Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th January 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

That the House do now adjourn.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until 5.55 pm.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, may I oppose the Motion? We have got to a point in the debate on the Bill where we should just finish it.

[Baroness Barran]

The reason for the delay is that the start of the health Statement in the other place has been delayed. The adjournment has been agreed through the usual channels.

[Lord Lucas]

So let us just finish the Bill. We have merely the Front Benches to hear from; we can then go on to the Statements. Why keep us here for an extra couple of hours? There seems to be no reason for it.

[Noble Lords]

Let us hear from Baroness Hamwee.

[Baroness Barran]

The adjournment has been agreed through the usual channels.

[Lord Lucas]

The usual channels do not rule this House; we do. It is our decision. If the Minister wishes to call a vote, that is fine.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds—the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, raised some very pertinent points—she might consider that if a miscreant wanted to obtain a corrosive substance, buying a brand-new motorcycle battery would be an extremely expensive way of doing it. When we look at banning things, we have to be very clear about what we think the benefit will be. This is a substance that is still very easy to obtain. It feels as if we are doing a great thing by banning things—we all want to see a reduction in the availability of these dangerous substances—but the reality is that any backstreet garage or facility will have stacks of used car batteries, from which these substances can be taken. We have to consider whether the delivery of an expensive motorcycle battery that may cost £50 is really a likely route for a miscreant who is trying to get hold of these substances. I am a motorcyclist too, although my battery appears to be very reliable.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, for raising this important issue. Before joining your Lordships’ House, I was warned that I would be surrounded by world experts on almost every topic and this short debate has reinforced that view.

The noble Viscount’s amendment seeks to address the potential that the provisions in Clauses 1 to 4 will have unintended consequences for suppliers of car and motorcycle batteries and, as the noble Viscount pointed out, other batteries which contain acid, for example those used in mobility scooters. I agree that this is an important point. Noble Lords may be assured that, in the light of discussions we have had with the representatives of the industry, the Government are carefully considering the impact that the Bill may have on the sale and delivery of such batteries. We remain committed to preventing young people from getting hold of acid in a form that they can use in the sort of horrific attacks that we have seen. But I agree with my noble friend Lord Goschen that it is quite a different matter to prevent the sale or delivery of car batteries and the like to those who have a legitimate need for them.

I ask the noble Viscount to bear with us a little longer. The Government need a little more time to consider how best to meet the point without impacting on the purpose of the Bill. I fully expect that we will have completed this work ahead of Report when I hope we will be able to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Given this assurance, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment to give the Government further time to consider this issue.

[Viscount Craigavon]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful for the spirit of that reply and to all noble Lords who have spoken in support. There is a genuine problem, which I outlined. It is useful to know that the Government are discussing this and coming up with some sort of answer because it has to be dealt with. I think it can be dealt with. I deal with it also under Clause 3. The Minister mentioned Clauses 2 to 4. I hope this can be dealt with. I am grateful for her answer. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, Amendment 10 simply asks why not just list all these substances, since we know what they are and the list will not change. Substances have been left off, such as slaked lime, which are seriously corrosive to skin, might be used and are very easy to obtain, and there are others on the list that would be very difficult to obtain. None the less, if we are going to have a list, since the list is not going to grow over time but is a small collection of basic inorganic chemicals, why not have the lot? It really does not add a lot of weight to the Bill to complete the list.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend, Lord Lucas, for explaining their amendments, which relate to the list of corrosive substances in Schedule 1. I can deal quickly with Amendment 9. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that we would consult with affected persons before making regulations amending Schedule 1. Whether we need to specify this in the Bill is a moot point, but I am happy to consider her amendment further ahead of Report.

Turning to Amendment 10, I know that my noble friend expressed concerns at Second Reading about the list of corrosive substances set out in Schedule 1 and felt that it did not go far enough and that we needed to have a more comprehensive list. It might be helpful if I set out how we arrived at the corrosive substances and concentration limits in Schedule 1. We based it on the advice from our scientific advisers at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory as well as from the police.

The substances that we want to prohibit sales and delivery to under-18s and to residential premises are those which we know have been used in attacks to harm and cause permanent injury and those that are the most harmful. Furthermore, the concentration limits are at those thresholds where, if the product was misused, it would cause permanent injury and damage. This seems a proportionate approach when talking about prohibiting the sale and delivery of corrosive products. It is important to remember that we are talking about products that have legitimate uses in our homes or for businesses. Consequently, we should not be criminalising the sale or delivery of particular corrosive substances without good cause.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining these amendments. I do not think we are far apart in what we want to achieve in relation to deliveries to residential premises. I hope that I will be able to clarify our intentions and assuage any concerns that might remain.

Clause 17 makes it an offence for a remote seller of bladed products to send them to residential premises or a locker. When developing the offence, we were keen to ensure that it did not apply to the delivery of products to residential premises from which a business was run—the noble Baroness gave the example of a craftsperson in a shed. We heard during the consultation from builders, plumbers and others who ran businesses from their homes. These people sometimes needed to have tools and other bladed products delivered to them quickly to allow them to carry on their businesses. We were also keen to ensure that farms would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to residential premises. This point was made on Monday by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and again today by the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose.

To achieve this, the definition of a residential premises at Clause 17(5) is limited to those that are,

“used solely for residential purposes”.

This means that anyone who runs a business from their home can continue to have bladed products delivered there. To put this beyond any doubt, Clause 17(6) explicitly states that, where a business is carried on from a premises, it is not to be regarded as a residential premises. I hope this addresses the example that the noble Baroness gave; her face suggests that she is not entirely convinced.

Amendments 43A, 43B and 43C would achieve the same effect but are unnecessary. Where a person runs a business from residential premises which they own or occupy, the Bill already ensures that they can have bladed products delivered to such premises. It will be for the seller to satisfy themselves that they are not sending the bladed products to an address that is used solely for residential purposes. The noble Baroness raised the earlier example from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of UPS, the delivery company. The noble Lord is right that there is no fool-proof way of establishing whether a property is a genuine business address. However, we are creating in Clause 17 a new offence for the seller, and in Clause 18(1) we set out the defences to that offence. We hope that these together will motivate the seller to take “all reasonable precautions” in verifying the address, although we acknowledge that there is no fool-proof way of doing that.

There are various ways that a seller could ascertain whether a premises is used as a business. The buyer could provide evidence that the house was registered for business purposes or they could provide confirmation in writing of the business entity and confirmation that the business is run from home. In many cases the seller will also have a relationship with the buyer as a business, possibly having supplied them with bladed products over many years. I hope this provides the clarity sought on these provisions and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendments.

[The Duke of Montrose]

Again, going back to my problem of sheep-clippers, or itinerant workers, do the business premises being delivered to have to be in the name of the person carrying out the business? If you happen to land with somebody who is running a business, could you have something delivered there?

[Baroness Barran]

There is no restriction on delivering to a business premises.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Official Report has already recorded my response, as noted by the noble Baroness.

I think we will all want to spend some time after this stage of the Bill looking at the various provisions that together make up what can and cannot be done. I would add to the mix the point raised on Monday which arises under Clause 18—it is not only my noble friend’s campaign about offences and defences—about the terms “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence” and how “all” applies in this situation. I want to spend quite a lot of time understanding what we have been told, how it is reflected in the Bill and what we should pursue at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Barran]

As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has explained, this amendment would make it a criminal offence for a businessperson to display a bladed product. The amendment seeks to replicate for knives the legislation in place on the display of tobacco products.

As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has just pointed out, the prohibition on the display of tobacco products is to help reduce the major risk to public health that comes from smoking: it is to help reduce smoking uptake by those under 18 and to support adult smokers who want to quit by removing temptation from open display. We do not want to stop people buying knives, only to stop their sale to under-18s. Requiring businesses to remove all bladed products from open display and to have them hidden away could have significant cost implications in terms of staff to operate the secure displays and for fixtures and the layout of stores. Our estimate shows that the cost to business of a requirement to lock bladed products into cabinets would be very significant. The Government believe a legal requirement not to display knives for all sellers, regardless of whether knife crime is a problem in the area where the business is placed, is not a proportionate measure. We believe that voluntary action on a risk-based basis will achieve the same aim.

The Home Office voluntary agreement with retailers including Wilko, Morrisons, Tesco and Argos includes an agreement that retailers will ensure knives are displayed and packed securely as appropriate to minimise risk. This includes retailers taking practical and proportionate action to restrict accessibility, avoid immediate use, reduce the possibility of injury and prevent theft. Retailers are also looking at more technology-based measures to prevent theft and to ensure that age verification takes place consistently in every case. For instance, retailers tell us that the use of tagging and more advanced bar-coding have proven to be an active deterrent in relation to both theft and age verification.

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[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I apologise for missing the first few words of my noble friend’s introductory remarks on this amendment. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said because I wonder whether the wording in the government amendment is as precise as it is intended to be. The Chartered Trading Standards Institute—I refer to my interests in terms of trading standards—says that a correct definition, if you mean just weights and measures authorities, would be,

“a local weights and measures authority”,

in Great Britain,

“within the meaning set out in section 69 of the Weights and Measures Act 1985”.

The Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland may enforce within its area, rather than simply talking in those terms. I wonder whether a broader definition would not make sense, given that in many local authorities now the trading standards function, which is so diminished, is often spread with other responsibilities. That may be something the Government want to take away and look at to make sure that what they are trying to achieve meets the obligation.

