(3 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI respectfully ask the Minister to reflect carefully on what I and the hon. Member for Glenrothes have said this afternoon. Whether or not the Minister thinks the new clause is one he can reasonably adopt, he has already accepted, in terms of what he says may be in the scope of the Bill, that this is a real issue. This is something that we have to think very carefully about and that, by its nature, is fairly difficult to pin down, because it relates to a series of actions that do not easily fit into the box of control or company takeover. It is much more subtle and potentially wide-ranging, but nevertheless it is something that we know is real. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, it is happening in silicon valley, Germany and this country. It is happening in a number of places. Interests are being bought up not because of altruistic concern for the health and welfare of that particular start-up, but for other, much more worrying reasons than simply influence as a limited partner in a company.
I am pleased that the Minister put on record that he thought that the extension of this activity might be in the scope of the Bill already, although I think it is stretching what the Bill has to say to take that line. I hope he will not regret that. When he looks at what he has said about what he thinks is in the Bill, he may find, on reflection, that the new clause would have been more use to him than he thought. However, I am not going to press the issue to a vote this afternoon.
I hope the Minister will reflect carefully. He has already said on the record that he thinks that a number of these measures can be squeezed into the Bill. I hope he will not find that there are circumstances where he needs this method of operation but that it can, after all, not be squeezed into the Bill as well as he thinks it can be. I hear what he says and wish him the best of luck with squeezing things into legislation that perhaps were not quite there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee
“(1) The Secretary of State must, in relation to each relevant period –
(a) prepare a report in accordance with this section, and
(b) provide a copy of it to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.
(2) Each report must provide, in respect of mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events called-in, and final orders given, details of—
(c) the jurisdiction of the acquirer and its incorporation;
(d) the number of state-owned entities and details of states of such entities;
(e) the nature of national security risks posed in transactions for which there were final orders;
(f) details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were being targeted; and
(g) any other information the Secretary of State may deem instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under this Act.”.—(Chi Onwurah.)
This new clause would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about powers exercised under this Act, allowing closer scrutiny and monitoring.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is with some regret that I rise to move new clause 7, because it is the last new clause we propose to the Bill. It is a Christmas present to the Minister. Things have certainly been interesting since we began our line-by-line scrutiny. With your leave, Sir Graham, I will take this opportunity to thank all those involved in drafting the Bill, as well as the Clerks, who have worked so hard and played such an important role in helping to draft amendments and provide support to all members of the Committee. I also thank you, Sir Graham, for chairing it so admirably.
We have learned a great deal over the last couple of weeks. I have learned just about everybody’s constituency—
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI think we can agree that it was brief. Bills would come to Ministers, fresh from the wells of construction and the pushing of pens to get them into good shape. I wonder whether there is a style guide, deep in the bowels of a building somewhere in Whitehall, that says, “Whenever the Minister is supposed to do something, write ‘may’ in small print.” It is such a long-serving style guide that people have forgotten why the word was ever put in the Bill in the first place.
The Minister would do a great service to the writing of Bills if he were able to say, “I don’t want to go along with the style guide. If someone is supposed to do something, I want to have that written in the Bill.” I appreciate that if the Minister were to say that when sitting around with a number of people who had a freshly minted copy of the proto-Bill in front of them, there would be much stroking of chins and suggestions of, “That is a rather brave method of proceeding, Minister.” But the Minister has the opportunity today, entirely divorced from all those influences, simply to say, “Yes, we will accept this amendment as a stake in the ground for the uprating of the style guide, wherever it happens to be.” That would be a great service to the Committee and to the nation, by getting us into a position where Bills are written to mean what they say and say what they mean.
I do not want to anticipate what the Minister will say, but he has said, with regards to similar amendments, that stating that the Secretary of State will do something does not mean that he definitely must do it. Does my hon. Friend agree that for the sake of clarity—for us in Parliament but also for businesses, particularly those affected by this—changing that one word would greatly improve the understanding of how the Bill will work?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If I went to my bank manager, who had called me in about my overdraft, and I said, “I don’t need to say anything other than, ‘I may pay it back,’ but don’t worry, because I will pay it back,” my bank manager might be a little upset and might have something to say about it.
It is curious that we have locutions in the putting together of Bills that fly in the face of common-sense parlance. I agree with my hon. Friend that it really is no great defence to say, “Don’t worry. We don’t need to change this, because we are going to do it.” It would be far better all round if we were straightforward, accurate and clear and put this wording in the legislation, so that everybody knows what we are doing for the future. If, by so doing, the Minister can banish that style guide from the bowels of the building forever, that would be a great service.
I beg you indulgence, Mr Twigg: I intend to speak first to clause stand part and then to amendment 29, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. Clause 53 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that set out the procedure that the Secretary of State must follow when giving a notice of, or serving, an order once the Bill becomes an Act. The level of detail that these provisions will involve is most appropriately dealt with in delegated legislation. That will also allow the provisions to be modified more easily if changes are deemed appropriate—in the light of operational experience, for example. I know all colleagues will share with me the wish for the unit’s operations to be as efficient and as slick as we can make them.
Examples of notices and orders include information notices, attendance notices, interim orders, final orders or penalty notices issued by the Secretary of State for non-compliance. The clause sets out what may be included in the regulations. For example, they may include the manner in which a document must be given or served and whether it is allowed to be served electronically—for example, by email.
Amendment 29 would require the Secretary of State to make these regulations, which returns, if I may say so, to the recurring theme raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, about the difference between “may” and “shall”. At the risk of becoming predictable, my thoughts here carry certain echoes of our previous discussions.
