Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Dunne)]

The Cipher contract cost the MOD £46 million. Work under the contract ceased in June of last year at the end of a protracted assessment phase, which concluded that the project would not meet the full defence capability requirement at value for money for the taxpayer. I remind the hon. Lady that the contract was placed in November 2008. It is a classic example of the legacy of out-of-control procurement contracts that we were left when we took office in May 2010.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

T5. To pick up the theme from the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman), between 1935 and 1939, defence expenditure doubled in response to the deteriorating security situation in Europe. Does the Department do any contingency planning to determine how our defence capability could be improved rapidly if there was a greater call on our nation’s defence resources?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

As I have said before in the House, part of the outcome of the strategic defence and security review in 2010 was that we should focus, while consolidating our armed forces, on our regeneration capability in case the need arose, or the resources became available, for capabilities or scale of operations that we do not have.

Defence and Cyber-security

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I will do my best, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I agree with the conclusion of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon): this is an extremely important issue and addressing cyber-security rightly sits at the top of our national security agenda. Cybercrime and cyber-attacks are not only tomorrow’s dangers; they are a very real and growing threat today. As others have already made clear, Governments, business and members of the public come under sustained attack from cyber-criminals and foreign powers. There were an estimated 44 million incidents in 2011 alone.

As we become ever more reliant on the internet, our vulnerability increases. Cyber-threats take two primary forms—cybercrime and cyber-attack, although sometimes the distinction is blurred. Cybercrime was estimated by the Association of Chief Police Officers to have cost £57 billion globally back in 2009, while Detica estimated that the 2011 figure for the United Kingdom alone was £27 billion. It is difficult to believe that that there has not been a geometric increase since then.

Large-scale cybercrime is an issue of national security. Cyber-attack and cyber-espionage also present a serious threat both to the state and to the community, and the state should be acting to protect both. As we know, cyber-attacks have had real-world effects, as exampled by the denial-of-service attacks in Estonia in 2007 and the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear development capability, although there appear to be disagreements about the degree of its effectiveness.

Cyber-espionage and theft of sensitive information is another major concern, so addressing the danger of cyber-threats today is real, not academic. The Security Service estimates that at least 20 foreign intelligence agencies currently operate to some degree against British interests. That threat merits our immediate and strong attention, which is why I welcome this debate and the attention the Defence Committee has given to the subject.

[Mr Gray]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Blunt]

Given the amount of time I have left, I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not give way to him. If I have time at the end, I will come back to him.

What is being done and developed in the strategy? In 2009, the previous Government produced Britain’s first cyber-security strategy, which, though laudable for initiating a centralised approach to cyber-security, I as the then shadow Minister critiqued as being a shallow copy of the then American strategy. I said:

“Minimal or no attention is given to key areas such as co-ordination of the new cyber-structures with existing agencies, response to a cyber incident and information sharing between government, industry”

and international action. I also said:

“There is no consideration within the strategy of how we would respond to a cyber-attack. No mention can be found of a framework for response or who would lead it. There is no discussion of issues such as back-up communications networks for security and emergency personnel.”

All of those were given coverage in the United States review at the time.

Given the severity of the threat, the then Opposition felt that the strategy was an inadequate response, so before the general election we produced our own paper on cyber-security and keeping Britain safe in the digital age. I am pleased to say that much of it found itself in the Government’s 2011 cyber-security strategy, which is currently being co-ordinated by the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance.

The strategy is far more detailed than its predecessor and offers a more thorough, co-ordinated and ambitious programme to enhance our cyber-security. The recent progress report from the Cabinet Office highlights the successes in implementing the strategy and the progress made towards achieving its objectives by 2015. I commend the strategy for its scope and ambition, incorporating everything from changes to law enforcement to greater co-operation and information-sharing with the private sector and enhancing our cyber-resilience. That the strategy also balances the attainment of security with civil liberties is reassuring.

