Corporate Economic Crime

Catherine McKinnell Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Westminster Hall

[Catherine McKinnell (Newcastle upon Tyne North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing North (Stephen Pound) on securing this important debate on prosecuting corporate economic crime, and on his argument, which he put forward with his customary elegance. The debate is timely, in the light of recent announcements by Ministers. I congratulate all the hon. Members who have taken part in the debate, who made powerful contributions and set out strongly the arguments that the Government should listen to. Each of them made important points, to which I shall refer. I do not mean to diminish the Minister’s presence when I say that I am disappointed that neither of the Law Officers could attend the debate. I hope that is not a sign of Government obfuscation on these important issues.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock), I am not here to bash bankers. The City of London is the world’s second-largest financial centre and a major contributor to the UK economy. Its success is clearly founded on the professionalism and integrity—for the most part—of those who work in the sector. That is why we cannot allow its reputation to be undermined by the actions of the minority who engage in fraud, corruption and market manipulation. Yet despite the events of 2007 and 2008, and all that has followed—parliamentary commissions, Select Committee inquiries and the setting up of new regulators—economic or white-collar crime remains a serious problem in the UK. We need only look at the horrifying spectre of LIBOR rate rigging to be reminded of why the Government cannot rest on their laurels in this matter; yet the ability of our law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to tackle such pernicious crimes remains limited.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing North pointed out, the Government gave some promising signals. They announced the introduction of a senior managers regime to hold named executives to account for their actions, and they pledged to introduce a new corporate offence of failure to prevent economic crime. It is disappointing that that was not, as my hon. Friend pointed out, etched in stone, but it was in the manifesto for all to see. Both proposals were seen as vital to prevent the repetition of the failings of the past and bring the UK regime into the 21st century. However, in both cases, the Government have backtracked.

What do we know about the reasons for the Government’s change of heart about the corporate liability offence? According to a response to a written question to the Ministry of Justice,

“there is little evidence of corporate economic wrongdoing going unpunished”,

despite the fact that according to the Financial Conduct Authority banks have paid an estimated £1.8 billion in compensation for mis-selling financial products such as interest rate swaps and have already set aside an additional £27 billion to compensate for payment protection insurance mis-selling. That is not to mention the £4.4 billion lost each year to tax evasion, according to the latest estimates from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, or the countless banks and financial institutions that are being investigated by the Serious Fraud Office for various types of misconduct, but have not yet been prosecuted. Why have the Government concluded that no action is required? I hope that the Minister can enlighten us.

Some recent disclosures are cause for concern. Last month, the Treasury published the national risk assessment, the first comprehensive assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing—both from within the UK and flowing through it. It is the first assessment of its kind and has been highly anticipated since the Government committed themselves to producing it, in their 2014 anti-corruption plan. The Government’s assessment of the risks posed by elements in the financial sector is clear:

“The size and complexity of the UK financial sector mean it is more exposed to criminality than financial sectors in many other countries, including abuse enabled by professional enablers in the legal and accountancy sector”.

Nevertheless, the report notes that the UK has “significant intelligence gaps” with respect to money laundering, despite what is judged to be a serious threat from, for example, the legal, banking and accountancy sectors. The conclusions are not encouraging:

“The UK’s response is well developed, but more needs to be done to ensure it is commensurate with our status as a well regulated global financial centre.”

The message is clear: far more needs to be done. I would therefore welcome reassurance from the Minister that something is being done. The aim must be to ensure that the appropriate measures are in place to deter behaviour that facilitates or contributes to the committing of economic crime. That would not only encourage good practice and the right corporate culture, but mean that wrongdoers were held accountable, which would be a deterrent. There is widespread concern that the UK’s current corporate liability regime is not up to the job. That is the view of the Law Commission and the OECD’s working group on bribery, both of which have produced seminal work on the subject. Both concluded that the current regime does not allow the UK to hold corporations and key persons within them to account effectively for their part in economic crimes.

In its extensive work on the UK’s corporate liability measures, the Law Commission described the present regime as

“an inappropriate and ineffective method of establishing criminal liability of corporations”.

It also noted the unfairness inherent in the identification doctrine, explained by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing North, which makes it far easier to prosecute smaller companies, where the “directing mind” is more easily determined, than large corporations with much more diffuse chains of command.

