Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

We are continuing to press for sanctions to be upheld against Russia. We are helping Ukrainian armed forces with trainers at six different sites in western Ukraine, training and improving the capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces. We have troops exercising in eastern Europe—in Romania and the Baltic—and our Typhoons are flying every day this summer to help to protect Baltic airspace.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

23. The need for the development of a NATO very high readiness joint task force is reflected in the deteriorating wider security situation, particularly with the Russians. That is not wholly consistent with relying on 30,000 reservists as part of our armed forces. If the wider security situation continues to deteriorate, will the Secretary of State review that reliance?

[Michael Fallon]

We have not yet got to the stage where Future Force 2020 has been completed. We have time enough to ensure that our total of 30,000 reservists is reached, but my hon. Friend will recall our manifesto commitment of no further cuts in the size of the regular armed forces.

Defence and Security Review (NATO)

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart]

That is a very significant question. It is definitely worth thinking about in the next SDSR. As the hon. Gentleman points out, many of our assumptions are based on the fact that we will operate with the US coalition, but in relation to the Falklands we cannot be so confident that that will happen.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

The figure of 2% is just a number that has been dragged out of the air, but it happens to be the level of our defence expenditure—about 2.07% of GDP. The conclusions of the summit in Wales seemed remarkably similar to the British posture of what NATO’s targets should be. The fact is that Russia has taken a disappointing divergence from the path that we had hoped it was on after the end of the Soviet Union. That is now beyond contradiction, and we are back to where we were in 1977. Regrettably, we should now be preparing for conflict, and 2% does not cut it.

[Rory Stewart]

I am very supportive of the idea that we should be spending even more.

--- Later in debate ---

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I only hope that the speech I am about to make can begin to get close to the excellent contributions we have heard from hon. Members from all parts of the House—it really has been an excellent debate. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon) that the speech by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) was extremely instructive, and I want to take it as my starting point, because it is essential that we identify what our role in the world is. We have avoided doing that ever since the end of the cold war and we have tried to fudge things. We are now living with the price of trying to “punch above our weight”. That may have sounded sensible when Douglas Hurd said it 20 years ago, but 20 years later, after all the conflicts that have happened in between, we have been left with the consequences: the tactical and strategic failure in Basra and in Helmand, where we simply were not prepared to commit sufficiently in order to carry out the military operation and deliver the political objective by the military means we put to it.

The hon. Lady threw down the challenge: what is our role in the world to be? I am an unashamed dove; it is my belief that our continuing aspirations to play some great power role in the world is a conceit, and a misleading and expensive one. So in the terms she put it, I am looking at greater Denmark and a mercantile policy to support British interests around the world. From that base, my conclusions ought to be instructive, although I understand that many of my right hon. and hon. Friends come from a different place.

The world has significantly changed since the end of the cold war. I would be the first to defend the peace dividend referred to by the hon. Member for York Central (Sir Hugh Bayley), pointing out the drop in defence expenditure after the end of the cold war. Absolutely the right thing to do in the circumstances of the time was to take those savings and reduce the defence budget from 3.5% of GDP when I was a soldier to 2.5% by 1997. But what has happened since then to Russia and what is now happening with ISIS and the rise of Islamic fascism—there is also the open question of China and its role in the world to consider, but this is particularly about the first two things—should give us serious pause for thought.

Churchill said in October 1939:

“I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”.

Knowing that my historian friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Mr Simpson), is with us, we should point out that Churchill went on to make a prediction in that statement, saying:

“I will proclaim tonight my conviction that the second great fact of the first month of the war is that Hitler, and all that Hitler stands for, have been and are being warned off the east and the southeast of Europe.”

That was triumphantly wrong.

What should give us real pause for thought is what is happening in Russia now. If ever there was a wake-up moment, it is not just Crimea and what the Russians are doing in Ukraine; it was the murder of Boris Nemtsov last Friday night and the fact that only a few tens of thousands of people went on to the streets of Moscow. What happened there was the dying gasp of liberal Russia. We have seen the same thing before; it was what Mussolini did to his opponents in fascist Italy. The alarming thing is the popular support that Putin enjoys—the statistics were given again by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston. He is a popular ruler and one in difficulty, which is why he is exploring the execution of power in the way he has been doing. That has taken us away from where we would have hoped Russia would have been, within the family of nations and with the basic agreements of how to conduct international diplomacy.

Alongside Russia, we face the rise of Islamic fascism. That is now on a scale far beyond the consequences of 9/11 and the activities of al-Qaeda; ground is now being occupied. We would do well to remember just how attractive an ideology fascism was, and in its guise as Islamic fascism it is proving attractive to members of our own population and to people from around the region, who are flocking in vast numbers, alarmingly, to put their lives on the line to support it. We underestimate the nationalist popularity of Putin’s strategy and Russia, and ISIS and the images it presents, at our peril. That means we now have to take these threats extremely seriously.