[Mr Gray]

Everything my hon. Friend says is absolutely right. The Ministry of Defence, of course, has no responsibility whatsoever for this. Is my hon. Friend therefore proposing that the things he is describing perfectly adequately should now become part of a defence cyber-strategy, or is he talking about something other than the topic of this debate?

[Mr Blunt]

My hon. Friend, in his usual perspicacious way, has identified precisely what I am moving on to, but before I finish on the wider cyber-security issue, I want to recognise the contribution made by the Baroness Neville-Jones in pulling this strategy together and much improving our country’s response.

No strategy, however, is incapable of improvement and the Government still appear to preside over a patchwork muddle of agencies and mandates responsible for cyber-security. In 2011, the Intelligence and Security Committee identified 18 different actors with responsibilities for cyber-security, which raises concerns about duplication, cost-effectiveness and confusion. I note the counterpoint expressed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, who said in evidence to the Defence Committee that although the arrangement is untidy, it is effective, given the need for a cross-Government approach. I must say that, in the absence of a personality as strong as Baroness Neville-Jones, there remain issues about co-ordination and leadership, as was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti).

We must recognise that the updated cyber-security strategy is a major step forward, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) has made clear, defence is only one small component of the pan-Government effort and by no means the most important. I wonder whether the bracketing of cyber-security and defence is in fact wise, given the MOD’s relatively limited role. The MOD has only two formal responsibilities: to ensure that armed forces operability is maintained both at home and abroad by securing its networks, and to enhance military operations by developing future cyber-capabilities.

Cyber-capability is immensely important for the armed forces: it is a battle-winning asset. In the same way that military operations become difficult if not impossible without air supremacy, cyber-superiority if not cyber-supremacy is required. What differentiates cyber-security is that it also applies to nearly every aspect of modem civil life. Not many businesses need to worry about the effectiveness of the F-35 and the Eurofighter in their daily operations, but the defensive cyber-capability is a daily national necessity for our financial system. Defence against most high-end cyber-threats, including those to critical national infrastructure, is the responsibility of other Departments, not least GCHQ and the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure. Given that fact, the conflation of cyber-security with defence is possibly misleading, in that it obscures a complex and much bigger picture. However, we are debating cyber-security in the context of defence, so I shall focus on that.

Other hon. Members have outlined the threat, so I simply want to say that the armed forces are increasingly vulnerable to highly targeted forms of cyber-attack, given the networked nature of modern military systems and the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and robots on the battlefield. Adversaries may seek signals interception to distort intelligence, disrupt logistical supply chains or, most worryingly, render major platforms and systems, such as ships and aircraft, dysfunctional. If we now regard cyber as a fifth domain of warfare, we must expect other countries to do so too. Britain is a world leader in defence technology, but we must expect emerging powers to be keen to shrink the development gap by stealing what they cannot easily or quickly develop for themselves. The need to protect the operability of our armed forces and the integrity of our defence establishment is thus abundantly clear.

Of the £650 million set aside to transform Britain’s national cyber-security capabilities over the next four years, the MOD will receive £90 million. That funding is not intended to secure MOD networks, because that is assumed to be business as usual, but I know that the Department is securing its supply chain against cyber-attack. The point has already been made about the importance of the need for a resilient industrial base, which must form part of the goal of the national cyber-security strategy. The MOD has responsibility to help to manage the security of its suppliers, and I note the work that has been done to that effect.

I also note the emphasis on reserve forces, which other hon. Members have mentioned, and I welcome the establishment of a joint cyber reserve unit. That is exactly the sort of imaginative use of civilian-qualified reservists in the armed forces that we will want in times of need, but we must bear it in mind that if the armed forces need them at a time of crisis, so will their host employers. On a separate point, I am encouraged by the assurance that spending on cyber will automatically be increased in the budgets of future programmes.

Cyber is part of how our armed forces will wage war in future, so the Department must be able to continue to enhance its military cyber-capabilities. I therefore want to touch briefly on cyber-attack. Inevitably, developments in technology will always be highly classified because the possessor of the latest technological advance is likely to have a battle-winning capability. I therefore understand why information in this area is restricted. However, I emphasise to the Minister that the military should understand that this House expects them to possess cyber-attack capability alongside the ability to defend their own networks from cyber-attack.

