United Front Work Department

Chris Murray Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me first come to the point the right hon. Gentleman made about FIRS. Upon our arrival in government, we found that FIRS was not ready to be implemented, as has been claimed. Since coming into office, we have ensured that more people than ever are now working on FIRS implementation, and the case management team have been recruited and are now in place. As I said in my opening remarks, we plan to lay the regulations that underpin the scheme in the new year, ahead of the scheme going live in the summer. As we have previously committed, we will provide three months’ notice of the scheme’s go-live date to give all those who will be affected by it adequate time to prepare.

The scheme will be underpinned by an IT solution consisting of a registration platform, a case management system and an online public register. The IT programme developed under the previous Government was not ready for the scheme to go live, and plans were not sufficiently robust. This Government have progressed at pace with the work to ensure that we are in a position to launch FIRS, with the laying of the regulations in the new year with a view to the scheme going live in the summer. Work is also under way to identify which foreign powers will be placed on the enhanced tier. That will be based on robust security and intelligence analysis. The Home Secretary and I plan to begin setting out the Government’s approach for the use of the enhanced tier in due course.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

The first duty of Government is national security, and the threat that the country faces is the most complex and evolving we have ever seen. Given the range of threats we face from hostile state actors, it is important that the Government take action to protect our critical national infrastructure from cyber-attacks and ransomware attacks. Can the Minister update us on the plans announced in the King’s Speech for a new Bill on cyber-resilience and other actions to improve protections in this area?

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are working at pace with colleagues across Government, including in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, to progress these matters. There is a lot of work going on across Government to ensure that we are as resilient as we can possibly be to the threats we face from a range of actors. He can be assured, as can the House, that this Government will use all necessary measures to protect our security and ensure that our critical national infrastructure is as resilient as it possibly can be.

Border Security: Collaboration

Chris Murray Excerpts

Wednesday 11th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Member raised asylum claims from Syria. This is something we discussed in the Calais group, and all five countries are taking the same approach of recognising that we cannot currently take decisions. We clearly want to be able to do so as swiftly as possible, but we need to monitor the situation in Syria in the meantime.

The hon. Member raised the importance of other partnership working, including with Europol and Eurojust, and I agree with her on the importance of that. One of the things we agreed, first with Germany and then as part of the Calais group discussions at which Europol was also present, is that we were keen either to establish a new Europol taskforce or to expand one of the existing taskforces to look at the end-to-end smuggler route and its supply chains, and particularly to work with the Kurdish authorities and the Iraqi Government on the end-to-end route involving the Iraqi Kurdish criminal smuggler gangs. All those involved, including the Iraqi Government, are keen to work with us on that, but we need that Europol taskforce in place in order to be able to do that.

On asylum decision making, we are increasing the caseworkers in post and we have substantially increased the pace of decisions. Decision making had plummeted by about 70% just before the election, but we now have the extra caseworkers in place and we have got decisions back up to where they were. That allows us to clear the backlog on initial decisions. Finally, I agree with the hon. Member that we need to continue to work on the source issues, and we are working closely with the Foreign Office on that.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I spent 15 years working on migration before I came into this House, including three years as the home affairs attaché in Paris, where I saw at first hand how the kind of instruments and data sharing the Home Secretary is describing can make a concrete difference in the fight against immigration crime. I also saw that, as the previous Government pulled the UK out of these instruments, it made our job as officials harder. I could not welcome the Home Secretary’s statement more. Immigration is an international phenomenon and, by definition, tackling immigration crime requires international co-operation. Can she tell us a bit more about the steps she has taken to build the relationships with these key European allies? Will she also commit to keeping her foot to the floor on this issue? In my experience, these relationships can so easily be cut, and but to bear fruit they take time and political will.

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend has considerable experience in these issues, and I thank him for all his work on this. He is right to say that, with something as basic as the right kind of information and intelligence sharing, if the systems are removed and no new systems are put in place, basic operational actions simply do not happen, whether they involve going after the criminal gangs or preventing dangerous boat crossings and criminal activities. This is as basic as making sure that we now have much stronger systems, including using the Europol secure information exchange network application—SIENA—system, so that when the German police get information from the National Crime Agency, it is in a form that they can swiftly use to pursue investigations and prosecutions. My hon. Friend is right. We have to make sure that the detail works, which has often not been taken seriously for far too long.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Chris Murray Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

The Bill’s provisions are appropriate for venues below the enhanced tier. They are proportionate, low-cost and not onerous. They are prompts to encourage organisations to do the kind of thinking that they should do anyway to prevent terrorism or any kinds of attack. The measures are not disproportionate at all, and the legislation is appropriate in that respect.

[Matt Vickers]

I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. An existing regulatory body is being given an additional job; there is no harm in coming back after 18 months to review whether the provisions are working and are fit for purpose. Similarly, there is logic in the House having a say on the fees and penalties that might be applied, rather than that being delegated to the Secretary of State. Those logical changes could relieve some of the anxiety in the sector. Everyone wants the Bill to go forward and fulfil its objective of making our communities safer, but some of the anxieties in the sector about unexpected and unintended consequences for community venues and small businesses are real, so let us relieve some of them by agreeing the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I would like to say that I have given that great thought, but as hon. Members across the House will know, after we came back in July, my tenure as a shadow Home Affairs Minister was rather short—[Interruption.] I thank the Minister, who said, “Shame”. That was after being shadow Northern Ireland Minister, shadow Foreign Affairs Minister and other Ministers, too. But I took this piece of legislation very seriously. The Government should make that decision, but I hope that the SIA is properly resourced and that it conducts its duties in the right way. That is why I think new clause 1 should be accepted this evening.

I do not want to overstay my welcome, but I will speak briefly about one of the concerns that I raised on Second Reading about the responsible person element of the Bill. I remain seriously concerned about this, and it was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox). Although I accept the scope of the Bill and the impact that it will have on the statute book, many organisations, particularly during cost of living crises and at this time of year, rely on their volunteers, and if we place undue and burdensome regulations on them, volunteers will simply not come forward and be in the voluntary sector. Charities are going through a difficult time. I remain concerned that if we tip slightly too much towards being overburdensome on those very small organisations, we will see a dearth of people in the voluntary sector. No one wants to discourage people from volunteering—we do not, and I know the shadow Minister and the Minister do not—but I worry that the thresholds set out in the Bill will have unintended consequences. I ask the Minister to look seriously at new clause 1 and amendments 25 and 26, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford.

Many will be happy to know that I am drawing my comments to a close. However, I am personally delighted that this Bill is before the House in record time, five months after the Government came into office. I hope that the Minister will see that the Opposition are working, and will continue to work, in a constructive way to get this on to the statute book. It is sad that, in order to have a relatively major piece of legislation changed so rapidly, we had to go through the atrocities that we saw in Manchester and terrorist attacks around the United Kingdom. However, I know that the legacy that Martyn leaves is one that his family will be greatly proud of, as this country should be. This is a mainstream, major piece of legislation, and I hope that by working together, we will ensure that people who go to venues for many years to come will be protected, and they will be protected in Martyn’s name.

[Chris Murray]

I welcome the fact that the discussion in the House today shows real cross-party support for the aims, principles and objectives of the Bill, and that the amendments focus only on nuances and more technical aspects. That shows that we are all united in trying to achieve this goal and in preventing tragedies such as that which happened in Manchester from happening again.

In trying to understand those nuances and where the more technical sides should be drawn, it is useful to reflect on the legislation’s key dimensions and advantages. First, obviously, it makes terrorist attacks less likely. The terrorist threat is substantial and we know that it is changing. It has gone from large-scale infrastructure and iconic sites to much more workaday, normal locations.

The most recent terrorist attack that we tragically saw in this country was an attack on a children’s dance class. It is clear that the terror threat is evolving and we must evolve with it, which is why the Bill is important, but it is also important because it minimises the death and destruction that result from a terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks may still happen despite our best efforts, and it is important for us to plan for that eventuality and make the right decisions in order to be ready when they do happen.

The former President Obama’s Under-Secretary of State for Homeland Security, the Harvard professor Juliette Kayyem, has talked of the “boom” of a terror moment or crisis, and divides planning into “pre-boom” and “post-boom”. Pre-boom is what must be done to prevent an event from taking place, but it is equally important to plan for the post-boom moment. We must ensure that even those running small venues have done some thinking in advance of an attack. What are the escape routes? Who needs to have the keys? What happens if they send people in this direction rather than that direction?

The Bill incorporates a distinction between enhanced and non-enhanced tiers, and that too is important. In my constituency we put on some of the biggest and best events in the world. I am utterly confident that those in the football and rugby stadiums and theatres who are in charge of security planning do all this thinking anyway, but there are many smaller venues where it has not occurred to people that that is necessarily their role, but which are now in the line of fire. It is important for people to recognise that responsibility, because the public have a right to expect it. The Bill codifies what should be happening anyway. We must bear that in mind as we decide where to set the thresholds, who falls in or outside scope, and what level of burden we expect organisations and venues to face.