The second point about whether this should be made a duty is important as well. People I know very well in the Chartered Trading Standards Institute try to get this both ways: they complain constantly about all the statutory duties placed on local authorities, and therefore the inability of local authorities to take them seriously, but they also say, “Here is something which ought to be a statutory duty”. The psychological effect of making it clear that the Government wish to place a responsibility on local authorities to pursue their role in this matter would be extremely helpful and valuable. If the Government were to find some way of making the resources available, so that, rather than just placing the duty, they could also ensure that local authorities had the wherewithal to take effective action, that would be extremely helpful.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are directed at a common end—namely, to support the effective enforcement of the provisions of the Bill by local authorities. Amendment 59 introduces a legal duty on local authorities to enforce the legislation in relation to the sale and delivery of bladed articles and corrosive substances.

Local authorities in England and Wales already regulate the sale of bladed articles using general powers in Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972. Under that section, where a local authority considers it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its area, it may prosecute, defend or appear in legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in its own name.

There is no reason why local authorities could not use the general powers under the Local Government Act 1972 to enforce the provisions in the Bill in relation to the sale of corrosive products. It is also possible for the legislation in relation to sales of bladed articles and corrosive products to be enforced by the police. Consistent with these existing powers, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to impose a duty on local authorities to enforce the legislation in relation to the sale of bladed articles and corrosive products.

That is not to say that local authorities’ enforcement powers in this area cannot be strengthened. This leads me to Amendment 60, which seeks to extend the application of the investigative powers provided for in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. These powers enable local authorities to: require information from sellers; observe the carrying on of business; enter premises without warrant; inspect products; test equipment; require the production of documents; or seize and detain goods.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I am very slow today. The Minister has spent a lot of time agreeing with me and then she has not suggested that we should adopt the amendment. Is she suggesting that we should adopt the amendment or is she trying to persuade me that it is not necessary?

[Baroness Barran]

I am trying to persuade the noble Lord that the Government’s amendments will achieve the same aim.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

No change there.

[Baroness Barran]

Returning to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about weights and measures, I am advised that this approach goes with the grain of existing legislation. We believe that weights and measures authorities are in fact local authorities, but I will confirm that in writing.

[Baroness Hamwee]

When that is done, could examples —not a whole list of the grain to which the Minister refers—be given to us?

[Baroness Barran]

We will gladly do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked for more detail about the prosecution fund that was announced in the Government’s Serious Violence Strategy. The Government committed £500,000 in 2018-19 and another £500,000 in 2019-20 to support local authorities to bring prosecutions, where appropriate, in relation to age-restricted sales of knives. The prosecution fund is managed by National Trading Standards, which is the body that brings together trading standards representatives in England and Wales. The fund will be used by 11 local areas identified as having a knife crime problem to test compliance with sale of knives legislation. I think the noble Lord will be pleased to hear that Croydon is among the 11 areas since he referred to the good work that is going on there.

Amendment 86 would enable local authorities and companies to establish partnerships with the purpose of complying with the provisions in the Bill. The noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong, but I suspect that this amendment is aimed at extending the benefits of the primary authority scheme. The primary authority scheme was created in response to recommendations in the Hampton report published in 2005, which noted widespread inconsistencies of regulatory interpretation between different local authorities. It was introduced in April 2009. The Enterprise Act 2016 included measures to amend the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to enable many more small businesses and pre-start-up enterprises to participate in primary authority.

The primary authority scheme provides greater regulatory consistency for businesses operating across a number of local authority areas. This is expected to improve compliance with the legislation. The scheme is based on the creation of a statutory partnership between a business and its primary authority. The primary authority acts as a key point of contact for a business that it partners with, in relation to the business’s interaction with local authorities that regulate it, known as enforcing authorities. The primary authority acts as co-ordinator of other local authority inspections of that business. The primary authority supports businesses in meeting their obligations by helping them to understand what needs to be done to achieve or maintain compliance: setting out a way of doing so, or providing information that the method of compliance chosen by the business is acceptable. For the benefit of noble Lords, I will mention that all the major supermarkets, Amazon and the Association of Convenience Stores—given that your Lordships have mentioned the importance of smaller retailers several times—are all part of the primary authority scheme. The scheme has been received positively and has had widespread uptake and support from businesses, professional bodies and local authorities. Government Amendment 82 therefore extends the scheme to the sale of bladed articles and corrosive products. Amendments 88 and 90 are consequential on the earlier amendments.

In short, the government amendments in this group achieve much the same end as the amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Kennedy. On that basis I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw Amendment 59.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I shall read the Minister’s response with some care, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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We ought to look at the boundary in a sensible way and say that some of these objects are not of any practical worry to police forces or to us in general because they will never, in any sensible way, be the kind of knife people will chose to use in criminal activity. As an earlier speaker pointed out, there are many millions of knives in the UK. These objects are among the least likely to be used in crime. They are, to those who collect them, objects of significant value and interest. We should, I think, allow them to continue to be possessed. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation of these amendments which relate to the provisions in Clause 22, updating the prohibition on flick and gravity knives. Amendment 64 seeks to widen the defences for those charged under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 or the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 to cover conduct relating to a weapon for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, for the purposes of theatrical performance or filming, or in relation to a weapon of historical importance or which was manufactured before 1945. It may be helpful if I describe briefly the current legislation and the changes provided for in the Bill.

Section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or a gravity knife. The importation of such knives is prohibited by Section 1(2) of the Act. Clause 21 amends the 1959 Act to update the definition of a flick-knife. The current definition is quite old, and new designs are available that mimic the speed with which a flick-knife can be opened, but do not strictly fall under the existing definition. For example, in many models currently on the market, the mechanism that allows the blade to open at great speed may not be in the handle—as required by the current definition—but the knives nevertheless mimic a flick-knife.

Clause 22 extends the current offence of possession of a flick-knife or gravity knife in a public place to cover any possession, whether in a public or private place. These weapons have no legitimate use, and we believe that it is appropriate that they are prohibited both in public and in private. This will ensure that the police will be able to seize these weapons if they come across them.

Clause 22 provides a defence for a person charged with an offence under the 1959 Act if the person shows that they have the weapons in their possession for the purpose of making the knives available to a museum or gallery, or if the person is acting on behalf of a museum or gallery. We have included this defence following responses to the public consultation that informed the Bill. In relation to whether a defence should be provided for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, flick and gravity knives have been prohibited for a long time. As my noble friend would expect, we have consulted the Ministry of Defence about these provisions and it has advised us that there is no need for such a defence to cover the Armed Forces. In relation to a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, new subsection (2F) already allows the lending and hiring of flick-knives and gravity knives by museums or galleries for cultural, artistic or educational purposes.

Nor am I persuaded that a defence should be provided for items of historical importance or which were manufactured before 1945. I am concerned that this defence may be used by people who want to use these weapons in crime. Such a person may deliberately seek to acquire a knife made before 1945, or they may argue that the knife belonged to their parents or grandparents and that the weapons were manufactured before 1945. I believe that we need to be cautious and should not provide defences under this legislation that could be easily abused. I hope that my noble friend agrees with me on this point.

Amendment 65 also seeks to exclude from the ambit of the law flick and gravity knives manufactured before 1945. As I understand it, my noble friend’s intention is also to future-proof the legislation to ensure that, irrespective of the passage of time, a flick or gravity knife manufactured after 1945 can never acquire the status of an antique. Again, I hope I can persuade my noble friend that this amendment is not needed. The 1959 Act does not provide an exemption for antique flick and gravity knives. The antique exclusion applies only to weapons to which Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies, which brings me to the beginning of my noble friend’s earlier words. I accept that there is a disparity between these two provisions, but it is one that has been in place since 1988. Moreover, the prohibition on flick and gravity knives has now been in place for 60 years and has operated successfully without an exception for antique knives. That being the case, I am unpersuaded that we should now alter this approach by merging the regimes under the 1959 and 1988 Acts as the amendment seeks to do. I hope I have been able to persuade my noble friend that these amendments are unnecessary and that he will be content to withdraw them.

[The Duke of Montrose]

The question of exception for use for theatrical purposes was included in the 1988 Act under Section 141. Is it necessary to repeat it here?

[Baroness Barran]

The advice I am getting is that it is necessary because they are subject to different legislation. If that is not entirely clear I am happy to write to my noble friend.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I hope that I will have the opportunity to pursue some details of this with my noble friend afterwards. I am particularly interested in what the Government propose to do about the major item to be prohibited under this legislation, which is World War II German paratroopers’ knives. Since these are of no conceivable use—they are gravity knives but without a point—they are not something that can sensibly be used in knife crime. I do not know whether the Government intend to compensate people who are currently legal owners of these objects and let themselves in for a large bill or whether they are to be turned in without compensation, but I am happy to cover those matters in conversations between Committee and Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

66: Clause 25, page 28, line 10, at end insert—
“(2A) In paragraph 1, after paragraph (s) insert—“(t) the weapon sometimes known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” being a weapon with—(i) a handle,(ii) a blade with two or more cutting edges, each of which forms a helix, and (iii) a sharp point at the end of the blade.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make it an offence under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to manufacture, supply or possess a weapon known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, these amendments add a knife often referred to as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” to the list of offensive weapons prohibited under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The prohibition will apply in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Sections 141(1) and (1A) of the 1988 Act prohibit the manufacture, sale or hire, and possession in private of those offensive weapons specified in an order made under Section 141(2). Currently 19 weapons are prohibited in England, Wales and Northern Ireland under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, with separate legislation applying in Scotland.