This area is highly sensitive because such technology can be applied against other states’ non-military assets in a way that makes it difficult to be clear about whether the laws of war apply. I will finish by discussing this international aspect. This area sits in the grey area between espionage and conflict. That is why, in 2009, I called for us to co-operate internationally on cyber issues to regulate the relations between states in respect of cyber-conflict. I am delighted that that is recognised in the 2013 statement on aspects of state behaviour in cyberspace. We must try to identify the future international rules of the road that will govern relations between states in this area.

I will end by reiterating three questions. First, by bracketing cyber-security with defence, are we in danger of misleading ourselves about where the main effort needs to be? Secondly, can the lead responsibility for cyber-security be made clearer? Thirdly, are we affording enough resources to research and development in this vital area?

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Afghanistan

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 10th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The Afghan constitution makes it clear that all ethnic minorities are protected and enjoy the same rights. Furthermore, some of the key players in Afghan society and political circles are Hazara. Of course, however, we should be mindful of the risks to ethnic minorities and the risk of ethnic fragmentation, which, after all, is at the root of many of Afghanistan’s historical problems. The right hon. Gentleman’s point is, therefore, well made, and it is very much on the radar screen.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

In echoing the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), I think we should reflect on the fact that two and a half times as many British servicemen have died in Afghanistan as died in Iraq and that the proportion of injuries among us and the Americans is about five times that suffered in Iraq. It is, therefore, inconceivable that there should not be a full and proper inquiry into the entire campaign. Now that the end date for active UK operations is well in sight, I would be grateful if my right hon. Friend took back to the Prime Minister the need to establish such an inquiry.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend has made his position clear. There are different views about the wisdom of embarking on these large-scale inquiries, but I certainly undertake to pass his suggestion to the Prime Minister.

While I am on my feet, Madam Deputy Speaker, may I take the opportunity to confirm that we expect 150 female cadets to be trained per year? The course is indeed 10 weeks, so there will be five cohorts of 30 in each year.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I do not believe that we maintain those data on the basis of the component nations of the United Kingdom, and the data that are published are a matter for the defence statistician, who is answerable to the national statistician.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

The challenge of meeting the reserves target is well rehearsed, but recruiting to the Regular Army is also in difficulty. Will the Secretary of State give his assessment of this and will he explain the role of regular regiments in assisting with their own recruiting? What continuing role will they have?

Reserve Forces

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Inspiration has just come to me. A new Army Reserve unit will move into Kilmarnock on an existing site, which will reopen to accommodate it.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

Nine days ago, I took part in a flag-raising ceremony at the beginning of Armed Forces week, organised by the borough of Reigate and Banstead, at which more than 20 organisations signed a community covenant to support the armed forces. I challenge my right hon. Friend to find any local authority that has been more forward in its support for the armed forces locally, and it is a pretty poor reward that 80% of the reservists in the borough are to disappear. May I gently register my concern about the fate of the cadet forces associated with the TA centre in Redhill that he is proposing to close? I very much want to come and see him or one of his colleagues to discuss whether, in terms of the establishment of the wider armed forces, including the cadets, they have got the decision right locally.

[Mr Hammond]

I recognise that individual Members whose constituencies are affected by site closures are disappointed. The site at Redhill is occupied by a Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers battalion. REME is being reinforced as a result of the structural changes, but there is a need for consolidation to make it work, and 103 Battalion REME, 150 Recovery Company, is to move to the Mitcham Road TAC in Croydon. My hon. Friend’s constituency will of course retain the TAC at Reigate.

