Environment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Daniel Zeichner Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I was in the middle of a brief exposition of the word “proportionately”, as found in clause 16, which we were discussing this morning. As I mentioned, the clause requires that a policy statement on environmental principles must be prepared in accordance with clauses 16 and 17. Subsection (2) defines the policy statement on environmental principles as

“a statement explaining how the environmental principles should be interpreted and proportionately applied by Ministers of the Crown when making policy.”

The word “proportionately” very much concerns Opposition Members, because the clause not only deals with the statement itself and how the environmental principles should be interpreted, but adds that Ministers of the Crown will be assumed to be proportionately applying those principles. It goes beyond the environmental principles themselves and gives Ministers of the Crown the leeway to apply those principles “proportionately”.

“Proportionately” is a strange word. The Cambridge philosopher of ordinary language J. L. Austin defined it, among others, as a “trouser-word”—a word that does not function properly without a pair of trousers on.

[Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)]

Where are you going with this, Alan?

[Dr Whitehead]

I think J. L. Austin is very interesting, but others disagree. Indeed, the dictionary definition of “proportionately”, which underlines his point, is:

“In a way that corresponds in size or amount to something else.”

It has no consequence in its own right, and that is the problem that we have with this particular formulation. If there are no trousers on “proportionately”, it can mean whatever anybody wants it to mean. In this instance, it appears to mean what Ministers of the Crown may want it to mean. It is possible—not in terms of the intentions or anything else of present company—that the definition of “proportionately” is entirely what Ministers of the Crown may want to make of it. A much more straightforward example of that particular action is Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty deciding that words mean exactly what he wanted them to mean.

We may come on to this later, but the Bill should define what “proportionately” might mean, what its limits are and what Ministers may do when deciding, proportionately, what environmental principles should be. I accept that it may well be the case that Ministers have a view on environmental principles and how that policy statement may be put into place. This is not an appropriate way to bring Ministers into that particular discussion. For the sake of clarity, we would like the to see the word removed from the clause, so that it reads, “a policy statement is a statement explaining how the environmental principles should be interpreted.” That offers enough leeway as far as policy statements are concerned. I welcome the Minister’s explanation as to why that additional line should be necessary in the clause, and what it adds rather than what it takes away, in terms of making quite meaningless some of the things that I have outlined in the first part of the clause with regard to Ministers.

[The Chair]

Before I call Daniel Zeichner, who caught my eye, can I explain a small point about procedure? It would be helpful if anybody who wishes to speak while the person who has moved the amendment is speaking would catch my eye one way or another—standing up in their place is the clearest way to do so. Those people speak, and the Minister speaks afterwards. That means the Minister is replying to the points that are made. For now, it is fine, but in future, Members should catch my eye while the mover of the amendment is speaking. They can speak, and the Minister can reply to what hon. Members have to say.

[Daniel Zeichner]

Thank you, Mr Gray. My apologies for muddling up the procedure.  I am grateful for the opportunity to make a few points on what seems to be one of the most important parts of the Bill. For many of us, the precautionary principle has been a key part of our environmental protections.

It is fair to say that there is a difference of view internationally about how one approaches these things. Without trying to trivialise it in any way, there is a difference between the American approach and the European approach. Of course, we have been part of the European approach for a long time, and the precautionary principle has been absolutely key. The introduction of proportionality will seriously weaken our environmental protections. Although we have reams of paper to go through, that is the key distinction. I fear that the application of proportionality will water down our environmental protections.

I found the explanatory notes very helpful, as I always do. Paragraph 173 says:

“Proportionate application means ensuring that action taken on the basis of the principles balances the potential for environmental benefit against other benefits and costs associated with the action.”

Of course, as soon as we introduce that balancing side, those essential precautionary environmental protection are at risk. I am afraid, despite the Minister’s optimism about the Bill, that this is the crunch issue. If this amendment is not carried, there is no doubt that our environmental protections will be weakened.

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend makes a key point about the importance of the amendment. It is not just that many things pivot on it; one could almost go so far as to say that the whole thrust of the Bill pivots on it.

The understanding has always been that the Bill really will put the environment on the map and will provide not only good environmental protection in the long term, but no regression and enhanced environmental protection in the future. If that word is at the heart of it, things could be traded off against considerations that are completely outwith the intentions and purposes of the Bill, and it could be subverted entirely at ministerial discretion. That is surely not something that we should easily countenance.

