(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI completely accept the noble Lord’s unhappiness—and possibly share it, because I have to answer this question on a regular basis. Unfortunately, the Government have no powers to intervene, as he will be aware, in the misconduct process. There are reasons why it has been held up, but I cannot say them.
My Lords, the Government have promised to make police and crime commissioners more accountable, because getting held to account only once every four years is not really enough. What exact measures will the Government put in place to make sure that they respond to the people for whom they are responsible?
The noble Baroness asks a good question. As she will be aware, we have passed secondary legislation to enact changes to the PCC voting system. This reform will clarify and simplify it and make it easier for the public to hold their PCCs accountable at the ballot box. We are increasing the transparency of PCCs by amending the specified information order so that PCCs are now required to publish additional information to allow the public to hold them to account, including their progress against the Government’s national priorities for policing, recent HMICFRS reports and additional complaints information. There are also recommendations to improve scrutiny, which I can go into. A lot has been done.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have been reflecting on the speeches which we have just heard. Listening to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and his point about the threshold, I have been thinking about what would be more than minor that was not significant. Looking at the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, gave, it seems to me that if one discovered people tunnelling under an area that was going to be HS2, that is not only more than minor; my goodness me, it seems to me to be significant. I was also thinking about the closing of four or five motorways. So far as I am concerned, that seems to be both more than minor and significant. I just wonder, rather hesitantly, whether we are arguing about a position where the difference between “more than minor” and “significant” is extremely small. I cannot at the moment think of a word that I would use that was more than minor but not significant. That is where I stand—a slightly different position, I confess, from what I said on the last occasion.
My Lords, I hope I do not cause offence here, but I disagree strongly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I shall give the House a few words that would be more than minor but less than significant: it could be “reasonable”, “measured, “limited” or “tolerable”. There are all sorts of stages between “more than minor” and “significant”. As a veteran protester, I have probably passed quite a few red lines in the past, although I have never committed violence—so far.
I turn to Motion A1. Obviously I am upset, along with other noble Lords, I hope, at the fact that the other place immediately whips out all our good work and indeed our hard work. We spend time reading the Bill and thinking about it, which obviously the majority of people in the other place do not; they simply do whatever the Government tell them. I feel that the Government are trying to stop protest of virtually every kind—almost any protest imaginable—and that is so deeply oppressive that I could not possibly support it, so I wholeheartedly support Motion A1.
If the House will indulge me, I will mention the other two Motions as well so that I speak only once. I am horrified by Motion B2. I regret that Labour feels it cannot support Motion B1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Sitting here, I have been thinking that I would vote against Motion B2, but that is probably too difficult. I do not even think I can abstain, so I think I am going to vote for it—but it will be through gritted teeth as it goes against all my libertarian views, and I am really annoyed with Labour for putting it in.
To finish on an upbeat note, there is Motion C. The Government make endless bad decisions. We are wallowing in an ocean of bad decisions nationally because of this Government, and some extremely unpleasant scenarios, with poverty and deprivation, are playing out because of them. But here they have done the right thing. It is incredible that the Government have come back with not just something that we generally asked for but with a slightly improved version of the Lords amendment, which I have to thank them for and say “Well done”—if that does not sound too patronising, or matronising. It is a win for civil liberties and the right of the public to be informed about protest and dissent.
On a final note, I have been saying that I am the mother of a journalist. That is a slight twist of the truth, because actually I am the mother of an editor, and I just know that she will be absolutely delighted with what the Government have done today.
My Lords, I declare an interest: I generally pay my mortgage by debating the difference between “significant” and “more than minor”, so I am on very familiar territory.
The problem with the word “significant” is this: what is the opposite of significant? It is insignificant. There is therefore a constant debate in the courts when something, generally a contract, is said to be significant. Does it mean substantial—that is, quite a lot—or does it mean not insignificant, in other words more than de minimis? That is the problem with a word such as “significant”. For those reasons, I respectfully endorse the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. We need a test here that is easy to apply.
Elsewhere in the law, we have the concept of significant risk. Of course, that is even more difficult, because there you are talking about risk—something that might happen—whereas here, in Motion 1A, we are talking about something that has happened or is happening. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked what the difference was between “more than minor” and “significant”. In the Court of Appeal case of R v Lang, Lady Justice Rose, who is now in the Supreme Court, said in her judgment:
“The risk identified must be significant. This is a higher threshold than mere possibility of occurrence”—
that is, a risk case—
“and in our view can be taken to mean … ‘noteworthy, of considerable amount or importance’”.
Even in that definition, there is a difference, I would suggest, between “noteworthy” and “of considerable amount”—and that is in the context of a risk, not something that is actually happening.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I briefly thank the Minister. I have heard from the stiftungs that we intervened on behalf of, and they thank the Minister for the movement that has happened and look forward to working closely with us in the future. I think it is as well to place these thanks on the public record.
