Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDanny Kruger
Main Page: Danny Kruger (Conservative - East Wiltshire)Department Debates - View all Danny Kruger's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(2 days, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOn a point of order, Mr Dowd. My understanding is that we are planning to sit a bit later today, which is fine by me. I wanted clarity from you that the Committee has no hard deadline—that although the intention is that Report stage will take place on 25 April, if the Committee wished to go further, it could. I was a little concerned by some of the remarks made in this morning’s sitting about people being conscious of time; there is a sense of being asked to speed up as we go. Am I right in saying that the Committee can take as long as it needs to, and that in fact it should, to debate this very important matter?
The short answer is yes. I think Members will inevitably deal with this in as sensitive and conciliatory fashion as possible, notwithstanding that point.
Clause 4
Initial discussions with registered medical practitioners
Amendment proposed (this day): 342, in clause 4, page 2, line 23, leave out
“may (but is not required to)”
and insert “must”.—(Danny Kruger.)
This amendment would strengthen the requirement for a registered medical practitioner to conduct a preliminary discussion.
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
I will try to keep my comments as brief as possible because we have had another very thorough discussion. First, my amendment 424 is, as the Minister said, a simple drafting change in clause 40 that confirms that “preliminary discussion” means a discussion as per clause 4(3).
Amendment 275 from my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central would, in many circumstances, broaden the scope of the conversation that the doctor would have with the patient, and I am happy to support it.
I am also happy to support the very sensible amendment 108 from my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington). It is perfectly acceptable to ask the doctor to offer to refer the patient to a specialist, as they would probably do in most cases anyway, but the amendment is for clarity.
I refer colleagues to the comprehensive comments on my amendment 183 earlier in proceedings, and also to the support of the British Medical Association. Following Second Reading, I listened carefully to Members’ concerns about the possibility of doctors only discussing assisted dying with patients. Even though the Bill states that that cannot be the case, for the avoidance of any doubt the amendment emphasises that the initial discussion mentioned in clause 4(3) may not be conducted without also explaining and discussing the matters mentioned in subsection (4). Accordingly, such a preliminary discussion may not be conducted in isolation from an explanation of and discussion about the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) of that subsection—that is, doctors cannot discuss the option of assisted dying in isolation but only in conjunction with discussion about all other available and appropriate treatment.
Indeed, Andrew Green of the BMA told us that
“some patients find it very difficult to bring up sensitive subjects with their doctors, even when those are the most important thing on their mind.”
He asked us to
“please do not pass legislation that makes it harder for doctors to understand their patients.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 42, Q24.]
That concludes my remarks.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 270, in clause 4, page 2, line 25, at end insert—
“(3A) Before conducting a preliminary discussion under subsection (2) the registered medical practitioner must ensure that the person has no remediable suicide risk factors which pose a significant risk to their life.”—(Danny Kruger.)
This amendment requires that the doctor ensures that there are no remediable suicide risk factors before proceeding to the initial discussion about assisted dying.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 71, in clause 4, page 2, line 31, at end insert—
“(4A) The practitioner must, following the preliminary discussion under subsection (3), refer that person to the Assisted Dying Agency if the person asks them to do so.”
This amendment is consequential on NC4 and would establish a pathway by which a person is referred to the Assisted Dying Agency.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 72, in clause 5, page 3, line 16, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) has been assigned to the person by the Assisted Dying Agency,”
This amendment is consequential on NC4 and provides that the coordinating doctor must have been assigned to the person by the Assisted Dying Agency.
Amendment 73, in clause 7, page 4, line 21, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—
“(b) provide the person who was assessed and the Assisted Dying Agency with a copy of the statement.
(3A) Upon receipt of the statement specified in subsection (3)(a), the Assisted Dying Agency must assign to the person, as soon as practicable, another registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of section 8(6) for the second assessment (‘the independent doctor’).”
This amendment is consequential on NC4 and would require the coordinating doctor to send a copy of their statement to the Assisted Dying Agency. That Agency must then to assign an “independent doctor” to the person.