In a moment, we will come on to an amendment that attempts to get a definition of proportionality on to the statute book. Although we do not want to divide the Committee on this amendment, if we do not secure substantial progress with the next amendment, we may seek to divide the Committee at that point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Policy statement on environmental principles: effect

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It is not the case that the Army and the MOD do not have policies that they themselves state are mitigating, pro-environmental principles, but under this legislation, those principles would be entirely voluntary. If the MOD decided one day that it did not want anything to do with them, that would be the end of the matter. When we are talking about an area that is, as I say, the size of Essex plus half of Greater London, we surely cannot have that as part of a Bill that claims to protect the environment as a whole over the next long period of time. This has nothing to do with that particular ambition.

[Daniel Zeichner]

We just had a discussion about proportionality, and it strikes me as perfectly possible to say to the MOD that it could react proportionately to these kinds of judgments. In our previous discussion, we introduced a notion that I would say will be used to the detriment of the environment; why could we not ask the MOD to act proportionately when it comes to its environmental obligations?

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. It would not be difficult to draft something that would both protect the activities that I think we all agree the MOD and the Army need to do on occasions, and ask them to act proportionately in respect of their environmental obligations when undertaking those activities.

An amendment to this clause has been tabled by the hon. Member for Edinburgh North—[Hon. Members: “And Leith.”] And Leith as well, yes; I have been to both Edinburgh North and Leith, so I should remember the connection between the two. The Labour party has also put forward amendments, which take out two sections of this clause and, as it were, challenge their inclusion and these exemptions separately. We do not see any substantive difference between what we are saying through those two particular challenges and, as it were, the overall challenge that the hon. Lady has put forward through her amendment: it is essentially a big question about why these particular exemptions are in place. We do not just have exemptions for the MOD; we have exemptions as far as

“taxation, spending or the allocation of resources within government”.

I am not exactly sure what land that controls, as we cannot put that in place in the same way as we can with the MOD, but it is also not apparent to me why those areas should also be treated differently.

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[Daniel Zeichner]

This is a fascinating discussion. As the debate has unfolded, I have found myself looking at the clause and thinking, “What would have been in anyone’s mind when drafting that extra line?”. What do they think needs to be excluded, and for what purpose? If the clause existed without that line in the first place, then unless people are seeking something rather extraordinary, I would not have thought they would try to open a huge opportunity to drive a coach and horses through an environmental protection Bill. What was the thinking, I wonder?

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed; my hon. Friend shines a light on it. If one were of a suspicious character, one might say, “Why is this line here anyway?”. As the Minister said, the Treasury and the MOD do quite a lot of work in this respect. One might say, “Good. They do quite a lot of work in this respect, and that needs to be encouraged, so let’s have a pretty strong starting point to bolster the work that they do already, and let’s have some limited exceptions, driven by absolute necessity, with accountability over what they consist of and how they are undertaken.” Instead, we have drafting that does the opposite. If hon. Members were suspicious, they might question why that drafting is in there, and not another form of drafting that is much closer to what we all want to see: environmental protections being respected as far as possible.

Frankly, the Minister has given us no explanation of why it is there. She has given us a very able and clear exposition of who does what through their good nature. I applaud her for that, because it is part of her Department’s remit to make sure other Departments do that. However, her Department’s remit would be strengthened if the clause was strengthened or if it was not there at all. On that basis, I am afraid that we will seek to divide the Committee on this amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Daniel Zeichner]

As I listen to the Minister, I think there is so much subjectivity involved in this. Just thinking back through the glorious array of Secretaries of State who we have had in the Conservative Government over the past decade—

[Leo Docherty (Aldershot) (Con)]

Glorious!

[Daniel Zeichner]

There has been a glorious range of opinions, including those of one or two notorious climate change deniers, so there would have been a completely different view on things that were happening internationally, depending on which part of the spectrum of opinion was held by the office holder at the time. Clearly, there can be a change of Governments in the future when this legislation is in place. Surely having an objective set of criteria for how this is done is far better than just having a subjective view, with it depending on whether something is deemed to be significant by the office holder and Government at the time.

[Rebecca Pow]

I think the hon. Gentleman has stepped right into my trap, because that is why it is really important that the report goes before both Houses so that they can both comment. The whole purpose of it is that it will be well scrutinised, so that the right measures are introduced. There will be many measures, and we will not want all of them to be introduced, so we need to choose the very best ones. The whole idea of the Secretary of State’s report is that it will be open and transparent—I honestly hope that I have made that clear.

The clause is about ensuring that the Government take active steps to identify significant improvements and are accountable to Parliament for the actions that they will take in response. It is therefore right that the Government take full responsibility for producing the report. I do not think that requiring the Secretary of State to outsource the responsibility is the right approach. Additionally, independent consideration can already be provided by the Office for Environmental Protection—for example, clause 27 provides Ministers with the power to require the OEP to advise on any other matters relating to the natural environment, which could include developments in international environmental protection legislation that it sees as important, positive or progressive, so we have that extra layer there as well.