I wish to focus now on what posture we should take. Having said that I do not want the United Kingdom to play a great power role but a more limited role, it is absolutely right that we face up to our responsibilities as a partner in NATO, which is what this debate is about. I understand the politics behind the 2% figure: we need to get NATO expenditure to a level that is at least rising for most of its members. However, 2% is an artificial number and, given the threats that we face now, it is inadequate. Whether we are aspiring to play a great power role or to pursue a mercantile role with no imperial pretensions, our strategic posture as the United Kingdom is woefully insufficient. The moment that we lost the maritime patrol aircraft from the strategic defence and security review at the beginning of this Parliament was the moment that we ceased to have the right suite of powers and intelligence capability to hang together. We have acquired the aircraft carriers and we will eventually acquire the aircraft to go on them, so we will have some status there, but we need to work out how they will form part of our strategy.

I come back now to the decision that we face in 2016, to which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) referred. He complained about the lack of Astute submarines, but we are committed to programme expenditure worth some £109 billion with the renewal of Trident. I have been very impressed by the new report from CentreForum about retiring Trident and looking for an alternative proposal. It demolishes the case for the Trident alternatives review, saying that it was based on a false premise. We need to look at the idea of going back to a free-fall bomb. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck) wants to intervene, I will happily give way.

[Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View) (Lab)]

indicated dissent.

[Crispin Blunt]

I—

[Dr Julian Lewis]

May I say to my hon. and gallant Friend that it is no good contrasting the building of the Successor-class submarines with the Astute-class submarines, because if we do not build the Successor submarines—I am not saying that that is a reason to have a deterrent when we otherwise would not have one—there will be a huge gap between the ending of the Astute hunter-killer programme and the next hunter-killer programme, in which all skill in building submarines will be lost?

[Crispin Blunt]

That is the point I wish to address. We will invest an enormous amount in one weapon system for one task only. If we choose to invest in a free-fall bomb and 48 strike attack aircraft in order to deliver that bomb, it would at least put doubt in the mind of our opponent because we would have a capability that we can deliver in extremis. Although we would not have the total protection that a submarine launch system would give us, it would be enough. When it comes with the potential to have five additional Astute-class submarines, four additional Type-26 frigates, six airborne warning and control systems and eight long-range maritime patrol aircraft, we should think about the capability that we will not have if we commit to Trident. If we have a deterrent that is suitable for the future role of the United Kingdom, we will ensure that we have some of the conventional capability that will be absolutely necessary.

There was a very good piece in The Times on Saturday by Matthew Parris. His chilling conclusion, with which I agree, is that we must now prepare seriously for war. We have not been in this position or seen the scale of engagement that will be required since the cold war, so 2% does not cut it. Mis-investing our limited resources, as we will be doing if we keep the deterrent in the way that is proposed, does not cut it. If we are going to put our soldiers into action, there has to be certainty that they will be properly equipped, capable of acting and capable of doing so in collaboration with our NATO partners. That is why the recommendations of the Defence Committee about forward basing and looking again at something like the Allied Command Europe mobile force must be looked at by the Government. I am afraid to say that the resources that we are putting towards our strategy are simply not enough.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

This has been a very well-informed debate in which we have had 15 speakers. I congratulate the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) on his opening remarks, which showed that the House made the right choice in selecting him as Chair of the Defence Committee. He not only put forward his usual well-informed arguments but made a very convincing case for why we are facing certain threats from Russia, in particular.

The main issue has been spending 2% of GDP for our NATO commitments. That was mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, by the right hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames), by my hon. Friends the Members for York Central (Sir Hugh Bayley) and for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), by the hon. Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage), by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes), by the hon. Members for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) and for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray), and by the hon. Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon), who called the 2% figure a line in the sand. The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) also spoke in favour of it, as did the weaponised dove, the hon. Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt), who argued for more than 2%, and the hon. Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael).

[Crispin Blunt]

I am interested in exploring what Labour would do. In 1977, even when the economy was a disaster, a Labour Government committed to a 3% year-on-year increase in defence expenditure at a time when we were facing a similar threat scenario to that which we face today. Is Labour committed even to a 2% floor?

[Mr Jones]

If the hon. Gentleman lets me get on with my speech, I shall tell him what our position is.

