(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberFirst, I pay a personal tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Singh, for all that he has done over many years for prison chaplaincy and for his tireless efforts on behalf of the Sikh community. I mean that most sincerely. However, respectfully, I do not entirely agree with the thrust of his question. In the Government’s view, the chaplaincy council needs to be brought up to date to make sure that all faiths are properly represented and, in particular, to make sure that the faith and belief advisers, who assist the Prison Service, particularly in the appointment of chaplains, and who are very often on the council, are remunerated and appointed transparently and consistently so that there is no question of any difference of treatment in that regard. It is perfectly true that there has been some disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Singh, in the past—that I accept—but I hope that the reforms that we are in the process of consulting on will remove any scope there may be for disagreement on the way forward.
I pay tribute to those who have done so much in this area. The Minister has again used the words “all faiths”. I wonder if he will include humanists in the consultation, because there are many who would welcome chaplaincy from a humanist understanding as well.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 152, to which I have added my name. I welcome Clause 65, because it recognises the additional responsibility that a driver has who causes death by virtue of having drunk before she or he got behind the wheel of a car. It is always deliberate to do that. Every single person knows that it is dangerous to drive after drinking—it is never a mistake; it is never careless; it is never an oversight; it is never an unforced error. It is a deliberate act to get behind the wheel of a potentially lethal weapon, putting other people at risk, when under the influence. So it is quite right, as in the Bill, that the sentence for the most egregious of outcomes—killing someone—should carry the additional penalty when, quite unnecessarily, driving ability was impaired through drink.
I am personally and obviously most aware of this as a result of the actions of a drunken driver who killed my mother on the day before my 10th birthday. But another factor contributed, and that was the absence then of seat belts. There were years of campaigning, including an attempt in 1979 by the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers, who, as Secretary of State for Transport, said:
“On the best available evidence … compulsion could save up to 1,000 lives … a year”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/3/79; col. 1720.]
After 13 failed attempts by Back-Benchers in both Houses, some 40 years ago, late in the evening of 28 July 1981, a Lords amendment in the name of Lord Nugent of Guildford succeeded in the Commons.
I was there to witness it, having an interest not just in drinking and driving but in seatbelts because of what happened to my mother. I recall my noble friend Lord Robertson, the chair of the National Seat Belt Survivors Club, speaking. There were many now in your Lordships’ House, including three in their seats today, who voted for that seatbelt amendment—I give a special call-out to my noble friends Lord Anderson, Lord Field, Lord Foulkes, Lord Campbell-Savours, Lord Clark, Lord Cunningham, Lord Dubs, Lord Prescott, Lord Soley, Lord Rooker and Lady Taylor, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, and to the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Baker, Lord Hailsham, Lord Horam, Lord Howell, Lord Hunt, Lord McNally, Lord Wigley, Lord Patten and Lord Patten of Barnes. Incidentally, I have a list of the others who voted the wrong way that night.
In 1982, the year before the new seatbelt law was enforced, 2,443 people were killed on our roads. By 2016, despite more cars being on the road, the figure had dropped to 816, so the estimate of the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers, was not an exaggeration. Why is that important to Amendment 152? It is because the sort of accident, caused by drink, which killed my mother might today, thanks to that seatbelt law, along with greatly improved rescue and medical interventions, have led not to death but to serious injury. But without Amendment 152, if death followed, the sentence would reflect the contribution of alcohol, but if the person survived, even with what are euphemistically called life-changing injuries, the contributing factor of alcohol would not be reflected in the sentence. That cannot be right, and that is what this amendment seeks to address.
Although I have not added my name to it, I support Amendment 168. It seems extraordinary that, where someone has either killed or injured someone though drink-driving, they could even think about driving again while disqualified. It seems like sticking two fingers up to society’s abhorrence of this irresponsible behaviour. A sentence of three years where people, disqualified, take to the wheel again seems a sensible measure. To get behind the wheel of a car having killed or injured someone, while being disqualified and therefore uninsured, seems a contemptible act. I hope that that is also an amendment that the Minister will feel able to accept.
Is the Minister saying that if we drafted this slightly better, with “dangerous driving” included, he might accept it?
I will be very careful here because the law in this area is really complex. I was going to say this later but will preface it now. I am very happy to have a discussion on these points. I am reluctant to reply to a drafting suggestion from the Dispatch Box but, if the noble Baroness writes to me, I will certainly write back and we can have a discussion. I hope that is helpful and answers her question.
