Privilege: Conduct of Right Hon. Boris Johnson

Debate between Bob Seely and John Hayes

Monday 19th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

First, I accept the Privileges Committee report, and I thank the Chair of that Committee and everyone who worked on it. Trust and integrity are important in politics. People think that politicians sometimes lack that, and when there is a chance to show that we are doing the right thing, it is important that that happens. As such, I will vote for the report and I accept the substance of it, while respecting some of the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg) and my hon. Friends the Members for Don Valley (Nick Fletcher) and for Great Grimsby (Lia Nici). Although I think they have a case, I am afraid that it does not quite convince me.

More broadly, I am so over Boris, and I am pretty over lockdown as well. The point I want to make tonight is that we are sometimes in danger of making Westminster look small and petty. Do not get me wrong: truth, and politicians at the Dispatch Box telling the truth, is a fundamental building block—a keystone—of this place. However, I can tell the House that, going by my inbox, for every person in this Chamber or every person watching who says, “Fantastic, you’re getting Boris,” or, “The Privileges Committee is doing its job,” there are other people saying, “Yet again, you are talking about yourselves. Yet again, it is politicians talking about process.” There were other big scandals to do with lockdown that arguably had more impact on our nation. That is not to deny the importance of Boris’s casual attitude to the truth. He saw lockdowns as being difficult to obey and, frankly, he was right. At that point, a wiser leader would probably have questioned his own rules, not sought to get around them—after all, they were his rules, and while one can love Boris, I think it is true to say that remorse is probably not one of his fine qualities.

For me, the scandal of lockdown and how we dealt with covid is not only whether there were wine Fridays and cake in Downing Street, and people carrying about pints of milk in protest; it is whether lockdown worked and the cost of lockdown in terms of lives, learning, sanity, money and truth. Since lockdown, we have had extraordinarily little conversation about those critical issues, but give people a chance to give Boris a kicking and we are queuing up to do so. I am just going to mention some of the other things that I think are important.

[Sir John Hayes]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to those other things, I want to reinforce the point he has made about calumnies in this House. By far the greatest deception I have seen in this House was when Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister, came before us and said that he had secret information that our country was at risk from weapons of mass destruction. Whether he was knowing or whether he was simply careless, the consequences were bloody, and we are now introspectively discussing cake and sandwiches. That is how the public see it, and my hon. Friend is right about them regarding us as both introspective and self-indulgent.

National Security Bill

Debate between Bob Seely and John Hayes

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes]

If I may be helpful while my hon. Friend is finding his notes, he makes a compelling case—a case that was made prior to this Bill by the Government and by those who recommended this legislation: the ISC, the Law Commission and others. The issue is how we construct this, how it is included in legislation and in the Government’s proposals, and at what stage we will know more about that. That was rehearsed earlier in the debate, but it is important that we have real scrutiny of that process.

[Bob Seely]

I am delighted that my right hon. Friend interrupted me just as I was fiddling around with my paperwork. There are two critical points that I will come to very shortly, looking at five potential options for the foreign lobbying and foreign influence element of the Bill, and at whether we go for a light touch, a moderate touch or a deep touch.

We know the situation with the Russians has changed dramatically, although it may change back in future years, but China is now, if anything, a more important case than Russia, because we know that the Chinese Communist party uses state, non-state and quasi-state actors in the same way that Putin’s Kremlin did. The one thing I see immediately on looking at the Bill—maybe the Minister can guide me here—is a lot of references to state actors. Is Huawei a state actor? We have had Ministers claim in this House that Huawei is “a private company”. In a communist, one-party state, a major company that is a front for Chinese technology is not a private company.

What are the Government going to do about the Oleg Deripaskas and the Abramoviches of this world? I know the world has moved on somewhat, but in theory, what are they going to do about rich players who are beholden to dictators in different countries? What are we going to do about the Saudis? They do an awful lot of influencing and influence operations in this country and a great deal of lobbying. They are our allies, but that is not a democracy. To what extent do countries such as Saudi Arabia need to be more transparent about the business they do here?

Both the Kremlin and the Chinese Communist party raise issues not only about politicians—who, for me, are not the most important aspect, and I am not just saying that because I am in Parliament—but about law firms, which are critically important. This is about the power of the finance houses and former civil servants who have expert experience of policy making. It is about the special advisers who work closely with senior Ministers and know how a Secretary of State’s mind operates and how they think.

Those things are, in many ways, frankly more valuable than how a Back-Bench MP or a member of an all-party parliamentary group is going to vote. We need a foreign influence element to the Bill, and my strong recommendation to the Minister is that we need something that is flexible and captures the idea that influence nowadays is not just peddled through people in this House. In many ways, many of the most important peddlers of influence are not Members of Parliament, but people in the civil service, or ex-civil servants, ex-military or ex-politicians—people in that sort of world.