My Lords, I still feel quite grumpy about the Bill, but I accept that the Government have moved a little. I very much hope that, when it gets back to the other place, Members there will perhaps see fit to introduce stronger protections for journalists. I understand that something has gone into the Public Order Bill, but I think something should have been in this Bill as well.
My Lords, we on these Benches are often critical of the Government—of either colour, I understand—so it is perhaps appropriate to record my appreciation, at least, to the Minister and indeed to the Security Minister, for the patience with which they listened to us, but also for the imagination with which they reacted, not simply producing cosmetic tweaks that resulted in dogs being called off, but being prepared to go back, particularly on the political tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, to first principles and to think it out again, with the consequence, I suspect, that we are now left with something of real value, rather than the bureaucratic nightmare with which we were threatened when the Bill left the Commons.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Baroness for her question. On 20 February, a package of measures was announced by the Home Secretary to tackle perpetrators and give better support to victims of domestic abuse. As the noble Baroness will know, the Government committed to legislate to add controlling or coercive behaviour, with a sentence of 12 months or more, to the list of offences eligible for management under MAPPA, and to ensure that all offenders managed under MAPPA are recorded under MAPPS when it is launched in 2024. She will know that MAPPS is replacing the violent and sex offender register. All these measures, together with the development and piloting of the domestic abuse harm risk assessment tool so that police forces can quickly identify the highest-risk perpetrators and take appropriate action, demonstrate the Government’s dedication to addressing these issues.
My Lords, one of the first areas the Government have to address is the sexism and misogyny in police forces all over the UK. What specific measures has the Home Office suggested for all police forces? If the Minister cannot reply, I am happy to have a letter left in the Library.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 18 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Faulks, and to a number of government amendments that touch on the same issue. I declare my interest as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group, which is a member of the News Media Association, and as director of the Regulatory Funding Company. I also note my other interests in the register.
One of the leitmotifs that ran through discussions on this Bill in the other place, and through Second Reading and Committee here, has been its impact on independent journalism, particularly investigative reporting, as the noble Lord has just said. I do not need to rehearse all those arguments on this subject, which have been well covered and widely reported. Indeed, it has attracted attention and criticism from international media freedom groups deeply concerned about the global impact of this legislation.
The crux of the argument is really very simple and arises mainly from the wide definitions of offences in Clause 3, which potentially criminalise aspects of investigative reporting. That in turn—this is the major worry—produces a powerful chilling effect on investigative reporting by responsible journalists. I appreciate that there are government amendments, which I am going to come to, but as it stands an offence punishable with heavy criminal sanctions and sentences is committed if someone
“knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it is reasonably possible their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
That would cover a wide range of reporting, whether about sexual assaults on board a nuclear submarine, Chinese influence in the UK, bullying by intelligence officers, an innocent photograph of a nuclear power station or huge investigations such as the Panama Papers.
The problem is that, when journalists start investigating a story, they cannot possibly know where it will lead and whether their reports might
“materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
They should not be criminalised for what they ought to have known, even if what they actually did know at the time is taken into account. It is too nebulous and such a low bar that much reporting could be caught. Editors and reporters would far too often be forced to stop an important public interest investigation because of the fear of breaking the law and individuals facing prison sentences.
As I said in Committee, I have never believed that the new offences in this Bill would be used regularly to imprison journalists, and I do not believe that is what the Government intend. But the risk, the uncertainty, the lack of clarity in the law and the chilling effect are there. As a result, the damage to the public interest is there.
To echo the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the Government to their great credit have listened to concerns set out so clearly in Committee by colleagues across the House in the debate on the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others. The Security Minster Tom Tugendhat has underlined his own strong personal commitment to media freedom. He, my noble friend the Minister and their officials have been extremely helpful and constructive in discussions with colleagues here and with the media industry to try to resolve these issues.
Government amendments tabled for Report to Clause 31 are an improvement on the Bill and I support them. They go some way to ameliorating the difficulties by changing “reasonably possible may” to “is likely to”, which brings helpful clarity. But I believe that, without a very clear signal from the Government that the purpose of their amendments is to ensure that public interest journalism is outside the scope of their Bill, on their own, they do not go far enough.
The reason for this is that lack of clarity in the criminal law is always the enemy of investigative reporting. Uncertainty as to whether something will end up in a lengthy jail sentence for a reporter of editor is anathema to media freedom. Here we have—even with the government amendments—lack of clarity and uncertainty, and a chilling effect from the wording that judges journalists for what they ought to have known.
Relying on the courts to interpret vague legislation is not good enough when it comes to media freedom, because we have all seen where that ends. There must be no ambiguity which would force the prosecuting authorities and courts to have to second guess the intentions of Government or which would allow a future Government not committed to freedom of expression to use the same prosecuting authorities and courts to suppress scrutiny of their actions.
