Tackling Fraud and Preventing Government Waste

Alison Thewliss Excerpts

Tuesday 1st February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

“Lamentable”, “woeful”, “arrogance, indolence and ignorance”—the words of Lord Agnew’s resignation should still be ringing in the Minister’s ears, as should the fact that the disconnect and disinterest in a range of Departments were part of the problem that he outlined. His words should prompt the Government to take action to fix the scandal of taxpayers’ money walking out the door.

In Lord Agnew’s resignation letter, he said:

“As the Minister for Counter Fraud, I have been asked today to publicly defend in Parliament our track record in countering fraud across Government. Unfortunately I am simply not able to do that given the lamentable track record that we have demonstrated since I took up this post nearly two years ago.

It has certainly not been through want of trying, but the Government machine has been almost impregnable to my endless exhortations.”

That is certainly a condemnation of the Government. The Paymaster General has become the Minister for defending the indefensible in the House, as he does yet again today. Perhaps if other Front-Bench Ministers and Conservative Back Benchers took the example of Lord Agnew and his attitude to them, many of them would learn something and resign too.

We are in a cost of living crisis, yet the sums of money that could go to help people now lie in the offshore bank accounts of crooks and fraudsters. Let us not forget that HMRC has stated that the levels of fraud in the covid support schemes are in line with its original planning assumptions. Planning for £4.3 billion-worth of fraud is absolutely breathtaking. The money that was committed in the Budget came far too late because these problems have been known about for years. The bounce back loan scheme, about which Lord Agnew was denied information as a Minister—that should really worry us all—is of course a UK Government-backed scheme, with an estimated £4.9 billion lost to fraud. Just look at the loans paid out to companies that were not trading. Lord Agnew indicated that 26% of losses are estimated to be attributed to fraud rather than to credit failure. This cannot be fobbed off to the banks, because the Treasury asked them to do this and they did it because the loans were Government-backed.

Let us put these figures into some context, because they are massive amounts of money. Scotland’s entire devolved social security system is forecast to cost £4.1 billion in the next financial year. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has calculated that a one-off £500 stimulus cheque for those on universal credit could cost £3 billion. A 5% pay increase for all the NHS staff in England would be £1.7 billion. This is money that could have been much better spent had it not walked out the door and into the hands of fraudsters.

We cannot deny that the money needed to go out the door quickly in the pandemic. I remember, during those early days, hearing on the Treasury Committee from banks and Treasury officials about how concerned they were about the fraud risk. Some of the checks that could have prevented this fraud are simple—a national insurance number or an HMRC reference—but others speak to a long-term systemic failure that the UK Government have been warned about repeatedly—the system of registration at Companies House. That is not an issue of reform, as some have tried to point out; it is an issue of legislation and an opportunity that this Government have missed time and again.

[Richard Fuller]

I am looking forward to hearing the hon. Lady’s recommendations on reforming this important area. She mentioned her role on the Treasury Committee. Did she, at the time, have concerns about the use of the British Business Bank for the delivery of loans to businesses?

[Alison Thewliss]

The British Business Bank being a relatively new mechanism, of course there were concerns about that. We took a lot of evidence on the concerns that existed around loans and other things that were going out the door, but that does not mean that things could not have been put in place to prevent this, and we did hear evidence to that end.

[Richard Fuller]

rose—

[Alison Thewliss]

I have a lot to get through. If the hon. Gentleman wants to make a speech later on, I am sure we will all be incredibly interested to hear what he has to say.

I have spoken at every opportunity, and Ministers have heard me at every opportunity, on the need for reform of Companies House, and it still baffles me why the Government are so lackadaisical about this clear open door to fraud. Companies House remains a repository of information, not a checking service. It is not an anti-money laundering supervisor. In answer to me at Treasury questions earlier, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury referred to the 2018 Financial Action Task Force report, but that still means four years of inactivity in this House. In 2018, as he will remember, we also had the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, a further missed opportunity to have closed this door and locked the fraudsters out.

Companies House has no connection with the UK Government’s Verify scheme, which is required for a passport, a driving licence or a tax return. For a minimal fee of only £12, someone can set up a company in the UK with no checks on who they are and what they intend to do with that company. Compare this with, for example, the £1,012 for a child to take up their right to citizenship. The money involved is absolutely baffling. Last year, in This is Money, Martin Swain, director of strategy, policy and external communications at Companies House, admitted:

“Even though, sometimes, we know that the information is incorrect or potentially fraudulent, the registrar is legally required to register it.”

The Companies House website even has a disclaimer at the top that says:

“Companies House does not verify the accuracy of the information filed”.