Amendment 75, in clause 8, page 5, line 9, leave out “coordinating doctor” and insert “Assisted Dying Agency”.
This amendment is consequential on NC4.
Amendment 74, in clause 8, page 5, line 16, at end insert—
“(ba) has been assigned to the person by the Assisted Dying Agency,”.
This amendment is consequential on NC4 and provides that the independent doctor must have been assigned to the person by the Assisted Dying Agency.
Amendment 76, in clause 9, page 6, line 14, leave out paragraph (e).
This amendment is consequential on NC4.
Amendment 77, in clause 11, page 7, line 18, after “appointment,” insert
“by the Assisted Dying Agency”.
This amendment is consequential on NC4.
Amendment 78, in clause 14, page 10, line 7, leave out from “person)” to end of line 12 and insert “the Assisted Dying Agency”.
This amendment is consequential on NC4.
Amendment 79, in clause 16, page 11, line 18, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
“(1A) The Assisted Dying Agency must, as soon as practicably possible, record the making of the statement or declaration.”
This amendment is consequential on NC4.
Amendment 80, in clause 17, page 11, line 36, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
“(1A) The Assisted Dying Agency must record the cancellation.”
This amendment is consequential on NC4.
New clause 4—Assisted Dying Agency—
“(1) There shall be a body known as the Assisted Dying Agency (‘The Agency’).
(2) The purpose of the body is to coordinate requests from people to be considered for assisted dying, including assigning, at the appropriate junctures, a coordinating doctor and independent doctor for a person seeking assistance to end their own life.
(3) Where a person has previously been referred to the Agency, no future referral relating to that person can be proceeded with by the Agency unless it considers there has been a material change in the person’s circumstances.
(4) The Secretary of State must make regulations setting out—
(a) the staffing and remuneration of such staff,
(b) the procedures of the Agency, and
(c) the means by which the Agency can pay coordinating doctors and independent doctors for services rendered under this Act.
(5) The Agency’s expenditure is to be paid out of money provided for by Parliament.
(6) The Agency must, for each financial year, prepare accounts in accordance with directions given to it by the Treasury.
(7) The Agency’s chief executive is its accounting officer.
(8) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year, the Agency must prepare a report about the performance of its functions during that year and lay that report before both Houses of Parliament.
(9) Regulations under subsection (4) are subject to the affirmative procedure.”
This new clause would create a new body that was principally responsible for coordinating and recording statements and declarations in relation to a person’s request for assistance to end their own life.
Although these provisions may seem irrelevant to the Bill—I do not think any of us wishes to see the creation of an assisted dying agency—I am nevertheless grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) for tabling them. He is playing his usual role of keeping us honest.
It is extraordinary that nowhere does the Bill lay out exactly how the assisted dying service would be delivered—whether it would be an NHS service, a private service or some mix of the two. I am therefore grateful to my hon. Friend for being clear in his suggestion that it should be a non-NHS service and that, if we are to pass this law, we should establish a bespoke agency for the explicit purpose of delivering that service. It is a rather macabre but logical way of delivering on the proposal in the Bill.
The fact is that many doctors, faced with the prospect of being asked to participate in assisted dying, have expressed their preference for it to be delivered outside the NHS. In its written evidence, the British Medical Association, which has been cited a number of times today, says:
“There is nothing in the Bill about how an assisted dying service might be delivered, although the possibility of a separate service is mentioned in the explanatory notes.”
The BMA’s view is that assisted dying
“should not be part of the standard role of doctors or integrated into existing care pathways”.
I stress that point, because it has often been suggested in the course of debate that the way assisted dying will work will be as part of a holistic range of options—pretty indistinguishable from palliative care or other treatment options put before patients. The BMA is clear that assisted dying
“is not something that a doctor can just add to their usual role.”
The Royal College of General Practitioners has also pointed out in evidence that the shape of the service is not set out in the Bill.
