Chemicals (Health and Safety) and Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness Altmann Excerpts

Wednesday 9th December 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her excellent explanation of the statutory instrument before us. As she mentioned, there are three issues in one. They have some complexities attached, but in my view the aim of the statutory instrument is important and welcome. I hope all noble Lords will be content with it.

All three issues, although separate, are important from the point of view of public health and safety. When we are dealing with biocidal products or the classification and labelling of potentially hazardous products, as well as imports and exports of hazardous chemicals and pesticides, it is only right that the Government make sure that they address the various issues that will need to be taken care of as we leave the EU.

I welcome the Northern Ireland protocol and recognise the need to separate GB from Northern Ireland, which is entailed in these instruments. I also welcome the fact that small businesses are not exempt because, when we are dealing with products and issues of this nature, it is really important that we and the public can be confident that all kinds of hazards are being considered.

I want to ask my noble friend the Minister about a particular issue. I also, by the way, put on record my thanks to her for arranging for interested Peers a very helpful briefing, attended by her and ministerial and official colleagues; it was very much appreciated. The issue concerns the resourcing of our hugely well respected HSE. The Health and Safety Executive will need to assess these various issues. I welcome the fact that the Government are introducing time limits; Article 37(5) of the CLP regulation, for example, currently states “without undue delay”. Providing a timeframe for approval is most helpful. How confident are the Government that the HSE is equipped to do this in the timescale required and with the resourcing implications of these timescales?

I also understand that the GB MCL list must be updated. I would like some clarification on the readiness of that list and the capacity both to identify the various potential problems and to notify those who will be affected.

I do not have much else to add on this matter. I welcome the instruments and thank my noble friend for her explanation of them.

Supporting Disadvantaged Families

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Thursday 12th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

I will go back and speak to my Secretary of State about the points the noble Baroness raises. I cannot make any commitment further than that. As the noble Baroness says, £16 billion is given to the devolved Administrations to allow them to plan. Last week, in the Chancellor’s Statement, there was a recognition that, through the Barnett formula, every time we do certain different policies, the devolved Administrations want to do additional things. We have a mature relationship with the devolved Administrations. They have been set a guaranteed amount of funding, and I assure the noble Baroness that there is still more room in terms of Barnett consequentials. The Chancellor was right to make the decision he did, and I am glad she welcomes it.

[Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome this Statement and this decision, and congratulate the Government. I urge my noble friend, in line with her responses, including to my noble friend Lord Forsyth, to continue urgently talking to the Treasury about the extra £20 uplift in universal credit being extended, given that the opportunity of work is much more difficult in the current environment. I also encourage the Government to look at the position of children in particular, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Ritchie, have said.

Could my noble friend the Minister please join me in praising the work of others, not just Marcus Rashford—the local organisations and religious groups across the country involved in providing these activities and food for children, who have helped make the pilot scheme such a success?

Social Security (Up-rating of Benefits) Bill

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Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 27th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, this is nothing more than a probing amendment to clarify the Government’s thinking. There is a commitment that the Government will uprate pensions and other benefits in line with practice. However, the economic situation may not trigger that increase via the triple lock and so we do not know what will happen. Without it being stated that that will automatically be in place through the triple lock, we do not know quite what the Government’s intentions are for this year. And what happens next year? What is going on? Some information on the Government’s ongoing intentions would help here.

In the middle of the coronavirus crisis, we sometimes forget that there will probably be a world afterwards. I am not sure whether this is being glass-half-full on this occasion, but are we committed to the triple-lock or something like it? We should look at this issue, or at least pay half an eye to it, because of generational fairness, which is the idea floating at the back of this debate. This Government, and others, I hope, must ask: are we going to continue to make sure that the basic pension is enough to live on and will be a little more than it is now in the future? That might encourage people to buy in.

I look forward to the Minister’s reply and thank her for pointing out before I rose to my feet, with her devastating and scything charm, the slight change to my explanatory statement, in which I originally got the wrong year. I seek the Government’s thinking on this. It is an opportunity for the Minister to provide clarity on the process that will apply if the economic situation does not respond in line with the legislation. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for his explanation of the amendment and echo his request for some clarity from my noble friend the Minister. Is she able to give us an idea of the Government’s thinking on the future uprating of pensions?

Clause 1, before proposed subsection (2A), relates to the basic pension and the standard minimum guarantee. At the moment, the triple lock does not apply to the standard minimum guarantee and pension credit. Were the amendment to be inserted, it would ensure that the poorest pensioners, who are normally those we might wish to protect the most, would get the benefit of the full triple lock. The overall issue on which I should like clarification from my noble friend is whether she can give us an idea of the Government’s thinking on the 2.5% element of the triple lock. Is that likely to continue in the light of what is happening in the rest of the economy? If so, is there any thinking within the department on ensuring that the pension credit is also uprated by the full 2.5%?

I congratulate my noble friend on pointing out what I was going to mention about the relevant 2021-22 tax year. The thrust of this probing amendment is of interest to the Committee and I look forward to her response.

[Baroness Janke (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome the amendment of my noble friend Lord Addington. We are all interested to hear the Government’s thinking, particularly on the future of the triple lock. I am sure that we all welcome their commitment to the undertakings in their manifesto and are pleased to see the Bill. However, in recent months, a lot of doubt have been shared regarding the triple lock’s future. Some people have said to me that there seems to be an almost systematic picking at the seams of the triple lock. With the Chancellor under pressure due to the economic implications of the pandemic, we would like some reassurance from the Minister that the Government are committed to ensuring that the pension keeps its value.

