Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, as the Minister has so clearly set out, there is much to welcome in this Bill to improve the law where needed and to make us safer. I look forward to following it closely. To the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I say that I also look forward to following the implementation when it is an Act. It will have a profound impact on the lives of many, including the most vulnerable. I particularly support the clauses relating to countering violence against children, women and girls.

Following the report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, the IICSA, I welcome the abolition of time limitations in historical cases of child sexual abuse with Clause 82. The importance of this clause was brought home to me by a very courageous survivor, who, following years of sexual abuse by his priest, has lived a life with incapacitating mental illness, of which the origin was that trauma. The last Government refused to act on this specific issue, so I am proud that this Government have conceded the fundamental legal principle. However, as drafted, it has limited benefit to those who have fought for the change and whose sufferings make it necessary to fight. I ask the Minister to discuss this with me further, together with survivors.

The IICSA recommendations should be adopted without change or qualification. However, the clause adds a new “substantial prejudice”, especially for historical cases, which creates uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors. As I understand it, the IICSA’s final report did not include any changes regarding the introduction of “substantial prejudice”. Its inclusion in the Bill could be interpreted as reintroducing the status quo. The impact of narrowing the court’s focus to a fair trial, with the burden on defendants, should make out-of-time CSA claims easier overall, but ambiguity remains around what count as “claims arising”.

New Section 11ZB(3)(b) and (c), introduced by Clause 82, introduce the novel legal idea of “substantial prejudice”, adopted from Scottish legislation, but they are unjustified, as there is no provision for relitigation in these cases in England and Wales. I suggest that if cases fail in civil courts then the legislation has failed in its aims, and these new paragraphs should be removed.

The testimony of witnesses to the IICSA shows institutional discouragement and the extended, often ineradicable psychological harm of abuse, underscoring the need for these reforms to remove barriers. One witness said to me, “Attending the IICSA was the second most dramatic thing in my life and the trauma of it has lasted seven years so far. If subsection (3)(b) and subsection (3)(c) remain, then preparing for a court case which could be dismissed on these grounds would be as traumatic as that, and with little personal benefit”. While survivors are relieved that, through this legislation, time limitations in historical cases of child sexual abuse will be abolished, the “substantial prejudice” clauses need to be deleted for better access to justice.

The clauses on the management of sex offenders are hugely important for the victims of violence against women and girls, and I am delighted, with my long-term interest in countering stalking, that the Government are seeking both to implement their manifesto commitments and to respond to the invaluable super-complaint made by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. Following discussions with those most concerned, I will wish to probe Part 6. I also know from campaigning on doorsteps that the new offence of cuckooing will be of great benefit, especially to those living in social housing.

Finally, I wholeheartedly support Clause 191 on the removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion. I pay tribute to my colleague, Tonia Antoniazzi.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments. What a speech my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made; I commend all the speeches that have been made. If the Government only do one thing with this Bill, it should be to take on this group of amendments.

It is utterly terrifying. I addressed a teaching conference this week, with the safeguarding leads of many schools around the country, and they are tearing their hair out about it. The kids are on this stuff 100%, as we have seen from the statistics. The other thing they said to me, which the noble Baroness mentioned, is that parents either know about it and are terrified about how to address it, or they do not know about it, and I am not sure which is worse.

I reiterate that we have to get ahead of this, as the noble Baroness said. The Government must get ahead of this; otherwise, the dangers are just too huge to think about. I will keep this brief because I will speak about it more in due course, but my team and I went on a chatbot and we were “Lily”, and within about three seconds we were having an incestuous conversation with our father. It was absolutely crackers—terrible—so I ask the Government to please take on board these recommendations.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not intending to speak and I have nothing to add to all the brilliant speeches that have been made. I did not participate in the debates on the Online Safety Act. I feel horribly naive; I find this debate utterly terrifying and the more that parents know about these things, the better. I very much hope that my noble friend will be able to take this back and discuss these issues with people in this Chamber and the House of Commons. We cannot be behind the curve all the time; we have got to grip this to protect our children and our grandchildren.

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly add my support to all these amendments, particularly the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Nash, which is fascinating. If we can get the software to do this, then why would we not? I offer a challenge to Ofcom, the Government and tech firms. If they can produce such sophisticated software that it can persuade children to kill themselves, why are BT and eBay’s chatbots so rubbish? We have to make AI a force for good, not for evil.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

330A: Clause 97, page 122, line 31, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (1) at the beginning insert “Subsection to subsection (1A),”;(c) after subsection (1), insert—“(1A) The court may only make a stalking protection order against a defendant if conditions A and B are met—(a) condition A is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has engaged in stalking behaviour towards a person; (b) condition B is that the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from stalking, or the risk of stalking, carried out by the defendant.”.”

