Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Baroness Pinnock Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th March 2023 Lords Chamber

We are minded to support Amendment 156 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, but we need to understand much more about the purpose and role of, and criteria around the appointment of, associate members. Without that, it is very difficult to determine whether there should be any provision for associate members to be granted a vote at the CCA table. We believe that the Government have been extremely opaque about this category of membership. So I ask the Minister: when are we likely to get more detail?

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, this is a very important group of amendments, which probes and challenges the membership of the CCA, and even existing combined authorities. It seems to me that there are three major principles that the amendments in this group are exploring; the first concerns whether the Government are determined to continue with democratic local government. There are proposals in the Bill for non-constituent members, which may be groups of businesses, rotary or chambers of trade, or trade unions, that are not elected locally, to be able to influence the spending of substantial sums of public money in their areas.

For me, the whole purpose of democracy is that those elected are those who are going to be accountable for decisions made about public funds—that seems to me to be a fundamental principle of local government. Unfortunately, the proposals in the Bill seem to be moving away from that basic principle by giving combined county authorities the ability to appoint associate members, who represent nobody but themselves, and indeed non-constituent members, who may not be members of an elected body such as a district, town or parish council. I would like to hear from the Minister the Government’s view on this and why these proposals are in the Bill.

The second principle is that of local. It seems that the Government, as perhaps were previous Governments, are intent on taking the “local” out of local government. The move to dismantle two tiers of local government and make them into unitaries moves the elected representatives away from their local area, because their wards are much larger in size. That leads me to support very much the proposals in the amendment of my noble friend Lady Scott of Needham Market about the involvement of town and parish councils within this system of combined authorities. It also leads me to support, the Committee will not be surprised to hear, the voices that have been heard across the Chamber on the important role of district councils within this system. They are the ones which, along with town and parish councils, are at the local level and they understand the economies and cultures of their areas. Those voices must be expressed in a higher or more remote tier of government.

The third principle that has been expressed today is proportionality. What we cannot allow—because, again, it is undemocratic to do so—is to move away from the convention of proportionality. We cannot accept that voices from other political backgrounds will not be given a chance to express those views within a combined authority.

I look forward to what the Minister is going to say about membership, voting arrangements and proportionality, and about the role of district, town and parish councils, because for me this is absolutely fundamental to any proposal for devolution. Devolution is a nonsense if it just results in another remote body that bears no relationship to its local area. If people cannot express their concerns or propose ideas, it is just another way of doing things to people rather than involving them.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness agree that one of the other concerns is that such members cannot then be voted out if people do not agree with them being there?

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

That is my fundamental principle. Anyone who makes decisions about public money has to be voted for; they have to be an elected member. The whole point is that they are then accountable for the decisions they make and can, quite rightly, be kicked out of office if local people do not agree with what they have done. That is the point and if you have non-elected members of these combined authorities who cannot be ejected from office for the decisions they have made, we are no longer a democratic country.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords have explained, this group of amendments considers various aspects of the membership of combined county authorities and combined authorities, and the voting rights of members.

Amendment 70, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, seeks to require equal membership for all the members of a combined county authority, removing the flexibility that the Bill currently provides. I listened carefully to the noble Lord but I have to come back to a point that I made in an earlier debate: it is vital that the primary legislation on combined county authority membership retains this flexibility and enables the local area to make the decision about membership.

The practice within the existing combined authority model illustrates why. It is very common for the constituent councils of the existing combined authority model to have equal membership, but this is not always the case. For example, in the West Yorkshire Combined Authority, each constituent council nominates one member of the authority and collectively they agree another three members so as to achieve political balance. This would not be possible if the legislation was amended as proposed.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my interests in the register. I am a serving district and county councillor and a vice-president of the District Councils’ Network.

I will speak to our Amendments 78 and 85 and will comment also on some of the other amendments in this group. Many in this House who have connections with local government will be very aware of the significant issues in relation to formal audit over the last three years. This has been the result of a number of issues in the private sector audit regime that we now have, including the increasing complexity of local authority accounts and the resultant demands on training, the recruitment and retention of staff, and rapidly increasing fees, to name just a few factors that have been experienced by the private audit sector. In fact, it was estimated last year that only 9% of local authorities had been able to have their 2021 audits completed on time.