Why is this being allowed to continue? Even a simple drop-down menu in the registration process would stop people putting in things like “Anytown, Anywhere” rather than a place that really exists.

[Emma Hardy]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent speech and pointing out all the problems with Companies House. At the moment, as it says, it would take over 10 years, on the pace of change that we have from the Government, to see action taken on this, and all the time people are setting up these fraudulent companies.

[Alison Thewliss]

The hon. Lady is absolutely correct. The rate at which people are doing that should be causing the Government real fear, and it is not. This makes no sense at all. Every day that the Government allow it to continue, the register becomes more and more useless and more and more full of junk information and fraudulent transactions, and they should be embarrassed by that.

It has been a matter of public record for years that the Companies House register is utter guff. It contains names such as “Holy Jesus Christ”, whose nationality is listed as “angelic”, residence as “heaven” and profession as “creator”, and “Adolf Tooth Fairy Hitler”, listed as one of the clearly invented directors of a company calling itself Spypriest Ltd. There are also some highly precocious company directors who are only a few months old. Research by Global Witness in 2018 identified 4,000 listed beneficial owners under the age of two, including one who had yet to be born—talk about being born yesterday!— as well as five beneficial owners who controlled more than 6,000 companies. This is just not credible, and the Government know it.

During the past week, the Companies House expert Graham Barrow has been monitoring in real time the construction of a network of companies using real names but fictitious addresses. This leaves real people affected, but often unaware that their names are being abused—and difficult to contact, because the addresses are not real. It also affects the counter-fraud efforts to which the Minister referred. The people setting up those fake companies cannot be traced and chased down, and are allowed to get away with it.

It gets worse, however, because this open door at Companies House allows dirty money to be laundered through the UK. Oliver Bullough is one of many who have pointed out that kleptocrats from around the world have been abusing UK corporate structures—including Scottish limited partnerships—for years to shift their ill-gotten lucre. There are pressing implications for the current situation in Ukraine, but this is not new; it has been going on for years, completely unimpeded. The news that the National Crime Agency has today been able to seize £5.6 million from an Azerbaijani MP based in London is of course welcome, but that is short of the £15 million that the NCA wanted to seize. It is the tip of a massive iceberg. Duncan Hames of Transparency International has said that it estimates that the ruling elite of Azerbaijan own £700 million worth of property in the UK, and that about £2 billion has been shifted around Europe, some of it through our corporate structures. That makes the delaying of a registration of overseas entities Bill even more unacceptable, and even more baffling.

[Catherine West]

Does the hon. Lady agree that while the arrangements relating to foreign entities do need to be a tightened, a culture change is also needed? She will be aware from press reports that the Foreign Secretary dined out at a Tory donor’s restaurant and charged that to the taxpayer although civil servants had said that the restaurant was too expensive. Does she agree that the Foreign Secretary should have to pay the money back?

[Alison Thewliss]

I agree that there needs to be probity when it comes to that kind of money and that kind of behaviour—particularly the overruling of civil servants, if that has indeed been the case.

When I raised some of these matters in the House last week, Ministers pointed to unexplained wealth orders as a great badge of success, so I tabled a parliamentary question to find out how successful they had been. In 2018, the year in which they were introduced, there were three. In 2019, there were six. I thought, “That is great—the numbers are going up”, but there have been none since then. Is this a measure that is actually effective in tackling unexplained wealth? I am not sure that it is.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

My hon. Friend will recall that the first ever unexplained wealth order was awarded against someone who was only allowed to become a United Kingdom citizen because of the billions of pounds that she had promised to bring into the United Kingdom. Does my hon. Friend believe that that is an indication that Government policy is fighting against itself? On the one hand the Government want to get people with lots of money into the UK, and on the other hand they do not ask too many questions about where that money has come from.

[Alison Thewliss]

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct to draw attention to that. It is one of many deficiencies in the Home Office systems as well. It seems that those with money are given a free pass, whereas those who come here with more humble undertakings to begin their lives here, to work and to build a family, end up being penalised and having to pay an awful lot more in fees, and experiencing all the challenges that that brings.

Hon. Members may think that some of these issues with Companies House seem a bit remote from the real world and the real lives of our constituents, but that could not be further from the truth. During lockdown, a company in Glasgow using myriad company structures made claims under the furlough scheme, but employees of that company never received the money that they were entitled to. Even if the company directors ended up being prosecuted, or HMRC ended up getting its money back, those employees would still get nothing. That shows the complete unfairness in the system. I would be interested to know whether the Government have any figures, from when they have chased down these companies, on how many employees never saw the money that they should have got and that they needed to get by.