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 330A, I will speak to Amendment 330B, tabled in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and to Amendments 330AZA and 356E, tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. In doing so, I welcome this weekend’s announcements that were part of the Government’s strategy to halve violence against women and girls in the next 10 years, and I look forward to the publication of the strategy later this week.

We owe much to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her 2019 stalking Bill that created stalking protection orders—SPOs—which were introduced in January 2020. The Government have recognised that the SPO process is in need of reform. Strengthening the use of SPOs was a manifesto commitment within their plan to have violence against women and girls over the next decade. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services’ response to the stalking super-complaint highlighted the need to change the legal framework for SPOs and align them more closely to orders available in domestic abuse cases. The amendments in this group seek to reform SPOs to ensure the victims of stalking are swiftly protected from further harm.

Amendment 330A seeks to clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, to bring this in line with domestic abuse protection orders—DAPOs—and so ensure swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 provides that the magistrates’ court may make an SPO if it is satisfied that the offender has carried out acts associated with stalking. However, the legislation does not explicitly state the evidential standard to be applied. This lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application across police forces and courts in England and Wales. In practice, some courts have applied the criminal standard of proof when determining whether the conditions for an SPO are met. This approach means that police forces need to gather evidence similar to that required for a full criminal prosecution in order to secure an SPO. Consequently, victims face significant delays in obtaining protection, leaving them at risk.

For example, a woman called Juliana experienced online harassment, criminal damage and vexatious complaints to her employer by her stalker. She reported it to the police, and her perpetrator was arrested. While an SPO was considered throughout the investigation, there was slow progress made by the police to submit her application. Multiple witness statements were obtained to support her SPO and legal services within the police were contacted. Seven months later, Juliana is still awaiting a court date for the hearing. Due to the time elapsed, she is concerned that her perpetrator will soon be let out on bail and she will have no protective measures in place. By contrast, under Section 32 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, a court may issue a DAPO on the civil standard of proof. This lower evidential threshold allows for swifter intervention and the earlier safeguarding of victims.

According to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, approximately half of stalking victims do not have a prior relationship with the offender, which means that there is a disparity in protection between the victims who qualify for a DAPO, who have a relationship with the offender, and those who must rely on an SPO. Given that stalking related to domestic abuse and stalking not related to domestic abuse have comparable impacts on victims, I suggest that the threshold should be consistent for both types of protective order.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that intervention, and I will certainly discuss those suggestions and points with colleagues from the police. The current statutory guidance for police on SPOs includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions, many of which could align with Amendment 330AZA. For example, the guidance could include prohibitions on contacting the victim or referring to the victim on social media, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, the statutory guidance for the police on DAPOs also includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions. It may well be that the points the noble Lord has mentioned are covered in that, but I will happily reflect on what he said.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I am sure my noble friend is correct that it is, or should be, covered in guidance, but patently the judge looking at the case that I mentioned was not aware of this and said the fact that the victim had been contacted via LinkedIn was not something he could take a view on. He did not know that this was something he could take a view on. I am grateful to my noble friend for ensuring that the guidance is properly looked at.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful again to my noble friend for referring to the LinkedIn experience. My assessment, having discussed this with officials and with my colleague Ministers, is that the statutory guidance for police includes prohibitions on contacting the victim by any means, including social media. If my noble friend will let me, I will reflect on what she has said today, and I will discuss again with officials whether the guidance in its current format is sufficient to cover that point. That is my understanding, and I think it is a reasonable understanding to put before the Committee today.

Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would replace the power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking with a duty to do so. This would align the provision on guidance with the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, supported the general direction of travel that the noble Baroness brought forward in her amendment. I agree that it is important, where appropriate, to ensure that legislative provisions tackling violence against women and girls are consistent. Accordingly, this is an amendment that I am happy to take away for further consideration and to discuss with officials.

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[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his positive response to so many of the amendments and I look forward to further discussions. I am sure that if any noble Lord who has participated in this debate can be of assistance in those discussions, we will be happy to have a meeting with the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 330A withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendment 270 makes a change to Clause 87. In making this change, the Government are responding to the concerns raised by some of your Lordships in Committee.

Clause 87 itself is vital; it removes the current three-year limitation period for personal injury claims brought by victims and survivors of child sexual abuse in respect of the abuse committed against them and gives effect to a recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. This is needed because many victims and survivors are not able to talk—or even think—about the abuse they suffered until many years afterwards, which is a direct consequence of the abuse itself.

