Trade Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, this is an important amendment. On matters of the environment, there has been a lot of rhetoric and aspirational thought. There are international agreements to which we are, I hope, firmly signed up. However, the point about moving forward on the environment is that we need muscle. We should be talking far more about how our trade policy can assist in fulfilling our obligations under existing environmental policy. It is too easy to begin a process of erosion whereby, for reasons of rationalisation or whatever, we begin to backslide. The amendment is a step towards ensuring that that cannot happen.

Part of our obligation in environmental policy is to ensure that the burdens that fall and the challenges that come to third-world countries are given pride of place. For that reason, we must regard fulfilling our obligations towards third-world countries as very much part of fulfilling our environmental obligations. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for having introduced this amendment and it will certainly have my support.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise for being a late newcomer to Trade Bill proceedings, but other Bills and committees have conspired against my taking part thus far. I want to speak in favour of both these amendments and to explain Amendment 83A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer and to which my name is added in the latest Marshalled List.

Whereas Amendment 77 relates to TRA advice, Amendment 83A relates to the economic interest test used as part of determining the final level of trade remedy measures. In the test, there is analysis of a range of socioeconomic matters in order to conclude whether the application of a trade remedy that is otherwise justified by virtue of dumping, subsidy or a surge in imports and that is causing harm to UK industry is also in the UK’s overall interest. Although the test broadly follows the EU’s Union interest test, as commented in the Brick Court Chambers blog on 24 September, it

“has the potential to play a strengthened and more prominent role than has been the case to date with the EU”.

I would add that, perhaps obviously, it can be more granular when applied to an individual country.

Under the economic interest test, the remedy can be diminished or set aside if stakeholder interests harmed by the remedy disproportionately outweigh those of the industry harmed, along with its related stakeholder effects. Amendment 83A requires that environmental obligations be part of that analysis. It is a probing amendment, not least because it would need to be put into Schedule 5, as well as Schedule 4, to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act in order to cover safeguarding measures as well, but I am sure that noble Lords understand the point.

Paragraph 25 of Schedule 4 to that Act lists the things that must be taken into account in the economic interest test. These are: industry, consumers, geographic areas, particular groups, the competitive environment and the structure of markets. Although there is a sweep-up provision enabling the TRA to consider anything that it considers relevant, the environment, with its unique importance—one could say for the future of everything—should surely have a place among the compulsory considerations.

By way of example, I recall discussions some time ago about solar panels and whether it is better to have cheap ones that everyone can afford, and hence greater deployment, or to have ones that protect an industry and jobs, and which will last better for the longer term, especially if the domestic industry goes. Added to that is the question of how you take account of carbon-dumping in the manufacture. Such socioeconomic wrangles are no simple matter, and there might not always be an environmental angle, but if this kind of weighing-up is to be done then environmental aspects should be in the mandatory checklist.

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[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, at this late hour, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the debate on the predecessor Bill on 4 February 2019, in which I made similar points to those that are reflected in the three amendments in my name in this group. Regarding what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, I do not think Amendments 104A and 108A are tidying up. They are there to delete the possibility that the chief executive of the Trade Remedies Authority might be appointed by the Secretary of State in the first instance where the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority has not been appointed.

We are in a situation where, if the Bill were to pass into law before the end of the year and if it were to be commenced rapidly, we already have a chair designate of the Trade Remedies Authority. We happen not to have a chief executive designate. We are in the unhappy position where the Trade Remedies Authority has been legislated for for a couple of years but has not actually existed because this Bill was supposed to have become law alongside the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. In that time, it has had a chair designate, who then stood down to be replaced in February this year, and a chief executive designate, who stood down in April this year and has not been replaced, so it is not a happy story so far. We cannot have a situation where the first chief executive of the body proper is not appointed by the chair designate who is in place, and I see no reason why that provision of Schedule 4(2) should not now be taken out and, as a consequence of that, paragraphs 17 to 23 of Schedule 4 can be removed since they all relate to that possibility.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, what is more important is the issue of the appointment of the chair and that, in order to reflect the importance of the role and the impact it can have in the public domain —including, obviously, from a business point of view, the economic domain in particular—and because of the requirement for independence, this should be an appointment where, before it is made, the Secretary of State should seek the views of the International Trade Select Committee in the other place.