For those completely excluded from the covid support schemes, this is all the more galling. Limited company directors and pay-as-you-earn taxpayers were left out because they were deemed too much of a fraud risk, and new mothers who had taken time off to have a child in the preceding three years lost out because calculating their maternity leave was thought to be too complex. Yet as they were being told that by Ministers, the real fraudsters were raking it in, with drugs gangs getting payouts, and many of the people who benefited will never be caught.

These most recent examples of the Government’s relaxed attitude to the wasting of public funds are by no means the only cases. Best for Britain’s “scandalous spending tracker” sets out the following examples—I will list just some of them; otherwise, we could be here all afternoon, and I am sure that others want to speak—since the current inhabitant of No. 10 Downing Street came to office. It categorises them in three ways: as “crony contracts”, “duff deals” and “outrageous outgoings”.

Here are a few highlights: £11 million on blue passports; over half a million on chauffeuring Government documents, never mind Government Ministers; £56 million contracting to big consulting firms outside tendering processes; £29 million on the festival of Brexit; £900,000 painting a plane; £900,000 researching a bridge to Ireland, which I could have saved the Government money on, because I did a second-year geography project—at high school, not university—that could have told them it was a ropey idea; £32 million on unusable PPE suits; over £38 million on a test and trace contract that was not fulfilled; £10 billion on a failed test and trace system; over £300 million on expired PPE, and billions more on contracts for friends and family of Ministers and Conservative party donors through the fast-track lane.

All that totalled £25 billion, and all of it at a time when the screw was being tightened on those who have the least, with cuts to universal credit, some getting no money at all, and more effort spent chasing down those who happened to wrongly claim child benefit than those who deliberately defrauded the public purse to the tune of billions.

I find it difficult to understand why the Government are so careless with our money and why they do not want to act on fraud and money laundering. The question “who benefits?” continues to rattle around in my head. While those on the Government Benches do not like the inference that it was them and their chums, I wonder whether the fact that this coincides with the undermining of the Electoral Commission and the relaxing of the rules on overseas donors is any kind of accident. It is not just me; the Centre for American Progress flagged recently:

“Uprooting Kremlin-linked oligarchs will be a challenge given the close ties between Russian money and the United Kingdom’s ruling conservative party, the press, and its real estate and financial industry.”

This should worry us all, but it does not seem to worry those on the Government Benches.

Lord Agnew’s estimate of the total fraud loss across UK Government Departments is £29 billion per year. That could go, as he suggested, to tax cuts or, as we on the SNP Benches would argue for, to investment in public services and increases in social security. Either way, there is a cost to this fraud, and it remains absolutely baffling that this UK Government have continued to let it go on their watch.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Alison Thewliss]

I am just coming to a close, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will have a contribution to make later.

The solution is not difficult if the will is there. We have lost too much time and too many opportunities to bring forward measures in different Bills. If we are to have an economic crime plan, it must tackle all these issues; we must not miss another opportunity. If the Government will not act, they should devolve full powers in this area to the Scottish Parliament and let our colleagues in Edinburgh get on with the job. Scotland has no desire to be tarnished yet further by this grubby excuse for a Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

When we designed the schemes, it was clear that we had to put in reasonable measures around the identity of individuals and that we had to allow people to self-report their turnover. The whole conversation with the banks was designed to ensure that that money was available as quickly as possible while not being reckless with those finances. We did it on the basis that, inevitably, there would be a measure of fraud. I am grateful for the measured way in which the hon. Gentleman speaks in the House. I cannot give a specific answer to his question, but that explains the context in which the schemes were designed.

The measures that we put in place were robust and comprehensive. There was no one single point in time where we said, “We’ve got everything right”—I would never stand at this Dispatch Box and say that. Some £2.2 billion of potentially fraudulent bounce back loan applications were blocked through up-front checks and extra fraud checks were introduced in relation to the bounce back scheme at the earliest practical point. The Government categorically do not accept the suggestion, however, that those checks could have been part of the scheme at its launch.

I have spoken to officials on several occasions over the last two years about what more could have been done at the inception of those schemes. The extra checks that we put in place as quickly as we could would have delayed the start of the schemes, which were already delayed because of the circumstances I explained earlier. It would have caused further delay—in some cases, not just weeks but months—and would have led to serious harm for many SMEs at a time of what we all acknowledge was acute crisis.

Subsequently, however, we have given the Insolvency Service and Companies House new powers to prevent rogue company directors from escaping liability for their loans by winding down their businesses. We have invested £4.9 million in the National Investigation Service to probe serious fraud and it has recovered £3.1 million in the last year alone.

[Alison Thewliss]

The Minister has made the point about pursuing rogue company directors. Can he tell me more about how he intends to pursue them if the name given is clearly false or the address is incorrect?