As hon. Members will know, clause 53 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that will set out the procedure that must the Secretary of State must follow when giving a notice or serving an order once the Bill becomes an Act. It is an entirely laudable objective to ensure that the Secretary of State provides those affected by this regime with the right information on the operation of the regime, and it is one that I shall always support. In practice, though, the amendment is unnecessary.
Although the Secretary of State may make regulations to that effect, in practice, for the regime to function effectively, he must do so. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State certainly does not propose to commence the regime without first making these procedural regulations. I therefore assure the hon. Member that the amendment is not required, as he and the Government seem to be in hearty agreement on the importance of such regulation. I ask him to do the honourable thing and withdraw the amendment.
Warm exchanges. It is certainly something to be welcomed.
I would like to say a few words to clause 53 stand part. As my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test observed, this is another example of a “may” rather than a “will”. The clause exists purely to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations—that is its function—and yet it places no requirement on the Secretary of State to do so.
While the Minister gave a warm response, saying that he and my hon. Friend are on exactly the same page and so on in our desires, I remind him that the Bill is not about our desires; it is about a legislative framework that protects our national security and gives, as much as possible, clarity and certainty to those impacted by it. It is because we recognise the importance of the clause that we wish it to have some effect in law, as opposed to being the gentle suggestion it seems to be at the moment.
The Minister has used a bank manager defence. If my bank manager wrote to me to say, “You have an overdraft that you must pay,” and I wrote back and said, “Dear Bank Manager, I may repay my overdraft,” and then the bank manager called me in and said, “What is the meaning of this letter?” and I said, “Don’t worry, I will pay the overdraft soon. No problem. That letter stands,” that would be a problem for me, but apparently not as far as legislation is concerned. The Minister has effectively said, “Don’t worry. This is definitely going to happen. We are all agreed it will happen,” so why not write it in legislation?
I will not pursue this matter to a Division, because we have exhausted this mine in Committee. The Minister knows that this is not the first time I have raised this issue during the passage of Bills, and I will continue to do so because it is an important principle that legislation should say what it will actually do. Perhaps that is a bit basic, but that is what I think is important. I will indeed withdraw the amendment. I thank the Minister for his reply this morning, although it does not dent my crusading zeal for this particular change to be made in legislation generally. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Disclosure of information
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 54, page 34, line 9, leave out
“which appears to the Secretary of State”
and insert
“which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to only share information, acquired in the course of national security reviews, if the Secretary of State has first undertaken reasonable enquiry.
I hope the Minister also agrees that we are moving to a much expanded national security screening regime. In 2002, Facebook was a year old or just being born. We are no longer in the place we were in 2002 when it comes to the issues of importance, volume, security and privacy associated with data and data sharing. I hope he will not rely on the 2002 Act as a justification, particularly as we are moving to an expanded national security screening issue and we are in a different data environment.
The strategy says that data is the economic engine, and we must be much better in assuring businesses and investors of their data protection. Instead of relying on appearances, the amendment holds up the standard of reason. Under it, the Secretary of State would have all the relevant powers of data sharing with relevant persons so long as the Secretary of State had reason, based “on a reasonable enquiry”, to think the person to be a relevant public authority.
It is critical that the UK has a national security regime that is grounded in national, competent exercise of state power to protect our security. The amendment would help to build success in that direction by removing a reliance on the use of appearance and instinct, by successive Secretaries of State, and grounding decisions in “reasonable enquiry” instead.
The expert evidence sessions provided support for that view. For example, Chris Cummings from the Investment Association said:
“There is so much around any investment process and the acquisition process that has to remain entirely confidential, that investors would require and would be looking for reassurance that these conversations could be held in the strictest of confidence and that nothing would appear until the right time.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 66, Q78.]
I ask the Committee to consider whether sharing data on the basis of appearances gives that reassurance.
The clause will give information-sharing powers to the Secretary of State. We recognise the importance of that, and we do not want to hinder it unduly, but we expect that the Secretary of State should, and importantly, should be seen to, exercise those powers on the basis of evidence. It is only right that we have clear evidential requirements. Although the 2002 Act uses similar language, it is right that we in this Committee clean up that language based on 19 further years of experience.
I wonder whether my hon. Friend might be tempted to use a bank manager comparison here as well. If I was summoned by my bank manager to the bank, and he or she said, “It appears you’re overdrawn,” and I said, “Why do you think I’m overdrawn?” and he or she said, “I don’t know. It just appears to me that you’re overdrawn,” I might say, “Could you pursue reasonable inquiries to find out whether my account is actually overdrawn or not?” Does she agree that that is an example of the appropriate use of ordinary language, and that the Bill could be put into that state?
I commend my hon. Friend on the extent to which he has used engagement with a bank manager to illuminate much of our discussion. He is absolutely right. To be honest, if any bank invited you to consider an overdraft on such a flimsy pretext, you would, I hope, change your bank, because you could not feel confident in it.
The serious point is that small and medium businesses and start-ups—our great innovation ecosystem in this country—can move, but we do not want them to move. We want them to stay in this country within the legislative framework. We want the new Bill to provide them with the reassurance and confidence that they need to help to implement the Bill effectively and to protect national security. My hon. Friend’s elegant example highlights the failings of the clause.
