Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts
Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
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I beg to move,

That the Bill be re-committed to a Public Bill Committee.

First, I wish to briefly refer to the death yesterday morning of my predecessor as Member of Parliament for Rhondda, Allan Rogers. I know that many Members found him a good colleague to work with, and I believe that he spent many hours on the Channel Tunnel Act 1987. I sometimes think that the people who do such Bills on behalf of all of us deserve a medal. I am sure the whole House sends its best regards and deepest condolences to his family.

Our core job as Members of Parliament is the scrutiny of legislation, teasing out whether a proposal will do what it says, whether it is necessary and proportionate, and whether it has public support. The Government have had total control of the Order Paper since 1902, so we can do that job properly only if the Government get their act together and play ball. That is what enables the line-by-line consideration of the laws that bind us. It is what makes us a functioning democracy. We need to send the Bill back to Committee because we simply cannot do that job properly today.

Let us recall how we got here. A first version of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill was introduced by the previous Member for Mid Bedfordshire on 18 July 2022. It was such a mess that it never even made it to Second Reading. Nadine Dorries was sacked in September last year, and six months later the Bill was sacked as well, to be replaced by a new and improved No. 2 Bill, which had its Second Reading on 17 April and completed its Committee stage on 24 May. That was 190 days ago.

I do not know what has prompted all the delay. Was it the general chaos in Government? Perhaps the Government do not fully understand the term “with immediate effect”. I like the Minister, and I have known and worked with him on many different issues for many years. I had a meeting with him and his officials on Thursday 16 November. He told me then that on Report the Government would table only a few minor and technical amendments to the Bill, which he hoped everyone would be able to agree fairly easily.

On the last available day, 182 days after Committee, the Government brought out 240 amendments. Some are indeed minor and technical, but many are very significant. They strike to the heart of the independence of the new Information Commission, they alter the rights of the public in making subject access requests, and they amend our system in a way that may or may not enhance our data adequacy with the US and the European Union and therefore British businesses’ ability to rely on UK legislation to trade overseas. In some instances, they give very extensive new powers to Ministers, and they introduce completely new topics that have never been previously mooted, debated or scrutinised by Parliament in relation to this Bill, which already has more baubles on it than the proverbial Christmas tree. The end result is that we have 156 pages of amendments to consider today in a single debate.

Yes, we could have tabled amendments to the Government amendments, but they would not have been selectable, and we would not have been able to vote on them. So the way the Government have acted, whether knowingly, recklessly or incompetently, means that the Commons cannot carry out line-by-line consideration of what will amount to more than 90 pages of new laws, 38 new clauses and two new schedules, one of which is 19 pages long. Some measures will barely get a minute’s consideration today. That is not scrutiny; it is a blank cheque.

Yesterday, I made a generous offer to the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work, the hon. Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), who is sitting on the Front Bench and whom I also like. We recognise that some of the issues need to be addressed, so we said: “Recommit the Bill so we can help you get this right in the Commons, and we will commit to have it out of Committee in a fortnight. It could go to the Lords with all parties’ support by Christmas.”

Let me repeat: this is no way to scrutinise a Bill, particularly one that gives the Government sweeping powers and limits the rights of our fellow citizens, the public. Sadly, it is part of a growing trend, but “legislate at speed, repent at leisure” should not be our motto. Some will say something that is commonly said these days: “Let it go through to the Lords so they can amend it.” But I am sick of abdicating responsibility for getting legislation right. It is our responsibility. We should not send Bills through that are, at best, half-considered. We are the elected representatives. We cannot just pass the parcel to the Lords. We need to do our job properly. We cannot do that today without recommitting the Bill.

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We are making changes to the way that counter-terrorism policing can retain biometrics shared via Interpol. It will now be able to retain biometric data in national security-related cases for as long as the relevant Interpol notice remains in force, rather than needing to submit a national security determination, which can present significant operational challenges for counter-terrorism policing. That will bring the UK into line with the rules under which all Interpol members retain and use those same biometrics. Our amendment was requested and is welcomed by counter-terrorism policing, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner and the security services, and I thank them for their co-operation on this aspect of the Bill.
Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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Broadly speaking, we support this measure. What negotiations and discussions has the Minister had about red notices under Interpol and the abuse of them, for instance by the Russian state? We have concerns about decent people being maltreated by the Russian state through the use of red notices. Are those concerns conflicted by the measure that the Government are introducing?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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As the hon. Gentleman knows, I strongly share his view about the need to act against abuse of legal procedures by the Russian state. As he will appreciate, this aspect of the Bill emanated from the Home Office. However, I have no doubt that my colleagues in the Home Office will have heard the perfectly valid point he makes. I hope that they will be able to provide him with further information about it, and I will draw the matter to their attention.

I wish to say just a few more words about the biometric material received from our international partners, as a tool in protecting the public from harm. Sometimes, counter-terrorism police receive biometrics from international partners with identifiable information. Under current laws, they are not allowed to retain these biometrics unless they were taken in the past three years. That can make it harder for our counter-terrorism police to carry out their job effectively. That is why we are making changes to allow the police to take proactive steps to pseudonymise biometric data received from international partners—obviously, that means holding the material without including information that identifies the person—and hold indefinitely under existing provisions in the Counter-Terrorism Act information that identifies the person it relates to. Again, those changes have been requested by counter-terrorism police and will support them to better protect the British public.

