Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer
Main Page: Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer's debates with the Home Office
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall intervene for a few moments. We are often told that scrutiny in the Lords is better than that in the Commons, but this is a section of the Bill that I would have liked to have talked on, under a number of amendments, and due to pressure of time and the fact that we will be going late this evening we will not have the opportunity. This section of the Bill will not be subject to the level of scrutiny that I believe it deserves.
My Lords, I follow that by saying that this is a particularly important section of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Hamwee laid out a little bit of the history of this legislation. Last time, with the SOCPA provisions, which are now being repealed, Parliament got it very wrong—although it got it wrong in a panic, as a reaction to terrorism. There are still things in the Bill that are deeply worrying, which is why it merits scrutiny. Having said that, I welcome the fact that the Government are repealing the SOCPA clauses.
In speaking to Amendment 244ZZA, I shall give an example of one thing that should really worry us. My amendment suggests that we should remove from the Bill the words “or is about to”. If somebody is doing a prohibited activity, it is quite plain that the police can give them a direction to stop them doing it. However, how will the police know that the person is about to do a prohibited activity? Is the policeman a mind reader? Can he or she guess what that person is about to do? There is something slightly more worrying behind these words. It disguises what we now have in this country—that is, two classes of citizen. The vast majority of the country do not fall into this class, but there is a second bunch of people who are classed as domestic extremists. Some of them may be in your Lordships' House, because to be a domestic extremist, for which there is no legal definition, you simply have to be somebody whom the police think has regularly gone on protests. I do not know the rest of the criteria that the police use to judge, and I do not believe that the Home Office is very aware of them, because when I asked a series of Written Questions about this to the Minister’s predecessor I was told that there is no legal definition. There is a database, and people can find out if they are on the database if they apply under the Freedom of Information Act. However, of course they would not know to apply, because most people would not suspect that they were on it.
This year we have also had the issue of the somewhat out-of-control undercover surveillance of activists. I am very glad that HMIC is currently carrying out a review of operational accountability of undercover work of the national public order intelligence unit, but we have not had the results yet of that review.
In addition, the Metropolitan police force has just acquired some suspect-mapping software called Geotime, which can take account of the activity done by domestic extremists in their everyday lives. For example, it can follow social networking when they use their sites, as well their mobile use, cash withdrawals and sat-nav use. The police can build up thus an entire picture of somebody who is not a criminal or somebody who has been convicted of anything but someone who is classed as a domestic extremist, for which, as I say, there is no legal definition. It is quite worrying. Those people, the domestic extremists, have not necessarily done anything criminal—nothing except to be known protesters and activists. In other words, they are people who might do something. That is what worries me about the wording,
“or is about to do”.
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 244ZZB. I suppose for Hansard I should also say that I am also speaking to Amendments 244ZA, 244ZAC, 244ZCE, 244ZCF, 244ZDZA, 244ZDZB, 244ZEA, 244ZEB, 244ZEC, 244ZED, 244ZEE, 244ZEF, 244ZF, 244ZG and will oppose the Question that Clause 149 stand part.
The first half of the amendments in this group would replace “constable” with “senior police officer” in Clauses 144, 145 and 146. Under Section 12 of the Public Order Act a “senior police officer” means the most senior in rank at the scene. I had wondered whether a constable was referred to because of the seizure powers that would be likely to be carried out in many instances by a relatively junior officer. However, the definition in my Amendment 244ZAC answers the point. The Public Order Act got it right by stating that the officer should be the most senior in rank at the scene. It is appropriate to ask the Government to justify why they have extended that right, only in the case of Parliament Square, to warranted officers below the most senior in rank at the scene.
What worries me more are the powers to be extended beyond warranted officers; those powers are the subject of the remainder of the amendments in the group. Powers are to be given by the Bill to authorised officers, who will include employees of the GLA and Westminster City Council. Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens of the Metropolitan Police gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the Commons to the effect that a broad discretionary power, vaguely drafted, is very difficult for a police officer to exercise in the middle of a protest. However, police officers have training and experience that are probably not available to authorised officers—council employees. I know that the duties of some council employees have been extended to some public order matters. There are wardens in Trafalgar Square, but their experience and duties are rather different from those expected under the Bill.
