Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

My right hon. Friend is completely correct about that. If the British public realised what has happened to the value of that taxpayer stake in RBS, they would be appalled. Today’s figures show that £2 billion-plus has been taken off the value of RBS since the botched handling of the departure of the chief executive, Stephen Hester. That mishandling forced the Chancellor to back down from a foolhardy dash towards a fire sale, which we know was part of the plan from the conversations that Sir Philip Hampton, the chairman of RBS, let slip in comments to journalists around that time. Labour Members, however, are absolutely focused on the need for the taxpayer to get good value for money, to get our money back. That is entirely possible. Stephen Hester revealed the flaw in the Chancellor’s strategy for a hasty sale driven by the electoral timetable when he gave an interview to the BBC last month. When asked whether taxpayers would get back their £45.6 billion, he answered:

“RBS is capable of being worth more than what the government paid for the shares”.

When asked again whether it is possible for us to get our money back, he said:

“RBS is capable of that and I would be disappointed if over the passage of time that that won’t be the case.”

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I am very supportive of new clause 10, particularly the notion that the Government describe how the taxpayer will get the money back. However, has the hon. Gentleman given any thought to the timing of such a report and what information may need to be omitted, particularly in relation to asset clauses the Government may continue to hold, because it might be market-sensitive in the run-up to the re-privatisation of the bank?

[Chris Leslie]

I would have thought that before the Government considered a sale they would decide what they want to sell and what they do not want to sell. I do not think that what the hon. Gentleman suggests should be a particular problem, particularly given the taxpayer interests involved, in terms of having that report before a sale. However, I accept that there could be circumstances in which commercial confidentiality might apply and a line might need to be considered. I would be happy to examine whether some aspects of that need to be built into this concept. There is an opacity about the Government’s strategy, and the fog engulfing the Treasury, perhaps hiding the chaos within, is extremely thick—a real pea-souper. I am amazed that once the Chancellor of the Exchequer had defenestrated the chief executive of RBS—let us be honest, that is essentially what happened, and although the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have protested, “It’s nothing to do with me, guv,” with his 82% shareholding he clearly had a hand in the decision —the Government were surprised when the markets reacted so adversely. It is amazing that they went down that route without thinking through who would replace Stephen Hester as chief executive of RBS, creating a massive amount of uncertainty about the future of the institution. We are glad that they changed their minds and were forced to back down from the rush to the fire sale, but what on earth are we left with and where is the situation going?

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

Most of the debate we have had in the short time available has pressed for firm action to be taken towards a sector that—let us not forget—brought down the economy, created massive deficits in our public finances, and required rescue by the taxpayer because of a blurring of the lines between issues that affected ordinary households up and down the country and high-risk investment banking activities that needed strong safeguards. Simply saying that we will have ring- fencing with no means to enforce or police that—no “electrification”, as it has been termed—would make that concept totally redundant. That is why members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards were surprised that the Government always seemed to take the path of least resistance—“Let’s not upset the banks too much; let’s try and go back to business as usual”—and are not learning the lessons of history.

We have re-tabled amendment 18 not just to have a specific firm-by-firm back-stop power for separation in case ring-fencing fails, but to have sector-wide powers as a back-stop in reserve should ring-fencing not work. We have the capability for full separation, but the Government have stubbornly refused to put that on the statute book—“Oh well, if we have such circumstances we can always legislate further down the line”—as if passing a Bill on such matters can be done quickly or effectively in any way.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the tone he is using on giving ring-fencing a chance and full separation being a back-stop power, or plan B, to be used only in certain circumstances. Amendment 18—the general requirement of separation and industry-wide potential for that—would clearly mean an end to universal banking, ring-fenced or otherwise. What consideration have he and his hon. Friends given to that issue, and particularly the transfer of cash between the two and the impact that might have on lending to the now retail sector, or lending for investment in business?