The state pension is particularly important to give the poorest pensioners confidence. Everyone is suffering under the pandemic but there is no doubt that the poorest are suffering worst. We would like to know the Government’s thinking for the future. Will there be a commitment in the Bill to keep the 2.5%, as well as transparency and clarity to reassure those pensioners who are particularly dependent on the state pension? I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Pension Credit

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Monday 26th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

That is a very good suggestion and, as always, I try to be responsive and helpful, so I am going to take that back to the department and I will personally come back to the noble Lord with an answer.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on the Government’s campaign in GP surgeries and post offices earlier this year to increase pension credit take-up. This is vital for the poorest pensioners to avoid poverty, and it makes them eligible for vital support such as housing benefits, cold-weather payments and free TV licenses. As the triple-lock does not apply to the pension credit, can the Minister say if there are further plans to improve take-up, such as using new channels, as suggested by the charity Independent Age?

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend says, the triple lock is a manifesto commitment. In February this year we launched a nationwide campaign to raise awareness of pension credit and to help dispel some of the misconceptions that people might have about their eligibility. We engage with stakeholders including Age UK, Age Scotland, Age Cymru, CAB and Independent Age, among others, to help spread the word. The point that my noble friend makes is a very good one, and we would welcome ideas from stakeholders and any noble Lords about how to best improve the understanding of what pension credit is.

Pension Protection Fund (Moratorium and Arrangements and Reconstructions for Companies in Financial Difficulty) (Amendment and Revocation) Regulations 2020

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Wednesday 21st October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the new regulations to ensure that the Pension Protection Fund can better protect its interests and those of pension scheme members whose supporting employers unfortunately need to enter a moratorium period or restructuring due to the current crisis. These cover the entities, including charitable organisations, friendly societies, credit unions and so on, which may be particularly vulnerable in the current circumstances.

The Pension Protection Fund is one of our flagship organisations, which has done marvellous work to protect the pensions of millions in this country and has compensated those who would otherwise have faced the potential of losing their pension rights if the employer failed, and possibly of losing their jobs too. It is vital that employers and corporate directors are not allowed to game the PPF or take advantage of financial turmoil to walk away from liabilities on which so many ordinary workers rely, as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, just said. I congratulate the PPF and put on record that I believe its staff have done brilliant work. I am sure that they will continue to do so with efficient administration and careful stewardship.

These regulations result from new measures passed in the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, which potentially weaken the rights of DB scheme members, trustees and managers to funds and assets belonging to the sponsoring employer during a moratorium or restructuring. I thank my noble friend and congratulate her on the way in which she introduced the regulations.

To allow the Pension Protection Fund to represent the trustees and managers in negotiations is an important measure, since it has to safeguard the interests not only of each pension scheme but of all other schemes too, and a moratorium does not trigger a PPF assessment period. If pension sponsors can more easily find ways to walk away from their liabilities without putting extra funds into the schemes in the current crisis, because it ranks only as an ordinary unsecured creditor without super-priority, and financial firms have leap-frogged up the priority order, the Pension Protection Fund could be forced to take on extra liabilities, which will ultimately fall on other sponsors via higher levy payments. As I expressed during the passage of the Act, I am particularly concerned at the ability of the sponsor or its other creditors to ask the courts to release assets that were supposed to have been pledged to the pension scheme as part of previous scheme-specific funding arrangements, leaving the scheme far more underfunded than was ever intended. I understand that the legislation ensures that any restructuring plan must not put creditors in a worse position than on insolvency, but can my noble friend confirm that this also definitely applies to the Pension Protection Fund? If she would like to write to me on my point, that will be fine. In addition, which parts of the previous regulations that she mentioned in her introduction have been revoked by this instrument?

Finally, I will ask a few other questions of which I have given my noble friend prior notice. I note that the Pension Protection Fund will produce guidance for monitors and directors on what information it will need to receive and its general approach to a moratorium or restructuring. When will that happen? Can she confirm the assessment of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, that no companies have yet gone into moratorium since this legislation was passed, and if any have, how many have done so and how many have a DB scheme attached?

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, and the noble Lord, Lord McColl, have withdrawn, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Hain.

Pension Scams

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Wednesday 14th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as listed in the register. I know that my noble friend is sympathetic on this issue. Will the Government consider establishing a central intelligence database to offer providers an early warning system for scams and help potential scam victims? Can my noble friend comment on any plans to centralise the confusing array of bodies for protecting consumers, including ScamSmart, Action Fraud, the police, regulators and Project Bloom?

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

I assure my noble friend, and indeed the whole House, that this issue is very high on the Government’s agenda. It is what we would call work in progress. We have established Project Bloom, which brings together all finance organisations, the regulator and pension providers to see what can be done and to work collaboratively. The Minister for Pensions met representatives to hear their thoughts on what the industry and Government can do. I would say, “Watch this space”.

Social Security (Up-rating of Benefits) Bill

Baroness Altmann Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 13th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, it is an absolute pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Stuart of Edgbaston. I am sure noble Lords will join me in congratulating her on her excellent maiden speech. I know that we can look forward to many more thoughtful, powerful and productive contributions from her in the future.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stuart, will leave a footprint in this House—fear not. Her battle for the position of women in politics, business and pensions will continue. The noble Baroness has had such a distinguished career in public service: 20 years as MP for Birmingham Edgbaston, including as Health Minister and on the Joint Intelligence Committee. Now, as chair of Wilton Park, she is dealing with conflict resolution, a skill that I hope will prove particularly valuable in the context of some of the conflicts we encounter in this House—on Brexit, for example. As a non-executive director in the Cabinet Office, she is and will be a real asset to the House. I am delighted to see her here.

It is a pleasure to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Stuart, whom I met and became friends with through her dear late husband, Derek Scott, with whom I worked on pensions policy in No. 10 when he was the then Prime Minister’s chief economic adviser. Her law degree and her near-PhD on pension issues have definitely stood her in good stead. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Stuart, Derek was personable, intelligent and with a really good sense of humour. All three of us were vehemently opposed to Britain joining the euro. Indeed, his warnings about the dangers of monetary union to European financial stability and the costs of bailing out weaker members such as Greece proved prescient around the time of his tragic death aged just 65 in 2012. I have no doubt that Derek would be so proud of the noble Baroness, Lady Stuart, and all that she has achieved—as, of course, are her sons, Ben and Alastair, and her wider family. I look forward to many more contributions from the noble Baroness, as do all noble Lords, I am sure.