The national underground asset register, or NUAR, is a digital map that will improve both the efficiency and safety of underground works, by providing secure access to privately and publicly owned location data about the pipes and cables beneath our feet. This will underpin the Government’s priority to get the economy growing by expediting projects such as new roads, new houses and broadband roll-out—the hon. Gentleman and I also share a considerable interest in that.

The NUAR will bring together valuable data from more than 700 public and private sector organisations about the location of underground utilities assets. This will deliver £490 million per year of economic growth, through increased efficiency, reduced asset strikes and reduced disruptions for citizens and businesses. Once operational, the running of the register will be funded by those who benefit most. The Government’s amendments include powers to, through regulations, levy charges on apparatus owners and request relevant information. The introduction of reasonable charges payable by those who benefit from the service, rather than the taxpayer, will ensure that the NUAR is a sustainable service for the future. Other amendments will ensure that there is the ability to realise the full potential of this data for other high-value uses, while respecting the rights of asset owners.

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John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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The purpose of the proposed new schedule is narrowly focused. It will ensure that where benefit claimants may also have considerable financial assets, that is flagged with the DWP for further examination, but it does not allow people to go through the contents of people’s bank accounts. It is an alarm system where financial institutions that hold accounts of benefit claimants can match those against financial assets, so where it appears fraud might be taking place, they can refer that to the Department.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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But it does include the state pension, doesn’t it?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I am surprised that the Opposition regard this as something to question. Obviously, they are entitled to seek further information, but I would hope that they share the wish to identify where fraud is taking place and take action against it. This is about claimants of benefits, including universal credit—

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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Pensions?

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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The state pension will not currently be an area of focus for the use of these powers.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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The House of Commons Library makes it absolutely clear that the Bill, if taken forward in the way that the Government are proposing at the moment, does allow the Government to look at people in receipt of state pensions. That is the case, is it not?

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Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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As I am feeling generous, I shall start with the nice bits where we agree with the Government. First, we completely agree with the changes to the Information Commissioner’s Office, strengthening the ICO’s enforcement powers, restructuring the ICO and providing a clearer framework of objectives. As the Minister knows, we have always been keen to strengthen the independence of the ICO and we were concerned that the Government were taking new interventionist powers—that is quite a theme in this Bill—in clause 33, so we welcome Government amendment 45, which achieves a much better balance between democratic oversight and ICO independence, so we thank the Minister for that.

Labour also welcomes part 2 of the Bill, as amended in Committee, establishing a digital verification framework. My concern, however, is that the Government have underestimated the sheer technicality of such an endeavour, hence the last-minute requirement for tens of Government amendments to this part of the Bill, which I note the Minister keeps on referring to as being very technical and therefore best to be debated in another place at another time with officials present. Under Government amendment 52, for example, different rules will be established for different digital verification services, and I am not quite sure whether that will stand the test of the House of Lords.

We warmly welcome and support part 3 of the Bill, which has just been referred to by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and the Minister, and its provisions on smart data. Indeed, we and many industry specialists have been urging the Government to go much faster in this particular area. The potential for introducing smart data schemes is vast, empowering consumers to make financial decisions that better suit them, enabling innovation and delivering better products and services. Most notably, that has already happened in relation to financial services. Many people will not know that that is what they are using when they use a software that is accessing several different bank accounts, but that is what they are doing.

In the autumn statement, the Government pledged to kickstart a smart data big bang. One area where smart data has been most effective is in open finance—it is right that we expand these provisions into new areas to have a greater social impact—but, to quote the Financial Conduct Authority, it should be implemented there

“in a proportionate phased manner, ideally driven by consideration of credible consumer propositions and use-cases.”

Furthermore, the FCA does not think that a big bang approach to open finance is feasible or desirable. Nevertheless, many of the Government amendments to the suite of smart data provisions are technical, and indicate a move in the right direction. In particular, we hope that, with smart data enabling greater access by consumers to information about green options and net zero, we will be able to help the whole of the UK to move towards net zero.

I want to say a few words on part 4, on cookies and nuisance calls. We share a lot of the Government’s intentions on tackling those issues and the births and deaths register. As a former registrar, I would like to see tombstoning—the process of fraudulently adopting for oneself the name of a child who has died—brought to an end. That practice is enabled partly because the deaths register does not actually register the death of an individual named on the births register, which I hope will at some point be possible.

Despite the Government’s having sat on the Bill for almost 18 months, with extensive consultations, drafts, amendments and carry-over motions, there are still big practical holes in these measures that need to be addressed. Labour supports the Government’s ambitions to tackle nuisance calls, which are a blight on people’s lives—we all know that. However, I fear that clause 89, which establishes a duty to notify the ICO of unlawful direct marketing, will make little or no difference without the addition of Labour amendments 7 and 8, which would implement those obligations on electronic communications companies when the guidance from the ICO on their practical application has been clearly established. As the Bill stands, that is little more than wishful thinking.