On this part of Amendment 152, the five-year maximum penalty for causing serious injury also contrasts with the two-year maximum proposed for the new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving in Clause 66, although the culpability levels are broadly similar. Saying clearly what should not need to be said, we recognise the seriousness of driving while unfit to do so through drink or drugs, but we also must have laws that reflect the various levels of culpability of drivers across the piece. Perhaps it will be more useful to discuss this against another draft, if that is what the noble Baroness wants. This draft does not strike a fair balance and therefore we cannot support it.
Turning to Amendments 167 and 168, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that we take road safety seriously. The sanction of disqualification is a very helpful tool, an integral part of the overall approach to road traffic enforcement and, therefore, to promoting road safety. However, again the sanction of disqualification must be proportionate. He proposes amending disqualification periods for stand-alone offences from two years to five years. We are not persuaded that an increase of that magnitude is warranted for all the offences which the amendment would encompass. For example, two offences that would fall within the amendment involve causing serious injury to other road users, and another covers any offence where the driver has incurred a disqualification in the previous three years. The proposed increase is unduly harsh in these circumstances.
We would want to think carefully and coherently across the piece about amending the periods of disqualification for various offences. We want to keep sanctions at the right level, and we keep this under constant review. With respect, the noble Lord has much to contribute to the road safety debate. I would be very happy to meet him and others to discuss potential changes to the existing periods of disqualification. Perhaps we can arrange that. I heard what my noble friend Lord Attlee said, and recall that on the then Domestic Abuse Bill, we found that what we called a teach-in was quite useful. That might be a useful way of organising this, with specialist officials in the MoJ and/or the Department of Transport. I will be in touch with the noble Lord on that.
Also, in the context of disqualification, the noble Lord proposes reducing, from three years to two years, the timeframe for which offences would be regarded as repeat offences. As repeat offences, this would trigger a longer disqualification period, of two years rather than 12 months. Three years is the time for the totting-up process. We think that it is useful to keep the same period for repeat offences.
I turn to the amendments to the penalties for repeat instances of certain offences. The noble Lord proposes an increase in the minimum period of disqualification from three years to 10 years. Ten years is a considerable period of disqualification. It would affect not only the disqualified person but possibly their families in serious ways. We must remember that those convicted in these circumstances often also face a custodial sentence in addition to any driving ban that they receive. Therefore, one must look at the disqualification period in that context.
The length of a driving ban is at the discretion of the courts. They sometimes impose a lifetime ban. The noble Lord will know, but I will make it clear to the Committee, that the courts have a statutory duty to take into account the impact of a custodial sentence when imposing a driving ban, so it is not diminished by the period spent in custody. However, we do not think that a minimum period of 10 years would be proportionate in respect of the offences that currently carry a three-year minimum period of disqualification for repeat offences. The three-year period is a minimum. As I have said, the courts can disqualify in excess of that if necessary.
The noble Lord also proposes a minimum disqualification period of two years for drivers convicted of dangerous driving. A person who is convicted of dangerous driving is still subject to obligatory disqualification for a period of one year. That can be increased by a judge in light of particular circumstances. Again, we are not persuaded that a conviction of dangerous driving warrants a longer minimum ban, nor do we propose to accept the proposal to reduce the penalty for the offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving from five years to two years. This is a good example of the balance I spoke about earlier. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, mentioned, when death results, the law often looks at things differently. When drivers cause the death of another person, a road user of any sort, through unacceptable behaviours such as careless driving, the penalties have to be sufficient to reflect the seriousness of their actions.
Turning to the amendments on the offence of driving while disqualified, if this sanction is to work effectively, people must be forced to adhere to the disqualification period. We know that that is not always the case. That is why we have a dedicated offence of driving while disqualified, which carries a maximum penalty of six months in prison. We consider that the right penalty for that offence. It is sufficiently effective in discouraging people from driving while disqualified and we do not believe that a longer period would be any more effective.
