Ajax Programme

Chris Evans Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Chris Evans (Caerphilly) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It would be easy to blame the last Conservative Government for the operational difficulties burdening the Ministry of Defence, General Dynamics and the British Army from the outset of the Ajax programme, but I could not do that with the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) sitting in front of me. He was often a critic when he sat on the Government Benches, and I have lost count of the number of times he said that heads should roll at Abbey Wood—it is a shame nobody listened to him at the time.

When we stood here three years ago, 37 of 39 projects were marked as either red or amber by the National Audit Office. That is unacceptable. Criticisms of the Ajax project included realistic targets not being set for the vehicle’s bespoke capability, and its complex requirements being largely ignored. As we have heard, whistleblowers were not listened to, resulting in the Ajax demonstration and manufacturing phases overlapping, which posed acute technical safety risks.

Progress reports were also often vague or overly optimistic, as we experienced in November. Ministers were assured that Ajax had achieved initial operating capability and was prepared for the Salisbury exercise. We have to ask why that was the case. A gross overestimation put the health of 30 soldiers at risk, and that is the nub of the problem. This is not simply economics; as the Minister knows, when we send someone into theatres with obsolete equipment, we are putting their lives at risk. If they lose their life, it is their family we have to be accountable to. That is what we have to remember. It is not about the defence companies or the equipment; it is about the soldier we are sending into theatre, and we should never lose sight of that.

We also have to look at the cultural issue at the MOD, which the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford constantly spoke about. Between 2011 and 2023, the Ministry of Defence welcomed five project managers, and each served for approximately two to three years. The job was unsustainable due to the complexity and breadth of its portfolio, which did not allow for effective oversight.

I will now turn to the Morpheus project, which was unfortunately delivered by General Dynamics land division. It was intended to supply the computing system for Ajax, but the system fell short of its requirements, even though the same company developed it. Ajax was expected to be the Army’s first set of vehicles based on one fully digitised platform, which was to include advanced sensors and enhanced communication systems, allowing vehicles to gather and immediately share information with other units. In stark contrast, Morpheus incurred significant costs and a delay of three years, during which time Ajax’s ability to exchange information was severely limited. The platform had the potential to significantly improve the British Army’s digital capabilities, and this country could have been a world leader in that sector. Its failure was nothing short of unacceptable.

There is no doubt that the MOD has been and is a uniquely failing Department. In opposition, Labour called for the MOD to be the first Department subject to the new Office for Value for Money, with a commitment to commission the NAO to conduct an across-the-board survey of the MOD’s wants and needs.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. I call James MacCleary, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.