Audit is really vital, as the noble Lord said just now. It provides public reassurance and confidence for both members and officers, and more particularly for the public. It is disappointing that the Bill does nothing to address that issue. However, the amendments in this section are aimed at ensuring that scrutiny within the CCA is as powerful and independent as it can be, which should, in turn, mean that audit is effective and can develop a high level of confidence among members and the public.

Turning first to our Amendment 78, this is needed because of the proposals in the Bill that effectively exclude district councillors from being voting members of the CCA itself. I appreciate that we have some work to do to clarify that point. The fundamental impact of the decisions taken by the CCA must, therefore, be able to be scrutinised effectively by members with a detailed local knowledge of their area. As chairs of overview and scrutiny review the decisions of their own councils’ executive committees on a regular basis, they will have a good working knowledge of the strategic planning for their areas, and therefore will be able to assess the likely impact of decisions taken by the CCA.

There is a precedent for this. For example, in the policing panels, which scrutinise the work and budgets of police and crime commissioners, all districts in a PCC’s area are entitled to be present. It is not intended that this amendment would prevent other members being appointed to an overview and scrutiny committee—for example independent members, as referred to in Amendment 84, from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley.

I turn now to our Amendment 85. This relates to the sharing of best practice on scrutiny, and there is some very good advice and support on scrutiny available from the Centre for Public Scrutiny. It will be vital to the successful operation of the CCA that best practice from around the country is shared among the committees. We appreciate that this is not necessarily the role of the Secretary of State, but it could be made clear in guidance to overview and scrutiny committees that they should give consideration regularly to how they operate and how they assimilate best practice.

I will now comment, if I may, on some of the amendments tabled by other noble Lords. We support Amendment 77, from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, which is designed to strengthen the role of overview and scrutiny in relation to CCAs. The Labour Party has long been advocating that local public accounts committees could be a way of pulling together local scrutiny of the impact of both national and local policy-making and decision-making on local areas. This would be a first step towards ensuring that overview and scrutiny committees have a level of independence from the CCA. The membership of these committees also needs to be carefully considered.

Turning to Amendment 79, the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, referred to the fact that overview and scrutiny committees must be able to carry out their work without influence, and I totally support that. The overview and scrutiny committees must be completely unfettered from any interference from the CCA, including such devices as setting out workplans for them or prohibiting them from scrutinising any aspect of work undertaken by the CCA. Neither should the CCA be able to determine the process used by the overview and scrutiny committees. For example, if the committees wish to call witnesses, including members of the CCA, they should be able to do so. We would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification that it is the intention that overview and scrutiny committees are entitled to carry out their scrutiny of the CCA in any way that they determine will achieve effective scrutiny.

The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raise some important issues around the way in which rural issues—such as housing, education, transport, rural economies and so on—often differ from those that are the main consideration of a CCA. We should support the freedom of a CCA to create any sub-committee that is relevant to the work that it undertakes. If it helps to have a rural sub-committee specifically listed to ensure that rural issues are considered by a CCA, that is no bad thing. This is particularly useful where the CCA covers an area that is largely urban but contains smaller rural areas, as it will ensure that issues relevant to rurality are properly considered and reported back to the CCA. A report from one of our own Lords committees, on rural communities, showed that, on the whole, local enterprise partnerships are not great at delivering for rural areas, so the need for that sort of committee of a CCA is well evidenced.

Amendment 82, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, is a belt-and-braces amendment, if noble Lords will forgive the expression, to ensure that, should a Member have recently crossed the Floor from one political party to another—meaning that they would have had very recent contact with the mayor, their decision-making processes and strategy—they are not then placed in a position to be able to scrutinise the mayor’s actions. It truly is belt and braces because, in my experience, people who change their political party do so because of disenchantment with where they have been, so it is possible that they may be the best critics of the mayor and their administration. However, this amendment would ensure that there could be no deliberate manipulation of the scrutiny function.

