Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I am quite shocked at what I have just heard. However, before I respond to that—I am sorry, I really am quite shocked— the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has said again, and it was objected to last time I raised this, that this is a life-or-death matter. These people are dying anyway and, therefore, a refusal of assisted death does not mean that the person will continue to live. They are going to die anyway and, indeed, may still commit suicide. We seem to forget that. If they do not get the assisted dying, they may still go abroad or commit suicide themselves, in ways that we know are not always reliable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

It is Committee; the noble Baroness can come in later.

As I say, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will be able to speak to Amendment 459 afterwards. One consideration has to be that the person has informed their children of their decision for an assisted death. I cannot be the only person who knows people for whom there is completely no relationship between parent and child. The child could be aged 60 and have been living abroad for years. They might not know their parent is ill and may not have been in touch with them for 40 years. But somehow we are going to have to try to track down children. Also, the ill person may not want their child to know that they are ill. We are all old enough now; we have had lots of friends go through this. I had a friend who did not want his daughter to know he was terminally ill because she was facing her own health issues at that time. But this would somehow lay down that despite the desire of a father, in that case, nevertheless that child has to be found and told that their parent not only wants an assisted death but that their parent is dying and wants an assisted death.

I really wonder about this denial of agency. If that person does not want to tell their child, according to Amendment 459, they have to make

“adequate arrangements for another person to inform the children”—

who might live abroad, or whatever—

“of the assisted death and provide bereavement support”.

I just wonder what world we are living in where, when someone is reaching the end of their life, some agency of the state demands that they tell them whether they have any children, whether they know that those children are still alive and where they are, and has to tell that child that their parent is ill and that—in a way, a smaller matter—they want to bring forward that death a little bit so that it is not too bad at the end.

Some of these ideas seem to me to exclude from our consideration the patient concerned. They seem to put everyone else in a position of taking decisions. The noble Baroness, Lady Cass, spoke earlier about the amendment that wants more and more specialist advisers brought in. Can we just sometimes revert to remembering that we are talking about seriously, terminally ill people who surely have some agency over their life? If they are refused this, they can still commit suicide but they will probably do it, as a friend’s father did, by going into the garage, blocking the bottom of the door so that no air can get through, turning the engine on and killing themselves that way. I wonder sometimes whether we are remembering that people are facing a terrible end and we just ought to have a little respect for them.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

May I intervene on that, given that my amendment is being questioned? Let me explain. When looking after people who are parents, a conversation is often about what the children know. Telling the children about someone’s impending death is extremely difficult for most parents. Usually, it is because the person who is ill wishes to protect those children; they think that, by not telling them and preparing them, they are somehow protecting them. The way children are informed needs to be age appropriate and appropriate to where that child is.

I do not suggest in this amendment that it should be an agent of the state. The amendment refers to making

“adequate arrangements for another person”.

That could be anybody. It is about asking whether they have somebody who will inform those children—or not—about the death. As for bereavement support, it might simply be about telling them in person and letting them talk about it for an hour over a cup of tea, or it might be much longer, depending on the needs of the individual—because bereavement is a very individual thing as well.

I am concerned that we could legislate and somehow believe that, by someone having an assisted death, rather than a death for which there has been preparation, the impact on any children in a family will be less, because the evidence is that it will not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

When I mention drafting changes, I mean in relation to the timing of this. As drafted, it would need to be done before the application is granted, and it may be that the requirement to go to the local authority could be at the same time as having approved it, not before. But, yes, this would be an additional requirement on the panel.

I hope the noble and learned Lord the sponsor or the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, can help with my second point on the principle of the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to the situation based on autonomy: the individual wants to do this and does not want to tell relatives. If we are strict purists about that—we had evidence on this at the Select Committee—then with this Bill there could be a situation where the first time anyone hears about the death is when the medical examiner telephones a relative.

I have tabled amendments in a different group on a requirement to nominate next of kin who are over the age of 18. I think it would be useful for the Committee to know what the situation is if someone acts completely autonomously like this and the body is there. Does the noble and learned Lord the sponsor need to bolt on a provision so that there is a public health burial? That is the continuation of the logic of this that you can do this alone, with no one in your life knowing about it. Therefore, to exercise that autonomy fully, there would need to be a public health burial, with everything done before anyone in the family knows. That is a conceptual difference. The noble and learned Lord and I spoke about this in a meeting in relation to what the law is, and it would be good for him to clarify the situation. Can the medical examiner not call anybody and go forward with a public health burial?

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness understand that, quite often, people die and their family does not know about it?

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

Absolutely, and therefore the medical examiner’s evidence is that, when they have the body in that circumstance, they are under an obligation, we think, to locate and find a relative. Sadly, this happens more frequently than we would like to think, and the local authority powers to perform a public health burial then become apparent. So, yes, there are these situations.