[Chris Leslie]

Those issues were covered pretty substantially by the commission in its first and second reports, and this was the conclusion it reached. Nobody wanted to go for full separation if it could be avoided; we wanted to ensure that ring-fencing arrangements could be upheld and made to work. There are some arguments in favour of that universal model, and therefore it was felt preferable to have such a power in reserve, but in the Bill. It is no wonder that the banking sector breathed a heavy sigh of relief today, when it saw the Government’s response on this and other issues. The markets judged that the banking sector got off lightly, and that there was nothing tough or difficult for the sector. That is why we have seen the market reaction today. The notion of business as usual seems to be back on the table.

I want the House to recognise that this is not an amendment that Labour has come up with in a partisan way. We are simply tabling an amendment that was drafted by the commission after days, weeks and months of deliberation and careful cross-party thought by Members of both Houses, but thrown back in the face of the commission by the Government today. It is important to have this on the statute book. A back-stop power will incentivise the banks to comply with ring-fencing. If the Government are correct in believing that ring-fencing will be adequate, the amendment will do no harm to the policy. It will sit dormant on the statute book. But if the Government are wrong, and this backstop power is not in place when it is needed, serious consequences could arise. It is nonsense for the Minister to ignore this risk, especially as the other place will want to come back to this issue. He may be forced to concede if we get into parliamentary ping-pong at some point.

I do not want to take up too much more time because many other hon. Members have spent a lot more time on this issue than I have, but I wish that the Government would listen to them and to the commission.

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[Stewart Hosie]

I am very supportive of the notion of legislating now for the leverage provision, but in his new clause, the hon. Gentleman discusses

“a target for the overall leverage of the…system, to encompass…the activities of foreign financial institutions and non-bank originators of credit”—

or shadow banking. Although that might be taken into consideration in the calculation, the FPC would have no power to implement a leverage ratio in the shadow banking sector, so is there not an unintended consequence that leverage ratios may be too high in the formal banking sector to compensate for what the report found?

[Chris Leslie]

I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman has taken the trouble to look at the new clause, because it is our second attempt to cajole or persuade the Government to look at this issue. In Committee, we took a different approach to the question of leverage, and tried to clarify that there was a clear power for the Government to act. I hope in the spirit of consensus and trying to move the arguments forward, the Minister and the House will accept that we have taken a new approach, thinking about leverage as it affects the UK economy as a whole. Leverage—and I shall come on to make this argument—is part and parcel of the way in which an economy works, and in the new clause we have looked at a particular design that would encompass other institutions. I do not want to be misinterpreted: we mention foreign banks, for example, but I do not intend any extra-territorial reference in the new clause. It simply makes it clear that the provision has to encompass effective leverage on the UK financial services sector as a whole.

I have referred to the Vickers commission, and it is important that we do not forget the work that it did, and that we pay tribute to it. It said that

“a leverage cap of thirty-three is too lax for systemically important banks, since it means that a loss of only 3% of such banks’ assets would wipe out their capital.”

The commission recommended a 25:1 ratio—a 4% ratio—but the Chancellor dismissed that concern. It is essential that the ring fence is supported by tougher capital requirements, as well as by a leverage ratio.

The parliamentary commission said that it was not convinced by the Government’s decision to reject the Vickers recommendation to limit leverage in this way. The parliamentary commission said that it

“considers it essential that the ring-fence should be supported by a higher leverage ratio, and would expect the leverage ratio to be set substantially higher than the 3 per cent minimum required under Basel III. Not to do so would reduce the effectiveness of the leverage ratio as a counter-weight to the weaknesses of risk weighting.”

Sir Mervyn King, the former Governor of the Bank of England, said that the leverage ratio turned out to be

“a far better predictor of the institutions that failed in the crisis”

than measures of risk-weighted assets. I could go on; a great deal of debate has taken place on this issue.