Every Conservative Member has called for 2% or more, but in a few weeks’ time they are going to stand for election on a manifesto that would see a cut in our defence expenditure. I refer to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s autumn statement, which clearly ring-fenced spending on schools, health, and overseas aid. The hon. Member for Aldershot mentioned overseas aid, which I know is dear to his heart. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, 60% more cuts have got to take place, so if we take the ring-fenced spending out, we see that the rest of the cuts that will have to be made amount to about £86 billion. Of that, it is estimated that £9 billion will have to come from defence—some 36% if we take the figures up to 2020. Some are saying that the figure may be in the region of 8%. The Conservatives have form on 8% margins, because that is the level at which the coalition cut defence expenditure when it came to power.

We have heard it argued that the Prime Minister gave a commitment to, and lectured others about, the 2% NATO target. I understand that today he has been in the constituency of the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), where he was asked about the commitment to 2%. As we expect from the Prime Minister, he dodged the question. He said that the equipment budget would be increased by 1%. He also made the remarkable statement that there would be no further cuts in the size of the Army. In that case, the situation for the defence budget is even worse than has been said, because the 9% cut that the Chancellor is arguing for will fall on only 55% of the budget. If the equipment budget has been protected, there are only two ways of keeping the Army intact while cutting 55% of the defence budget by 9%—by taking out of service equipment that is there today or by reducing the number of personnel.

The Prime Minister needs to level with the British people and be honest about what is being proposed. This is a charade. I do not doubt that the Conservative Members who have spoken—I know them all very well and they are very strong defence advocates—genuinely believe that more money should be put into defence or that the 2% NATO commitment should at least be met, but they need to challenge the Prime Minister on the figure. There is no way that the Chancellor’s cuts can be met by 2019-20 without affecting the 2% we currently give to NATO.

Afghanistan

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I add my congratulations to those that have been offered to my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Mr Simpson) on obtaining the debate. It is a pleasure to follow his speech and the thoughtful contributions of my hon. Friends the Members for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and for Newbury (Richard Benyon). I shall be tempted briefly along the road of contributing my view on why lessons need to be learned and what some of them may be. However, my central point is that the lessons to be learned from Afghanistan are not done justice by an hour and a half in Westminster Hall—or, frankly, by the combat analysis, if that is what has been undertaken, inside the Ministry of Defence on its own.

That combat analysis may be splendid for people serving in the armed forces—I do not know; I have not had access to it. It might even be able to contribute something towards telling the parents of Corporal James Hill why he was killed on the outskirts of Camp Bastion a couple of days after arriving in Afghanistan, and how the Taliban could get so close to what was supposed to be a safe area. I do not know. However, it will not tell Mr and Mrs Hill why their son was there in the first place. It will not look properly at the story of how we got into Afghanistan, taking in everything from the attack on the twin towers, which is probably the appropriate starting point, and examining the western response all the way through, including the mismanagement in 2001 and 2002 of our reaction to and relationship with Iran.

Iran initially was on our side in helping to take out the Taliban Government. How far should our objectives have gone at that point? In my view, our objective should simply have been to do our best to eliminate a Government who were responsible for harbouring our enemies. The lesson that should have been meted out to the people of Afghanistan was: “If you are going to support a Government who will harbour people who directly attack us, you cannot expect us to accept that Government continuing.” That is what happened in 2001 and 2002. It was highly effective and was achieved with assistance from previously hostile countries such as Iran, because our interests elided.

The opportunity to recast a wider relationship with Iran at that point was blown away in President Bush’s speech when it was described as part of the “axis of evil”. That destroyed the reformers’ position in the conversation that was happening inside the Iranian Government at the time. Such lessons should be part of any comprehensive examination of the subject.

[Jack Lopresti]

Does my hon. Friend accept that Iran was then and now remains one of the biggest world sponsors of terrorism, and that its weapons and money cause chaos around the world to our strategic interests and peaceful nations?

[Crispin Blunt]

We should take the trouble to understand why Iran behaves as it does. Why does it have the relationship it does with Hezbollah? What interests are served by its supporting what we have proscribed as a terrorist group in Lebanon? What is its relationship with the Assad regime, its neighbours in Afghanistan, and the rest? We must add to that the complexity of the whole existing Iranian political set-up. We ought not simply to deal with things in black and white. The world is all shades of grey, and all the actors playing into the drama that led into Afghanistan had their interests.

Our failure in all instances to turn the board around and understand the perspective of the other players in the drama led us into a series of decisions that were, overall, catastrophic for the British national interest, with 453 dead soldiers as a consequence and al-Qaeda replaced in Afghanistan by the forces of Islamic State. Those are beginning to emerge in Helmand, as parts of what was the Taliban appear to be changing sides and declaring allegiance to it. Goodness knows what that will mean for the future of Afghanistan.