The Bill grants powers of direction and seizure to an authorised officer, although, as a result of an amendment during proceedings on the Bill before it reached us, only a constable may use “reasonable force”. I welcome that, of course, although I cannot quite envisage an authorised person—a council employee—seeking to seize an item, its owner holding on to it, and the authorised person saying something such as, “Oops, please wait right there while I get a constable”. It is not clear that this is workable. It is better not to let those who are not warranted officers—warranted officers would be clearly identifiable—getting into the situation at all.
This was something on which the Joint Committee on Human Rights made a number of comments, referring to the fact that the Minister had explained that the Government thought it would be bureaucratic and time-consuming to limit the direction-making power to police officers. I am well aware of how much work the Committee has to get through tonight, but I nevertheless want to read the JCHR’s recommendation into the record. At paragraph 1.22 of the report the committee said:
“We are concerned that the main reason given by the Minister … is cost and administration saving”.
The committee continues:
“We welcome the Minister’s reassurance that these powers would be accompanied by guidance dealing with the appropriate exercise of discretion, identification and, in particular, with the reasonable use of force. However, no provision for these important safeguards is made on the face of the Bill. We regret the Government’s reluctance to accept the need for further definition or statutory guidance. In the absence of statutory safeguards, we do not consider that the Government has provided adequate justification for the extension of this broad discretion to use such powers to local authority employees or contractors”.
It also states at paragraph 123:
“We consider that the power to seize property is a power of the type which should generally be reserved to police personnel. Without further justification for seizure powers to extend to the local authority, we consider that this power should be limited to police personnel”.
I have cut down the amount that I was intending to read into the record. I beg to move.
Briefly, I agree heartily with my noble friend. It is not just a question of the seniority of the police officer, or whether they are warranted. My noble friend made some important points. Every inquiry into difficulties with protests recently has found that training is the issue. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell the House what provisions are in place under this Government for better training. The other place concluded after G20 that never again must untrained officers be placed in the front line of public protest. Nowhere is more front-line than Parliament Square. Inadequate training in the law, including human rights and public order powers, and a lack of clarity about the role and function of the forward intelligence teams, who are very much on the ground in the case of bigger public demonstrations, have been issues.
I realise that since some of those comments were made, we have had the appointment of Sir Hugh Orde, who has brought some valuable experience in human rights training from Northern Ireland, which was recognised for integrating human rights training into general training. In human rights training, it is so important to get the balance between freedom of expression and that spilling over into something else.
The previous Government rather sloped their shoulders with regard to the Home Office giving guidance on what training should be given and said that it was a matter for ACPO. Does the Home Office feel more strongly now that guidance on training, particularly in this regard, is a matter for the Home Office?
My Lords, I, too, will be brief. I have one amendment in the group. It relates to Clause 149 and deals with a very similar issue to that raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: the definition given of “authorised officer”. The clause states that it can be,
“an employee of the responsible authority”,
or,
“any other person who, under arrangements made with the responsible authority … is so authorised for the purposes of this Part”.
All I want to add is that there are concerns, which have been eloquently expressed, about the powers that may be operated by someone other than a warranted police officer. I appreciate that the purpose of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is to ensure that it is a senior police officer.
It will be very helpful in probing how the Government see the role of people other than warranted police officers under this part of the Bill, if the Minister could say what those authorised officers, as defined under the Bill, will be expected to do. What will an authorised officer not to be able to do that a warranted police officer could do under the Bill?
