Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Third sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsThursday 14th December 2023
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 December 2023 - (12 Dec 2023)
The Chair
Okay. Would you like to introduce yourself?
Nick Smart: Good morning, everybody. I am Nick Smart, acting president of the Police Superintendents’ Association. We represent superintendents and chief superintendents in England and Wales; we have approximately 1,500 members nationally.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
The nuisance rough sleeping provisions in clauses 51 to 62 are likely to have an impact on police officers and the work that they have to do. Does the association have a view on that, and on its resourcing implications?
Nick Smart: Yes. With the repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824, the new measures are welcome. The powers give officers the ability to move people on in certain circumstances, be it rough sleeping or begging. As Mr Stephens from the National Police Chiefs’ Council said, this is a wider societal issue, not necessarily just a police matter. We would encourage the use of these powers in line with our community safety partners to address the issues. We would look at this as a positive step for police officers.
Alex Norris
Q
Nick Smart: A lot of the individuals who end up in this situation are vulnerable; I am sure you have heard evidence of that. Will it address the root causes of rough sleeping and begging? That remains to be seen. We note that with the one-month imprisonment, there is a potential risk of people being arrested subject to notices and then yo-yoing in and out of the criminal justice system, prisons and so on. If they are in prison for a short time, they are not able to access all the help that they may need. Where sleeping and begging also has that harassment or nuisance element, however, that is an appropriate power.
Alex Norris
Q
Nick Smart: On the police appeals tribunals, it makes perfect sense to us as an association that where officers need to be dismissed, or it is believed that officers should be dismissed, chief constables have the right to appeal to the tribunal rather than going through the rather litigious and expensive route of judicial review.
We are supportive of the duty of candour and code of ethics. Nobody in policing wants bad cops within the organisation. We are overtly cognisant of the trust and confidence issues in policing and of the legitimacy that we all—the public—seek and desire. We believe that the College of Policing needs to come up with some clear and unambiguous guidance for all police officers. If you were to ask a PC, at 2 am, what “duty of candour” means, I think they might struggle to answer, but if the College of Policing is clear with that guidance and rolls it out in an unambiguous manner that everybody can understand, which I believe it will, we do not have an issue. We support that 100%.
Alex Norris
Q
Nick Smart: The purpose of vetting is to make sure that the right people get into the organisation. There is certainly a reputational risk in having the wrong officers in the organisation; we have seen the damage it can do to trust and confidence in the police service. I believe that the measures that the College of Policing will instigate for licence and vetting units are a positive step to make sure that they adhere to a certain standard.
Having His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary review vetting units as part of its inspections is a sensible way of safeguarding and making sure that they are working effectively. As with any issue, if you want to enhance the vetting it will mean more staff, which will cost more. The current budgets are set, so if you put more people and resources into more robust vetting, which is a sensible idea, something at the other end will have to give, because there is no endless money pit for the police budget.
Yes, we welcome it and we believe that it is the right thing to do. As an observation, an officer is vetted at the time of joining, but you could have repeat vetting at some point during their service, to make sure that they still have the appropriate vetting. Also, when you get promoted to superintendent level, for example, you go to management-level vetting, which is slightly more intrusive. If you are a counter-terrorism officer, you may get some even more enhanced and developed vetting that takes more time and resources. We would welcome more robust vetting, and I think most chief constables would welcome it, but it is a question of resourcing and staffing to make sure that the process is fit for purpose.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Nick Smart: In terms of the appeals process?
The Chair
We welcome the three witnesses: Councillor Sue Woolley, Conservative lead at the Local Government Association and Safer and Stronger Communities; Emily Spurrell, a Police and Crime Commissioner and justice portfolio lead; and David Lloyd, a PCC and criminal justice portfolio lead. Can you start by introducing yourselves, please? We will start with David.
David Lloyd: Thanks very much, Sir Robert. Thank you for the courtesy of extending invitations to the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners to attend. You realise that PCCs have a strategic role in setting plans and budgets and holding their chief constable to account. We are not operational, and therefore any remarks we will make will be more about strategy—I suppose budgets, specifically—but we are also proudly victims champions. I suppose that is what we have brought to the criminal justice system—there is bias in favour of criminals. I am David Lloyd, and I am the PCC in Hertfordshire.