Cadets are co-located on many reserve sites. The fact that we are vacating a site does not mean that the building will be shut or the site disposed of. Where cadets are in occupation, they will continue to occupy and we will seek appropriate ways of reproviding for cadets in the same area; that may be on the same site or on one in the near vicinity.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

One of the reasons the previous Government were able to run up a £38 billion gap between their budget and their forecast expenditure was the doing away with the annual defence review White Papers in 1997. What measures does my right hon. Friend have in place to make sure that the forthcoming defence budget stays honest in the light of his decade-long promise on defence expenditure?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. We have implemented a number of measures internally, including a very tight control on new commitments, constant monitoring of budgets, and attention to this issue at the highest levels of the Department, including ministerial oversight. I am very confident that the defence budget, having been got into balance, will be kept in balance, however difficult the decisions that have to be made to ensure that.

Army Basing Plan

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The expansion of the military facilities on and around Salisbury plain, and the additional military numbers to be based there, certainly implies an increase in civilian employment as a consequence. I cannot give my hon. Friend an exact profile of the investment in Salisbury at the moment, but I can tell him that the move of 20 Armoured Brigade will take place towards the back end of the programme. That reflects the fact that there is a very big investment programme to be completed. Partly for technical and planning reasons and partly for financing reasons, it will be somewhat slower to get under way than some of the smaller investments we are making elsewhere. It will therefore be towards the second half of the programme that he sees that investment going into the area.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend will understand that if, like me, one was born in a British military hospital in Germany, lived there as a child, and then served there as an adult in the British Army of the Rhine, the importance of this statement, certainly in personal terms, can hardly be overestimated. Charting as it does the plan for ending the contribution of the British Army of the Rhine, it is a very profound thing that he has brought to the House today.

May I ask the Secretary of State two things? First, will he ensure that the arrangements made with the German towns that have played host to the British Army for so long are kept under close ministerial oversight and that proper compliments are paid to them? Secondly, and substantively, will he and my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces make sure that the plans for the necessary, very substantial investment around the Salisbury area are executed to a scale and a standard that we will be able to look back on with pride in decades to come, rather than future Administrations having to put right a failure of investment over the next few years?

[Mr Hammond]

Let me deal with the last point first. I am clear that the accommodation we build and the technical facilities we construct must be of a high quality and fit for purpose. I do not, however, intend this £1.8 billion to form a cornucopia for architects.

On the question of Germany, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. We need to plan carefully how we end the relationship with the many German towns that have hosted the British Army. The Army in Germany is very much on the front foot on this. We are aware of the significant impact, particularly in the Bergen-Hohne area, which, by German standards, is relatively less well off. We are looking, where appropriate, at what can be left behind as a physical memorial to the British Army presence in Germany. A series of events will be organised with local communities, and Ministers and senior military personnel will expect to attend them and provide a fitting tribute to the support the German people have given us.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend knows, we have allocated £1.8 billion over 10 years for additional training, infrastructure and equipment for the reserves to try to rebuild the broken trust that resulted from the previous Government’s slashing of funding for reserve training and equipment. On the economics of using reserves instead of regular forces, it is true that, when deployed on operations, reserves are more expensive than regulars, but, held as a contingency, reserves are significantly lower cost than regular forces. We are simply trying, within the budget envelope available, to create the greatest amount of military capacity it is possible to generate.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

Is the Secretary of State able to give any detail as to the exact consequences of the Prime Minister’s welcome statement on the use of the DFID budget alongside the budgets of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence for the future of defence diplomacy?

Armed Forces Redundancies

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

I should say that this process not only affects our regular armed forces. Civilians in the Ministry of Defence are affected by a parallel programme—I think that by 2015 we will have reduced our number of civilians by approximately 33%. It would be unfair to say that our regular forces are bearing the brunt of the process while our civil service work force are not, because they are being affected in parallel.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

In conducting this wretchedly painful exercise—for reasons that we all understand—which is often heartbreaking at unit level, will the Minister confirm that his duty is to the future shape of the armed forces, that they have the best possible collection of experience and ability to shape manpower and that this will mean making people redundant who do not apply for it? That is a necessary difficulty that, if he is to exercise his duty, we have to face up to.