Interestingly, I have asked the chair of the International Trade Select Committee in the Commons whether it has seen the chair designate of the Trade Remedies Authority and, as of last week, it had not. It seems to me that the department has been somewhat remiss not to put the chair designate in front of the Select Committee and to seek its views, and, not least because we had this debate back in 2019, it could easily have done it when it came to appoint a new chair designate in 2020. However, it has chosen not to do so. I think that the time has now come for Ministers to agree that this role should be one where the Secretary of State takes the views of the Select Committee before making the appointment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak in favour of Amendments 78, 79, 104 and 114, in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer and in my name.

Amendments 78 and 114 would amend similar wording in Clause 6 and Schedule 4, where in both places the Bill has the provision that the Secretary of State must

“have regard to the expertise of the TRA and to the need to protect … its operational independence, and … its ability to make impartial assessments when performing its functions.”

We have heard several times in this House, including from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that “have regard” has no force, so these amendments are intended to get the operational independence and impartial assessments out from governance by the weak words “have regard”. I will not labour the point any further save to say that the independence of the TRA is very important for international credibility, and indeed not only with regard to the Secretary of State.

Amendment 104 also goes to the matter of independence, as my noble friend Lady Kramer has already explained. It would explicitly put into legislation things that have been said, understood or only indirectly recited. I believe that in the other place the Minister, Greg Hands, said that if there was no recommendation, that was the end of the matter. However, it would be good to see it in the Bill. Likewise, I am curious about whether there could be an order for an instant reopening in the event of no recommendation. It seems a good idea to clarify that the end means the end unless circumstances change.

Amendment 79 is a little different in that it relates to funding and inserts into Clause 6 that when the Secretary of State seeks advice, there must also be regard to the capacity and funding of the TRA. Although I regret the omnipresent “regard”, that is important, because TRA funding is determined by the Secretary of State, as is stated in paragraph 29 of Schedule 4. We wanted to probe a little to make sure that the TRA will have sufficient funding.

With trade matters coming under UK control, success and funding are linked. It will be no good if the TRA finds itself in the situation that it cannot do things for fear of cost or the cost of litigation, which has hampered other regulators and authorities. That might please some if they think they come under less scrutiny from a supervisor, but this is not a supervisor but batting for the UK. Will there be a formula that relates to workload, and is it appreciated that workload is not under the control of the TRA? Workload happens because of actions in other countries, and what the TRA does or does not do can be hauled up before the Upper Tribunal as well as the WTO.

I understand that the Secretary of State has shied away from having the arrangements of the CMA, which are seen as much more costly, and I have to say the salaries on offer in the advertisements for TRA posts are low by international standards. Will that be reflected in lack of experience and possibly in staff retention once staff are trained up and the private sector beckons? Will these matters be seriously kept under review or will the TRA just be told to suffer the squeeze? Would the TRA be allowed to raise funds of its own? I have some concerns there around the issue of independence, but I think we ought to know. I appreciate that these probing questions go further than the amendment, but the last thing we want is the TRA explaining to Select Committees or the Upper Tribunal how it has funding for only half the job.

I also agree with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and although he does not seek a committee approval of a nominee for chair, I have personal experience of holding the power of approval over appointments and reappointments of chairs and chief executives for all the European financial services authorities, and pre and post-appointment hearings for potential candidates for the board of the European Central Bank. Although those powers were resisted in the first instance and my committee had to wring them out of the Commission, the European Council and Eurogroup, almost immediately those bodies decided that these were rather constructive things to have. They were always phoning me up to ask more about what the Parliament thought, and the UK should be brave enough to follow suit.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton.

Trade Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I shall be brief in moving this amendment. It is partly probing and partly serious, and in due course I shall probably reserve the right to come back to it on Report.

I referred to the idea for the amendment in my Second Reading speech at col. 712 of Hansard on 8 September. I accept of course that the two bodies, the Trade Remedies Authority and the Food Standards Agency, do not have the same legal status. The Food Standards Agency is a non-ministerial government department whose staff are civil servants, and indeed its board would make such a decision as implied in the amendment. It is the principle that I seek to transfer, which has worked quite successfully in the legislation for the Food Standards Agency for over 20 years, under Governments of all parties—in other words, the principle of transparency and openness when dealing with what can sometimes be confidential matters.

The power is there, as I say in my explanatory statement, to be a further guarantee to reinforce the operational independence of the authority. No one is ever going to believe that any of these bodies—set up at the behest of Ministers and perhaps fulfilled without proper due process, in the way that all bodies should be—are actually operationally independent. The one way to ensure that is to give the body such a power. I fully accept that that is very unusual—government departments, in the main, do not understand how the Food Standards Agency legislation came to provide such a power—but it was freely given by the Government and accepted by Parliament in the 1999 legislation. To the best of my knowledge, it has not actually been used, in the sense of being a sanction.