In Committee, it was reassuring to hear several of my concerns being allayed. One of them has already been discussed, namely the impact on business and the potential for a burden. There is no denying that something of a burden will be placed on some organisations where no one has done any thinking or preparation for a potential terrorist or other attack, but the Bill contains very proportionate elements that do not impose much of an extra burden. Its requirements are intuitive, they are not onerous, they are straightforward and they are commonsensical. As I said in an intervention earlier, they are essentially prompts for organisations to do the kind of thinking that we would hope they were doing already to avoid an attack. That not only avoids attacks, but mitigates their impact.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about the proportionality of the Bill, which we discussed in Committee. The word “burden” has been used a great deal this afternoon. In his evidence to the Committee, Andy Burnham said:

“I just think that we cannot talk ourselves into a sort of thing where it is all too big a burden. I can tell you from experience: a terrorist attack is a massive burden on a city and what it does challenges everybody at every level—and that is ongoing. Like Figen said, Manchester will never be the same again after what happened. It has changed us but it has strengthened us and made us more united, and as I say, I do not want any other city to go through that.”––[Official Report, Terrorism (Protection of Premises Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2024; c. 16, Q11.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this is a proportionate Bill, and that the burden of a terrorist attack far outweighs any burden caused by its provisions?

[Chris Murray]

Absolutely. There is a small element of burden in the Bill, but it is light-touch and proportionate, and the alternative scenario is significantly more burdensome. In my own city of Edinburgh, the impact of a terrorist attack and of people not feeling secure in the aftermath could be destructive not just to the lives affected by the attack, but to the whole economy on which our city is based, which is event-focused. It is right for us to draw that distinction, and to seek to get the balance exactly right.

[Nick Timothy]

The hon. Gentleman is making an eloquent speech about the “protect” element of the counter-terrorism strategy. It is clear from the Manchester attack inquiry report that the asylum system is a big part of the story.

Salman Abedi and his brother Hashem—who planned the attack and prepared the explosives, and was as guilty of the attack as Salman—were born in Britain to Libyan asylum seeker parents. Their father, Ramadan Abedi, was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an Islamist militia. He was granted asylum in this country, but travelled back and forth between Britain and Libya throughout that time, which is a story that we often hear about people who are granted asylum here. Given the number of people who come here illegally and across the channel, whom we have no ability to investigate and on whom we cannot make checks, how does the hon. Gentleman think we might reform the asylum system to prevent such things from happening again?

[Chris Murray]

I am struggling to understand quite how that falls within the scope of this debate, but it is important to discuss the issue of how we deal with terrorism. As we have seen in the history of this country, terrorist attacks can be both foreign and domestic. They can be homegrown, or they can come from overseas. I have talked about the need to prepare for an attack before it happens, so that mitigations can be introduced. They can be long term, which means looking at where the threat is emanating from, or they can be immediately in advance of an attack, which means introducing security measures. My argument, however, is that the benefit of the Bill relates to what happens after the attack has taken place. We need to help the smaller venues that now find themselves within the scope of terrorist attacks to prepare for those attacks. It is not a question of who committed the offence, but a question of how they are prepared to deal with that event.

[Dr Luke Evans]

I was fortunate enough to listen to the hon. Gentleman’s Westminster Hall debate on the Edinburgh fringe and its success around the world. That is a prime example of where the Bill might be helpful. Has the hon. Gentleman given any thought to how those small venues can work together? If they share best practice, that can create an environment of security. I wonder whether the fringe organisations themselves have thought about this, given that they are, by their very nature, likely to be a target. Sharing best practice may help to strengthen the entire environment when people visit it.

[Chris Murray]

That intervention was slightly more in scope and was also about Edinburgh, so I was happier to take it.

The hon. Gentleman is right. Indeed, in advance of the Bill Committee debate and the debate that we are having now, I spoke to Edinburgh city council and to some of the event organisers, who told me that it is exactly because Edinburgh has become a place where fringe events take place regularly that these considerations have been normalised. Our city has put a lot of the necessary infrastructure in place, along with the thinking and the organisational requirements—and there is also a corporate memory between the small venues—to cope with terrorist events. As Andy Burnham pointed out in his evidence, Edinburgh is one of the national leaders on this front. However, I recognise that not every community has that advantage, which is why the Bill will extend to other communities the measures that already benefit mine.

[Sammy Wilson]

The hon. Member said earlier that these were “prompts”, and that what we should consider was what happened after an attack. What is worrying is that the Bill goes beyond that. It talks about occasions on which it is suspected that a terrorist offence might take place or is taking place. That is not an “after”. The Bill creates an obligation for those who are in charge of the event in question to prevent individuals from entering. Before an event or while it is happening, there is a security obligation on some of these small groups to prevent people from entering the premises. That is not a prompt; it is a huge burden on the organisers.

[Chris Murray]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. Again, having been on the Public Bill Committee, my argument is that the Bill is proportionate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sammy Wilson]

I fully understand the reasoning and the demand for a Bill such as this when it became known that, after a terrorist event, lives were lost because of bad organisation. If it is possible to introduce legislation that helps to avoid a situation that we have seen develop in the past, then of course we should do it. However, we have to be cognisant that when we introduce legislation, it has consequences for the people to whom it applies.

As we have heard time and again during the debate, Members believe that this legislation is both proportionate and practical. If Members genuinely believe that that is the case, there is absolutely no reason why new clause 1 should not be supported. We are entering a new field and imposing new regulations on bodies that were not regulated in relation to terrorism before, so surely it is important that we find out whether or not the objective and the intention is actually fulfilled. One way to do that is to monitor the effect over a period of time.

I have some concerns about the legislation, which people have already raised. In many cases, I do not think that the measures are practical. Secondly, I do not believe that they will not have an impact. That is not what Members expected and it is not what they want. Members across the House have said that they think the legislation may put people off engaging in activities that they would have undertaken in the absence of the regulations—activities that make a valuable contribution to their communities.

There is always a danger that people interpret the legislation that comes before the House, and sometimes our own rhetoric encourages them to do so. They may think a result of this legislation will be that it reduces the danger of people suffering a terrorist attack. To be clear, that is not and cannot be the purpose of the Bill. Terrorist attacks can be stopped only if we have intelligence, the security forces can act on that intelligence and we act in time. As the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh (Chris Murray) pointed out, the legislation is more about what happens after the event. However, it is not only about what happens after the event. The legislation puts obligations on people before they make a decision to undertake an event. Some of the wording in the Bill raises concerns.

[Chris Murray]

To clarify, I was not saying the legislation was only of value after an event. I said that part of its value was the impact it had on planning for the period after an event. On the burden the right hon. Gentleman talks about on people making preparations, does he accept that it is important that they consider the potential impact of events and think in advance about that in taking those decisions? That is how we will avoid the kind of atrocities we have seen.

[Sammy Wilson]

Let us look at some of the language and the requirements in the Bill that are totally reasonable. For example, the Bill sets out that people who are organising events should have plans

“for evacuating individuals from the premises”.

As far as I know, that already happens. At many of the events I attend, before the event even starts, somebody stands up and says, “Here are some house rules: in the event of a fire, the exits are here, here and here. Leave in an orderly way. When you get outside, meet at a certain point, so we can check everybody is out of the area.” There are measures in the Bill that are reasonable and that I would assume people are already doing. If they are not doing them, then it is not onerous on them to start saying that at the beginning of an event.

However, the Bill applies to retail as well. It is easy to communicate that kind of information to people if they are in a theatre or at some kind of concert, but it is a bit more difficult to communicate that to individuals when they are moving in and out of retail premises. We have to be careful about the practicalities of what we ask people to do.

Let me set out some of the things I have concerns about, which I believe are unreasonable to require of organisations. First, “public protection procedures” have to be

“followed by individuals working on the premises or at the event if there is reason to suspect that an act of terrorism is occurring, or is about to occur, on the premises”.

I suppose it is fairly obvious if something is “occurring” —we know if something is happening—but what if it is likely or “about to occur”? Are organisers meant to liaise with the police and get intelligence from them—intelligence that the police may not be able to divulge, or may not even have? What onus does it put on individuals in terms of preparation, given the random nature of terrorism? We have seen somebody go into a pre-school class with a knife. Nobody could have anticipated that.

Furthermore, when an event is occurring, or might be about to occur, the organiser has to prevent individuals from entering the premises. If I were organising an event, I would want to know what kind of security requirement that puts on me as the organiser. Am I meant to ensure that a security presence is there? What kind of security presence? We have talked quite a lot tonight about the fact that many events of 200 people could be organised by ordinary community groups. I think of theatre groups in my constituency. The only interest that people who organise such events have is acting. They do not have any of the skills that might be required to prevent people from entering the premises, so do they need to have security apparatus, such as security people?