So-called cyclone knives are designed and manufactured in a way that has no purpose other than to cause injury. We have not been able to identify any legitimate alternative uses for such knives. The way they are marketed in the USA is purely in terms of their ability to inflict significant harm to individuals and cause maximum injury. We have also seen videos on several platforms where the weapon is promoted for its ability to pierce police armour and to leave a wound which is “difficult to stitch up”.

Although there is no evidence that these weapons are being marketed in the UK in the same way, we believe that there are no reasons why they should be on sale. There is no evidence, as yet, that cyclone knives have been used in criminal activity in the UK, although a cyclone knife was discovered by Metropolitan Police officers in a dawn raid in Lewisham in August, along with class A and class B drugs. We believe that it is right to act pre-emptively and prohibit these knives now.

In defining a cyclone knife, the most important elements are that it has a twisted blade, a point and a handle. The handle is important because we want to avoid capturing large screws and drill bits in the definition. Certain types of drill bits will have sharp edges along the length of the bit, but it is the presence of a handle that would make any item useful as a weapon. An implement with twisted blades but a blunt point would also be limited in its utility as a weapon. Finally, what distinguishes a cyclone knife from others is that it has more than one cutting edge along the length of the helix. I am sure noble Lords would agree that there is no place for such knives where their only conceivable use is as a weapon. I beg to move.

Amendment 66 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

67: Clause 25, page 28, line 40, leave out from beginning to “, after” in line 41 and insert—
“(8) The Schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons)(Scotland) Order 2005 (SSI 2005/483) is amended as follows.(8A) In paragraph 1, after paragraph (q) insert— “(r) the weapon sometimes known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” being a weapon with—(i) a handle,(ii) a blade with two or more cutting edges, each of which forms a helix, and(iii) a sharp point at the end of the blade.”(8B) In paragraph 2”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make it an offence under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to manufacture, supply or possess a weapon known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” in Scotland.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which is why I added my name to it. There is little that I can usefully add because, as members of the Sikh community, the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, have already articulated exactly why this amendment should be accepted. I hope that the Government can accept it.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out the case for exempting all kirpans from the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. I can reassure him from the outset that both I and my noble friend Lady Williams would be delighted to meet representatives of the Sikh Council UK and other noble Lords as the noble Lord sees fit to discuss their concerns.

Before I go on, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and my noble friend—

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon]

Could I just correct that to the Network of Sikh Organisations, not the Sikh Council?

[Baroness Barran]

I thank the noble Lord for the correction. The spirit of my comment is that we will respect whoever he feels it is appropriate for the Minister and me to meet. I also thank him for his very helpful introduction, which gave us a sense of the historical context of the discrimination that Sikhs have faced over the years, despite their values, which he outlined for us. I thank also my noble friend Lady Verma for her explanation of the importance of the kirpan to the cultural identity of the Sikh community.

While I have great sympathy for the issue raised by noble Lords, a key difficulty with this amendment is how to define a kirpan in legislation in a way that does not open up a glaring loophole that could be readily exploited. A kirpan is only a kirpan in relation to Sikh culture and faith, otherwise it is simply a knife or a sword. In our discussions with the Sikh community, it was made clear that there is no such thing as a standard kirpan. They can come in all forms: some have curved blades and some do not; some have long blades, while others have short blades. The fundamental problem with the noble Lord’s amendment is that it depends on a legally sound definition of a kirpan which until now simply does not exist. The only thing that distinguishes a kirpan from other swords and knives is its use for religious purposes.

Under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 it is already a defence to possess a bladed article, including a kirpan, in a public place with good reason or lawful authority. The legislation is clear that good reason includes religious reasons. Similarly, Section 139A of the 1988 Act, which prohibits possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon on school premises, includes a good reason defence which again includes religious reasons. As the noble Lord is aware, Clause 25 amends the Criminal Justice Act (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 to provide a religious reasons defence for the possession in private of weapons covered by Section 141 of the 1988 Act, which can include large ceremonial kirpans where they have a curved blade of more than 50 centimetres.

The possession of kirpans for religious reasons is therefore covered under all of the possession offences. In addition to religious reasons, the offences include other defences—for example, for re-enactment activities and sporting purposes, as was mentioned by the noble Lord, and for items of historic importance—but these are not just aimed at kirpans.

Finally, we should be clear that when a kirpan is possessed for non-religious reasons it should be treated like any other bladed article. Crime is unfortunately committed by all parts of our society including, sadly, the Sikh community. Just because something is claimed to be a kirpan does not mean it cannot be used as a weapon, and it is quite right, for example, that the police might want to question why someone is carrying a ceremonial kirpan at three in the morning if they are hanging around a former partner’s home. Clearly Sikhs should be able to own and carry kirpans in public and use them in Sikh martial arts where this is part of their faith. The law already provides for that.

[Baroness Verma]

I hope I can be helpful to my noble friend. The kirpan is worn as part of the five Ks. We do not carry the kirpan in any other form. It is worn. Where the difficulty will lie is that it is always worn for religious purposes. People who are practising Sikhs have to have it as part of their five Ks. I am looking to the noble Lord, Lord Singh, who is much more experienced in this than I am, as I do not know how we would be able to differentiate the carrying from the wearing for religious purposes. I understand what my noble friend says about gifting it to a non-practising Sikh when it could be seen as a weapon, but in worship through the Sikh faith the kirpan is worn as a religious item. I hope that clarifies this rather than muddying the waters.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank my noble friend for her helpful explanation. I hope we can explore these things in detail when we meet, before too long, I hope.

The Sikh Federation (UK) and the Sikh Council UK raised concerns via the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Sikhs about the provisions.

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon]

I wish to put in context that the Sikh Federation (UK) is not a representative body of the Sikh community. Concerns have been raised by the Network of Sikh Organisations. They are trying to capitalise and muddy the waters. It would be helpful if the Government dealt with the Network of Sikh Organisations, which represents the vast part of the Sikh community.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank the noble Lord for his advice. As I mentioned earlier, the spirit of our meeting is that we will take his steer on who we should talk to about this. The point I raised simply reflected the fact that those organisations raised concerned with the All-Party Parliamentary Group on UK Sikhs about the provisions in the Bill.

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon]

The All-Party Parliamentary Group and the Sikh Federation are one and the same thing. They are exactly the same, and everyone knows it.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank the noble Lord for clarifying that point. Concerns were raised on the possession of long kirpans. As a result, the Government amended the Bill to include a defence for religious reasons rather than religious ceremonies, which is narrower. No concerns were raised in relation to any other provisions of the Criminal justice Act. Moreover, members of the Sikh community have been able to carry kirpans in public, including long kirpans, in religious parades—I am not sure whether that addresses my noble friend’s earlier point—and the Bill will not change that. I am therefore not persuaded that a wholesale exemption for kirpans from the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is needed. I fully understand the importance the Sikh community attaches to this issue. Indeed, I understand it better thanks to the interventions of noble Lords. With the reassurance of a future meeting, I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord that we have the balance right and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

This takes me back to those heady days when we had a Labour Government and I was a lowly Whip. That sounds like a very Treasury counterargument. One day when I was handling a particular clause, I was told that it was impossible to frame the legislation to meet the need. I said, from my lowly position in the massive meeting, “You’d better try because otherwise you will get the words that are in the amendment because it will pass at the next stage”. At that, there was a great writing of things and, lo and behold, the Government managed to find an amendment which was satisfactory. I strongly recommend that the Government make an intense effort to frame an amendment of their own which meets the across-the-board support for the spirit of this amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, it should be said that concerns are being expressed at the impression being given by the Government of there being no room for negotiation on this issue. I hope that they will at least approach that meeting with an open mind rather than giving the impression, as might be inferred from what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, that there is no room for manoeuvre.

[Baroness Barran]

I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government will approach the meeting with an open mind. I tried to be clear that the key issue is achieving a specific definition for a kirpan, which we will obviously make every effort to work with. We will see whether that is possible.

[Lord Sheikh]

I have had representations from various Sikhs in the past few days—not members of the association but ordinary Sikhs—asking me to speak on this subject. They feel very strongly about it. What is being asked for is reasonable. As I said, there is great disquiet among Sikhs that this is happening. I therefore suggest to my noble friend that she enter dialogue and not close the door. That would be greatly appreciated by the community—I do not necessarily mean the association; the noble Lord, Lord Singh, has already alluded to that. Let us have a discussion with the community to see whether an amicable settlement can be reached that is acceptable to it. I speak as a Muslim and not as a Sikh.

[Baroness Barran]

I hear the concerns of several noble Lords. I reassure them again that we will enter the conversation with a very open mind.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I cannot remember the last time I had such broad-based support. I feel that I need to bask in it for a few seconds, but enough is enough. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have given notice of our intention to oppose the question that this clause should stand part of the Bill. I will also speak to Amendments 71 and 72. Clause 28 would change current legislation in terms of the risk that must be present for an offence of threatening someone with an offensive weapon to be proved. Currently, the person threatening must do so in such a way that there is an immediate threat of serious physical harm. The Bill changes this level of risk to what a reasonable person would think was an immediate threat of physical harm, not serious physical harm—it is only a perceived threat and not an actual threat.