Clause 87 inserts new Section 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980 because it is that Act that makes provision for the dismissal of actions which are outside the time limit for personal injury claims. Under new Section 11ZB(2), if an action is brought outside the usual three-year limitation period, for it to be dismissed the defendant must satisfy the court that a fair hearing cannot take place. Under the current drafting of new Section 11ZB(3), the action may also be dismissed if the defendant demonstrates that allowing the action to proceed would cause them substantial prejudice.

We have listened carefully to the testimony of victims and survivors, and reflected on the amendments debated in Committee, all of which raised concerns about the substantial prejudice test. We decided that they were right. The retention of Section 11ZB(2) alone both implements the relevant IICSA recommendation and ensures that those accused of child sexual abuse maintain their right to a fair hearing. I am therefore pleased to say that Amendment 270 removes new Section 11ZB(3) from Clause 87.

Many have spoken about this, and I pay tribute to them all, but I make special mention of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and Mr Stephen Bernard, who brought this to our attention swiftly. Mr Bernard spoke to me most movingly about his own experiences, and I thank him for this; he has played a big part in ensuring that the Government reached this decision. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, as I mentioned at Second Reading, I am very proud that with Clause 87 this Government abolished the time limitations in historical Church child sexual abuse cases. Survivors such as my friend Stephen Bernard, whom my noble friend the Minister referenced, were concerned that the clause, as originally drafted, added a new substantial prejudice, especially for historical cases. This created uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors.

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for listening to the concerns of survivors such as Stephen, and for tabling Amendment 270. With the removal of lines 31 to 39, the IICSA recommendation has now been adopted in full, thus ensuring better access to justice for the survivors of historical sexual abuse. I am very grateful to my noble friend.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I supported the amendment in Committee, and I echo the thanks given by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, to the Minister for listening. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who tabled the original amendment. This is a really important clarification, which will help victims and prevent injustices happening in the future.

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I say again how grateful I am to all those who have spoken. These issues are so important. The Government are with you. We must make the online world a safer place, especially for women and girls, but we have to get it right. I hope all those who have tabled amendments today will understand why the Government cannot support those that I have spoken to, but I and my ministerial counterparts in other departments are keen to continue and build upon the helpful discussions we have already had. In the meantime, I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, I am sure the whole House agrees with, in essence, what Amendment 273 says, but I also noted from my noble friend that it is much more complex than I had understood. I am sure that she is as frustrated as everyone else that these things take time, and I wonder whether she is able to give us any timeline. Sorry, I am an optimist, but this is an extremely important amendment. I will be supporting the Government, but it would be good to know if we are talking about months or whatever, because obviously we want to see this in statute as soon as possible.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not think I can quite express how unpopular I would be if I suddenly, on the hoof, came out with a time. All I can say is that we are committed to doing this quickly.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, following consideration of amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in Committee, the Government have brought forward amendments to the stalking provisions in Part 6.

Amendments 308 to 313, 314 and 315 explicitly provide for the civil standard of proof to apply when a court is deciding whether to make a stalking protection order, or whether to include a particular prohibition or requirement to an order in England, Wales or Northern Ireland. This includes when the courts are deciding whether to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on the variation or renewal of a stalking protection order. This will promote consistency and improve clarity in understanding of the standard of proof applicable in cases of stalking protection orders.

In addition, I am very happy to accept Amendment 316 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which will convert the power conferred on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about stalking into a duty to do so. This will align the provision on guidance in the Stalking Protection Act 2019 with that in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, promoting consistency in the legislative provisions which aim to tackle violence against women and girls.

My noble friend Lady Royall also has Amendment 313A in this group. I will respond to it once she and other noble Lords have contributed to the debate, but in the meantime, I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, before speaking to Amendment 313A, I thank my noble friend for bringing forward amendments in response to my amendment in Committee. These amendments clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, bringing this in line with the domestic abuse protection orders, so ensuring swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders, and it will make a real difference to the protection and safety of victims.

I am grateful to the Minister and the Bill team for meeting me, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and to the Victims’ Commissioner and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust for their support.

Amendment 313A is very similar to the one I moved in Committee, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It would introduce stalking protection notices—SPNs—to provide an immediate safeguard to prevent unwanted contact or communication from a perpetrator until a full SPO is granted, thus mirroring domestic abuse protection notices. In response to the debate on that amendment, my noble friend the Minister suggested that the amendment as drafted would be disproportionate, since it would criminalise the breach of a police-issued notice without court oversight. I have therefore updated the amendment so that a breach of an SPN would not be a criminal offence, ensuring that it reflects the framework for DAPOs.