It is important to clarify this in relation to this Bill, because we have this evidence from the medical examiner that the first the family might know is when they are called by the medical examiner. We need to be clear about that and about the position of families. Is this personal autonomy—that is the conceptual point—so fully and properly enacted that there would be a public health burial, without any obligation to inform anybody that this is happening?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I shall speak briefly to the three amendments that I have tabled in this group, to start off with. First, Amendment 472A would slightly tighten up the requirement for the panel to speak to the person’s proxy, when they have a proxy. Currently, as the Bill is drafted, they may speak to the person’s proxy, but I think that they should speak to the person’s proxy. There are no criteria set out about how they make that distinction. Given that the person’s proxy will have signed the declarations that kick off this process, they should speak to them. I do not anticipate it being a very long conversation, but it is essential that they do so.

Amendments 495D and 496D reference the appeal mechanism in Clause 18 and set out a time limit in line with normal tribunal and administrative appeals—so somebody has to appeal against the panel’s notification of the refusal of the grant of certificate within 10 calendar days. I shall not labour the point, but it is just sensible to have a time limit to make sure that there is a clear process.

I had intended to limit my remarks to that, but I have done the dangerous thing of actually listening to the debate, and I wanted to reference my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s amendment. It came out in the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Hayter—a perfectly reasonable difference about exactly where we need to have transparency and balances against privacy. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is perfectly at liberty to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and she obviously does, but I was surprised that she appeared to take against him for the temerity of even tabling his amendment. She said she was shocked. The presumption in the Bill as drafted, as far as I read it, is that in Schedule 2 the panels are to determine referrals in public; that is their default procedure. I give way to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

That is very helpful, because I can say what I said to my noble friend in private. Had we been doing this Bill at the sort of speed I hoped we would, I would have tabled an amendment that it should be in private. My personal view is that it should be. Because of the way things are happening—I will say no more—I have not tabled those sorts of amendments.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

That is very helpful. It enables me to make this point, because this is where we have a disagreement. It gives the sponsor of the Bill the opportunity to set out why the Bill is drafted as it is. I will set out why I think my noble friend’s amendment is broadly right, but perhaps there is a comparison with what we already do in similar cases. That may give the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the opportunity—he may not wish to say so—for another “told you so” moment, as it is a judicial comparison.

The presumption in the Bill is that panels will do the referrals in public. There is a “subject to” on that: the chair of the panel can decide to do it in private if they feel that is appropriate. I accept that there is a balance to strike because, for obvious reasons, these panels are making decisions about personal, private matters. It is also right that there is some transparency. My noble friend Lord Jackson’s amendment would give quite a big window, 28 days, to publish the notice of the panel meeting. It would also include the name of the person.

The comparison I looked at, which I thought was a reasonable one, was what the Court of Protection does. It makes decision about sensitive financial and welfare matters. It used to be the case that the Court of Protection’s presumption was to sit in private and not hear cases in public. That has changed over time. The presumption now is that cases are heard in public. Again, my understanding is that there is the ability for the judge presiding on those cases to decide for them to be in private if that is felt necessary. Even when they are in private, I understand, members of the public can make applications to go and listen to those cases. I think that is all right and proper. That appears, I presume, to be where—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is nodding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I do. The reason why I partly agree with my noble friend Lord Jackson is that I had a look at what the Court of Protection does in terms of publicity—the bit that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, objected to. It publishes hearings in advance—not 28 days—but it does not publish the full name of the individual. It publishes initials and what the case is about: the broad category of the decision. That strikes me as quite a good balance, which provides transparency but maybe avoids people coming to “watch a spectacle”, to quote the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter.

However, there is some necessity for it to be in public. The reason for that is also set out in the Bill, which says the panels

“must hear from, and may question, the co-ordinating doctor … must (subject to subsection (6)) hear from … the person to whom the referral relates”.

At this point, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Berger. That should absolutely be a must; there should not be an exception. If it is the case, as I understand from the appearance of the noble Lord with me on a media programme, that the exception is designed for cases where the person’s medical situation is very severe, they should not necessarily have to come to the panel, but at least one member of the panel should absolutely still have to go and talk to them. It really should not be okay for the panel to authorise somebody to have an assisted suicide without ever having spoken to the person concerned.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I am sorry that we are doing this, but the person will be at home, very often, and bedridden. Are we actually expecting a panel to go to their home, into their bedroom, and do this there? Again, this is not the sort of world that I know from some of the people who I see living in surroundings where it would be quite difficult even to put a spare chair in their bedroom—they could be on oxygen, or whatever—for someone to see them there.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

These are difficult issues, but the panel is being asked to authorise their death, so this is a serious issue. I accept that this is uncomfortable, and I am not suggesting the entire panel would rock up at their home, but at least one member of the panel ought to have to talk to them. The idea that the panel would authorise somebody to have an assisted death, never having spoken to them, is frankly appalling.