I also pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Field of Birkenhead, whose maiden speech we have also heard today. I look forward to many more contributions from the noble Lord, not only on education, apprenticeships, modern slavery and national unity but on today’s subject: pensions and social security. He is, as many others have commented, a legend in his field.

The Bill before us today is vital to protect pensioners. Clearly, using earnings growth for the period May to July 2020 would make it impossible to uprate many important benefits that pensioners rely on. It is right that the Bill gives the Secretary of State discretion to increase the state pensions by an amount considered “appropriate” in light of the economy and other matters. It would be wrong to freeze state pensions in the current environment, especially when so many older people are struggling with the effects of lockdown, restrictions on their daily lives, or having to spend more on care, for example.

The UK state pension is already the lowest in the developed world relative to average earnings. I share the views of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and have called, as he has, for a double lock, increasing by the best of prices or earnings. In fact, as others have said, the triple lock is not just problematic for intergenerational fairness; there is an element of intragenerational unfairness. The triple-lock construct is not entirely suitable for the purpose of preventing poverty in later life. It is more of a political construct than a rational economic policy tool to protect later life. The 2.5% is arbitrary and, in particular, does not apply to pension credit, which has to be increased only in line in with earnings, rather than the triple lock. The triple lock protects only the full basic state pension of £134.25 a week and the full new state pension of £175.20. It does not apply to SERPS or the state second pension. So it benefits the youngest pensioners most, rather than the oldest and poorest. I urge my noble friend the Minister to reassure the Committee that the pension credit will not fall behind the new state pension in any way. I also urge the department to look again at how we protect the oldest and poorest pensioners.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, mentioned the issue of frozen pensions: the 4% of UK pensioners who have no right to an increase in their state pension. I know that this is a difficult issue for the department but it might be one, in the light of the pandemic and of Brexit, that we wish to reconsider.

I also ask my noble friend to look at other benefit upratings which are particularly important. One that I have commented on before is bereavement benefits; in particular, having an allowance for children that lasts longer than 18 months and disregards their parental status.

Finally, I ask my noble friend to consider particularly the position of women, the disabled and the lowest earners; in particular, the older women trying to live on far less than the full pension, even though they are entitled to a share of their former spouse’s pension after either divorce or bereavement. Could my noble friend update the Committee on the work being carried out in the department to identify what has gone wrong with the system which is meant to ensure that women receiving below the minimum have their pensions increased when their spouse reaches his state pension age, and whether remedial measures are about to be put in place?

Covid-19: Over-60s

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Monday 12th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

The answer to the noble Baroness’s question needs to come from the Department of Health and Social Care. I will talk to my colleague and ensure that a letter is written to the noble Baroness with the answers to her questions.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I am glad my noble friend agrees that people in their early or mid-60s are fit and healthy, and most are able to work. However, some are genuinely unable to do so. In light of the near 20-year differential in healthy life expectancy across the UK and looming rises in unemployment, might the Government consider a bit more flexibility in the state pension and allowing early access, perhaps on health grounds?

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

It will come as no surprise to my noble friend that the Government at this point have no plans to review early access to state pensions, as I have already said. Where people have health conditions and are in receipt of universal credit, however, depending on the circumstances, they may be able to receive an additional amount.

Pension Protection Fund (Moratorium and Arrangements and Reconstructions for Companies in Financial Difficulty) Regulations 2020

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Monday 14th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for laying these amendments and for the excellent way in which she introduced them. I also support the amendments and believe that many of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, are particularly relevant. It is clearly important that the Pension Protection Fund has some recognition—or as much as possible, if you like—in the new environment that has created the moratorium and various super-priorities. It is important that the Pension Protection Fund retains creditor rights where it can to avoid gaming of the fund, which otherwise could be overwhelmed with extra liabilities that are picked up by other pension schemes.

I agree with my noble friend that it is important to ensure that these regulations are able to act in the interests of the Pension Protection Fund and to balance that against the need to preserve functioning and ongoing sponsors during the current emergency. Can my noble friend help the Committee understand what powers this grants to the Pension Protection Fund? I recognise, and we discussed through the passage of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, that there is a limit on the power of the Pension Protection Fund. I appreciate the Government’s amendments, which have introduced some representation, but, for example, if trustees, as was suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, prefer to approve a high-risk restructuring strategy but the board of the Pension Protection Fund believes the risk is too high and would result in higher costs to it when the company fails—as the board believes would be most likely given the balance of risks that that restructuring would entail—would it have the power to override the trustees and to refuse to agree the proposed course of action and, ultimately, ensure that the company fails sooner rather than later, or would that not be within its powers under the new system?

Equally, if the management of the company wishes to try to sell assets that have already been pledged to the pension scheme and apply to a court to permit this—I understand the corporate insolvency Act permits the authorisation of the sale of such assets and the PPF must be informed or consulted—does the PPF have powers to protect itself against such a transaction on which the funding of that defined benefit scheme had previously been based? What representations might it be able to make in the court environment? Does it have the power to demand detailed information or to conduct its own investigations into the financial position of the company when it is aiming to restructure or undertake some asset sales? Does the Pension Protection Fund have the power to investigate the impact of any loans or other restructuring agreed in a moratorium that might be beneficial to favoured lenders or, ultimately, to the owners of the company, who might end up taking over a restructured operation, having jettisoned the pension fund to the detriment of the funding of the pension scheme when it goes into the PPF?