Finally, the noble Lord proposes an amendment which seeks to make it an offence to cause death or serious injury when opening a car door, with a penalty of a fine, imprisonment or both, obligatory disqualification from driving and obligatory endorsement of penalty points. We believe that the new offence is unnecessary, because causing death or serious injury when opening a door would already be covered by existing offences under Regulation 105 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986, which is brought into play in this context by Section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
More generally, while I recognise the importance of checking the road carefully before opening a car door, the penalty must be proportionate. The penalty for the current offence is limited to a fine and we do not have any evidence base upon which to agree or accept that the new and much higher penalties for the offence proposed by the amendment are warranted or justified. However, we are updating the Highway Code to improve guidance for opening vehicle doors carefully and safely to minimise any risk this may pose. We have been promoting what I think is called the “Dutch reach”, where you reach across—I will try to give an example from the Dispatch Box—to open the door with the hand which is further from it, because that forces you to look around.
There is another point here. It is called the Dutch reach because it comes from Holland, where a lot of people cycle. To pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, cycling is good for people not just when they are cycling but when they are driving. If you are a cyclist, you can also become a better driver, because you are more aware of cyclists on the road. We certainly appreciate the point and are looking at it.
I will pick up two further points from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. First, on the example he gave, I am not sure I took it down accurately, but my initial reaction was that alcohol is always an aggravating factor. However, I will check Hansard and can perhaps write to him with a specific response on that point. Secondly, on the 2014 review, that was announced and we have been working on it. We published a consultation on driving offences and penalties relating to causing death or serious injury and are now bringing forward proposals for reform of the law, which we committed to in our response to the consultation. My colleagues at the Department for Transport are taking that work forward on the broader issues of road safety.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, said that she would pick up her point in a later group so, with respect, I or my colleague will respond to it then. My noble friend Lord Attlee asked about an increase in the prison population. The short point here is that people go to prison only when the court cannot impose another offence and they go to prison immediately only when it is sufficiently serious that the sentence cannot be suspended. I hope that gives him some reassurance. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on Clause 65. I note his support for the amendments, but for the reasons I have set out, I hope those proposing these amendments will feel able to withdraw them.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest as president of the Road Danger Reduction Forum. I support both these amendments. It is absolutely ridiculous that we have such high alcohol limits, and we really ought to bring them down. We should say that no alcohol is permitted when you are driving—when you are in charge of a tonne of metal.
I want to make a small point, but it is something that road safety campaigners care very much about. We have heard the word “accident” used a lot. Road safety campaigners ask that we do not use the word “accident”, because that presupposes that it was accidental. It prejudges the situation, and that is clearly not right when something might come to court. They ask instead that we use the words “incident”, “collision” or even “crash”, but not “accident”. There is also an argument for saying that we should not use the words “road safety”, because that is the solution to the problem; the problem itself is “road danger”. We have to get our head around these differences, because it changes the way we perceive such situations.
My Lords, I will not repeat what I said earlier about my own mother having been killed because of a drunk driver—though I did not mention at the time that I also lost my brother-in-law in a different accident. The people who did this were not dependent, unregulated drinkers at all; they were perfectly normal people, who got behind the wheel of a car when they had been drinking. As the noble Baroness just said, this is not accidental. It is deliberate: these people have a drink and then get into a car.
But things have altered in those 60 years. I mentioned seatbelts earlier, and there has obviously been the breathalyser. When I first started campaigning on this, the Government’s Christmas campaign that year was “Stay Low”—it was not even “Don’t Drink”. So we have made enormous progress, and we should not forget that. But it is a journey, and we have not got there yet. We ought to continue on that journey.
Listening to some of the earlier debate, I heard the argument that the way to solve this is not to use sentencing or to send more people to prison. I have a lot of sympathy with this. I think there are times when prison is right, but what we actually want is prevention: we want to stop people getting in a car after they have had a drink.
Just like the changes I have mentioned, we also have to celebrate the fact that the Government and industry have done a lot. There has been a really good dialogue. There is now zero-alcohol beer—my fridge at home is full of it—that tastes very good. It is not like the early stuff; it is very good. There has been a big investment by industry to make that available—you can now get my favourite tipple, Guinness, with zero alcohol. There is the acceptability of water with meals, and a number of pubs serve coffee. We have to accept that this has been a whole-society move, but, as I say, we should not just stop where we have got to; we need to continue on the journey.
Just as the industry has been very good, we should acknowledge what the Government did in the Budget, when they moved to what a number of us have been asking for—oh, for lots of years: that the tax on alcohol should correlate with the strength of the alcohol in the drink. The Government have done that. It will take time for it to be implemented, but we are moving in the direction of understanding that. All of those are great things. It means that there is a much greater choice of drinks, either in the pub or while drinking at home.