[Stephen Pound]

My hon. Friend raises a point that has given me pause for thought. Does she agree that there is such a thing as a corporate culture in certain companies—I think that there is ample evidence of such behaviour—and that if, often, the culture is not in the interest of probity or the wider public, it is difficult to identify the person of whom an example should be made? If the culture is allowed to fester and permeate, inevitably it spreads. Does my hon. Friend agree that there is an issue of identifying an individual, pour encourager les autres at the very least?

[Catherine McKinnell]

My hon. Friend makes an important point that goes to the heart of the argument. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon argued cogently that, ultimately, we need a better way of establishing responsibility for the actions of a company and those who serve within it. It is not enough for those at the top to wash their hands of responsibility for the actions of the officers and employees who operate, act and work under the company’s name.

There needs to be much greater clarity about the legal framework. Many bodies, including the Law Commission, have called for that. What is even more key is that the Government seem to share that view. In a consultation undertaken in July 2015 on the introduction of a new corporate offence of failure to prevent tax evasion, the Government concluded:

“Under the existing law it can be extremely difficult to hold the corporations to account for the criminal actions of their agents”.

That observation has been made by the Government and Ministers on several occasions, as well as by my hon. Friends in their contributions today.

The Law Commission, the OECD working group and the director of the Serious Fraud Office point to section 7 of Labour’s Bribery Act as a potential solution. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing North set out in his speech, section 7 of the Bribery Act makes it an offence to fail to prevent bribery. It places the onus on companies to prove that they have put in place adequate procedures to prevent bribery and is widely seen as a far more effective way of holding companies and the individuals within them to account, which is why many want to see that model extended to other types of economic crime.

[Stephen Kinnock]

We have talked a lot about accountability and trust today, but another important word here is “risk”. We saw in the events leading up to 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers a systemic failure to manage risk. It is in the interests of both Government and the private sector more broadly—the real economy and the financial services sector—to put systemic measures in place to manage risk in a way that ensures the appalling events in and following 2008 never happen again. Some regulation of the market is therefore, by definition, required as a risk management tool. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Catherine McKinnell]

My hon. Friend makes an important point and anticipates my next point. First, I want to clarify exactly where the Government seem to be on this issue.

The Government’s recent announcement has caused much confusion among those who care about this issue, because it seems to be very much at odds with what they have been saying and the messages and signals they have been sending out. In his first speech as Attorney General over a year ago, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) suggested that he was considering the section 7 proposal. We then discovered, in an answer to a written parliamentary question, that it had been dropped. We need clarity from the Minister today about exactly why that decision was made and what the Government will do to ensure that our concerns are addressed if they are not proceeding with that proposal.

The director of the Serious Fraud Office, David Green, has made clear his support for the expansion of section 7 of the Bribery Act. He has described how useful it would be to better facilitate the use of deferred prosecution agreements. My hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Christina Rees) set out eloquently how deferred prosecution agreements work and their potential importance in dealing with some of the issues that have been highlighted. It is no secret that the Serious Fraud Office director favours the use of DPAs, which are currently more widely used in the United States. To clarify, they provide for a corporation to avoid prosecution by entering into an agreement with a number of conditions attached, which may include paying a financial penalty, paying compensation or co-operating with future prosecutions of individuals. In doing so, they avoid prosecution. The aim is to hold key individuals to account, to secure significant financial penalties from companies that have committed wrongdoing and, ultimately, to prevent future wrongdoing by encouraging or mandating reforms within those companies.

Deferred prosecution agreements are not without their critics, but they have been widely used in the US for the past 20 years or so and brought in some $4.2 billion to the Department of Justice in 2014 alone. One key problem with importing the use of DPAs to the UK is that they are intended to be a carrot, while the stick is the prospect of prosecution for corporate economic offences.

[Stephen Pound]

My hon. Friend is giving us a masterclass, and it is greatly appreciated. I am sure that she, like me, felt her heart leap when the American authorities started to act against FIFA using their Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Does she agree that we can learn much, for once, from the American example and the action they took against the appalling, utterly corrupt situation regarding FIFA? I am not remotely comparing any British business to FIFA—it would be hard to find anything outside the Augean stables or the seventh circle of hell that compared to that organisation. The Americans seem able to achieve things that we cannot. Is that because of the quality of the excellent US Attorney General and her staff, or should we be learning from the American legislation?