On a point of order, Mr Dowd. In his opening sentence, my hon. Friend said that none of us wanted to see the creation of an assisted dying agency. My interpretation of our speaking to a particular amendment is that we have to address what it intends to do in the Bill. My hon. Friend said that he does not want what the amendment intends and that he is speaking more generally about the delivery of the service. Could we have your guidance as to whether that is in order? One of our problems is that we are having very expansive debates, and previous Chairs have sought to keep everyone in order. I am anxious that my hon. Friend does not exhaust himself by straying from the central point in the amendment.
The fact of the matter is that the hon. Member does not have to agree with the amendment, so he is perfectly entitled to speak in that regard.
I am grateful to you, Mr Dowd, and to my right hon. Friend for his concern for my welfare, which is much appreciated. However, he will be relieved to know that I have plenty of energy and can keep going.
To speak seriously, it is very germane to the Bill that the amendments are considered. As I was explaining, GPs and other medical practitioners have been concerned about the absence from the Bill of clauses to specify the delivery of the service, so I am grateful that we have this opportunity to discuss that and to hear from the Minister and the sponsor how they imagine the Bill would operate and whether it would, indeed, be appropriate to establish some kind of agency along the lines proposed. The reason I object to an assisted dying agency is that I object to assisted dying, but I see the logic of the proposal if we are to proceed with the principle of the Bill.
It is extraordinary that this crucial question is not set out. In his evidence to us, Chris Whitty said rather airily that it was for Parliament to decide how the service should be delivered. I would stress that most medics involved, particularly in palliative care and care for people at the end of life, are very hostile personally to the suggestion that they should participate in assisted dying. The BMA’s 2020 survey of its members found that 76% of palliative medicine doctors would be unwilling to participate if assisted dying were legalised. The Royal College of Physicians 2019 members’ poll found that 84% were opposed.
This is not in order; it has nothing to do with the amendment.
I, too, am grateful, Mr Dowd. I stress that I am discussing the suggestion in the amendment that assisted dying be taken out of the NHS and not be part of the normal pathways doctors are invited to participate in. It strikes me as relevant that most doctors, were the law to be passed, would wish for something along the lines of the amendment to be included.
We do not know exactly how that would work. We know that it could potentially be private, according to the scheme set out in the amendment, or it could be within the NHS. We know from the references in clause 40 that private provision is envisaged, because of the talk of reasonable remuneration for the provision of services. So it would be outside the normal service expectation of medical professionals employed by the NHS; indeed, we know that it could be a lucrative market.
Does the hon. Member think that, if we bring in an agency from outside the NHS—from the private sector—this will become like a business?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The opportunity is there in the Bill for private businesses to be established to deliver assisted dying services. Indeed, it would be quite a lucrative money-making enterprise. Estimates have been given of between 5,000 and 17,000 assisted deaths per year, depending on how they are arrived at. If the charges employed by Dignitas—which is in a sense the model being proposed here—are anything to go by, it could be in the region of £5,000 to £10,000 per patient. Even a small proportion of that would be significant—a multimillion-pound business would be possible under the Bill. Advertising would also probably be possible; we saw TfL suggest that the Dignity in Dying adverts in the tube before Second Reading were compliant. There is no prohibition in the Bill on advertising or on people making money from it.
However, the Bill also specifies that this would be a state-protected service, so if it were to be a private enterprise, it would have all sorts of state protections that would not normally apply to private providers of anything. Under clause 25, the providers would be exempt from any civil liability for providing assistance under the Bill. Under clause 29, a death would be exempt from investigation under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Clause 30 says that a failure to comply with any code of practice
“does not of itself render a person liable to…criminal or civil proceedings”.
The only monitoring that would be done would be undertaken by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, who is not an independent figure, but the person responsible for setting up the panels that approve the deaths.
Order. We need to get back to the assisted dying agency. Can the hon. Member keep to that, please?
I shall—I am winding up now, Mr Dowd. These amendments go to the heart of this great absence—this blank space—in the middle of the Bill, which is how on earth it will be delivered. Who would deliver it, and under what regulation? What would be their terms of engagement? All of that represents quite a scandalous gap in the Bill, and my concern is with that enormous gap.
