel and make these UWOs work properly. The NCA has a list of 100, but those of us who took part in the lawfare debate know that roughly 140 Russian oligarchs should be on the target list. Not all of them are in Britain, but they should be on the list because their money may be in Britain, even if that is not the case.

It seems to me that there is a serious issue that should be in today’s regulations. I worry about the Government moving so slowly that their prey escape them and that the people who are in effect the enemies of the people of Ukraine by proxy get away with things that we should not allow. We must fight fire with fire and beat the oligarchs at their own game.

I will pick one oligarch out. We have already seen the results of actions taken so far, with oligarchs scrambling to protect their reputations. In the newspapers in the last few days we have seen Roman Abramovich doing things to protect himself. According to the Spanish Intelligence Committee, he is the man—or at least one of the men—who manages Putin’s business affairs. That is a really important issue in considering whether he should be on our target list. He was refused a Swiss residency permit due to suspected involvement in money laundering and contacts with criminal organisations and, when his UK visa was up for renewal, he chose to withdraw his application as it became clear that he would need to explain the source of his wealth due to the changes that we introduced in 2015. I picked one, but I could have picked any of 100-plus to illustrate that there is information and knowledge—it is not a question of being unable to identify the individuals. It should not have taken a war for us to make a start on that.

[Liam Byrne]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a brilliant speech. Will he give the House his perspective on the potential weakness in the sanctions regime? Its focus is obviously on asset freezing, but while Abramovich, who is widely regarded as Putin’s cashier, has tried to take pre-emptive measures by transferring control of Chelsea football club to a charitable trust, there is a real issue that the mansions, the jets and the yachts owned by oligarchs will continue to be available for their use because the regulations do not prohibit the use of economic resources for personal consumption.

[Mr Davis]

That is true. We must also face facts on the sophistication of the targets that we are aiming at. The assets that the right hon. Member talked about—the blocks of flats, the grand houses and the yachts—are probably owned by six or seven layers of companies through various offshore entities in the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands or whatever, and it is incredibly difficult for the state to find out who the owner is. That is why these unexplained wealth orders are at least the first weapon that we should sharpen up. That is also why speed is important.

Every day we give to these people allows their advisers to develop more sophisticated tactics of concealment and distraction. In at least a couple of the unexplained wealth orders, it turned out that the state was pursuing the wrong ownership because of distraction tactics. Speed, determination, sophistication and clear targeting, which is not difficult given what I have just been saying, are critical to succeeding in this. It should not have taken a war for us to start rooting out dirty Russian money in the UK, but we are where we are and we must not wait any longer.

We must start by going after the 140 or so oligarchs who have been identified as having direct links with Putin. We must take that action immediately and make clear to those corrupt oligarchs that their money is no longer welcome on these shores, and indeed that it is unsafe while they continue to provide financial support to Putin, whatever they say in the public press. I would have liked that process to have started today with these SIs. Sadly it has not, but hopefully it will be in next week’s economic crime Bill. However, if that takes weeks as well, every single week means more lives lost, more opportunities for these people to escape justice, and a worsening of the chances of our rescuing the Ukrainian nation from the fate in front of it.

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[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I will not read the list of more than 100 names, but I have picked out 10 that demonstrate not only the importance of tackling individuals, but their links to the UK. So we are complicit in this and we are facilitating it by not tackling this.

Alexander Abramov—my apologies if I mispronounce names—is the co-owner and chair of a multinational company registered and headquartered here in London, Evraz, which is a metals company. Together with his partners Roman Abramovich and Alexander Frolov, he owns a nearly 25% stake in TransContainer, which is the largest Russian container railway operator. His wealth is estimated at $6 billion.

Andrey Guryev is the majority owner and deputy chairman of PhosAgro, which is one of the world’s largest producers of fertilizers. It might well have been involved in the disaster in Lebanon—I am not alleging that, but the explosion in Lebanon arose from fertilizer that came through Russia. He has given 20% of the company to Putin’s university professor Vladimir Litvinenko, who is thought to be a proxy for Putin. He owns Witanhurst palace in London, which is valued at about £450 million, and his joint wealth with his family is estimated at $5.5 billion.