Will the role of the authorised officers include policing demonstrations? How will people know that they are authorised officers under the terms of the Bill, since presumably they are not going to be dressed like police officers? Will it be obvious to all concerned? The Minister will know from evidence given in relation to this Bill that a view has been expressed in police circles that even clearly identifiable police officers may at times have difficulty in having their decisions and instructions accepted by those who are taking part in demonstrations—certainly in the heat of the moment. Surely that becomes even more difficult, depending on what the Minister has to say about the role of authorised officers, in relation to somebody who is not a police officer. Who will determine the suitability of these authorised officers for the role envisaged for them in this Bill, whatever that role may be?
I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify the situation and perhaps put minds at rest to some extent by what he has to say about the role and responsibilities he expects for these authorised officers who are not warranted police officers.
My Lords, I intervene with another rather silly and naive question. I ask these questions because previously sometimes the most ludicrous things have happened and we find an article in the Evening Standard about action taken during one of these demonstrations which none of us comprehends. I want to ask a very simple question. Clause 146(1) says,
“if it appears to that constable or officer that the item is being, or has been, used in connection with the commission of an offence under section 144”.
What about a deckchair? If a demonstrator turned up with a deckchair, who will decide whether the chair is for sitting upon or for sleeping upon? It is in those silly little areas that stupid decisions are taken that can lead to trouble in crowds, and subsequently to violence. It can be the small things that trigger a demonstration. This is why this whole area of the Bill should have been dealt with in far greater detail than it has been, and I simply ask what might appear a naive question but may well turn into an issue at some stage.
I have one illustration to add to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, made so well. Who is to say that that person with the deckchair is even on the demonstration? One of the issues under the—happily to be repealed—SOCA provisions was that a person turning up in a T-shirt with a slogan saying “down with the war” might be taken to be on a demonstration but might be taken to be walking down the road in a T-shirt. The same thing would apply to things like deckchairs and blankets. Is a poncho something for sleeping in? It is a sort of blanket but your head can go through it. There are all sorts of issues that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is correct to raise that are going to be an immense matter for judgment.
My Lords, I will pick up on that last point about seizure before I begin to address the amendments. Police officers have different seizure powers that are largely based on their need to prevent crime or to seize evidence for a crime. People have mentioned deckchairs and other such items. Depending on the circumstances, it would be up to the police officer concerned to exercise their judgment about whether the item they were seizing was involved in either preventing crime or was evidence that might be used in a later prosecution.
Amendment 244ZZB is premised on ensuring that only the most senior officer present at a scene can issue a direction to cease doing a prohibited activity. The Government fully appreciate the likely challenge to these provisions. We understand that the intention behind the amendment is to ensure that directions are properly issued by escalating authority to the senior officer present at the scene. On a point of principle, the Government are confident that police constables, regardless of rank, can issue appropriate directions. The Government support the return of discretion to police professionals.
On a point of operational practicality, the package of reforms is designed to support early and proportionate interventions by the police to prevent an escalation of prohibited activities. However, the amendment would hinder that. Amendments conferring powers only on the senior officer present at the scene would have an adverse impact on practical enforcement on the ground, and on that basis I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
The same arguments extend to Amendment 244ZA and other amendments in a similar vein. These amendments would remove powers from authorised officers of the Greater London Authority and Westminster City Council, about which I shall say more in a moment. The effectiveness of the new legal framework in Part 3 depends on a strong collaborative partnership approach between the Metropolitan Police, the Greater London Authority and Westminster City Council, with which the Home Office continues to work closely. It is necessary for all three agencies to be able to exercise some powers to avoid the type of situation in which, for example, a heritage warden employed by the Greater London Authority found himself unable to act or to deal with an individual until a police officer arrived to assist. Removing all powers from authorised officers would make the provisions in Part 3 unworkable.
Clearly, members of the public must be able to identify authorised officers, understand what powers they have and their authority to use them, and what avenues of complaint are open to them. Greater London Authority heritage wardens carry identification and wear a uniform, as do authorised officers from Westminster City Council. We understand from both the GLA and Westminster City Council that to date there have been no issues with authorised officers’ identification for the purposes of implementing by-laws. In addition, we are working with the relevant authorities to develop enforcement protocols and guidance on all these issues. I say to my noble friend Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer that the Home Office has undertaken to provide the guidance and operation for this part of the Bill.