I want to conclude with a reflection on that lack of clarity. Elizabeth Gardiner, who I understand was the very experienced parliamentary drafter who contributed her time to draft the Bill, talked on the Hansard Society podcast of the opportunity that drafting has to change the law. She noted that if the law
“is a restriction that would curtail the ability of this to be delivered through the National Health Service, the Bill could change that.”
So it has been suggested that the Bill would require changes to the National Health Service Act 1946 to remove what the Hansard Society calls the “duty to protect”.
Order. The hon. Gentleman heard what I said earlier, and I do not want to reaffirm it, but can we get back to the substance of the assisted dying agency provision, please?
I have one last point to make, Mr Dowd, which I hope you will regard as in order because, as I said, it goes to the heart of things. At the moment, the Bill does not specify how these things should be done, and Elizabeth Gardiner, the drafter behind it, said on the radio:
“we didn’t have time to go into all the detail of how those regimes work and to make the provision on the face of the Bill. And so there are regulation making powers there, which enable that provision to be set out”—
I believe that that is in clause 32. Enormous Henry VIII powers are being established. I deeply regret the gap in the Bill, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled these proposals, for enabling us to have this debate.
Order. I remind the hon. Member to keep to the issue that we are discussing, because if he or any other Member does not, and goes beyond the scope of what they really should be sticking to, I will take a much less lateral approach in future. I say that gently and with the best intention.
I have nothing to add, other than to agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire; I do not think any of us on the Committee are keen on the implementation of the assisted dying agency.
I really regret that we have had such a small debate on the enormous question of how on earth assisted dying would actually be delivered. We are leaving it to Ministers, subsequent to the passage of the Bill, to design this service. The clear possibility is that a private enterprise could run the service. It might be an NHS service. The fact that that is unclear in the Bill is shameful, but I am grateful we have had the opportunity to debate the matter, sort of, and I am not going to press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 276, in clause 4, page 2, line 31, at end insert—
“(4A) A medical practitioner must not conduct a preliminary discussion with a person under subsection (3) until a period of 28 days has elapsed, beginning with the day the person had received a diagnosis of the terminal illness.” —(Naz Shah.)
This amendment would mean a doctor could not conduct a preliminary assessment until 28 days from the day the person received a diagnosis of the terminal illness.
Before I call Danny Kruger to move amendment 412, I remind Members to keep within scope and to ensure that any points raised are relevant and not repetitive, or I will intervene.
I beg to move amendment 412, in clause 4, page 2, line 32, leave out subsection (5).
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 341, in clause 4, page 2, line 33, leave out from “subsection (3)” to the end of line 36 and insert
“is not required to refer the person to another medical practitioner but must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”
This amendment would provide that a registered medical practitioner who is unable or unwilling to have the preliminary discussion with a person must provide information to the person about where they can have that discussion, but that this need not take the form of a referral.
Amendment 338, in clause 4, page 2, line 34, leave out from “so” to end of line 36 and insert
“direct them to another registered medical practitioner or the independent information and referral service established under section [Independent information and referral service]”.
This amendment, which is linked to NC13, would mean that a registered medical practitioner who was unwilling to have preliminary discussions would direct the person to another registered medical practitioner or an independent information and referral service.
Amendment 287, in clause 4, page 2, line 34, leave out from “practitioner” to end of line 36, and insert
“who is qualified to undertake such a preliminary discussion, and set out palliative medicine options to provide the patient with appropriate end of life care, including referring them to a palliative medicine expert.”
This amendment means that the medical practitioner who is unwilling to have an initial discussion with a person must, both refer them to another registered medical practitioner and set out the palliative care options including referring them to a specialist.
New clause 13—Independent information and referral service—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to establish an independent information and referral service to—
(a) provide information to persons who are, or may be, eligible for assisted dying in accordance with this Act, and
(b) where requested, facilitate the person’s access to assisted dying in accordance with this Act.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to the affirmative procedure.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make provision for an independent information and referral service.
I rise to speak to this important group of amendments, which are all relevant to the duty to refer, whereby a doctor who does not want to advise a patient on assisted dying is obliged to send them to somebody who does. In different ways, we each seek to provide more protections for those medical professionals.