How do the Government plan to deal with schemes when banks or other lenders to a company during a moratorium attempt to leapfrog ahead of the pension scheme on insolvency, should that occur. At what stage does the Pension Protection Fund have any power to prevent this happening or to be able to intervene to represent its interests if it believes such loans are suspect or may be intended to game the PPF? I have given prior notice of these questions to my noble friend and was grateful to hear that Ministers have some ability to override some of the potential risks to pension scheme members and to other pension scheme members.

I know that it is important to make sure that the Pension Protection Fund—

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, there is a five-minute limit.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

I apologise.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

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Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 30th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to government Amendments 1, 3 to 7, 9 to 12 and 14 to 31, as well as to my related Amendment 2. First, I thank the Minister and her team for their close engagement with us on the Bill and their time, patience and occasional willingness to change their minds.

The government amendments are a good example of mind-changing. As the Minister said, they remove the instances in Part 1 of first-use-only affirmative procedures; that is a very good thing. The DPRRC’s report on the Bill in February this year was concerned about the use of these procedures. It pointed out that the powers in the regulations remain exactly the same on subsequent use. In Committee, I strongly urged the Government to remove this type of procedure; I very much welcome the fact that they have now done this. All the subsequent uses of the negative procedure have been withdrawn by these amendments.

However, one negative procedure remains: what is left of Clause 11(8) in line 18 on page 7. This is the subject of my probing Amendment 2. Subsection (8), as amended by government Amendment 3, prescribes the negative resolution procedure for regulations under Clause 11(2)(e). Subsection (2)(e) seems a little opaque. It seems to allow the Secretary of State to add persons or categories to those whose fitness and propriety TPR must assess. On 22 June, the Government confirmed to me in writing that this was the case. They believed that this was largely an operational matter and that the negative procedure provided

“appropriate scrutiny as well as opportunity for debate if desired”.

This is a mischaracterisation of the negative procedure, which in practice barely merits the label “scrutiny” at all. Possibly because I did not ask them to, the Government did not address why subsection (2)(e) was necessary at all or give examples of what kind of persons or categories of persons are envisaged in subsection (2)(e) and what role they may play in the schemes themselves. Any additional involvement of these persons or categories of persons may give them significant influence over the conduct of the schemes.

It is obviously desirable to have these new entrants assessed for fitness and propriety. The issue here is the Secretary of State’s decision to add persons or categories to the list without constraint, restriction or proper scrutiny. I would be grateful if the Minister could address these points when she replies.

[Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I very much welcome the Government’s amendments to this Bill and congratulate my noble friend on her initial speech, in which she so clearly explained what the Government intend to do. I also congratulate her on the way in which she has engaged with Members across the House and, together with the Bill team, has listened to the concerns expressed at previous stages of this Bill. I particularly welcome the change from the originally proposed first-use-only affirmative procedure and the comments made by my noble friend on the importance of, for example, the cooling-off period before pension transfers occur.

I must admit that I also support Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. I share his concerns and would welcome an explanation, such as he has requested from my noble friend when she comes to respond, of why only this area—assessment of whether somebody is fit and proper to run a CDC scheme—should be left to the negative resolution procedure and be wholly at the discretion of the Secretary of State without what we would normally consider to be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny in this important area. The CDC framework is completely new for this country. I therefore think that colleagues across the House who have expressed the same concerns are right in suggesting that it is important that we have as much scrutiny as possible.

I have an amendment in this group—Amendment 13—regarding the accuracy of pensions data that needs to be submitted to a CDC scheme. I will not move it at this stage; I will come back to this subject during debate on a later group with my other amendments.

I welcome the current government proposals and hope that my noble friend will listen to some of the concerns expressed. I look forward to hearing contributions from other noble Lords and colleagues as we go forward in this debate.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to support Amendment 32, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to which I have added my name. I should add that I also wholeheartedly support Amendment 8, but I will restrict my comments to Amendment 32.

While there seems to be general support for the introduction of this new type of pension—collective money purchase schemes, or CMPs; I am going to try very hard not to call them CDCs as we go through this—they are not without risk. As we discussed at some length in Committee, one of the greatest risks that is often raised in respect of CMPs relates to intergenerational fairness. Indeed, at the extreme, in a situation where no returns are being earned but pension levels are maintained for existing pensioners, the pensions being paid would be dependent on the funds being put by new joiners, as in a Ponzi scheme. That is very extreme, as I say, but it demonstrates that there is the possibility of one cohort being disadvantaged by the treatment of another cohort. If existing pensioners are paid too much, those currently paying in will suffer, and if the scheme is overcautious in what it pays out to pensioners, pensioners will suffer and current workers will gain.

This is not theoretical. We only need to look at what is happening in the Netherlands to see that the question of whether to cut benefits when returns are not as good as expected is a real and current issue. In a standard defined contribution scheme, the risk is not pooled, so the issue does not arise. In a defined benefit scheme, the matter is dealt with by the employer making up the difference. However, in a CMP, there is no possibility of that happening. If you want to maintain the level of pensions when returns are low, the future pensions of those still contributing will be impacted and vice versa, so the issue of intergenerational fairness is specific to CMP schemes.

It is also worth pointing out that CMPs have implications for not only intergenerational fairness but fairness more generally. For example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, if someone wants to transfer their fund out of a scheme, how do you value their share? The benefits that arise from the scheme are uncertain, being targets only, so if you value a transfer based on the target benefits, which seems to be what is proposed, that will not take account of the risk that those benefits may not be achieved. In that situation, the person transferring out is getting a better deal than those staying, unless that risk is taken into account in the transfer valuation. The issue is complicated further because of the pooling of longevity risk in a CMP. For example, if someone has just a couple of years to live, there would be a strong incentive for them to take their money out to the detriment of those staying in.