However, there is still a problem: people are getting into cars when they have been drinking. I find it extraordinary, even at 50 milligrams. I do not drink at all when I am driving because I know that my foot would simply not hit the brake as fast, even after one drink. I know it would not, so I do not do it at all. Driving round London at the moment, even at 20 miles an hour, I see some cyclists—and I am a cyclist—going round without lights on and wearing dark clothes; you often have to hit the brake very fast. We may need to continue to move that way.
Therefore, I really favour this drop to 50 milligrams. It works very well in France, where much more is done, with proper random breath tests—closing off a road and checking everyone going through. That is what I would like to see. You do not have to do it very often, by the way, just every now and again.
The other possibility—I know we have discussed it in earlier debates—is whether we could move at least to 50 milligrams for new drivers; say, in the first five years of being qualified. My guess is that, once they get used to driving without drinking at all, they would continue that through life. I think some thought and creativity could be given to that.
We need to go further. I hope the Government do not say that they are doing everything they can, that they have an advertising campaign, that everything is brilliant and that we do not need to move any further. While sometimes they have come through Private Members’ Bills, often the changes we have had have been from the Government, whether through Barbara Castle or others. There is a responsibility on the Government to take it a bit further. Therefore, I hope that the response we get will be “Yes, it is time to do more”. And these may be just the two amendments that we need.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this House has stood up time and again for human rights—for the poor, disabled, gay people, refugees, children and the old—but there is one group now crying out for their human rights, and that is those dying in pain and discomfort, without control over their final weeks. They do not want to take away the rights of others, although they think that others are trying to impose their will on them, as was said so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Davidson, in a remarkable maiden speech.
Actually, I do not think the disabled are any different from us on this issue, as was said by my noble friend Lady Lister and the noble Lord, Lord Low. Whether they are blind, limbless or paralysed, they are much the same as us on this. As the wonderful Tom Shakespeare, who has done far more for the health of others than I will ever achieve, says:
“We disabled have fought all our lives for choice and autonomy for disabled people—all we ask is the same choice at the end of life.”
For some disabled people, the alternative—that lonely trip to Switzerland—is even more of a challenge than the rest of us, for the reasons we just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson.
We have all had the letters: from a man with MND terrified that he would drown in his own saliva as he lost the ability to swallow; from a nurse in the hospice movement wanting people to be able to choose their own time of dying; from a retired palliative care consultant, describing as inhuman that we deny people personal autonomy to choose assistance at the point of death; and from people in fear of not being in control of their final days.
It is time. Let us do what we have done for others who seek our help, and enable those dying to end their life with dignity and in peace, with their family around, in a way that all of us would want in our final days.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe vast majority—well over 90%—were in favour of humanist marriage. Humanists represented by far the greater majority of those who responded to the consultation. Pagans and naturists also responded—the latter, for some reason, were particularly keen on outdoor ceremonies, which might be challenging at this time of year.
My Lords, it seems to me that the Minister is taking the Law Commission view ahead of Parliament. It was this Parliament that decided that the Secretary of State should have this power. Is it not now time to move on that?
I respectfully reject what the noble Baroness says. She is quite right that it is a matter for Parliament, and it is also a matter for the Government to consider. The Law Commission has produced a very valuable and thorough report—as I am sure she will agree, having read it—which provides material for the Government to consider. The report was only produced just before Christmas. After considering that report, the Government will then make a decision.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberAs I indicated, the Prison Service tends to—correctly, I suggest—allocate prisoners according to their legally recognised gender, but there is a discretion to respond to the individual circumstances of a case, which is often as a result of a thorough risk assessment involving both the prisoner and other prisoners. Often, a multiagency panel will be involved. It is indeed the policy of NOMS to make sure that these matters are dealt with sensitively.
My Lords, returning to what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, the Minister seemed to suggest that this happens at the point of prison, which really is too late. Surely, when a person is leaving court, they need to be in the right van to go to the right prison. Should the decision not be taken earlier, before they leave court? Can he assure us that the staff there are properly trained and that the decision is taken at the right point?