Consider this not unusual scenario. It happens not infrequently that an investigation by a newspaper relating to a matter of national security looks as if it may end up criticising or embarrassing the Government or intelligence services. During the course of such a wholly legitimate investigation in the public interest, the editor of a newspaper receives a call from someone who says, “Publish this and you’ll be assisting a foreign intelligence service”. The editor and reporter have no way of knowing whether that is true or is just an attempt to stop an investigation. In such circumstances, the risk of prosecution because they “ought reasonably” to have known that they were assisting a hostile power will deter them from publication. Simply put, if you do not know what constitutes “conduct” amounting to a criminal offence, you are unlikely to pursue a story touching on national security issues. Even with the government amendments, that still therefore leaves a profound chilling effect.
I understand that the Home Office and the security services need “conduct” to be drawn sufficiently broadly in Clause 3 to protect the public in a wide range of circumstances—something we all want—but that is why, at the same time, it must be made unequivocally clear that genuine journalistic activity is not within the ambit of prosecution.
The purpose of my amendment is therefore to provide clarity and certainty by ensuring that those working on articles or investigations for publication by recognised news publishers—a term already defined by government in both this Bill and the Online Safety Bill—have a defence to rely on if they are threatened with prosecution for conduct that they must necessarily engage in during the course of their work. This simply codifies in the Bill the Government’s stated intention in regard to journalism, and is a straightforward, practical amendment to deal with the problems that have been identified throughout the passage of this legislation.
I have consistently said that I wholeheartedly support this Bill. National security is the primary task of government and one which this House takes incredibly seriously. However, all legislation of this sort is a balance between competing rights and responsibilities. Noble Lords will know that, 80 years ago, President Roosevelt set out his four freedoms. The fourth was freedom from fear, which is what this Bill is all about. We should not be fearful of the terrorist, the bullet or the bomb, or of a cyberattack, and this Bill rightly strengthens the armoury available to the state to deliver that. However, Roosevelt’s first freedom was freedom of expression—the source of all other liberty. He recognised, as so many after him, that a balance needs to be struck. This amendment seeks to do that by ensuring that this vital Bill protects the public interest that springs from investigative reporting at the same time as it protects the security of the public. In doing so, it would send a powerful signal to the rest of the world about the commitment of our Parliament to free speech—a global responsibility that we must take very seriously.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Black. I read up on him and it says online that he is a passionate defender of press and media freedom, and free speech. I think we might be coming at these things from different directions, but on these things we agree. I declare an interest as the mother of a journalist. I care very deeply about this issue of press freedom; it is a ditch I will die in—which looks likely, perhaps, today.
The Minister said he has heard from the media. I have heard from the media as well, and it has been quite interesting hearing what journalists have to say about this particular Bill. For example, only today, the Sun journalist Mr Harry Cole texted me to highlight stories that he broke that could have criminalised him. That is quite a useful example. One of the stories was, of course, Matt Hancock in his office with his then girlfriend—perhaps not a matter of great state concern, but at the same time it showed a carelessness on behalf on members of the Government for laws that they had brought in.
The government amendments in this group are proof that your Lordships’ House can force the Government to recognise errors in their legislation—of which, of course, there are always a lot. As I said at Second Reading and in Committee, the offences in the Bill are simply too broadly drawn; they risk ensnaring far too many innocent actions, turning them into serious criminal offences. I am glad the Government have now conceded that point, including a recognition that current drafting risks harming journalists alongside numerous other legitimate actors, such as charities and non-governmental organisations.
However, while the Government’s proposed amendments will tighten the offence, they still do not sufficiently protect innocent people from falling foul of these laws. That is why I have tabled Amendment 72, which would protect journalists unless they did something on the orders of a foreign power. This strikes a much better balance. It does not grant a total exemption, which would allow actual spies to claim they were journalists, just as it would not allow the Government to brand actual journalists as spies.
I like Amendment 18. It is not as good as my Amendment 72, but it has slightly more elegance. I strongly support it and hope that the noble Lord will press it to a vote. I do not want to take any glory for him but, if he chooses not to because he trusts the Government’s assurances, I would feel compelled to put his amendment to the vote myself.
I have been in a lot of legal briefings recently on several Bills, and all of them included phrases from the Government like, “Oh, you’ve got to trust us on this”, “Really, we assure you”, and “You can trust us”. Quite honestly, who trusts the Government any more? I bet millions of people do not—I certainly do not. I want something in the Bill that actually protects journalists.
My Lords, although I sympathise with Amendment 79, which seeks to protect those who act genuinely in the public interest, I do not support it, for a number of reasons.
First, although I accept that, in its comprehensive 2020 review relating to the protection of official data, the Law Commission recommended that a public interest defence be introduced, that was in relation only to the Official Secrets Act 1989. Its recommendation did not suggest that such a defence should be incorporated into the rest of the Official Secrets Act regime, which is what in effect this Bill seeks to replace.