[Catherine McKinnell]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We should not shy away from learning lessons from any jurisdiction that manages to control risk, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon highlighted, and to hold companies to account where wrongdoing has occurred. Where there are lessons to be learned from the US, we should learn them and do what we can to implement them within our own system. We could then hold ourselves up as a beacon for other countries and hold our heads high as a well-regulated, world-leading financial centre. That has to be our aim in all of this.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Neath pointed out, without the fear of corporate economic crime being prosecuted, there is little incentive for companies to enter deferred prosecution agreements and no incentive for companies to co-operate with the SFO to change their practices as mandated under a DPA. Unlike in the US, which has far stronger vicarious liability laws, there are still far too few corporate prosecutions in the UK under the current identification principle. No matter how much we may wish to learn from the United States—if that is what we see as the right way forward—without a strengthened corporate liability regime, we will be hampered in our efforts to implement such changes.

Finally, I turn to another area that shows concerning signs of backtracking by the Government and in which we would otherwise have seen individuals in companies held accountable for their own and others’ actions. In its 2013 report on the banking sector and how to prevent the failings that led to the 2008 crash, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards similarly recognised the difficulty in identifying individuals and holding them to account. One of its key recommendations was to introduce a senior managers regime to hold named executives personally responsible for key risks in the bank. That issue was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon, who made a powerful speech about encouraging better and more responsible management within companies to change bad practice where it is found. The commission recommended that the regime place a burden of proof on those named executives, who would have to show the regulator that they had done all they reasonably could to prevent failings or misconduct if they were to avoid sanction.

[Christina Rees]

Does my hon. Friend agree that even though we have the legislation in place in section 7, there is no will to use it? That is the problem. There has not been a single prosecution.

[Catherine McKinnell]

My hon. Friend raises a concern relating to the Bribery Act, but there are two ways of looking at the Act’s implementation and the fact that no prosecutions have yet happened under it. There is evidence that it has already brought about significant changes in corporate culture and that the managers tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that they have taken all the steps they could reasonably be expected to have taken to prevent bribery in their organisations have taken those steps. Some positives can therefore certainly be derived from the situation, but I agree that a very close eye needs to be kept on prosecutions. I note that there are already murmurings from the Government about backtracking on the Bribery Act and trying to weaken that legislation, and we must stay vigilant about that.

On the senior managers regime, the commission recommended that the regime place a burden of proof on those named executives. The recommendation was accepted by the Government and enshrined in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. However, the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill, which is currently in the other place, is set to reverse that burden of proof, meaning that instead, the regulator—the Financial Conduct Authority—will be required to prove that senior managers have failed in their duty to prevent misconduct or prudential failings. The onus will be back on the regulator, and not on the named senior executives. Is that just more backtracking from the Government, who seem to be going soft on economic crime? I would be grateful if the Minister provided reassurance that that is not the case.

Ministers urgently need to look again at their approach to tackling economic crime, because without change, the prospect of ensuring that justice is served to those who have mis-sold financial products, evaded tax, laundered money and defrauded seems as remote as ever, and the risk of the scandals of recent years being repeated has far from disappeared.

[Graham Stringer (in the Chair)]

I remind the Minister that although he has an unusually large amount of time in which to wind up, under the new procedure, there is time at the end for Stephen Pound, the proposer of the debate, to sum up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Raab]

I am grateful for that intervention. I stand better informed than I was before, but obviously I cannot comment on individual prosecutions or cases until they are in a position to conclude.

Much has been made of the Conservative manifesto commitment, rather caricaturing the nature of what was very clearly stated and ignoring the fact that we are specifically further considering legislation relating to tax evasion. As hon. Members will know, but this is an opportunity to remind them, the consultation on that closed on 8 October. I am sure that further announcements will be made in due course.

The shadow Justice Minister made some of her most powerful points on deferred prosecution agreements, which were introduced in the last Parliament and represent a significant opportunity for prosecutors to take action. I think that they rather refute the suggestion that this Government have been either lax or demonstrating inertia in trying to develop the tools we need to deliver convictions and accountability in this area.