Our new clause seeks a way of ensuring clarity on the powers and what sort of process would take place. We suggest that the powers of the Financial Policy Committee in the Financial Services Act 2012 should be amended to make it clear that a target should be set by the Treasury for the overall leverage of the United Kingdom’s financial system to encompass all the activities of those institutions that are originators of credit.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

We will see what happens under the new Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Bank of the England and the Chancellor. It is important that Conservative Members realise that self-regulation failed and that not having that statutory arrangement was no great thing. Eddie George was the Governor who said, “Let’s just trust the chaps at the desks to deal with these issues.” That was how banking reform was regarded during their tenure in office. But this is turning into a history lesson.

[Stewart Hosie]

rose—

[Chris Leslie]

Speaking of history.

[Stewart Hosie]

Ten minutes ago, before the hon. Gentleman got dragged into a debate about how rubbish the tripartite system was—and it was—he was making a good point about the lack of time for scrutiny of the Bill. Not least, issues such as the one referred to some time ago—capital requirements for small building societies—took some time to emerge. Will he perhaps get away from the history of how rubbish the tripartite system was and continue to make the case for more time for proper scrutiny, so that those in the industry can tell us what they think of the final shape of the Bill?

[Chris Leslie]

For once, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for wanting to focus on the issues; it is important that we have enough time to look at the detail. It is also important to commend the work of the banking standards commission, which has done a phenomenal job so far. I will find today’s report of great use in the short Committee stage, because at least it has taken the rather helpful step of drafting suggested amendments that no doubt the Minister, I and others will be discussing in due course.

The banks have not changed sufficiently. The LIBOR scandal shifted the agenda away from the discussion about excessive risk taking in the financial services sector so that we are now talking almost about anti-corruption measures that need to be put in place. We have had the mis-selling of personal protection insurance and the fleecing of business customers with mis-sold hedging interest rate swap products, while the high-reward bonus season continues to roll on and on, with £600 million of bonuses at RBS sanctioned by the Government, despite a £5 billion loss, to take just one example, so why are they dragging their feet on reform?

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Tuesday 22nd May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

Is the hon. Gentleman concerned that, if the amendment is passed, financial institutions might stop providing the hedge products against interest rate changes or forex changes that SMEs might need and from which they might benefit? Is there not a slight risk of those products no longer being available, adding to the risk for SMEs over a period of time during which interest rates and foreign exchange rates might change?

[Chris Leslie]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but no, I do not think that is a risk. Amendment 73 does not propose to outlaw interest rate swap products; indeed, it is not specifically related to those particular products. It is really about the powers of small firms to complain and to take proceedings if they feel that they have been mis-sold a particular product.

On the particular issue in the news about interest-rate swap products, there are some serious questions that the Financial Services Authority and the Minister need to answer. Were those interest-rate hedge products a requirement of loan agreements, or were they optional? Were the minimum and maximum parameters fair and balanced, or was the downside risk always likely to hit the consumer more than the banks? How frequently was there a mismatch between the term of the loan agreement and the term of the hedge product obligation? Sometimes the term of the hedge product obligation continued even though the loan term had concluded. Were there asymmetrical rights to cancel? In other words, could the banks cancel the arrangement for a particular product, with which the consumer or small firm had to continue? Those are some of the key questions.

Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

I obviously disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s assessment, but he made an important point earlier about the plight of those who are suffering as a result of the austerity approach being applied in southern European countries in particular. I worry greatly about that; it is a matter of concern. It is also a concern, however, for our constituents here in the UK. We take a different approach on principle about the right ways to repair our economy. We believe that a stronger emphasis on growth is necessary to generate revenues; it is not just about public expenditure cuts, which do not provide the way out of the situation. I also disagree that the motion is a general debate about the state of the European economies. We are debating whether the Red Book provides a right, accurate, fair and good assessment of the state of the British economy such that we can submit it, as we are required to do by the treaties, to the European Commission. I am simply following the strictures placed on us by the Maastricht treaty.

