Environment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Anthony Browne Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed—Secretaries of State come and go, just as Presidents of the USA come and go. Nevertheless, while they are there, Presidents can appoint justices of the Supreme Court who are always there. Although the member of the Executive has gone, the effect of their actions remains—in this example, with the judiciary branch in the US. In principle, that is what could happen as far as this construction is concerned in the Bill. A Secretary of State who comes and goes could appoint, without involving the parliamentary process, somebody who will outlast the Secretary of State in that position.

[Anthony Browne (South Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

I am a member of the Treasury Committee. We do a lot of selection hearings and most of them are agreed through parliamentary processes. We find we end up doing an awful lot of selection hearings, and we have spent a huge amount of time doing them, on the board of the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Policy Committee and so on. We end up having discussions about whether we want to do all these hearings. Do we do them in this way or that way? Do we do reappointment hearings? We retain flexibility around that, because it is done through the parliamentary procedure.

It seems to me that the danger of setting down in legislation that all non-executive members should be appointed on the consent of the two Committees is that we bind their hands into the future. They may decide that they want to do it in some other way. We retain more flexibility for the Committees if they do it through parliamentary means.

[Dr Whitehead]

Well, yes is the answer. We are trying to bind those Committees to some extent to do the right thing, as far as those appointments are concerned. The hon. Gentleman who has experience on the Treasury Committee and other hon. Members who have experience on Committees will know that Committees take their responsibilities seriously. I have been party to that sort of discussion in Select Committees that I have served on in the past. They take their responsibilities very seriously. They take the issue seriously. They do it very carefully and make sure that the result of their deliberations is as good as it can be. That is something that I am absolutely fine with; I do not wish to fetter that in any way.

However, the hon. Gentleman and other Members also know that that has not always been the case with Select Committees. Indeed, in my time in Parliament, is has largely not been the case. The process of deciding upon the appointment of members of various organisations via a Select Committee hearing is a relatively recent innovation. That came about not as a result of legislation but as a result of Select Committees pushing their own authority within the parliamentary system.

In one sense, that is perfectly acceptable, but I am seeking to draw a distinction between that process, which has by and large resulted in a good outcome as far as these appointments are concerned, and the fact that it says in a piece of legislation, “That is what is supposed to be done.” There are other pieces of legislation in existence that specify what is supposed to be done, but this piece of legislation does not. I wonder to myself why those pieces of legislation specify those things whereas this piece of legislation does not.

It would not be difficult—on the contrary, it would be very straightforward—to specify in this piece of legislation what is to be done, while agreeing that that is largely what happens in practice in this Parliament. That is a good thing, and it is a sign of our changing unwritten constitution—I emphasise the word “unwritten”. That is why, in a piece of legislation, it is probably necessary to write down what our intentions are and how they are to be carried out in practice by the House in its interpretation of the unwritten constitution of this country.

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[Anthony Browne]

I have set up lots of organisations and it is completely standard to go through a process where there is a shadow or interim chief executive and an interim board. There is a critical difference between that position and a substantive chief executive, which is that they are setting up the way the whole system works—the operations, the modus operandi—and making significant decisions that will last for many years or decades. They are doing it in a position where there is not full governance around it, such as a fully established board, an established chair and everything else. It is right that there is some oversight of what an interim chief executive is doing in setting up the organisation, because the rest of the governance infrastructure will not be there yet.

[Daniel Zeichner]

There has not been any comment yet on the extraordinary situation we find ourselves in. We are just 55 days away from the end of the year and the new situation that we are about to embark upon, and there is nothing in place. That is part of the problem. It is a shambles, quite frankly, that we are leaving the European Union and entering a period where it is unclear how our environmental protections will work. I suggest much more will be said about that as we go through our debates.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test and the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire have said, this is a key moment in setting the path ahead for this new organisation. This provision feeds into this general sense that, far from having a much more sophisticated and wider way of approaching these issues, it all comes down to centralising power in the hands of the Secretary of State to determine the way forward. That cannot be right and I think there is genuine outrage among many who are looking at how this process is unfolding.

We have gone from helping to establish strong environmental principles as a leading player in the European Union to the extraordinary position we find ourselves in. We have no idea how long this is going to take. Is it going to be in place? Perhaps the Minister could tell us. Perhaps things are in train and we are waiting for announcements. Perhaps it will happen next week or in January, or perhaps it will not happen for months and months. In the meantime, many of our own protections are in limbo, effectively.

The schedule gives us no confidence that the Government even have a plan for where we are going with this. I hope the Minister can give us some reassurances, because many of my constituents—and, I suspect, many constituents of other Members—are really worried about these issues. At a time of climate crisis and biodiversity emergency, how can we possibly be setting an example to the rest of the world as we approach COP26 when we are in this shambolic position, with the suggestion that this so-called independent agency should effectively be run by the Secretary of State?

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[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 155, in schedule 1, page 122, line 15, after sub-paragraph (4) insert

“;but an appointment may be made in reliance on this sub-paragraph only with the approval of the Chair.”.

This amendment requires the Chair’s approval for civil servants or other external persons as interim chief executive of the OEP.