It is also worth saying that, as a basic principle, we should try to exercise existing law enforcement powers to the full before we go back to Parliament and ask for more. I fear that it was rather the epitaph of the previous Labour Government to legislate hyperactively and leave the statute book littered with offences that were not really ever used in practice, so I make no apology for saying that we really ought to be crafting criminal legislation on the statute book that will deliver convictions in practice.

The hon. Member for Aberavon, who unfortunately is no longer in his place, made an interesting speech. He widened the debate to talk about systemic risk, which is an important point, and expressed some of the concerns about the 2007-08 financial crisis that are understandably still feeding calls for further action to be taken now. In that context, I highlight the action that has been taken on the banks by the coalition Government and this Conservative Government in relation to capital ratios, the bank levy and regulating to ensure proper separation between the investment and retail arms of banks. He was absolutely right to make that point, but the whole system of regulation on systemic risk looks fundamentally different today from when the Labour Government left office in 2010.

Going back to the identification principle, we have heard that the law on corporate and criminal liability has that very much at its heart. The identification principle means that a corporate is criminally liable only if a person who is its controlling mind and will is criminally liable. In most cases, there will be liability only if a director is criminally liable. Hon. Members made perfectly reasonable points about that and about the related difficulties and challenges. Many other assertions were made about the state of the current law, such as that the evidential threshold is too high and that it makes it easier to prosecute smaller businesses than larger corporates and particularly difficult to prosecute large and complex multinational corporations. Those are all valid points, rather inherent, though, in trying to regulate and enforce offences in this sector. We certainly do not want small businesses to be hammered while the big ones get off scot-free. That is absolutely the wrong approach and one that we are mindful of the need to avoid.

Other points made about the current state of the law are that it can result in corporates escaping prosecution where there is criminal wrongdoing on behalf of a corporate and the corporate benefits; it does not do enough to deter economic crime in the UK or to promote good corporate governance; and it puts UK prosecutors at a disadvantage compared with some law enforcement agencies overseas where the attribution of corporate criminal liability does not have such a high threshold. The hon. Member for Ealing North made the point about the United States very well. Some have called for a much broader vicarious liability for companies, closer to the US model.

I recognise the point that a different approach, combined with the DPAs introduced in 2013, could have a powerful impact. We need to consider the criminal legal basis along with the prosecutorial tools. That combination is the key to getting more convictions and plea bargains under the DPA arrangements. Notwithstanding the common desire for accountability and convictions, we need to take half a step back and acknowledge the need to be careful to guard the basic principles of justice that we all, at least notionally and rhetorically, hold dear—the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof—and ensure that we have a focused, targeted law enforcement system.

The Bribery Act 2010 contains the much-discussed new offence of failure to prevent bribery by a person associated with the company, which allows prosecutions of corporates for failure to prevent bribery in cases in which the identification principle threshold could not be reached. There have been suggestions for further change by extending the Bribery Act model to other areas. Under that legislation, a commercial organisation is guilty of an offence if a person associated with it bribes another person while intending either to obtain or retain business for the organisation, or to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of its business. The legislation sets out that it is a defence for the organisation to prove that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent people from undertaking such conduct. That is the balance struck.

The legislation relates specifically to bribery—a very serious economic crime—and is designed to encourage more responsible corporate behaviour. Extending section 7 as some have suggested could criminalise commercial organisations that fail to prevent other types of economic crime, including fraud and tax evasion; I am sure that hon. Members can think of other examples. Some people have urged the Government to go even further and advocated a more dramatic change, calling for legislation to create an offence of vicarious liability. That would be far more like the US model.

As I think was mentioned, the Government published last December the “UK Anti-Corruption Plan”, which included the commitment to consider the case for a new offence of a corporate failing to prevent economic crime. Much has been made of the statement made on 28 September by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), that we will not be carrying out further work on this specific point at least at this time. It is important to understand the reasons for that. Again, they have been rather caricatured, although not intentionally; I would not say that.