Secondly, in any event, the risks of introducing such a defence need to be carefully considered and balanced against the benefits of potential alternative approaches. This includes the creation of an independent commissioner to receive and investigate complaints of serious wrongdoing, which the Law Commission also recommended.
Thirdly, any introduction of a public interest defence needs to form part of a wholesale reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989, which this Bill does not seek to do. As I said at Second Reading, the ISC was disappointed to see that the Government were not reforming that Act. I will not repeat what I said then, other than to say that it is a very significant missed opportunity. That is particularly so because the Government have accepted the need to change the OSA for years, and this Bill represented a clear legislative route to do it.
Lastly, this amendment is very broadly drafted. It would introduce a public interest defence into a range of offences that do not require one, such as the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. For those reasons, I cannot support it.
My Lords, I recognise the Government’s argument that these spying offences need to be broad enough to capture the wide range of illicit activities that foreign powers may undertake to harm the UK. However, if that is so, equally broad defences are needed to protect innocent people who may become ensnared in the broad definition of the offences. Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is absolutely vital; it must be in the Bill.
I want to respond to the Minister’s comments in our debate on the previous group. I heard his reassurances about journalistic freedom, which I am sure were very sincere, but promises can be broken. Ministers move on. Governments move on. Commitments can be forgotten. I just do not think that, if it is not in the Bill, it can be held to be the law.
My Lords, I acknowledge the changes that have been made to Amendment 79 since it was introduced in Committee, but I still do not feel that it would be appropriate and right for us to accept it. The noble Lord, Lord West, has pointed out a number of the reasons why, but I emphasise that we are being invited to introduce a public interest defence for what is, straightforwardly, espionage on behalf of a foreign service. I do not believe that we need to provide a public interest defence when an individual obtains and provides protected information on behalf of a foreign power while recognising that this is prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom.
I also recognise that the amendment extends to the Official Secrets Act 1989 but, again in support of the noble Lord, Lord West, I say that, if we are to change that, we must do so in a careful and deliberate fashion and bring forward legislation to do so. The 1989 Act does not deal with espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. It is drawn up for different purposes. Therefore, it is separate from the issues that we are considering regarding the Bill. More broadly, it remains extremely dangerous to encourage or to lead individuals to believe that there is a public interest defence to the disclosure of highly sensitive information. Any one individual is unlikely to be able to make an accurate assessment themselves of whether their declaration and their disclosure is damaging to national security. That must be considered carefully, and it is not something for an individual official, however senior, to take on themselves. Therefore, any legislation and any amendment that might encourage them to do so is misguided.
Also, once a disclosure has been made, it cannot be withdrawn. Even though there may be benefit in prosecuting an individual for having done it, that does not stop the damage that has already been done. Therefore, we must have care not to lead people into believing they will be able to defend themselves having already made a disclosure, because the damage will have occurred.
Finally, on the question of evidencing damage, I recognise that the change in the burden of proof is a significant change to the amendment. Nevertheless, we are then faced with a situation where a person who has been accused of this offence will be trying to argue that they did not cause damage. In so doing, they are likely to adduce more evidence and more contextual material which might itself be damaging. It is not clear that this makes it easier in terms of the evidence or that it makes the prospect of prosecuting people for harmful activity any easier. For these reasons, I do not support this amendment. I hope that the House agrees.
My Lords, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as I have said already, non-domestic stalking is already covered under MAPPA. I would not say that it is not necessary, but it is already there. To a large extent, and to be more specific, it would not have been needed.
My Lords, the problem with this sort of issue has always been that the police are not very good at accepting the word of women who come forward after repeated incidents of harassment or violence. It is very good that a couple of police forces are doing well, but what about the rest of them? What are the Minister and his department going to do to make sure that all police forces take this seriously?
As I alluded to earlier, the Safeguarding Minister is planning to write to all chief constables whose forces applied for fewer orders than might have been expected. The previous Safeguarding Minister also sent similar letters to chief constables, as has been referenced publicly. Clearly, there is no denying that more needs to be done in certain areas. However, as I have said, the Government are also piloting a number of avenues for people to report such offences, including the Ask for ANI scheme I mentioned earlier. Over 5,000 UK pharmacies—both independents and chains—are now enrolled in that scheme. There are a number of avenues through which victims can report this sort of abuse.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 46 in my name and to speak to Amendment 47, to which I have added my name. Amendment 46 would remove Clause 10 from the Bill; I am grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Meacher, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who have signed this amendment. Amendment 47 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to which I have added my name, would remove Clause 11 from the Bill. These clauses give the police new powers to stop and search for an article made, adapted or intended
“for use in the course of, or in connection with”
protest-related offences, such as highway obstruction, causing a public nuisance and offences under the Bill —Clause 10 based on suspicion and Clause 11 without suspicion—if a police officer of or above the rank of inspector authorises it in a particular place for a specified period. This can be done if the officer “reasonably believes” that people in the area are carrying prohibited objects.
