Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Fox of Buckley and Lord Faulks

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thoroughly welcome these sensible and proportionate amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which he more than ably explained. I was prompted to speak on Amendment 393B having just read the Government’s Protecting What Matters action plan. I have plenty to say on that, but your Lordships will be relieved that I am not going to do so now.

In the plan, the Government readily admit that trust in institutions is in decline and that social cohesion is fraying. I am concerned that, if Clauses 168 to 171 go through unamended, it could create a problem of further distrust in policing. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, saying that there is not a huge gap between the amendment and the Government in relation to presumed anonymity for armed police officers, the Government are proposing an unprecedented rejection of the principles around open justice and, more importantly for me, press freedom. I am concerned that the clauses will limit the ability of the press to report in any meaningful way on cases involving the use of lethal force by police officers.

Replacing the presumption of anonymity should not leave officers vulnerable or unsafe, but the amendment would allow the power to grant anonymity if there are specific risks to safety or if it is in the public interest, to prevent harm. This is a blunt instrument. It would set up a privacy regime that would shut the media out from scrutinising the state’s exercise of power with guns. I cannot see how the public will not see that as covering up when the media will be denied any meaningful opportunity even to contest such anonymity, let alone to report. That is the concern. I am sure that the Minister will explain.

It is interesting that the police have recently been asking for greater freedom to release more details in relation to some investigations. This is not in terms of armed police, but police forces have recognised that suppressing information can lead to misinformation. That can turn nasty if the public feel that there has been a cover-up.

That is a move to transparency to ensure public consent and build trust, which goes in the right direction. I am just worried, although it is not their intention, the clauses will be a step back from a duty to have candour and from the state being transparent when, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, an armed officer representing the state takes another human being’s life. We should not just grant automatic anonymity in that way. We have to at least allow the media to ask questions and scrutinise.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my name is on the series of amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken to, and I will make a few brief comments in support of them. Before I do, I shall make a few observations about Amendment 394. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has not yet spoken to it, and he may be able to answer all the points I will make.

I start by saying that I share—with all noble Lords, I think—concern and admiration for the police generally, particularly for police officers who undertake willingly the task of bearing arms on our behalf in circumstances that may conceivably lead to serious harm to them and which call for difficult judgments to be made, often on very little information and in a split second. I entirely understand the concern.

I also wonder whether all these amendments are not significantly inspired by the Chris Kaba case and the officer, Martyn Blake. As to the decision not to grant him anonymity, it is very arguable that the judge came to the wrong decision. But, of course, we must bear in mind that hard cases make bad law and that there is a danger that, from one case, we then proceed to legislate in a way that overreacts and makes a change which is not really justified.

I will deal with Amendment 394, on presumption against prosecution. I am concerned about this. The idea of a presumption against prosecution does not find its way into the criminal law very often. I was able to find only one, the much-criticised Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021, where the then Conservative Government brought in a limit to the prosecution—a legal threshold in relation to overseas acts by serving forces rather than police officers. In certain exceptional circumstances there would be a presumption against there being a prosecution after five years. That was much criticised. What I struggle with in this amendment is that, before any prosecution is brought—the Minister will know this better than anyone, really, in your Lordships’ House—there has to be a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.

The factors referred to in this amendment, for example, in proposed new subsection (5)—

“In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters … the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—


are absolutely right, but I respectfully say that those are the very considerations that would be taken into account by the prosecution in the ordinary course of affairs when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence and deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. This would put into the criminal law a presumption that does not have a satisfactory precedent and place officers in a particular position. I feel we must leave it to the prosecutors to take all these matters into account in deciding whether it is appropriate to prosecute.

I should perhaps declare an interest, in that I was a barrister who acted on behalf of the police in one of those few cases where an officer did, in fact, unfortunately, kill a suspected criminal. The case went all the way to the House of Lords. It is called Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police. Ashley’s relatives were represented by Sir Keir Starmer, as he was not then, whose junior was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, as he was not then. The argument involved very much the same issues that we have discussed this evening about objective and subjective mistakes. A very junior officer, as part of the armed response unit, thought he had seen a sudden movement. He opened fire and unfortunately killed Mr Ashley. He was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, because it was a mistake. Civil proceedings followed in due course. It was difficult, but he clearly made a mistake and the jury had no difficulty in acquitting him.