Why is this amendment necessary? Because, as highlighted in the Suzy Lamplugh Trust super-complaint and its report on experiences of the CPS and the courts, the use of full and interim SPOs is currently inadequate, including lack of applications by the police and the time that it takes to obtain one, given that both the full and interim orders have to be granted by a court. Victims say that when police do apply for SPOs, the judiciary do not recognise the need for an SPO, particularly if other orders are already in place.

In response to the super-complaint, HMICFRS highlighted the arduous application process for the police and their frustrations over their inability to issue orders themselves. It called for the Government to use the DAPN framework as a template to legislate for a new stalking protection notice, which, like the DAPN, would not require an application to the court and could be issued by the police to offer protection in stalking cases.

The length of delays in cases varies from months to years. For victims of stalking, a delay in taking their case to trial means a continuation of the stalking behaviours, especially if no protective orders are put in place. The failure to put in place an interim or full SPO at the earliest opportunity puts victims at risk of further acts of stalking, which increases the potential psychological and physical harm that they are likely to suffer. Data on SPOs is also limited and outdated, making it hard to establish how many are refused by the courts.

It is both right and logical that SPNs should be enabled and put in place following a similar approach to DAPNs. They would offer immediate police-applied protection in stalking cases and set a timeframe for the courts to consider a full order. It cannot be right that, at the moment, a woman who is at risk of violence from a stalker has less protection than a woman at risk of violence at the hands of her domestic abuser, so steps must be taken to bring this into line.

The hour is late, but I will cite one case study from the Suzy Lamplugh Trust relating to delays in SPOs and the harm caused. This case opened in January 2025. The client was subjected to criminal damage, vexatious complaints to her employer and an online campaign aimed at discrediting her. The offender also moved house to be closer to the client. This has had a significant impact on her quality of life. The case has had four different OICs and different teams from the outset, which has caused considerable delay—to the detriment of the client. An SPO has been considered throughout the investigation, but there has been little progress or ownership of responsibility across the police force.

The advocate has pointed this out on numerous occasions. Several complaints have been made to the police and the local MP but, as far as the advocate knows, no response has been received. Legal services within the force had been contacted about an SPO in February 2025. Multiple witness statements had been obtained to support the application. The police stated that the SPO application was submitted in March 2025, but this turned out to be incorrect. The judge, in a separate non-molestation order request hearing, asked why after six months the force had not secured an SPO. At the time of writing, the SPO application was sitting with the force’s legal services awaiting a court date. Due to the time that has elapsed, the perpetrator has now been on bail for so long that it has required a magistrate’s application to secure a bail extension.

This and hundreds of similar cases demonstrate the need for swift action and the introduction of stalking protection notices. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for setting out the details of her amendment, which I signed. I will not repeat any of the things that she said. I completely endorse them. I thank the Government for their amendments. Moving from the criminal level of proof to a civil standard of proof is important. We have been arguing for this for some time, so I am very grateful that the Government have taken this on board.

My Amendment 316 is another attempt to draw parallels between all the protections for victims of domestic abuse and those of stalking. It felt an odd decision that a Secretary of State might be able to report but not have to report on conditions. So I am very grateful that the Minister has signed my amendment. I look forward to seeing the statutory reports in due course.

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Tabled by

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

313A: Clause 109, page 153, line 36, at end insert—
“364I Stalking protection notices and streamlined process for stalking protection orders(1) A senior police officer of the rank of Superintendent or above may issue a stalking protection notice (“SPN”) where they have reasonable grounds to believe that—(a) the defendant has carried out behaviour associated with stalking as described in this Act,(b) the defendant is aged 18 or over, and(c) it is necessary to issue a notice to protect another person from the risk of stalking.(2) A stalking protection notice may—(a) prohibit the defendant from engaging in conduct which amounts to stalking, or from contacting or attempting to contact another person (“the protected person”) in a manner associated with stalking behaviour,(b) include a direction for a defendant to attend a magistrate’s court within 72 hours for an application for a Stalking Protection Order, and(c) remain in force until that hearing takes place.(3) A stalking protection notice must—(a) state the grounds on which it is made,(b) set out the terms of the notice, and(c) inform the Defendant of the date, time and location of the court hearing.”

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the response from my noble friend the Minister. I did not really understand the point about age, so I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I look forward to reading Hansard and to receiving a letter likewise.

It is great to know that there is an internal review taking place, and of course we look forward to Richard Wright’s review. I note that the Government have said that they will respond to the review within four months, so we look forward to a response before the summer. With that, I am happy not to press my amendment.

Amendment 313A not moved.