The noble Baroness makes an important point and the National Offender Management Service is currently looking at ways to facilitate the proper recording of this information through the introduction of an equalities self-declaration form to be completed by all defendants who are adjourned for the preparation of a pre-sentence report. These details are very difficult to obtain while adopting appropriate sensitivity and recognising the obligations under the Gender Recognition Act.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble and learned Lord is quite right. He points to the difference between the dualist system, which we have, and the monist system whereby unless law is incorporated in an Act of Parliament, it does not become automatically a part of the law. The question of the amendments to the Bill of Rights, when or if it comes before Parliament, is somewhat separate but he accurately states the necessary constitutional principles.
My Lords, if the former AG, journalists, campaigners, senior lawyers, ex-Ministers, ex-civil servants and academics think this change is wrong, is it possible that they are right and that the Government are not? Can the Government explain why they sneaked this change through, along with a change to the code for special advisers, rather than make a proper Statement in the House?
There is no question of sneaking it through. It has been available since 15 October 2015 and this is the second time in a week that I have answered questions at the Dispatch Box on the Ministerial Code. It has also been the subject of much debate, as the noble Baroness points out, in the newspapers and elsewhere. Those authors she cites are entitled to their view, but it is not a view that I agree with.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, for the two Bills on which I will lead for the Opposition —on charities and to create a public service ombudsman —I have nothing but praise, albeit we may want to strengthen them just a little. Had the Government’s programme stopped there, I would have had no complaint. However, while respecting the fact that the electorate chose a Conservative Government, there will be some unforeseen circumstances, which we will seek to mitigate. We will in particular seek to protect the rights of others in the way outlined by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer.
But there are other important issues, such as the extension of the right to buy to housing association tenants. We will examine the rights of this carefully. The housing Bill will force councils to sell their most expensive—in other words, their best—housing when vacant, and to use the proceeds to compensate housing associations for the loss of their stock, as well as to build new affordable homes in the same area. However, where housing and land costs are astronomically high, such as in Kentish Town in Camden, this will accelerate the emptying out of London’s poor from inner London areas which started in the last Parliament—and, incidentally, where sold-off council properties are back on the market at £800,000, or at three-times affordable rents. Kentish Town did not vote Tory on 7 May, but will have to live with the consequences of other people’s choices. Indeed, this Government could seriously damage Camden. The housing Bill could force it to sell a third of its social housing and to undermine its community investment programme of building 1,400 new homes. Land is simply not available there at affordable prices to rebuild unit for unit sold.
The National Housing Federation has said that extending the right to buy to housing association tenants, funded by selling off high-value council homes, will deepen the current housing crisis. We look forward to the maiden speech tomorrow of the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, on this very issue. Housing associations fear that the proposals will undermine their wider aim: to provide affordable tenancies for the less well-off or low-rent provision for the homeless, as is recognised in the charities and social investment Bill that the Government published last week. It could even undermine therapeutic communities or sheltered accommodation.
It has also been said that the proposals will undermine the ability of housing associations to build affordable homes in the future. A number of issues have been raised with regard to the legality of interfering in this way with the assets of what are after all independent charities. All such criticisms we will address during the passage of the Bill. The last Parliament was bad enough for charities, gagging them with the lobbying Bill while completely failing to deal with corporate lobbying. Now we see the state interfering in charities’ provision, allocation and funding of housing.
Meanwhile, the state is interfering with independent trade unions, forcing them, as did the Government’s predecessors in the 19th and 20th centuries, to change their rules, deliberately so as to undermine Labour Party funding. A similar provision in the 1927 trade union Act resulted in a fall in the number of political levy payers from 3.5 million to 2 million and a drop in party income of 20%. The equivalent this time could be much more. It is what the Independent reported as a “shamelessly partisan” attack on Labour. This is simply to deal with payments of 5p or 10p a week by trade unionists. For that, we will have to set up the operation for them to be able to opt in. All this will happen while companies will be free to make large political donations without any reference to their employees, their customers or their shareholders. We have seen how much the Tories benefit from such largesse. In the last Parliament, they raised £108 million, with £28 million from hedge funds alone. David Cameron used to say, and I approved, that he wanted to end the “big donor culture”. But with this gracious Speech, we have seen the truth: we will continue to allow big donors to his party but clamp down on those tiny weekly contributions made by millions of trade unions to our party.
As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, the votes for life Bill will end the 15-year rule, allowing millions of Britons overseas, including tax exiles, to vote in UK elections, but perhaps the Tories’ real aim is to allow those people to donate to UK political parties, meaning more rich pickings from non-taxpaying expats.