Unfortunately, the story is the same on tackling cookies. We have a bunch of half-baked measures that simply do not deliver as the public will expect them to and the Government would like them to. We all support reducing cookie fatigue; I am sure that every hon. Member happily clicks “Accept all” whenever cookies comes up—[Interruption.] Well, some Members are much more assiduous than I am in that regard. But the wise Members of the House know perfectly well that the problem is that it undermines the whole purpose of cookies. We all support tackling it because clicking a new cookie banner every time we load a web page is a waste of everybody’s time and is deeply annoying.

However, the Government’s proposed regulation 6B gives the Secretary of State a blank cheque to make provisions as they see fit, without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is why we are unhappy with it and have tabled amendment 6, which would remove those powers from the Bill as they are simply not ready to enter the statute book. Yet again I make the point that the Bill repeatedly and regularly gives new powers to the Secretary of State. Sure, they would be implemented by secondary legislation—but as we all know, secondary legislation is unamendable and therefore subject to much less scrutiny. These are areas in which the state is taking significant powers over the public and private individuals.

Let me deal with some of the Labour party’s amendments. First, I take subject access requests. The Government have repeatedly been in the wrong place on those, I am afraid, ever since the introduction of the first iteration of the DPDI Bill under Nadine Dorries, when they tried to charge people for access to their own data. Fortunately, that has now gone the way of Nadine Dorries. [Interruption.] I note that the Minister smiled at that point. We still have concerns about the Government’s plans to change the thresholds for refusing subject access requests from “manifestly unfounded or excessive” to “vexatious or excessive”. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, Reset, the TUC and Which? have all outlined their opposition to the change, which threatens to hollow out what the Government themselves admit is a “critical transparency mechanism”.

We have tabled two simple amendments. Amendment 2 would establish an obligation on any data controller refusing a subject access request to provide evidence of why a request has been considered vexatious or excessive. Organisations should not be allowed to just declare that a request is vexatious or excessive and so ascribe a motive to the data subject in order to refuse to provide their data, perhaps simply because of the inconvenience to the organisation.

The Government will try to tell me that safeguards are in place and that the data subject can make appropriate complaints to the organisation and the ICO if they believe that their request has been wrongly refused. But if we take the provisions set out in clause 9 to extend the time limits on subject access requests, add the advantage for companies of dither and delay when considering procedural complaints, and then add the additional burden on a data subject of having to seek out the ICO and produce evidence and an explanation of their request as well as the alleged misapplication of the vexatious or excessive standard, we see that people could easily be waiting years and years before having the right to access their own data. I cannot believe that, in the end, that is in the interests of good government or that it is really what the Government want.

Despite public opposition to the measures, the Government are also now going further by introducing at this stage amendments that further water down subject access request protections. Government new clauses 7 and 9, which the Minister did not refer to—in fact, he only mentioned, I think, a bare tenth of the amendments he wants us to agree this afternoon—limit a data subject’s entitlement to their own data to the controller’s ability to conduct a “reasonable and proportionate” search. But what is reasonable and proportionate? Who determines what has been a reasonable and proportionate search? The new clauses drive a coach and horses through the rights of people to access their own data and to know who is doing what with their information. That is why Labour does not support the changes.

I come to one of the most important issues for us: high-risk processing, which, as the term suggests, is of most concern when it comes to the rights of individuals. I was pleased but perplexed to see that the Government tabled amendments to new clause 30 that added further clarity about the changed provisions to record keeping for the purposes of high-risk processing. I was pleased because it is right that safeguards should be in place when data processing is deemed to be of high risk, but I was perplexed because the Government do not define high-risk processing in the Bill—in fact, they have removed the existing standard for high-risk processing from existing GDPR, thereby leaving a legislative lacuna for the ICO to fill in. That should not be up to the ICO. I know that the ICO himself thinks that it should not be up to him, but a matter for primary legislation.

Our amendment 1 retains a statutory definition of high-risk processing as recommended by the ICO in his response to the Bill, published in May. He said:

“the detail in Article 35 (3) was a helpful and clear legislative backstop.”

That is why he supports what we are suggesting. Our amendment 4 would also clarify those individual rights even further, by again providing the necessary definition of what constitutes high risk, within the new provisions concerning the responsibilities of senior responsible individuals for data processing set out in clause 15.

I turn to automated decision making, which has the potential to deliver increasingly personalised and efficient services, to increase productivity, and to reduce administrative hurdles. While most of the world is making it harder to make decisions exclusively using ADM, clause 12 in the Bill extends the potential for automated decision making in the UK. Yet countless research projects have shown that automated decision making and machine decision making are not as impartial or blind as they sound. Algorithms can harbour and enhance inbuilt prejudices and injustices. Of course we cannot bury our heads in the sand and pretend that the technology will not be implemented or that we can legislate it out of use; we should be smart about ADM and try to unlock its potential while mitigating its potential dangers. Where people’s livelihoods are at risk or where decisions are going to have a significant impact, it is essential that extra protections are in place allowing individuals to contest decisions and secure human review as a fundamental backstop.

Our amendment 5 strikes a better balance by extending the safeguarding provisions to include significant decisions that are based both partly and solely on automated processing; I am very hopeful that the Government will accept our amendment. That means greater safeguards for anybody subject to an automated decision-making process, however that decision is made. It cannot just be a matter of “the computer says no.”