The next measure about which there is a degree of ambiguity is the requirement that organisers do not divulge security information relating to the premises or event. I understand that they should not send out plans of the building in which they will be operating, showing the doors through which people can come in and get out, and the easy and hard ways into the premises. However, the Bill goes further than that. The organisers cannot give information about the event. The whole purpose of an event is to publicise it. Where will it be held? At what time will it be held? How many people can be facilitated? How do people get tickets? The point that I am trying to make is that there is language in the Bill about which I would have a lot of questions, were I an individual who was subject to it, because if I did not get it right, there would be a fine of up to £5,000 or £10,000.

Asylum Seekers: Hotel Accommodation

Chris Murray Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not agree that allowing asylum seekers to work while their claim is being considered will not be a pull factor. The way to deal with this issue is to have a fast, fair and efficient asylum system. We are looking at how we can redesign it, and at what we can do to deal with the huge backlogs that we inherited, not least in the tribunal system when there are appeals. We need a much better end-to-end system that is fair and efficient. That will mitigate any of the issues that the hon. Lady raises with respect to asylum seekers not being allowed to work. Were that restriction to be lifted, I believe that it would be a huge pull factor, which would have potentially serious consequences.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge (Sir Gavin Williamson) on securing this urgent question on a matter that the Home Affairs Committee is looking at, but I am astonished that he wants to draw attention to the Conservatives’ legacy in this area. In 2019-20, the Home Office was spending £17,000 per asylum seeker per year on accommodation; by 2023-24, it was spending £47,000 per asylum seeker per year. At that point, it stopped taking decisions, so the number could only grow as the UK taxpayer paid for asylum seekers to stay in hotel accommodation. Does the Minister agree that the correct way to deal with the issue is to seriously address the systemic problems in the immigration system, such as the lack of any decisions being taken, and not ridiculous gimmicks such as wave machines and deterrents for four people?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I agree that it is about doing the day job effectively and efficiently, and if it cannot be done effectively and efficiently, redesigning it so that it can be, rather than having huge rows with the international community, threatening to leave the European convention on human rights, and setting up a parallel scheme that was not agreed by anybody, which spent vast amounts of money and ground the system to a halt. That is not the way to achieve success in this area. Considering the use of a wave machine to somehow send boats back to France just about sums up the reality of the Conservatives’ attitude to what is a difficult situation.

Small Boat Crossings

Chris Murray Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is my first chance to congratulate the right hon. Lady on her election as Chair of the Select Committee. I look forward to coming before her Committee whenever she wishes to talk to me. The Department certainly wishes to keep her informed about what is going on.

There has been a significant shift in international co-operation, what with the G7 collaboration on smuggling and the dialogues of the European Political Community, of which there is a meeting tomorrow, at which we hope there will be some announcements. The Government have also been working on bilateral memorandums of understanding and action plans across Europe to achieve a step change in cross-border co-operation, which is the key to beginning to tackle the awful criminal smuggling activity.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

In the five years before the election, I worked on preventing human trafficking in Scotland, including with many of the victims who came on small boat crossings. They have gone through the most appalling abuse that chills the soul. Does the Minister agree that public money is far better spent on smashing the gangs and freeing the victims than on a Rwanda plan that was never going to work?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, I agree profoundly with my hon. Friend, which is why the new Government have changed tack in this area. I am sure that we will see the results in due course.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Third sitting)

Chris Murray Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 31st October 2024 Public Bill Committees

Clause 5 sets out that the Secretary of State may, through affirmative regulations, amend the types of procedures that should be in place. This power is carefully constrained. First, further procedures can be added only if they are considered to reduce the risk of physical harm to individuals. Secondly, procedures can be removed or changed only if doing so is not considered to increase the risk of physical harm.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I wanted to speak on this clause because it is arguably the most important component of this legislation and could have the biggest impact. Obviously we all hope that terrorist events do not happen, but we must be alert to the possibility that they can, and to what we collectively need to do to prepare for that situation.

Enhanced-tier organisations, particularly those at the upper end such as stadiums, will already have many operations in place to prepare for that. They will do table-top exercises; they will do war games; they will designate staff; they will have protocols. But for the standard tier, in particular, will not automatically be doing that. As we see the terror threat evolving to target those smaller standard-tier institutions, it is important that we prompt them, through this legislation, to do that thinking.

The former US Under-Secretary of State for Homeland Security, Juliette Kayyem, talks about the distinction between “pre-boom” and “boom” with terrorist events. Pre-boom, we can do a lot of work to stop terrorists—put in checks and do things—but we have to think about what we do in the moment when the terrorist attack has already begun. That is not the time for institutions, particularly small institutions, to be thinking, “What is the exit route? What do we need to do? Who’s in charge here?” In reference to American school shootings, Juliette Kayyem says that the least useful person, once a school shooting has started, is the person who says, “We should have banned guns.” It is too late to be having that conversation, and the gun is already in the school. People need to be prepared for that situation.

The four requirements under subsection (3) are small, and quite intuitive, prompts that we are asking of standard-tier institutions; but in giving those prompts we could be encouraging them to take the small steps that will, when the terrorist event happens, affect the outcome and could really save lives. This is a really important clause.

The Opposition have made the point that the clause presents a burden on business, and it is true that it is bringing into scope organisations that probably have not had this burden placed upon them before. Admittedly, there is a component of burden being placed here—but actually it is not the legislation that is doing that; it is the evolving terror threat, which we are responding to. That is why it is important to note that the proposals made here—those four requirements—are straightforward. As I say, they are almost intuitive and commonsensical. They are not onerous and they are low-cost.

My constituency, the city centre of Edinburgh, is event central. We have hundreds of events there every week, and in August we host the third-biggest ticketed event in the world—double the number of people go to events in that month as go to the Olympics. But they are not all in one place. It is not one big stadium; they are spread throughout the city.

Some of those events, such as the Tattoo, would qualify for the enhanced tier, but many of them would be standard tier. If we can prompt them to make these changes, we really could make a huge impact. If we do not do that and there is a chilling effect because people feel insecure, the burden on organisations will significant; we need to take that seriously. That is why the distinction between standard and enhanced is appropriate, and I think the requirements being made of the standard tier are the right ones.

This very important clause codifies something that society should be doing anyway, given the evolving terror threat. The way we will know it has had an impact is that we will never hear about it again, because the prompts will mean that further action is not required and tragedies do not happen.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Public protection measures for enhanced duty premises and qualifying event

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 6, page 5, line 1, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from creating further requirements for enhanced duty premises by regulations.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Chris Murray Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 31st October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Dan Jarvis]

As I have already said, the Bill gives the SIA powers to take a range of enforcement action, including issuing monetary penalties, to enable it to deal with non-compliance. Such action is anticipated to be the primary method of enforcement, allowing swifter resolution without resorting to criminalisation. However, where civil enforcement is not enough, the public will expect criminal consequences for cases of non-compliance, such as persistent and egregious failures.

Clause 24 makes it a criminal offence to fail to comply with a compliance or restriction notice that has been given in relation to enhanced duty premises or a qualifying event. It will be a defence for the accused in subsequent criminal proceedings to show that they took all reasonable steps to comply with the relevant compliance or restriction notice. The offences are triable either way and, if convicted on indictment, a person will be liable to a sentence of up to 2 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Turning to clause 25, receipt of accurate information will be vital to the effective functioning of the SIA and to ensure that any public safety risks arising from non-compliance can be addressed. Although we expect information to be provided in good faith in the majority of cases, clause 25 makes it a criminal offence to provide false or misleading information where the person either knows that the information they are providing is false or misleading, or is reckless as to whether it is.

That might happen where the responsible person notifies the SIA that they are responsible for qualifying premises but knowingly misleads the SIA as to whether their premises are in the standard or enhanced tier. A person in receipt of an information notice might also give false information to the SIA in responding to that notice. The offence does not criminalise genuine or honest mistakes, such as where a person provides information that proves to be inaccurate but did so in good faith. The offence is triable either way and, if convicted, a person may be liable to a sentence of imprisonment for no more than 2 years and/or a fine. The offence will provide a deterrent and an appropriate punishment for those who purposely provide false or misleading information to the SIA to avoid complying with the requirements or to evade enforcement action.

Clause 26 provides that a person other than the body may also be liable in some cases for a criminal offence committed by the body. The person must be a relevant person in the body or a person purporting to act in that capacity for the body. A relevant person is involved in the management or control of the entity, such as a company director or partner. That ensures that those involved in senior management can be liable for offences committed by the body. Those offences relate to serious misconduct and persistent, egregious non-compliance by the body.

Specifically, a relevant person may be liable alongside the body for the offences of failing to comply with a compliance, restriction or information notice if the body committed the offence with their consent or connivance or as a result of their neglect. They may also be liable where they have consented to, or connived in, the body committing the offences of providing false or misleading information, obstructing an authorised inspector or pretending to be an inspector. The provision is necessary to deter serious non-compliance by ensuring managerial responsibility within bodies. Members of the Committee will no doubt have seen the importance of similar measures in other legislation.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I want to make a few points on offences, following our evidence sessions on Tuesday.