From the decisions of 2001 through to those leading to the military campaign in Helmand, what was Dr Reid —now Lord Reid—doing as Defence Secretary, along with the Prime Minister, at the NATO summit in 2005? Who was trying to drive a new role for NATO—some new justification for NATO’s role? When the United Kingdom picked up responsibility for drugs policy in Afghanistan at the 2002 conference, that was the moment at which the west decided we were going to try to create Switzerland in the Hindu Kush, and the nations of the west took up differing responsibilities for helping Afghanistan in various ways. Why did people not properly understand what happened to poppy cultivation in Helmand between 2001 and 2004, which led to our feeling that there was a role for the United Kingdom there? Then, with all the tragic military mis-appreciation that my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury referred to, we went in with a wholly inadequate military force, with an objective that frankly could not in the end be achieved with 10 times as many troops.

There are so many issues to examine from the Afghan disaster that it can only be right, even though one trembles at the expense and time that it would take, to hold a proper inquiry. Its terms of reference should give it enough resources to do the job in reasonable order. It would cost a lot of money, but we owe it to 453 of our servicemen who did not return alive from Afghanistan, as well as all those who served there and were grievously injured in the process. Because of the fantastic medical contribution that was made there, there are many more such people than would have been associated with other conflicts.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman not feel that after the endless Chilcot inquiry, which has been delayed and delayed, and the Saville inquiry, which took 10 years to report on the events of a single afternoon, it is a matter of urgency that we look at an inquiry into the decision to go into Helmand, made in the hope that not a shot would be fired? That decision changed the situation from one in which just half a dozen of our soldiers died in combat to one in which 453 died. Should we not be urgently told the truth of what happened, so that we will be informed in respect of future decisions to go to war?

[Crispin Blunt]

Frankly, I would support a very narrow inquiry into the Helmand decision, but that would not do justice to the entire sweep of events and exactly what happened. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, that is the key moment, but there is a strategic analysis that then has to join up with all the other elements of defence policy that have gone on.

We owe it to the soldiers, sailors and airmen who have been sent into combat on our behalf, and to their families, to have a proper understanding of how we got into this and of the circumstances in which we are getting out, and properly to learn the lessons from what, frankly, has been an unqualified disaster for the United Kingdom.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Trident Renewal

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

There are of course current threats to this country from ISIL and the jihadists, as, indeed, there are from Russia’s behaviour over the past year or so, but we must also plan for future threats to this country, including nuclear threats. Some may well argue, like the hon. Gentleman, that in the face of terrorism and the other immediate threats that we have seen over the past year, a nuclear deterrent is somehow less relevant. That is an argument, but we have never suggested that those other threats should or can be countered by the nuclear deterrent. We are clear that the nuclear deterrent is the only assured way to deter nuclear threats.

Others have suggested that we should move away from continuous patrols and have a part-time deterrent, as if our enemies did not work the full week, but there is simply no alternative to a continuous at-sea deterrent that can provide the same level of protection and the ability to deter an aggressor. We know that because successive Governments have looked at the different options for delivering a deterrent capability. Most recently, the Trident alternatives review in 2013 demonstrated that no alternative system is as capable or cost-effective as a Trident-based deterrent. It also found:

“None of these alternative systems and postures offers the same degree of resilience as the current posture of Continuous at Sea Deterrence, nor could they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances.”

All the previous studies have also shown that four submarines are required to maintain the continuous posture.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I wanted to intervene earlier, at the end of my right hon. Friend’s arguments about the nature of the gamble that one would be taking with the future security of the United Kingdom by not having a nuclear weapons system. Is not the rather difficult truth that we are making a series of risk assessments and gambles about what we spend on defence and the particular type of defence we buy? While it is funded from the defence budget, Trident comes at the expense of a larger Army, Navy and Air Force, so it is all part of a wider risk assessment, not, as the Secretary of State has suggested, an absolute. If there was no money left for anything except Trident, is that really the decision that we would take?

[Michael Fallon]

My hon. Friend is of course right to say that we must assess future risks and the capabilities that we will have to deal with them. All I can say to him is that every successive Government who have looked at the future threat have, in the end, decided to continue to renew our continuous at-sea deterrent. In a world that is becoming more dangerous, there are no alternatives that offer the level of protection and security that this country needs.

Let me be clear, particularly to the Scottish National party, about what we are planning to replace and when. Subject to a maingate decision in 2016, we are planning to replace the current Vanguard submarines—not the Trident missile or the warheads. We are planning to replace the submarines in the late 2020s, by which time our Vanguard submarines will be 35 years old.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The global situation is profoundly unstable. Whether or not there is a nuclear adversary precisely at this moment, we simply cannot say what will be the case in the next 20, 30 or 40 years. That is the decision we are making now: what threats we will face while other countries are increasing, rather than decreasing, their arsenals.