Leonid Mikhelson is the founder and chairman of natural gas producer Novatek, which is also listed on the London stock exchange. In 2017, he bought a 17% stake in petrochemical company Sibur from Putin’s reported former son-in-law, increasing his stake to 48%. His partner is Gennady Timchenko, a billionaire who is also a close friend of President Putin and whom the UK has also sanctioned. His wealth is estimated at $21 billion.

Mikhail Fridman has already been sanctioned by the EU. Fridman controls Alfa Group and LetterOne, both headquartered in Luxembourg. Fridman was investigated by the Spanish National Court between 2019 and 2021 for his role in the Zed bankruptcy. He owns £90 million of property and permanently resides in London. His worth is estimated to be $13 billion.

Vladimir Lisin is majority shareholder and chairman of NLMK Group, a leading manufacturer of steel products and responsible for one fifth of Russian steel production. NLMK is listed on the London stock exchange. Lisin also owns the railway operator First Cargo, as well as some ports and shipping companies. His estimated worth is $24 billion.

Petr Aven has been sanctioned by the EU. He is head of the largest Russian private bank, Alfa Bank. With his partners German Khan, Alexei Kuzmichev and Mikhail Fridman, Aven co-owns Alfa Group and LetterOne, both headquartered in Luxembourg. He is tipped to be the group’s direct link to Putin from his days as the Russian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. He owns a mansion in Surrey and is a renowned art collector. His worth is estimated at $5 billion.

Suleiman Kerimov was sanctioned by the US in 2018. He gets most of his fortune from his 76% stake in Russia’s biggest gold producer, Polyus. He profited from co-investing in Russian shares together with the then First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who was responsible for the Russian economy. The FinCEN files show that Kerimov paid £6 million to the Chernukhin family, who have been well exposed in the UK press. Kerimov’s family is worth some $10 billion.

Vladimir Potanin acquired a stake in Norilsk Nickel during Russia’s privatisation in 1995. Today, he owns just over a third of Russia’s largest nickel and palladium producer. Norilsk Nickel is also listed on the London stock exchange. Potanin also owns a pharmaceutical company, Petrovax Pharm, and a ski resort, Rosa Khutor, near Sochi. His worth is nearly $26 billion.

Yelena Baturina—sorry, she is a woman; Russia’s wealthiest, apparently—is the widow of Yury Luzhkov, who was the mayor of Moscow from 1992 to 2010. During her husband’s time as mayor, Baturina owned the construction company Inteko and cement factories, which benefited from the city’s commissions. She was the previous owner of the British property Witanhurst.

Finally—I have only chosen 10 out of the list—we have Vladimir Yakunin. He is an ex-KGB colleague of Putin. He ran state-owned monopoly Russian Railways between 2005 and 2015. He and his family extracted nearly $4 billion in assets and commissions from Russian Railways, in Navalny’s estimates. Most of those assets are now administered by his London-based son via a Luxembourg-registered investment fund. Yakunin is the founder and president of the Putin-linked World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilisations”. We do not know, because we do not have a public register of ownership, but we think he owns two north London properties. I will undertake to send the Minister the complete list, from which I have raised only 10 examples.

[Mr David Davis]

My right hon. Friend, if I may call her that, will be able to work out, as a former Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, that 35 plus 105 comes to 140, which is the number I was using before. These are the people I was thinking of. The reason I say that is that although Vladimir Putin theoretically has no assets, in practice he is estimated to have something like $200 billion, and that $200 billion will be being held by the 140 people we have talked about. In targeting them, we are targeting him directly, and that is the incentivisation we are aiming at in this exercise.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Hear, hear. We all agree. I will send the complete list to the Minister. I ask him and his colleagues in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and elsewhere to forensically examine the circumstances of the people on that list and to come back to us all, so that we have confidence that the Government are enacting what they say they want to do and taking real firm action against those cronies of Putin who are propping him up and allowing him to create havoc in Europe.

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[Mr David Davis]

This is not my main point, but I just point out that it is not just Britain; after all, the chairman of Gazprom and the former German Chancellor is another such example.

The point that I want to bring my hon. Friend to is his question about the lawyers. I do not feel that I responded properly to his intervention about the professions involved here. It seems to me that professional bodies themselves have to look very hard at the issue. We also have to make sure that the law is enforced. What he is talking about—people ignoring the origin of the money being paid to them—is actually a breach of the law that those people understand.