Given that fairness is the single most commonly raised risk that relates to CMPs, it is curious that there is no explicit mechanism in the Bill to deal with it. In our previous discussions, we were pointed in the direction of Clause 18 to see how the matter is dealt with, but in fact that clause sets out only how benefits and so on will be calculated and says that regulations will be made in that respect; nowhere does it mention the critical question of fairness. I imagine that that is because it has been based on other pension legislation, which, as I said, does not suffer from this risk.

Amendment 32 introduces as very simple means by which to ensure that intergenerational fairness and fairness more generally must be assessed by the trustees. Given the importance of this issue, I urge the Minister to consider it really seriously.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I have enormous sympathy with the aims of the two amendments in this group. Amendment 8, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake, Lady Sherlock and Lady Bowles, was expertly moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and deals with situations where a pension scheme may not have enough money to meet its obligations and there is a risk that it will need to draw on the funds in the members’ pension pot rather than have money coming in from outside.

As I mentioned in debate on earlier stages of the Bill, I am particularly concerned about the situation where a scheme has had a triggering event or is winding up and may not have sufficient administrative budget to cope with, for example, a significant IT failure in which member records are lost or transposed from one to another so that it is an enormous job to unscramble each member’s entitlement. The costs of that work can be significant; if no reserves are in place to meet those costs and the employer is in financial difficulties, what will a CMP scheme be able to do to fund the costs of sorting out the records? It is true that the aims of the CMP scheme as set out in the Bill will be to have central estimated assumptions for guiding benefit adjustments to ensure that there is no difference of treatment between different members, but on the particular issue that I am referring to and that Amendment 8 refers to, the continuity strategy outlined in the Bill is supposed to have money to meet a triggering event, including its costs, but may not do so.

Therefore, as I understand it, the thrust of this amendment is to ensure that the Pensions Regulator requires a separate capital buffer, or that an insurance arrangement will cover the costs incurred in winding up, or that, in exceptional circumstances, the costs required to administer the scheme are met other than from members’ funds. When we set up this new regime, it is important that we make sure that we cater for eventualities that we do not expect to happen but which we know could in theory happen. Having seen with defined benefit schemes the devastating impact of scheme wind-up without sufficient resources and the amounts of money taken out of defined benefit schemes when an employer has failed or walked away from the scheme—those cases have reduced the amounts available for pensioners, in some cases to zero—there is a real need to look at some catastrophe insurance, disaster-type insurance or capital buffer of some kind to make sure that we have catered for that before it happens.

I think it would be wise for my noble friend to consider what else might be done over and above what is in the Bill. I also look forward to her answer to the specific question asked by noble Lords about what would happen in practice should a scheme require money that does not currently exist within the fund, other than in members’ entitlement pots, to cover the costs of wind-up. Of course CMP does not give each person an individual pot, but if the overall assets have to be raided to meet these costs, their pensions will be impacted.

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[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments in the names of my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Neville-Rolfe. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Noakes on the way she introduced this amendment.

There are valid concerns around the wording of the good intentions of this Bill to introduce criminal offences or financial penalties for avoiding employer debt or risking member-accrued benefits. But it is right to express some concerns that this should apply only if the person is either an employer or associated with the employer, so that professional advisers cannot be held criminally liable, nor banks just making loans in the ordinary course of business, nor even insurers for mistakes made in underfunding the pension scheme.

I welcome the long-overdue extension of the Pensions Regulator’s powers contained in this Bill, which can punish wilful or reckless behaviour and non-compliance with contribution notices and so on. I also welcome the intention to deter bad practice by scheme employers, and indeed scheme trustees from undermining their pension scheme. It is right to have a criminal offence, but, as currently written, the provisions under Clause 107 could criminalise anyone who deals with a pension scheme. I do not believe that is the intention, and it could leave parties reluctant to deal with a business because of its pension scheme, which could in turn jeopardise the ongoing solvency of the company. Therefore, I would welcome some reassurance from the Minister that this will not be the outcome of this legislation.

Some might say that advisers should surely share the responsibility were there to be attempts to avoid pension debt. I have some sympathy with this. So, once again, will my noble friend reassure us that this Bill will not see those acting in good faith being caught out by the actions of an employer, or even perhaps of complicit trustees who might act in ways that are detrimental to the scheme? I hope that this reassurance can be forthcoming.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Altmann and the strong case they have made for these amendments. Noble Lords may recall that at Second Reading on 28 January I expressed some doubts about the scale and nature of the penalties in this Bill, which include a civil penalty of up to £1 million. I am still concerned that increasing them, especially the new criminal element, will deter the respectable people we need from becoming pension scheme trustees.

The world has been changed by the challenges of the coronavirus, as we have just heard. According to Patrick Hosking in the Times yesterday, using figures from pension experts Barnett Waddingham, FTSE pension deficits have soared by £45 billion to £210 billion since the start of the year, so that companies that have a deficit are now a good deal further away from closing it. This is an enormous strain on mostly well-run companies and schemes and reflects years of low interest rates caused by QE and turbulent equity markets. Who would want to get involved in pension administration? Yet its success is at the heart of the British savings system and vital to the future livelihoods of millions of hard-working people, often of modest means, up and down the country.

The Bill rightly reflects the need to plug a hole revealed by the Philip Green case and the furious debate in Parliament before Sir Philip was persuaded to pay up. However, as is often the case with legislation that responds to scandals, it is wide-ranging and takes enormous powers. It goes too far in my view towards burdening business at the expense of other stakeholders. The result will be less willingness to become a trustee and more administrative and other costs for pension schemes paid for, in the end, by the unfortunate pensioners, and the risk of more businesses being pushed into the Pension Protection Fund. This is the background to my unease with Clause 107 and why I moved an amendment in Committee with the help of my noble friend Lady Noakes, and why I now support her and my noble friend Lady Altmann with these amendments.