These are a significant expansion of police powers at a time when confidence in the police is waning and on a day when another police officer has been given multiple life sentences for, among other things, abusing his authority. There is potentially an endless list of objects that could be made, adapted, or intended
“for use in the course of or in connection with”
protest offences. Coupled with the power to stop and search without suspicion, this could result in many innocent people being stopped, searched and potentially arrested for being in possession of commonplace objects. If a protest takes place in central London, for example, shoppers in Regent Street and Oxford Street could potentially be stopped, searched and arrested for possessing household objects that they had just bought in John Lewis.
Stop and search is a highly intrusive and potentially damaging tool if misused by the police. The fact that you are seven times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white where the police require reasonable suspicion, and 14 times more likely where the police do not require reasonable suspicion, presents a prima facie case that the police are misusing these powers.
As a commander in the Metropolitan Police Service in July 2000, I presented a paper to my senior colleagues entitled “It is Time to Face the Realities of Stop and Search”. It attempted to demolish established explanations, provide an analysis of why in reality disproportionality was happening and set out steps that needed to be taken to ensure that stop and search was more accurately targeted. That was almost 23 years ago, at a time when disproportionality in stop and search with suspicion was running at eight times; it is now seven times.
A Joint Committee on Human Rights report of November 2020 stated that 25% of black voters in Great Britain were not registered to vote compared with an average of 17% across the population. Even more black people are likely to be excluded as a result of the new requirement to produce photographic identification at polling stations before you can vote. Black people are therefore likely to have less confidence in the electoral process, making protest more important to them as a way of making their voices heard. The same report cites the fact that 85% of black people are not confident that they would be treated the same as a white person by the police.
Put the two things together, and add the seven to 14 times disproportionality in stop and search, and you create a situation where the powers in Clauses 10 and 11 are likely to have a significant chilling effect on black and other visible minority people’s participation in protest. Not only is that reprehensible in itself but it is likely to increase the chance of serious violence as significant numbers conclude that violent protest is the only alternative means that they have of getting their views taken into account.
The only difference between Clauses 10 and 11 is the degree to which black and other visible-minority people will be deterred from participating in legitimate, peaceful protest. As the JCHR highlights, stop and search without suspicion has been available in the past only to combat terrorism—but was subsequently repealed because of police misuse—and serious violence. The JCHR said:
“It is surprising and concerning that the bill would introduce similar powers to deal not with serious offences punishable with very lengthy prison terms, but with the possibility of non-violent offences relating to protest, most of which cover conduct that is not even currently criminal.”
Even the Police Federation has concerns. Commenting on serious violence prevention orders, another expansion of stop and search without suspicion, a representative said:
“I imagine we would be deeply concerned about moving away from a form of stop and search that is not rooted in ‘Reasonable Grounds’. We could easily make a case that this leaves officers vulnerable to complaint, ‘post stop’, in an area which is already supercharged as an issue in many communities. Reasonable Grounds has a firm legal basis, is tried and tested, and therefore affords reassurance to our colleagues engaged in these stops.”
A previous Home Secretary asked HMICFRS to do a report on policing protests, page 109 of which says:
“Arguing against the proposal for a new stop and search power … another officer stated that ‘a little inconvenience is more acceptable than a police state’. We agree with this sentiment.”
Neither of these clauses should be part of the Bill. Depending on the support from other parts of the House, I may wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 46.
My Lords, this House is wonderful. Your Lordships have heard from a former police officer exactly what the police think of this and how they will handle, or possibly mishandle, it; we are shortly to hear from a lawyer who has experienced court cases about this sort of thing; and here your Lordships have the inveterate protester who has been arrested at a protest—a peaceful one—and it was extremely unpleasant.
Basically, Clauses 10 and 11 could fundamentally change the relationship between police and protesters. At the moment, you can take my word for it, that relationship is usually quite good until the police are told to move in and arrest us or whatever. Most of the time it consists of natural talking, with us explaining what we are there for and them saying what they had for breakfast and that sort of thing. It is not as disastrous a relationship at the moment as it will be if these clauses pass.
Clauses 10 and 11 will definitely be able to change that relationship for the worse. The police will be able to physically stop and search protesters with or without suspicion. I do not know how awful that sounds to noble Lords, but we feel that we are in a democracy. We are not in Iran or Russia; we are meant to be in a democracy where the police are not allowed to do things like that.
The Greens will vote against these as unjust laws, and I very much hope that the majority of noble Lords will follow suit. We all have a very vaunted idea of what Britain, our freedoms and democracy are all about. Here we are seeing a retraction of that and a diminution of our freedoms. I do not see how anyone can vote for that, even the Government Front Bench over there. I very much hope that this measure comes to a vote, and I will definitely vote against.
My Lords, I will carry through a bit further the citation from my noble friend Lady Fox of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, a much-respected Minister at the Home Office. More fully, she said that these powers were necessary:
“To ensure that the police have the ability to proactively prevent protesters causing harm … it is not always possible for the police to form suspicions that certain individuals have particular items with them.” —[Official Report, 24/11/21; cols. 977-78.]