I shall just finish, because I want to stick to time—although I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord nicked a bit of it to explain to the Committee. I shall finish by saying that the amendments that have been put down are very helpful, because we have fleshed out this very sensible issue of how much of this should take place in public.

The other reason for it being in public is because, otherwise, there are two groups of people the panel is asked to talk to. It may hear from and question any other person and may ask any person appearing to have relevant knowledge. The problem is that, if these hearings are done in private and no one knows they are happening, I do not know how the panel is supposed to know who any of these people are; these people are not going to be able to make themselves known to the panel. So there is a clear argument about where you draw the line and there is clearly a balance to strike between openness, transparency and privacy, but it seems to me that this is a good debate for the Committee, and I want to hear where the Bill’s proposer thinks that balance should be struck. We have heard a little bit about that, and we can hear a little more later.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 9th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, I have found this debate to be very helpful, because we all of course want the safest processes possible in all of this. It is clear that we are all reaching to try and find a way that we think will work. To a certain degree, it is all down to whether the best way to do this is through a multidisciplinary panel or a judge-led court process.

The example that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, gave in terms of life support is quite illustrative, because life support decisions are made by medical professionals. In the vast majority of those cases, they then go through on the basis of that professional advice. It is only in the edge cases or serious cases where there is an appeal process that the family can take to court.

On this proposed process, there is a multidisciplinary panel, very well described by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which includes a psychiatrist, social worker and judge—the professionals in this particular area—who will be very well placed to reach a decision in a similar way to life support decisions for which, in the vast majority of cases, everyone is happy that it is the safest and right decision. There is also the oversight role of the commissioner, who is of course a judge in this process and, rather like the example of the life support case, has the ability to oversee and review that case where there are serious concerns. The life support example is a very good one here, given that we are trying to adopt a similar process in the multidisciplinary panel with the oversight of the commissioner.

On a way forward, it may be for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to discuss how those cases can interact. Where the multidisciplinary panel might need oversight, the concern is how that can be triggered and how that can be worked out in terms of the commissioners. We have a framework there that, like the life support example, can get the best of both worlds. That could prove a constructive way forward.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I will take the advice of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and now get rid of what I was going to say, because the noble Lord, Lord Markham, has said most of it. I now have only three points to add, so I thank the noble Lord for that.

First, the big discussion is on whether it should be a court or panel. The reasons for the panel have been put, so I do not need to repeat that. The only thing I would say is that when this was discussed in the Commons, it was not about the capacity of the courts that made them make the change to a panel but about the advice they got that this would be a much better, holistic and patient-focused way of doing it. In fact, making sure that that bit was added was very much welcomed by the British Association of Social Workers and the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers.

Secondly, the mention just now of legal aid says it all. Surely, we do not want this to be an adversarial process. It should not be argued in front of a court that way. I want to be very brief, because I am taking the advice of the noble and learned Baroness to be very brief, but we want this to be a conscientious decision and not one that is adversarial, which is why I think the panel would be so much better.

Lastly, this is not a life-or-death issue, because these people are dying. We are discussing only when they die, not whether. That is different from deciding that a baby will die who was not going to die anyway, or even someone in a permanent vegetative state. That is why I really do not agree that it is right to use the word “suicide”, rather than “assisted dying”. People are dying, and this is the issue of when they die and not whether.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Is the noble Baroness aware that we are discussing the possibility of having either a panel or a court process? The research and reports show that families and individuals have great difficulty negotiating the Family Division of the High Court and the family-designated judges processes. Legal aid may well be necessary to assist in some of these matters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has done us all a great service. Last night, it was clear that there is a view that some really major parts of this legislation need to be addressed and debated. This is absolutely one of those major parts. It is about where decision-making finally sits. The noble Lord has provided a clarity that could improve safety in relation to the Bill—I will not say to make it safer but to make it less unsafe—and that becomes important.

The scheme that the noble Lord has proposed would reinstate a court-based model that was previously welcomed when the Bill was introduced because of the clarity of decision-making that it provided. On the process of assistance with suicide or having an assisted death, we are not going to argue about the wording here now. That is not appropriate. The clauses relating to the specifics of the lethal dosage of drugs both make the death part of the process clearer and provide better governance oversight. The process also seems to provide some protection for NHS services by putting the decision-making outside healthcare, with clarity of the roles between the two.

