Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Bobby Dean Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lloyd Hatton]

I agree with the right hon. Member’s remarks. I think that the actions of the previous Government and this Government to tackle the shadow fleet are starting to bite. The measures are hitting the Kremlin war machine and will slash the revenues that Putin desperately relies upon to continue to wage war in Ukraine.

Secondly, I welcome sanctions against organised criminal gangs that are currently perpetrating the vile trade of people-smuggling. This action by the Government is a world first, and it targets ringleaders, key intermediaries and the suppliers of people-smuggling equipment. The sanctions help to disrupt the flow of money and materials, including by freezing property, bank accounts and other assets. It will help to disrupt a range of different activities—from supplying small boats for smuggling to sourcing fake passports, middlemen facilitating illicit payments, and people-smuggling via lorries and small boats. It also sanctions the very gang leaders themselves. The people-smuggling gangs operating on the English channel are attempting to make a small fortune. It is essential that this Government continue to use sanctions and every lever at our disposal to disrupt and destroy the gangs.

Thirdly, the Government have made innovative use of sanctions against kleptocrats and their enablers. Notably, the Magnitsky-style sanctions deployed against Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former president, for corruption and stealing public funds marked a pivotal moment in the fight against kleptocracy in Angola and helped to address long-standing corruption that had hindered development and worsened inequalities in the country. I welcome that action, as I am sure do Members on both sides of the House, but we must now look to deploy similar sanctions against other kleptocrats and those who enable their corrupt dealings.

While all those measures are achievements worth celebrating today, I fear that we are not going quite far or fast enough. Our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions to target human rights abuses has, to date, been a little too timid. Only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under that style of sanction, which contrasts with the nearly 3,000 individuals and entities sanctioned under a single scheme specific to one country: namely, Russia.

As REDRESS and other civil society organisations have shown, too many individuals remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of their involvement in corruption and serious human rights abuses the world over. Despite high-profile designations, such as the targeting of Isabel dos Santos, the frankly limited number of Magnitsky-style sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. By focusing only on isolated bad actors, such narrow designations overlook key backers or enablers and they fail to adapt when entities rebrand, or disappear and then reappear, simply to sidestep sanctions.

To illustrate the problem, here are just three brief examples that highlight the gap in our use of Magnitsky sanctions, allowing those responsible for egregious human rights violations to act with impunity. For instance, just last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces—the RSF—suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. The civil war in Sudan, as has already been mentioned, is the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis, displacing some 13 million people. There is overwhelming evidence of heinous crimes, mass executions, starvation and the systemic and calculated use of rape as a weapon of war. Evidence compiled by the UN, experts and journalists has shown, as has already been cited, that the UAE and its officials have been secretly supplying weapons to the RSF via neighbouring Chad—a position that the Gulf state denies, but the overwhelming evidence suggests otherwise. Sadly, no action was taken against the RSF’s key military and diplomatic backer, the UAE, or against the chief commander of the RSF.

Similarly, the narrow scope of sanctions designations in Georgia also undermines our response to the human rights crisis currently under way. Georgia is increasingly finding itself subject to authoritarian rule. Since the highly disputed election in 2024, during which the Georgian Dream party claimed victory, there has been an escalation in the crackdown on protests and on independent media, including widespread violence and human rights abuses. The Georgian Dream party has now captured almost all Government branches and institutions. It has used its new-found power to aggressively suppress protests and all scrutiny of its actions, including hundreds of reports of arbitrary detention and even torture.

Although the UK has rightly sanctioned some of those responsible for violent attacks against journalists and protesters, key members of the pro-Russia elite were sadly absent from those designations. They include Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and chairman of the Georgian Dream party, who was sanctioned by the Biden Administration in the United States for undermining democratic processes simply for the benefit of the Kremlin. The UK has yet to take the same steps in relation to Georgia, so will the Minister make decisive use of sanctions to crack down on the abuses, which only benefit the Russian Government and are entirely at the expense of the Georgian people?

Finally, although the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in the deadly repression of Uyghur Muslims in China in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from REDRESS and other human rights organisations, which identified the broader command structure behind the violent atrocities committed against the Uyghur people in China. We cannot continue to ignore the calls, already put forward today, for sanctions on senior Chinese officials, who must include the Chinese Communist party secretary in Xinjiang, who is considered the architect behind the human rights abuses committed.

Those three cases all show how limiting our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions undermines their effectiveness. Sanctions are a key tool in our armoury to crack down on the most egregious human rights abuses, but narrow designation overlooks the key backers or enablers of the worst atrocities.

Underpinning our sanctions with strong enforcement is also critical to their impact. We know that sanctions are only as strong as the enforcement behind them. In last year’s cross-Government review of sanctions, the Government rightly recognised that there are gaps in the UK’s sanctions implementation and enforcement, which they are seeking to address through new measures to increase the deterrent effect of sanctions and enhance our ability to take robust action against those who choose to break the rules.