That brings me to the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand what has been said over the years in relation to those matters, but they are very much taken into consideration by juries in any event. Self-defence would include all those matters, or the urgency of the situation. Although I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say, I am not at the moment convinced that we need to change the law.

I said that I do not like presumptions in the context of the criminal law. I do not like presumptions much anyway, which brings me to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What worries me about the presumption is: what rebuts that presumption? At the moment, the law provides that a judge decides in the particular circumstances whether it is appropriate to grant anonymity, and he or she will take into account all the factors, including the risk of danger to the officer if he or she is named, which is entirely proper. But this presumption would, I respectfully suggest, mean that the judge would be getting a very strong steer from Parliament that he should grant anonymity unless—and we do not really know what the “unless” is.

Granting anonymity runs contrary to the principle of open justice. Although one has considerable sympathy for any officer caught up in the situation, nobody is above the law, whether they are officers or not.

The press has a duty to report cases, particularly cases of this sort, where serious consequences have followed from the action of the state. We know that journalists are thinner on the ground than they once were and often have to cover different courts. I speak with some experience as the chairman of the press regulation body and knowing the pressures that journalists are under. They themselves often have to make representations to judges, in all sorts of circumstances, as to whether there should be an anonymity order or not. They might be faced with having to persuade a judge who has already been told that there is a presumption of anonymity. That is a hard burden to discharge for a journalist who may or may not have some legal representation. As a result, it seems to me almost inevitable that all officers will be granted anonymity.

If that is what Parliament thinks is appropriate, so be it, but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that presumption will mean anything other than automatic anonymity in these circumstances. I think this is a step that should not be taken. Although all these amendments concern a very real issue and concern, open justice and fairness to all seem to me to point to the result that the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should be accepted and the other amendments rejected.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Fox of Buckley and Lord Faulks

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the amendment is legally coherent and that is very much in its favour. It contains a tacit acknowledgment of the dualist system that we have in this country. That means that we are bound by domestic law and bound by international law only in so far as it has it has been incorporated in domestic law. The noble Baroness is right that there are references to the refugee convention in domestic law—for example, Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993.

The main provision of the refugee convention that attracts attention is Article 33, the non-refoulement provision. Does membership of the refugee convention require a particular response from the courts of this country? There is reference to it in the Supreme Court decision on the Rwanda policy, although it was not entirely clear, to me at least, what effect it had on the outcome of the case. The much greater part of the judgment was taken up with the review of the relevant articles of the ECHR, which are incorporated into our law by the Human Rights Act.

What is quite clear is that it is always open to Parliament to exclude references to international law from domestic legislation. In which case, any obligations that this country has under the refugee convention exist only as a matter of international law. I say that without meaning to diminish the importance of international law; we should comply with international obligations as far as possible. However, there is an increasingly recognised view that the 1951 convention was of its time and that it is necessary to look again at its application in the light of the challenges that immigration now presents not just to this country but to other European countries and to countries such as Australia that have signed up to the convention.

If the leaked memo reported in Saturday’s Times is correct, the Attorney-General himself acknowledges that the time may have come to look again at the convention and its application to the immigration and asylum system. It is important to stress that no body or institution is empowered to determine authoritatively what the convention means. This distinguishes it from the ECHR, where the European Court of Human Rights performs that task.

My view is that it would be best to remain a member of the refugee convention but to remove any references to it from domestic legislation, so that Parliament can determine the proper policy in relation to immigration and asylum without fearing interpretation of that legislation by reference to the convention. This amendment does precisely the opposite of that, which is the reason that I oppose it, despite its legal coherence. I anticipate that the Government may not altogether be inclined to accept the amendment either, because to do so would hard-wire the convention, with all its imprecision, into our domestic law. This would create just the sort of difficulties that we have had with the European Convention on Human Rights and the obligation, under Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, to take it into account.