I added my name to the amendment to strengthen the conscience clause, Clause 31, so that no registered medical practitioner is under any duty to perform a function in relation to this Bill other than those of notification and recording matters. This avoids eroding NHS clinical services and maintains the core duties and responsibilities of the NHS. It will be particularly important if legislation is passed in Scotland, because we need compatibility of the conscience clause between England and Wales and Scotland. The legislation currently going through in Scotland will have its draft conscience clause removed at the time that the Scottish Parliament goes to vote on it, because the provision of such a conscience clause is not a devolved matter. The exercise of conscience not being a devolved matter will require a statutory instrument passed from this House, or possibly even primary legislation, for it to be then included later in the Scottish legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised concerns about the wording of proposed new subsection (1) in Amendment 116. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, would consider changing that to incorporate the amendment that I have tabled—the proposed new clause would replace Clause 3—over the assessment of capacity. This amendment was developed by the Complex Life and Death Decisions group at King’s; the national expert on mental capacity assessments sits as a key member of that group and as a professor at King’s College.

I hope the proposers of the Bill will recognise that proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 116 provides very important minimum criteria that must be provided: questions that must be asked when such a decision is to be made. The court can certainly ask for them to be provided to it. It seems as if a panel would be discretionary over whether these criteria were looked at, and it would strengthen confidence in the decision-making to know that they were there, because it would provide transparency and consistency, and a process of appeal would be available. We know that no appeal system exists in the Bill as currently written in relation to panels agreeing to an assisted death being provided, and the real concern there is that these panels could eventually become something of a tick-box exercise under quite a lot of process. As has said been said before, those with a judicial background are not acting in a judicial capacity on the panels, whereas the proposal by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, provides judicial capacity and processes.

The amendment that seems to be key is Amendment 120: its proposed new subsection (4)(b) would require a statement of medical fact, with the decision-making being taken by the court. Again, it will be much easier for people to provide a statement of medical fact than to feel that they are taking a decision over the provision or non-provision of lethal drugs. In proposed new subsection (5)(a), I hope that the doctor has to be on the specialist register for the specific condition of the patient—I seek clarification on that—or to have been a GP principal for longer than three years. It is important to be clear that this should not be a doctor who is at a training level, even if they have been a trainee for more than three years, because the ultimate responsibility sits with the consultant or the GP under whom they are training. There could be confusion over responsibility if this is not clarified.

On Amendment 120’s proposed new subsection (6)(a), can the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, confirm that it may be not the GP at all who is involved but a hospital consultant or long-term associate specialist who has been providing medical care? These might seem like minutiae, but we are in Committee and discussing amendments that can be changed, and I think it will be important to have that clarity.

It seems that proposed new subsection (5) in Amendment 426 seeks to provide additional security with a court-appointed medical expert. This proposal seems to protect us against going down the route that Canada has gone down. It seems to really attempt seriously to detect undue influence. Allowing interveners is very important; it is all part of the desire for there also to be an appeals process and of getting all the information.

I stress that there is a clarity between decisions about whether somebody is given lethal drugs to significantly shorten their life, accepting that a prognosis of six months is not much more than a guesstimate—in fact, it is a guesstimate—and the position that has been discussed over life support decisions. When a patient is on life support, the decision to cease that intervention is based on two potential factors: one is the futility of continuing with an intervention that is not achieving a therapeutic goal, and the other may be because the patient withdraws their consent for continuing that intervention in an informed way and has capacity to do that. That is fundamentally different from somebody providing lethal doses of drugs with the deliberate intention to shorten a person’s life—which may be by days, weeks or months, but may be by years. As has already been said, we all have experience of people given a very short prognosis that turned out to be completely wrong.

I have some questions for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I know that he has already been given a large number of questions to answer, but I think it is really important. First, in 2024 he stated that

“family judges are … completely unsupported”

and that the family justice system is—I think I can quote correctly—“literally crumbling”. Were these the reasons behind the removal of the court oversight when the Bill was considered in the other place?

Secondly, in discussing these proposals with officials, what assessment has been made of the volume of cases outlined in the impact assessment being handled by this system, and what provision has been made for recognising that the numbers in the impact assessment are almost certainly inappropriately low? The data from Australia, New Zealand and other places has shown that, by year three, the uptake will probably be about 10 times higher than written in the impact assessment, because the impact assessment was based on data from quite a long time ago, when the Oregon system was instigated.

Thirdly, what costing has been undertaken for each of the models—the model of the panels as put in with the different numbers that might be involved—and what consideration has been made for a costing over this model?

I ask the Minister: what budget has been put aside to fund the system, whichever model is adopted, and what option appraisal has been undertaken over the safety of individuals and the ability to identify coercion with a higher degree of probability than currently exists and to identify abusive relationships?

As I have said, the financial costs for each model, tested against the impact assessment numbers, appear unrealistically low. I think we all look forward to the questions being answered.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, given the number of questions that have been put to the Minister—and, indeed, to my noble and learned friend and to the mover of this amendment—I wonder whether it might be useful if we now move to the Minister and the others to answer some of these questions. There are so many that it would really help the Committee if we could hear some of the answers.