In their joint briefing, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust point out that the new definition is a much lower threshold for conviction. The person being threatened does not have to be present or at actual risk of harm. Previously, there had to be an immediate threat of occasioning grievous bodily harm; now, it is an undefined level of physical harm, and the “reasonable person” test is vague.

Clause 28 relates to offences in public places and Clause 29 to offences on further education premises. I question why these offences are needed at all. Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 states that a person is guilty of an offence,

“if he uses or threatens … violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.

An affray may be committed in private as well as in public, and a person guilty of affray is liable to a maximum sentence of three years in prison or a fine, or both. Can the Minister explain which parts of these new offences are not covered by the offence under Section 3 of the 1986 Act?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for affording the Committee the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill updating the offences of threatening with an offensive weapon. It may assist the Committee if I briefly explain the provisions in Section 1A of the Protection of Crime Act 1953 and Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and then explain why we have brought forward changes to these provisions. I will also cover Section 3.

Section 1A of the 1953 Act provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of the weapon threatens another person with the weapon in a public place. Section 139AA of the 1988 Act similarly provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of an article with a blade or point threatens another person with the article in a public place or on school premises.

Unlike the offences in Section 1 of the 1953 Act and Section 139 of the 1988 Act, which are simple possession offences, where a person is convicted of an offence under Section 1A of the 1953 Act or Section 139AA of the 1988 Act, the court must, in the case of an adult, impose a custodial sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment, unless it would be unjust to do so. The power to make a community order is not available in circumstances where the mandatory minimum sentence condition is met.

It is an essential element of these aggravated offences that the defendant threatened the victim with the weapon,

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to the victim”,

as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained. However, the view of the Crown Prosecution Service is that the requirement that the defendant threatens with the weapon or article,

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”,

sets too high a bar to prosecution and does not take proper account of the effect of the threat on the victim.

The noble Lord will be aware that in the 12 months to September 2018 there were just under 13,500 offences resulting in a caution or conviction for possession of an article with a blade or point and just under 7,000 for possession of an offensive weapon, but only 958 for threatening with a knife or offensive weapon. I hope the noble Lord will agree that fewer than 1,000 offences of threatening compared with more than 20,000 possession offences does not appear to be an accurate reflection of what is happening on our streets, where we are seeing one homicide a week in London as a result of knife crime. The noble Lord will be aware that this point was made by the Chief Crown Prosecutor for the north-east, Andrew Penhale, when giving evidence in another place.

The penalty for the offence of affray, which the noble Lord referred to, is three years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. The penalty for threatening with an offensive weapon is four years. The Government consider that that reflects the seriousness of using an offensive weapon to threaten an individual. Importantly, the Government also believe that it is fairer to the victim that the test be based on how a reasonable person in the victim’s place would respond to such a threat, not on whether the victim was objectively at risk of immediate harm. The reference in Clause 28 to the effect on a reasonable person removes the element of subjectivity on the part of the person threatened. We believe that the replacement objective test is more appropriate in the context of these aggravated offences.

Striking out Clause 28 and amending Clause 29, as the noble Lord seeks to do, would maintain the current test of what constitutes risk of physical harm for these aggravated possession offences. However, I put it to the noble Lord that these offences were introduced to protect victims threatened with offensive weapons and ensure that offenders are appropriately punished. Clauses 28 and 29 will ensure that the victim’s point of view is put at the heart of these offences. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord of the case for the new test and that he will support Clause 28 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, can my noble friend say how many offences are committed annually on further education premises, which are the subject of Clause 29? Further education premises are a place where perhaps a majority of the people have an offensive weapon, as defined in the Bill, as part of what they need to do their training. If someone is spending their day with a screwdriver because they are on an electronics course and someone comes up and kicks them in the butt, and they turn round with the screwdriver in their hand, under the amended provision, they will be in chokey for it. We do not seem to have incorporated in it any defence which says that the person had the weapon for perfectly good reasons and was using it for perfectly good reasons when somebody else did something which caused the threatening situation. In public, one does not come across this often, but in an FE college it is a routine occurrence. I cannot see that we should criminalise arguments in FE colleges without there being some reasonable defence.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank my noble friend for his question. As we are including FE colleges for the first time in the legislation, we do not have the data as yet, but that will be captured in future. We have the data on schools and public places, which I am happy to share with my noble friend. On his last comment, there is no intention of criminalising arguments. We are talking about people in possession of an offensive weapon and threatening someone else with it in such a way that any one of us—assuming that we are all reasonable people—would assume that there was a risk of physical harm.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, if you are waving a screwdriver about, there is a risk of physical harm, which is the point of the old wording of “serious physical harm”: to rule out such a random occurrence. In public places, in schools, by and large people do not handle physical, offensive weapons openly. In a further education college, a lot of people will be, because it will be part of what they are required to do. Nobody doing anything serious with a knife uses a blade that does not lock. Anybody using a screwdriver or other pointed implement will be using something that will be classified, or is capable of being classified, as an offensive weapon. We should make sure that somebody reasonably having in their hands an offensive weapon because they are using it at the moment when the flash of an argument starts does not become the cause for a mandatory prison sentence. There has to be the scope for a court to take a sensible view of what is going on. It is not like a school; it is an environment where offensive weapons are routine and where a lot effort goes into making sure that people use them safely. Common sense needs to be applied when considering whether it is an offence with a bladed weapon or just an argument taking place when one or both of the parties happen to be holding an offensive weapon, because that is what they were supposed to be doing at the time the argument started.

[Baroness Barran]

I hope that I can reassure my noble friend on two points: first, the spirit of the legislation is not to criminalise people in the way that he has described; secondly, the sentencing guidelines were updated relatively recently, in June last year, and give multiple scenarios for the courts to consider in sentencing—which I think would allay my noble friend’s fears.

[Lord Lucas]

I would be grateful if my noble friend could share that.

[Lord Elton (Con)]

My Lords, can the Minister remind us of the youngest age to which these provisions apply? I remind her that it is the effect of the legislation, not the intention, that matters.

[Baroness Barran]

The youngest age to which the provisions apply is 10—the standard age of criminal responsibility.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I invite the Minister to look at proposed new subsection (1A)(b) under Clause 29(2) on page 31 of the Bill, where there is reference to unlawfulness and intention.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank my noble and learned friend for helpfully pointing out that detail.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation, most of which does not seem to hold water. She said that under the existing offence, someone can only get six months in prison, so they are unable to get a community sentence. However, an offence of affray carries a three-year sentence; therefore, you can give a community sentence to somebody convicted of affray.

The Minister also said that existing offences under the Prevention of Crime Act and the Criminal Justice Act set the bar too high, evidenced by only 958 offences of threatening and almost one homicide per week. If a knife makes contact with somebody, that is a substantive offence, probably of grievous bodily harm or wounding, possibly with intent. Inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent carries a maximum life sentence, so the number of instances where somebody threatens but does not make contact is likely to be small, but the number of offences where somebody is found in possession of a weapon—perhaps in their pocket—and is not threatening another person is likely to be high. The number of offences of GBH or, regrettably, homicide is likely to be high. That is the plausible explanation for why the number of offences of threatening is low, rather than the evidential bar being set too high for the existing offences.

However, the only reason why the offence of affray does not provide a legitimate and reasonable alternative to the Government’s proposals here is that one carries a sentence of three years and the other a sentence of four years. Of course, that could easily be amended by increasing the maximum sentence for the offence of affray. An objective test is included in the offence of affray under the Public Order Act. I am afraid that apart from the difference in the length of sentences, all the reasoning seems to fall away, bearing in mind that an offence of affray can be committed in private as well as in public so the offence would apply in FE colleges, schools and public places. However, I will not pursue the matter any further at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

I stand corrected, but there are many other things that do too. I do wonder whether we are just homing in on one particular device, when you can make yourself a mortar that can blow up a lot of people. Why would you want to choose that particular weapon? I am very sad when I see us unable to take part in international competitions on a global stage, because we are worrying about something that has not been a problem yet.

[Baroness Barran]

I do not want to stifle the debate but there is concern about the number of groups of amendments we have to get through. If noble Lords could keep their comments reasonably brief, that would be much appreciated.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, Amendment 76 would add a new clause to the Bill which would require a Minister of the Crown to lay before Parliament an assessment of the impact of Clause 31 before it comes into force. This is important because Clause 31 gives the police powers to search schools or further education premises for corrosive substances. That is an additional power for the police.

The worry is that this will disproportionately affect BAME children and young people who we know are already more likely to be stopped and searched, and that is something we must be aware of before the measure comes into force.

The equality statement on the policy does not appear to contain any specific analysis of the likely equality impact of the extension of the investigative and enforcement powers. Perhaps the Minister will comment on that in her response. This is about getting the balance right. We must get things in proportion and take care not to damage relations between the black community and the police. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, we need to ensure that the police have appropriate powers to deal with threats on school or further education premises involving corrosive substances. Given the significant harm that corrosive attacks can cause and the fear that they can instil, it is important that we ensure that the police have sufficient powers to be able to take swift and preventive action.