I hope that I have given some clarity, and I ask hon. Members not to press amendments 195 to 197.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 179, page 121, line 16, at end insert

“with the consent of the Environmental Audit and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committees of the House of Commons”.

The amendment would require the appointment of the Chair and other non-executive members of the Office for Environmental Protection to be made with the consent of the relevant select committees.

We have now moved from chapter 1 of the Bill, which is about environmental governance and improving the natural environment, to the very important topic of the Office for Environmental Protection, which I think will detain the Committee for a little while, as we will discuss not only its formation and operation, but the amendments that the Government made while the Bill was not before us, changing what the Opposition think are substantial elements of the OEP’s operation.

Clause 21 states:

“A body corporate called the Office for Environmental Protection is established.”

So before anybody worries too much about where we have got to, that is all we have done so far. We have just established the Office for Environmental Protection. As with all good Bills, however, the meaning is often contained at the end, in the schedules. That is the next bit we are dealing with this afternoon—the schedule that sets up what the Office for Environmental Protection is about. I assume that we will get stuck into the substance of the Office for Environmental Protection’s objectives, independence and general function in our next sitting, but this afternoon we are concentrating on some details about the OEP’s membership, non-executive directors, interim chief executive and so on. Some people may say that those are not particularly central or important to the OEP, but they nevertheless have quite considerable repercussions in terms of its independence or otherwise.

Amendment 179 looks at the first appointment of the chair and non-executive members, and at how they are appointed and with what agreement. I am sure hon. Members will agree that, in addition to what the Office for Environmental Protection does, a key part of its independence lies in who its chair is, who the non-executive directors are, how they act in their role and the extent to which they ensure and guarantee that the office carries out an independent function in terms of that protection role. Paragraph 1(1) of schedule 1 defines what the OEP consists of: a chair, at least two but not more than five other non-executive members, a chief executive, and

“at least one, but not more than three, executive members.”

Paragraph 1(2) states:

“The members are to be appointed by the Secretary of State”.

Under paragraph 2, the non-executive members are also to be appointed by the Secretary of State, but

“The Secretary of State must consult the Chair before appointing any other non-executive member.”

The key is that a lot of the appointments effectively flow from the appointment of the chair. The Secretary of State must consult the chair on how other members are appointed having appointed the chair in the first place. The question then is whether it is right that the chair of the OEP is appointed simply because the Secretary of State decides that he or she should be appointed and has an untrammelled ability to do that. We think that that could create a cascading lack of independence in the whole OEP, depending on how the process is carried out. If it is carried out without any scrutiny or accountability, it is quite possible that the Secretary of State could appoint someone whom he/she particularly favours or thinks will give him or her an easy time with the appointment of other members of the office, and shape the office to be entirely subservient to what the Secretary of State wants to do.

[Daniel Zeichner]

My hon. Friend is making an important point. A theme runs through the debates today: an extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of the Secretary of State. In the discussion on the Aarhus convention, we saw the move away from supranational bodies. It is a basic principle that if power is spread, there is far more chance of it being exercised properly, particularly with something as important as environmental protection. Does he agree that this is just the latest example of a theme that has developed all the way through?

[Dr Whitehead]

That is indeed a concern. We have raised, and will repeatedly raise, the difference between the Bill’s aspirations and many of the practicalities. The difference between the Bill’s lofty aspirations and its often severely lacking practicalities is apparent throughout its construction. This is one instance where that is the case. The chair of the OEP is, in the first instance, to be a non-executive member of the office. I would be interested to hear whether the Minister shares my understanding, but it looks to be the case that the chair will be appointed from among the non-executive members whom the Secretary of State has appointed in the first place. The key at that point is who the non-executive members are and how they are appointed. In this instance, they appointed just by the Secretary of State. We suggest a procedure that grounds those appointments within parliamentary procedures.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Well, yes is the answer. We are trying to bind those Committees to some extent to do the right thing, as far as those appointments are concerned. The hon. Gentleman who has experience on the Treasury Committee and other hon. Members who have experience on Committees will know that Committees take their responsibilities seriously. I have been party to that sort of discussion in Select Committees that I have served on in the past. They take their responsibilities very seriously. They take the issue seriously. They do it very carefully and make sure that the result of their deliberations is as good as it can be. That is something that I am absolutely fine with; I do not wish to fetter that in any way.