I think the Minister is slightly surprised that we are concerned about democratic engagement, but I will explain. The Bill introduces several changes to electoral practices under the guise of what the Government call “democratic engagement”, most notably through clauses 86 and 87. The former means that any political party or elected representative could engage in direct marketing relying on a soft opt-in procedure, while clause 87 allows the Secretary of State to make any future exemptions and changes to direct marketing rules for the very unspecified purposes of “democratic engagement”.

The Ada Lovelace Institute and the Internet Advertising Bureau have raised concerns about that, and in Committee Labour asked the Minister what the Government had in mind. He rather gave the game away when he wrote to my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock), to whom I pay tribute for the way she took the Bill through the Committee:

“A future government may want to encourage democratic engagement in the run up to an election by temporarily ‘switching off’ some of the direct marketing rules.”

Switching off the rules ahead of an election—does anyone else smell a rat?

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Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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He does not—great.

Finally, new schedule 1 would grant the Secretary of State the power to require banks or other financial institutions to provide the bank account data—unspecified—of any recipient of benefits to identify

“cases which merit further consideration to establish whether relevant benefits are being paid or have been paid in accordance with the enactments and rules of law relating to those benefits.”

It is a very broad and, I would argue, poorly delineated power. My understanding from the Commons Library, although I note that the Minister was unable to answer the question properly, is that it includes the bank accounts of anyone in the UK in receipt, or having been in receipt, of state pension, universal credit, working tax credit, child tax credit, child benefit, pension credit, jobseeker’s allowance or personal independence payment.

The Minister says that the Government do not intend to go down some of those routes at the moment, but why, in that case, are they seeking that power? They could have come to us with a much more tightly written piece of legislation, and we would have been able to help them draft it properly. The proposed new schedule would mean that millions of bank accounts could be trawled without the Department for Work and Pensions, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) referred to, even suspecting anything untoward before it asked for the information. The 19-page new schedule, which was tabled on the last day for consideration, would grant powers to the Government without our having any opportunity to scrutinise it line by line, assess its implications or hear evidence from expert witnesses.

We should of course be tackling fraud. The Government have completely lost control of fraud in recent years, with benefit fraud and error skyrocketing to £8.3 billion in the last financial year. The Minister seemed to think that it was a good thing that he could cite that figure. The year before, it was even higher—a record £8.7 billion. On the Conservative party’s watch, the percentage of benefit expenditure lost to fraud has more than trebled since Labour was last in power.

Let me be absolutely clear: Labour will pursue the fraudsters, the conmen and the claimants who try to take money from the public purse fraudulently or illegally. That includes those who have defrauded the taxpayer over personal protective equipment contracts, or have not declared their full income to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. My constituents in the Rhondda know that defrauding the taxpayer is one of the worst forms of theft. It is theft from all of us. It undermines confidence in the system that so many rely on. It angers people when they abide by the rules and they see others swinging the lead and getting away with it.

I back 100% any attempt to tackle fraud in the system, and we will work with the Government to get the legislation right, but this is not the way to do it, because it is not proper scrutiny. The Minister with responsibility for this matter, the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work, who is present in the Chamber, is not even speaking in the debate. The Government are asking us to take a lot on trust, as we saw from the questions put earlier to the Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure, so I have some more questions for him that I hope he will be able to answer.

As I understand it, the Government did a test project on this in 2017—all of six years ago—so what on earth have they been doing all this while? When was the new schedule first drafted, and why did the Minister not mention it in the discussions that he and I had two weeks ago? How many bank accounts does it potentially apply to? The Government already have powers to seek bank details where they suspect fraud, so precisely how will the new power be used? I have been told that the Government will not use the power until 2027. Is that right? If so, how on earth did they come to the figure of a £600 million saving—that was the figure that they gave yesterday, but I note that the Minister said £500 million earlier—in the first five years?

What will the cost be to the banks and financial institutions? What kind of information will the Government seek? Will it include details of where people have shopped, banked or travelled, or what they have spent their money on? The Government say that they will introduce a set of criteria specifying the power. When will that be introduced, how wide in scope will it be, what assessments will accompany it, and will it be subject to parliamentary scrutiny?

There is clearly significant potential to use data to identify fraud and error. That is something that Labour is determined to do, but it is vital that new measures are used fairly and proportionately. The Department for Work and Pensions says that its ability to test for unfair impacts across protected characteristics is limited, and the National Audit Office has also warned that machine learning risks bias towards certain vulnerable people or groups with protected characteristics. Without proper safeguards in place, the changes could have significant adverse effects on the most vulnerable people in society.

On behalf of the whole Labour party, I reiterate the offer that I made to the Government yesterday. We need to get this right. We will work with Ministers to get it right, and I very much hope that we can organise meetings after today, if the Bill passes, to ensure that the debates in the Lords are well informed and that we get to a much better understanding of what the Government intend and how we can get this right. If we get it wrong, we will undermine trust in the whole data system and in Government.

Broadly speaking, Labour supports the changes in the Bill that give greater clarity and flexibility to researchers, tech platforms and public service providers, with common-sense changes to data protection where it is overly rigid, but the Government do not need to water down essential protections for data subjects to do that. Our amendments set out clearly where we diverge from the Government and how Labour would do things differently.