I anticipate that the Minister will talk about the language in the Enterprise Act. Not only is that 18 or 19 years old, which is one reason that this Bill has been needed for so long, but the person exercising the functions and powers in the Competition and Markets Authority is not a political appointee or political figure. The Bill refers to a political figure, the Secretary of State, so it is all the more important that he or she should be seen to act on the basis of evidence, not on the basis of appearance or instinct.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI respectfully ask the Minister to reflect carefully on what I and the hon. Member for Glenrothes have said this afternoon. Whether or not the Minister thinks the new clause is one he can reasonably adopt, he has already accepted, in terms of what he says may be in the scope of the Bill, that this is a real issue. This is something that we have to think very carefully about and that, by its nature, is fairly difficult to pin down, because it relates to a series of actions that do not easily fit into the box of control or company takeover. It is much more subtle and potentially wide-ranging, but nevertheless it is something that we know is real. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, it is happening in silicon valley, Germany and this country. It is happening in a number of places. Interests are being bought up not because of altruistic concern for the health and welfare of that particular start-up, but for other, much more worrying reasons than simply influence as a limited partner in a company.
I am pleased that the Minister put on record that he thought that the extension of this activity might be in the scope of the Bill already, although I think it is stretching what the Bill has to say to take that line. I hope he will not regret that. When he looks at what he has said about what he thinks is in the Bill, he may find, on reflection, that the new clause would have been more use to him than he thought. However, I am not going to press the issue to a vote this afternoon.
I hope the Minister will reflect carefully. He has already said on the record that he thinks that a number of these measures can be squeezed into the Bill. I hope he will not find that there are circumstances where he needs this method of operation but that it can, after all, not be squeezed into the Bill as well as he thinks it can be. I hear what he says and wish him the best of luck with squeezing things into legislation that perhaps were not quite there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee
“(1) The Secretary of State must, in relation to each relevant period –
(a) prepare a report in accordance with this section, and
(b) provide a copy of it to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.
(2) Each report must provide, in respect of mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events called-in, and final orders given, details of—
(c) the jurisdiction of the acquirer and its incorporation;
(d) the number of state-owned entities and details of states of such entities;
(e) the nature of national security risks posed in transactions for which there were final orders;
(f) details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were being targeted; and
(g) any other information the Secretary of State may deem instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under this Act.”.—(Chi Onwurah.)
This new clause would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about powers exercised under this Act, allowing closer scrutiny and monitoring.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is with some regret that I rise to move new clause 7, because it is the last new clause we propose to the Bill. It is a Christmas present to the Minister. Things have certainly been interesting since we began our line-by-line scrutiny. With your leave, Sir Graham, I will take this opportunity to thank all those involved in drafting the Bill, as well as the Clerks, who have worked so hard and played such an important role in helping to draft amendments and provide support to all members of the Committee. I also thank you, Sir Graham, for chairing it so admirably.
We have learned a great deal over the last couple of weeks. I have learned just about everybody’s constituency—
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the Minister for that clarification, which appears to suggest that the whole of the Bill, or the decisions in it, are in principle covered by the ability to bring a judicial review. He will know that under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 there is some pretty clear guidance about the time limits for judicial reviews. Indeed, the CPRs state that claims must be lodged promptly and, in any event, no later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose, unless the court exercises its discretion to extend. The judicial review rules are pretty much governed by that three-month time limit.
In the clause, the framers of the Bill have taken out certain elements of the Bill. I mentioned some of them, including the attendance of witnesses and the power to require information. They have said that, while no new procedure has been put in place for reviewing certain decisions—that is, the normal rules of judicial review apply—the big difference is that any action must be brought within 28 days of the event, and not within three months, as is the case in the standard judicial review arrangements.
I thank my hon. Friend for the excellent points that he is making, which give cause for concern and thought. Given the Minister’s earlier assertion that there was no need for a complaints procedure with regard to the provisions of the Bill, does my hon. Friend agree that neither the reporting requirement, which we have identified will not mean reporting on everything, nor the judicial review provisions, which we have now identified are not reviewable in the normal timescales for everything, will be sufficient to address the concerns of small and medium-sized enterprises? Does he also agree that that will clearly not be the case given the complexities that he has outlined?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the extent to which justice in such circumstances might be like the Ritz: open to everybody, but not necessarily quite as open to some as to others.
Certainly, that is the case with the time reduction applied to those particular things in the clause. Nevertheless, that reduction has to fit in with judicial review rules for everything else. That is, no new procedure is set out in the Bill, which is otherwise reliant on the standard judicial review procedures.
Hon. Members will see that elsewhere the civil procedure rules refer to the provision of skeleton arguments before a judicial review can be heard. Under those rules, such arguments must be undertaken within 21 working days of a hearing, which in practice means close to the 28 days in the clause, which are not as working days. Given the adherence to the rest of the judicial review rules, therefore, the 28 days can conceivably reduce to virtually nothing the period in which a person may apply for a claim to judicial review under the Bill.
Furthermore—this is what I think my hon. Friend was alluding to—given that brief timescale, it is important and I would say necessary to have a clear idea of when the event that caused the 28-day timescale to come in took place. I turned up an interesting article, one of Weightmans’ “Insights”, from October 2013, entitled “Is the clock ticking? The importance of time limits in judicial review”. The point made in that article is that getting the point at which the clock started ticking absolutely right is important.
I am not certain whether all the events specified in the clause have identical starting points. That is, is the starting point a trigger mechanism? Is the starting point the issuing of a notice? Is the starting point the receipt of a notice? If the receipt of a notice is delayed—and the judicial review procedure very much hinges on the actions of the Secretary of State in issuing notices—my hon. Friend can imagine that, for a small business, that could be very confusing and possibly difficult to adhere to. If it turns out that the point at which the 28-day clock starts to tick varies according to different provisions of the clause, descibed as the particular provisions that the Secretary of State has reserved for the 28-day reduction in judicial review, that will be pretty difficult for people to adhere to properly.