Obviously, the situation in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can be very febrile: emotions run high, and media attention can be high. It is human psychology, sadly, to look for someone to blame, and we might have imagined, before we scrutinised the Bill, someone guilty of this offence finding themselves in the eye of that storm. When we questioned Shropshire council representatives on Tuesday, they spoke about the obligations that would be on them if they were the people affected. I was reassured to hear them say that they already felt that burden of responsibility and that this legislation did not impose any further such burden on them.

The legislation refers to non-compliance in general, not non-compliance in the aftermath—that is really important. I thought it would be good to put on record the reassurances we heard on Tuesday on these measures.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Guidance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (First sitting)

Chris Murray Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)]

Q Thank you both for coming; I echo the words of everyone else this morning so far. Are there any recommendations from the Manchester Arena inquiry that this Bill would not address?

Figen Murray: The Manchester Arena inquiry obviously had Martyn’s law as one of its recommendations. If I remember rightly, Sir John’s words were that it is needed as a matter of urgency. I think he referred to training, and he also recommended—which is certainly not covered in Martyn’s law under the standard tier—that people have lifesaving training. That is not for debate in Martyn’s law at the moment. But certainly the ACT training was part of the recommendation.

Brendan Cox: To add to that, the other thing that has been amazing—I think you are hearing from Mayor Andy Burnham later—has been the extent to which Manchester has already started to operationalise some of this, so when we are having the debates about proportionality, we can consider some of the real experiences of businesses that are already implementing this. It is worth really digging into that conversation, because what it shows is that lots of businesses that fall below the threshold are voluntarily taking part in the training and starting to implement Martyn’s law, because they know what it gives them. Who does not want their venue to be safer from terror attacks? It is something that organisations in general want to do, and that is why we have been seeing the adoption of this ahead of the legislation being published, even by venues that will not be covered by the capacity legislation.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Q Can I ask a bit more about the reaction of organisations that do fall in scope? Can you tell us a bit about what their experience has been, any teething problems that they have had and how they have adapted in Manchester as they have implemented it?

Figen Murray: We had in Manchester a tabletop exercise that Nick Aldworth and I were allowed to witness. They invited us in and they gave us the results of that tabletop exercise. There were medium-sized businesses, small businesses, and venues and businesses even under the scope, and the feedback was that implementing Martyn’s law would actually be either no-cost or low-cost and that it would enhance, in a lot of cases, customer experience, because people would feel safer. The most onerous thing, in some people’s opinion, was to ask their staff to do the 45-minute, free-of-charge ACT e-learning training. Basically, they had to pay one hour of staff wages, but on the whole, they felt it was good and the staff felt better having that knowledge, because they felt better equipped to deal with a crisis.

In fact, some of the venues in Manchester were also saying they do regular real-life practice of lockdowns, for instance. For some reason, Manchester has really embraced it. A few years ago, I got called into a council meeting and they basically said, “We want to support you. What can we do?” I just looked at them and said, “Don’t wait for the legislation. Just do it anyway.” And Manchester did. They worked together with counter-terrorism police and put on the free-of-charge, once-a-month, three-hour, face-to-face ACT training. The sessions are always oversubscribed; they are very well attended.

Brendan Cox: I think that the fact that it has been taken up so strongly belies some of the idea that this is a huge burden on businesses. Of course, with any methodology like this, you can come up with a costing for how much the opportunity cost of doing x, y or z is. You have the big public campaigns around “See it, say it, sorted.” Of course, there is a cost with that. You could measure that cost through the amount you spend on it, the opportunity cost of the things that people could be doing while they are listening to it, the distraction cost—there is a whole way in which you could come up with a very big figure, but the reality is that is a proportionate response to what is a very substantial threat when it happens. As Figen mentioned, our threat is substantial at the moment, and that is therefore the proportionate response that we are trying to come up with.

In the conversations on and implementation of this in Manchester, one of the reactions we got, which was a broader reaction from the public as a whole, was, “Doesn’t this already exist?” The public expect that public venues would have an obligation to keep you safe. You have an obligation on the temperature that you need to keep food at, the number of toilets that you have and to fill in your tax return, but you do not have any obligation to keep your often paying customers safe from a very substantial threat, which is judged to be substantial by the Government. That is a massive loophole, and that is what this Bill helps to fill.

[Chris Murray]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

There are no further questions, so I thank both witnesses for their contributions this morning. We will move on to our next guest, who is Andy Burnham.

Examination of Witness

Andy Burnham gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Connor Rand (Altrincham and Sale West) (Lab)]

Q The whole country saw how Greater Manchester came together after the arena bombings, and we have heard about the importance of not letting the memory of the event affect how we live our day-to-day lives. I wonder whether you can talk about the buy-in from local people and local communities. How important is it to the people of Greater Manchester and the city that lessons are learned and this legislation is implemented?

Andy Burnham: Mr Bishop made a point about recommendations from the Manchester Arena inquiry. The deputy Mayor, who is sitting behind me, has led a whole process to look at implementing every single one of those recommendations—to the letter. As I have said, what happened on 22 May 2017 has changed the city, but not in the intended way. It was intended to divide us, but it brought us together, as you have just recognised. It was also intended to weaken us, but in fact it will leave us with stronger arrangements. At no point in this process have I seen anything other than overwhelming public support for what Figen has called for. The public support has never been in any doubt whatsoever.

I want to come back to the point about the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service. You may remember that, on the night, there was confusion within the fire service about what to do, and it took a long time to arrive at the arena. The service has gone through a painstaking, difficult exercise about what happened and how, and it is a very different organisation as a result.

I want to come back to this point: the role of fire and rescue services is not clear. We, along with London, are the only two fire brigades in the country to have put in place arrangements for all our firefighters to have training in marauding terrorist attacks and to have the capability to respond. That is not the case with the others. Again, I had no resistance to that training from the firefighters or the Fire Brigades Union; everybody saw that it was the right thing to do. But we are now in a position where neighbouring fire and rescue services do not have that capability. It is unclear what happens in an incident, and it should not be unclear.

The Greater Manchester experience is that we have done everything that this legislation is asking, and more. We continue to challenge ourselves and do more, but it has to be standardised nationally for the reasons we have given around the nature of the threat. The message from us is that none of it has been resisted or too difficult to implement with our public services. There is strong public support. I come back to what I said earlier to members of the Committee: please do not let this Bill be watered down any further. If anything, it should be strengthened. Amendments should be coming forward to strengthen it. The risk is that smaller venues will become the ones that are more targeted if we leave that flank open, and I hope that we will not. I think that the standard tier should go back down to venues of 100 or more.

[Chris Murray]

Q I would like to ask about the impact that you think the legislation will have on events. My constituency is in Edinburgh. We have the Edinburgh festival in August, where suddenly we have 5,000 events taking place in one month and 50,000 tickets being sold in venues across the city. How do you think this legislation will help cities like Edinburgh, where we have large-scale events—especially when they are distributed? I should also say that Edinburgh city council is very supportive of this legislation. It recognises its power.

Andy Burnham: Thank you, Mr Murray. We are really grateful for its support. A lot of collaboration is going on between Edinburgh and Greater Manchester at the moment; the director of the festival was with us just last week.

I have visited Edinburgh festival for the last three years, and I am left in awe at the arrangements in place there because of the depth of experience in Edinburgh of running major events with many facets and many venues, and because of the number of visitors who come into the city. There is a lot to learn from Edinburgh city council and how it manages things. The fact that it supports the Bill should say something. Those who have been to the festival know that a whole range of venues are used—all kinds of sizes. That is the point I made a moment ago in response to Mr Roca: if the smaller venues were not covered by the Bill, they would potentially become the ones more at risk and more targeted.

The point is about the whole ecosystem of venues, from the smallest to the biggest. Measures should not be disproportionate, sure, but if the Bill went through in its current form that would cause me anxiety, given my position. I would have to look at the venues that were not covered. To go back to the question that Linsey Farnsworth raised, that would not make the job of Edinburgh city council, Manchester city council or any other local authority easier. Having clarity in terms of the arrangements is not going to make the job of local authorities harder—the more arrangements are standardised, the better.

[Paul Waugh (Rochdale) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Thank you, Andy, and thanks also to Figen and Brendan. You all make a really powerful case for why strengthening security actually helps business—it is not just helping the public, but helping businesses to thrive because then they can attract people in a secure, safe environment. However, at the same time, some smaller, independent, live concert promoters, very small-scale people, are worried about the impact on them.

The reason Martyn went to this gig was the reason a lot of people go to gigs—they love music. You love music. Greater Manchester, and Manchester itself, is fantastic for music. Could you explain what is happening in Manchester locally to reassure some of those small-scale live music people, who are saying that this could put them out of business—“We’re not the big boys, we’re not the arena, how can we cope with this and make everyone feel safe without changing our way of life?” As Brendan said, not changing our way of life is ultimately the purpose of this legislation.