There are two main reasons why doctors may not want the obligation to refer that is in the Bill. The first is the central point that this is not a healthcare treatment, as is traditionally understood. Assisted dying does not address the condition or treat the illness; it treats only the symptoms, in the sense that it obliterates the existence of the patient. Like the advert for bleach says, it “kills all known germs”—it kills every experience that the patient has or could have. It is not part of the range of treatments that a doctor should have to offer, as clause 4(1) makes clear.
That point similarly relates to the question of referring to somebody who can offer that discussion. I suggest that the act of referring is an act of endorsement, just as offering the intervention itself is an act of endorsement. Dr Green from the BMA made it clear during oral evidence that the BMA does not like the word “refer”, as it implies assent to the option that is being offered. Indeed, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, in conversation with Dr Green during evidence, accepted that the word “refer” was “not…quite right”, as she put it, because it has the particular implication and expectation of a form of endorsement.
We have heard the same opinion from multiple witnesses in written and oral evidence to the Committee, particularly from Muslim medical professionals and their trade body. Those representing pharmacists also expressed significant concern that they might find themselves included in the definition of medical practitioner. The Association of Anaesthetists and the Royal College of Nursing were worried as well. A range of professional bodies and representative organisations share my concern that imposing a duty to refer—an obligation to assist somebody to have an assisted death by finding them a doctor who will conduct the preliminary discussion—is itself a breach of their rights of conscience.
The second reason follows from the first. Doctors may reasonably conclude that being in a position to help with assisted dying puts them in a totally different relationship with their patients. That is why the BMA is so unhappy and has asked for the requirement to be removed. It has an alternative, which some of these amendments also propose. It said:
“We urge the committee to remove the referral requirement and, instead, make it clear that the doctor’s duty is to direct patients to where they can obtain information”.
That is what amendment 341, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), would do. The BMA suggests that
“this should be an official body set up to provide individual information and advice to patients, to which patients could be referred or directed to, or could self-refer.”
My preference would be not to have any obligation on doctors to make any kind of referral, but I respect the aspiration of the amendment, which is to ensure that there is an independent body to give advice that patients can seek out themselves or that they can be advised of, so there is no expectation of a referral to a doctor who can facilitate the assisted death.
The Royal College of General Practitioners is also unhappy about the provision. It suggests that instead of expecting doctors
“to refer directly to a medical practitioner who is ‘willing and able to conduct that discussion’”—
as per the Bill—
“the doctor’s duty would be to direct patients to an official service where they can obtain objective and accurate information”.
I think we should pay heed to the advice of the professionals.
As ever, I would like to refer to the experience of foreign jurisdictions, because we are constantly told that this Bill is the safest in the world. None of the legislation in Australia or New Zealand, or the legislation currently going through in the Isle of Man, puts an obligation to refer on to doctors. Victoria and South Australia’s legislation says that a doctor has the right to refuse to participate in the request for assistance process and to give information about voluntary assisted dying, so there is no duty to refer—not even a duty to provide information.
I conclude with an observation that was submitted to us by Dr David Randall, a consultant nephrologist. It was very telling that he said in written evidence:
“I would not be willing to act in accordance with Section 4(5) of the Bill. I am a doctor in good standing with the GMC, and who has always striven to provide the highest standards of care to patients. Passage of this Bill would place my practice in direct opposition to the criminal law.”
He talks about “moral injury”, which is a very important principle. We have an obligation to protect the conscience and human rights of medical professionals.
We are still unclear whether this process will take place within the NHS or outside it. Nevertheless, the obligation to refer in the Bill would be a direct breach of doctors’ rights and would impose a moral injury on them. My preference is to remove clause 4(5) altogether, as that would be consistent with the Abortion Act 1967 and similar legislation on assisted dying in other countries. If we are not prepared to do that, we should at least restrict the obligation and provide more protections, as per the amendments in the names of other hon. Members.