By maintaining subject access request protections, establishing a definition of high-risk processing on the face of the Bill, and defending the public from automated decision making that encroaches too significantly on people’s lives, a Bill with Labour’s amendments would unlock the new potential for data that improves public services, protects workers from data power imbalances and delivers cutting-edge scientific research, while also building trust for consumers and citizens. That is the data protection regime the UK needs and that is the protection a Labour Government would have delivered.

David Davis Portrait Mr David Davis
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Before I speak to my new clause, I want to address one or two of the things that the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant), just raised. By not accepting his motion to recommit the Bill to a Committee, we have in effect delegated large parts of the work on this important Bill to the House of Lords. I say directly to the Whip on the Treasury Bench that, when the Bill comes back to the Commons in ping-pong, I recommend that the Whips Office allows considerable time for us to debate the changes that the Lords makes. At the end of the day, this House is responsible to our constituents and these issues will have a direct impact on them, so we ought to have a strong say over what is done with respect to this Bill.

New clause 43 in my name is entitled “Right to use non-digital verification services”. Digitisation has had tremendous benefits for society. Administrative tasks that once took weeks or even years can now be done in seconds, thanks to technology, but that technology has come with considerable risks as well as problems of access. The internet is an equaliser in many ways; I can access websites and services in East Yorkshire in the same way that we do here. I can send and receive money, contact friends and family, organise families, do work, and do all sorts of other things that we could not once do.

However, the reality is more nuanced. Some people lack the technological literacy or simply the hardware to get online and make the most of what is out there—think of elderly people, the homeless and those living on the breadline. As with many things, those groups risk being left behind by the onward march of technology through no fault of their own. Indeed, some people do not want to go fully online. Many people who are perfectly au fait with the latest gadgets are none the less deeply concerned about the security of their data, and who can blame them?

My bank account has been accessed from Israel in the past. My online emails have been broken into during political battles of one sort or another. These things are risky. I hope nobody in the Chamber has forgotten the Edward Snowden revelations about the National Security Agency and GCHQ, which revealed a vast network of covert surveillance and data gathering by Government agencies from ordinary online activity, and the sharing of private information without consent. More recently, we have heard how Government agencies monitored people’s social media posts during the pandemic, and data trading by private companies is an enormous and lucrative industry.

What is more, as time passes and the rise of artificial intelligence takes hold, the ability to make use of central databases is becoming formidable. It is beyond imagination, so people are properly cautious about what data they share and how they share it. For some people—this is where the issue is directly relevant to this Bill—that caution will mean avoiding the use of digital identity verification, and for others that digital verification is simply inaccessible. The Bill therefore creates two serious problems by its underlying assumptions.

Already it is becoming extremely difficult for people to live anything approaching a normal life if they are not fully wired into the online network. If they cannot even verify who they are without that access, what are they supposed to do? That is why I want to create a right to offline verification and, in effect, offline identification. We saw earlier this year what can happen when someone is excluded from basic services, with the planned closure of Nigel Farage’s bank account. That case was not related to identification, but it made clear how much of an impact such exclusion can have on someone’s life. Those who cannot or do not wish to verify their identity digitally could end up in the same position as Farage and many others who have seen their access to banking restricted for unfair reasons.

The rise of online banking, although a great convenience for many, must not mean certain others being left out. We are talking about fairly fundamental rights here. Those people who, by inclination or otherwise, find it preferable or easier to stick to old-fashioned ways must not be excluded from society. My amendment would require that all services requiring identity verification offer a non-digital alternative, ensuring that everyone, regardless of who they are, will have the same access.

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Kate Osborne Portrait Kate Osborne (Jarrow) (Lab)
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I rise to speak to the six amendments that I have tabled to the Bill. I am grateful to Mr Speaker for selecting amendment 11, which I will press to a vote. It is an extremely important amendment that I hope will unite Members across the House, and I thank the hon. Member for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady) for confirming his party’s support for it.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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I add mine and that of the Labour party, too.

Kate Osborne Portrait Kate Osborne
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I thank my hon. Friend for that.

I have been contacted by many people and organisations about issues with the Bill. The British Medical Association and the National AIDS Trust have serious concerns, which I share, about the sharing of healthcare data and the failure to consider the negative impact of losing public trust in how the healthcare system manages data.

The Bill is an opportunity to adapt the UK’s data laws to strengthen accountability and data processing, but it currently fails to do so. It provides multiple Henry VIII powers that will enable future Secretaries of State to avoid parliamentary scrutiny and write their own rules. It undermines the independence of the Information Commissioner’s Office in a way that provides less protection to individuals and gives more power to the Government to restrict and interfere with the role of the commissioner.

The Government’s last-minute amendments to their own Bill, to change the rules on direct marketing in elections and give themselves extensive access to the bank accounts of benefit claimants, risk alienating people even further. I hope the House tells Ministers that it is entirely improper—in fact, it is completely unacceptable—for the Government to make those amendments, which require full parliamentary scrutiny, at this late stage.

We know people already do not trust the Government with NHS health data. The Bill must not erode public trust even more. We have seen concerns about data with GP surgeries and the recent decision to award Palantir the contract for the NHS’s federated data platform. A 2019 YouGov survey showed that only 30% of people trust the Government to use data about them ethically. I imagine that figure is much lower now. How do the Government plan to establish trust with the millions of people on pension credit, state pension, universal credit, child benefit and others whose bank accounts—millions of bank accounts—they will be able to access under the Bill? As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) and others have asked, legislative powers already exist where benefit fraud is suspected, so why is the amendment necessary?