I referred at Second Reading to a stench of corruption about this Government—not as individuals, but there is a general feeling that something is not quite right about the way things are being done. Any wayward move on a trade deal—that is the polite term—could be avoided if those who wanted to be a little wayward knew that the TRA had such a power. That is where the idea of a sanction comes in: it would be established in primary legislation, even though I suspect, and sincerely hope, it would never be used. Then, we could better trust the trade deals, which is the important, central point. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. While I am in favour of transparency and of what he called the ability to sanction, I am also cautious when it comes to the disclosure of information from any source. I can see that with food, there is a public health issue that might override everything else, but I question whether the comparison is the right one when expanded more generally. Much information will be submitted to the TRA from UK and overseas companies that is commercially confidential and has been given on the understanding and indeed requirement of confidentiality—among other things, under WTO treaty obligations.

I will leave it to the Minister to reply, but it seems to me that the amendment, maybe unintentionally, goes too far and could undermine international co-operation or even leave the UK in breach of international rules. Not that I would expect the TRA to do that, but it should be clear that it is not in contemplation, so as to avoid international misunderstanding. Maybe the amendment could be worked on to include some acknowledgement of those constraints.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 80 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, which is trying to create levels of transparency in the Trade Remedies Authority similar to the principles of openness and transparency that underpin the Food Standards Agency.

There is no doubt that the TRA must have operational independence to enable transparency and prevent any form of corruption in trade deals. We are in a new dispensation that requires such trade deals to bring benefit and, obviously, to be open, subject to the issue of confidentiality which, I believe, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, covers in his amendment. In many ways, I suppose there is also that direct read-across with the need for an international trade commission, but that was dealt with in previous amendments on Tuesday in your Lordships’ House.

We are all aware of the concerns about hormone-infused beef, chlorinated chicken and other issues surrounding corruption. We therefore need those high standards of transparency and openness. In that respect, the model of transparency and openness ushered in by previous Governments back in 1999 and 2001 with the Food Standards Act, which set up the Food Standards Agency, provides a useful paradigm for the transferral of those principles.

There is undoubtedly a need for the Trade Remedies Authority. It should publish advice, and any information issued should be subject to issues of confidentiality. I believe that the amendment would enable openness and transparency and help to prevent the concern that pivots around the issue of corruption. I will be happy to support the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, if he wishes to bring the amendment back on Report.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

This mixed group of amendments shows that there are a lot of ideas around the TRA and the thinness of the elaborated governance arrangements, which makes appointments all the more a matter of concern. Amendments up to and including Amendment 109, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Kramer, concern appointments, the important matter of representation and how to ensure that stakeholders have a voice, and where that voice and influence take place.

We support a role for the Select Committees. I have already spoken about how it can be a positive experience all round. We also agree that there must be a voice and policy influence for stakeholders. However, there is a significant difference between where stakeholders are placed in Amendment 106, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and in our Amendment 109. This difference is important in terms of what independence means for the TRA and it is that which I wish to probe, but the amendments both show that there are issues around devolution, regional representation and dispute resolution that are missing, as indeed they are in the internal market Bill.

Much of the concern about representation stems from the economic interest test. As I said on Tuesday, it has the potential to play an important part in final decisions about applying remedies and requires analysis of various socioeconomic factors, including effects in geographical areas. The test echoes the EU interests test but has been further elaborated, and as it only covers the UK, offers scope for greater granularity. Guidelines issued in 2019 broadly envisage the economic interest test being technical, but they also say that there should not be an over-prescriptive methodology. While such flexibility may well be appropriate, it does not diminish anxiety.

No other country has quite the same test. The EU’s is nearest, but it has majority voting of member states in Council as a final decider. On the economic interest test, we have the TRA and, in some very limited circumstances, an override possibility for the Secretary of State and then the Upper Tribunal.

The TRA will carry the burden of proof of having to show a disproportionate effect in order to remove or dilute a remedy that is otherwise shown as justified under international trade law criteria. This could be controversial, pitching consumer versus jobs and upstream jobs against downstream jobs that may be in different areas. There is also a requirement to consider competition and market structure, which at its core is also about consumers.