[Stewart Hosie]

That is the key point. The hon. Gentleman quoted from the 1993 Act—a Tory Act, of course—about the need to submit information to the European Commission, including information on industrial investment. We have seen forecasts of 6.7% business investment growth ending up being a negative 0.8% out-turn. He is thus absolutely right that the Red Book is not credible in terms of the objective set out in the 1993 Act.

[Chris Leslie]

It is that lack of credibility that makes me want to oppose the motion. The hon. Gentleman picked up on the point about business investment. I encourage hon. Members to turn to page 16 of the Red Book, which says:

“business investment will pick up and make an increasingly strong contribution to growth in each year of the forecast as confidence builds and credit conditions ease”.

Just yesterday, the trends in lending data came out from the Bank of England. Year on year, net lending to all businesses—small and medium-sized enterprises in particular—has fallen in every single month since the Government took office. That is despite Project Merlin and all the attempts at credit easing, which have still not come into effect and will do nothing to help credit availability. Last year, they said in their document that

“Credit conditions have shown signs of stabilisation.”

That has not come to pass, so I have no confidence that their current propositions will come to pass either.

On borrowing, page 12 of the Red Book claims that we are heading for

“£11 billion lower over the forecast period than was projected at Autumn Statement 2011”,

which is sophistry because we know that in the spending review figures from October 2010, the Government projected a set of borrowing statistics that have had to be ripped up, because we are on a trend that takes us into £150 billion of further borrowing over the lifetime of this Parliament. The new borrowing figures out this morning confirm that particular trend. That is where things are going.

The Chancellor keeps restating that the UK is “a safe haven”, although he slipped a little bit today in saying that it was “a safer haven”. There he was in Washington this weekend, saying that the UK has “solved our problems”. That is our Chancellor’s assessment of our economy. Such dangerous complacency beggars belief, and I think that it is a sign of arrogance.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman picks up on our Chancellor’s reference to “a safer haven”. Does he think that could be because the debt figures on the treaty calculation are no longer expected to peak at 87% of gross domestic product as was forecast a year ago, but at 93% of GDP—a catastrophically high figure?

[Chris Leslie]

Of course, that is because of the Government’s record of high unemployment, with statistics showing not much improvement, an increase in welfare costs and so forth. All those things are a drag on public expenditure; they are making things no better. That is the result of the Government’s misguided strategy. On the wider issue of employment and unemployment, I challenge hon. Members to find much in the Red Book that provides an assessment of what is going to happen to them. We know that we have the highest unemployment in 17 years, with 2.67 million people on the dole. We know the story that long-term unemployment doubled in the last year and that youth unemployment is at a record high. My hon. Friends do not need me to repeat these figures.

On inflation, the Red Book says that

“inflationary pressures, which the OBR considers to have been the main drag on UK growth over the past 18 months, have started to abate, easing the pressures on household incomes and improving the outlook for consumers.”

Well, consumer prices index inflation rose, I think, in the last month. We are at around 3.25%. We should not forget that the Chancellor’s target for the Governor of the Bank of England is 2% inflation. Indeed, Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the Bank of England, warned this week that inflation is likely to stay above 3% for much of 2012. Again, even on inflation, the Government’s assessment of the economy is just not correct. There is no mention of consumer confidence in the analysis. Although there is a section on “Investment and confidence” on page 14, it does not mention consumer confidence at all. The consumer confidence indices have been down and are worsening at minus 31%.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

It was the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself who warned against the stability of the graveyard. We have to have joined-up Government and co-ordinated economic policy—I hope hon. Members accept at least that much. It should not be impossible to ask the Bank of England simply to have regard to Her Majesty’s Government’s strategy—not the Opposition’s; obviously, ours would be different—and objectives on growth and jobs. That is all we are saying. We are not saying that that should overrule the broader stability objective of the FPC. It is a simple bit of wiring to make sure that we have joined-up Government and that all the branches of Government talk to one another.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I support the amendment in principle, but surely it should have referred to a range of impacts, in the sense of a fan chart? It is not just macro-prudential tools, of course, but the impact of those with monetary policy, which may change —it may tighten or loosen—and fiscal policy, which may also have the impact of tightening or loosening monetary policy.