My amendment 11 seeks to ensure that special category data, such as that relating to a person’s health, is adequately protected in workplace settings. As the Bill is currently worded, it could allow employers to share an employee’s personal data within their organisation without a justifiable reason. The health data of all workers will be at risk if the amendment falls. We must ensure that employees’ personal data, including health data, is adequately protected in workplace settings and not shared with individuals who do not need to process it.

The National AIDS Trust is concerned that the Bill’s current wording could mean that people’s HIV status can be shared without their consent in the workplace, using the justification that it is “necessary for administrative purposes”. That could put people living with HIV at risk of harassment and discrimination in the workplace. The sharing of individuals’ HIV status can lead to people living with HIV experiencing further discrimination and increase their risk of harassment or even violence.

I am concerned about the removal of checks on the police processing of an individual’s personal data. We must have such checks. The House has heard of previous incidents involving people living with HIV whose HIV status was shared without their consent by police officers, both internally within their police station and in the wider communities they serve. Ensuring that police officers must justify why they have accessed an individual’s personal data is vital for evidence in cases of police misconduct, including where a person’s HIV status is shared inappropriately by the police or when not relevant to an investigation into criminal activity.

The Bill is not robust enough on the transfer of data internationally. We need to ensure that there is a mandated annual review of the data protection test for each country so that the data protection regime is secure, and that people’s personal data, such as their LGBTQ+ identity or HIV status, will not be shared inappropriately. LGBTQ+ identities are criminalised in many countries, and the transfer of personal data to those countries could put an individual, their partner or their family members at real risk of harm.

I have tabled six amendments, which would clarify what an “administrative purpose” is when organisations process employees’ personal data; retain the duty on police forces to justify why they have accessed an individual’s personal data; ensure that third countries’ data protection tests are reviewed annually; and ensure that the Secretary of State seeks the views of the Information Commissioner when assessing other countries’ suitability for the international transfer of data. I urge all Members to vote for amendment 11, and I urge the Government and the other place to take on board all the points raised in today’s debate and in amendments 12 to 16 in my name.

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covering “seven sectors”. That is wonderful—absolutely super—but I ask, “Which seven sectors, and when?” If the Minister is able to clarify that, or at the very least say when the Government are going to publish the timetable naming the sectors and the dates on which each sector will be ready, he will be doing international investors in our country and our existing successful, world-leading organisations—
Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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I agree with the hon. Gentleman on this, but quite a lot of steps need to be taken here. For instance, we might need to mandate standards on smart meters in order to be able to take advantage of these measures. We have not been given any kind of plans so far—unless he has seen something.

John Penrose Portrait John Penrose
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I wish I had seen something, because then I would be able to pull my amendment or inform the House. I have not seen something, and I think such a plan is essential, not just for Members in the Chamber this afternoon, but for all those investors, business leaders and app developers. That would allow them to work out the critical path, whatever the minimum viable products might be and everything else that is going to be necessary, and by what date, for the sectors they are aiming for. So the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right in what he says, and it is vital that if the Minister cannot come up with the timetable this afternoon, he can at least come up with a timetable for the timetable, so that we all know when the thing will be available and the rest of the open banking industry can work out how it is going to become an “open everything” industry and in what order, and by what time.

So this is fairly straightforward. There are promising signs, both in the autumn statement and in the Government’s new clause 27, but further details need to be tied down before they can be genuinely useful. I am assuming, hoping and praying that the Minister will be able to provide some of those reassurances and details when he makes his closing remarks, and I will therefore be able to count this as a probing amendment and push it no further. I am devoutly hoping that he will be able to make that an easier moment for me when he gets to his feet.

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John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I thank all hon. Members who have contributed to the debate. I believe that these matters are important, if sometimes very complicated and technical. My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr Fysh) was absolutely right to stress how fundamentally important they are, and they will become more so.

I also thank the shadow Minister for identifying the areas where we are in agreement. We had a good Committee stage with his colleague, the hon. Member for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock), where we agreed on the overall objectives of the Bill. It is welcome that the shadow Minister has supported us, particularly on the amendment that we moved this afternoon on the powers of the Information Commissioner’s Office, the provisions relating to digital verification services, and smart data. There were, however, some areas on which we will not agree.

Let me begin by addressing the main amendments that the hon. Gentleman has moved. Amendment 1 relates to high-risk processing. It is the case that one of the main aims of the Bill is to remove some of the UK GDPR’s unnecessary compliance burdens. That is why organisations will be required to designate only senior responsible individuals to carry out risk assessments and keep records of processing when their activities pose high risks to individuals. The amendments that the hon. Gentleman is proposing would reintroduce a prescriptive list of high-risk processing activities drawn from article 35 of the UK GDPR. We find that some of the language in article 35 is unclear and confusing, which is partly why we removed it in the first place. We think organisations should have the ability to make a judgment of risk based on the specific nature, scale and context of their own processing activities. We do not need to provide prescriptive examples of high-risk processing in the legislation, because any list could quickly become out of date. Instead, to help data controllers, clause 18 of the Bill requires the ICO to produce a document with examples of what the commissioner considers to be high-risk processing.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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But the Minister has already indicated that, basically, he will come forward with exactly the same list as is in the legislation that the Government are amending. All that is happening is that, in the Bill, the Information Commissioner will be doing what the Government or the House could be doing, and this is the one area where the Government disagree with the Information Commissioner.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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As I say, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to have a prescriptive list in the Bill. We feel that it is better that individuals make a judgment based on their assessment of the risk, with the guidance of the Information Commissioner.