Labour is proud of its record on non-proliferation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett) was the Labour Foreign Secretary who committed the UK to a “global zero”—a world completely free from nuclear weapons. Britain was the first nuclear state in the world to sign up, before President Obama, before Russia—although it has clearly reneged on what it said—and, to the best of my knowledge, before either of the parties who have proposed the motion. They were busy thinking small, as is their wont. They were telling Scots that the answer to this issue was to expel nuclear submarines a couple of hundred miles south of the border—they are not coming to Barrow, by the way. They did that while having the cheek—I am not sure whether this is parliamentary language or not, Madam Deputy Speaker—to have the unbridled hypocrisy to say that nuclear weapons were grotesque and inhuman, but that they wished an independent Scotland to remain part of the specifically nuclear alliance of NATO.

[Crispin Blunt]

I realise that, as the hon. Gentleman represents Barrow and Furness, he might have a slightly different answer to this question from other hon. Members, but at what point and at what cost does this weapon system cease to be a proper value-for-money decision for the United Kingdom? How much of the defence budget does it need to take before he would say, “Actually, we are better off investing in other weapon systems that are much, much more likely to be used”? What would his number be?

[John Woodcock]

I will come on to figures later; I will make some progress first.

We will not insult people by saying that Trident is effectively fine as long as it is not coloured tartan. We are a party whose ambition is big. We have acted by reducing stockpiles and reducing to a single nuclear platform the minimum credible independent deterrent that it is responsible to maintain while others hold a threat that one day could be used to blackmail the United Kingdom. We led the world on “global zero” and we will lead again in government. Britain is an outward-looking country that shoulders its responsibilities. It will make genuine progress through multilateral negotiation, not futile unilateral gestures.

Labour is not a unilateralist party. I was at a CND “ban the bomb” demonstration at RAF Molesworth. I think it was in 1984 and I was aged five. If my mum will forgive me, I appreciate the fruit gums she gave me on that day but we are not going back to those days—we have moved on as a party. I listened carefully to my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock), who has had to leave for a constituency engagement, but I was left questioning her opening statement. She called herself a multilateralist, but scrapping the programme to replace the ageing Vanguard-class deterrent submarines is tantamount to unilateral disarmament—not today, but a decade or so hence, once the Vanguard-class submarines are no longer seaworthy. As a result of the delays in bringing their successor into service, they are now projected to be the longest-serving submarines in the history of the Royal Navy, but they cannot go on for ever. At that point, we would lose our nuclear capability for ever, yet we cannot possibly know what threats we will face in decades hence. Not only would it put our security at risk, but for any genuine multilateralist, it would be a missed opportunity to encourage other countries and bind them into a deal that makes genuine progress across the world.

The construction taking place in my constituency, and in all parts of the UK, is among the most highly skilled, cutting-edge engineering in the world. We cannot just put these submarines on hold and then pick them up when they might come in handy some years down the track. While a “global zero” remains beyond the horizon, we will finish the programme of renewal that we started in government but which this Administration have delayed to the point that there is precious little contingency left.

The investment announced is significant, but the £100 billion is highly flimsy at best. We do not accept the figure, but—imagining that we did—let me put it into the context of overall UK Government spending, on current levels, over those 50-plus years, a time period that never makes it on to CND posters. According to my office’s estimate, all things being equal, Government spending over those 50 years will be £35,700 billion, which I am told is £3.7 quadrillion—not a number I have used before. Within that, pensions would account for £7,160 billion, and health for £6,475 billion—I used to work for my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), but not even he would use such figures. Education would account for £4,510 billion, and conventional defence for £2,115 billion. Over that period, the £100 billion figure does not seem quite the show-stopper unilateralists would have us believe.

[Crispin Blunt]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the part-polemic by the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart). He was unable to answer a question put to him when he was challenged by Opposition Front Benchers about the extent to which his party, as the head of an independent Scotland, would be prepared to shelter under the American nuclear alliance. That is an important question that his party has to answer.

I say that from the perspective of someone who intends to vote with the hon. Gentleman this evening. It is right that there should be a proper debate about this, and I therefore welcome the debate that his party colleagues have introduced. We should have a cool, calm consideration of the merits of the Trident weapons system. Over the course of a decade, I have been increasingly uncomfortable about the prospect of renewing this weapons system. It is a system, and we are renewing the submarines that make up part of it. Some people have said that the motion is therefore technically in error, but without the submarines the system is pointless and without the missiles it is pointless. That is what the motion means and it is on that basis that I support it. Let me explain why.