[Bob Seely]

I do not want to abuse privilege, but, to put it bluntly, I have been told of law firms that do not carry out client checks. I have been told of law firms that are effectively complicit in breaking the law. I have been told of law firms that are knowingly taking from organised crime, but doing it through a front. I will not start naming names now, but people are coming to me and telling me about this stuff—they are telling others here as well. It is a very serious that our legal systems have become so corrupted.

When it comes to solicitors, certainly in the Belton case, there is John Kelly at Harbottle and Lewis; Geraldine Proudler at CMS; Nigel Tait at Carter-Ruck—how often should that company have been mispronounced—which represents the interests of Rosneft; and Hugh Tomlinson QC, who represented all of them. Tait is also going after Charlotte Leslie for another client, as I think some here have mentioned. We have to wonder about the reputations that these people will end up with in a few years’ time, even if they are behaving as well as they might—I am being careful in what I say. Perhaps they are really lovely people, but perhaps their amorality will really begin to bite their reputations in a way that will be uncomfortable.

I just wonder: how on earth have we allowed this to happen? I would love an answer from a lawyer in Government. A free press should be intimidating kleptocrats and criminals. Why have we got to this position in our society—a free society, the mother of Parliaments—where we have kleptocrats, criminals and oligarchs intimidating a free media? We have a coalition not of the willing, but of the woeful. Oligarchs, Putin’s henchmen, team up with amoral lawyers—we know the oligarch model. We heard that from my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne). Just a few weeks ago, they told us how these firms set up a one-stop corruption shop to offer a form of legalised intimidation to silence not only their rivals, but journalists and authors.

There is also an unstructured, unregulated private eye business that is now collecting kompromat on people in this country. Do not get me wrong: people have the right to advice and legal representation, but that is being abused very badly in our society at the moment. To make the link with Putin, when it comes to the Belton case Catherine Belton says that the legal cases against her started two months after the Navalny video of Putin’s palace, when Navalny quoted from her book. As if by magic, a few weeks later three oligarchs, completely coincidentally, attack her to try to silence her and try to bankrupt HarperCollins and intimidate it into withdrawing the book.

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[Liam Byrne]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. We are now seeing a sanctions gap emerge, where the UK is the soft touch, the weakest link, and the slowest to the punch. None of us in this House wants to be in this position. We all welcome the regulations that the Paymaster General has brought before the House this afternoon, but the question that we put back is: “Tell us what further power and resources you need so that we can genuinely be best in class around the world.”

[Mr David Davis]

One of the reasons the sanctions are milder than perhaps the right hon. Gentleman or any of us would like may well be the problem that in British law, the stiffer the sanction, the greater the reaction. We may well have to take action in two stages, by freezing the assets in the first instance and then sequestering them.

[Liam Byrne]

That could well be the case, but if the Paymaster General has told us this afternoon that nothing is off the table, then we in this House need to hold him to his word and ask him to come back to us with an explanation, because at the moment the regime prohibits the dealing in economic resources but permits the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation to make available those resources. Personal consumption is not prohibited, according to the regulation. I guess we are asking him please to commit to us today to look at this question and bring back proposals for our urgent consideration, because I believe I speak for the whole House when I say that we will give the green light at a moment’s notice.

I want to pull together some of the brilliant contributions that we have had in this debate over the past few years and, in particular, over the past couple of weeks. If we write down the contributions that we have heard from all hon. Members, we basically get a call on Ministers for a 10-point plan to drive hard behind the powers that are being granted. First, surely it is now time for a Minister for economic warfare. This came up in conversation with the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). We are now settling into what will be a long confrontation with Russia, yet the sanctions team is in the Foreign Office, the instructions to the Bank of England are issued by the Treasury, and the Minister for Security is in the Home Office. I have been a Minister with a foot in two different Departments, and I can tell the House that it is an absolute nightmare. Surely it is now time to unite the political leadership in a single department for economic warfare that begins to take the fight to President Putin in a far more aggressive way.