There is also in the gracious Speech the threat to the independence of the BBC, which stands for free speech and professional, unafraid journalism here and across the world, by the possible undermining of its funding model or finances.
This sounds like an illiberal, politically motivated Government interfering with the legitimate activities of unions, charities and housing associations while extending potential Tory funding from expats. It is not a one-nation gracious Speech; it is not a programme based on rights, on fairness, on equality or on any sort of social justice. It is partisan and mean-minded. It cuts billions from benefits to needy families while ensuring that the Tories’ own income is secure. This is not the gracious Speech that we anticipated.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the order before the Committee today amends Schedule 1 to the LASPO Act 2012 to maintain the status quo regarding the provision of legal aid for proceedings involving gang injunctions in respect of under-18s and to reflect the expansion of advocacy in special educational needs matters. It also ensures that advocacy is available for new proceedings created by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act which are in the scope of the civil legal aid scheme generally by virtue of consequential amendments made by that Act to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This order does not alter means or merits and does not bring any new matters within the scope of legal aid.
Before setting out further details about this order and why the Government are taking this action, I will briefly explain some background. Anti-social behaviour orders on application and anti-social behaviour injunctions will be replaced with “Injunctions” under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Legal aid for advocacy in respect of applications for anti-social behaviour orders under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is provided under the criminal legal aid scheme currently, but the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 brings all Part 1 injunctions within scope of the civil legal aid scheme. For under-18s, Part 1 injunctions, along with parenting orders made in respect of a youth subject to such an injunction, will be heard in a youth court and the route of appeal from the youth court is to the Crown Court.
Schedule 1 to LASPO sets out the matters on which civil legal aid is available. This is subject to the exclusions at Parts 2 and 3 of the schedule which detail the availability of advocacy. Because of the general exclusion of advocacy except for specified proceedings, it is necessary to add the relevant proceedings to the exceptions in Part 3 of Schedule 1, which will expand the scope of civil legal aid to include advocacy in these proceedings.
Section 18 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 will amend Part 4 of the Police and Crime Act in relation to gang-related injunctions which concern persons under the age of 18 being heard in the youth court and not in the county court, which is where they are heard currently. As I previously mentioned, the appeal route from the youth court will be to the Crown Court. In order to enable civil legal aid for advocacy in such proceedings to remain available, it is necessary to add them to the list of exceptions for advocacy in the magistrates’ and Crown Courts in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to LASPO to reflect the change in venue for these proceedings.
Part 1 injunctions under the Anti-social Behaviour, crime and Policing Act are intended to address the same kinds of behaviour which are currently dealt with by anti- social behaviour orders and anti-social behaviour injunctions for which legal aid, including advocacy, is currently available. It is therefore reasonable that legal aid for the new injunctions, including related parenting orders, should be made available. That intention is achieved in part by the consequential amendment made to Schedule 1 to LASPO by the Anti-social Behaviour, crime and Policing Act.
However, the amendment made by that Act was partially defective as it failed to take account of an amendment to paragraph 7 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 to LASPO, which had already been made by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (Family Court: Consequential Provision) Order 2014. It also did not include provision for advocacy in the Crown Court, which is necessary with regard to appeals. The order therefore provides for advocacy in both the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court in relation to injunctions under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and related parenting orders.
The order also seeks to maintain the availability of civil legal aid for under-18s in respect of advocacy related to injunctions to prevent gang-related violence. This is necessary in order to reflect the change of venue for such injunctions made by the Crime and Courts Act from the county court to the youth court, which is, as the Committee will know, a specialist type of magistrates’ court.
I now turn to advocacy in special educational needs matters. Part 3 of the Children and Families Act 2014 came into force on 1 September. Paragraph 96 of Schedule 3 to that Act makes amendments to paragraph 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to LASPO in order to allow for the funding of civil legal aid services in special educational needs matters. However, as I have previously mentioned, Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 1 allow for advocacy only in certain circumstances and the amendments made by the Children and Families Act do not allow for the availability of legal aid for advocacy in special educational needs proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.
The Government consider it appropriate that legal aid should be available for advocacy in the new special educational needs matters under the Children and Families Act before the Upper Tribunal. Advocacy is already available for similar proceedings arising under Part 4 of the Education Act 1996 and the Government therefore consider that it should be available for these proceedings. It follows that in order for advocacy for such matters to be in scope, an order under Section 9 of LASPO is required to amend Part 3 of Schedule 1.
