Courts and Tribunals Bill

Andrew Mitchell Excerpts

Tuesday 13th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

I want to draw the House’s attention to new clause 22, which I have tabled with the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), my parliamentary neighbour, whose absence from the Government Front Bench is a matter of regret to all of us on the Conservative Benches. I thank both the Lord Chancellor and the shadow Lord Chancellor for engaging with us on these issues. The new clause would restrict immunity from civil suits for police officers in relation to certain conduct in preparation for criminal court proceedings.

I want to draw the House’s attention to a deeply troubling development in our law. Last year the Court of Appeal handed down a judgment that, in my view, risks placing police forces beyond proper accountability for serious wrongdoing committed during the preparation of criminal cases. If left unaddressed, this new legal principle could make it far harder for victims of police misconduct to obtain justice, even where the harm that they have suffered is severe and life-changing. The doctrine has been described as a form of police misconduct immunity. We all know that the rule of law depends on a simple principle: no one is above the law—not politicians, not public officials and not the police.

New clause 22, which I have tabled with the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley, would restore accountability and make it clear that there cannot be one rule for the police and another for everyone else. The issue arises directly from the 2025 Court of Appeal case of the chief constable of Sussex police and the CPS v. XGY. I know that the hon. Lady will refer to the case of XGY if she catches your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker. The victim of the abuse had given her confidential refuge address to the Sussex police, and that address was later disclosed in court, exposing her location to the abuser and forcing her to flee.

The Court of Appeal answered the question by extending what is known as core immunity. Historically, this immunity was narrow but existed to protect witnesses and advocates for what they say and do in court, allowing them to give evidence freely without fear of being sued, but the Court’s judgment went much further. It expanded that protection beyond the courtroom and into the wider process of criminal investigation and prosecution preparation. In practical terms, it means that certain police actions connected to a future prosecution may now be shielded from legal challenge, even where those actions caused significant harm. The Court’s ruling therefore raises serious concerns about whether victims will be able to seek redress when police misconduct, negligence, human rights breaches or serious errors occur. That is why the case of XGY matters far beyond the individual victim involved.

I want to illustrate the practical consequences of the new doctrine, and the human cost, through another case with which I have been closely involved for some years: the case of Ali Kololo. Mr Kololo is a Kenyan forest dweller and woodcutter who was wrongfully convicted in 2013 in connection with the murder of a British tourist and the kidnapping of that tourist’s spouse, Judith Tebbutt. These were grave crimes. At the time, I was the Secretary of State for International Development and was engaged in the Government’s response to the kidnapping through COBRA, but we now know that Ali Kololo was innocent. A Kenyan court has since overturned his conviction, with the evidence showing that he had become a scapegoat in a deeply flawed investigation.

What makes this case particularly troubling is that the Metropolitan police played a significant role in supporting the investigation. The Independent Office for Police Conduct found that a senior Metropolitan police officer had a case to answer for gross misconduct. The investigation concluded that the evidence provided by the officer had the potential to mislead the court, because important forensic information had been omitted. The consequences for Mr Kololo were catastrophic. He spent 11 years in prison, he faced a death sentence, and he endured abuse, illness and separation from his family. He lost years of his life that can never be returned, and although his conviction was eventually quashed and he was released, he has yet to receive redress for the harm he suffered.

Let me be clear: the original principle of witness immunity serves an important purpose—witnesses should be able to give evidence without fear of personal litigation, and our justice system depends on that protection—but extending immunity far beyond the courtroom and into the wider conduct of criminal investigations risks creating an accountability gap.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order.