Moving to the shadow Minister’s second amendment, the Government agree that controllers should not be able to refuse a request without proper thought or consideration. That is why the existing responsibilities of controllers to facilitate requests from data subjects as the default has not changed and why the new article 12A also ensures that the burden of proof for a request meeting the vexatious or excessive threshold remains with the controller. The Government believe that is sufficient, and stipulating that evidence must be provided each time a request is refused may not be appropriate in all circumstances and would likely bring further burdens for controllers. On that basis, we oppose that amendment.

On amendment 5, the safeguards set out in reformed article 22 of the UK GDPR ensure that individuals are able to seek human intervention when significant decisions about them are taken solely through automated means with no meaningful human involvement.

Partly automated decisions already involve meaningful human involvement, so there is no need to extend the safeguards in article 22 to all forms of automated decision making. In such instances, other data protection requirements continue to apply and offer relevant protections to data subjects, as set out in the broader UK data protection regime. Those protections include lawfulness, fairness, transparency and accountability.

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John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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What I am saying is that the Government’s intention is to use the power only when there is clear evidence or suggestion that fraud is taking place on a significant scale. The Government simply want to retain the option to amend that should future evidence emerge; that is why the issue has been left open.

Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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The trouble is that this is not about amending. The Government describe the relevant benefits in part 5 of proposed new schedule 3B, within new schedule 1, which is clear that pensions are included. The Minister has effectively said at the Dispatch Box that the Government do not need to tackle fraud in relation to pensions; perhaps it would be a good idea for us to all sit down and have a meeting to work out a more sensible set of measures to tackle fraud where it is necessary, rather than giving unending powers to the Government.

John Whittingdale Portrait Sir John Whittingdale
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I agree, to the extent that levels of fraud in state pensions being currently nearly zero, the power is not needed in that case. However, the Government wish to retain an option should the position change in the future. But I am happy to take the hon. Gentleman up on his request on behalf of my hon. Friend the Minister for Disabled People, Health and Work, with whom he has already engaged. I am sure that the right hon. Member for East Ham will want to examine the issue further in the Work and Pensions Committee, which he chairs. It will undoubtedly also be subject to further discussions in the other place. We are certainly open to further discussion.

The right hon. Member for East Ham also raised the question of commencement. I can tell him that the test and learn phase will begin in 2025, with a steady roll-out to full-scale delivery by 2030. I am sure that he will want to examine these matters further.

The amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) focuses on digital exclusion. The Bill provides for the use of secure and inclusive digital identities across the economy. It does not force businesses or individuals to use them. Individual choice is integral to our approach. As the Bill makes clear, digital verification services can be provided only at the request of the individual. Where people want to use a digital verification service, the Government are committed to ensuring that available products and services are secure and privacy-focused. That is to be achieved through the high standards set out in the trust framework.

The trust framework also outlines how services can improve inclusion, and requires services to publish an annual inclusion monitoring report. There are businesses that operate only in the digital sphere, such as some online banks and energy companies, as I think has been acknowledged. We feel that to oblige them to offer manual document checking would place obligations on businesses that go beyond the Government’s commitment to do only what is necessary to enable the digital market to grow.

On amendment 224 from the Scottish National party, solely automated decision making that produces legal or similarly significant effects on individuals was not entirely prohibited previously under the UK’s data protection legal framework. The rules governing article 22 are confusing and complex, so clause 12 clarifies and simplifies the rules related to solely automated decision making, and will reduce barriers to responsible data use, help to drive innovation, and maintain high standards of data protection. The reforms do not water down any of the protections to data subjects offered under the broader UK data protection regime—that is, UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018.

On the other amendment tabled by the SNP, amendment 229, effective independent oversight of surveillance camera systems is crucial to public trust. The oversight framework is complex and confusing for the police and public because of substantial duplication between the surveillance camera commissioner functions and the code, which covers police and local authorities in England and Wales only, and the ICO and data protection legislation. The Bill addresses that, following public consultation, through abolishing the surveillance camera commissioner and code.

The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow North would negate that by retaining the code and transferring the surveillance camera commissioner functions to the investigatory powers commissioner. It would also blur the lines between overt and covert surveillance, which the investigatory powers commissioner oversees. Those two types of surveillance have distinct legislation and oversight, mainly because covert surveillance is generally considered to be significantly more intrusive.

On amendment 222, it is important to be clear that the ability to refuse or charge a reasonable fee for a request already exists, and clause 8 does not place new restrictions on reasonable requests from data subjects. The Government believe that it is proportionate to allow controllers to refuse or charge a reasonable fee for vexatious or excessive requests, and a clearer provision enables controllers to focus time and resources on responding to reasonable requests instead.