With that background, I turn to the reason for the order before us today. The injunction under Part 1 will replace anti-social behaviour injunctions and anti-social behaviour orders. The new injunctions under Part 1 will combine the provisions of both previous orders. The order must be made to ensure that legal aid for advocacy is available for injunctions under Part 1 and related parenting orders.
Proceedings relating to gang injunctions have been moved from the County Court to the youth court due, as I said, to the consequential amendment made by Section 18 of the 2013 Act. Although it is yet to be commenced, in the interests of providing for advocacy in the youth court for such proceedings and in the Crown Court for related appeals, we must make appropriate provision in the order. In special educational needs matters, the Government consider it appropriate that legal aid should be available for advocacy in those proceedings.
In summary, in order to achieve the policy intention that I described, it is necessary to make an order specifying that advocacy for such proceedings is in scope of the civil legal aid scheme set out in LASPO. That is achieved by the order before the Committee today. I hope that noble Lords will welcome the order. It makes relatively minor but none the less important changes to the civil legal aid scheme which complement the wider changes made by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and the Children and Families Act 2014. I therefore commend this draft order to the Committee and I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for moving and explaining the order. It is always rather worrying when one reads in a background note that, as became apparent in the words the Minister used today, an order that had gone through Parliament was defective. It is hard to know whether that was because the original LASPO Act was so badly thought out that it trickled down to the implementing measures, or because the Ministry of Justice had cut its staff to the bone and was asking too much or simply because it was careless. However, whatever the reason, with regard to this part of the order, will the Minister tell the Committee how many cases have had to be delayed as a result of the defective order or, more worryingly, how many have gone ahead without legal aid being available? Perhaps the legal aid should be used to draft rather better SIs in future.
I hope that the order will be passed today and go through the House and be implemented fairly rapidly because, as the Minister anticipated, we welcome its content. It will ensure that certain young people, particularly those with special educational needs or disability, and people involved in parenting orders will be able to be properly represented at magistrates’ and county courts and in the Upper Tribunal, thanks to civil legal aid being available.
I am sure that the Minister will know that we remain deeply concerned about the types of cases and the number of people affected by having to represent themselves in hearings because of the absence of legal aid. Apart from that policy decision by the Government, it is regrettable that under the Government’s LASPO Act nothing qualifies for legal aid unless it is made an exception. It is a very negative way of describing something. As the evidence today shows, it is rather short-sighted because it means that even quite administrative, de minimis or, in the words of the Minister, minor changes to legal aid, such as these, require affirmative statutory instruments. That does not seem the best way of ensuring that human rights are safeguarded in all our courts. The content today is to be welcomed, but some of the procedures and effects are areas for concern.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her comments on this. Clearly, I do not accept all that she says about the LASPO Act, which, in the Government’s view, was a necessary correction to reflect the amount of money that was being spent on legal aid. Some difficult choices had to be made, and of course the noble Baroness will remember that on page 5 of the Labour Party manifesto there was an undertaking to make savings in legal aid.
As the noble Baroness quite rightly said, there was an error in the drafting. These things happen. I do not know precisely who is to blame, but I assure her and the Committee that policy and legal teams within the Ministry of Justice are working together closely to put in place clear procedures to monitor all planned changes to legal aid in primary and secondary legislation to prevent any future possibility of conflicting amendments.
As to the noble Baroness’s question regarding how many cases have been affected by this, I am told that the answer is none. New cases in the youth court are possible only after Section 18 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 is commenced. Current cases are in the county court, and legal aid is directly provided for such proceedings. I understand why the noble Baroness asks that question, but I am able to reassure her on that.
Following from that comes the question of why not very many gang injunctions have been issued as yet. It is a matter for local partners to consider the best way to prevent gang violence and support young people. These gang injunctions are relatively new. We know that local partners regard them as a useful tool, and there is more information and communication to ensure that they are appropriately and properly used. They have become an important, although not oppressive, part of the equipment to deal with the scourge of anti-social behaviour.
Therefore, I hope that I can assure the noble Baroness that this is a necessary change. It will regularise the position and ensure that legal aid is maintained as appropriate. There was an unfortunate slip. Fortunately, however, it has not resulted in any injustice. In those circumstances, I ask that the matter should proceed. I suggest that this is an appropriate amendment and that the special educational needs matters are uncontroversial.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the Legal Ombudsman provides a route of redress for consumers where they have complaints about the service they receive from regulated legal service providers. There is no charge to consumers for bringing complaints with costs being met by the regulated businesses that fall within its jurisdiction.