Although it is late afternoon and I do not want to go on the record as being excessively shirty for a long period, I am afraid that discussion of the amendment is part of that shirtiness process. Paragraph 4(4) of schedule 1, which was written as part of the Bill and was not part of the suite of amendments we saw when the Bill reconvened from the Government side, suggests that rules that the chief executive may not be an employee or a civil servant do not apply to the appointment and operation of an interim chief executive.

The constraints on the appointment of an interim chief executive are not there. They could be an employee of the Department, a civil servant, or someone placed by the Secretary of State in that position, when the requirement to underpin the independence of the OEP means that should not be the case for the chief executive proper. That underlines the theme of determined non-independence of the OEP in its early stages, and the Secretary of State’s ability to mould and shape how the OEP works, before it is properly formed.

Amendment 155

“requires the Chair’s approval for civil servants or other external persons as interim chief executive of the OEP.”

Having been appointed, the real chair—not the interim chair—would have the authority to act as a guardian of the independence of the OEP. We have already been through the process of appointing the chair, so at the point at which the interim chief executive might be appointed from within the civil service or the Department, or that might be proposed, the chair of the OEP would not necessarily say that was bad or impossible, but would at least have the authority to decide whether the Secretary of State was doing the right thing. That seems to me to be the least of the requirements that should be placed on this sub-paragraph.

We have discussed the independence of the OEP as it is set up. Having got to the position of having a reasonably independent chair in place, to then not involve the chair in the appointment of the interim chief executive seems perverse. The amendment does nothing except try to ensure that the OEP is visibly independent; Members from all parties can agree to that.

[Anthony Browne]

I used to be the chair of the Regulatory Policy Committee, a non-departmental public body linked to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; I appointed its entire new board. In a previous life, as I have mentioned, I was involved in setting up various other bodies, such as TheCityUK and the HomeOwners Alliance, and I have been involved tangentially in setting up independent bodies as part of the civil service.

I completely salute the support expressed by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and the Opposition for the independence of the OEP. They are doggedly making sure that it is fully independent, and I totally support that; it will function properly only if it is fully independent. However, on the issue of the interim chief executive, I think—to follow the dogged analogy—that they are slightly barking up the wrong tree.

The whole point about the interim chief executive of any organisation is that they are setting it up. They are designing the org chart, saying “Right: this committee will do this, we need to hire these personnel to do that, these are the finances, this is the first draft budget,” and everything else—they are not actually fulfilling the substantive end function of the public body. The Opposition are worried about the timing, and I am worried about the timing too.

What normally, or very often, happens is that an organisation does not go through a recruitment process for an external interim chief executive. The chief executive is normally banned from being a civil servant, which is absolutely right, but we are talking about getting somebody to set the body up and get it going before the recruitment process for the end chief executive, the appointment of the entire board and everything else, which will take a long, long time—I think it took me about eight months to recruit a new board for the Regulatory Policy Committee.

The thing to do is get a civil servant who has experience of setting up bodies. Because of employment rules in the civil service, they can basically just be reassigned and put in place immediately. They can start setting up the organisation and doing all the stuff that needs doing, and in the meantime we can recruit the full, substantive, independent chief executive, which takes longer. When the independent chief executive is recruited, they will then have an organisation that they can work with and can retune and rejig if they want. That is a far better and more efficient way of setting up an organisation than taking the completely purist approach that the first chief executive has to be a fully independent person who is not a civil servant and will not take directions from the civil service.

[Daniel Zeichner]

rose—

[Anthony Browne]

I have finished, but the hon. Gentleman is welcome to succeed me.

[Daniel Zeichner]

I am grateful; I am sure that the hon. Gentleman can unfinish briefly.

This is not just about setting up another body; it is an extraordinarily delicate issue. The complaint out there is concern about independence. Because of the substantial shift away from a supranational body, surely it is much more important to make sure that everybody sees that that the new body is independent from the outset. This is exactly the wrong way of going about giving people that confidence.

[Anthony Browne]

I will just make one observation, speaking as somebody who has hired various chief executives for other organisations. On the boards that I have been on, the recruitment processes for external chief executives has taken at least three months just to identify the candidate. The sort of people we are looking for are often on notice periods of three or six months, so we are really talking about a minimum of six months, maybe nine months—quite probably a year—to hire the substantive chief executive.

Do we want to sit around doing nothing, with no organisation and no one doing anything for a year or nine months, while we hire the substantive chief executive? I agree with the principle, but what is more important is getting the machinery up and running, the cog wheels going and the pieces in place, and doing the recruitment of the substantive chief executive in the meantime. When we finally appoint them, which might well be six or nine months later, they will then have a skeletal organisation to run.

[Rebecca Pow]

I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his interest in the interim chief executive’s role and the Secretary of State’s power to appoint them. I reiterate what I mentioned in our debate on amendment 154: that the role of the interim chief executive is to take the urgent administrative decisions required to ensure that the OEP is up and running on time. That power will be required only in the event that a quorate board is not in place soon enough to make those decisions; that is the crucial point. If the Secretary of State is required to consult the chair on the appointment, the power may not be worth exercising, because we expect the board to become quorate soon after the chair starts in post.

Amendment 155 actually has the potential to delay the appointment of the interim chief executive, which I think is what my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire was alluding to. That would actually defeat the point of appointing one. He or she might be there for just a couple of days.