(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Because of the strategic position occupied by Iran and the vital nature of the strait of Hormuz to the world’s economy—oil supplies transit that waterway—any action, or even suggestion of action, will be deeply destabilising and debilitating. We remain committed to the process of engagement with our European allies and others, which includes the use of economic and financial sanctions to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian regime. There is very significant evidence, particularly the declining value of the Iranian currency, to suggest that such sanctions are beginning to have an effect and to cause fracture within the Iranian leadership.
I commend my right hon. Friend and the Government for the policy they are pursuing towards Iran. Will he continue to ensure that the policy serves to divide the Iranian Government from their people and does not inadvertently unite them?
My hon. Friend makes a good point and is absolutely right. I have quizzed many of our allies in the Gulf who have an intimate knowledge of what is going on in Iran on the ground. We do not want those sanctions to unite the Iranian people with their oppressive regime; we want to wake the Iranian people up to the cost of this madcap dash for nuclear capability.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing this debate. He and my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) have made the case for the 2RRF in the context of the current review extremely powerfully. I am not entirely sure that they were wholly served by the arguments of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), whose assault on the supporting arms could be described only as unfortunate. I would have thought that he among others would understand that the armed services, the Army, depend on team work between the different armed services and between the teeth arms and all the supporting arms. They all have an extremely important role to play.
When on coming into office the Government were faced with financial stringency, decisions about the number of infantry battalions as opposed to arm or core regiments, as opposed to engineers, were among the wretched decisions that Defence Ministers then had to take. The point I am about to make is beautifully illustrated by the Public Gallery, which I have never seen looking more impressive. The Officers of the House deserve congratulation on imposing a little bit of discipline up there. If I were the Defence Minister, I might find it quite intimidating, but the view presented in the Gallery makes one think about the wonderful institution that we are discussing today.
Anyone such as me who has had the privilege of serving in the Army understands the essential element of regimental identity. I was lucky enough to serve during the 1980s when I was only training to fight and die alongside my colleagues. Tragically, since 1990, far too many times that training has had to be turned into reality. That is what the deliberate creation of identity within Army fighting units is about. When Ministers are faced with wretchedly uncomfortable decisions about how to reshape the Army as times change and as warfare and the balance between the arms changes, we run straight into the political difficulty surrounding issues of identity.
The Ministry of Defence and the chiefs of staff have attempted to put in place some basis for making choices, but the toxin in the issue has already been alluded to. As my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has explained, this decision has been about political calculation, not about military logic. I believe that these decisions have not been taken by the chiefs. I know from my own experience just how painful it is when one’s regiment is amalgamated. For those who have ceased serving—they, of course, will have spent 20 to 30 years in service—these issues will be at everyone’s heart. For those who are currently serving—their service is likely to be shorter—they will be concerned but they will turn to the right and get on with whatever organisation they are placed in, in order to do their duty for Queen and country.
Issues of identity, graphically represented here today, are incredibly important. I think that my hon. Friend has made his case when it comes to explaining how the decisions have been taken in this particular round. These are incredibly difficult decisions for the Minister for the Armed Forces and his colleagues, although the point has been made that we cannot be entirely sure that it was he who took them.
This brings us to the issue of national sentiment. I shall now do the strategic equivalent of invading Russia and China, and take aim at Joanna Lumley and the Gurkha lobby. I think it is a particular pity that we are talking about the disbandment of a British line infantry battalion when there are battalions of, frankly, foreign mercenaries still in our Army. The national sentiment attached to the Gurkhas is, of course, entirely proper. Their century-plus service to our country is beyond compare, but it is many senses now an historic anachronism. There in 100 years-plus of sentiment associated with them, which led to the then Government being defeated on a measure dealing with the Gurkhas in the last days of the last Administration.
I strongly support the campaign and the debate, but I think it will be extremely unfortunate if we allow the failure of the Government to do their first duty to defend the realm by preserving our armed forces to descend into a battle between whether we prefer the Gurkhas, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the Loamshires or whatever. We should be saying that the Army will be too small at 82,000 and that these cuts are unacceptable, as we cannot defend the realm as a result of them. We must not allow ourselves to set one regiment against another.
It becomes an issue about identity in the end. With parts of the United Kingdom such as South Yorkshire providing the recruits for the Fusiliers or the north-east providing recruits for the Light Dragoons and so forth, there is an important issue of identity and then of wider public policy in relation to having a recruiting regime in another country, bringing Nepalese soldiers into the British Army. That was fine when, frankly, the Gurkhas were cheap. They were paid less than their equivalents—their pensions cost less, too—and there was a deal. It meant that these soldiers went back to Nepal, highly trained to be really good citizens of enormous value to Nepal. We have changed the rules through sentiment. In my judgment, we now have the most expensive infantry in the British Army supporting a training organisation in Nepal, which is quite limited in what it can do in comparison with British line infantry whose future we are debating today. That poses real public policy problems that we should be brave enough to address; we need to be brave enough to work through the sentiment. Of course there is enormous sentimental attachment to the Gurkhas.
For the information of the House, much as I want to save the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the Gurkha regiments have been recipients of the Victoria Cross on no fewer than 26 occasions. I think the hon. Gentleman maligns the Gurkhas with his words today.
Yes, I did, and I was wrong. I am happy to put on record that I regret it. One of the consequences is today’s debate, and another is the fact that we have done Nepal no favours by taking some of its finest people into the British Army and giving them the right to settle here as a result of their service. The British Army, which is a fantastic training machine, is taking some of Nepal’s finest young men, and they are not returning to Nepal to give it the benefit of their Army training. Moreover, we are probably building up social problems of our own, because the population who are coming into the United Kingdom with their families are going to find it tough to adjust to life here.
We have ended up with an expensive part of the infantry which is much more restricted in its employment than a British light infantry regiment such as the one that we are debating today, in the wake of a policy decision made on grounds of wholly understandable sentiment and for exactly the historic reasons alluded to by the hon. Member for Gateshead (Ian Mearns), including its awesome contribution during two world wars and the Falklands war. It is our responsibility here to try to exercise proper judgments about public interest and public policy. We need to decide what is the right thing to do, and what is in the defence interests of the United Kingdom.
It is easy to be carried away by sentiment. If I did not think that my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay had made his case in support of the 2nd battalion, I would not be supporting his motion today, because battalions have to face disbandment. I will of course listen to what is said by my hon. Friend the Minister of State, but the fact is that we are having to trade off British tommies against Gurkha battalions because of national sentiment, and because decisions were made in Downing street for reasons that were political rather than connected with military logic. I can summarise the arguments presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay by saying that decisions such as this should always be based on military logic, not on political calculation.