Emily Spurrell: I am the PCC in Merseyside. To echo what David said, scrutiny and partnership working in particular are some of the areas that we are keen to look at.
Councillor Sue Woolley: I am Councillor Sue Woolley. Today I am representing the Local Government Association. As you have already said, I am a member of the Safer and Stronger Communities Board. As a representative of local government, you will know, and I would suggest, that we are probably the bit of the jam that brings everything together, so that we have the opportunity to work with all those wider partners, including the PCCs, local government and the police force.
Alex Norris
Q
Councillor Sue Woolley: The community safety partnerships are absolutely important for partnership working at that local level—I must impress that on you—and provide the opportunity to bring together those other agencies that work particularly in the wider scheme of things. For example, under local government you will have public health, which sits with upper tier authorities; of course, they are responsible for things such as drug and alcohol services. While you may have the sharp end, if you like—the police force and the PCC—working with those who have broken the law, it is then the turn of local government and its wider partners to pick it up and put some restoration into the process.
Emily Spurrell: As I said, I think partnership is a key part of the work we are trying to do. As police and crime commissioners, it is certainly very much in our job description that we bring partners together, and community safety partnerships are a good tool to do that.
They have probably had some challenges since they were first introduced many years ago, particularly around capacity in some areas—partly because of funding and because they do not sit on a statutory footing. In Merseyside, I fund the five CSPs that sit within the five local authorities. I give them funding to try to help them drive some of the really local issues that we see. It is also important that, as PCCs, we try to bring them together at the Merseyside force footprint level, so we can try to join that up. We want to try to get the balance of giving the local CSPs the powers and funding to do some really local issues while ensuring that we do not lose sight of how we get consistency and a joined-up approach at the force level.
In terms of some of the issues that the Criminal Justice Bill talks about—antisocial behaviour, nuisance begging and those kinds of issues—we absolutely need to use the powers of partners. We cannot rely on the police to do that job, for many reasons. The CSPs are the place where we can try to bring those people together and say, “It does not meet a police threshold, but we have other powers that we can use.” That is the value of the CSPs all coming together to do that work.
David Lloyd: Emily is quite right: they are very good idea. I think they are variable. In Hertfordshire I have 10, based on the borough council footprint. Some very much want to work alongside policing. They are a very good idea, because community safety is clearly not just a policing issue; that is the most extreme end of it, but most of it is further upstream. But they are variable, and a lot of it is to do with the funding that they choose to put in or not. It is very easy to spend other people’s money on something; it is far more difficult to spend one’s own money on something. Frankly, that can be an issue, so we need to think about that funding and how it happens.
We also have to think about how they can influence the police and crime plan and how we can influence what they are doing. Even though they are fairly mature organisations, things still do not always join up as much as you might expect, especially if there are different political beliefs and different political leaderships.
Alex Norris
Q
Councillor Sue Woolley: I couldn’t possibly comment!
David Lloyd: When they were originally brought in under the Labour Government in the ’90s, I think they were missing teeth, if you like. Perhaps there was more accessible funding in those days, but to an extent I think that they do not have the teeth. Clearly, there is now a democratically elected corporation sole: a person who has that very direct role around community—a direct mandate from the public. So being able to sweep up into what the local council is doing would be very helpful, because we need some way of ensuring that, where common persuasion does not work enough, there are some teeth within it.
Alex Norris
Q
Emily Spurrell: From my point of view, if the system was working as it should—again, I am reflecting on my own experience in Merseyside—you should all be talking about the same things anyway. When I look at my CSPs in Merseyside, if they are not all talking about serious organised crime, something has gone wrong. They are all talking about it, because it is an issue in all their areas. There will be some really specific issues that I think CSPs need to be able to look at but, generally speaking, if they are not talking about those issues, something else has gone wrong further upstream. It could be helpful to put this in because then, as David says, there is a reminder that you need that connection. The reality is that if they are not really talking about those things, there are bigger issues at play, in terms of why those same priorities are not being picked up.
Councillor Sue Woolley: I think that if at all possible, when you have partners around a table and they are equal partners, that is a conducive way to good practice and working. I am quite sure that works really well in some places. In my own area, that works particularly well. All partners are equal around the table; everybody works together. I am quite sure that in other areas, that bond may not be as strong. Rather than just legislating for something, I would suggest that, if at all possible, there could be something around a duty to work together. You will know the language better than me.