The clinching argument for me—although I also want to refer to lots of other issues—is the opportunity cost of spending, let us say, £100 billion on renewing the weapons system over its lifetime. I am wearing the regimental tie of the Light Dragoons and want to make it clear that I spent a long time in defence, professionally and then subsequently as a special adviser in the Ministry of Defence and then in the Foreign Office. I remember trying to plan a scenario, in a political sense, for the circumstances in which the United Kingdom would decide to use nuclear weapons or weapons of similar destructive power, but, frankly, I found it impossible to find such a scenario. I think that that is still the case, and the deterrent effect of that uncertainty has been discussed.

Thirty years on from the decision taken in the 1980s to acquire the Trident system, things have changed significantly and, given the opportunity cost of acquiring the system, I believe that the decision to spend £100 billion should be altered. This weapons system is of much less practical utility than it used to be in deterrence terms and, given the cost-benefit analysis, the time has come to say that this is a business that the United Kingdom should probably get out of. As a nation, given the other potential demands on our defence budget, we can no longer justify the expense.

I listened carefully to the arguments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin)—he made an extremely good speech—and they need to be addressed. First, if we buy this system, will it come at the expense of other parts of the defence budget? My view is that it will. My hon. Friend maintained that if the system is not bought, the Treasury will not give the Ministry of Defence the money. However, we have just made a significant political commitment to maintain defence expenditure at 2% of GDP.

[Mr Jenkin]

Have we?

[Crispin Blunt]

It was a political commitment made by the leaders of NATO at a summit hosted by the United Kingdom, so I believe we have made that commitment. The Government have not made it explicit and the Prime Minister will not do so before the general election, because we have to address serious budget issues and he is, rightly, giving himself room for manoeuvre. Everyone present knows that defence expenditure is already at historically low levels in terms of its share of national wealth. We are making economies in defence and in my view our defence posture is, frankly, incoherent, because we can no longer afford a coherent defence policy for the United Kingdom owing to the amount of resources we are devoting to it.

That is an issue for another debate, but it illustrates the point about the cost of acquiring this system. In the 1980s it cost between 2.5% and 3% of the total defence budget. The cost of renewing the system will be at about the same level of real expenditure, which means that it will cost about 6% of the defence budget. In private conversations with colleagues who share the same background as me, when I ask them whether they would rather have that money spent on the field army or on acquiring this weapons system, their answer is clear: they would rather have it spent on actual deployable defence—soldiers, sailors, airmen and the equipment deployed with them on operations—or even on the deterrence that a decent set of conventional armed forces provides. The names of some of the distinguished former Chiefs of the Defence Staff or those in other roles who have questioned the value for money of taking such a sum out of the defence budget have already been paraded.

I would argue very strongly to the Defence Secretary that if we are committed to this system, we should understand that it is a political weapons system, and that it is of very doubtful military utility. I do not entirely buy the deterrence argument, but that is a qualified position, because all these things are matters of judgment. If we do buy the argument, however, that should not come at the expense of a coherent defence programme. If we need 2% of GDP to provide a coherent conventional defence programme, we should buy this political weapons system not out of that budget, but from a separate source of funding.

In an intervention on the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), I asked just how much he would spend on acquiring this weapons system. He represents Barrow, where the submarines will be made, so I understand that his view of their value is rather different from that of other Members. However, we must answer this question, which we have not properly addressed: at what point does the expense become unaffordable for the United Kingdom?

I am perfectly content to continue to shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. I accept that the decision matrix would be profoundly different if the United States of America was not a rock-solid ally, the Atlantic alliance was not extremely important to the Americans or we could not place the same degree of reliability on their support as we now do. If we had good reason to believe that the United States was not going to be intimately tied into the defence of ourselves and Europe, the decision would be different. I happen to believe, however, that our interests are so closely intertwined, as they have been in all sorts of ways, that we can continue to rely on that alliance.

Frankly, I am not sure that the Americans place very much value on a separate source of nuclear deterrence decision making in London. I think that they would prefer us to bring such resources to the table in the form of deployable conventional forces. The United States Government will not of course take a public view that embarrasses the UK Government, but if we scratched them, we would find that they would rather we had more effective conventional forces.

I do not buy the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex that we would lose the money from the defence budget altogether and not be able to spend it on anything else. However, even if the money was lost, it would have value: £100 billion off the debt or spent on other parts of the public service would be valuable.

I therefore ask: what are we buying with the system? There should be a debate about whether we are buying security or, given the laws of unintended consequences, insecurity. The hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire said that he thought we were buying status for our leaders so that they can parade themselves appropriately at conferences. I do not buy that argument—our leaders are perfectly capable of thinking in hard terms about what hard security is affordable—but I am concerned about the political background to this discussion, and about whether we can have a sensible debate on the cost-benefit analysis of acquiring this system.