Andy Burnham: It is a good question, Paul, and it goes back to the guidance for local authorities. The way we work—when I say “we”, I am thinking of the leader of Manchester city council, Bev Craig, and deputy Mayor of Greater Manchester, Paul Dennett; people you will know—is that we get close to the venues because we all love music and we are a music city region. You will know that there has been a threat to one of our venues night and day in recent times; at different points, we have had similar issues with other venues.

We cherish the infrastructure, and we work hard to keep it. We work hard to understand the issues that venues have, and how we can work in a practical way to help them. That is what I mean by getting close to the night-time economy—that is critical, and it is one of the things we do really well in this country. It is a big reason why people come and visit Britain: not just for the big arenas, but for the grassroots music scene as well. We had WOMEX, the Worldwide Music Expo, in the city last week; Councillor Besford has been very much at the heart of that, and he runs the English folk festival. We, like Edinburgh, often have events that involve the smallest and the biggest.

My point is: do not just impose things on venues. You have to sit down and talk with them and ask what we can do to help. This is my point about Greater Manchester Fire Rescue Service—if you have a capable fire service, they can go in and help. The blue-light services can help provide the training and help people comply with the measures in the Bill. This is not just about leaving venues on their own, saying, “Here is Martyn’s law, so get on with it even if it puts you out of business.” That is not how it is done. We are doing it a different way: get down there and listen to them all. They will all have different issues, so support what they do because they are important in bringing visitors to the city.

I am just giving you the Manchester perspective. That is the way we go about things. The music infrastructure in the city, and the broader entertainment infrastructure, is highly valued. There was an era when a certain nightclub was just left to close and there are flats there now. We do not think like that these days; we protect the infrastructure and that means supporting the venues. It is tough for them, so get close to them and support them. I appreciate that times are hard, but there are blue-light services everywhere that can help them raise their game from a security point of view.

I just think that we cannot talk ourselves into a sort of thing where it is all too big a burden. I can tell you from experience: a terrorist attack is a massive burden on a city and what it does challenges everybody at every level—and that is ongoing. Like Figen said, Manchester will never be the same again after what happened. It has changed us but it has strengthened us and made us more united, and as I say, I do not want any other city to go through that. The Bill is designed to prevent people going through that and part of what I would say is that the way we and Edinburgh do it is a good model for others to look at.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sonia Kumar]

Q Do you anticipate that certain types of community events or venues may struggle to meet the requirements due to the nature of their spaces, such as historic venues with limited security options?

Helen Ball: We have had conversations with a lot of parish councils and parish clerks over the last few months. A lot of village halls are quite distinct in where they are, so there is some concern as to how they would actually be able to enact evacuation and lockdown procedures, particularly when you have just got a large room and you may only have one entrance and one exit. There is that level of concern.

A lot of the problems that we have at the moment are more about the fear of the unknown; people have read the Bill and are looking at the worst-case scenario. We have tried to advocate—as a society and also as NALC, as part of our Martyn’s law working group—that it is a bit of a “Keep calm and carry on” situation, and that we can do this. A lot of it is a common-sense approach to security. The sentiment from our society is that the legislation should be welcomed and that regardless of whether there are bandings within certain buildings, we should develop a culture of terrorism awareness.

“What price is a life?” is the other comment that a lot of clerks have said of late. Why would somebody’s life be less important if they were in a building that has 199 people as opposed to 201? It is incumbent upon our sector to try to encourage a better culture.

[Chris Murray]

Q Could I ask about the responsibility being placed on specific officers? As we all know, in the days after a terrorist attack there is a lot of media attention and emotions are very high. What would it be like for the person responsible for compliance, or named as the one supposed to do something that might not be a very big part of their job or something that they had only received limited training for? What protections do you think would be in place for those officers to be prepared for that and to navigate that scenario?

Helen Ball: Let me give you a bit of my perspective as a practitioner. My involvement in that kind of terrorism management came two weeks after the Manchester bombings, because we were due to have an outdoor music event with 12,000 people in our park. We were starting to get comments from the public such as, “I don’t think I’m going to feel safe. Can I have my money back?” It was incumbent upon us to sit down with the event organiser and their security team, and the counter-terrorism officers and the local police, to put measures in place that would reassure the public that they were safe.

A lot of the kind of things in the current Bill are things that we have been doing. In effect, I, as a town clerk, have had to take on that kind of responsibility. I already had the responsibility under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, so it is not as if it is something brand new to us; it is just a different vein.

From our sector, clerks are exceptionally resourceful individuals. They have to be, because they have lots of plates spinning at any one time. So the right kind of guidance would be beneficial—perhaps guidance that we could work within the sector, including the security industry authority, to have very specific guidance that would help our fellow clerks. I think they would take it on board, because they see that this is an important piece of legislation that we have to work towards.

Keith Stevens: In the Bill, it would be good to have slightly more clarity on the responsibilities. If the parish council owns the land, and it is let out for an event, whose responsibility is it? Yes, I think it is down to the parish council to make sure the event organiser is carrying out everything per the rule, but whose responsibility is it if that person says, “Yes, I’ll do all that.”, and then does not? It is one of the slightly grey areas that could be made clearer.

[Chris Murray]

Q We have talked about the resourcefulness of town clerks. We have clerks in Scotland; I know the officers and they are very resourceful. I know local authority resourcing is a huge issue. Is this adding another layer of responsibility that you are concerned about, or is this another responsibility that is quite capable of being absorbed in the current broad resource envelope?

Helen Ball: It is something that has evolved over the years. When I became town clerk in Shrewsbury 15 years ago, when we were renting the park for an event, it used to be a case of, “Fill out the application form, send me your public liability insurance and the cheque, then drop the keys off when you are finished—thank you very much.” Now we have more stringent premises licenses that require us to ensure that there are event plans and security plans, and that they are communicated with emergency services and the emergency planning team. It has become a morphed role anyway that we have absorbed. I do not really see how Martyn’s law is going to add significantly to that. It just gives us more strength in the argument with event organisers that we have legislation backing us.

[Chris Murray]

It is reassuring to hear that. Thank you.

[Ben Maguire (North Cornwall) (LD)]

Q Thank you for giving evidence today. I represent a rural constituency, North Cornwall, which has 74 parish councils. I know from experience it can be really difficult to get parish councillors to stand for these positions. I am interested to get your views on how these new regulations may put off parish councillors from taking part in their local councils—if at all.

Keith Stevens: I don’t think so. One of the issues stopping people coming back or standing for councillor has been the standards regime. I was pleased that it was announced that that is being looked at, and it would appear to bring back the standards regime and the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. I think that is the only reason why people have not come forward so much, and that is a growing problem not just for councils, but for charities, because of red tape and things like that. I think people will come forward and support their parish council on issues such as safety. People in the village have children and relatives, and they want to keep them all safe. That is where I think parish town councils are almost the key to safety in the community. They are the ones that know what is going on, and people follow their lead.

Helen Ball: I agree with Councillor Stevens. Parish councils are the beating heart of a community. The fact that they have community venues, parks and open spaces, as well as holding events in there, adds to the culture and the dynamic of that community. When you have that strong community infrastructure, you are likely to have a greater mandate from people wanting to stand. Both NALC and the Society of Local Council Clerks have regional structures, which means that we can cascade that enthusiasm and culture down to grassroots level.

Keith Stevens: I would just add that a lot of parish councils are custodian trustees for their village halls, and the village halls are run by a charitable management committee. In my view, it is beholden on the parish councils to make sure that all the community groups in their villages or towns also understand the effect of Martyn’s law. However, I have to mention that it will have a cost. There is not a cost on lives but there are a lot of smaller parish councils with a lower precept; the cost to them will increase, and we will need to undertake training programmes, which has been mentioned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tim Roca]

Q Have you a view on the designation of the SIA as the regulator?

Alex Beard: It puts additional responsibilities on the SIA, which needs the resources and expertise to fulfil those duties. It is a big step up—that is my No. 1 observation.

Heather Walker: And it needs the time to put this in place so that it is consistent and appropriate.

Paul Laffan: Certainly from our point of view, it is a good appointment. It is the logical one, given what it already does in the private security sector. Our only real concern would be around its—forgive me for using the wrong word—ability to pragmatically apply the risk assessment and the review of processes in what is quite a different industry and setting across much of live entertainment, versus the classic private security sector, but we are sure that that will come out in its guidance as it starts forming.

It would be great to have clarity in the Bill on how the SIA will interact externally, such as with public planning. As we strengthen our own four walls, if that shifts the attack vector to externals, with things like vehicle-as-weapon, we have very little control over the public spaces outside our buildings, yet we will introduce a crowd of people leaving after a show. HVM—hostile vehicle mitigation—is an example. That is something that we always push for in planning applications and it is very swiftly declined, fundamentally on the basis of cost and whether it suits the planning aesthetic of pedestrianised areas. It is about understanding how much power the SIA will have in enforcing, collaborating and engaging with external bodies on behalf both of the Bill and of us as private entities.