We know that there are around 800 attacks per year in England and Wales, and we need to ensure that action can be taken not just to deal with actual attacks but with threats to use a corrosive substance. Clause 31 is designed to ensure that the police can effectively enforce the offence of threatening with a corrosive substance in a private place as it applies to schools and further education establishments.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has explained his concerns that this new power will be disproportionately used against black, Asian and minority ethnic pupils and students. I appreciate and understand the noble Lord’s concern, which should be taken seriously. It is, however, important to recognise that this power can be used only in circumstances where a police officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that someone has been threatened by another person with a corrosive substance. Reasonable grounds might include a report from a teacher, a parent or a pupil.

It is also important that we ensure there are sufficient protections in place for our schools and further education premises to deal with any situations where a pupil or student may threaten to throw or squirt a corrosive substance over another student or a teacher. The police need to be able to enter and search a school or further education premises and any person on them to prevent an actual attack. That said, I have indicated that the noble Lord has raised a perfectly proper concern.

While I do not consider this amendment to be necessary, I can give your Lordships an undertaking that we will consult relevant school and further education bodies, including teaching unions, local authorities and other associations, on the implementation of this power before we bring the clause into force. With that assurance, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, I had read this clause as primarily directed to the power to enter and search premises—in fact you have to do that—as well as a person. Can the Minister assure the Committee that, as well as the consultation she has mentioned, information and statistics will be kept that show the BAME profiles? I should not use the word “profile”, but the Minister will understand what I am saying. This is an issue we have brought up at other points in the Bill.

[Baroness Barran]

I am glad to be able to reassure the noble Baroness that that will be the case.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I thank the Minister for her response, which was very helpful. At this stage, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

81: After Clause 39, insert the following new Clause—
“Enforcement of offences relating to sale etc of offensive weapons
(1) A local weights and measures authority may enforce within its area a provision listed in subsection (2).(2) The provisions mentioned in subsection (1) are—(a) section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (penalties for offences in connection with dangerous weapons),(b) section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows to persons under 18),(c) section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (offensive weapons),(d) section 141A of that Act (sale etc of bladed articles to persons under 18), (e) section 1 of the Knives Act 1997 (unlawful marketing of knives),(f) section 2 of that Act (publication of unlawful marketing material relating to knives),(g) section 1 of this Act (sale of corrosive products to persons under 18),(h) section 3 of this Act (delivery of corrosive products to residential premises etc),(i) section 4 of this Act (delivery of corrosive products to persons under 18),(j) section 17 of this Act (delivery of bladed products to residential premises etc), and(k) section 20 of this Act (delivery of bladed articles to persons under 18).(3) For the investigatory powers available to a local weights and measures authority for the purposes of enforcing a provision listed in subsection (2), see Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015.(4) Nothing in this section is to be construed as authorising a local weights and measures authority to bring proceedings in Scotland for an offence.(5) In paragraph 10 of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (duties and powers to which Schedule 5 applies), at the appropriate place insert “section (Enforcement of offences relating to sale etc of offensive weapons) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would confer the investigatory powers in Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 on Trading Standards for the purposes of enforcing various existing and new offences relating to offensive weapons.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, is trying to do with the amendment. It raises again the issue of websites that are hosted overseas and the lack of territorial reach to apply the suggested offence to overseas website owners. That creates an imbalance, as we discussed on previous elements of the Bill, between UK and overseas sellers of knives and corrosive substances, for example. I see some practical difficulties with this but I understand what the noble Lord is trying to achieve.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, which seeks to make it a criminal offence when,

“a website … is used to advertise, list or otherwise facilitate the sale of any weapon listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 … or any offensive weapon capable of being disguised as something else”.

We can all agree on the spirit of the amendment. Indeed, in preparing my remarks, I spent five minutes googling what I could buy online. The noble Lord makes a good point: some very shocking weapons are easily accessible online. However, I hope to persuade him that his amendment is not needed.

We are satisfied that there is no gap in the law and that legislation addressing the criminal behaviour outlined in the amendment already exists. Indeed, the noble Lord alluded to that in his remarks. The Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability wrote to the Public Bill Committee in the other place to set out the legal position on online platforms that advertise or sell offensive weapons in contravention of Section 141 or Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It may assist your Lordships if I set out the position.

Section 141 of the Act states that,

“any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in his possession for the purpose of sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other person, a weapon to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence”.

A list of such weapons is set out in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988. Section 141A of the 1988 Act makes it an offence to sell certain articles with a blade or point to anyone aged under 18. Clause 1 of the Bill will make it an offence also to sell corrosive products to a person aged under 18. As is clear from these provisions, anyone who sells, hires, offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in their possession for the purpose of sale or hire any of the weapons to which the 1988 order applies—whether online or otherwise—is guilty of an offence. This would apply to individuals, but “a person” can include a body corporate or unincorporated, such as a company.

Where the user of a website places advertisements or listings for anything contained in the 1988 order on that website, the service provider may rely on the defence in relation to hosting under Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Whether Regulation 19 applies will depend on the facts of the case. As the noble Lord mentioned, there may also be jurisdictional issues if the service provider is based overseas. I assure noble Lords that the sites I found were all based overseas. Regulation 19 will not apply where the provider of the website is offering the items for sale directly and where the provider had actual knowledge of the unlawful activity and upon obtaining that knowledge did not act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.

We therefore consider that the provider of a website who sells items on it directly would likely be caught under the wording of the legislation. Where the provider of the website is enabling advertisements to be placed by others, the defence under Regulation 19 may be available. We have discussed the matter with the Crown Prosecution Service, which is of the view that these provisions can be used to prosecute where appropriate. In the light of this explanation of the existing law, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I thank the Minister for her helpful response. I tabled the amendment to highlight the problems in this area. It was good to hear that there are already provisions in place to deal with these matters. I look forward in due course to the Government’s White Paper on the wider debate on the internet, the good that it does and how we deal with its bad side. At this stage, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 26th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I want to say a couple of things about this as I have been involved in this area for some time as a result of the Digital Economy Act, which raised exactly the same challenge of trying to check people’s ages. As a result, a lot of work has gone into doing this online or electronically. We can use technology to make this work and that technology exists now.

The great thing is that most young people now have a smartphone, which checks that the correct person is using it as many people now access their phone using a fingerprint or another biometric, such as face recognition. Many of your Lordships probably have a mobile smartphone issued by the House which they unlock with their thumb print, so it is possible to know whose phone it is. Therefore, that can work, and several age check providers—not just the one mentioned, although it is one of the leading ones—are experts in establishing proof of age. They will check people.

A lot of young people will establish their age when they first register if that is the only way that they can operate in the future. They will be checked against another document or something else, so the age check providers know how to do that. When it comes to proving their age to someone else, they do not have to release any personal details; it can be proved on their smartphone or online. What is released is not proof of age but the result of the age check, and a certificate can be issued to show that that has been done.

Therefore, there are several solutions. As I have mentioned before, if noble Lords want to see what they are like, they can go to dpatechgateway.co.uk. If they want to, noble Lords can see that in Hansard later. You can look at and try several solutions there and see how easy they are: these solutions will work very easily online and at the point of delivery by using the recipient’s mobile or similar technology. They are all compliant with the British Standards Institution’s Publicly Available Specification 1296, which goes into exactly how to do this and how to verify that people have done it properly. It also has addenda about privacy and everything like that. I know this because I chaired the steering group—I suppose this is an interest, but I did not get paid for it.

It frustrates me that the technology is there and this Bill says that,

“the accused is to be treated as having taken reasonable steps to establish the purchaser’s age if and only if … the accused was shown any of the documents mentioned in subsection (5)”.

The first two of those are “a passport” and,

“a European Union photocard driving licence”.

I suppose that becomes a problem in a few months’ time—or a few years’ time—because I do not know if the UK photocard licence will be good enough. The list continues:

“such other document, or a document of such other description, as the Scottish Ministers may prescribe by order”.

Does that apply to things in England as well if one Scottish Minister okays it—“The English can use that too”—or are we stuck with a passport? How many people over 18 do not have a passport? The Home Office could enter the 21st century and start to realise that this stuff can be done much more effectively using modern technology. We know that not all passports are genuine. We can move to better standards than are prescribed in this Bill.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving this amendment in the absence of my noble friend Lord Lucas. The two amendments allow us to consider the merits of prescribing one or more specific electronic methods for establishing the age of a purchaser of a corrosive product or bladed article as an alternative to the examination of official documents such as a passport or driving licence.

Amendment 4 would enable an electronic method of age verification to be prescribed solely for use in Scotland. I assume this is because Clause 1 imposes particular requirements on retailers in Scotland if they wish to benefit from the defence of having taken reasonable steps to establish the purchaser’s age. In Scotland, in line with a number of existing age verification laws that operate in that part of the UK, a retailer is obliged to establish a purchaser’s age by examining his or her passport, photocard driving licence or other document, as prescribed by the Scottish Ministers. There is no such requirement in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Consequently, Clause 1 would not preclude the use of electronic age verification technology.