Judicial review is a very important part of the process; not that it would often be used, but it is important that it is there in the Bill. It is also important that the people affected by the arrangements have access to the judicial review process. The Government obviously recognise that by putting it into legislation. I am concerned not about the fact that it is in the legislation—it should be—but about whether placing certain areas of concern in the Bill under that 28-day heading has been completely thought out. If it has been completely thought out, why has it been thought out in that particular way? What is it about those things that requires the normal rules of judicial review to be reduced from three months to 28 days?
I am sorry to interrupt my hon. Friend while he is in full flow, and I am immensely grateful for what I am learning about the intricacies of the judicial review process and the importance of understanding the initial timing and what the trigger event was. He mentioned that skeleton hearings must take place within 21 working days. Can he say a little bit more, for my understanding, about how those skeleton hearings affect the following timetables in the process?
My hon. Friend somehow suggests that I have knowledge and expertise beyond my calling. I should say that I am not a lawyer, so I have only limited guidance to give her on this. However, from my reading of civil procedure rules, there are certainly elements, which I think relate to working days in some instances and to simple time in others, that are sub-time limits within the overall limit for judicial review. Civil procedure rules give those sub-limits as working practices for the operation of judicial review overall. The skeleton argument rule requires skeleton arguments to be put to the court within a certain period before the hearing takes place. If the hearing is delayed for a long time after the initial event, the 21 days apply before the court hearing. However, if the court hearing is close to the event, those sub-rules within the overall judicial review rules could affect quite substantially an individual’s remaining time to get their case together prior to the hearing.
The point I was trying to make is that the uncertainty in any of those sections means that any party to a transaction can, if they feel they could frustrate the process because the outcome might not be advantageous to them, use the judicial review process to add to the uncertainty of a transaction. In addition, there is also a public interest in timely certainty and finality about decisions made under the regime that are, after all, imposed for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The 28-day limit is also in line with the current merger screening regime that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test asked about, where applications for the competitions appeal tribunal made under the Enterprise Act 2002 to review a merger decision must be made within four weeks, a time period chosen after public consultation. There may be some situations where, for legitimate reasons, 28 days is simply not enough. It is therefore important to remember that this Bill provides that the court may “entertain proceedings” that are sought after the 28-day limit, if it is considered that exceptional circumstances apply.
This shortened time limit and flexibility is for the courts to deal with exceptional circumstances. It strikes the right balance for this regime, in my view. It allows sufficient time for parties to obtain legal advice and mount a challenge, while also providing timely certainty about the effect of the relevant decision made under the Bill. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will withdraw the amendment.
I have to be honest, I did not think that was very good. Let us start with who is shortening and who is not shortening. The Minister said that the Opposition seek to lengthen the period; no, the Opposition are not seeking to lengthen the period. The Government are seeking to shorten the period that is standard in the UK justice system as far as judicial reviews overall are concerned.
That is a very important point, because the Opposition are not trying to do something that is not an ordinary principle of British justice; the Government are trying to that. The Minister’s remarks could have applied to a lot of other areas, where it might be a bit inconvenient to have a judicial review being tenable for a three-month period after an event had occurred. However, it is not a question of inconvenience. Is a matter so important to national security that the 28 days can be justified under those terms?
The Minister has sought to justify the 28 days under the terms that there may be some uncertainty if there is a longer period for judicial review to be undertaken. He is potentially right about that, but not right as far as this Bill is concerned. He is right potentially as far as any application for judicial review is concerned, in all sorts of areas in this country. That is the problem of judicial review for the Administration, under any circumstances. When someone comes along and says, “I’m going to JR this,” a lot of people clap their hands and say, “That’s very inconvenient. It really does foul things up, because we would like to do this, that and next thing, but because we have been judicially reviewed, we have to carry out the procedure that is there.”
As several people have said in a number of different circumstances, the fact that the JR procedure is there and that often ordinary people have a reasonable amount of time to get their case together to undertake the JR process, is an important principle of the British justice system. The Minister has made no serious case for why these things should be so special under these circumstances. Interestingly, the consultation document did not make any case at all for the 28 days, other than to note that it was a shorter period. I am sorry to say that this appears to be a shortened period simply for administrative convenience.
Does my hon. Friend think that shortening the JR period for administrative reasons is especially contentious, given that the judicial review process would be the only option for small and medium enterprises to complain about the way in which they are being treated under this process? The Minister says that their only option to make a complaint is effectively to JR it, yet they are given less time to JR it.
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. In many circumstances, we are not talking about the sort of JRs that we hear about in the press, where a big corporation has been judicially reviewed on some subject by another large corporation, or some big body has judicially reviewed someone else about a planning decision.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe amendment follows on from a number of concerns that have been raised about small businesses, their role in the production of information and attendance notices, and the effect on those small businesses; and about the potential development of a regime that is far more onerous than those in other parts of the world as we pursue the proper purpose of dealing with information and attendance, and shining a light on the activities of companies that may need to declare what they are doing in a reasonably timely way.
I am reminded of the question of reasonable speed and efficiency, as far as notification and evidence are concerned, as our expert witnesses mentioned earlier in our proceedings. Michael Leiter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP stated:
“I think it will be an issue unless you are confident that small-scale, early-stage investors can have their transactions quickly reviewed within roughly 30 to 45 days. If it is longer than that, that will make the investment climate, I think, worse than other competing markets. I think that could have an impact.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 47, Q53.]
The question in front of us is how we ensure that that happens, or at least shine a light on the process and monitor it. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish each year the aggregate number of days included under subsection (4), the number of called-in events for which such days are included, and the number of times information notices are given for each called-in event in the report required in clause 61.