[Mr Francois]

I thank my hon. Friend for the spirit of his question. In the Ministry of Defence we are ultimately responsible for the defence of the realm, but as I hope he and the House will accept, I fully appreciate as someone who has served in uniform the difficult side of what we are having to do today. We completely understand that. We are therefore doing our best to proceed as sympathetically and fairly as possible; but we must configure our armed forces for the defence of our country and achieve the target set out in Future Force 2020.

Nuclear Deterrent

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

I apologise to the House for the fact that I will not be able to stay until the end of the debate, due to a prior commitment. I am grateful to you, Mr Speaker, for calling me.

After Labour was massacred in the 1983 and 1987 general elections because of its advocacy, under a charming but useless leader, for unilateral nuclear disarmament, I was appointed by Neil Kinnock to review foreign and defence policy for the Labour party. As a result of that review, Labour became eligible for re-election and was re-elected at long last in 1997.

If Britain did not have nuclear weapons, I would not advocate our acquiring them, but history has bestowed them upon us. Let us not forget that it was a Labour Government in time of peace who decided that the United Kingdom should acquire nuclear weapons.

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for reviewing the history of the decision making. Would he say that the conclusion that he came to was about politics or policy?

[Sir Gerald Kaufman]

The hon. Gentleman’s question requires a yes or a no, but it is not as clear as that. We are prisoners of history. That history decided that a medium-sized power that was pretty well bankrupt at the end of the second world war should possess nuclear weapons. We are a medium-sized power, and, for better or worse—it is worse in many ways—we would not be listened to any more than anybody else, including Italy, Spain, Greece or Germany, without the unwanted legacy of possession of nuclear weapons.

This is not a question of how we acquired them; the fact is that we are in possession of them. Owing to that fact, unlike those other western European countries and other countries in different parts of the world, we are eligible to participate in international nuclear disarmament. That is essential. We should take into account that it is 58 years since the end of the war. It is remarkable how few other countries have acquired nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel have acquired them, but even Iran—an aggressive and objectionable power with foul internal policies—has not yet done so. We have a voice on the international front that exists to try to prevent nuclear proliferation. If we did not by accident of history possess nuclear weapons, nobody would listen to us on nuclear disarmament. For that reason, we should use the result of that accident of history to take part in international negotiations to reduce, and eventually to eliminate, all nuclear weapons owned by any country.

Incidentally, I have a great affection for my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), but Reagan offered the Soviet Union a major internationally agreed nuclear disarmament. He might not have been the greatest President in the world, but at the same time, being there and having what he had, he was able to make the offer. It is deeply unfortunate that the Soviet Union did not grab that offer.

That being so, I say clearly that I do not want nuclear weapons; I am not happy we have got them, but we have got them. Divesting ourselves of our nuclear weapons would be regarded by many as an act of self-indulgence. We can use our possession of them to persuade others not to use them—there is always a danger that India, Pakistan and Israel will use them—and to take part in international negotiations to reduce and abolish them. That status comes to us by chance and by history. We should use our status.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) back in his place. He put the case extremely well on behalf of Barrow-in-Furness for the current policy remaining in place and being renewed. I welcome the fact that we are having this debate, and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on securing it. We have been brothers in arms on defence, one way or another, for quite a long time. He has really distinguished himself on these issues, and I congratulate him on encouraging the Backbench Business Committee to hold this debate. His position is in the ascendancy and it speaks to his intellectual depth and courage that he is prepared to put his ideas to the test in the Chamber. I also want to congratulate the former Minister of State for the Armed Forces, my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), on his contribution to starting, and initially leading, the review of the alternatives to Trident. We owe it to ourselves to think rather more deeply about this matter than we have done in the past.

It was interesting to hear the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) explaining how the Labour party had moved to its present position. Those on the Opposition Front Bench are no longer allowed to think about this issue, because the politics of 1983 were so appallingly scarring. Labour Front-Benchers are now frozen in a position in which any sense of doubt about the continuation of the present policy would be seen as politically catastrophic, and they are not allowed to go there. The only expressions of doubt that we will hear today will come from the old stagers of the 1980s who fought and lost the battles on disarmament at the time. I believe that it was quite proper that they lost those arguments.