However, the hon. Gentleman and other Members also know that that has not always been the case with Select Committees. Indeed, in my time in Parliament, is has largely not been the case. The process of deciding upon the appointment of members of various organisations via a Select Committee hearing is a relatively recent innovation. That came about not as a result of legislation but as a result of Select Committees pushing their own authority within the parliamentary system.

In one sense, that is perfectly acceptable, but I am seeking to draw a distinction between that process, which has by and large resulted in a good outcome as far as these appointments are concerned, and the fact that it says in a piece of legislation, “That is what is supposed to be done.” There are other pieces of legislation in existence that specify what is supposed to be done, but this piece of legislation does not. I wonder to myself why those pieces of legislation specify those things whereas this piece of legislation does not.

It would not be difficult—on the contrary, it would be very straightforward—to specify in this piece of legislation what is to be done, while agreeing that that is largely what happens in practice in this Parliament. That is a good thing, and it is a sign of our changing unwritten constitution—I emphasise the word “unwritten”. That is why, in a piece of legislation, it is probably necessary to write down what our intentions are and how they are to be carried out in practice by the House in its interpretation of the unwritten constitution of this country.

[Daniel Zeichner]

I had the privilege of serving on the Transport Committee for a couple of years. Like the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire—my near neighbour—I went to a number of hearings and found them very useful. It strikes me that there is a range of levels of significance. This appointment is hugely significant. It takes back from a supranational body, the European Union, responsibility for one of the most important oversights. We all agree that it would be good to go through this process, so I do not understand why the Government do not want to codify in law what will in fact happen. I do not quite see what they are frightened of. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[The Chair]

Order. I do feel that we are slightly going round in circles.

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[Anthony Browne]

I have set up lots of organisations and it is completely standard to go through a process where there is a shadow or interim chief executive and an interim board. There is a critical difference between that position and a substantive chief executive, which is that they are setting up the way the whole system works—the operations, the modus operandi—and making significant decisions that will last for many years or decades. They are doing it in a position where there is not full governance around it, such as a fully established board, an established chair and everything else. It is right that there is some oversight of what an interim chief executive is doing in setting up the organisation, because the rest of the governance infrastructure will not be there yet.

[Daniel Zeichner]

There has not been any comment yet on the extraordinary situation we find ourselves in. We are just 55 days away from the end of the year and the new situation that we are about to embark upon, and there is nothing in place. That is part of the problem. It is a shambles, quite frankly, that we are leaving the European Union and entering a period where it is unclear how our environmental protections will work. I suggest much more will be said about that as we go through our debates.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test and the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire have said, this is a key moment in setting the path ahead for this new organisation. This provision feeds into this general sense that, far from having a much more sophisticated and wider way of approaching these issues, it all comes down to centralising power in the hands of the Secretary of State to determine the way forward. That cannot be right and I think there is genuine outrage among many who are looking at how this process is unfolding.

We have gone from helping to establish strong environmental principles as a leading player in the European Union to the extraordinary position we find ourselves in. We have no idea how long this is going to take. Is it going to be in place? Perhaps the Minister could tell us. Perhaps things are in train and we are waiting for announcements. Perhaps it will happen next week or in January, or perhaps it will not happen for months and months. In the meantime, many of our own protections are in limbo, effectively.

The schedule gives us no confidence that the Government even have a plan for where we are going with this. I hope the Minister can give us some reassurances, because many of my constituents—and, I suspect, many constituents of other Members—are really worried about these issues. At a time of climate crisis and biodiversity emergency, how can we possibly be setting an example to the rest of the world as we approach COP26 when we are in this shambolic position, with the suggestion that this so-called independent agency should effectively be run by the Secretary of State?

[Rebecca Pow]

There have been some fiery comments about this particular amendment, Chair.

I welcome the support of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for our inclusion in the Bill of a mechanism to appoint an interim chief executive of the OEP. I want to give some reassurances that establishing this independent body that can hold future Governments to account is of crucial importance. That remains very much in focus when considering this power for the Secretary of State to appoint an interim chief executive.

The initial role of the interim chief executive would be to take urgent administrative decisions to ensure that the OEP is up and running as soon as possible, which I know is a key concern of Members. I want to say a little about that role and why it is necessary. Such decisions would include staff recruitment and other matters related to setting up the new body. I welcome the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire, who has a lot of experience in setting up these bodies. It is a fully practical step to help with the interim period. By way of background information for the hon. Member for Cambridge—he raised some pertinent points—we intend that the permanent chief executive will be in place no later than autumn 2021, and the proposed timeline then allows for the OEP chair to lead the appointment of that chief executive.