Amendments 278 and 279, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil, would remove the new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interests, which the Bill will add to article 6 of UK GDPR. Amendment 230 accepts that there is merit in retaining the recognised legitimate interests list, but would make any additions to it subject to a super-affirmative parliamentary procedure. It is true that the Bill removes the need for non-public-sector organisations to do a detailed legitimate interests assessment in relation to a small number of processing activities. Those include activities relating for example to the safeguarding of children, crime prevention and responding to emergencies. We heard from stakeholders that the need to do an assessment and the fear of getting it wrong could sometimes delay or deter those important processing activities from taking place. Future Governments would not be able to add new activities to the list lightly; clause 5 of the Bill already makes it clear that the Secretary of State must carefully consider the rights and interests of people, and in particular the special protection needed for children, before adding anything new to the list. Any new regulations would also need to be approved via the affirmative resolution procedure.

My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil has tabled a large number of other amendments, which are complicated in nature. I have written to him in some detail setting out the Government’s response to each of those, but if he wishes to pursue further any of the points contained therein I would be very happy to have further discussions with him.

I would like to comment on the amendments by several of my colleagues that I wish I was in a position to be able to support. In particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Jane Hunt) has been assiduous in pursuing her point both in the Bill Committee and in this debate. The problem she identifies is without question a very real one, and she set out in some detail how it is massively increasing the burden on the police, which clearly we would wish to reduce wherever possible.

I have had meetings with Home Office Ministers, as my hon. Friend has, and they absolutely identify that problem and share her wish. While we welcome her intent, the problem is that we do not think that her amendment as drafted would achieve her aims of removing the burden of redaction. To do so would require the amendment and exception of more principles than those identified in the amendment. Indeed, it would require the amendment of more laws than just the Data Protection Act 2018.

The Government are absolutely committed to reducing the burden on the police, but it is obviously important that, if we do so, we do it right, and that the solution works comprehensively. We are therefore actively working on ways to better address the issue, including through improved process, new technology, guidance and legislation. I am very happy to continue to work with her on achieving the aim that we all share and so too, I know, are colleagues in the Home Office.

With respect to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), as I indicated, we absolutely share his enthusiasm for smart data and ensuring that the powers within the Bill are implemented in a timely manner, with interoperability at their core. While I agree that we can only fully realise the benefits of smart data schemes if they enable interoperability, different sectors will have different levels of existing digital infrastructure and capability. Thus, we could inadvertently hinder the success of future schemes if we mandated the use of one universal set of standards based, for instance, on those used in open banking.

The Government will ensure that interoperability is central to the development of smart data schemes. To support our thinking, we are working with industry and regulators in the Smart Data Council to identify the technical infrastructure that needs to be replicated. With regard to the timeline—or even the timeline for a timeline—that my hon. Friend asked for, I recognise that it is important to build investor, industry and consumer confidence by outlining the Government’s planned timeline.

My hon. Friend is right to highlight the Chancellor’s comments in the autumn statement, where we set out plans to kick-start the smart data big bang, and our ambition for using those powers across seven sectors. At this stage I am afraid I am not able to accept his amendment, but it is our intention to set out those plans in more detail in the coming months. I know the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and I will be happy to work with him to do so.

The aim of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Jarrow (Kate Osborne) was to clarify that, when special category data of employees such as health data is transferred between members of a group of undertakings for internal administrative purposes on grounds of legitimate interests, the conditions and safeguards outlined in schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act should apply to that processing. The Government agree with the sentiment of her amendment, but consider that it is unnecessary. The current legal framework already requires controllers to identify an exemption under article 9 of the UK GDPR if they are processing special category data. Those exemptions are supplemented by the conditions and safeguards outlined in schedule 1. Under those provisions, employers can process special category data where processing is necessary to comply with obligations under employment law. We do not therefore consider the amendment necessary.

Finally, I turn to new clause 45, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar). The Government are absolutely committed to improving the availability of comparable UK-wide data. He, too, has been assiduous in promoting that cause, and we are very happy to work with him. We are extremely supportive of the principle underlying his amendment. He is right to point out that people have the right to know the extent of Labour’s failings with the NHS in Wales, as he pointed out, and his new clause sends an important message on our commitment to better data. I can commit to working at pace with him and the UK Statistics Authority to look at ways in which we may be able to implement the intentions of his amendment and bring forward legislative changes following those discussions.

On that basis, I commend the Government amendments to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 6 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

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Chris Bryant Portrait Sir Chris Bryant
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I, too, would like to thank the Clerks for their help. They are always enormously helpful, especially to Opposition Members, and sometimes to Government Members as well. I would like to commend my close friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock), who took the Bill through Committee for our side. I think the Minister suggested that it was rather more fun having her up against him than me, which was very cruel and unkind of him.

We support the Bill, although I suspect that regulatory divergence is a bit of a chimera, and that regulatory convergence in this field will give UK businesses greater stability and certainty, but that is for another day. I also worry about the extensive powers that Ministers are giving themselves, and the suggestion that they will switch off the rules on direct marketing in the run-up to a general election. Then there is new schedule 1. I repeat the offer I have made several times, which is that we stand ready to knock that into far better shape, whether in meetings we have privately or through our colleagues in the House of Lords. I feel ashamed to say it, but I hope the Lords are able to do the line-by-line scrutiny that we have been prevented from doing today.

Roger Gale Portrait Mr Deputy Speaker
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I call the SNP spokesperson.