That leaves me with a sense of nervousness, for the same reason as the noble Lord, Lord Debden, who unfortunately seems to have left the Chamber—
My Lords, I disagree very strongly with the noble Lord, because I think he is wrong. Once you give the police the idea that it is okay to arrest a journalist, why would we expect them to understand—you cannot deny that the police quite often misuse the law because they do not understand it—that they can do so only if they are gluing their hands or something like that? In any case, what journalist would do that? I cannot think that they would want to.
Mistakes are made; people are arrested wrongly. The police find acute problem-solving solutions when everyone else talks about “in six months’ time”. Someone has to make a decision; sometimes they make the wrong one—they happen to be human beings—and that is a problem. There is no general defence of being a journalist to any criminal offence. There is protection of legally privileged material, including journalistic material, and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act provides quite proper protection for that. However, that is not the same as providing a general defence for criminal behaviour to a journalist. In my view, that is what this proposes.
I speak as the mother of a journalist, so I have a vested interest here, but journalists do not go along to protests to join them but to watch and report on them. The Hertfordshire police and crime commissioner, David Lloyd, with whom I had the displeasure of sharing a panel the day after this all happened, said that protesters should not have the oxygen of publicity. That was his attitude: “Freedom of the press is fine, but not for protesters.” That is utterly unreasonable, as are the noble Lord’s comments. I support this very strongly. I do not see why anyone here would have a problem with it, except the Government. What are they frightened of? What do they think journalists will report that would look so bad for them? Obviously, almost anything.
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has said. This is really a matter of definition. We all agree that journalists should not be arrested while doing their job, but it is very difficult for a policeman to distinguish between A and B—
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord makes a good point. I have already expressed that the Angiolini inquiry will look into all aspects of that culture. This is also a useful time to remind all of us that the vast majority of serving policemen do an exceptional job and deserve our thanks and praise.
My Lords, the “spy cops” undercover policing inquiry that is going on at the moment has taken years. It is a classic case of police forces covering up former crimes. What makes the Minister think the inquiry he mentioned will be any different?
There are very specific circumstances surrounding the undercover inquiry to which the noble Baroness refers. She is right that it has gone on for too long; unfortunately, it looks like it is going to continue to go on for quite a long time. As regards this inquiry, I have every confidence that Lady Angiolini—as I say, I met her last week—will be rigorous; she has been up to now.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberYes, of course. If I gave that impression, it was a mistake on my part. This is the whole point: there has to be “serious disruption”, as in my amendment. The debate—not the argument but the debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, just raised—is about what we actually mean by serious disruption. I thank the noble Lord, for pointing that out. If I said that, it was a mistake.
I am curious about this “serious disruption”. Quite honestly, if anyone has driven on the M4, the M25 or through the streets of London, they will know what serious disruption is, because we get it every single day from people using their cars. If we have any confusion about what serious disruption is, that is what it is: traffic jams. Perhaps we ought to lobby the Government to stop traffic jams, because they cause more delays to children getting to school, to ambulances getting to hospital, and so on. Please, can we just understand that serious disruption is something we all experience, every single day of our lives? What we are talking about here is not really serious disruption: this is people who care about the future of humankind, here in London and worldwide. Could we take it a bit more seriously?
I agree with my friend the noble Baroness about the importance of the issues. I think everyone in the Chamber is taking this seriously. There is a legitimate debate going on as to what “serious disruption” means. My friend is right to point out that we are discussing very serious issues, and we will talk about that when we come to “reasonable excuse” in particular. Before I am accused of being a hypocrite, I should say that I did drive here today—I thought I had better own up to that.
I turn to Amendments 48 and 49 and the Government’s response, we think, to slow walking, introduced at a very late stage—not in the Commons, and not even in Committee in this Chamber, but here on Report. It has been our contention that existing legislation, enforced robustly, would deal with many of the problems we have seen. As the chief constable of Greater Manchester said—and no doubt we will quote chief officers at each other, so let me start—in an article in the Telegraph on 12 December 2022, entitled “Just Stop Oil protesters should be arrested ‘within seconds’”:
“I think fundamentally, if people obstruct the highway they should be moved … very quickly”.
In other words, he argued for greater use of obstruction rather than a whole range of new powers, as contained in Amendments 48 and 49. We should remember that existing law, whatever the rights and wrongs of this, have led to Extinction Rebellion calling off its action.
In new subsection (3) as inserted by Amendment 48 and new subsection (4) as inserted by Amendment 49, there is the same argument about hindering that is more than minor, which I have just been through with respect to the meaning of “serious disruption”. In other words, the threshold for what constitutes “serious disruption” is being lowered.