Reducing an otherwise justified remedy will inevitably cause upset—which is why most countries avoid it. It potentially puts the TRA in the position of “picking losers”, so of course stakeholders want to be there to make sure that they are not the losers. Even though there will be hearings and submissions involving all interested parties, there is reasonable justification for stakeholders having some closer involvement in the evolution of the policy, especially for the devolved Administrations.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the creeping power of HMRC to demand information, potentially from anyone, without any controls or supervision. I am a member of the Finance Bill Sub-Committee, and this is a matter that we, too, are investigating in our current inquiry.

Here in the Bill there is another swathe of powers, or potential powers. I am not against powers to investigate or to make sure that any taxes due are properly paid; the problem comes with generalised powers that can then be used beyond what might be called their proper limit, or exercised by individuals at relatively junior level without appropriate training. We have seen that before. HMRC also has a track record of being rather heavy-handed on innocent or easy victims—as with the loan charge—and missing the big fish.

Against that background, Clause 7 is drawn too wide. Clause 7(1), which kicks off the provision, is worded to cover any person. It is not limited to whether they have an interest or are connected in any way with the trade, business or profession. It could enable fishing anywhere—and potentially compulsorily under regulations made via Clause 7(3). Clause 7(3) also seeks to be able to amend Acts of Parliament on the type of information required and how the request is to be made, again without limitations. If it follows HMRC’s present trend, that could include seeking the disclosure of information that would normally require the approval of a court. I expect that that is intended, as it is in the current Finance Bill. That is already unacceptable, but at least it is in a Bill; it would become even more unacceptable were it done by regulation.

Once HMRC had got such information, Clause 8 would permit it to allow the onward disclosure of that information—again, at HMRC’s own discretion—which should not be allowed, and most certainly not in blanket form.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 84 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, which she moved so eloquently. Like her, I am a strong supporter of the Government’s trade policies, but I share her wariness about the Bill’s powers to require disclosure of information. I believe that it is not the kind of thing a Conservative Government should do, in so far as those powers go beyond what is absolutely necessary.

I also agree with my noble friend’s Amendment 87, and I ask my noble friend the Minister to explain exactly which other functions the Government had in mind when they drafted the rather convoluted language of subsection (2). I also agree with my noble friend’s Amendment 88. Why does the Minister think that HMRC should have the power to disclose what may well be sensitive information, the disclosure of which might have an anti-competitive effect?

I also have some sympathy with Amendment 85 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton. Can the Minister explain in what circumstances he thinks it would be necessary and reasonable to use this Henry VIII power?

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it makes sense to take Amendments 85A and 89A together and I am grateful for the opportunity to do so. It is generally believed in legal circles that Clause 7(1) and the whole of Clause 8 as currently drafted are extremely wide and give great discretion to HMRC to require information. A similar amendment was moved in the other place that these provisions should be much more clearly defined to give greater certainty about the extent of the information and the anticipated frequency of this method of data collection. As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe described so clearly, while in normal circumstances it could be quite amusing, a breach of confidentiality or legal privilege is no laughing matter—and accidents and mistakes do happen. It is for that reason that Amendment 85A seeks to add at the end:

“Nothing in regulations made under subsection (3) may require the disclosure of information or the production of documents which are subject to legal professional privilege.”


Similar wording would be added to the relevant provisions of Clause 8.

I know that my noble friend Lord Younger went to some pains in summing up the previous debate to make it clear that the information would be provided on a voluntary basis—his defence was that there should be no compulsion. That indeed was the summing-up of my right honourable friend the Minister, Greg Hands, in the other place: that legal professional privilege was, in his words,

“a long-standing principle that protects the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and their lay clients and vice versa.—[Official Report, Commons Public Bill Committee, 25/6/20; col. 299.]

He went on to expand on why the principle is so important.

In thanking the Committee for the opportunity to speak to these amendments, I will say that it is felt that there are grounds to have these two amendments written into the Bill. Perhaps the Minister could meet me half way to make sure, by putting these phrases into the Bill, that there is absolutely no scope for anything to be done involuntarily or accidentally. With those few remarks, I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we support these amendments and, broadly speaking, I could just repeat my comments on the previous group. So, if your Lordships could take them as read, I will not repeat them.