We have not debated clause 61 yet, but it requires the Secretary of State to produce an annual report of quite extensive proportions on proceedings generally under the Act, as it will be. Hon. Members will note that clause 61 provides for what one might call a quantity report. It will record expenditure, the number of mandatory notices accepted and rejected, the number of voluntary notices accepted and rejected, the number of call-in notices, and the number of final notifications. It is an annual numbers report. The amendment would add quality to that quantity.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for his excellent comments on the amendment. Does he also recognise that the report under clause 61 is the one that the Minister just described as providing accountability to small businesses regarding their concerns about procedure or how they might be affected by the Bill? Does my hon. Friend therefore agree that adding quality to quantity as a function of that report would be a truly important step?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the overall effect that shining a light on proceedings, and accounting for them, will have. She emphasises that it will be important for small businesses—I will come to the mechanisms by which this might be done—to see how effectively things are run and organised, ideally in their own interest when it comes to the question of turnaround in proceedings. I quoted one expert witness, but a number of them emphasised the point about turnaround and the problems that might arise for small businesses as a result of lengthy periods of consideration.
My hon. Friend emphasises what I want to emphasise, which is that the report under clause 61 does not enable anyone to assess efficiency and effectiveness. A reader of that report could look at what has occurred and what numbers have gone out, but it would not allow them to consider the efficiency with which those numbers have been arrived at. Our amendment would make that possible. The report under clause 61 would be on the numbers, but the amendment would make it much easier for a reader of the report to interrogate the numbers, and it would therefore add quality to quantity.
It is important that the Committee recognises the momentous occasion of the first use of the vaccine in this country and congratulates the Minister. It is also important that we reflect on the fact that our fantastic NHS and key workers, rather than the Minister himself, made it possible.
Indeed. I was about to reflect on the appointment a long while ago—in another time and another Administration, when there was a severe and prolonged drought—of a Minister for drought, the right hon. Denis Howell. The Minister’s success was amazing: within about three days of his appointment, it poured with rain.
My hon. Friend is making a really important point, because we all know that what is measured throws a light on the process behind it. If these orders are not measured, I am concerned that they will effectively be a way for a hard-pressed department to gain more time. We have all seen during this pandemic—I refer not least to responses to parliamentary questions—how pressure on resources has increased timescales in the operation of Government Departments. This amendment would shine a light on that and prevent such misuse.
My hon. Friend makes an important point on the amendment about how we undertake the difficult job of making sure something is efficiently and effectively carried out, while not taking the wheels from under the organisation as it does its job. That is a difficult process to undertake, because information notices are clearly important, as are attendance notices, and we should have no mechanisms in the Bill that prevent or undermine the ability of the organisation charged with giving notices out to do that properly. That is a given as far as the process is concerned.
However, it is equally important that substantial light is shed on how that process works in practice and whether, over a period of time, that process might be seen not to be working as well as it should be in combining the necessities of those notices with a reasonably fair approach, particularly as far as small businesses are concerned. Managing that metric properly while enabling the unit to carry out its job properly is quite a task.
The amendment would enable us to undertake that task by requiring the recording of quality—that is, the numbers of notices given out, the “aggregate amount of days” that those notices have consumed and the
“number of called-in events for which such days are included”.
By enumerating those numbers and putting them together in each report, we can see whether the unit is doing its job well overall, could improve or could undertake activities to make sure that there was a balance between efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in the whole process.
Indeed, it is not just small businesses that might welcome having a light shone on what is being done to them; it would also be a potentially important tool to allow the Secretary of State to see what the unit, which is essentially carrying out the Secretary of State’s work, would be doing over each period of the year. The Secretary of State could use that reporting mechanism as a way of ensuring that the unit is doing what it should and that the principles we have set out in the Bill for the good expedition of information and attendance notices continue to operate in the best possible way over a period of time.
Adding quality to the quantity in the report is good news all around. It enhances the Secretary of State’s ability to manage his or her own Department. It shines a light for those bodies that ought to be co-operators in the process, but that may sometimes feel themselves as victims in the process. It shines a ray of light on the operation of the organisation itself—the unit carrying out these activities—and is therefore a welcome addition to its activities. That will keep it considering the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations in the knowledge that the information will be stuck in a report each year and will be scrutinised in terms of the unit’s activities in carrying out the wishes behind what will be the Act.
The amendment would be a constructive and careful addition to the reporting process, and one that would considerably enhance the effectiveness of the Bill. I hope the Secretary of State can consider it in the light in which it is intended, which is as an addition to the Bill, and not as seeking to undermine the effectiveness of the process or the activities of the unit itself.
Given that, as my hon. Friend sets out, this information should be of use to the unit’s internal workings and that it would, I hope, be readily available in the Department, as part of the workflow in modern-day information management systems, can he think of any reason why the Secretary of State would not want to make it available?
I cannot immediately, because as I mentioned, having that information available in some way or other—we suggest it should be in the report—is a win, win, win all round. It is useful for everybody and potentially important for some.
I do not suggest for a moment that there might be anything untoward about hiding that information away, and I am sure that the Minister absolutely would not want that to happen. However, under the mechanism he has set out and his argument for why this amendment is unnecessary, that is precisely what could happen, which is not something that we should feel very happy about. I hope that, as a minimum, the Minister will address that point, along with the intervention by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South about this information being freely available one way or another, whether in a report or not. An overwhelmingly better idea would be simply and unobtrusively to add it to the report, so that we knew it would come out and could refer to it.
I am not sure whether we would seek to divide the Committee on this—[Interruption]—but I think we might. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, I am slightly at a loss as to why this provision would not be acknowledged and put in the Bill, or something close to it, one way or another. I invite the Minister to intervene to say whether the disclosure of this information on a regular basis would happen in the report or whether he will give an undertaking to ensure that happens in passing this legislation.