[Bobby Dean (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an excellent contribution to the debate. The Treasury Committee heard evidence last year about the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. It appeared to me that it is far too small for the job that it has to do, especially compared with equivalents overseas in the US and Europe. Does he think that part of the solution is also funding OFSI properly, so it can be proactive in its monitoring of sanctions, and not only reactive?

[Lloyd Hatton]

I believe that proper resourcing of OFSI is essential. Similarly, other bodies and authorities that fight economic crime must be properly resourced so that they can do their job properly.

Three further changes are needed to ensure that there are effective instruments for challenging human rights abuses. First, to free sanctioned assets, we need to be able to identify their ownership. If we cannot follow ownership of assets through corporate and trust structures, which are often complex and involve secretive offshore havens, many of our designations will inevitably seep through the cracks and our enforcement will turn into nothing more than a game of whack-a-mole.

Ensuring that we can follow the money is therefore a priority and that must include the UK’s overseas territories and Crown dependencies. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation found that since February 2022, over a quarter of all suspected sanctions breaches were made using intermediary jurisdictions, including the British Virgin Islands and Guernsey. That is deeply concerning, as the very jurisdictions that are enabling sanctions evasion are dragging their feet on important corporate transparency measures that would help us to follow the money in their backyards. Transparency at home and abroad is essential if sanctions are to be enforced effectively. That means ending all tolerance of secrecy in our overseas territories and Crown dependencies, which we all know have provided shelter for dirty money for far too long.

Secondly, we must strengthen the policing of sanctions evasion with a clear focus on networks and professional enablers. Reports from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation have found that it is almost certain that lawyers, estate agents and associated property service firms based right here in the UK have helped clients to evade and avoid asset freezes, seemingly undermining our efforts from within. Some companies and enablers with a high risk appetite are willing to provide services to sanctioned high net worth individuals, allowing them to maintain their property empire and sidestep sanctions altogether. Infamously, the oligarch and former owner of Chelsea FC, one Roman Abramovich, was reportedly able to transfer his extensive property empire and a fleet of super-yachts, helicopters and jets to his children just weeks before being sanctioned here in the UK.

Despite the vast scale of sanctions evasion, enforcement by authorities in the UK in response to violations has been too weak in recent years. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has imposed just three fines for violations of the UK’s Russia sanctions regime in the past year, totalling a measly £622,750. That is an utterly damning figure and shows that we are bringing a water pistol to a knife fight when it comes to enforcing our sanctions measures. Worse still, OFSI has not imposed any fines at all for breaches of Magnitsky-style sanctions.

I know that the Government are planning to scale up our capability to target the professional enabler network. In the recently published anti-corruption strategy, which I wholeheartedly welcome, Ministers were right to commit to expanding the use of sanctions against professional enablers. Given the UK’s world-leading role as a professional services provider, such a measure is essential if we are to begin to impose serious constraints on sanctioned individuals. A professional services ban, for example, would be an effective way to start to tackle kleptocrats and human rights abusers. Many of those individuals might not own an asset in the UK or even plan to travel here, but they rely on UK-based professional services, such as a legal firm and a bank. That simple measure would block wrongdoers from enjoying access to our large professional services sector in the UK.

Finally, I remain concerned that there is a real lack of publicly available data about enforcement capacity, actions and impact, which will undermine Parliament’s ability to scrutinise sanctions enforcement and better understand whether they are working. Without a credible public picture of what is actually frozen, how can Parliament judge the effectiveness of sanctions and whether enablers may simply be assuming that enforcement in the UK is patchy at best? I ask Ministers to look closely and carefully at these proposals to improve data transparency, strengthen our ability to identify ownership and boost the policing of the enablers of sanctions evasion.

Magnitsky-style sanctions remain one of the most useful tools at the Government’s disposal to hold perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and corruption to account. The effective use of these sanctions sends a clear message that the UK will not act as a safe haven for dirty money belonging to kleptocrats or human rights abusers. However, the effectiveness of sanctions depends not on their existence alone, but on the political will to use them fully, consistently and credibly. At a time when, unfortunately, the United States sometimes appears reluctant to deploy these tools with the necessary resolve, the United Kingdom has a clear responsibility to step forward and work with a broad coalition of allies and partners to effectively deploy Magnitsky-style sanctions.

I know that the Government, and almost all Members of the House, are serious about defending human rights, tackling corruption and upholding the rules-based international order, but to achieve that we must ensure that Magnitsky-style sanctions are not only a symbolic gesture, but sharp, effective instruments used to hold bad actors to account and speak truth to power. As has already been said, in an age of global uncertainty, with rogue states and corrupt individuals wishing to operate with impunity, that is exactly the type of leadership that this moment demands.