The problem is the inheritance of the politics of the 1980s. When the decision was made to acquire the Vanguard and Trident system, the then Labour Opposition came out against it in 1983 as part of the “longest suicide note in history” that they presented to the United Kingdom electorate. I think that that policy was wrong and that at the time, because of the cold war, it was right to renew the deterrent. The people of the United Kingdom took the same view in the general election, as they did about the rest of the basket of promises that Michael Foot and his colleagues presented to the country, and they gave that policy, very properly, an extremely large raspberry and possibly the biggest Conservative majority in the history of Parliament—I am sure I will be corrected if that is wrong.

The scarring effect of that event, and the fact that there might be some proper debate, particularly on the Opposition Benches, means that dissent is suppressed. I am proud to stand here as a Conservative and question the efficacy of the decision under discussion, particularly in terms of its opportunity cost. It may be that I have discounted my future career prospects to such an extent that I feel free to make these points, but for the benefit of the Government Whip who is making a note, I say that this is where my judgment lies currently, but it would not prevent me from exercising collective responsibility to support the decision as part of any future Administration. [Laughter.] We should be able to have this debate and ask questions. How much money would we be prepared to spend on this system if its cost was not going to be 6% of the defence budget? What about if it was 10% or 20% of the defence budget? At what point does it cease to be sensible to invest in this system?

Many Members support deterrence in principle, or at least are not against the possession of weapons of this destructive power in principle—that is a perfectly proper position to take, although I do not share it because to a degree I buy the arguments that I grew up with in the 1970s and 1980s about the principle of a defence. I agree that during the cold war these weapons ensured that the world did not elide into direct hot war engagements that had the ability to escalate into catastrophe. The potential for catastrophe at the root of deterrence in a cold war, bipolar world kept us safe, but we are now in a different world and different calculations must be made.

My view is that for the United Kingdom, 6% of the defence budget is not justifiable, and that also relates to my view of Britain’s place in the world. Unlike most of my colleagues, I would be prepared to put our permanent seat on the Security Council up for negotiation and debate in a reform of the UN Security Council, to try to make that institution more effective. I think it is difficult to justify a British veto on the UN Security Council, and because it is so difficult to justify, the veto is hardly ever used by the United Kingdom. We must also think about Britain’s role in the world, and I do not think that we have properly had the debate about exactly what we can bring to the councils of the world, and what Britain’s position in the world should be.

We will be much better equipped to defend our interests if we are a wealthy, successful, entrepreneurial and trading nation that looks out to the entire world, and I am not sure that landing us with a weapons system that we are never going to use is a sensible use of resources, and it therefore might become a burden—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I am loth to interrupt the hon. Gentleman. He is making an extremely interesting speech, which is being listened to with respect. He said that the debate needed to happen and I just want, very politely, to make the point that six other hon. Members, who will have a lot less time than the hon. Gentleman, are waiting to speak. Therefore, I feel confident in predicting that his last sentence is coming.

[Crispin Blunt]

I am very grateful, Mr Speaker. I looked around to see who was standing and got to a different number, so I am immensely grateful and will conclude my arguments.

I had taken the view of the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) that there should be an alternative way of buying this kind of deterrence, or at least some kind of deterrence, in a cheaper way. I now accept that the alternatives review has answered that question, and has at least made the decision matrix around this much clearer. I do not think it is now possible, on the basis of that work, for us to buy a deterrent in a different way.

However, I gently point out to those who think that by renewing these weapons we are buying an invulnerable system, that I do not think we are. I think the nature of surveillance under the sea will make the future generation of submarines much more discoverable than present science suggests, and the question of Scottish independence will come around again in the lifetime of this weapons system. Had we had to move this weapons system from an independent Scotland, the cost of making a base for it in Plymouth or elsewhere would have been eye-watering. All those uncertainties need to be factored in. On that basis, and on the opportunity cost, I will with deep regret be voting against most of my colleagues this evening.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

It was a grammar school. I will move swiftly on to answer his question. [Interruption.] The Hartland was a very good school—I think the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and I both went to it. [Interruption.] Oh no, he went to another one. Anyway, the important point is that I do not share the view of the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman). This is not about children being put on the front line. I am confident that our duty of care and the way in which we train everybody who joins our armed forces are absolutely right. We take our responsibilities very seriously. Nobody under the age of 18 goes on to the front line—we need to make that very clear.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I thank the Minister and the Secretary of State for listening during the consultation. The proposal was very nearly a disaster for the existing CCFs and they rescued it. I thank them very much indeed. Although I understand the desire to have CCFs in state schools, I ask the Minister not to lose focus on the Army cadet force as the policy continues.