[Chris Leslie]

I accept that. It gets to the nub of the issue. There is no single variable that has an impact like pulling a lever and an economic outcome comes along down the track. A number of factors combine to create an economic outcome. That is why people say it is sometimes more of an art than a science, but in so far as there is an ability to make projections or to measure, that assessment is needed. I hope it could be as sophisticated an assessment as the hon. Gentleman suggests.

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[Chris Leslie]

Absolutely. That is right. We are not saying that these powers might not be necessary. However, let us say, for example, the Government and the Bank consider it necessary to lean against a consumer credit bubble. They want to change the minimum repayments that our constituents make on their credit cards from 2% a month to 5% or 10%. That will have a big effect on our constituents. Imagine us going back to those constituents when they complain to their Member of Parliament, as they undoubtedly would, and ask, “Whose decision was that?” We would say, “It was the Bank of England’s decision. We voted on this in theory a couple of years ago, but now the Bank has pulled the lever and pressed the button, and this has happened.” There would be great anger. The public would expect us, at the very least, to have had the opportunity to debate and discuss that in more thorough and substantive detail, albeit in a Committee. That is all we are suggesting in the amendment.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there would be anger, but there would also be economic consequences. If one of the macro-prudential tools invoked was a change in sectoral capital ratios, which impacted to ration mortgages, and there was a 60-day consultation period, the impact in the market, either with deals being rushed through or deals being abandoned, might be as bad. Has he considered the downside of putting such information into the public domain for such a prolonged period?

[Chris Leslie]

I did indeed consider the downside of having parliamentary scrutiny that might in some way impact adversely in an emergency scenario. We have not sought to amend the provision that would allow the Treasury to bring forward those orders in an emergency situation. It could do that. We could have retrospective scrutiny of that order once it had come into place. These are for ordinary, normal times scenarios. The amendment may be imperfect. I would have liked a proper way to deal with the issues, but there has been significant resistance along the way for such measures.

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

I would not want the hon. Gentleman to misunderstand the point of our amendment. It would, in essence, ensure that the charter for budget responsibility had a wide enough definition to give the new Office for Budget Responsibility, if it is indeed an independent body, more latitude to look across the wider set of economic indices and make its analysis and assessment of the impact of the Treasury’s policy on the ground—in the real world and the real economy—instead of looking merely at the desiccated issue of deficit reduction.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I understand why the hon. Gentleman wants this provision, and I am not unsupportive. I am worried that he would conflate the work of the OBR with that of the Financial Policy Committee. We should remember that the FPC is charged with looking at the macro economy, which may well mean looking beyond monetary policy—the responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee—and the macro-prudential. It might be able to look at the other aspects that he is expecting the OBR to look at, and that could muddy the waters even further. Does he see the potential for conflict between the OBR, with the role that he wants to set, and the FPC, with the role it is likely to have?

[Chris Leslie]

I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. As I understand it, however, the Government, in creating the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank of England, propose to give it a particular responsibility for macro-prudential regulation. That is quite different from the role of the OBR, which, as an analytical and assessing independent body, will have a duty to provide comment and analysis on, and a degree of scrutiny of, the proposals of the Treasury and, more narrowly, the Treasury’s policy in relation to the accounting aspects of fiscal policy alone. If we are to have an Office for Budget Responsibility—or, as some hon. Members have suggested, the equivalent of the Congressional Budget Office, with some kind of parliamentary Budget office, which we will discuss later—it must be an independent body, so it must have the indisputable right to comment on the Treasury’s policies writ large on macro-economic and fiscal policy. I do not feel that there is necessarily a conflict with the Government proposals on changing financial services regulation, although we have not yet seen their proposals, and we do not really know what powers they intend to vest with the Bank of England on macro-prudential regulation. We will come to that another day.