The criminal offences in Clause 107 are widely drawn. They try to catch bad behaviour by anyone who might be involved. But I maintain that this may have appalling perverse effects, injecting great uncertainty into what is permitted behaviour by those involved in pensions administration. My principal concern is with trustees, having been one and knowing what fine judgments one is called to make, but also with financial advisers, actuaries, accountants, insurers, property consultants and even secretarial support, all acting in good faith. It is one thing to provide for criminal sanctions against an employer, but wrong to extend this in such a vague and general way. A number of suggestions were made in Committee as to how one might tackle this, but disappointingly the Government have not listened—or not so far.

These new criminal offences will have a chilling effect on trustees and others involved, as my noble friend Lady Noakes explained, and I ask my noble friend the Minister to agree to think again and to narrow the very wide offences in this Bill to provide some comfort, either in this House or when it proceeds to the other place.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 50 I will also speak to Amendment 51 in my name. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, for their support and the Minister and officials for the time they have given to discuss the issue on a number of occasions.

Both these amendments relate to a similar concern: shareholders of companies with pension deficits removing excessive value from companies and thereby increasing the risk relating to their pension schemes. We had a long discussion about this in Committee, so I shall try not to duplicate that too much, but I will briefly explain the issue for those coming to this for the first time. I suggest that events since Committee have conspired to make the matter more rather than less relevant.

The Bill introduces a requirement that the regulator should be notified in advance of notifiable events and that the notification should be accompanied by a description of how the notifiable event might impact the pension scheme and what is being done to mitigate that impact. The Bill does not say what those notifiable events will be; they are to be prescribed in future.

However, it is understood that the Government intend these to be, first, the sale of all or a material proportion of the assets or business and, secondly, the granting of security on a debt in priority to a debt of the scheme. An email I received from the regulator describes the purpose of the notifiable event regime as being to act as an early warning system so that it is alerted to corporate actions that may have a detrimental impact on the scheme and that it may otherwise not have been aware of.

The easiest way for shareholders to remove value from a company is through either a dividend or a share buyback. While the regulator will be able to find out about these after the event, it has no way of seeing them in advance. Once the money has gone, it is too late; it is very hard to recover, especially if it has gone abroad. We have seen high-profile examples of companies going under after large dividends have been paid, leaving pension schemes with deficits—BHS and Carillion being just the two most high-profile ones. It is not a theoretical risk and, sadly, recent events have made such situations only more likely.

The Government rightly argue that we should not restrict the payment of normal, reasonable dividends; I completely agree with them. Restricting the payment of normal, non-excessive dividends could have a negative effect on the company and therefore on the pension scheme. Anyway, many dividends end up in pension schemes. It is only excessively high dividends, compared with the deficit repair payments, that I am trying to catch here. Even then, I am asking only that they be notified in advance so that the regulator can consider whether they have a negative impact on the pension scheme. I am not trying to block them, despite some noble Lords wishing that were the case.

Secondly, the Government also rightly argue that we should not overburden the regulator with too many unnecessary notifications. Again, I agree with them, so I have changed the amendment we discussed in Committee so that Amendment 51 now allows the regulator to set the level of dividend at which it should be notified. Share buybacks are a less common action, so I suggest that they should always be a notifiable event.

Amendment 50 simply says that any company with a pension deficit should notify a share buyback to the regulator in advance. Amendment 51 says that a company with a deficit should notify the regulator in advance if the dividend is bigger than the deficit repair contribution and the deficit repair period is longer than a period to be specified by the regulator.

It is interesting to note that if a company borrows more than £50 million under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme, the Government forbid it to pay dividends, make a buyback or pay a bonus. They have taken that view presumably because they are worried that if it pays a dividend or a buyback it will increase the risk of non-payment of the loan.

By contrast, we are allowing companies that owe large sums to their pension schemes and deferred salaries to their employees to pay whatever they want without even a notification. That feels slightly like “one rule for us”. I do not think that the Minister will accept these amendments, and I would prefer not to push them to a Division. The Bill allows the Government to prescribe events as notifiable events in the future. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, has kindly confirmed to me that the Government will keep the issue of dividends and share buybacks under review, and take appropriate action if they or the regulator feel that they are becoming a potential problem. If the Minister could kindly confirm that understanding for the record, I will not seek to divide the House over these amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for moving these two important amendments. I have added my name to Amendment 50, which requires share buybacks to be notified to the regulator if a company is responsible for a pension scheme in deficit.

The case for accepting this amendment seems quite overwhelming. The noble Lord has been extremely reasonable in only requiring notification of a buyback. Equity buybacks are sometimes used by companies to distribute to shareholders what is considered surplus cash where management believes that it has no better use for that money. That suggests that sometimes, management believes that the current share price is undervalued. Of course, the buyback improves reported earnings per share and flatters financial statements, but these measures are sometimes used as a yardstick to determine top executives’ pay or bonuses. Many receive a large element of their compensation in the form of stock options, and a buyback can offset the dilution of existing share values and any potential reduction in earnings per share that might otherwise come from their options. Therefore, buybacks could be considered a ploy to boost reported earnings per share or share price levels.

It should be remembered that although the buyback may increase earnings per share, it does not increase the fundamental value of the company. Even more worrying, sometimes, companies engage in buybacks funded by increased borrowing. One of the reasons given for taking on the increased debt to fund such a buyback is that it is more efficient, because the interest on the debt is tax-deductible, unlike with dividends. However, clearly, this will reduce the financial resilience of the company when the debt must be repaid or the gearing level rises, leaving less money available to fill a pension deficit.

A company’s financial difficulty results from lack of cash, not lack of profits, and for a company which sponsors a defined benefit pension scheme with a deficit, the buyback would allow shareholders to enjoy rewards at the expense of pensioners. Ultimately, if the cash has gone into buying shares, it is no longer available to fill the deficit. The buyback itself cannot be argued to generate future growth, because a company’s investing its cash in the business would be a reason to suggest that it will be better off as a result of that decision. However, where spare cash is simply given to shareholders to boost share prices and potentially boost management remuneration, this requires some oversight by the regulator.