Section 161 of the Legal Services Act 2007, once commenced, will extend the remit of the Legal Ombudsman to enable it also to deal with complaints about claims management companies regulated under the Compensation Act 2006. I know that noble Lords will welcome the Legal Ombudsman being able to deal with these complaints. The claims management sector has acquired a reputation for being somewhat unscrupulous as a result of a number of companies engaging in poor business practices. The Legal Ombudsman will provide a new avenue of redress for consumers of regulated claims management companies and will assist the Claims Management Regulator in driving out poor standards and practices in the market. The Legal Ombudsman has a greater range of redress powers, including the potential for awards of compensation which are not currently available.
The fees order enables the Lord Chancellor to impose fees on regulated claims management companies to recoup the costs of complaints handling by the Legal Ombudsman. It sets out the fees payable by regulated claims management companies for this purpose. These fees will be charged on a sliding scale based on the relevant turnover of the regulated claims management company. This will enable the Government to achieve full cost recovery without putting a disproportionate burden on small and medium-sized businesses. The Government will keep the fee structure under review and will consider making changes when more information is available on complaints volumes and the types of complaints that are being considered by the Legal Ombudsman. If this order is approved, we will commence Section 161. It is intended that the ombudsman will commence this new work on 28 January next year, subject to parliamentary agreement.
The amendments to the Compensation (Claims Management Services) Regulations 2006 make the current regulations compatible with the requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007. In order to enable the handling of complaints about claims management companies by the Legal Ombudsman certain changes must be made to the powers of the Claims Management Regulator. These include the removal of the regulator’s power to award redress, the removal of the power to review how a claims management company has dealt with a consumer’s complaint and amendment of the power to issue directions to a claims management company. The amendment regulations also allow for information sharing between the regulator and the Legal Ombudsman in specified circumstances, something that is particularly important in ensuring a robust regulatory regime.
In conclusion, it is right that the Legal Ombudsman’s costs relating to regulated claims management complaints are met by the claims sector in the same way as the costs relating to legal complaints are met by that sector. This fees order will achieve this. The amendment regulations make the relevant claims management regulations compatible with the Legal Services Act and in so doing allow for claims management complaints handling by the Legal Ombudsman. I commend the order.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these two orders, which, not surprisingly, we warmly welcome. They will allow complaints against CMOs to be taken to the Legal Ombudsman and will enable LeO to raise the necessary money to fund that. My only complaint, for which I gather I cannot get redress, is that it has taken rather a long time. It was actually August 2012 when this rather excellent policy decision was taken, and it was announced by the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the MoJ, Jonathan Djanogly. However, as the Minister said, it will not actually come into effect until 2015.
However, the Minister might not know that I have long form on this one. The initial delay after the policy was stated was, of course, not his department’s fault, but the fault of the Treasury, which raised umpteen issues about raising a levy to enable the cost to be met for the work that LeO did. It was therefore in my name that we tabled an amendment to the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill in order to implement that. It was an effective intervention by his predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, together with the noble Lord, Lord Newby that managed to finally unbundle all of this. That enabled the Government to produce the correct amendment, which appeared in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, and myself. That is why I am so happy that this is finally here today. It is a shame that it has taken so long: even that amendment was in December last year, so it has taken another 12 months for it come here. Given the role of the noble Lords, Lord McNally and Lord Newby, in this, perhaps we should call it the McNally/Newby amendment. It will be important for complaints about those companies, so we wish it well and wish LeO all haste and good work in taking on these complaints.
I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s comments. As she says, she clearly has form in this area and has made a contribution to the development of the approach to this issue. In fact, the existing arrangements allow for certain remedies that could refund fees and order that the work be redone if feasible and direct that an apology be made. However, this gives a much greater power to the consumer and it seems to us—and I pay tribute, as she does, to the noble Lords, Lord McNally and Lord Newby, in assisting in this—that it should be financed by those claims management companies and that the complaints are now properly directed to the Legal Ombudsman, who should be able to deal with them in the most effective way possible. I suggest that, while this new route is obviously a little bit late, it is nevertheless the right answer.