Alex Beard: Ensuring that there are no cracks between the obligations on individual institutions and the role of the local authority and the statutory authority is absolutely key. Even when hostile vehicle mitigation is accepted as required or desirable, the time lag in implementing it can be very considerable.

[Chris Murray]

Q We have talked a lot about the proportionality and opportunity costs that come with these changes. Could you say a bit about what it is like in your sector? If there were a terrorist attack, that would obviously be really awful for the venue and the people involved, but if the public more broadly did not feel safe going to venues, would that have an impact on your ability to operate? How sensitive is your sector to those fluctuations? Put another way, is the proportionality correct? The impact on your sector could be quite significant.

Heather Walker: Security is both a moral and a commercial obligation for our visitors and our staff. It is essential that the public and our staff feel safe in our building; that is an important part of their feedback and how we keep on attracting them. The reasonable practicableness is a very subjective view. As an example, we do bag searches for everybody who comes into the building. Some might feel that having security arches is reasonable, but we have to balance that with the fact that we are a theatre—we are providing entertainment and this is a social space to come into with your friends and family. All these things are about balance and assessment. Having a CTSA to guide us through that is certainly extremely valuable.

Stuart Beeby: Our view, looking across the United Kingdom, is very similar. Things are affected, and there is a groupthink. We can demonstrate with statistics how long it took people to come back into places of mass gathering for great entertainment: post covid, it has taken a long time. I speak as the largest operator of theatre in the UK. There will be areas, particularly in some constituencies, where there are still independent theatres run by local authorities. The challenge with the cost base in live entertainment is very real, given the national living wage, energy costs and just the costs of producing. There has always been a high bar, but with those three it is a bit of a perfect storm. Unfortunately, cost is a reality that makes people look.

As we tried to paint a picture earlier, when we talk about the formulaic, you could get the same effect by scanning the ticket, having the table, checking the bag, having another queue for bigger bags or maybe not even allowing bigger bags into your theatre. You can do all that. If you come to our theatre at the Lyceum, with Disney as our partner, where we are doing 2,100 people with eight shows a week, you will see dogs there. I do not use dogs at the Savoy or the Princess theatre in Torquay, but that does not mean that you are less safe. There is an assessment.

We have to constantly manage that message. We do customer feedback, and you are right that we get the two bookends: “You made us do a bag search, it was raining, it was ‘An Inspector Calls’, the average age was 65 and we were out in the rain,” versus, “You were rushing us through, I had a bag and the check by your security staff seemed cursory.” We are constantly having to balance it.

There will be a real challenge on cost, which comes back to the application. For us, I guess it is about being very clear. It needs to be effects-based in terms of how it is assessed and the mitigations you put in place, because good training and being professional are just as effective as somebody being poor and just trying to whizz everybody through an arch, which would create a lot of cost. That formulaic piece is key.

We are constantly managing the message that these are safe spaces to be, because in the theatre the average age is still higher. It is still that demographic that is 45-plus with more disposable income and, particularly in regional theatre with your matinées, there will be more retirees, so they are very receptive to trigger events.

[The Chair]

As no other members of the Committee have questions, may I thank all our witnesses for their evidence this morning? That brings us to the end of our morning session. The Committee will continue taking oral evidence at 2 pm, here in the Boothroyd Room.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Second sitting)

Chris Murray Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Dan Jarvis]

Q Good afternoon to you both, and thank you for appearing in front of the Committee. It is much appreciated. My question is for Mr Collins. First, thank you for your consistent and constructive approach throughout this process, which has been appreciated. On the basis that I suspect you might be asked some more general questions, I wanted to ask you a specific one: how do you see the legislation interacting with the events sector’s already established security procedures?

Jon Collins: Thank you for those comments. We are attempting to be a critical friend to strengthen the Bill as it moves through the House. The first recognition is the role of licensing in our industry. Every one of the venues and festivals I have talked about will have a premises licence, be that for the event or for the venue. There are four objectives under that piece of legislation that relate to public safety, the prevention of crime and disorder and so on. We have concerns about how the requirements under this legislation will or will not align with the licence conditions that our venues and festivals will be operating within.

There is a risk of some potential conflict—particularly as the licensing process is often a multi-year process, where the local authority gets to understand the venue and the festival and comes back year in, year out. There will be the development of security advisory group sessions and the development of an event management plan. That is a long, well-developed process, but now an inspector could potentially visit just before the event and say, “I am not satisfied with all of this; you need to take these steps.” The first thing we would note is that there is no requirement for them to be reasonably practicable in the Bill, whereas the requirement for operators is to take reasonably practicable steps. We think an amendment that adds that expectation to the inspectorate would be useful.

Beyond that, could the guidance for this legislation be mirrored in the section 182 guidance for the Licensing Act 2003 in England and Wales, and its equivalents in other countries and regions? Could we have something in the legislation to say that a requirement from the inspectorate cannot conflict with a licence condition? If there was conflict, if something happened and we had to get into the whys and wherefores, there would potentially be legal considerations there: “Well, I was compliant with this legislation, but you’re saying I am not compliant over here.” There are some challenges there that we think can be addressed as the Bill moves forward and the guidance is created.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Q Can I follow up on that? That is very interesting —what would drive that kind of conflict? I am Scottish and represent a Scottish constituency, and sometimes some elements are devolved and some are not, so I know it can be difficult for organisations with a footprint across the UK to follow different regulations. Is that the level of conflict you are talking about, or is it more that they would be speaking at cross purposes and there needs to be harmonisation?

Jon Collins: The Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 is similar to the 2003 Act in its provisions. It could be, for example, a venue having a condition that says they will search everybody on entry. That will necessarily create a queue outside the premises, but it might be that from a counter-terrorism perspective you need to get everybody inside the premises as quickly as possible. Then you have a direct conflict, and the operator is trying to square that circle.

Melvin Benn: As Jon said, the two licensing Acts in England and Wales and in Scotland are very similar. In Scotland, particularly for outdoor events, licences are done on an annual basis, as opposed to a permanent premises licence as it is in England and Wales.

However, there is potential for conflict where a venue, an annual festival or an annual series of concerts has been in monthly meetings with safety advisory groups and has done all the preparation on the basis of the advice from the safety advisory group—who of course take advice from the local police force and the local CT SecCo, or counter-terrorism security co-ordinator, and so on—and the organisers will have their plan for the evening, or the festival, the weekend, or the next month or six months of the venue, all costed and budgeted, and then the regulator’s representative may come in and say, “I fundamentally disagree with that, and I need you to do this.” It appears that they have supreme powers. Certainly, in the way it is written, as Jon said, there is no factor of reasonableness in it, which we have to have. Parliament expects us to be reasonable in our endeavours, in our searching and so on. This does not have that factor of reasonableness, and it could cause conflict. It could be that the regulator and the safety advisory group have differences of opinion and we get caught in between, with what could be very significant financial penalties, not knowing quite which way to go.

[Chris Murray]

Q But the Bill does not introduce that conflict. If there was a conflict between getting people through the door very quickly or having them queueing outside—in a festival trying to make a decision —that sort of thought process already exists.

Melvin Benn: The Bill certainly introduces conflict outside of the venue. Without question, it introduces conflict outside of the venue.

Venues are licensed premises, and we abide by licence conditions. That is how we survive in business. We work very hard to keep our customers safe, but we only have responsibility and jurisdiction over our licensed premises. We can have no jurisdiction or responsibility outside of the licensed premises, particularly when that is on the public highway. Once it is on the public highway, it is the responsibility of law enforcement. The Bill is actually trying to introduce a responsibility in something called “the vicinity”, which is very ill-defined—exceptionally ill-defined; we do not know what the vicinity is. Sometimes it is referred to as the grey space, but it is defined as “the vicinity” in the Bill, where we somehow have to take responsibility for safety.

We cannot undertake safety in a public space, because we have no legal right to affect what the public are doing in a public space. Actually, the British public, in the main, know that the only people that can charge them or direct them to do something different to what they are doing on a public highway are the police forces. So, if our security personnel, for example, are directing a crowd that do not want to be directed, to do something, they have every right—we have lots of video evidence of this in various locations—to stand their ground and say, “You have no right to tell us to do that—only the police can do that.”

The Bill is actually trying to tell us to do something that legally we are not allowed to do, and that is a very significant conflict. Even if the concept of vicinity was defined, we still have the problem of external to the licensed premises, which is very defined, where we have that responsibility. So there is conflict there.

Obviously, in terms of the general essence of the Bill, we are massively in support of its direction and desire; we are doing that, day in, day out. The Licensing Act is a really good basis for keeping customers safe—incredibly good. It is standing the test of time really well. This introduces conflict to that, unfortunately.

[Paul Waugh]

Q I asked Andy Burnham this morning what protections there would be for smaller, live music venues, and to seek some reassurance about what happened in Manchester. He said that in Manchester, voluntary measures have worked very well. His solution is to hug people close, in terms of small venues—listen to them, ask them what they want and how they can make it viable, for both the public and the venues. He said that there would be low to zero costs for smaller venues of between 200 and 400 capacity. What is your assessment of that?