If we are to have a foreign lobbying element, what should we look at? I recommend that we create laws to compel individuals and entities who lobby in the UK for hostile states and their proxies to record that on a national register. The Government accept that. The problem is that previous laws have limited lobbying to “consultant lobbyists”, which is not adequate to the task. We know that hostile states make use of non-lobbyist individuals and entities—those backed by or linked with a state, active in the spheres of academia, economics, culture and the media. Registrable lobbyists should be anyone who influences Government decisions or national policy, and that will therefore include PR consultants, research firms, reputation managers, law firms when they offer additional services, and banks. Law firms in particular have been at the corrosive heart of some of the most corrupting elements of how individual oligarchs have tended to use and manipulate power in the west.

I would also create laws to force foreign Governments to disclose when they spend money on political activity in the UK; that ban foreign Governments or their proxies from providing political, financial and other support during election periods; and that compel foreign Governments and their proxies to label and disclose material and campaigns undertaken in the UK, especially those online. I would make those laws enforceable by criminal penalty. The Government are approaching some of those positions, which is great, but it is the breadth that is important.

On the next element, there are three options. One is a weak regime that treats everyone the same, so the Saudis the same as a Russian oligarch, or Huawei, or the New Zealand tourist board—sorry to bring up that example again. Or the Government could say that they will have a two-tier system with a very light registration for the New Zealand tourist board or the Norwegian salmon producers association, but a much higher degree of form filling and detail giving for Chinese, Iranian and Russian organisations and the potential influencing that they are doing, especially with the United Front. Or do we just have a very deep set of requests for everybody, which would probably result in a lot of unnecessary form-filling? The Goldilocks solution for me is level two, with a light layer of registration for all organisations that are working on behalf of foreign states or their entities, but a much deeper level for named countries, individuals or institutions, including Confucius Institutes.

We should also have a level that understands the importance of making sure that we know what is going on in our universities. When we have PhD students here from China whose sole purpose is to steal as much intellectual property as possible, that is not a good thing. We should at least acknowledge that that is going on.

[Sir John Hayes]

On that very point, my hon. Friend might want to turn his attention to the Confucius Institutes that are active in several of our universities and may be doing precisely what he says. I will say no more than that, but I regard them—as I hope he does—with a considerable degree of suspicion.

[Bob Seely]

As ever, my right hon. Friend stays one step ahead of me. We know that the socialist paradise of Sweden has banned the Confucius Institutes, which is a potentially attractive route forward. As several hon. Members have said, transparency is critical.



Just to finish the point about a two-tier system, while we need a light regulatory touch for most foreign entities in this country, the critical element is when would the Government have listed China, for example, for a much deeper level of requirement about proxies and registering interests—state interests and Huawei interests as well? Would they have done it in 2012, before the visit of President Xi? Probably not. Would they have done it in 2016? Would they be under pressure not to use these laws? We need a Government willing to use these laws and willing not to have an entirely laissez-faire system—a Government who understand that, in this day and age, defending our institutions, our democracy and people in this country from covert malign influence is absolutely critical, and that we need to take an approach that is deep in some areas but also broad and that captures all those involved.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Bob Seely and John Hayes

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Bob Seely]

It was very concerning that those who govern us were calling a part and parcel of the Chinese state a private firm, which it clearly was not.

The Government claimed that Huawei could be safely limited to the periphery of the network. That is a dubious argument that is still being debated and is not believed by many experts in many other countries. Were there espionage issues with Huawei? Well, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage said, we do not expect a state threat to come from Sweden or Finland. But we do expect a potential threat to come from one-party totalitarian states such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. China is clearly one of those. So the Nortel example was a good one.

As we know, China has a dreadful reputation for intellectual property theft and cyber-attacks, so there were many reasons to be deeply concerned about what was happening in our relationship with Huawei. Yet at the same time it became incredibly powerful in this country. Why? Because it had a very aggressive lobbying network. It was throwing money at lobbyists and senior people who used to be at the heart of Government, at very senior levels. This really concerns me about the state of our democracy, and it is one reason that I would like to bring in a foreign lobbying Act. We need to have a much clearer idea of what those companies or oligarchs—those who act on behalf of other people and states—are up to in this country. We did not really know the extent of the Huawei lobbying operation.

[Sir John Hayes]

My hon. Friend is painting a picture of a strategic view of China and other powers that has prevailed under successive Governments. It is born of a kind of determinism: “We can’t stop them, so we’ll have to live with them”. There is a predetermined inevitability about the domination of these states, and that is a misconception that needs to be challenged fundamentally, in the way in which he is doing so tonight.