We are now in a completely new era, and we owe it to ourselves to review the policy properly, and as openly as we can. That review is now being carried out under the leadership of the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and it will report to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, but I am concerned that there has been no undertaking to publish it, and that there will therefore be no opportunity for us to examine the costings.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

If my hon. Friend studies the coalition mid-term review document that was published last week, he will see that, for the first time, there is an explicit commitment to publish the review. I understand that the review will be concluded in March, and that publication will probably be in May.

[Mr Blunt]

I am delighted to be corrected on that point.

This is the hub of the issue. We are being invited to engage in an insurance policy that is going to last about 40 years and cost between 5% and 6% of our defence budget. Will that insurance policy ever be cashed in? My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) would probably suggest that it is being cashed in all the time, owing to the fact that it exists. In that sense, the deterrence is eternal.

We need to get into the minds of the likely decision makers who might attack British interests in a way that would engage the use of our deterrent. We also need to get into the minds of our leaders who might then have to contemplate the use of the deterrent in response. There has been a change in the debate on how states conduct these affairs. The question of whether it would be a matter for the International Criminal Court if a leader chose to eviscerate millions of wholly innocent people in pursuit of their state’s policy is one that ought to engage us, particularly as we no longer live in a bipolar world consisting of one alliance taking a position against a competing ideology. The world has changed.

I do not pretend to have an answer to this question, but I want the House to have as much data as possible so that we can begin to make as informed a decision as possible. It is the position of the Government—and, I believe, of those on the Opposition Front Bench—that paying a premium of 5% to 6% of the defence budget for the 40 next years would be worth it because of what it would buy. Well, would 10% or 15% be worth it? How solid are the figures of 5% to 6%? Why should that cost be coming out of the defence budget, given the cost of the equipment that is going to the soldiers, sailors and airmen who are carrying out the other tasks that we ask them to undertake? Should the cost be found from outside the main defence vote?

[David Rutley (Macclesfield) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a compelling case. Given the importance of the deterrent, does he share my concern about what a potential yes vote to Scottish independence would mean, and does he share my hope that the Scottish people will see this as another reason for staying part of the United Kingdom?

[Mr Blunt]

It could work the other way. It could provide a reason why the Scottish people would vote to leave the United Kingdom, as they could then dispose of having to host the deterrent and of the threat of counter-measures for the people living immediately around the area.

I would like to be exposed to more data about the vulnerability of the future submarine systems. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) intervened to say that what was required of the system was that it be invulnerable. Well, I do not know how he can predict the efficacy of surveillance systems in 40 years’ time, just as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said that we have no idea what the international situation will be in 40 years’ time. It is perfectly possible that satellite observations and surveillance of the sea would make it pretty straightforward to trace a submarine in 40 years’ time. I do not know, but I would be grateful for the best data available so that we can test whether or not we will need to spend this eye-watering amount of money on something that will do what it says on the tin, to use a current phrase, in 40 years’ time.

I believe that we are owed the results of the review instigated by the hon. Member for North Devon. This House needs to be informed about these questions. We need to understand where we are through a cost-benefit analysis of the replacement Vanguard submarine system with Trident missiles, which will mean getting the data on the re-engineering of the Trident missiles and the new engines they might need during the course of their next deployment, alongside an understanding of issues around the use of tactical nuclear warheads on cruise missiles. In any scenario planning I did when I was engaged as a special adviser in defence and foreign affairs, the only conceivable situation I could see for using the missiles was for taking out pinpoint targets of rogue states or rogue terrorist groups equipped with missiles that had the capability to launch weapons of mass destruction at us—and for that we would want a small pinpoint weapon, not a strategic weapon that would wreak massive and unacceptable collateral damage in the process.

I am extremely grateful for the debate and for the review, and I think we should keep an open mind until we can reach a proper decision on this matter.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—