The Government recognise the concerns generated by the powers that are available to authorised officers. That is why, as noble Lords may know, we have listened to concerns raised in the other place and have decided to remove the power to use reasonable force from authorised officers. However, the amendments would take away the powers of authorised officers to deal with even the most routine cases. I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments, which would make the provision in Part 3 unworkable. I hope they will feel that I have given them sufficient information to be more confident about how we intend to proceed with this part of the Bill.
My Lords, the Committee will have noticed that I confused my ZZAAs before, which is why I moved that amendment earlier, for which I apologise. It is confusing when they are grouped like this.
With the amendments in the name of my noble friend we move to whether the maximum fines for a summary conviction for an offence are proportionate under Clause 144 for failure to comply with the direction. We feel that it would be more proportionate to move from level 5 to level 3, which the JCHR comments on. It says that the Minister may wish to impose an effective deterrent, and that,
“any punishment should be proportionate to the relevant offence. We do not consider that the Minister has explained why these offences differ significantly in impact or scale from other public order offences to justify a significantly greater degree of sanction. Without further justification the Bill should be amended to reduce the sanction from level 5 to level 3, in line with other similar public order offences”.
I should be grateful if the Minister could explain why this is considered worthy of such a significantly greater fine.
Amendments 244ZCG and 244ZCH would reduce from 90 days to 14 days the period in which an activity is prohibited. Surely 90 days is really very extreme. Do we imagine that people will hang around for 14 days and try to repeat their activity? That is possible; it might be taken as part of the freedom to try your demonstration again. But similarly, the Joint Committee on Human Rights asks the Government for an explanation as to,
“why they consider that it is appropriate for the Court to have such broad Order-making powers in connection with the proposed offences. In particular, the Minister should explain why lengthy Orders banning an individual from the vicinity of the controlled area around Parliament might be appropriate”.
Under the provisions of SOCPA part of the enormous offence caused by the clauses in that Bill was to do with banning individuals from an area. The Government need to proceed with extreme caution in this case. If individuals feel very strongly about something that is about to happen—I could quote, for example, the country going to war—of course, individuals will want to protest again and again. Is it really reasonable to prevent them doing so for three months just because they lay down to sleep although they were directed not to do so and contravened the Act? In any case, if they feel that strongly, why should they not do it again? I am not condoning people undertaking criminal activity but in this case, there is a very fine line between taking all individuals who protested and contravened something and banning them from appearing anywhere outside Parliament for 90 days. I do not feel that that is proportionate and I beg to move.
Having heard this useful further discussion, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend I thank the Minister for his reply on the retrospective aspect of this matter. I am sure that she will be as reassured as I am by that. I thank him for his explanation on why the penalty is as it is. I still wonder whether 90 days is rather heavy-handed. We will want to come back to whether police officers should be able to vary their guidance or their judgment of a situation on Report.
Around the House, we are in agreement that peaceful protest is a good thing and violent protest is not. On 28 March, we had a good example. At the Fortnum & Mason peaceful protest, 138 people were charged. Of several dozen violent protesters only 11 were charged. Somewhere there the police did not get their judgment right. I am grateful that my noble friend the Minister has had such broad experience of protests—going on them and now from the Dispatch Box. I am sure that he will be able to weave a careful path through this very knotty issue. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this group of amendments moves us on to amplified noise, which was referred to a moment ago. The Bill prevents all use of noise amplification equipment without prior authorisation, which rather returns us to the situation under the SOCPA provisions where you had to have prior authorisation for a demonstration. Following representations from Members of the other place and from this House, it is understandable that the Government have felt that they have to react to the issue of noise equipment. On the day of the visit of the President of the United States there were a couple of demonstrations outside this building. I am sure that all of your Lordships could tell that it was not necessary to have amplified noise equipment in order to have a loud demonstration, even from 30 or 40 people. The matter of whether we need such restrictions to be so overwhelming is one issue.