[Anna Soubry]

I absolutely will not lose focus. It is worth saying that we listened to all the representations that were made. We also know and understand that we have a duty to live within our means as a nation and to keep within the Defence budget. That is why we always look at such matters with great care. We looked at the matter, we listened and, in this instance, we did not act. The policy will therefore continue and I am confident that it will do so with success.

Al-Sweady Inquiry Report

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

On the hon. Gentleman’s first point, he is right to draw the House’s attention to the fact that thousands of British troops served in Iraq. They did so with distinction and they did us proud, and only a very small handful had these allegations made against them. We should remember that.

On supporting our servicemen and ex-servicemen, I am delighted that the armed forces covenant is now enshrined in law; we must now make a reality of that covenant. The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry), has written to all colleagues in the House drawing attention to the role we can play in making sure that the covenant is properly implemented by our local authorities, GPs, jobcentres and the others involved in looking after our armed forces. Just yesterday, I think, we published the annual report on the covenant and its operation.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is, of course, right that we must hold our servicemen to the highest possible standards. He will remember that by April 2004 the detention of people in that region was already a point of controversy, but by then—when the Defence Committee visited Shaibah in April 2004—it was clear that any deficiencies had been seriously gripped by the chain of command. When we hold ourselves to such high standards, it is particularly outrageous that the consequences of what perhaps happened to Baha Mousa and the trials that then followed have been thoroughly and unscrupulously abused by extension by the representatives of these people. My right hon. Friend has made absolutely clear what actions he expects the Solicitors Regulation Authority to take, and may I tell him that I absolutely agree with that?

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The events investigated by Sir Thayne were from 10 years ago, just at the beginning of some of the hardest fighting in Helmand, and it is noteworthy that right from the beginning the procedures were being examined and were improved. They have certainly improved significantly over the 10 years.

On the solicitors involved, as I have told the House, there is now an investigation into both firms by the SRA, but I think that before we see the result of that investigation the very least the lawyers involved in this case can do is apologise to the soldiers—and, indeed, to the taxpayer.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I am taking a relaxed attitude, the House should know, because there is protected time for subsequent business and I cannot bear to see colleagues disappointed unnecessarily.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

How much has been spent on advertising to support the current reserve recruitment, and how much is budgeted to be spent on advertising in future?

[Mr Brazier]

I shall have to write to my hon. Friend in order to give him a full answer.

Reserve Recruitment

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I have the greatest respect for the right hon. Gentleman. I am glad that he, too, buys into the principle of the plan. We are committed to the same targets. He will see that as the measures that we have taken to unblock the recruiting system feed through into the numbers—let us remember that we are looking at 12-month rolling data, and that will take time—we will achieve these targets. We are committed to getting 30,000 reservists trained by 2018. I look forward to further exchanges on this with Members from across the House.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

The assumptions underlying this policy were not tested because of the experiences of the Minister for the Armed Forces in the TA 30 years ago. I wrote to the Secretary of State over a year ago to point out that this policy was highly unlikely to work, and that the Department would have to throw a fortune at it to try to make it work. It is not working. When will Ministers face up to that? At the current rate of progress, it will take between 100 and 200 years to achieve the target.

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend. He says that the policy should have been tested; the recommendations came out of an inquiry chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff. They have been strongly and publicly supported by the Chief of the General Staff, both publicly in front of the Select Committee on Defence and privately in front of the all-party group, of which my hon. Friend is a member. We know that we can achieve this; the plain fact is that we said that it would take five years. We are unblocking the recruiting system. The units that I visit all suggest that they are well on their way. We will achieve the targets.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Murrison]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s question. Reserve forces were mentioned in response to an earlier question and cyber-capability is one of those niche areas in which reserves will be able to bring something to the piece. This is a difficult and complex area and as we move forward into a different defence environment, we must think carefully about the new niche capabilities that we need.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

Army 2020 doubled the savings expectations from the Army following the strategic defence and security review. Reserve capability is important. What is the training strength of the Army Reserve today?

[Dr Murrison]

I am a reservist, so I should really know the number off the top of my head, but from memory it is a little shy of 20,000.

Oral Answers to Questions

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I think the reaction tells its own story to the hon. Gentleman.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate)]

Our military are increasingly subject to a legal regime that is increasingly costly, both financially and operationally. Does my right hon. Friend agree with the Defence Committee’s recommendation that the next strategic defence and security review must examine the legal framework within which they operate and have less regard to human rights law and more regard to the law of armed conflict?