[Bob Seely]

I look forward to being as eloquent and well dressed as my right hon. Friend one day. Before I come to the point that he mentioned on the need for a consistent approach and better understanding, let me say one more thing about Huawei.

A few other Members have touched on this matter: China’s human rights issues. The excellent Australian Strategic Policy Institute has presented credible evidence of significant human rights forced labour issues, with people from Xinjiang province being used not only by Huawei, but by other significant Chinese firms, or by firms producing goods for western consumer markets and western branded goods. This point brings us to the National Security and Investment Bill—although I know that we are not talking about that at the moment—and the need for a definition not only of national security, but of national interest as well. Do we really think it is in our national interest for us to be accepting slave labour products in this country, whether through Huawei—allegedly—or other firms, including well-known branded names? That human rights aspect is well worth playing up.

It seems clear that the China that we had all hoped for —indeed, the golden era that we were meant to welcome under David Cameron and George Osborne—is not the China that we are getting. We need to be realistic. When it comes to international relations, in the west we are effectively liberal internationalists. We take a positive view of humanity—maybe a liberal, rather than a conservative one, if one is being philosophical about these things, but a benign view of humanity. That is not necessarily shared by the hard-nosed realism school of thought that we see in Russia and China, which is much more of a zero-sum game: we win, you lose. China plays that more subtly than Russia, but there are enough similarities between the two that it should be of concern to us. We need a clearer understand that some people out there with whom we do business do not necessarily wish us well and do not wish our values well. Finally on that, we are stumbling towards that understanding, but we need a more consistent approach to how we deal with China, along the same lines of how we deal with Russia.  They are not the same—they are very different—but we have been forced to take a more consistent understanding of the Russian threat, and we need to do the same with China.

I congratulate the Minister on his work on the Bill. The “no new install” date is the key now, and that is why everyone is on side with the Bill. We need that September date, because it shuts down any alternatives for Huawei in the short term. We need a consistent approach, whether it is the Huawei Bill or the National Security and Investment Bill, across Government. This is one of the very small number of truly significant policy packages that we will have to get right in this country for the 21st century.

There are two choices for humanity this century. We can go down our route of open, broadly tolerant societies where people control their Governments—that free open model—or there is the closed model of totalitarian or one-party states, which are building up, with Huawei’s help, this Orwellian state, where the state knows what you are thinking before you do. That is not a good avenue for humanity to go down and, without being antagonistic and too hostile to other people, we need to defend our version of the future of humanity with a little more resolve.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Bob Seely and John Hayes

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes]

That is an excellent suggestion from another member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. My goodness, we are here in force and working as a team, as you can see, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is important that the House considers these matters, as well as the Committees I mentioned which have a particular responsibility for dealing with these things and holding the Government to account.

The point was made earlier that the national interest and national security are not identical. But they are coincidental—they do overlap—as there is a point at which national resilience, or its absence, compromises national security. The Government acknowledge that in the scope of the Bill. They talk about critical national infrastructure, as well as technology sectors of various kinds. By the way, I first looked at this issue, Madam Deputy Speaker—this is not a widely known fact, but I am happy to share it in the privacy of this intimate gathering—as a Cabinet Office Minister, with the former Member for West Dorset, Sir Oliver Letwin. We looked particularly at the threats posed to core infrastructure, such as the energy sector. By the way, that threat is posed not only by hostile state actors, but other players who might choose to disrupt core activities, with extraordinarily damaging consequences for our citizens. The Government do look at those things, but historically I do not think they have done so systematically enough. I know my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells, who has a distinguished record in this area, will have had similar experiences to me when we, in turn, looked at energy as part of our ministerial responsibilities.

China has been mentioned. I do not want to speak about it at great length, but clearly the ISC is currently looking at China and will be considering these very subjects in relation to that inquiry. That will come as no surprise to the House or the Minister.

I said this Bill was necessary, but necessity requires a degree of precision and I have some specific questions that I hope the Minister will deal with, either in summing up or by writing to the ISC if he does not have time to address them today. In looking at a specific case, will the investment security unit be able to consider the cumulative effect of a particular business transaction? In other words, will it take into account whether past acquisitions in that sector, when combined with the case currently under consideration, will result in a cumulative threat to national security? Moreover, will the unit consider acquisitions that might result in an indirect threat, for example, through supply chains or managed service providers? This may well involve very small businesses; sometimes a single expert or a small group of experts will play a vital role, as component parts, in either a technology or an industry that is vital to our national security.

[Bob Seely]

My right hon. Friend is making an excellent point in an excellent speech. He is highlighting the need to understand national security not only as individual events and individual companies, big or small, but as a series of cumulative processes. Those gradual processes, over time, are as important to understand.