I rise to speak in support of amendment 341 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. It would provide that a registered medical practitioner who is unable or unwilling to have the preliminary discussion must provide information to the patient about where they can have that discussion, but that need not take the form of a referral.
One of the messages that we heard loud and clear in the evidence sessions was that medical practitioners do not wish to be put under an obligation to refer a patient to another registered medical practitioner by the Bill. “Referral” has a very specific meaning in medicine, and it is that word and the corresponding action required of it that many doctors have an issue with. A referral puts a patient on a pathway, whereas the provision of information merely indicates where such a pathway can be found. During oral evidence, Dr Green said:
“The word ‘referral’, to a doctor, means writing a letter or communicating with another doctor to see, but some doctors would find themselves not able to do that. For that reason, we believe that there should be an information service for the doctor to direct to.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 48, Q41.]
We are well aware that assisted dying is a complex issue and a matter of conscience for many. It is therefore important that we respect the personal views of medical practitioners. One of the points that I have made several times in these proceedings is that assisted dying affects not just the patient but other people participating and supporting. Some medical practitioners will be comfortable with it, but many others will not. It is therefore vital that we recognise their rights and needs, not just the patients’, when formulating this law. If for whatever reason a doctor does not want to refer a patient, they should not have to. Their legal responsibility should be limited to directing the patient to where they can find the relevant information that they need. Doctors should have no further obligation.
I rise to speak to amendments 341, 338 and 412 together, and I welcome the debate on these important amendments. Choice is one of the key tenets of the Bill, primarily—but not exclusively—for terminally ill adults with a limited time to live. Choice is also very important for medical practitioners, and I am very respectful of, and acknowledge the importance of, conscientious objection for doctors. When it comes to assisted dying, I believe that they should also have choice. Indeed, the Bill is written so that they can choose not to participate in the process for any reason. That is the BMA’s view, and I agree with it.
The BMA has a position of neutrality on assisted dying, and there are a range of views within medical professions, as there are within all groups of people. That is why I have adopted its position of an opt-in model for the purposes of the Bill. Nevertheless, the process must remain patient focused at all times, and that means enabling them to have a discussion on such an important matter. It would not be right to rely on online advice or even the best-designed written materials. As we have already established, doctors are used to having sensitive and compassionate discussions with people who are terminally ill, and there can be no substitute for that. While a doctor may not wish to participate themselves, and I fully respect that, they still have a responsibility towards their patients, and that should include ensuring that they can speak to a properly qualified medical practitioner at such a difficult time.
I understand that the BMA and others would not be comfortable with the word “refer”, which I understand to have a special meaning within medical practice. The GMC guidelines use different language. They talk about where a doctor has a conscientious objection, in which case they are advised that they must make sure that arrangements are made for another suitably qualified colleague to take over their role. The BMA’s guidance says that patients must be able to see another doctor, as appropriate, and that it need not always be a formal procedure. It is not, however, sufficient to simply tell the patient to seek a view elsewhere—I agree completely.
The BMA supports amendment 341, which says that a doctor
“must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”
I am therefore happy to support the amendment today and, if it were to need further adjustment, I am very happy to consider alternatives based on existing best practice. I would be very happy to meet with the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, who is herself a doctor, to discuss her thoughts and draw on her considerable medical experience.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 341, in clause 4, page 2, line 33, leave out from “subsection (3)” to the end of line 36 and insert
“is not required to refer the person to another medical practitioner but must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”—(Rebecca Paul.)
This amendment would provide that a registered medical practitioner who is unable or unwilling to have the preliminary discussion with a person must provide information to the person about where they can have that discussion, but that this need not take the form of a referral.
I beg to move amendment 125, in clause 4, page 2, line 35, leave out from start of line to end of line 36 and insert
“who is on the Register of Assisted Dying Medical Practitioners.”
This amendment provides that only a medical practitioner who is on the Register of Assisted Dying Medical Practitioners as provided for in NC7 would have a person referred to them.
At this point, I will not necessarily call Members, including the Minister, unless they particularly want to speak. If Members do wish to speak, will they please bob?