I think all of us believe in the right to protest. Yes, sometimes we may get irritated when protests disrupt our lives, and clearly there have to be limits, but many of these amendments simply go too far; they will have a chilling effect on protests and protesters. It will undermine one of the fundamental freedoms we all enjoy: standing up to injustice as we see it. It is a price we pay for our democracy. Any interference with these freedoms poses an unacceptable threat to the right to protest, which is a fundamental cornerstone of our rights and our democracy. I beg to move.
I was looking to identify the threshold at which one reaches the point where, on my approach, one moves beyond a minor disturbance to something that becomes significant. That is why I use “more” for the point at which, I suggest, given these particular offences, it is right that the police should then intervene. I asked the question: once one reaches that point, in the case of the tunnelling, why should that go on and on? People are arguing about whether we have reached the stage where the harm is caused is significant without the further guidance of being directed to the point at which it becomes significant.
The problem with the words that the noble Baroness is addressing to me is that they can mean a range of things within the compass of the word “significant”. I am trying to direct attention to the particular offences and consequences that follow from the activities being carried on. That is why I suggest that “more” is the most important and significant part of my formula.
As for locking on, the other of the three offences, I do not have a long catalogue of things that may be affected. There is always a risk that something might be missed out, so I have tried to capture what is put at risk by the omnibus words “their daily activities”. But here again, the threshold that I am seeking to identify is to be found in the words
“more than a minor degree”,
for the reasons that I have explained. Again, the question is: why should the police wait any longer once that threshold is reached?
I come back to the point about proportionality that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, mentioned, and the reasonable excuse point. Proportionality is very important and the threshold has to be put into the right place, because we need to consider at what point the interference with the convention rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association becomes disproportionate.
In its judgment in the recent Northern Ireland abortion services case, delivered last December, the Supreme Court said in paragraph 34:
“It is possible for a general legislative measure in itself to ensure that its application in individual circumstances will meet the requirements of proportionality … without any need for the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.
In other words, there is then no issue for a jury to consider or a magistrate to address his or her mind to; it will have been sufficiently addressed if the issue identified in the legislation is in the right place.
As to whether that is so, some guidance can be found in a decision of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court in a Lithuanian case called Kudrevičius in 2015. That case was about a demonstration by farmers, of which a number have happened in recent years. They had gathered in a number of groups to block the traffic on a number of public highways. The court said that in that case the disruption of traffic that resulted could not
“be described as a side-effect of a meeting … in a public place, but rather as the result of intentional action by the farmers”—
in other words, they were intending to disrupt the highway—and that
“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities”
of others, the court said,
“is not at the core of”
the right to freedom of assembly. That in itself, however, was not enough to remove their participation entirely from the scope of the protection.
That is the background for what the court then decided. It said that “Contracting States”, which included ourselves,
“enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in their … taking measures to restrict such conduct”
and that the farmers’ intention—a serious disruption of the highways to a more significant extent
“than that caused by the normal exercise of the right of peaceful assembly in a public place”—
was enough to enable the Court to conclude that the criminal sanction which was imposed there was not disproportionate. That is an example of a case which went across the border from being a side-effect of what was happening to something that was a deliberate obstruction of traffic, which is what locking on is all about, and a deliberate interruption of, let us say, the HS2 development, which is what the tunnelling is all about.
My approach also has the support of a decision by the Divisional Court in March last year in a case called Cuciurean. That case was about tunnelling. It affected only a small part of the HS2 project, it lasted for only two and a half days and the cost of removal was less than £200,000. However, the prosecution for aggravated trespass was upheld as not amounting to a disproportionate interference with the protester’s rights. I am sorry to weary your Lordships with those references, but, having looked at those and other case law, I believe that the position I have adopted in these amendments strikes the correct balance for the proportionate treatment of the rights we are talking about.
Of course, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will not press his amendment—although I have no doubt he will feel he should—because I believe it is not fit for purpose. It is not right to introduce a general definition of that kind, which is perhaps all right for one of three offences but is completely out of place for the other two. It is not good legislation. We try in this House to improve legislation. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, I do not think his amendment improves it. On the contrary, I suggest that my amendments do improve it and, when the time comes, if I have the opportunity to do so, I will seek to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I admire the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for trying to convince us. I support and have signed Amendment 1. I cannot argue the law—I cannot argue how many angels dance on the head of a pin—but I can question the politics. My concern about the politics of the whole Bill is that the Government are seeking to be “regressive” and “repressive”—these words have been used. This is nasty legislation.
You have to ask: is it appropriate for a few dozen protesters? Is this heavy-handed legislation appropriate for that number of people who occasionally disrupt our lives? I would argue that it is not. It is almost as if this legislation is perhaps designed instead to prevent millions of people protesting, because the Government know they have lost the confidence of the public in Britain. In a recent poll, two-thirds of people thought that the Government were corrupt. That suggests that any legislation this Government try to bring in is possibly not very well designed for the majority of people in Britain. They are giving very heavy powers to the police when we have already seen that the public do not trust the police, and they are giving more powers to Ministers—and we do not trust Ministers.