It should be possible to remain signed up to the refugee convention without unduly or unnecessarily hampering our obligations. Australia has managed this, as I said. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in his 188-page analysis of the various issues that are thrown up by the convention. He is right that we may have to think again, even without this amendment, if our courts interpret domestic law in a way that appears to incorporate international law. Important though it is, it confuses the issue. Parliament ought to be sovereign in these matters and to decide the correct policy.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I really support the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who very articulately and with legal adeptness explained some of my reservations. I will raise just a few other points.

I am particularly opposed to Amendment 184, because it would further institutionalise—this is even its title—the primacy of the refugee convention. I think that emphasising that primacy undermines democracy.

I listened carefully to the expansive debate on refugee family reunion in the first group. One of the most insightful comments came in the very moving contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, about her family’s experience of refugees fleeing Nazi antisemitism. It was a reminder of that historic period, but also of the importance of historic specificity. This matters today—which is such a joyous day, by the way, with the return home of the hostages; I spent most of the morning crying, but with joy in this instance. Jew hatred is alive today—it is still happening—but it is not the Nazis or the Second World War. This is a completely different version; something else is happening.

That issue of history is one of the reasons why I wanted to speak on this group. I have long argued that the refugee convention is long past its historic sell-by date and that it is time for us to consider leaving it or maybe amending it in some way, as has been discussed. So I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has given us a chance to consider the issue.

Of course, when the refugee convention was established in 1951, it had noble aims. It was designed for a world coming to terms with the aftermath of a world war and mass displacement. But if you think about the way that the term “refugee” is used today, you will find that it has become so expansive and flexible that it has been used recently to describe a trans-identifying burglar from Algeria and a Zimbabwean paedophile, both of whom say that they are entitled to the same protection as women and children fleeing a war zone.

Earlier today the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that language and words matter, and I agree. In this instance, “refugee” has become completely corrupted and confused. So we urgently need to review terms such as “refugee”, as interpreted by today’s reading of the refugee convention, because these stoke resentment among the public and actually harm the interests of those who might legitimately be refugees in need of protection. It bundles up a whole lot of things.

The history of the convention means that it is not the rule of law—an act of God that cannot be challenged at any time—because it has an interesting history. Established in 1951, as I say, it was a practical solution to the existence of hundreds of thousands of people in Europe who had still not been resettled after the Second World War. It is interesting that, when it was introduced, the convention applied only to refugees in Europe, and only in respect of those who had acquired that status due to the events that happened before 1951. The convention has therefore changed because it did not assist with refugees who fled Hungary in 1956. That did not mean that people were not humane in 1956; the convention was not something that could be used—as is regularly done—just to say, “Where’s your humanity? Don’t you care about refugees?” It was very specific.

It was only in 1967 that the regional and temporal limits of the refugee convention were lifted to give rights to refugees around the world. That was motivated, as many historians have noted, by the Cold War. It was used to say that all refugees are welcome in the West and to show the superiority of democracy over communism. Actually, rather a small number of refugees came on that basis.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the refugee convention seemed to lose its raison d’être. It is interesting that, in 2004, Tony Blair, no less, noted how the convention,

“first introduced in 1951, at a time when the cold war and lack of cheap air travel made long-range migration far more difficult than it has become today, has started to show its age”.

Following Blair’s lead, in the 2005 general election the Conservative Party had a manifesto commitment to withdraw from the convention. There have been discussions about whether it is showing its age. I would say that the refugee convention is not just showing its age but has outlived its usefulness and shackles democracy.

My concern about this amendment is that it tries to do something that is already a problem. We spend all our time in this Chamber scrutinising pieces of law. If we are then told, “No, you can’t do that because of the refugee convention”—or if we pass laws and they are usurped by the refugee convention through the courts—what is the point of democracy and the decision-making here if they are so undermined by international treaties? The refugee convention therefore betrays democracy and the public.

If we in this place get frustrated that laws are made and conventions are then used to undermine those laws, can noble Lords imagine what it is like to be a voter? I know it has been a while for a lot of us, but it is worth remembering that voters’ frustration is even more palpable. This does not help refugees; it is a way of bypassing democratic accountability and is a hindrance, rather than a help, to refugees and the British public.