I will explain why I think it is important that we focus on the concept of a growth mandate. It is not something that was just dreamed up by the Opposition. The Engineering Employers Federation has also called for a growth mandate to supplement the fiscal mandate in the charter for budget responsibility and in the Budget. It states that a growth mandate would

“send a powerful signal to business in the forthcoming Budget that government has a clear strategy to address the barriers to growth”

and calls for

“a Parliament long programme to deliver on it.”

Terry Scuoler, the chief executive of the EEF, has said that a growth mandate should be introduced to

“report on the progress at each Budget in the same way it does with the Fiscal Mandate.”

The EEF also states that

“like the Fiscal Mandate, the Growth Mandate should span the lifetime of a parliament with each subsequent Budget and policy announcement showing further incremental progress.”

The EEF makes a good point about the impact on the industries that it represents, which are in the real economy. Ultimately, that is what matters to our constituents.

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[Chris Leslie]

Possibly, but in a more tragic and important way that affects real lives and real people. It does not really matter what happens to the Liberal Democrat poll rating, but growth falling behind and diminishing as unemployment rises is a really important issue in the real world.

[Stewart Hosie]

May I bring the hon. Gentleman back to the amendment for a second? I am sure he is not suggesting that the OBR should have any role in setting the fiscal mandate. I understand why he wants the consideration of growth to be part of its mandate, but the Treasury Committee stated that the OBR’s commentary function

“should be one of informing public debate through disseminating better understanding of fiscal policy and long-term economic trends, identifying possible risks”

and so on. Those long-term trends would inevitably include growth. Although none of us would want the OBR to comment on individual policy measures, even the Government’s response—I certainly do not defend them—states that the OBR would be

“examining and reporting on…the long-term impact of the Government’s decisions.”

Again, that would include their impact on growth. Does the OBR not already have the ability that he is looking to give it?

[Chris Leslie]

I suspect that the Economic Secretary will make that point in her retort, when she eloquently resists all amendments, as is her usual pattern of behaviour. However, it is not clear enough that growth and employment are matters that the OBR can comment on and analyse. I absolutely would not want to give it the power to determine the mandate, but the Treasury should be big enough and ugly enough to withstand commentary from such an independent body.

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[Chris Leslie]

Indeed, and we should pay tribute to the previous Prime Minister for maintaining and establishing those freedoms and that independence. However, you would rule me out of order, Mr Speaker, if we departed too much from the amendments.

A growth mandate is necessary on the four principal components of growth. The Government’s strategy on consumer spending is falling apart by the day. The nationwide consumer confidence index published this week showed a record low among the general public. One reason consumers are losing confidence is the possibility of VAT going to 20%. Real disposal incomes are falling back to the 2008 level, and median income is falling more than at any time since the 1980s. John Lewis reported falls in sales last week, Debenhams is saying that trading conditions are tough, credit levels are contracting, and from April onwards, of course, some of the tax credit changes and other changes will take money out of the pockets of consumers. We know therefore that on the consumer spending components of growth the Government have already lost control of a decent growth strategy.

On business investment, banks are still slow to lend to high-growth businesses. More than 20% of commercial real estate loans are in default or in breach of their covenants, and the much-trumpeted national insurance holiday that Ministers offered to new start-up businesses has not been taken up to the extent predicted by Ministers, owing to the complexities they have imposed on the arrangements. The Government’s growth strategy currently seems to depend on a number of odd assumptions, including that it is the fault of employee rights, which need to be eroded to boost growth. That is the kernel of their growth strategy.

On planning law, the Government are sometimes localist and sometimes not; sometimes they devolve powers but sometimes they do not want to give certain powers to councils. Their approach on planning is confused. Will they relax Sunday trading laws? There is speculation all over the place. There is even confusion over business rates. The Minister’s colleagues in HMRC have issued 40 different consultations, discussion documents, updates and responses on tax changes since the previous Budget, which, as many businesses complain, brings uncertainty and confusion. And to cap it all, with the abolition of the regional development agencies, they have created these local enterprise partnerships, with no clarity about their role or budget. We will see tomorrow about the enterprise zones, but on business investment the growth strategy is very deficient.