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[Baroness Drake [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 52 is in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Sherlock and the noble Baroness, Lady Janke. The Bill enables the introduction of an ecosystem of public and commercial pensions dashboards. When built, the dashboard service will find and display, for view by all individuals, all the information about their occupation, personal and state pensions in one place. The Secretary of State can mandate all pension providers and schemes, including the state, to release their data on an individual. That mandate will cover the financial data of many millions of people.

The intention is that the dashboard will contribute to better decision-making by individuals about their long-term savings. Unfortunately, the evidence shows that that will not automatically translate into engagement and good decision-making by everyone. Structures will need to exist around the dashboard which support people making choices and protect them from detriment. That is why Amendment 52 is important. The amendment ensures that a dashboard service should not go beyond the finding and displaying for view information on a consumer’s savings into allowing financial transactions to take place through the dashboard before Parliament has had the opportunity to consider the matter and approve this through primary legislation.

The long-term savings market is particularly vulnerable to consumer detriment, because of the asymmetry of knowledge and understanding between the consumer and the provider, consumer behavioural biases, the complexity of products, and the irreversible nature of many pension decisions. There is a plethora of reports from different regulators confirming this. Allowing transactions on commercial dashboards, such as the transfer of assets, could provide new opportunities for detriment. The impact of scams, mis-selling, provider nudging and poor decision-making could increase if an individual’s total savings are displayed in one place, the dashboard allows financial transactions, and the wrap of consumer protection is not fit for purpose. For some vulnerable customers, poor decisions could be more costly if the impact is across all their savings, and if people are scammed, they could be scammed out of everything.

Before transactions are authorised, Parliament needs to understand how the dashboard is driving behaviours, of both consumer and provider, and how consumers will be protected. In this market, the consumer demand side is weak, and, increasingly, regulatory focus is on provider supply-side controls to protect consumers’ interests. Commercial dashboards could make it much easier for firms that have attractive front-end offerings to capture consumer assets through, for example, encouraging early consolidation and the transfer of pension pots. It is to be remembered that pension transaction decisions are mostly irreversible, and poor decisions can be financially life-changing in their impact.

Dashboards are not a silver bullet for removing consumer risk. Most individuals do not proactively engage with their pensions until they have to. When they do, they can be price insensitive and vulnerable to nudging, inertia and judgments detrimental to their retirement income. We now see that vulnerability in the drawdown market following the introduction of pension freedoms, as the FCA has confirmed.

Consumers reveal powerful behavioural biases which have more impact on financial capability than lack of knowledge and information. They take what the FCA describes as the “path of least resistance”, even in the face of information available to them. If someone is looking to consolidate all their savings, rather like Alice and the Drink Me bottle, if there is a button on the provider’s commercial dashboard that is marked “Transfer All Savings”, they are more likely to press it.

The FCA rules have not prevented mis-selling. Regulated advice failed the Port Talbot steel workers. The FCA report on the financial advice market’s support to pensions does not make good reading. In a dashboard service which allows financial transactions, protecting individuals’ data, and who can hold, access and use it, are questions of major importance. This amendment does not argue against allowing financial transactions longer term over the dashboard, but it recognises that the consumer protection issues are of such importance and magnitude that the decision to allow transactions must be preceded by the approval of Parliament. Neither Government nor Parliament can be agnostic on the matter. The state supports the long-term saving system with more than £40 billion of tax relief and mandates employers to enrol millions of workers into a pension scheme.

The Government must ensure that the dashboard service makes a positive contribution to retirement income outcomes for the consumer and the public good of the UK. I am arguing that people should have the freedom to make good decisions and be protected from poor decisions that they cannot reverse. This is something that the FCA often tries to do, and I am sure that if one put the issue to some of those Port Talbot steel workers, they would agree. Some of those steel workers learned a cruel lesson: poor pension savings decisions are irreversible. In Committee on 2 March, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, commented:

“I do not believe that I expressed a categorical Government intention to include transactions on the dashboard. I said that we would make that incremental step only after the most careful consideration and public consultation, and assessment of all the risks. I freely acknowledge that risks exist in that quarter.”—[Official Report, 2/3/20; col. 209GC.]


My case, and the sheer weight of the evidence, is that such are the potential risks that Parliament itself should have its say and that scrutiny by secondary legislation in the affirmative is not sufficient. Furthermore, the very nature and extent of the protections required may, because of their nature, require primary legislation. This is not an area of settled policy and it is a matter of significance for many millions of citizens. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment. If he does not, I intend to push it to a vote. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I have little to add to the wise words of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, on Amendment 52. There are significant dangers should there be an easy transaction button on a pensions dashboard right from day one. However, perhaps I may speak briefly to my own amendments, which have been kindly supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles: Amendments 56 and 59.

Amendment 56 is probing in nature and seeks to amend Section 119 of the Pensions Act 2004 to provide that regulations may be imposed that would require information from occupational pension schemes to dashboards to be accurate and up to date. Further, the amendment would ask the regulator to impose requirements for regular data audits, accuracy checks and error correction reports.

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Given the issues of public good and consumer interest in play here, this amendment asks no more than that the Government, in exercising their duty of care to what will be millions of consumers, ensure that the MaPS service is up and running for a year before commercial dashboards enter the market, and that the Secretary of State has reported to Parliament. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment. If not, I intend to push it to a vote.

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I want to speak briefly in support of Amendment 63. I have also added my name to Amendment 65. As the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has just outlined, consumer protection has to be paramount. There has to be significant concern that, once a dashboard is up and running, we will need to learn lessons before further activity takes place. If we have a public service dashboard for a minimum of a year, we will have chances to learn lessons that otherwise might not be learned—particularly in light of such issues as data concerns, types of protected benefits and requirements for MaPS guidance. I am most grateful to the Minister for accepting the concept of requiring MaPS advice or guidance before any transfers. This is an important issue. I therefore hope that the Government will recognise the necessity of ensuring that private dashboards do not start before the public dashboard has been tried, tested and reported upon in Parliament.