Emily Spurrell: That actually already exists for PCCs. It is within our duty to work in partnership as well.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: We of course hold the chief constable to account in a variety of ways and in different places. Realising that there is a duty of candour is another part of the armoury, because it is something that we can push back. I know that this was very much part of the post-Hillsborough legacy. Clearly, that whole lack of candour was one of the things that went wrong. We are good at holding the chiefs to account, and it should happen locally. With this extra duty there, it is something that we will need to be reminded about—it is helpful for us to be reminded that there is a duty of candour—but we can then ask those questions as well.
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Second sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsTuesday 12th December 2023
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 December 2023 - (12 Dec 2023)
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Good afternoon to both our witnesses; thank you for your time. Rebecca Bryant, you mentioned Resolve’s long-running interest in antisocial behaviour. Could you give us your views on the clauses in the Bill that relate to antisocial behaviour and whether there is anything you would add to them?
Rebecca Bryant: Thank you for the question. First of all, as a membership organisation, the views are of our members. We have spent time talking to them since the Bill was published. Quite a few different views have been put forward by our members and by Resolve ourselves as an organisation. Some of the clauses we agree with, and some of them we do not. I can take you through each particular one.
We absolutely agree with the clause on creating a duty for police and crime commissioners to promote awareness of the antisocial behaviour case review. I am quite happy to elaborate on that. On extending the power to implement dispersal orders to local authorities, our members generally agree that dispersal powers should remain with the police rather than being spread to local authorities, and there are very specific reasons for that. The police are required to enforce any breach of the dispersal order, and really these powers should be seen as a partnership response rather than a sole agency response.
When a dispersal order is being put in place, that needs to be considered by the local authority and with it as a partnership across the board through the community safety partnership. There should be an understanding as well that the police are on the ground and out on patrol 24/7, so are in a much better position to be able to use that power. They also have the skills and knowledge to use it.
That takes me on to extending the time frame for a dispersal order from 48 hours to 72 hours. All our members that we consulted are in favour of the extension of time. Our members are not in favour of extending the public spaces protection orders to the police because local authorities are very skilled in using them—that is where the knowledge lies. Significant expertise and a lot of consultation with the public are required before you put one in place. Rather than extending it, it should be used in partnership through the community safety partnership.
In relation to lowering the age for issuing a community protection notice from 16 to 10 and increasing the upper fine limit from £100 to £500 for breaches, members are mixed, particularly on the lowering of the age to 10. A lot of work goes into early intervention and prevention and how we deal with young people on the path to causing antisocial behaviour. Penalising young people at age 10 for antisocial behaviour by fining their parents if there was to be a breach is quite a significant step and flies in the face of our approach to early intervention and prevention, which uses positive mentoring and youth interventions for young people.
On extending the time frame for applying for closure orders from 48 hours to 72 hours after serving the notice, everybody was in favour, but they would like to see more explicit guidance and support around magistrates courts. On giving the closure power to housing providers, everybody who is a housing provider is absolutely in support of that; Resolve has been lobbying for that for some time now, particularly as it is a very good tool to use for more serious types of antisocial behaviour, such as cuckooing and exploiting vulnerable people.
In terms of the power of arrest for all breaches of civil injunctions, on the whole most of our members are not particularly swayed by that because the power of arrest is a very serious tool. It requires the police to conduct that power of arrest, and it will mean significant resource implications for the police. Not only that, but we would have to get past the courts on proportionality and reasonableness for the power of arrest to be attached to any clause. It would also significantly impact on the court system, particularly if someone was arrested. They would have to be presented to court the next day, so there would be issues around cells and also the management of community expectations once we had got an injunction with the power of arrest. For the CSOs who enforce breaches of community protection notices, it was felt that this would be positive because having more resources with which to be able to enforce those breaches would be welcome.
Alex Norris
Q
Rebecca Bryant: Yes. I would like to bust a few myths, if that is possible while giving evidence. There is a perception in the media and the community that young people are the main perpetrators of antisocial behaviour when, in fact, they are not: the vast majority of antisocial behaviour is perpetrated by adults.