The Government are relying totally on an export-driven miracle to be the salvation of their growth strategy, yet if the Treasury predictions are correct we would need the highest export growth every year for the next three years, which last occurred in 1974, I think. That means, for example, that our exports to the USA would have to triple or our exports to China would have to grow twentyfold. That is not a growth strategy, but a prayer for a miracle.

To cap it all, we know what is happening with public sector expenditure. The rush to reduce the deficit so deep and so fast is causing great harm to the growth prospects of the economy and taking out a number of posts, particularly in parts of the country that are least resilient.

Amendment 3 would add to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s duties the requirement to assess the impact of Treasury policy on jobs and economic growth. Defining responsibility as such a purist, accountancy-type concept is to take a slightly dry and aloof approach, which seems to us irresponsible, given the real-world impact on people, jobs and society. We need to ensure that the OBR is a more rounded organisation that is grounded in the real economy, not just a narrow, bean-counting institution that looks at statistics or just one aspect of economic policy. It needs to be strategic, predictive, competent and authoritative, and it can do that only by having a duty to analyse the Treasury’s impact across the board. That would be one way of creating longer-term sustainability for the Office for Budget Responsibility, beyond the Government’s current plans for deficit reduction.

Amendment 4 would give the OBR a duty to assess the impact of growth in our regions and nations. We know that the Government’s spending cuts are hitting less prosperous parts of the country disproportionately. The disparities in our economy are growing as a result of the Government’s policies, and clearly that is harmful. Indeed, we saw that in the unemployment statistics this week, for example, with 27,000 more people made redundant in the west midlands and 8% unemployment in my region of the east midlands.

[Stewart Hosie]

We have indeed seen unemployment statistics, which show unemployment in Scotland falling for three months in a row, employment rising for three months in a row and construction up massively, specifically because of decisions taken by the Scottish Government to re-profile capital expenditure. How would the OBR relate, for example, to the Scottish Government on the different routes that they had taken over the same period? How would that technically work?

[Chris Leslie]

If the OBR could explicitly comment on employment and growth policy, it would be able to look at the different tactics employed in the economic policies of the different regions and nations. If there were good or poor policies in different corners of the country, the OBR would be able to analyse and pass comment on them.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman is being generous in giving way, but I am quite keen to probe on this issue. What he has said makes perfect logical sense, but at that point the OBR would be commenting not on UK policy, but on regional or national policy. If it were commenting on a micro-policy, rather than policy at the UK level, would that not put it in difficult political territory?

[Chris Leslie]

If a policy were having a significantly adverse effect on jobs, such as some of the policies pursued by the current, Tory-led Government, it would be useful to have an independent, authoritative budget office to comment on that and to flag it up—to put out a red alert, as it were—as something that parliamentarians ought to comment on. I would not have a problem with that level of commentary. We should be big enough to cope with that level of challenge, audit and scrutiny. We would not be giving the OBR any power to make decisions; the point is simply to shine a spotlight on Treasury and Government policies.

Finance (No.2) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Monday 8th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie]

This is interesting. I have seen many of these quotes before, and I am certainly minded to support the new clause, if the hon. Gentleman pushes it to a vote. An examination of the level of tax on banking is sensible, but I would like to know what the Labour party proposes for the level of taxation, given that every billion out of the banks is about £10 million to £15 million less to lend in the real economy. I am curious, therefore, to find out how punitive the Labour party would be.

[Chris Leslie]

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point. We have to be prudent in how we address these questions, and I hope to come to some of the matters he raises as we explore corporation tax and so on. If he bears with me, I will—hopefully—elaborate.