The principle of Amendment 68, tabled by my noble friend Lord Young, is right. I would just advise caution on the issue of data accuracy and the lack of data standards, and the fact that it may simply not be possible for a dashboard and the data to be ready in the timescale he is suggesting, but the thrust of it and having an end date is absolutely the right way forward.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden [V]]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. This amendment is very simple. It seeks to ensure a period of a year from the establishment of the publicly operated dashboard before competing commercial dashboards are allowed to operate. This may seem a small point, but it is quite important. Dashboards are a new concept and will include large amounts of sensitive and complex data from many sources. We do not yet know how they will used, whether the current design concepts are suitable in practice and whether changes will need to be made to ensure that they operate well and safely. Therefore, it must make sense for the system to be tried out in one place, with proper controls, and reviewed and reported upon, before we open it up to the commercial world. This period of a year will allow us to see how a dashboard is used and whether any unforeseen problems and consequences arise.

I am grateful to the ABI for its commentary on the amendments to this Bill, but I am afraid that I disagree with it on this matter. The ABI is right that making dashboards as accessible as possible is desirable, but that must be done in a way that ensures that unforeseen consequences are avoided. As I mentioned in an earlier debate today, a bad dashboard is worse than no dashboard. A year’s grace period to ensure that what the noble Lord, Lord Young, called the plumbing is working well, and to make any tweaks, seems a common-sense safeguard.

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[Lord Young of Cookham [V]]

My Lords, I will add a brief footnote to the powerful case made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. She referred to the Railways Pension Scheme. As Secretary of State for Transport from 1995 to 1997, I am familiar with the scheme, which has grown in the intervening years to be one of the UK’s largest funds and which I believe to be well run.

I shared with my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott the concerns of the RPS; namely, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has said, that the draft DB funding code that will emerge as a result of this legislation would oblige the various schemes under the RPS to de-risk with lower returns. As the noble Baroness has explained, these would have to be made good by the industry, if it could afford it, or its employees, or the schemes would be closed to new members.

I was encouraged by my noble friend’s helpful reply, dated 17 June, which said:

“Those employers and schemes who are already following good practice and planning for the long term should not need to change and we would not expect such schemes to require significant additional funding.”


However, I shared the letter with the RPS and, despite this, it believes that the powers in the Bill are too loosely expressed and that more specificity would ensure that the subsequent regulations got off on the right track. If the Minister cannot accept the amendment, can he make a commitment that there will be a distinction between open and closed schemes, to be followed up in the subsequent regulations? Will he ask his officials to discuss these concerns further with interested parties in an endeavour to find an acceptable way through as the Bill completes its passage through both Houses?

[Baroness Altmann [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 71, to which I have added my name. I have little to add to the excellent words of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham.

I stress to my noble friend the Minister that this is a really important amendment. The Government’s recent White Paper called for pension scheme funding which enables the best deal for members, supports the economy and does not place extra burdens on business. If those are the objectives—and I think they are the right ones—they will be at odds with the draft DB funding code that may emerge from this legislation, which seems to want to drive DB schemes on a path to so-called de-risking, aiming for a particular date of maturity. This concept is simply inappropriate for an open scheme.

The regulatory approach for schemes such as USS or the Railways Pension Scheme would see their ability to invest for the long term, which must be in the members’ best interest, become much more difficult. There does not seem to be sufficient recognition of the difference in liquidity profile and investment horizon of an open, relatively immature scheme compared to a closed scheme. Indeed, this would pose an existential threat to the survival of all remaining 1,000 or so open schemes. In the face of quantitative easing, increasing exposure to gilts and fixed income assets makes little sense while central bank policy is designed to force bond yields lower. Forcing schemes to compete with central banks to buy ever more expensive bonds is the most expensive way to fund these pension commitments.

The Bank of England’s pension scheme is an ideal example. It follows a lowest-risk approach, investing solely in gilts and other such supposedly safe assets. It does not match its liabilities, but it is open and entails a contribution rate of between 40% and 50% of pensionable salary. Should such pension contributions be required without any upside potential for a diversified investment strategy that can take advantage of the wide range of investment options available from infrastructure assets, building housing for rental and other areas where pension schemes with a long-term horizon are ideally placed to take advantage—for example, our own infrastructure, in which other countries’ pension schemes have significantly invested—schemes such as RPMI would require such significant contribution increases that members could not afford it and would opt out, and employers could probably not afford it either.

Therefore, I urge my noble friend to look carefully at this really important issue and to recognise explicitly that there are different needs for open DB schemes relative to those that are otherwise closed.

[Baroness Drake [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 71. Given the hour, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, with her usual skill, has captured the issues clearly and succinctly. It is clear that there is genuine concern among those running DB schemes which are materially open to new members with strong employers, such as the sections of the Railways Pension Scheme and the Universities Superannuation Scheme. They fear that they will be forced to de-risk unnecessarily, with all the implications that that carries and all the potential detriment for both employers and employees in the scheme.

The amendment seeks to address two issues: first, that it should not be government policy to require trustees of pension schemes materially open to new entrants with strong employer covenants to adopt a strategy that will result in them de-risking their investments unnecessarily and prematurely, for all the reasons that other noble Lords have clearly articulated; and, secondly, that the Secretary of State, in exercising powers under Schedule 10 to make provisions through regulation on the funding of defined benefit schemes, should make provisions that are consistent with the policy in the White Paper statement that running on with employer support could be an acceptable long-term strategy for a materially open scheme. The amendment is consistent with any reading of the government policy in the White Paper, but it seeks to ensure that it happens.