Jon Collins: Our member, the Music Venue Trust, reckons that about 17% of their 800 members—so 140 or 150-odd—sit between 200 and 300. Fifty per cent. sit below 200 and the remainder above 300. There are a lot of small music venues out there. We heard talk about whether the threshold should be for the standard tier; there is an argument to move the threshold to 300, particularly for licensed premises, because all those venues already have the requirements of the Licensing Act, as Melvin put it.

The trust’s view is that, if this is introduced in a way that is integrated into operating practices under the licensing legislation, it does not need to be overly burdensome. It would actually align quite nicely with the standard operating practices, particularly if an organisation such as the MVT was able to develop sector-specific training, which it could then cascade out to its members. Part of the challenge in trying to understand the cost and implications of this legislation is that the tiers and the scope of the Bill are so broad, particularly—wandering off your question a bit—as the enhanced tier goes from 800-capacity venues up to 175,000-capacity festivals.

Melvin Benn: Some are even bigger than that, yes. As drafted, it literally ranges from 800 to an unlimited number. The largest festivals in the UK are for over 200,000 people, for example. Again, this is a complicated one, because safety applies to everyone, regardless of the size of space.

Jon and I have talked about this a little, particularly in respect of the previous witness, whom I only caught the end of, but if you are putting on an event in an unlicensed premise—a church hall, a community hall or something of that sort—and if it is for up to 499 people, you do not need a premises licence, but can apply for a temporary event notice. That is a licensing cut-off, in that sense. From 500 onwards, you need to have a premises licence. It would seem sensible for the Bill to mirror that to a certain extent, because once you get into the premises licensing, you get into safety advisory group meetings and sitting in front of local authority committees to get the premises licence to do everything properly.

There is that element of crossover that I think should be thought about a little. But there is that point that Jon makes, that you then go from 800 to 200,000 or greater. Should there be a different onus on a different event? The Reading festival, for example, is 105,000 people. Clearly, the intensity of planning and thought and so on, around a large event like that—the 105,000 people are all camping as well—is probably under greater scrutiny than, say, a 5,000 independent festival by the Association of Independent Festivals. That is somewhat under the radar to the world, in a way.

There is that discussion. We all accept, of course, that safety is paramount. As I mentioned, that is how we keep in business, in that sense. You just mentioned Andy’s example, and we work closely with all local authorities in Manchester and everywhere we go. It is a joint arm around each other, because with these events, local communities value the music spaces that they have, which are great for the local economy and so on. There is an element of partnership work with the smaller and larger venues. It is our business and it is what we do, but of course it must be partnership work. In our experience, the more partnership work there is in legislation, the more coherent and better it will be. At this point in time, it feels like the way in which it is written and planned is a little dictatorial and not in partnership. It is a little bit “you must do”, rather than “you must consider and take Government advice and so on”.

[Tim Roca]

Q The Home Office’s estimated costs are just over £3,000 for the standard tier. We heard this morning from a number of witnesses about the exercises that Manchester has done with a really wide range of businesses there, all the way from Depot Mayfield, which has a capacity of more than 30,000, to small and medium-sized nightclubs, such as Matt and Phred’s, Band on the Wall and hotels. I was struck by the information I saw from Manchester city council saying that in those desktop exercises, it was unanimous that the financial impact and operational issues were not actually that onerous in the view of the people attending those sessions. I would say that that sounds quite positive. Can you comment on that?

Jon Collins: I think that is a by-product of the fact that we operate with licences and have partnerships with local authorities that go back decades. The variable that we do not want to introduce is for an inspector to come to a venue or festival and insert new requirements with no appeal, which they can do at the moment on the balance of probabilities, and disrupt that well-established way of working between the venue and the regulator.

On the Home Office’s costs, the difference between the low-end cost and the high-end cost for the total bill is eightfold—it is around £593 million and up to £4 billion. That tells you just how open-ended a lot of this legislation is at the moment. Trying to work out compliance costs and so on can therefore be a challenge, but the Manchester experience is common to our work with local authorities up and down the country.

[Chris Murray]

Q You are making a really interesting point. To follow up on that, do you accept that there are two categories of organisations? There will be some where the inspector will find that they are doing everything that they should be, so their costs will be low, but there will be some that are not—otherwise, there would be no need at all for this legislation—and costs will be involved there. That is the open-ended component.

Jon Collins: I will make one quick point before Melvin comes in. Because we operate with a licence, we are already considering counterterrorism safety and security in how we run the premises. The issue is the new variable. I do not see that there are two classes of venue; the Licensing Act takes care of that. If you are not meeting your obligations under that Act, your licence is at risk and can be removed. The fact that this can be imposed without appeal on a balance of probabilities, and disrupt what can be a decades-old relationship between the venue and the local authority, is the concern.

Melvin Benn: It is exactly as Jon said. Because there is an entertainment licence, the granter of the entertainment licence—be it a premises licence in England and Wales, or a yearly licence in Scotland, for example—has assessed that what the operator is doing is safe and makes the customer safe. In that sense, one could argue that there is no need for the legislation.

I think the industry generally would say that adding an additional safety piece about counterterrorism into the four pillars of the Licensing Act would have been a better route than creating an additional piece of legislation. We are not in charge of that, and we will go whichever way it is. We are fully supporting the direction of this. The simpler way would have been to add to what already exists, rather than to create something separate.

[Tim Roca]

Q That is from the point of view of your industry, but we are also talking about places of worship, schools and other places.

Melvin Benn: Obviously, I am speaking from the point of view of my industry. But it is an industry that is quite grown up and has an incredibly good safety record. In our view, adding to what already exists would have been in some ways a simpler route. There would then be something separate for unlicensed premises. The fact that the Bill almost ignores the existence of licensed premises is a little bit of a failure. That is where we see conflict—and we do see conflict—not with the overall aim, of course, but there are two jockeys on the horse at some points. That is where you are going to get to, and when there are two jockeys on a horse, that horse never wins. At least, I have never backed one that won.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tim Roca]

Q I worked in higher education, so I know that there are quite a lot of regulators already knocking around. I wondered what your view was about the SIA being designated as the regulator, as far as the legislation is concerned.

Gary Stephen: I am aware that in some parts of the security industry, the SIA has a poor reputation when it comes to the enforcement of licensed premises. But from the information provided to me, and with the creation of a separate entity within the SIA to manage the enforcement of new legislation, it is comforting. Looking at the alternatives, it seems like the most practical and logical appointment on the face of it.

[Chris Murray]

Q What is your view on what the Bill would look like in practice? Could you give us a bit of an overview of the reality of what it would look like on the ground for your sector, and how you judge the level of compliance and compliance risk you would be taking on board?

Gary Stephen: The majority of higher education organisations will be in the enhanced tier with public protection measures. I strongly believe that most of my peers have significant experience in dealing with counter-terrorism risk assessments and security plans, and I would be disappointed if that was not already a priority for most of them in the planning and preparation of events. However, I am aware that not every organisation has an experienced security professional to manage events on campus.

With that in mind, we created the special interest group CONTEST to share best practice and signpost to our members what good looks like. Most organisations have very good relationships with local counter-terrorism security advisers, and due to specialist research being carried out on many sites, the security posture is normally of a good standard. So I would be conscious to make sure that vice-chancellors and COOs are aware of their obligation under the new legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Waugh]

Q Minister, can you explain to us why you increased the standard tier capacity from 100 to 200? Can you answer some of the concerns raised this morning by both Figen Murray and Andy Burnham on that point?

Dan Jarvis: Yes, I am happy to do that. But with Dame Siobhain’s indulgence, perhaps you will let me say a few words about the sessions that we have had today. I hope that this has been a really useful opportunity for members of the Committee to hear from a range of authoritative stakeholders about the Bill. That, certainly from my perspective, has been incredibly useful in informing our collective understanding as the Bill moves forward in its passage through the House of Commons.

It would also be remiss of me not to reiterate the comments that I made earlier on about Figen Murray. I think that her contribution, and the contribution of the team that has supported her, has been outstanding and inspiring. We frankly would not be at this place without the incredible work that she has done over some time now. I think that that is worthy of recognition by the Committee this afternoon.

I also want to briefly reflect on the testimony that we heard from Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes, because I think that that was significant. He very helpfully outlined the nature of the terrorist threat that our country faces, and it is reassuring to know that the analysis from him and his team is that the Bill is both proportionate and effective.

I was also struck by the very positive testimony that we heard from Mayor Andy Burnham on the Greater Manchester experience. I think that, for those who have had some concerns about proportionality and about the impact that this Bill could have on certain sectors of the business community—and the hospitality sector in particular—it was reassuring to hear the very positive experience from Greater Manchester.