UBS analysts said that they expected Lloyds and HSBC to benefit by 2012 because of the cut in corporation tax bills, which in their case was larger than the hit they expected to be sustained through the banking levy. It seems, therefore, that the banking levy is playing quite a small part, perhaps a walk-on character—

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

The TUC says that the effective rate of corporation tax for the banks will fall from 25% in 2000 to below 20% this year, which means that, in reality, they are already paying a rate that is below the headline rate that small firms pay. Those findings are certainly eye-catching. All I am saying in new clause 3 is that they merit further review and consideration, which would be a reasonable step to take. Indeed, those findings suggest that we could even be heading towards a regressive corporation tax system in the UK. Small businesses should be paying less in corporation tax than the banks, but the evidence suggests that that might not be the case.

The third wheeze that the banks might benefit from, in their navigation of the corporation tax system, is known as deferred tax, which can be defined as the tax liability that might be payable at some point in the future because of transactions that have already taken place, albeit where there is no certainty about when it will have to be paid. Deferring the payment of tax is not something that ordinary taxpayers can indulge in with great ease, yet it appears that the banks are playing that game on a gargantuan scale, according to the findings of Richard Murphy, the director of Tax Research LLP. He suggests in his recent report that the banks’ deferral of tax reserves are absolutely phenomenal. He calculates that a sum totalling nearly £19 billion, which is nearly half what this country spends on capital projects annually, might not be paid by the banks in corporation tax as a result. He describes that as

“an extraordinary double subsidy going on for these banks.”

Not only were the banks underpinned by the taxpayer in 2008—they are still underpinned in the form of the guarantees offered by the Treasury—but they may receive another fillip, he argues, from that deferred corporation tax gain.

[Stewart Hosie]

Unless my memory is playing tricks on me, at least one of the nationalised banks used those unused or deferred tax assets to pay for the asset protection scheme, which was set up—rightly—by the Labour Government in the previous Parliament. Without those unused tax assets or that deferred tax, the asset protection scheme would not have been possible, thereby imposing an even bigger burden on the banks, so I am not quite sure where the hon. Gentleman is going with this.

[Chris Leslie]

I am not making any particular proposals at this point; I am simply saying in new clause 3 that we should review the level of tax that banks are paying. There may be perfectly good and justified reasons for it, but we are talking about enormous sums of money. If, as some allege, the banks are playing a canny game, with sums of money that might have prevented many of the swingeing cuts that we are seeing to public services, it is incumbent on us, on behalf of our constituents, to ask those questions. If we are indeed “all in it together”, as we are constantly told, we should ensure that the banks pay their fair share and do not leave the rest of us picking up all the bills.

Finance Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Stewart Hosie

Monday 12th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

That is a moot point and I would not go to the wall to argue against reducing corporation tax in this way. All I am suggesting is that there are other strategies that I do not feel that the Government have properly explored. We ought to be focused on growth and on how business can contribute to it. Let us not forget that we have such a deficit situation in this country not because of so-called excessive public service consumption but because tax receipts have been so depressed. That has partly been caused by the credit crunch and the lack of credit available, which provoked the private sector investment strike that has been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett).

[Stewart Hosie]

When the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend talk about a private sector investment strike, I wonder whether it might not be because there has been negative growth in unused sterling credit facilities for the past 27 months. Businesses, large and small, have simply been unable to get the cash.

[Chris Leslie]

Indeed. There are liquidity problems across the economy and they remain. There are rumours in the air about the return of quantitative easing and that we might be entering into double-dip recession territory. All these things prove that the so-called independent Office for Budget Responsibility’s downgrading of growth predictions as a result of the measures in the Budget suggests that the Government had a choice in their hands to steer the economy in a particular direction and that they have chosen not the pro-growth path that the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party advocated before the election but, because of the damascene conversion of the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills the day after the general election, the anti-growth path. They will take a whole chunk of money out of the economy by cutting public services so steeply and so massively in such a short space of time.