To be precise, I said that I was not sure whether we should divide, because we are a little bemused as to why, one way or another, that information should not be within the report or the Minister could not make a firm statement that it will be regularly available, and the Minister has not said either in his response.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. Does he agree that it would be helpful if we could be sure that the Minister’s accuracy were not as low when reporting my hon. Friend’s words as when reporting on the functioning of the clause?
To be kind, I think the Minister was reflecting on what the motives for our brief discussion about dividing might have been, rather than attempting in any way to put words in people’s mouths that were not there.
I will put Committee members out of their misery. I do not think there was sufficient reassurance in the responses that have been given, and I think we ought to record that we would like the amendment to be in the Bill. Therefore, we will divide the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank my hon. Friend for the excellent points that he is making, which give cause for concern and thought. Given the Minister’s earlier assertion that there was no need for a complaints procedure with regard to the provisions of the Bill, does my hon. Friend agree that neither the reporting requirement, which we have identified will not mean reporting on everything, nor the judicial review provisions, which we have now identified are not reviewable in the normal timescales for everything, will be sufficient to address the concerns of small and medium-sized enterprises? Does he also agree that that will clearly not be the case given the complexities that he has outlined?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the extent to which justice in such circumstances might be like the Ritz: open to everybody, but not necessarily quite as open to some as to others.
Certainly, that is the case with the time reduction applied to those particular things in the clause. Nevertheless, that reduction has to fit in with judicial review rules for everything else. That is, no new procedure is set out in the Bill, which is otherwise reliant on the standard judicial review procedures.
Hon. Members will see that elsewhere the civil procedure rules refer to the provision of skeleton arguments before a judicial review can be heard. Under those rules, such arguments must be undertaken within 21 working days of a hearing, which in practice means close to the 28 days in the clause, which are not as working days. Given the adherence to the rest of the judicial review rules, therefore, the 28 days can conceivably reduce to virtually nothing the period in which a person may apply for a claim to judicial review under the Bill.
Furthermore—this is what I think my hon. Friend was alluding to—given that brief timescale, it is important and I would say necessary to have a clear idea of when the event that caused the 28-day timescale to come in took place. I turned up an interesting article, one of Weightmans’ “Insights”, from October 2013, entitled “Is the clock ticking? The importance of time limits in judicial review”. The point made in that article is that getting the point at which the clock started ticking absolutely right is important.
I am not certain whether all the events specified in the clause have identical starting points. That is, is the starting point a trigger mechanism? Is the starting point the issuing of a notice? Is the starting point the receipt of a notice? If the receipt of a notice is delayed—and the judicial review procedure very much hinges on the actions of the Secretary of State in issuing notices—my hon. Friend can imagine that, for a small business, that could be very confusing and possibly difficult to adhere to. If it turns out that the point at which the 28-day clock starts to tick varies according to different provisions of the clause, descibed as the particular provisions that the Secretary of State has reserved for the 28-day reduction in judicial review, that will be pretty difficult for people to adhere to properly.
Judicial review is a very important part of the process; not that it would often be used, but it is important that it is there in the Bill. It is also important that the people affected by the arrangements have access to the judicial review process. The Government obviously recognise that by putting it into legislation. I am concerned not about the fact that it is in the legislation—it should be—but about whether placing certain areas of concern in the Bill under that 28-day heading has been completely thought out. If it has been completely thought out, why has it been thought out in that particular way? What is it about those things that requires the normal rules of judicial review to be reduced from three months to 28 days?
I am sorry to interrupt my hon. Friend while he is in full flow, and I am immensely grateful for what I am learning about the intricacies of the judicial review process and the importance of understanding the initial timing and what the trigger event was. He mentioned that skeleton hearings must take place within 21 working days. Can he say a little bit more, for my understanding, about how those skeleton hearings affect the following timetables in the process?
My hon. Friend somehow suggests that I have knowledge and expertise beyond my calling. I should say that I am not a lawyer, so I have only limited guidance to give her on this. However, from my reading of civil procedure rules, there are certainly elements, which I think relate to working days in some instances and to simple time in others, that are sub-time limits within the overall limit for judicial review. Civil procedure rules give those sub-limits as working practices for the operation of judicial review overall. The skeleton argument rule requires skeleton arguments to be put to the court within a certain period before the hearing takes place. If the hearing is delayed for a long time after the initial event, the 21 days apply before the court hearing. However, if the court hearing is close to the event, those sub-rules within the overall judicial review rules could affect quite substantially an individual’s remaining time to get their case together prior to the hearing.
The point I was trying to make is that the uncertainty in any of those sections means that any party to a transaction can, if they feel they could frustrate the process because the outcome might not be advantageous to them, use the judicial review process to add to the uncertainty of a transaction. In addition, there is also a public interest in timely certainty and finality about decisions made under the regime that are, after all, imposed for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The 28-day limit is also in line with the current merger screening regime that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test asked about, where applications for the competitions appeal tribunal made under the Enterprise Act 2002 to review a merger decision must be made within four weeks, a time period chosen after public consultation. There may be some situations where, for legitimate reasons, 28 days is simply not enough. It is therefore important to remember that this Bill provides that the court may “entertain proceedings” that are sought after the 28-day limit, if it is considered that exceptional circumstances apply.
This shortened time limit and flexibility is for the courts to deal with exceptional circumstances. It strikes the right balance for this regime, in my view. It allows sufficient time for parties to obtain legal advice and mount a challenge, while also providing timely certainty about the effect of the relevant decision made under the Bill. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will withdraw the amendment.