[John Glen]

I pay tribute to the hon. Lady’s work to highlight the inadequacies, which she reflected in her amusing but serious speech about Companies House reform. She knows my view, which I have stated numerous times, including at Treasury questions earlier today, that the reform of Companies House is an urgent priority. That is why, in the last spending review, the Treasury gave an extra just over £60 million to start that process. More needs to be done and legislation will be required to fulfil that process.

I will now address the motion’s claim that the Treasury has written off £4.3 billion in the furlough scheme and other HMRC-delivered covid support schemes, which could not be further from the truth. As the Chancellor has previously said, no, we are not ignoring that money and no, we are definitely not writing it off. We are taking decisive action to recoup it. We have invested more than £100 million in a taxpayer protection taskforce, which has over 1,200 HMRC staff focused on combating fraud. Make no mistake: this is one of the biggest and swiftest responses to a fraud risk ever made by HMRC. In fact, over 13,000 one-to-one inquiries were set up in the last tax year, and already the taskforce has contacted over 75,000 people, some of whom could face criminal prosecutions. Meanwhile, HMRC has already recovered over £500 million through a host of other robust measures, and I know that it will continue to consider every avenue when it comes to recouping money lost through fraud and error.

The motion refers to an NCA investigation. I stress that we have not prevented the NCA from investigating fraud associated with covid-19 support schemes. The NCA has investigated cases of fraud against the schemes and contributed to 13 arrests in relation to bounce back scheme fraud. The Treasury has worked closely with the Home Office on the law enforcement response to fraud, and I agree that the NCA should continue to pursue cases of serious fraud against bounce back loan schemes. As part of the 2020 spending review, the Government committed a further £63 million to the Home Office to tackle economic crime, including fraud.

I now want to address some of the points raised on procurement; the motion talks about public procurement. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Paymaster General said, we take our duty extremely seriously. On personal protective equipment, our focus during the crisis—rightly—was on saving lives and protecting our healthcare workers. However, as has been mentioned today, the pace of this roll-out involved a change in risk appetite, and meant that Treasury Ministers and officials had to make calculated judgments on how to apply that spending control. It was not business as usual. None the less, at all times, the principles set out in “Managing Public Money” continued to apply, DHSC took decisions on the basis of sound advice and all transactions were approved by the Cabinet Office and the DHSC clearance board. We will continue to combat fraud in that area. We will pursue any contracts where there has been a technical failure or other breach, and we will not hesitate to take legal action against suppliers where needed.

I will finish on some of the other aspects included in the motion, starting with defence. As somebody who was a member of the Defence Committee for a couple of years and attended the Royal College of Defence Studies course, I take a great interest in these matters personally. My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Simon Fell) mentioned the complexity of some of the procurements and the evolving scope of individual projects—sometimes, at the inception of these capabilities, their formation is not fully known, so it is a particularly challenging element of Government spending. However, the National Audit Office has noted the progress that we have made so far. The financial settlement of the 2020 spending review is helping the Ministry of Defence to move to a sound financial footing and we are focused on driving improvements that will result in greater value for money.

Equally, we are sharpening our tools to deal with the scourge of economic crime. We are committed to delivering reforms through the economic crime plan and the forthcoming fraud action plan and, thanks to the spending review settlement and private sector contributions, as has been mentioned, we have an additional £400 million to tackle such crime over the next spending review period.

I repeat my thanks to Members across the House for participating today. I have listened very carefully to their remarks and will reflect carefully on them. There can be no doubt that fraud and waste hamper a Government’s efforts to change lives and transform a country for the better. That is why we are focused on combating those threats to our national wellbeing, while working hard at boosting efficiency across every part of Government. We are right to take this action to fulfil that enduring commitment to the economy, to the country and to every citizen.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House agrees with the remarks of Lord Agnew of Oulton in his resignation letter that the Government’s record on tackling fraud is lamentable; recognises the vast amount of taxpayers’ money that has been lost to waste and fraud since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, including the estimated £4.3 billion recently written off from Treasury-backed Covid business support schemes; notes the Government’s unacceptable record of poor procurement over the last decade, including £13 billion wasted on defence projects; further notes the warnings the Chancellor received in 2020 regarding the serious weaknesses allowing for public funds to be diverted to criminal enterprises; calls on the Government to set out a strategy to recover all taxpayers’ money obtained by criminal groups and to fully engage with a thorough National Crime Agency investigation into all issues related to the fraudulent exploitation of the covid-19 support schemes; and further calls on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make a statement to this House before 31 March 2022 detailing how much taxpayers’ money has been successfully retrieved.