Also, before turning to the substance of your question, Mr Waugh, I just want to reiterate the importance of the cross-party support that we have been able to build for this Bill. This is legislation that began its life in the previous Parliament under the previous Government, with important pre-legislative processes taking place. All that has been incredibly helpful in terms of informing the process and ensuring that the Bill is as fit for purpose as it possibly can be. I am very grateful to all of those who went before and for the contributions that they made.

I turn to the substance of your question; I will bring in Debbie in just a moment because she has dealt with the detail of this for longer than me. I think that the heart of your question is about issues of proportionality. I am struck by the fact that we have had a useful conversation today about where the threshold of the standard tier should lie. I am quite confident that if a decision had been taken to place that threshold in a different place, we would still have had a discussion about whether it was in the right place and whether the decision to have it at a lower level would have excluded some even smaller premises. We have to be realistic that whenever you are dealing with legislation that requires a threshold, there will always be a debate—it has been in that sense a very constructive one—about where that particular threshold sits.

We have got to where we are based on extensive consultation. There was the pre-legislative process that took place in the previous Parliament. There have been two quite extensive public consultations and a significant amount of contact with a range of different stakeholders who would be affected by the legislation. In the end, Government have to take a view about what is the most appropriate threshold and that is what we have done. We think that that is the right judgment, but clearly there is still a debate to be had around that. After significant consultation and consideration, that is where we have got to and as the Minister, I think that is the right judgment.

It is also worth making the point that other changes have been made to the legislation since the earlier iteration, not least the inclusion of the “reasonably practicable” test, as well as the points around reasonable expectation. I hope they go some considerable way to reassuring the concerns expressed about the impact the legislation would have on smaller venues and premises. Debbie, if there anything you want to add to that, you are welcome to do so.

Debbie Bartlett: In terms of reflecting on the change from 100 to 200, one of the clear voices we heard through the consultation and the pre-legislative scrutiny process was around those voluntary organisations and premises. Moving from a 100 to a 200 threshold reduces coverage of those village halls from 54% at the 100 threshold to just 13% at the 200 threshold, which feels more proportionate given some of the feedback we received through the pre-legislative and the consultation process.

[Chris Murray]

Q Thank you for what you have set out. We have heard in the sessions about how some wanted to be at a lower threshold and some at a higher one. I can understand that you have to pick a number somewhere in between, so it makes sense in how you have set that out.

On compliance and how you are dealing with organisations that do not comply, obviously the hope would be that as many organisations as you come across are complying and doing this kind of thinking already. We have heard about how things like licensing regimes pretty much encourage a lot of organisations to do compliance. Can you talk about why you have set the threshold for non-compliance at that maximum and what the process was in deciding that?

Debbie Bartlett: In setting out the compliance and sanctions regime, the decision was taken—looking at the heart of the Bill, which is proportionality—to have a primarily civil sanctions regime in place. The key role for the regulator, as has been discussed today, is around educating, bringing people up to standard and improving protective security and organisational preparedness across the country. Obviously, to enable that regime to have teeth, there needs to be some kind of compliance and sanctions regime in place. The sanctions regime allows for flexibility. We have heard from significant witnesses today that this cannot be about one size fits all. We are talking about an extensive number of sectors with different operating models, different ways of working, different staff ratios and so on. There has to be flexibility in all parts of the Bill, including compliance.

Setting the compliance regime where we have, at the £10,000 maximum for the standard tier and the £18 million or 5% of worldwide revenue for the enhanced tier, mirrors some regulatory regimes in this space, so it is not unheard of. It also gives us the flexibility because when you consider the enhanced regime in particular, you are looking at venues that could go from 800-person capacity right through to 100,000-person capacity. That is quite unique in terms of what their revenue structures and so on will be in terms of how they will differ.

The regulator will have the ability to consider what is best when thinking about compliance and what can be imposed on a venue or an event. One of the things that they can take into consideration is the ability of the responsible person to pay the revenue costs. That will have to be considered. It is about giving us maximum flexibility because, as we have said, one of the challenges around this legislation is the uniqueness and the number of venues and the number of operating models that we are trying to consider.

[Kirith Entwistle]

Q How are the Government working with bodies within the scope of the Bill to plan and prepare for its implementation, and will there be enough time for organisations to prepare?

Dan Jarvis: Yes, we are confident that there will be enough time. Following Royal Assent, we expect the implementation period to be at least 24 months, and given the extensive consultation with stakeholders that has already taken place, that is very much a live process. It is not a process that will come to an end; it will continue throughout.

Having looked at this very carefully, the Home Secretary is particularly keen to ensure that we have an implementation period that will allow ample time for those businesses that will be affected to prepare properly. Yes, we are confident that all of the relevant safeguards are in place, but it is important that we continue to engage with businesses and other stakeholders.

That has been a productive process. As I have said, there have been two public consultations and I think there have been more than 100 stakeholder engagement events, with hundreds of businesses being engaged throughout that process. That will continue and we will make sure that all those businesses have the information that they require to implement the legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Chris Murray.

[Chris Murray]

Q You talked about the proposal for the SIA to be the regulator. Why did you choose the SIA as the regulator? How should an organisation respond when it perceives that there is a conflict between what the SIA is asking it to do and what other legal rules, such as licensing, ask it to do?

Dan Jarvis: Let me pick up on the first bit of your question, then I will hand over to Debbie for the second bit. Clearly, this is an important role for the regulator, and there has been an ongoing debate for some time about how best to provide that regulatory authority. A number of options were considered by both the previous Government and this Government, and there were other ways of providing that regulatory authority. Clearly, we were mindful of the Cabinet Office guidance about how best to proceed in terms of the creation of new regulatory authorities, which is not recommended. We looked carefully at the current role and responsibility of the SIA, and the judgment taken was that it has or will have the necessary experience and skillset to provide that regulatory function. This is an important role, and Ministers will ultimately be accountable to Parliament for the performance of the regulator.

This is an important piece of regulation that does require that regulatory function. We as Ministers clearly wanted to satisfy ourselves that that is the most appropriate solution. Clearly, we have to consider other factors as well, such as cost. Having considered all those factors and looked clearly at the capacity and capability within the SIA, the judgment was made that it is the most appropriate body to take on this regulatory function, but it is important to say that clearly there will be ministerial oversight over that process. Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for the performance of the regulator, and this is a crucial part of the legislation.

I have to say that the feedback has been largely positive about the decision. There was a period of time initially when there was not clarity about the regulatory functions and who would provide that particular arms’-length-body regulatory function. The Government took the decision that the SIA was best placed to do that, and we think that that is the right solution.

Debbie Bartlett: We are absolutely alive to the fact that the SIA will have to align and work closely with a number of regulatory bodies, including those responsible for fire safety, licensing—as we heard from the gentleman before us—and health and safety, and with our other operational partners in this space, including the police, and industry themselves. There will be a lot of work to ensure that those regimes are complementary. We heard clearly from the gentleman about the concern of duplication. I do not think that is the case; it is actually about aligning. The licence regime is limited. That is why we felt this legislation was necessary over and above what is already out there.

Many of our venues and premises are already be aligned to things like health and safety and fire safety. Where possible, we have sought in the legislation to try to align and complement as much as possible. What we are asking of people should not be a huge surprise in terms of what has already been asked under those other regimes. They absolutely will have to align and, indeed, within the legislation, we are giving the SIA the powers to share information with other bodies as necessary in the delivery of their duties and those of other public bodies.

[Katie Lam]

Q I want to follow up on thresholds. If I understand this correctly, there was previously this idea of capacity, and that has been changed to this idea of reasonable expectation. If I ran a venue that had a capacity of 220 people, could I decide to only ever sell 195 tickets and I am not caught? Is that how this will work?

Debbie Bartlett: That is correct. As long as you do not expect to have more than 190 individuals at your premises, you will not be considered in scope of the standard tier. Obviously, the regulator—the SIA—will have the powers to seek information that will justify some of that decision making. For some, and we have set this out in fact sheets, depending on how you justify that decision, it could be historical attendance data or your fire safety capacity data—it depends what you use—you will then have to present to justify that decision making.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Murray Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2024 Commons Chamber

[Seema Malhotra]

The hon. Gentleman knows that net migration must come down. It trebled under the last Government, largely driven by overseas recruitment. Immigration is a reserved matter, working in the interests of the whole UK. Previous schemes along the lines that he has suggested have succeeded only in restricting movement and rights and creating internal UK borders. Adding different rules for different locations would also increase complexity and create frictions when workers move locations.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Scotland is a diverse place. Some areas are seeing depopulation, but areas such as East Lothian, which I represent, are seeing unprecedented population growth. Will the Minister commit to working constructively with the Scottish Government on their woeful population strategy, which in 17 years has comprehensively failed to address Scotland’s demographic challenges?

[Seema Malhotra]

We are committed to working with the Scottish Government on this and all issues. Indeed, many of the levers to address depopulation in Scotland are in powers that the Scottish Government already have at their disposal. The reasons for local workers leaving particular areas must be addressed through investment in jobs, in infrastructure and in public services, and many of these are issues that we must tackle together.