I have to be honest, I did not think that was very good. Let us start with who is shortening and who is not shortening. The Minister said that the Opposition seek to lengthen the period; no, the Opposition are not seeking to lengthen the period. The Government are seeking to shorten the period that is standard in the UK justice system as far as judicial reviews overall are concerned.
That is a very important point, because the Opposition are not trying to do something that is not an ordinary principle of British justice; the Government are trying to that. The Minister’s remarks could have applied to a lot of other areas, where it might be a bit inconvenient to have a judicial review being tenable for a three-month period after an event had occurred. However, it is not a question of inconvenience. Is a matter so important to national security that the 28 days can be justified under those terms?
The Minister has sought to justify the 28 days under the terms that there may be some uncertainty if there is a longer period for judicial review to be undertaken. He is potentially right about that, but not right as far as this Bill is concerned. He is right potentially as far as any application for judicial review is concerned, in all sorts of areas in this country. That is the problem of judicial review for the Administration, under any circumstances. When someone comes along and says, “I’m going to JR this,” a lot of people clap their hands and say, “That’s very inconvenient. It really does foul things up, because we would like to do this, that and next thing, but because we have been judicially reviewed, we have to carry out the procedure that is there.”
As several people have said in a number of different circumstances, the fact that the JR procedure is there and that often ordinary people have a reasonable amount of time to get their case together to undertake the JR process, is an important principle of the British justice system. The Minister has made no serious case for why these things should be so special under these circumstances. Interestingly, the consultation document did not make any case at all for the 28 days, other than to note that it was a shorter period. I am sorry to say that this appears to be a shortened period simply for administrative convenience.
Does my hon. Friend think that shortening the JR period for administrative reasons is especially contentious, given that the judicial review process would be the only option for small and medium enterprises to complain about the way in which they are being treated under this process? The Minister says that their only option to make a complaint is effectively to JR it, yet they are given less time to JR it.
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. In many circumstances, we are not talking about the sort of JRs that we hear about in the press, where a big corporation has been judicially reviewed on some subject by another large corporation, or some big body has judicially reviewed someone else about a planning decision.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but I wish to say a few words about the excellent contribution that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has made to our continuing discussions about “may” and “must”. It is a particularly egregious case that he has highlighted. If we look at the number of “musts” that appear in clause 14—this point has been made by other Members—we see that the subsequent “musts” would fall immediately if the Secretary of State may not prescribe by regulation the form and content of a mandatory notice—so the “must” in subsection (5) is relevant only if the Secretary of State does that in the first place, as are the “musts” in subsections (7) and (8), as my hon. Friend pointed out earlier.
There is also an interesting “must” at the beginning of the clause, which relates to the mandatory notification procedure itself. Subsection (1) states that
“a person must give notice to the Secretary of State before the person, pursuant to a notifiable acquisition…gains control in circumstances”
and so on. So subsection (1) appears to stand whether or not, in subsection (4), the Secretary of State decides to prescribe by regulation the form and content of a mandatory notice. That means that a person must provide a mandatory notice, even if the Secretary of State has not prescribed any form or content of that notice. The person may therefore have no idea what is to be in that mandatory notice, because the Secretary of State has not put it in regulations, but still they must give notice because this subsection says “must”.
That does not seem to be particularly proportionate. It appears to be constructed in such a way that, regardless of whether the concept is completely unknown to the person giving the notice, it is entirely up to the Secretary of State whether he or she makes the mandatory notice in any way comprehensible. I think that is quite an odd juxtaposition in this instance of “mays” and “musts”.
The “may” in subsection (6) is perfectly acceptable, in as much as its states that:
“The Secretary of State may reject the mandatory notice on one or more of the following grounds”.
That “may” is absolutely appropriate. However, the positioning of “must” right at the beginning of the clause, and the positioning of “may” in subsection (4), does not look reasonable to me. That could easily be solved by using the word “shall”, so that the situation is proportionate between those circumstances. That is the essence of the amendment 18, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South outlined earlier.
I accept that there have been a number of occasions when, although I have not particularly liked “may” going into a Bill, it has had some justification. However, the particular juxtaposition that we see here causes me to think that it is a rather important issue, as far as “may” and “shall” are concerned. I am interested to hear whether the Minister thinks that the wording could give rise to the sorts of problems that I have suggested, in the event that another Minister—not himself, of course—might be tempted not to produce such regulations when defining the form and content, because I think that could cause potential problems for reasonableness, as far as this clause is concerned.
I rise to give some thoughts on clause 14 stand part, but will also refer to the amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South. Clause 14 is a critical part of this process, because it sets out the mandatory notification procedure. In some respects, it is the mandatory notification which places the greatest burden on those falling, or who might consider themselves to fall, within its remit. This is because it requires the person who is to make a notifiable acquisition to give a mandatory notice to the Secretary of State prior to the acquisition taking place.
The clause goes on to give the Secretary of State the option to set out the form and content of the mandatory notice. I shall come back to that. It then sets out the process by which the Secretary of State “must” decide whether to reject or accept that notice. If a mandatory notice is rejected, the Secretary of State must provide reasons in writing for that decision to be made. It also sets out the timescale elements and the persons to be notified. We recognise that mandatory notifications are an important part of making the Bill have the desired impact on our national security. It is absolutely right that in key areas the onus should be on those who will be aware that the transaction is taking place to notify the Secretary of State.