The reasons for not taking the work forward at this stage are as follows. First, the UK has corporate criminal liability and commercial organisations can be and are being prosecuted for wrongdoing. Secondly, as I have mentioned, there have been no prosecutions under the Bribery Act offence, so it is not as though we have a huge amount of concrete practice to learn from—in fairness, that point was also made by the hon. Member for Neath. Thirdly, as a result of that and the information and evidence that we get as we look at whether the case is made for new offences, there is little concrete and specific evidence of the wider corporate economic wrongdoing that we should now target that is currently not unlawful and could reasonably be caught by a proposed new offence. If hon. Members want to tell me about a specific area and tailored offence, I will be all ears.

[Catherine McKinnell]

It does not sound as though the Minister will go on to explain how he intends the Government to live up to their manifesto pledge. He indicated earlier that it was in relation to tax evasion only, but the Government did in their manifesto state:

“We are also making it a crime if companies fail to put in place measures to stop economic crime, such as tax evasion, in their organisations and making sure that the penalties are large enough to…deter.”

If the Minister explains how the Government will fulfil that manifesto pledge, that will give hon. Members reassurance today.

[Mr Raab]

I thank the shadow Minister for her intervention. She has not come up with a specific offence beyond tax evasion.

[Catherine McKinnell]

rose—

[Mr Raab]

I will not give way again at this point, but perhaps I will shortly.

The hon. Lady referred to the manifesto commitment, which specifically cites tax evasion. I will go on to say a little about that. I thought that one of the best points in her original speech was about the intelligence gap. That feeds the point that I have been making that we should not confuse the difficulties or challenges that we have in enforcing, which is what the intelligence gap is all about, with the breadth of the criminal base that we have on the statute books. That is a very important distinction, which she made rather well.

The bottom line is that there is no point in legislating for the sake of it. The hit and hope approach does not do any good; in fact, it feeds public mistrust. Frankly, we saw far too much of that under the Labour Government. I want to know that when we legislate we are putting in place a model, a criminal offence on the statute book, that will deliver prosecutions, convictions and the wider deterrent effect that we all want.

[Mr Raab]

We are taking forward the manifesto commitment. We have an ongoing consultation on tax evasion and, if the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will come on to it. The other point made in the manifesto commitment is about the need to punish and deter. That is not just about legislation; it is about the enforcement regime. Over the years, hon. Members have been far too willing just to nod legislation through without thinking properly about how it will be enforced in a targeted and effective way.

Having said all that, I can give examples of very good outcomes, including in the high-end serious and complex cases dealt with by the Serious Fraud Office, which emerge from within the existing legislation and even pre-Bribery Act in some instances. There are other outcomes aside from criminal prosecutions. Deferred prosecution agreements are a further and significant tool. Civil recovery orders are an option.

The SFO cases involving prosecution or substantial civil recovery orders for a corporate have included the cases of AMEC, BAE, Innospec and Macmillan. Fines and civil recovery orders for more than £40 million were issued in SFO cases between 2008 and 2012. Nearly £30 million was paid by BAE to the people of Tanzania, following a settlement with the SFO and the US Department of Justice. More recently, last year, the SFO completed the Innospec and Smith & Ouzman prosecutions, both of which resulted in the conviction of the corporate as well as senior officials in relation to foreign bribery. And the SFO had its first prosecutions under the Bribery Act—they were associated with a biofuel fraud—albeit not under section 7.

The director of the SFO has said that there are current cases that may prove suitable for prosecutions under section 7 of the Bribery Act. Hon. Members will appreciate that I cannot go into too much detail on things that are subject to either a pending prosecutorial decision or investigation. The Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs have had important successes, too, and some have also been very high-profile.

On tax avoidance, HMRC is responsible for policing the tax and excise laws. It has a range of tools and powers to secure compliance, including the power to conduct criminal investigations in appropriate cases in line with HMRC’s criminal investigation policy. Since 2010, HMRC has increased the number of criminal investigations leading to prosecution by 500%. That is a very clear example of where we have managed not only to have the legislation in place but to deliver a quantum leap in successful law enforcement. I am sure hon. Members from all parts of the House agree that that is what we should be aiming for.

Marketed tax evasion schemes have been one strand of priority work for HMRC during this period, and the CPS has brought a number of complex prosecutions against individuals. There are a number of high-profile examples, including Vantis and cases relating to the film industry. I have acknowledged the suggestions that have been made about extending the remit of section 7. Although Ministers have decided to halt that work for the time being, the criminal law is always monitored and if any clear and well evidenced difficulties come to light on which we can take targeted action, we will, of course, do so.