The age verification requirements as they apply to Scotland have been discussed and agreed with the Scottish Government and are intended to reflect the law as it currently applies to other age-restricted products. We have drawn the Scottish Government’s attention to my noble friend’s amendment and will ensure that they have sight of this debate. However, they have advised that they would prefer any steps in this area to be taken on a consistent basis across all age verification provisions. As such, they have advised that we should be wary of introducing in this Bill new procedures on a piecemeal basis that disturb wider current age verification procedures related to the sale of age-restricted products in Scotland.

In short, I commend the development of technological solutions to age verification. I am sure that this is something that the Scottish Government will want to look at in future. However, any change to the current arrangements regarding age-restricted products in Scotland should be considered across the piece and not in isolation. As I have said, we will draw the Scottish Government’s attention to this debate.

Amendment 69 would require the Secretary of State to publish and maintain a list of systems assessed as suitable for online and offline age verification. Again, I recognise the place for the use of technology to verify the age of a person seeking to purchase age-restricted products, as a number of noble Lords have mentioned. However, I have concerns about what is proposed here.

I am sure noble Lords would accept that Government cannot be seen to be endorsing one or more proprietary age verification systems over others. There are different types of age verification systems available and a number of different providers. The technology behind these systems is continuing to develop at a very fast pace. There is a danger that, if we prescribe a specific electronic method for age verification, this could quickly be overtaken by technological innovations.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I would like to correct her: there is a British standard. As I mentioned, it is PAS 1296. It is technology independent, does not specify anything and is written to be as future-proof as possible. I recommend it to her as some bedside reading to bring her into the 21st century.

[Baroness Barran]

I will certainly do that. I reassure the noble Lord that I did go to dpatechgateway.co.uk, so my bedside reading is now complete.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

8: Clause 1, page 2, line 29, at beginning insert “Subject to subsection (13A),”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the Minister's amendment at page 2, line 41 would exclude batteries from the offences in Clauses 1 to 4 relating to the sale or delivery of corrosive products.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, in Committee I undertook to consider an amendment tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, which sought to exclude batteries from the offences in Clauses 1 to 4 relating to the sale or delivery of corrosive products. These government amendments do just that. As I indicated in Committee, we were already aware of the unintended consequences of Clauses 1 to 4 on battery retailers and manufacturers and were working on how best to frame any exemption for batteries. We have also had discussions with representatives from the battery industry on exempting batteries, to better understand the various types of batteries available and their different uses. These government amendments will exempt all batteries from the prohibitions on the sale and delivery of corrosive products under Clauses 1 to 4. I trust that this satisfactorily deals with the point raised by the noble Viscount. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke in support of the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, in Committee. I thank the Government for coming forward with an eminently practical amendment to address a consequence of the Bill that was surely never intended. This is the House of Lords doing its job quickly and properly. I thank the Minister for orchestrating this and look forward to hearing her response to my noble friend’s questions.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Duke of Montrose for his detailed questions about the use of batteries. I can reassure him that under-18s will be allowed to buy batteries. He also asked about having a good reason to have a battery in a public place and about extracting sulphuric acid from batteries. I am not a battery expert but, as I understand it, all batteries are sealed and you would have to cut one open to remove the acid. The acid has never been used—

[The Duke of Montrose]

I am sure that my noble friend the Minister has looked into this in more up-to-date detail than I have. Car batteries and anything of that size are sealed, but I think there are larger batteries, with a capacity of around 100 amps, which have individual cells with a screw top. You can probably get at those rather more easily.

[Baroness Barran]

I think this is above my battery expertise. I was advised that even open vent batteries have caps which are sealed for home delivery, but I hope we are not going to argue with my noble friend about this. The principle behind the logic of many of the clauses is that we are trying to prohibit access to acid that has been used in attacks; there is no evidence that acid has been extracted from batteries of any type and then used in attacks. Indeed, I think I am right in saying that my noble friend Lord Goschen pointed out in Committee that this was an extremely expensive way of accessing sulphuric acid. I hope that reassures my noble friend.

Amendment 8 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(12A) Before making regulations under subsection (12) the appropriate national authority must consult such persons likely to be affected by the regulations as the authority considers appropriate.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the appropriate national authority to consult before making regulations under Clause 1(12) which amend the list of corrosive products in Schedule 1 to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, Schedule 1 contains a list of corrosive products for the purposes of the offences in Clauses 1 to 4 that relate to the sale and delivery of corrosive products. The Bill includes a power by regulations to amend Schedule 1. In Committee, I undertook to consider an amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to require prior consultation before any such regulations are made. As I indicated in the debate, we would fully expect to consult affected persons in any event, but we are content to include an express requirement to this end in the Bill. These amendments do just that. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for these amendments. One of the main things that irked people in the police service was people taking credit for other people’s work. These amendments were originally spotted and drafted by my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Barran]

I apologise to the noble Baroness for my oversight.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not irked—I rarely get irked.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

10: Clause 1, page 2, line 37, leave out “subsection (12)” and insert “this section”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Minister’s amendment at page 2, line 36.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendment 13. The only purpose of revisiting these amendments which we tabled in Committee is to make a point—and I refer to a letter in relation to these matters from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, dated 12 February—about the fact that two substances of the concentration specified in Schedule 1, sulphuric acid and nitric acid, are specified there as substances which should not be sold to people under the age of 18. This is despite the fact that you need a Home Office licence under the Poisons Act to buy these substances. Therefore, the chances of someone under 18 getting a Home Office licence to buy what are precursors for making explosives are diminishingly small. Indeed, in her letter the noble Baroness says that it is extremely unlikely that anyone under 18 will be able lawfully to acquire or purchase these acids. This goes to the point of a lot of this Bill—that it is there simply to send a message, which is not what we should be using legislation for. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, these amendments return to the debate we had in Committee about the relationship between some of the substances we have listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill and the provisions of the Poisons Act 1972. The noble Lord is concerned that we have listed both nitric acid and sulphuric acid in Schedule 1, despite the fact that these are already regulated substances within the Poisons Act.

I reiterate the point I made in Committee, that both sulphuric and nitric acid were identified by our scientific advisers at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the police as appropriate for inclusion in Schedule 1. This was because we know that sulphuric acid has been used in attacks, and that nitric acid is considered to be one of the most harmful corrosive substances. While I understand the noble Lord’s concerns about including these two poisons which are already regulated under the Poisons Act, our overriding concern in framing the Bill’s provisions relating to the sale and delivery of corrosive products is that we do all we can to prevent anyone under 18 getting hold of these substances. We therefore think it is appropriate that they are included in Schedule 1.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

33: Clause 9, page 10, line 42, at end insert—
“(5) In this section—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) in paragraph (b), for “Scotland, Northern Ireland or a member State other than the United Kingdom” substitute “Scotland or Northern Ireland”,(ii) at the end of paragraph (c) insert “or”, and(iii) omit paragraph (e) and the “or” preceding that paragraph, and(b) in subsection (3)—(i) for the definition of “civilian offence” substitute—““civilian offence” means an offence other than an offence under an enactment mentioned in subsection (1)(c) or (d);”,(ii) in the definition of “conviction”, in paragraph (b) omit “and a member State service offence”, and(iii) omit the definition of “member State service offence”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a provision to Clause 9 which would not need to be commenced at the same time as the rest of that Clause but which would, on being commenced, amend it to take account of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, as we have previously debated, the Bill includes provision for mandatory minimum sentences where a person has been convicted of having a corrosive substance in a public place and has a previous relevant conviction. The definition of a relevant conviction seeks to capture certain offences committed in EU member states other than the United Kingdom. As the Bill may well be enacted after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, we cannot in those circumstances use the powers in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act to modify these provisions post Brexit. This amendment therefore includes a prospective repeal of provisions relating to member states. I beg to move.

Amendment 33 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am moving this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and at his request. Part of the defence to the sale and delivery of knives to under-18s is that the package containing a knife is clearly marked to indicate its contents. The amendment is intended to probe the effect of labelling a package as containing a knife on the likelihood of the package being stolen during delivery. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lucas, because it gives us the opportunity to consider the requirements that remote sellers need to meet if they are to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling bladed articles to a person under 18.

Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to sell a bladed article to a person under 18. It is a defence that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence—for example, that they had asked to see proof of a person’s age.

Clause 15 provides that, in relation to remote sales—for example, online sales—of bladed articles, the seller can rely on the defence only if they can prove they have met certain conditions. These conditions are: that they have systems in place at the point of sale for verifying the age of buyers; that they clearly mark the package containing the article when it is dispatched, and have taken steps to ensure that the package is finally delivered is delivered to someone over 18; and that they did not arrange for the article to be delivered to a locker.

The amendment concerns the second of those conditions, which is that that when the package is dispatched it must be clearly marked to indicate that it contains a bladed or sharply pointed article, and that when finally delivered it should be into the hands of someone over 18. The amendment would remove the first part of this condition, so the package would need to be labelled to say that it must be handed to a person over 18, but it would not need to say it contained a bladed or sharply pointed article.

Before I turn to the amendment itself, it might be worth saying a bit about the purpose of Clause 15, which is to drive a change in behaviour by remote sellers. It sets out the minimum requirements we would expect sellers to meet if they wanted to be confident that they were not selling to under-18s, but it is mainly aimed at individual transactions—young people trying to buy knives online—rather than large business transactions. It is not aimed, for example, at a seller of kitchenware that deals exclusively with restaurants and hotels.