Similar to Amendment 82, Amendment 83, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would mean that, if there is no party with an outright majority on the CCA, the chair of overview and scrutiny should not be a member of either of the parties that may hold the majority together. Depending on local circumstances, this might be difficult if, for example, a third or fourth party is very much in the minority and may not be able to put forward a chair. In those circumstances, it might be necessary to make provision for an independent chair; the fact that we need to continue to discuss this means that there are issues here that continue to need resolution.

The LGA has made some extensive comments on Amendment 84 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. It is worth recording what it has said about having independent co-opted members on audit committees; it is certainly in favour of it. It states:

“Having multiple co-optees enables them to have complementary skills (eg finance, risk management, governance) … The constitutional rules should still require the majority of audit committee members to be elected members. This is for two reasons”—


which are fairly obvious to me but perhaps they are not always so obvious. They are that

“audit committees are fulfilling a role delegated by elected members … who are jointly and severally ‘those charged with governance’, and … elected members represent the community and are in a unique position not enjoyed by independent co-optees to understand what the concerns of local people are in relation to assurance”.

So, although we would support the increase in transparency provided by an increased number of independent members participating in an audit committee for all the reasons that the LGA and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, have highlighted, we question the need to have a specific number when the Bill already states that “at least” one member of an audit committee is an independent member. Perhaps it should be for the CCA to determine its preference for the number of independent members, based on the particular skills base that it feels it needs to carry out the audit role. In time, we feel that good practice would be developed by CCA audit committees as they understand what particular skills are needed in relation to CCA audit work; we are sure that they would be supported by national bodies such as the LGA in sharing good practice.

Another important issue arises here: the question of remuneration, which the LGA has raised. Independent members of a CCA audit committee are likely to be necessarily highly skilled individuals in, for example, finance, risk management and/or governance. While one could expect that they will give a certain proportion of their time for community benefit, it seems unreasonable to expect that they would carry out this role without any remuneration at all. Although the cost of the remuneration of independent members is likely to be minimal in the context of the overall budget of the CCA, consideration should be given to this at the initiation of the CCA so that the roles can be properly defined and recruited. The availability of the necessary skills in any particular area can be decided only in practice.

I am grateful to noble Lords for all their amendments in this group.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I remind the House of my interest as a member of Kirklees Council and one who has served on its audit committee for a number of years. Scrutiny and audit are close to my heart. My noble friend Lord Shipley has raised some important issues about scrutiny—about the importance of an appropriate person not being seen as a political nominee, because that would undermine the whole purpose of scrutiny, taking an independent view of the decision-making process in the combined authority.

The second thing, which has not yet been explored, is that scrutiny can be post decision-making and pre decision-making. In strategic decisions made by a combined county authority or a combined authority, the primary duty of a scrutiny committee ought to be pre-decision scrutiny, because that is one way of ensuring a very detailed look at what is proposed—through a semi-independent committee one step removed from the decision-makers in the combined authority. I look forward to what the Minister will say on that and whether emphasis could be put on pre-decision scrutiny, particularly in this role.

The audit function has been illustrated by my noble friend Lord Shipley, who pointed out the number of councils that are failing in their financial status because auditors fail to pick up what is going on there. There are two elements of audit, though, which, again, have not been explored today or indeed in the Bill. One is internal audit, which ought to be primarily the duty of elected members, and the other is external audit, where the appointed external auditors of every council have a very important role at looking at where deficiencies might occur and where decisions being made by the council pose a substantial risk to its future. I totally support the views expressed by all Members who have spoken so far about the importance of having independent experts on those committees from a financial, audit or risk sector to support and advise the committee, but in the end, it is the decision of the elected members. It is them who have to carry the can, quite rightly: if they make poor decisions and fail to expose issues of concern in their councils, they too must be held accountable. I look forward to what the Minister will say on those issues.