I think that we are just concluding one of the most important debates that the Committee will have: the debate on clause 4. I welcome the concession from the hon. Member for Spen Valley, particularly her commitment to modify the obligation to refer. That is welcome and will make the Bill a little safer.
In our debates on the clause, there has been clear confusion, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has just mentioned, about the extent to which assisted dying is a healthcare treatment. That speaks to the question of whether there is an obligation on doctors to offer this treatment—as there should be, if it is a treatment that is one of a range of options for which the patient is eligible—or whether it is something that they are not obliged to offer. That confusion, which was present in the Committee’s exchanges, remains. I want to record in hon. Members’ memory the fact that that question was unresolved. In my view, that is extremely unsatisfactory.
Despite some welcome concessions, the Committee has just decided to reject a series of amendments that would have protected both doctors and patients. Most concerningly, we rejected an amendment to give children the right to be protected from the suggestion of an assisted death before they are even eligible for it.
I will conclude by referring to evidence, which I do not believe has been referred to so far in the debate, on the question of how assisted dying is received as a suggestion or offer, particularly by marginalised groups. I was very concerned by the oral evidence that we took from Professor Ahmedzai, who supports assisted dying. In written evidence, he has said explicitly that he especially wants the option to raise assisted dying with
“patients who are poorly educated, ill-informed or seem to be unaware of the option”.
He has explicitly required and requested the opportunity to put it to these disadvantaged, marginalised patients: “poorly-educated, ill-informed” people. Compassion in Dying, the sister organisation to Dignity in Dying, which supports the Bill, makes the same point: that marginalised people will need to be “directly prompted” with the offer.
I am afraid to say that, in rejecting the amendments, the Committee has endorsed the approach that people who are particularly marginalised and disadvantaged need to have this suggestion explicitly made to them. I am astonished that the Committee proposes to proceed on that basis, which completely misunderstands the dynamic of vulnerable people in the face of authority. I am very distressed to find that the Committee thinks that acceptable, and I am very sorry that apparently we are proceeding with the clause. I do not propose to put it to the vote, because the Committee’s will to proceed is fairly clear, but I hope that everybody is fully aware of what they are doing.
I am grateful for the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire. I will speak briefly to amendments 403 and 404, which would create an expectation that a patient at least addresses the question of whether their family is aware of the decision they are making. In an amendment that has not been selected for debate today, I proposed simply to make that expectation clear.
My personal view is that I do not accept that this is healthcare, and therefore that a doctor would have an obligation to ensure that the next of kin of somebody to whom they are proposing to give lethal drugs is informed. However, in the spirit of the Bill, which is all about autonomy, and in an attempt to be constructive and put forward amendments that might be accepted, I accept that this is a decision for the individual in the same way as a healthcare decision, and that there is therefore no obligation under rules of patient confidentiality and the expectations around healthcare that the family should be informed.
Nevertheless, creating a moment at which the first doctor the patient speaks to gently encourages them to consider telling their family before taking the enormous step of signing the first declaration is appropriate. The amendment would give the patient three options: first, to confirm that they have informed their family of their wish to be provided with assistance to end their life.
Order. I understand that the hon. Gentleman wants to touch on that amendment, but it has not been chosen today. He is talking about the declaration that the person has informed their family of their decision and taken their opinions into consideration. We are not dealing with that today.
Nevertheless, amendments 403 and 404 have been selected for debate, and it is those amendments that would effect that declaration in the Bill.
I am grateful to you, Mr Dowd, but I want to explain why these amendments are appropriate to the Bill.
The patient would have the opportunity to declare clearly that they do not have a family. I take the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire; it is not always clear what a family is. Nevertheless, if the patient wants to specify that they have no family or do not want to inform their family, the amendments would give them that right. I want to emphasise the importance of this consideration. I recognise that clause 9, which will come later in the process, includes consideration of the family. It states that, in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate, they may advise the patient to inform their family, so there is recognition of that question a little later. My suggestion is that it should come earlier because it needs to take place before the first declaration is signed.