It is very heavy legislation. I am worried that the Government are actually bringing legislation for when there are general strikes and hundreds of thousands of people on the streets protesting about the collapsing and soon-to-be privatised health system or the fact that everybody’s pay is getting squeezed apart from the pay of the bankers and the wealthy. I worry that they are bringing in these laws for far more people that just the protesters. Quite honestly, who would not agree with Insulate Britain? It is the smartest thing we can possibly do if we are worried about our energy crisis. So it seems that the Government are not really focused on the protests we have had so far; they are focusing on protests we might have in the future.
We are going to vote very soon on whether to declare a protest illegal if it disrupts somebody. The whole point of protest is that it disrupts life to some point, so that you notice and start debating it and it gets reported in the newspapers. It is incredibly important, in a sense, that protest is disruptive. I heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, say that Amendment 1 was not suitable, but I have taken advice from lawyers and I think it is entirely suitable, so I will be voting for it. My big concern in this House is that we have a Government who are simply out of control. They talk about protesters being out of control, but it is the Government who are out of control.
That is what the amendment says: “prolonged”.
Who is going to decide? The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made this point: people may have lost confidence in the police, for reasons that we understand. However, the alternative appears to be that we leave it in the hands of the protesters to decide how long they will stay. That is unacceptable. If the state is going to have a view on these matters, it is for the state to decide, not the protesters. Of course they will have a view, which may be different, but they have to take the consequences if they get that line wrong. That is not happening at the moment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said that we could all be disrupted. She has often made that point and I have often disagreed with her. She says that we are always disrupted every day, certainly in London—not the rest of country, frankly—by congestion and, therefore, why should we criminalise protest that only does the same thing? I hope that I am fairly representing her argument.
Nearly. Pollution kills people but we are not trying to legalise unlawful killing. One could pursue that argument to its logical extent, but I do not accept that someone intentionally blocking someone else’s path is the same thing as someone suffering the consequences of congestion. I expect that the noble Baroness is going to say something.
In a disruption, people can turn off their engines. In traffic, they keep them running.
I am sorry—I was looking at my notes and missed that. Would it be terrible if the noble Baroness repeated it, so that I can properly respond?
The noble Lord is so profound. I said that when there is disruption, people know that it is going to last some time, so they can turn off their engines. What happens in traffic is that people leave their engines running, which is, of course, highly polluting, as he said.
But the protesters could leave. It is in their gift—I think.
The Met Police, after the disruption on motorways into London, put out a tweet asking people to report instances of being unable to get their children to school, medical emergencies or whatever. The stream of replies after the tweet was nothing to do with people objecting to the disruption; they were supporting the action. So the Met Police might have got that slightly wrong.
My final point is that although I cannot support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for the reasons I have explained, I support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. However, the challenge made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is that “minor” sounds intuitively contentious when referring to something serious, and it is an unusual bar by which to define something. The noble and learned Lord I think acknowledged that there may be more work to do on that.
My Lord, we come to the next group, and I have put my name to leaving out Clauses 1 and 2, on locking on and going equipped. I will not rehearse the problems with the vague nature of the offence of locking on, which, at its lowest, could literally be linking arms; or going equipped, which is a thought crime that could criminalise people carrying all sorts of innocent items in their rucksacks—bicycle locks or even potentially, in the context of the way in which some journalists or photojournalists have been arrested of late, the camera they were going to use to photograph the locking on, because they knew there was a protest. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will speak to some amendments he has tabled in the group to tighten and improve some of the more serious offences, and the Minister will of course speak to the government amendments, which I do not believe, for once, are incredibly controversial. I beg to move.
I support the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Quite honestly, we are trying to amend this awful piece of legislation and really, it is not enough: we should just kick it all out, including these government amendments.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, they are disturbing; they are concerning; they are all of those things. I cannot say they are unacceptable at the moment because, unfortunately, the responsibility for this particular misconduct hearing lies with the Cleveland police and crime commissioner.
My Lords, the Minister was quite dismissive about police authorities, but I have some experience of them. They were in fact not anonymous; they were mostly councillors, who were elected directly by their constituents and known extremely well, and they actually did talk to people. PCCs do not; they are quite remote, and the Minister has also pointed out that they are held to account at the ballot box every four years. I can quote an example in Dorset where the PCC and the local MP have generated a lot of public dismay about their relationship, and yet the voters cannot do anything about it until next year, can they?
My Lords, I would have thought that councillors are also elected once every four years as a rule, so I am not sure what the difference is there. The fact is that police authorities were anonymous, notwithstanding the noble Baroness’s evident fame on the police authority where she was. I would also say that, through part 2 of the review, we are undertaking a fundamental assessment of the whole panel system, and there is a considerable degree of transparency that has been introduced into the way the police and crime commissioners communicate with their constituents.