Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

My right hon. Friend is completely correct about that. If the British public realised what has happened to the value of that taxpayer stake in RBS, they would be appalled. Today’s figures show that £2 billion-plus has been taken off the value of RBS since the botched handling of the departure of the chief executive, Stephen Hester. That mishandling forced the Chancellor to back down from a foolhardy dash towards a fire sale, which we know was part of the plan from the conversations that Sir Philip Hampton, the chairman of RBS, let slip in comments to journalists around that time. Labour Members, however, are absolutely focused on the need for the taxpayer to get good value for money, to get our money back. That is entirely possible. Stephen Hester revealed the flaw in the Chancellor’s strategy for a hasty sale driven by the electoral timetable when he gave an interview to the BBC last month. When asked whether taxpayers would get back their £45.6 billion, he answered:

“RBS is capable of being worth more than what the government paid for the shares”.

When asked again whether it is possible for us to get our money back, he said:

“RBS is capable of that and I would be disappointed if over the passage of time that that won’t be the case.”

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I am very supportive of new clause 10, particularly the notion that the Government describe how the taxpayer will get the money back. However, has the hon. Gentleman given any thought to the timing of such a report and what information may need to be omitted, particularly in relation to asset clauses the Government may continue to hold, because it might be market-sensitive in the run-up to the re-privatisation of the bank?

[Chris Leslie]

I would have thought that before the Government considered a sale they would decide what they want to sell and what they do not want to sell. I do not think that what the hon. Gentleman suggests should be a particular problem, particularly given the taxpayer interests involved, in terms of having that report before a sale. However, I accept that there could be circumstances in which commercial confidentiality might apply and a line might need to be considered. I would be happy to examine whether some aspects of that need to be built into this concept. There is an opacity about the Government’s strategy, and the fog engulfing the Treasury, perhaps hiding the chaos within, is extremely thick—a real pea-souper. I am amazed that once the Chancellor of the Exchequer had defenestrated the chief executive of RBS—let us be honest, that is essentially what happened, and although the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have protested, “It’s nothing to do with me, guv,” with his 82% shareholding he clearly had a hand in the decision —the Government were surprised when the markets reacted so adversely. It is amazing that they went down that route without thinking through who would replace Stephen Hester as chief executive of RBS, creating a massive amount of uncertainty about the future of the institution. We are glad that they changed their minds and were forced to back down from the rush to the fire sale, but what on earth are we left with and where is the situation going?