Secondly, there are 12 different agencies currently tasked with taking on economic crime, and the Government, in their negligence, have not yet appointed a lead authority. Surely that now has to change. The National Crime Agency was bewildered to hear that a kleptocracy cell was being set up, as were the people in the National Economic Crime Centre. We have to do away with this nonsense and create a single lead agency that brings to this House a CONTEST-style strategy for taking on economic crime in which we prepare, protect and prevent, and pursue economic criminals to the ends of the earth.

Thirdly, there are Government reports that now need to see the light of day, starting with the Home Office’s review of the golden visa scheme. The Home Secretary has said that her ambition is for it to published. Why on earth has it not been published this week? We need to know where the weaknesses are, so let us get the facts on the table.

Fourthly, we need to resource the fight against economic crime far more seriously. Lynne Owens, the former director general of the National Crime Agency, is on the record as saying that its budget needs to double. When we consider the £100 billion-plus in economic damage to our country, surely doubling the National Crime Agency’s budget is a very small ask of the Treasury. While we are at it, we need to introduce cost capping orders in relation to unexplained wealth orders, as the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) said, so that the costs of prosecution are that much smaller.

Fifthly, we need policy infrastructure such as a register of beneficial ownership of property and a proper targeting system based on our financial information. There is a group of urgently overdue laws that must be introduced over the next couple of months. We need a foreign agents registration Act, an update to GDPR legislation so that abusive data subject access requests can be stopped, and SLAPP-back laws to allow judges to throw out abuses and attempts to silence journalists such as brave Catherine Belton and Tom Burgis. We need updated espionage laws before the House as quickly as possible.

I have to say to the Government that there needs to be a ban on political donations from profits earned outside the UK. We need a regime for calling in donations from improper sources for national security assessment. Fortunately enough, the Elections Bill is in the House of Lords, and as it happens I have tabled amendments that would allow us to achieve exactly that. The answer that normally comes back—it is getting slightly wearing now—is “Just because there are people with Russian links donating to political parties, not all Russians are bad.” No one is saying that. Stop patronising our intelligence!

We have named specific individuals with links to Russia, such as Mohamed Amersi, who, together with his partner, has given £750,000 to the Conservative party, despite making millions of dollars from a deal that involved President Putin’s telecoms Minister. In case anybody is in any doubt about the gravity of the situation, let me quote from a letter from Carter-Ruck that I have been sent in defence of Mohamed Amersi.

[Mr David Davis]

Haven’t we all!

[Liam Byrne]

The right hon. Gentleman might have had a similar letter. Mine is many, many pages long and must have cost an absolute fortune. It says:

“Our client did not know, and cannot reasonably have been expected to know or suspect, that Ms Karimova was the ultimate controller of Takilant Limited”—

that was the corrupt telecoms deal that he was involved in. Anybody who was doing business in the country knew that that family were behind pretty much every major industry. Mr Amersi is many things, but he is not stupid. At the bottom of page 4, the letter goes on:

“To be clear, all of our client’s…dealings in Russia and the former Soviet Union…were entirely legitimate, lawful and transparent.”

Surely this is not the kind of individual that the Conservative and Unionist party should be taking money from. I could go on; I have made previous contributions in the House about the matter. Dmitry Leus—a man whose cheque the Prince’s Foundation has sent back—has given something like £30,000 to the Justice Secretary’s constituency party. Please stop patronising our intelligence, stop telling us that all the donations were given under the rules that existed at the time, stop pretending that we are trying to smear the entire Russian people, look at the people writing the cheques with suspect links, and pay the money back.

Let me set out the final couple of points in our 10-point plan. In addition to the five pieces of legislation that need updating, we need to update the regulation of the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Many of us have heard time and again how firms such as Mishcon de Reya and Carter-Ruck abuse the legal process in order to create and inflate costs and intimidate others. Frankly, that has to stop.

As the hon. Member for Isle of Wight said, it is a tragedy that it has taken a war to bring us together across the House around a plan for tackling economic crime. When the Berlin wall fell, and also on that tragic day of 9/11, I looked out on the world and thought, “We are moving into a different era”, and now I think we are moving into a different era again. We will need to rethink the way in which we fortify our frontline with Russia across the NATO territories, and we will need to get serious about taking on the cancer of economic crime once and for all. If we do that, I believe that we will ultimately prevail.