By way of more background, the Secretary of State has asked officials to assemble a team of staff within the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs group, to be funded from the Department’s budget, to receive and validate any complaints against the criteria for complaining to the OEP; so there will be a team in place in the interim. A lot of work has gone on behind the scenes but we had a lull because of the coronavirus, so it is nobody’s fault that this has happened. Obviously, other structures and plans are being put in place, but that is why details of an interim chief executive have had to be considered. That power will be required for the interim chief executive only in the event that a quorate board is not in place in time to make the decisions. If the board is quorate in time, it will be able to make its own arrangements. During any period when they are making administrative decisions on behalf of the OEP before the board is quorate, the interim chief executive must be capable of being held to account. That is essential good governance and oversight of public funds. That is why we are giving the Secretary of State, as the accountable Minister, the power to direct the interim chief executive during that period.

The shadow Minister was, if I may say so, making some slightly malign intimations about what he potentially thought the Secretary of State had in mind in controlling the interim chief executive. I would like to set all those thoughts and views aside—that is not the purpose; it is a practical arrangement. I would like to give more reassurance on two point. First, the Bill provides for the interim chief executive to report to the OEP’s board, not the Secretary of State, as soon as the board is quorate. Secondly, the Government will not commence the OEP’s statutory functions before the OEP is quorate. Therefore, the interim chief executive will only be able to make decisions relating to the OEP’s statutory functions when they report to a quorate board, not to the Secretary of State. Therefore, the Secretary of State will not have any power of direction over the OEP’s statutory functions. It is important to make that clear. Amendment 154 is, consequently, unnecessary and I ask the hon. Member to withdraw it.

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[Anthony Browne]

I used to be the chair of the Regulatory Policy Committee, a non-departmental public body linked to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; I appointed its entire new board. In a previous life, as I have mentioned, I was involved in setting up various other bodies, such as TheCityUK and the HomeOwners Alliance, and I have been involved tangentially in setting up independent bodies as part of the civil service.

I completely salute the support expressed by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and the Opposition for the independence of the OEP. They are doggedly making sure that it is fully independent, and I totally support that; it will function properly only if it is fully independent. However, on the issue of the interim chief executive, I think—to follow the dogged analogy—that they are slightly barking up the wrong tree.

The whole point about the interim chief executive of any organisation is that they are setting it up. They are designing the org chart, saying “Right: this committee will do this, we need to hire these personnel to do that, these are the finances, this is the first draft budget,” and everything else—they are not actually fulfilling the substantive end function of the public body. The Opposition are worried about the timing, and I am worried about the timing too.

What normally, or very often, happens is that an organisation does not go through a recruitment process for an external interim chief executive. The chief executive is normally banned from being a civil servant, which is absolutely right, but we are talking about getting somebody to set the body up and get it going before the recruitment process for the end chief executive, the appointment of the entire board and everything else, which will take a long, long time—I think it took me about eight months to recruit a new board for the Regulatory Policy Committee.

The thing to do is get a civil servant who has experience of setting up bodies. Because of employment rules in the civil service, they can basically just be reassigned and put in place immediately. They can start setting up the organisation and doing all the stuff that needs doing, and in the meantime we can recruit the full, substantive, independent chief executive, which takes longer. When the independent chief executive is recruited, they will then have an organisation that they can work with and can retune and rejig if they want. That is a far better and more efficient way of setting up an organisation than taking the completely purist approach that the first chief executive has to be a fully independent person who is not a civil servant and will not take directions from the civil service.

[Daniel Zeichner]

rose—

[Anthony Browne]

I have finished, but the hon. Gentleman is welcome to succeed me.

[Daniel Zeichner]

I am grateful; I am sure that the hon. Gentleman can unfinish briefly.

This is not just about setting up another body; it is an extraordinarily delicate issue. The complaint out there is concern about independence. Because of the substantial shift away from a supranational body, surely it is much more important to make sure that everybody sees that that the new body is independent from the outset. This is exactly the wrong way of going about giving people that confidence.

[Anthony Browne]

I will just make one observation, speaking as somebody who has hired various chief executives for other organisations. On the boards that I have been on, the recruitment processes for external chief executives has taken at least three months just to identify the candidate. The sort of people we are looking for are often on notice periods of three or six months, so we are really talking about a minimum of six months, maybe nine months—quite probably a year—to hire the substantive chief executive.

Do we want to sit around doing nothing, with no organisation and no one doing anything for a year or nine months, while we hire the substantive chief executive? I agree with the principle, but what is more important is getting the machinery up and running, the cog wheels going and the pieces in place, and doing the recruitment of the substantive chief executive in the meantime. When we finally appoint them, which might well be six or nine months later, they will then have a skeletal organisation to run.