In focusing on young people, we should be thinking about how they are impacted by antisocial behaviour. They are often victims. You will have seen terrible films on TikTok and social media outlets of fights, violence and aggression. That means that those young people are victims rather than perpetrators as a whole. We certainly need to recognise that if we can get in early and use the early intervention and prevention tools available to us to stop the antisocial behaviour or stop those young people becoming antisocial, we will be able to reduce antisocial behaviour as a whole.
Antisocial behaviour is often a precursor to more serious crime, so if we can use our opportunity—I call it a “golden moment”—to intervene with a young person, perhaps with an alternative trusted adult from outside the home, and work with them to understand the impact of the behaviour that they may be perpetrating, that in itself does not fall into the idea that we should be reducing the CPN to the age of 10.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Harvey Redgrave: I am in favour of this measure. I think it was used relatively effectively under the last Labour Government in relation to prolific offenders. [Interruption.] Sorry, do I need to speak a bit louder?
The Chair
Q
Andy Cooke: Good afternoon. I am Andy Cooke, His Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary and His Majesty’s chief inspector of fire and rescue services.
Andy Marsh: Hello, I am Andy Marsh, the chief exec and chief constable of the College of Policing of England and Wales.
Alex Norris
Q
Andy Marsh: I am of the view that there has not been enough rigour in the way in which vetting responsibilities and duties have been conducted. I am also of the view—significantly because of high-profile cases, but also because of inspection work by Andy Cooke’s team—that not only have vetting processes been inadequate but they have not been complied with. The College has done two things as a start: we have rewritten the code of practice for vetting to introduce new standards, and we are about to launch a new authorised professional practice for vetting that will set new, more rigorous standards across England and Wales that address all of the areas for improvement addressed in Mr Cooke’s inspection report.
Is that enough? In my opinion it is not enough. When the spotlight moves on from this important area of safeguarding the public and the reputation of policing, will chiefs and police forces continue to apply the scrutiny and effort that is going into this at the moment? It is my intention—I have expressed this—for this to be an area of service provision that is high-risk and which the College proposes to license or authorise in each force vetting unit each year. There will be training and support for personnel, and there are good people in those force vetting units, but in my plan, if they do not achieve the required standards, they will not be allowed to do vetting. It will have to be done by another police force.
Alex Norris
Q
Andy Marsh: I am unlikely to put a new time limit on the period of vetting, because I think in the 21st century when people—I am talking about all employees and police officers—commit a misdemeanour or when something occurs that throws into doubt their vetting status, that happens in real time, and our vetting systems should be good enough to pick them up in real time as well. We cannot wait for periods of time.
I used to be responsible in England and Wales for firearms licensing, and that period I was responsible for saw a shift in doctrine from revisiting a licence every three or five years to revisiting someone’s safety to hold a weapon 24/7, 365 days a year. Our approach in principle, while complying with the code of practice and the authorised professional practice on vetting, is that there will be time thresholds for hard stops on renewal, but in my opinion and assessment, there is an expectation that vetting should be under constant review.
Alex Norris
Q
Andy Cooke: I am fully supportive of the College’s desire to license vetting officers to practise. As you are well aware, the vetting inspection we conducted not too long ago had more recommendations than any inspection previously done. It showed policing in a pretty poor light. Some forces were doing okay, but overall it was not sufficient to protect the public or the reputation of policing. If policing cannot be sure it has the right people in it, that is a sad indictment on the force or forces across the country. There needs to be a continued focus on this area of policing. Licence to practise will assist in that, and the inspectorate will continue to look at these issues right across the forces across England and Wales.
Alex Norris
Q
Andy Cooke: It is a power that will need to be closely monitored, but it is a power I am supportive of. The ability to recover stolen property in such circumstances is a real issue if policing is going to catch the people it needs to catch, particularly around the likes of mobile phone theft, which is endemic across large parts of the country. The inspectorate will obviously keep a close eye on it as part of the legitimacy of policing and the ethical context in which policing is conducted. It will form part of future inspections when necessary.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Marsh, can I continue the line of questioning about the warrantless power of entry where it is necessary to recover stolen goods when there is no time to get a warrant? Andy Cooke just mentioned that the inspectorate would keep a close eye on whether that power, if granted by Parliament, is being exercised properly. Could you confirm for the Committee’s benefit whether you would in due course, if this were passed, produce some authorised professional practice to make sure that police forces exercise the power in a way that is responsible?