A proposed new offence of failing to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion, whether onshore or offshore, was the subject of public consultation by HMRC between July and October this year. The consultation closed on 8 October, and the Government are considering the responses. That clearly falls within the area of the manifesto commitment that Opposition Members have enjoyed citing. That work is ongoing.

Deferred prosecution agreements, which became available on 24 February 2014, are one of the critical law enforcement tools that the Government have brought into being. To date, no DPAs have been concluded, but I am aware that a number of cases in the pipeline may yield DPAs. Under a DPA, a prosecutor charges a company with a criminal offence, but proceedings are automatically suspended. The regime has been designed carefully and we consulted on all its aspects. There are important safeguards in place, which is why we need to be a bit careful about the rather gung-ho suggestion that we should follow the American approach lock, stock and barrel. If we did so, concerns would be raised by Members on both sides of the House about the lack of safeguards in place.

[Catherine McKinnell]

I agree with the Minister that a gung-ho approach should never be taken to any of those matters, but does he acknowledge that significant concerns have been raised about the DPA tool not being as effective as it could be, while it remains so difficult to bring prosecutions against corporations, because the identification principle has set the bar for prosecution so high?

[Mr Raab]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to say that the combination of the law enforcement tool—in this case, the DPA—and the criminal base will be the key to securing convictions. We will constantly look to fine tune and sharpen up that double act of legislation and law enforcement. If she has any suggestions about how that can be done in a sensible way, I will consider them. I am not sure that the extension of section 7 more broadly and exponentially will be the panacea that she is looking for, but if she can come up with specific, tailored and targeted areas in which that might be the case, I will consider them.

[Catherine McKinnell]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Raab]

I will give way shortly, but I want to make a little bit of progress, because I am mindful of your advice about timing, Mr Stringer. I want to talk briefly about the code of practice for DPAs that the director of the SFO and the DPP issued on 14 February 2014. That followed the consultation, and I am sure that the hon. Lady made her views known at the time. Prosecutors should have regard to the DPA code when they negotiate a DPA, when they apply to the court for approval of a DPA and when they oversee a DPA after it has been approved by the court. A DPA can be appropriate where the public interest would not be best served by entering into a prosecution. Entering into a DPA will be a transparent event, and the process will be supervised by a judge. That is important, because even if a DPA is in place, we want justice to be seen to be done as well as to be done.

I recognise that some organisations and others have raised concerns about the amount of information that will be available about DPAs as they are being negotiated. Letters of invitation to a company to enter into a DPA negotiation are confidential, for understandable reasons. The code of practice for prosecutors explicitly states that the letter of invitation to a company to enter into negotiations should make an undertaking in respect of confidentiality about the fact that DPA negotiations are taking place. Negotiations are, and need to be, confidential in the early stages to encourage co-operation on the part of the corporate. Any DPA that is agreed will be publicly announced, and that will provide transparency and accountability. As soon as a DPA is approved, the court must make a declaration to that effect, along with reasons, in open hearing. Unless it is prevented from doing so by an enactment or order of the court, the prosecutor will be expected to publish the DPA on its website.

I hope that hon. Members will agree that there is much to be positive about. Good results are being achieved in cases across the prosecuting authorities. We are giving active consideration to further changes where there is evidence that they are warranted, particularly in relation to tax evasion, but we remain open-minded if a case can be made broadly from a specific evidence base.

Outcomes other than prosecution should be acknowledged and welcomed. It may not always be in the public interest for a company to be prosecuted, and that is one of the considerations that led to the DPA regime. The director of the SFO, David Green CB QC, has said that he expects the first DPAs to conclude this year. I know that hon. Members will join me in looking forward to seeing the first successful outcomes. We are seeing a step change in the law enforcement model and the vigour with which it has been applied since 2010. The tax gap was reduced to record levels in 2014. The SFO’s asset recovery against serious criminals has been expanded; in 2014-15, 26.5 million financial orders were made. Since 2010, HMRC has increased the number of tax evasion criminal investigations leading to prosecution by 500%, as I have said, and we also have the DPAs. A huge amount of action is being taken. I am grateful for the contributions of hon. Members from across the House today.