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[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly, because time presses, my name is attached to the stand part debates on Clauses 58 and 59. I do not seek to repeat what has been said already about those two clauses, but I hope the Minister will give clear evidence for the need for both clauses, because I am unconvinced that they are necessary. I will make a further point in relation to what the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said a moment ago: that the whole principle behind police and crime commissioners was that they were directly elected. If the ballot box is the main means for a police and crime commissioner to be appointed to their job, I do not think that that system can be meddled with in the way that the Government appear to want to meddle with it.

Indeed, to develop what the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, of course a mayor with PCC powers can appoint a deputy mayor to have the PCC powers on behalf of the mayor. Actually, when we read the Bill very carefully—indeed, we debated this in earlier stages of consideration of the Bill—the deputy can also pass powers on to “any other person”. There are some restrictions in the Bill as to what that might mean, but the fact is that the words “any other person” simply take away the power of the electorate to make a decision as to who is the police and crime commissioner. For that reason, I support the propositions on Clauses 58 and 59 not standing part.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, this is another really important group of amendments to do with the extent of devolution: what are the limits that the Government are putting on that? The only areas we have explored, very important though they are, are the National Health Service, policing, transport services—buses, in particular—and general functions. I have great sympathy with all the amendments in this group, particularly those introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, asking where the National Health Service fits in with the notion of devolution to local areas.

As the noble Lord explored, currently the NHS does not fit in. A move was made in the Greater Manchester Combined Authority for the mayor to take the provision of health and care services—which we have not referred to so far—under his powers. That was accepted but has not made much progress. One of the biggest challenges, as has been said time and again in this Chamber in debates relating to other Bills, is the absolute importance of connecting the National Health Service and the social care system. Enabling devolution of NHS services to a mayoral combined authority would enable social care and NHS services to be properly linked. The result of no progress being made in this area is before our eyes; we have too many older people staying in hospital for too long, which harms their health, and they are not discharged into the social care service because the two are not linked. The Government have failed to do this time and again. Well, okay, devolve it—pass it on to local mayoral authorities so that we can see what progress they can make. I repeat every sympathy, and support what has been said. I do hope it will be pursued at later stages of consideration of this Bill because it is so important for the health and well-being of the people we serve.

I will also wholeheartedly support the Clauses 58 and 59 stand part notices, for the reasons that have been said. I will give the example of West Yorkshire, where it was determined that the police and crime commissioner role would be combined with that of our elected mayor. Now we no longer have an elected police and crime commissioner because that role is unelected; they are appointed by the West Yorkshire mayor. That was her right; I am not saying she has done anything wrong. But who is now called to account for failings in policing in West Yorkshire? There have been a number of examples across the country where police and crime commissioners have, for various reasons, been found wanting and have been held accountable for their actions. How does that work in a combined mayoral authority where the mayor appoints the police and crime commissioner? Does the mayor have to be held accountable for the decisions and actions of their appointed deputy? That is the only way that accountability can take place. The attempt by the Government to undermine an elected process is undemocratic. How do the Government think that local people will feel about the very important role of holding policing in the West Midlands to account when an elected police and crime commissioner there is somehow unelected? Those two big issues are very important. It is about whether we are talking about devolution to local areas or still talking about centralised systems where there is delegation to combined authorities—which leads nicely to buses.

I cannot add to my noble friend Lady Randerson’s description of what has happened to the bus services and how important they are to any hope of levelling up for many parts of the country. As she said, if you cannot get a bus in order to access employment then, for many people, it is financially impossible to do other than stay at home. Mayoral authorities need to be given the powers to control bus services, as bus services should be encompassed in mayoral authorities. In giving another local example, I should point out that it was done before the mayoral authority was set up. Nevertheless, it comes from the centre of West Yorkshire where, in my own area, we have a number of small villages where the bus services were poor and people could not get about. Fortunately, there was not only one bus a week—like the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, has, I think—but services were poor throughout the day. We managed to get a subsidy for what I call a small hopper bus—a 15-seater—to go around the various parts of the Spen Valley area and pick up older people, take them into town to do their shopping, collect them and go back again. After a bit, because it was so popular, it has become a self-financing bus service. With local initiatives comes success because local areas know what would probably work for their patches. That is why enabling mayoral combined authorities to have control over bus services is so vital.