The Bill gives a large amount of discretion to the police as regards reasonableness, on matters such as whether a person is about to turn up the volume so that people around are likely to be able to hear it. That is very theoretical and it will make the life of the police more difficult if they have to make that sort of judgment. However, there is clearly a judgment to be made here. People have a right to go about their business in the square, whether they are tourists or Londoners, and they should not have to hear an incredible amount of noise—although the traffic is probably still the noisiest thing. Our amendments probe whether there should be an overall prohibition on amplification and whether the restriction should be so broad. I beg to move.
You can still hear it from there. I am not saying that that is where the loudhailer is; I am saying that you can hear it from there. You cannot hear what is being said; you just hear a shriek. As I have said, we are not trying to prevent protestors using a loudhailer but we want it to be proportionate in how it impacts on other people.
I shall just go through the regulations on applications. Twenty-one days is the period currently used by the GLA and Westminster to consider applications for loudhailers under local by-law provisions and Section 137 of SOCPA. Six days would be too short a period and would not give local authorities sufficient time to consult others. We are talking about a very limited area in which authorisation to use amplified noise equipment is needed. The authorisation scheme is there to protect competing interests in the limited space. Therefore, I urge the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
I come to the court and the distinct issue of limiting its ability, on conviction, to make an order requiring the convicted person not to enter the controlled area of Parliament Square by imposing a time limit of no more than seven days. The Government’s provisions leave the length of time entirely to the court to determine, in line with the circumstances of each case. This is wholly appropriate and would allow the courts to deal with determined individuals who might be resolute in simply coming back after seven days. I hope noble Lords will understand that we believe we have got the proportionality right here. I will write to the noble Lord on his more detailed technical question about different types of equipment.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for her reply. She has certainly laid out the Government’s thinking very clearly. It is still possible to see one or two difficulties. For example, if you wanted to use a loudhailer at the last minute because you had only just decided to march on a particular issue, you would not have 21 days in which to apply to do so. In that case, would you be in contravention of what is in the Bill? There may be some other details that we shall want to come back to on Report, but we now have a clear understanding of where the Government are coming from. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am very sympathetic to the amendment because I feel quite strongly, and always have done, that people should be allowed to demonstrate in the square. This is a perfectly reasonable way of dealing with the difficulties that arise. Basically, you are simply clearing the square in the evening after the demonstrations have taken place during the day.
It always gives me a thrill when I drive around Parliament Square to see those people encamped on the pavement. This must be one of the only democracies in the whole world where people can demonstrate on the very steps of Parliament. It must be most enlightening for people coming in from all over the world to see it actually happening here in the United Kingdom. It might give them cause to reflect on the way we run our democratic arrangements in this country. This amendment should be seriously considered by the Government. It would certainly save a lot of space in the printing presses where they produce legislation and it would deal with the problem in a way that is perfectly acceptable. I hope it can be considered on Report in perhaps greater detail—perhaps even in the Division Lobbies.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is quite right. When parliamentarians from other countries come here it is one of the things that they comment on—and not adversely. They do not dwell as much on the slightly messier aspect that MPs and some noble Lords have complained about. They are more impressed with the fact that the demonstrations take place. There is much attraction in the noble Lord’s amendment, not least for the Government. They have signed up to a bonfire of regulations and this gets rid of an awful lot of regulations all at once. I imagine that they will be nervous of adopting it because it seems perhaps too gentle but for my part I am very attracted to it.
I note that these two amendments are identical, and almost identical to the Private Member’s Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. Does this replace his Private Member’s Bill or will we return to this on 1 July, which I think is now scheduled for the Second Reading of his Bill, for a third debate on the issue that began with the Second Reading of the Private Member’s Bill of my noble friend Lord Tyler last Friday?