However, the amendment set out by hon. Friend is all about protecting and supporting the interests of small businesses. I am concerned that the Minister does not seem to be as vigilant about reducing the burden on and setting out the guidance for small businesses as we would like. All our constituencies have small businesses—it is often said that they are the lifeblood of the economy—yet in the Bill, and particularly in the clause, the Minister is not setting out the minimum support that they might require.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test got to the nub of the matter in one of his very informative discussions about the difference between “must” and “may”. He observed that the “must” falls on the person who has to do the notifying. For example, it could be a small artificial intelligence start-up with a few members of staff, none of whom is a lawyer—remember that there are no de minimis provisions in the Bill for the size of the acquisition that must be notified—that is seeking investment from a foreign party. That start-up would be asked to indicate whether that investment would involve making a notification. Not only that, it must decide itself the form that the notification should take.
I really cannot understand why the Bill apparently seeks to give discretion to the Secretary of State to lighten his load, but not to our fantastic small businesses or to business generally. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, why should a small business, the notifier, also have to set out the format in which its notification takes place? Given that the clause sets out,
“The Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe the form”,
why can we not simply turn that into “shall by regulation prescribe the form and content of a mandatory notice”?
Equally, when voluntary notices are considered, I hope the Minister has some ideas about what should be in the notification. If he does, is it not simple and desirable for him to share his ideas with our business community, which in less than a month’s time is facing a huge change in how it trades and does business with the European Union, our largest trading partner by value? That involves countless new forms to be filled out, as we have discussed in the Chamber, some of which are not yet designed. At the same time that that is happening, to require that they should decide for themselves what is involved in a notification seems wholly unacceptable.
On that basis, I ask the Minister to set out whether he intends to accept the amendment. If not, will he tell us what work has gone on in the Department to look at the kind of information might be required? How will the impact assessment assess the likely level of familiarisation required for this legislation—there is a phrase that says that there is not expected to be a huge amount of familiarisation required in it—while at the same time there is no guidance, assessment or inkling about the kind of information that will be required to be included in that notification?
I thank the Minister for that intervention, and we will not oppose clause stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Power to require information
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 19, page 12, leave out lines 24 to 27.
This amendment seeks to broaden the Secretary of State’s powers to require information.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOur amendment was genuinely intended to be helpful, to try to ensure that what we see as a loophole is closed. The Minister has indicated that, in his view, that loophole would be closed at the expense of uncertainty in company land, as it were—uncertainty for those companies that might be subject to this procedure.
The circumstances that would see this amendment put into action—I have outlined some possible circumstances—would be very rare; only circumstances in which things had changed very substantially, in terms of global interest in particular areas of our economy, or circumstances in which information that could have been supplied was not supplied, and not because there was an intention to be malicious or misleading, but because people did not get to the bottom of something first time around. In those circumstances, companies would perhaps anticipate that that change might happen, and certainly if there were substantial global changes in who was interested in what, then companies would also anticipate that to a considerable extent. I do not share the Minister’s view that the amendment would place companies in general in a state of uncertainty.
The additional assistance that the amendment would provide to make the process watertight should be taken seriously. However, I hear what the Minister has said and appreciate that a balance has to be achieved between different arrangements so that they are satisfactory both for national security and for company wellbeing and development—I am sorry that he has perhaps come down slightly further on one side than on the other in his appraisal of amendment 10. However, I appreciate what he has said and therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Statement about exercise of call-in power
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 3, line 1, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
This amendment would make it obligatory for the Secretary of State to include certain matters in a statement about his/her exercise of the call-in power.
My hon. Friend intends to stay where he is. I thank him for his oratory on the importance of the single word “may”. Something has been lost in translation between ourselves and the Clerks, in that there was originally an intention to address the first “may” with regard to publishing the statement. The Minister says that we do not need that to become a “shall” because it will be published but rejects the notion of it becoming “shall” despite the fact that it will be published. I leave it to the Committee to decide on the holes in that logic.
I am sure that the Minister was not deliberately trying to misinterpret what we were saying, but we made it clear that we are not looking for a precise and narrow definition of national security; we are looking for broad indications or guidance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon said in citing how the US does it, we are looking for a sense of what is taken into consideration with regard to national security. I would only plead with the Minister to recognise the circumstances of so many small businesses, start-ups and investors in trying to understand what the Secretary of State will take into account. This is intended not to define it narrowly, but to give a sense of what will be taken into account as we move into this new regime that is so vastly different. Because these amendments are important and significant, I intend to press them.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I thank the Minister for his comments on clauses 5 and 10 and schedule 1, which are quite technical provisions designed to allow for the different ways in which control may be acquired over a qualifying entity or asset or a trigger event may occur. I shall not repeat what the Minister so ably set out, but simply say that we recognise the need to set out ways to mitigate the impact of hostile actors, as he put it, going to complex lengths to hide their interest in a qualifying asset or entity. However, having the powers and these definitions is not the same as actually using them. There have been several instances in which hostile actors have behaved in entirely transparent ways that we have not identified and prevented. While these provisions are necessary, we need to see the ways in which the Secretary of State will actively identify evolving risks even as they hide behind complex financial organisations.
Will the Minister expand on some of the provisions in schedule 1, particularly as they relate to what might be a UK version of the case that I mentioned earlier concerning the US company that Dr Lenihan mentioned in his evidence? A company that had gone bankrupt had its assets, patents and employees bought up by what might have been conceived to be a hostile company in the US, in this case Huawei. If we imagine that happening in the UK, some questions arise about how schedule 1 is worded.
That sort of action might happen in a number of ways. It could be that a potentially hostile company buys up a failed, bankrupt company with the intention of making that company work again but so that it has control of its activities thereafter. Alternatively, the hostile company or organisation might want to buy up elements of the company not to make it work but to make off with the things that it wanted and then push the company further into liquidation. The company would not work but its assets and intellectual property would have passed into the hands of the other organisation.