Crucially, we need to consider the wider impact of not considering or involving the family, particularly when children or dependants are involved. The Bill accepts the scenario where a family can find out after the fact—not through any formal notification, they just discover—that their loved one has ended their life with the help of doctors and the state. Families can be badly impacted by an assisted suicide: clinical grief disorders, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder are all harms that can follow from a family member taking an assisted death. It is unethical and irresponsible not to factor that in as we discuss and design the new law.
A parent may choose to end their life under the Bill, but is not required in any way to consider notifying their family. I wonder if the sponsor could clarify what would happen if they were the sole carer of a minor—would there be an obligation for anyone to inform the child that this was happening? One hopes that that would be an extremely rare scenario; nevertheless, it is possible under the Bill.
I want to mention two more groups quickly. In written evidence, a group of anorexia nervosa sufferers and carers said:
“The Bill does not anticipate situations where someone seeks to end their life as a result of cognitive symptoms inherent to the illness, as is the case with AN. For these patients, families would often be needed to advocate for their loved ones and their potential to recover…Without family involvement, patients may make decisions in isolation, potentially influenced by cognitive distortions or feelings of hopelessness inherent to the illness.”
I hope that we do not want to allow that scenario.
Finally, Dr Jamilla Hussain, who we have heard from a few times, said in written evidence that in her
“consultation with structurally disadvantaged ethnic minority groups”—
which include Pakistani, Roma and Black Caribbean community groups, they showed much concern about the exclusion of families. She said:
“it was emphasised that, traditionally, family and community members provide hope and strength when someone feels like life is too much. There is apprehension that such expressions of care and support could be reframed through a medical or legal lens as coercion.”
That is the saddest thing, which was hinted at quite strongly—in fact, stated explicitly—in some of the evidence sessions. It has been suggested that wanting a loved one to live is seen by doctors as a form of coercion that should be resisted; that trying to argue a loved one out of an assisted death is the coercion that we need to guard against and, on that basis, we should not be making any expectation that families are informed. What a tragic thing for us to say. To enable doctors to issue lethal drugs that kill people without their family knowing is an absolutely tragic thing. I beg the Committee to consider what on earth we are doing allowing that.
I apologise to the Member, who was within his rights to speak to amendments 403 and 404.
I rise to set out why—reluctantly—I cannot support amendments 403 and 404, which have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire. It is not because of the principle involved, because my hon. Friend was very clear in setting out the amendments. They would not provide for a prescriptive situation where an individual must tell their family. A range of options are set out, which I anticipate that any sensible and responsible doctor or clinician would take a patient through, encouraging them to involve their family in their decision making.
The issue that I have is around the legal clarity of the wording of the amendments, because under the English and Welsh legal system there is no statutory definition of “family”. There is a concept of family, but the concept of family to me may be very different from that of my neighbour, or from that of someone who lives in another city. For example, for some people stepbrothers, stepsisters and step-parents are very much part of their family; for others, they are not. For some people, unmarried couples with children are a family; for others, they are not. For some people, unmarried couples without children are a family; for others, they are not.
I take that point; families are difficult to define. Nevertheless, the Bill currently refers to the opportunity for a doctor, or the suggestion that a doctor,
“in so far as the assessing doctor considers it appropriate, advise the person to consider discussing the request with their next of kin and other persons they are close to.”
That is more precise. Would my hon. Friend accept an amendment along the lines that I have proposed, prior to the first declaration, but using the language that is currently in the Bill about
“their next of kin and other persons they are close to”?
That would satisfy me. The reason I say that is because at the moment the wording is too broad and ill-defined. The question is: is this about the closeness and proximity of a relationship? The suggested wording that my hon. Friend just put forward would be much closer to that and much clearer, and more akin with the language of medical registration. When someone turns up in A&E, they are asked to give the name of their next of kin. That defines the closeness, the proximity and the permanency of that relationship.
If my hon. Friend was perhaps to consider withdrawing this amendment and tabling it again in an alternative form, or rewording it, that would certainly be something that I would be open to supporting. I have outlined why, as the amendments currently stand, I cannot support them.