As I have already said, I welcome the discussion of not just the future of Parliament Square but also the whole question of the democratic environs of the Palace of Westminster. If I might go slightly off ministerial piste, so to speak, I think that we all recognise that the most intrusive element in Parliament Square is traffic. Some of us were actively supportive of the World Squares for All initiative which intended to close off either one or two sides of the square. That would give us back a major democratic space. Part of the reason that the encampment has been able to lodge on those pavements for some time without interference is because it is difficult for the ordinary person to get across the traffic on to Parliament Square Garden under most conditions except in the middle of the night.
If we are going to discuss the whole issue of Parliament Square and demonstrations in the vicinity of Westminster, Abingdon Green and so on, I suggest that we need to pull together a committee which will include not just the authorities here but also the Supreme Court, the authorities of Westminster Abbey and elsewhere. I am sympathetic to a good deal of what is behind the amendment but suggest that if we are to discuss this area it is not just a question of the management of demonstrations or the encampment in the middle of Parliament Square. The Government are working with the Greater London Authority, Westminster City Council and the Metropolitan Police on effective enforcement protocols. Guidance will be issued to the public about these new provisions. However, that is about the narrow issue of the future of encampments in Parliament Square. The wider issues that I suspect the noble Lord wishes to get to require debate outside the confines of the Bill. I therefore request him to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, my name is to this amendment. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for her energetic work in this area. She has given the House an excellent introduction to this amendment so I will not delay things at all, except to say that since the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 one Government or another—indeed, society as a whole—have tried almost everything in the book. We have not got anywhere with it, really. The so-called war on drugs is a stalemate at best; at worst, we are losing the battle. This seems a good moment to try a different approach. Something in particular that has changed is that in the early 1970s, when we did not have the internet, people could not just order things online and get them by post. The public now are looking for consumer protection, whether for aspirins or legal highs. I understand that we all, whatever our political point of view, have to approach this question with great sensitivity; it is not an easy one. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for tabling the amendment in the way that she has. It gives us a great opportunity.
My Lords, the whole House should congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, on the way in which she has introduced the amendment. It has given us a good perspective on these issues and picks up on the very good debate on this topic that we had at Second Reading.
This side of the House took from that debate the concern that has just been mentioned about the rhetoric of the war on drugs and the worry that that may have outlived its purpose. Our concern is that there needs to be a new look at all the psychoactive drugs, and a policy that looks through one prism at the way in which they impact on individuals and society. Our continuing worry has been expressed again today: that policy in this area needs to be joined up much better, so that the health and educational aspects of all work on drugs are brought together. I know—at least, I hope—that the Minister shares in that expression of concern. Whether that amounts to a need for a new plan B in this area would be a good debate and might be something that we want to come back to on Report.
Our amendments in this group are supportive of the original amendment. We feel that control under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 may be appropriate for the most harmful new substances, but it has a number of negative consequences that can increase the dangers to some users from the substance in question and other more harmful substances for which new drugs may be substituted. It would therefore be appropriate for the ACMD to be asked also to consider the use of other legal powers, such as consumer protection legislation, trading standards in particular or, as has been discussed, medicines controls, before they consider recommending the use of temporary banning orders.
As has been mentioned again in this debate, the experience of the control of mephedrone indicates that the Government can at times have very limited information about both the impact of controlled substances on users and the changes in usage in terms of the adoption of both less and more harmful behaviours caused by the introduction of legal controls. Again, it would be appropriate for the ACMD to commit to reviewing the effects, both positive and negative, of each temporary ban before making any recommendations about making the control permanent. It should be noted that, even one year after a temporary ban has been introduced, robust data about usage and the impact of the ban are likely to be limited unless steps are taken to improve data collection processes. The evaluation should certainly consider, at the very minimum, the impact of temporary bans on the use of the banned substances: the actual use of the substance, its purity and the replacement of the banned substance with other substances, including controlled and other substances.
Finally, the Government should be encouraged to commit to reviewing the temporary banning powers in general after three years from their first use. This will provide an opportunity to evaluate how effectively they are being used and what impact they are having on the consideration of other control mechanisms.