The powers of HMRC cannot ride roughshod over matters that are protected, in this instance by legal privilege. It seems to me that HMRC cannot be put above the law as a matter of principle. I will repeat that there are concerns because of the current provision in the Finance Bill seeking to obtain access to bank accounts that would normally have required a court’s approval. There is also doubt as to whether, within HMRC, there are the appropriate procedures for the proper handling of some of the information that it may demand. The issue is around the training and abilities of the people who may access or disclose things who, if previous form is to be followed, can be in relatively junior positions. I think that these are matters that HMRC is trying to address but, despite that, it seems improper to demand to acquire powers before any safeguards are in place. Also, legal privilege would appear to me to need special protection, and therefore provisions to achieve the aims of these amendments would be useful in the Bill.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for her speech and amendments. As she says, the provisions in the Bill are quite widely drawn, and the amendments stop information on documents relating to legal professional privilege being disclosed. I well understand the sensitivity of legal professional privilege. All information between a lawyer and their client must be handled with care and confidentiality, so we will be listening carefully to whether the Minister’s response alleviates the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I suspect that her amendments are probing but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, they touch on sensitive issues.

Trade Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, there was some good debate on the TRA in Committee, and the amendments in this group largely follow up on those themes, about which there was quite a lot of agreement. The disagreement was about whether or not they should be included in the Bill. I will speak mainly in support of Amendment 27, which my noble friend Lady Kramer has already explained. I want to add more background to why it is proper to put a little more on the face of the Bill when a regulator is created.

We have a lot of independent regulatory bodies in the UK. We will have even more, such as the TRA, following Brexit. They become part of the system of unelected power. That system has its strengths and weaknesses. We seem to have been broadly free of corruption, but maybe we have had our fair share of ineptitude. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the system, there is really only one opportunity for Parliament to intervene in the objectives and formulation of the regulator in a way that is seen as benign and away from incidents, rather than threatening it or treading on its powers, as it may see it. That time is when it is being set up, as the TRA is now. If I recall correctly, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, said that the TRA will have heard Parliament’s views and could take account of them. It is true that the TRA, once formed, may take note, especially if the Minister is supportive, despite wanting to keep amendments down.

However, in reality, reliance on kind words in debate is not enough, especially ones lost in the mists of time. The Government may get another go, whether through policy messages of a formal nature or otherwise, or through statutory instruments, which we all know that Parliament has no power to change. For Parliament, once the Bill is passed, it is down to how far Select Committees will manage to harangue a regulator when it goes wrong or to how many Members pose Parliamentary Questions and cause enough publicity and aggravation to force a review, usually after a dramatic failure. I have trodden that path, but how much better it would be to accept the benign influence of a few more words in legislation at the outset, so that slippages are prevented or can be reminded about and caught sooner. Maybe there will be some constructive sessions with Select Committees and regulators will say “I will take that idea back” but, in my experience with financial services regulators and the FRC, that rarely leads anywhere.

As has been pointed out, the TRA has some well-defined functions stemming from WTO rules already in legislation, but there is wriggle room left around the economic impact assessment and it is all happening at a time of great sensitivity. Although I acknowledge that the department is doing a good job in its current work and preparation for the TRA, there would be comfort for the future in having something in the Bill to remind it about engagement with stakeholders.

The other amendments in this group also have merit. Amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, concerning the scope of advice, raise in my mind the question of whether the Government might at any stage wish to consult the TRA about state aid subsidies. What co-operation might there be between the CMA or other state aid control bodies given that the TRA has the other side of it? In a similar vein, I wonder whether the TRA will have the role of investigating infringement of state aid by the EU under the trade and co-operation agreement, as well as under WTO rules.

My plea to the Minister is that he put something on the face of the Bill so that there is at least something to point to concerning stakeholders.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak only to Amendment 27 in this group. I do not support it, mainly because I believe it is not necessary to tell a public body how to do its job. The TRA will be set up with a chief executive, staff and a board which will have a majority of non-executive directors and a chairman. It is being set up in a perfectly conventional way, which should allow it to ensure that it operates effectively.

A public body—or indeed any kind of body—does not need to be told to draw up a stakeholder engagement strategy. I also find it slightly bizarre that the amendment focuses on an engagement strategy. There will be far more important aspects of the TRA’s work—for example, on the kinds of information it seeks and the kind of analysis it carries out—but no strategy seems to be required for those. I also find no merit in the requirement to publish a strategy; I fail to see how that would add to the effectiveness of the TRA in providing advice.

Even if we need to specify that there must be an engagement strategy, it is quite unnecessary to specify a list of stakeholders with whom engagement must take place. I must say that the relevance of some in the list in this amendment is not entirely obvious. It seems to me that those proposing this amendment have forgotten that the TRA will focus on the kinds of things set out in Clause 6(3). It is a body focused on trade and traders, not on solving the problems of the world which are of interest to lobby groups.