Any notion of levelling up will not work without the aspect of transport. There has been too much focus on rail services, which are very important but do not feature in a lot of people’s options for transport. I repeat that my noble friend Lady Randerson made a powerful case for ensuring that mayoral combined authorities can run bus services. Without that, many people—especially in rural areas, but not only in rural areas—will find that they cannot access the services and jobs they need to if levelling up is to be anything other than a slogan.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, as others have said, this has certainly been a mixed bag of amendments, but clearly they all look at the extent of devolution, the powers and the different functions involved. We have two probing amendments in this group. First, in Clause 19, my Amendment 91 probes

“whether the Government will cooperate with trade unions representing employees of CCAs.”

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, for her support and for her excellent speech on this matter. At the moment, Clause 19—“Integrated Transport Authority and Passenger Transport Executive”—does not consider the people who work for the CCAs. We believe they should be able to be part of any decision-making process. This is also why we believe it is important for the Government to co-operate with trade union representatives.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I did not say it has nothing to do with the districts or the county—

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

I apologise to the Minister. I just thought I would add to the questions now and not interrupt further.

Is this an admission by the Government that the current system of independently elected police and crime commissioners has not been effective? I cannot think of any other reason why the two separate roles should be combined unless it is felt that the separate role of the police and crime commissioner has not been as effective as the Government wished.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

In the interests of making life easier for the noble Baroness, perhaps I could add my question. What assessment have the Government done of the crossover of funding between local authorities and police services for community safety work and partnerships? That is a frequent model. When the noble Baroness says that the police and crime commissioner role has no impact on local authorities, surely, that funding flow is relevant.

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The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Pinnock, and others, asked who will be accountable. I assure them that, even if there is a deputy mayor for crime and policing, the elected mayor will be accountable. That is important, because the mayor has been elected, and he or she goes back for re-election. Noble Lords have said that you cannot get rid of a deputy mayor who has been appointed, not elected.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

I am struggling with this logic. The combined authority mayor can appoint a deputy to be responsible for police and crime, but the elected mayor will take the accountability if things go wrong. Why, then, can we not have an elected police and crime commissioner? That is the logic of what the Minister is saying.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

That is not the logic. It is an opportunity for the directly elected mayor to be able to join up all these issues within their geographic area and deliver more joined-up services by working with others.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

No, I do not think so. I will make it very clear: these amendments are nothing to do with the West Midlands. These amendments were in the White Paper a number of years ago and were fully consulted on. I will take the noble Baroness’s point, but that is not what normally happens. You would normally have one of your team as a deputy mayor responsible for one thing or another, as you do in London. In this case, it could be for police and crime. I do not know what West Yorkshire will do.

I would also add that Parliament’s approval is needed for a combined authority to take on any new function. PCC functions can be conferred on a combined authority mayor by secondary legislation only, which needs parliamentary approval before it can be made.

Finally in this group is Amendment 469, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Pinnock and Lady Randerson. This would confer new powers on local authorities to run their own bus services, which we believe is premature. The national bus strategy states that the Government would review whether it remains right that local authorities cannot set up new bus companies. Any consideration of change to the operation of the local bus market needs to be conducted in an orderly manner, with all views and potential impacts, positive and negative, considered. We therefore intend to wait until the review of the bus strategy comes out.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

Following the Minister’s earlier remarks about the mayor being able to appoint a deputy to be responsible for policing, I was wondering: are there powers for them to appoint a deputy to be responsible for buses?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I do not know about buses, but I imagine that there may be the ability for a mayor to appoint somebody to be responsible for transport in a large area. I will check that, but I am sure that it is within their powers. It is probably a very good thing to have in large geographical area, as the mayor cannot do everything in detail there. I hope that that satisfies noble Lords.