The requirements under Clause 15 are therefore the minimum requirements that a seller has to meet if they want to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, should they ever be prosecuted for selling to an under-18. Where a seller knows their customers, they may decide not to comply with the conditions under Clause 15 because they are sure they will never be prosecuted. Examples would be: where a seller sells only to a wholesaler; where a seller has traded with the same customer for years; or where a seller knows the individual they are selling to—for instance, where they make hand-made items for particular customers, they will know the buyer is over 18 and may decide that complying with the conditions is unnecessary.

Turning to the amendment, our discussions with delivery companies and those who provide collection point services indicate that they want any packages that they are going to handle to be clearly marked by the seller so that the risk that they inadvertently hand them over to a person aged under 18 is reduced. You cannot expect staff working for a delivery company or at a collection point to ensure that the package is handed over to an adult unless it is clear from the packaging what it contains and what the restriction is on delivery. It makes sense that those working for delivery companies and at collection points know what they are handling. This will enable them to treat the package with due caution. This is particularly the case where the package contains sharp objects or corrosive substances.

Finally, the amendment applies only to Clause 15 and not to Clauses 16 and 17, which deal with the same matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to Clause 2, which sets the same conditions in relation to corrosive products where these are sold remotely.

I hope I have provided the noble Lord with sufficient explanation around the purpose of Clause 15 and the labelling requirement and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[The Duke of Montrose]

My Lords, perhaps my noble friend can clarify on the record to what extent an article is regarded as pointed. I am afraid I am the one who is always raising the virtually impossible but it would be possible to extend this provision to a packet of screws or an order of nails—which are not all that sharp but they are sharply pointed articles—and anything else of that nature.

[Baroness Barran]

I will write to my noble friend with an accurate answer on that. I am confident that there is a tight definition of this but at this hour I cannot recall it exactly.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wanted the Government’s response to the amendment on the record and that is what we have achieved. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments as well. A lot of effort is going into preserving hill farming and small farming. There is a lot of focus on that area, yet along comes the Home Office, without consulting Defra, Natural England or anyone else, and it could wipe out all the good that has been done elsewhere. We need to start looking at this approach.

On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which runs through the whole thing, this is about disadvantaging UK against foreign business. There is no logical reason to do that. I say to the Minister that, just because this amendment is aimed at knives because it is in this part of the Bill, that does not mean you would not logically continue that through to corrosive liquids. I cannot think how to describe the argument that says that it does not cover that as well, when we have moved on to this part of the Bill. The intransigence of the Home Office has been evident throughout this, and I do not think that is a good argument against sensible amendments later.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his amendments, which return us to the proposed prohibition on the dispatch of bladed products to residential premises and lockers.

I hope I can quickly provide my noble friend with some reassurance on the point he has raised but, before I do so, I would like to answer the point he raised on Report, on 26 February, about the definition of “pointed articles” and whether it includes things like screws carried in someone’s pocket. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to possess in public,

“any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed”,

without,

“good reason or lawful authority”.

Section 141A of the same Act prohibits the sale to under-18s of articles with a sharp point that are,

“made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person”.

The wording “sharply pointed” is used in various parts of the Bill, including Clauses 15 to 17 and Clause 31.

The new offence of arranging delivery to residential premises or a locker is limited to “bladed products”—that is an article which is, or has, a blade and which is capable of causing serious injury by cutting the skin, so does not include pointed articles. It will be for the courts to decide whether an article is sharply pointed, or has a sharp point, in each specific case, but the legislation was clearly never intended to include screws, which are not generally considered to be offensive weapons and which have not been made or adapted for the purposes of causing injury. We are not aware that the definition of pointed articles has caused any problems with the operation of existing offences over the past 30 years.

The amendments in this group would enable bladed products that are used for agricultural or forestry management purposes to be sent by the seller to a solely residential premise. Some agricultural and forestry management items will be caught by the definition of bladed product, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they will no longer be able to be sent to solely residential premises or a locker. However, the definition of residential premise is limited to those premises that are used solely for residential purposes. My noble friend eloquently set out a number of ways that one could demonstrate whether something was also a business address. It will be a matter for the seller of a bladed product to satisfy themselves that the delivery address is not used solely for residential purposes.

This means that bladed products will still be able to be sent to business premises and this includes, importantly, where a business is run from a residential premise. Therefore, bladed products could be sent to a farm, an agricultural supplier or a forestry centre. They could be sent to the home of a person who runs a self-employed forestry business from their home. We have been clear from the outset that deliveries to farms will not be prohibited under the Bill and, in most cases, agricultural and forestry tools will be related to business activities and should not be affected.

Clause 19 also includes a regulation-making power which will enable further defences to be added by secondary legislation if it becomes clear that the prohibition on home delivery is having a particularly negative impact on certain types of business or not-for-profit activities. A defence for agricultural and forestry equipment could therefore be provided if it becomes clear that there is a detrimental impact on this type of trade or activity. However, for the reasons I have set out, we do not currently think that this is necessary.

I hope I have given my noble friend sufficient reassurance that the deliveries of agricultural and forestry equipment should be largely unaffected by the measures in the Bill. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[The Duke of Montrose]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for all her efforts in answering the questions which I have raised from time to time. What she has said has been much more reassuring. It sounds as if a letter to your supplier is critical to whether or not you have a registered business. It does not have to be certified in any way; you can just say to your supplier: “This is my business address”. Maybe that situation is adequate, though there are obviously loopholes.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an interesting point. The amendments were attached to different parts of the Bill. I thought the wording was a little more appropriate in each case, but I would not stand by it terribly much.

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. We are in a happier position, for those who require blades and pointed instruments, than we were when it started. I beg leave to withdraw.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I shall speak at the same time to Amendment 90. I am very grateful to the Home Office for bringing a large and intelligent team to listen to representations concerning in particular the use of weapons in film and antique weapons. I am grateful for the time that we were given. I have not received any feedback since those meetings so I have tabled these amendments as a way of receiving that feedback.

There are three sections here. The first concerns an exemption for the Crown Forces. The Government have said they do not think it is required, but as a matter of routine overseas forces issue their personnel with gravity knives and flick-knives and it is said that our own Special Forces use them from time to time. Some members of our Armed Forces are being picked up and persecuted for crimes when they thought that they were acting in the line of duty, and we should not expose them to attack for having a weapon that was required and legal at the time. We should give them some protection.

Secondly, there is the question of film. We make a lot of money out of making films in this country. By and large, film directors want their close-up shots to be authentic in terms of the look, sound and heft of real weapons. Clearly, these things have to be used in secure conditions, but we allow heavy machine guns, assault rifles and similar items to be used in films made in this country under conditions of strict control. There are licensed armourers who supply such weapons for dramatic performances and films. It does not seem to me that people who are trusted with such weapons should not be trusted with the weapons prohibited under the Bill. To have a film of “Mack the Knife” without a flick-knife would seem a bit odd. I cannot see that by allowing an exemption for film and performance, we are doing anything more dangerous than we allow for other weapons at the moment. This is a direction in which we should feel comfortable about moving.

Thirdly, the same applies to antique weapons. At least in this House, many of our parents were heavily involved in the Second World War. There are many items used in that war that were issued to members of civil defence or captured from German troops that are very properly considered collectible and part of our national history, but are not so unique that the British Museum would want to end up with a large collection of them. We ought to allow these items, as we allow other weapons, to be part of collections. We allow old swords and other very dangerous weapons to be collected. Why not the weapons that we are prohibiting under the Bill, as long as they are antique?

I think 1945 is a convenient time to end the definition of “antique”, mostly because shortly thereafter steel became contaminated with radioactive elements from the aerial atom bomb tests, so you can distinguish old steel from new. Also, designs changed a good deal after the war, and there was a long period when some countries did not produce. So 1945 is a convenient cut-off: you can tell what is pre-1945 and what is later, and that is also where the intense history ends. It would be sensible to allow us all to possess the mementos from the last great war and to prohibit weapons produced after it. Apart from anything else, these antique weapons go for a considerable price and are very unlikely to be bought by someone who just wants to use them in a crime and then throw them away.

I very much hope that my noble friends will be bearing me at least a semblance of an olive branch on this amendment, and that we will be able to look in a constructive way at these three potential exemptions. I am not holding out for any of the detailed wording in the amendments, but I hope this is an area that my noble friends will feel able to smile on. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to my noble friend, Lord Lucas, for these amendments. As he mentioned, we had a very useful discussion on the issues covered by them on 13 February that went through in detail the concerns of collectors and theatrical suppliers.

These amendments would create new defences for the supply and possession of weapons covered by Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, namely flick-knives and gravity knives. The amendments would provide defences for Crown functions and visiting armed forces, for theatrical, film and television production purposes, and for flick-knives and gravity knives made before 1945. As I set out in Committee, Section 1 of the 1959 Act makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or gravity knife and prohibits their importation. Clause 23 extends that prohibition to cover the possession of flick-knives and gravity knives.

I turn first to the proposed defence for Crown functions and visiting armed forces. I am afraid we are not persuaded that a defence is needed in this area. The supply, including importation, of flick-knives and gravity knives has been prohibited for a long time and the Ministry of Defence has advised that there is no need to provide defences for this purpose. We are also not aware of any Crown function that would use flick-knives or gravity knives, unlike under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act where curved swords may be an issue. In any event, the general principle in law is that statutes do not bind the Crown unless by express provision or necessary implication. Where acting as agents or servants of the Crown, the military will benefit from the Crown exemption. The Government are therefore not persuaded that any defence for the Crown or visiting armed forces is needed.

On a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, it was clear at the meeting that the supply of flick-knives and gravity knives for such purposes has not been an issue in the past 60 years, despite their supply being banned. The supplier at the meeting suggested that most of the items used for these purposes are blunt, so it is doubtful they meet the knife definition in the 1959 Act. Given this, again, we are not persuaded that any defence is needed for flick-knives and gravity knives for theatre and film purposes.

I have more sympathy for the proposed defence for flick-knives and gravity knives made before 1945. We are aware that there are collectors of these weapons and we also know that families sometimes inherit them from relatives who fought in the war. Possession of the weapons will be banned under the Bill, so collectors and families will need to surrender any weapons they own and claim compensation, or gift them to a museum where they are of historic importance.

Our concern in accepting a defence for pre-1945 weapons is that it will be difficult to operate on the ground. In contrast to what my noble friend suggested, the police will not know with any certainty which knives had been made before 1945 and which are more modern. I appreciate this is not the answer that my noble friend would like to hear, but given that the supply of the weapons has been banned in this country since 1959 we remain of the view that there is no good reason why anyone should possess them.

[The Duke of Montrose]

Can the noble Baroness reassure me on a question that I raised at Second Reading? Does the Royal Company of Archers, the Queen’s bodyguard in Scotland, qualify for the Crown’s exemption on weapons? I also asked about a rather shady area, which the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is probably more familiar with than I am. Are the Atholl Highlanders taken to be doing historical re-enactments, or are they likely at some point to take up weapons as a legal army?

[The Earl of Erroll]

Given that they are the only private army, but are sanctioned by Her Majesty, after Queen Victoria, I find it a very interesting question.

[Baroness Barran]

I can reassure the noble Lord on both questions, and I will write to him to clarify the details.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, naturally I am very saddened to hear my noble friend’s answers, but I see no point in trying to pursue this further, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

92: Clause 28, page 30, line 38, leave out “such”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove a surplus word from Clause 28(11)(b).

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, Clauses 28 and 37 to 39 make provision for payments to be made to owners of offensive weapons, firearms, bump stocks and ancillary equipment, who will be required to surrender these items to the police by virtue of them being prohibited by the Bill. The purpose of Amendments 93, 98, 100 and 102 is to widen the regulation-making powers as drafted in these clauses so as to allow the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, as the case may be, to set the amount of compensation that will be paid to each claimant. This will be necessary for claims to be settled, given that the amount paid out will be based on the evidence of the value of the weapon provided by the claimant.

We believe that this is the right approach, given that the value of individual surrendered items will vary greatly and it would not, therefore, be equitable to the owners or in the interests of the public purse for the regulations to specify a fixed amount of compensation for each type of item made unlawful by the Bill. I remind noble Lords that the compensation regulations, which we have published in draft, are subject to the affirmative procedure. Accordingly, they will need to be debated and approved by both Houses before they can come into force. Amendments 92, 97, 99 and 101 are minor drafting amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am sorry to prolong this a little. As the Minister said, the amendments allow for discretion, both as to whether to make a payment and as to the amount under the provisions relating to the surrender of weapons. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland must make regulations and may make regulations restricting eligibility and the procedure to be followed, which is understandable. So we have an overall mandatory context but a discretion both as to whether to make a payment and its amount. How can that operate justly and fairly?

The Minister said that the arrangements must be equitable, and I agree, but the draft regulations include provisions about eligibility for compensation and determining the amount of compensation,

“taking account of the valuation evidence supplied”.

They also provide for no compensation if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that, under the regulations, compensation is payable. Is what I have just quoted a discretion? It does not seem so to me. The term “discretion” in the amendments suggests there is a distinction for people who surrender weapons in an arbitrary fashion. I cannot believe that is what the Government intend but, given that we already have provision for valuing the weapons, why is discretion needed on top of secondary legislation that provides for the valuation?

[Baroness Barran]

If I have followed the noble Baroness’s question correctly, there are two elements to this. First, there is an element of discretion around the need for the individual who is surrendering weapons to show documentary evidence that they are the legal owner, and that the weapons have been lawfully acquired. Secondly, there is a range of valuations that could be provided, including from an auction house or for insurance. My understanding is that there is an element of discretion in judging the validity of those.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I understand why the Secretary of State or whoever has the final say in that, but I do not think that that is the same as discretion. I will not pursue the matter any further now.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

93: Clause 28, page 30, line 41, at end insert—
“(c) provision enabling a person to exercise a discretion in determining—(i) whether to make a payment in response to a claim, and(ii) the amount of such a payment.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would confirm that regulations under Clause 28 providing for compensation for surrendered offensive weapons may allow a person determining an amount of compensation to exercise a discretion in doing so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, we return to the argument that the Bill is full of unnecessary new legislation that has clearly not been thought through and which is already adequately covered by existing legislation. The Bill is being used simply to send a message that the Government are taking the issues of knife crime and corrosive liquids seriously, instead of investing in those things that really make a difference, such as youth services and community policing.

In Committee I raised the fact that the offence of affray was almost identical to the proposed changes to the existing offences of threatening with an article with a blade, a pointed article or an offensive weapon. Section 1A(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states that:

“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an offensive weapon with him or her in a public place … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the weapon, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.


Subsection (2) says:

“For the purposes of this section physical harm is serious if it amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861”.


Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states:

“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an article to which this section applies with him or her in a public place or on school premises … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the article, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.


Again, serious physical harm means grievous bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

The main differences proposed by the Bill concern the nature of the risk, which is changed from,

“immediate risk of serious physical harm”—

GBH—

to the person threatened, to a much wider definition of,

“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A”,

that is, the person being threatened,

“would think that there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”,

that is, the reasonable person.

So we go from an immediate risk of GBH to the person being threatened to a much vaguer concept of a reasonable person—is that a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner—thinking that there was an immediate risk of physical harm. Does that mean common assault, ABH or GBH?

In Committee, the Minister and I engaged in an intellectual and legalistic argument over the technical differences between the offence of affray—in Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986—and the proposed new offences. That section states:

“A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.


So in affray we have,

“uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another”,

instead of,

“unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person”.

In affray we have,

“his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”,

instead of,

“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A would think there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”.

Can the Minister really tell the House that there is a practical difference between a “person of reasonable firmness” fearing for their personal safety and a “reasonable person” thinking there was an immediate risk of physical harm? I would be grateful for an example. Indeed, the affray definition does not rely on the extremely vague concept of a “reasonable person” but instead refers to,

“a person of reasonable firmness”—

not a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner but what we are really talking about: a person of reasonable firmness.

This legislation also adds further education premises to school premises in the 1988 offence, but affray can be committed in private as well as in public, so all premises are covered. Therefore, the only substantive difference between affray and the new offences is the maximum sentence on indictment: three years for affray and four years for the 1988 offence. This amendment addresses the one outstanding issue by increasing the maximum penalty for affray to four years for an offence in which a corrosive substance or bladed article has been used. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, this amendment returns, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just said, to an issue that he raised in Committee about the differences between the revised offence of threatening with an offensive weapon in public in Clause 29 of the Bill and the offence of affray under Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986. I wrote to him on this matter on 21 February. I will try to clarify the difference to your Lordships’ satisfaction and give an example of how it will work in practice. The difference between the two offences is not simply a matter of different maximum penalties, as Amendment 94 implies.

The offence of affray deals with circumstances where a bystander observes someone threatening another person and where the bystander feels threatened. The offences of threatening with an offensive weapon in public under Section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and of threatening with an article with a blade or point or offensive weapons under Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1998 deal with circumstances where a person is themselves being threatened. Indeed, in practice it is possible to commit both offences at the same time, as the noble Lord will be aware and as the CPS charging advice sets out. An example would be where someone is holding person A by the throat in the road, screaming and shouting, but also waving a knife around in the air so that person B thinks that the defendant might also come for them—that would be an offence of affray—or someone might start a fight in a pub in such a way that people nearby think that the person might also start on them, as opposed to cases where there is not that perception that a bystander would be affected. Case law examples include driving a car at another occupied vehicle or setting dogs on the police with the words, “Go on! Go on!”—only in case law does such language get used.

Therefore, affray concerns a reasonable bystander who witnesses someone else being threatened and fears for their own personal safety. This is a different test from that under the offences amended by the Bill, which ask whether a reasonable person exposed to the same threat as the victim would think that there is an immediate risk of physical harm to that victim. Under the offences in the Bill it is therefore what a reasonable person in the victim’s shoes would be likely to feel when threatened, rather than whether a person witnessing a threat against someone else also feels threatened. Amendment 94 therefore fails to address the fact that these offences deal with different things. As I have indicated, it is not just about penalties, although I fully accept that I highlighted this as a key difference in Committee. Affray is a public order offence and therefore focuses on the weapon and the threat to the wider public, rather than the impact on the victim. The offences of threatening in public deal with the victim being threatened.

I hope, in the light of this further explanation, that the noble Lord is persuaded that we are not creating unnecessary duplication in the criminal law and, on that basis, will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I do not think that it does away with my general comments about the legislation as a whole but on this occasion, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.