Andy Marsh: Minister Philp, as you are aware I am strongly supportive of police officers conducting all reasonable lines of inquiry to catch criminals and keep communities safe. It caused me great frustration as a chief if ever a letter landed on my desk to say, “My bike’s on sale on eBay, my daughter’s phone is in a house and you said you couldn’t do anything”.
We have already started our plans to hardwire this new power into our guidance, our training and our standard setting to do our very best, along with working in partnership with His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services to ensure that we use this power consistently in two respects. I do not want to see circumstances where the power should be used, where it is not and people could be caught and property returned; and I certainly do not want it to be used in such a way that would undermine confidence in policing. As in many things in policing, we need to get this just right. The College has a fundamental role in achieving consistency and getting it just right.
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Fourth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsThursday 14th December 2023
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 December 2023 - (14 Dec 2023)
The Chair
Good afternoon. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. We will now hear oral evidence from Kennedy Talbot KC, barrister at 33 Chancery Lane. For this panel, we have until 2.20 pm.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Sir Graham, I was hoping I might declare an interest at this stage. I am a member of USDAW—the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers—as is my wife, and the Committee has a witness from USDAW coming later.
The Chair
Thank you very much; that is all recorded. Mr Talbot, may I ask you to introduce yourself?
Kennedy Talbot: Yes. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am a barrister in independent private practice. I am not part of any pressure group; I am not pushing for any particular position. I suppose the only interest that one could say I have and might declare is the fact that at the moment I am not able to be paid out of restrained funds, but if this Bill becomes law, there would be the power for that to happen—whether I would be better off as a result of that I do not know. Apart from that, my only interests are to help the Committee, if I can, to ensure that the Bill operates efficiently and fairly and promotes the orderly dispatch of this business.
The Chair
Excellent. Thank you very much. We will start with shadow Minister Alex Norris.
Alex Norris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: Yes. Speaking broadly for the moment and without commenting on the Bill—I do not think the Bill would be a vehicle to make all the changes that might be desirable—the key issue is plainly to investigate and to identify criminal proceeds and then to ensure that they are secure. That is the principal problem: by the time the courts get involved, making orders divesting people of assets, in most cases the assets have long gone. That is if the courts actually are engaged.
As you will probably recall from the report in March by the Public Accounts Committee, looking at the investigation of fraud, something like 41% of crime is fraud, yet it is largely not investigated. Of the 900,000 reports that are made to Action Fraud, only 1% result in any kind of judicial proceeding. That, from the broadest perspective, is where the problem lies—ensuring that fraud and other economic crimes are properly investigated and assets are frozen early. That is the best way to ensure that they are confiscated or forfeited.
Alex Norris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: I think it may be possible to make amendments to the Bill in two respects to deal with the issue that I have just mentioned. One involves restraint orders. I am sure that the Committee is familiar with the power for the court to make restraint orders preventing people who are suspected of crime, and then charged with crime, from dealing with their assets. At the moment, a statutory proposal in the Bill is that the risk of dissipation factor—such risk needs to be established for an order to be made under case law, not under statute —should be specified. The answer, in my view, is to scrap the risk of dissipation, so that it is not a requirement.
In many cases, what prevents prosecutors from applying for restraint orders is that they feel they cannot meet that test. Normally, that is because the case is brought to them some time after an investigation first started. The defendants are often aware that they are being investigated, and the case law more or less establishes that unless you can show that a defendant is on the point of selling his house or moving £100,000 to the UAE or whatever it may be, you cannot get a restraint order. Scrap the risk of dissipation.
Alex Norris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: That was one. The other is about receivers. Receivers have always been a very useful tool, in particular with economic crime involving businesses, because they enable the court to appoint a court officer, a receiver—normally an insolvency practitioner—to manage, run and control businesses. That was from the time that a restraint order could be made, so from the very beginning of an investigation. As a result of case law that went to the Supreme Court, however—a 2013 case named for the Eastenders Group—management receivers, as they are called, have dried up. The reason for that is that the Supreme Court held that if the management receiver was wrongly appointed in the first place, the prosecutor had to meet the costs. In that case, it was more than £1 million, which had a chilling effect, so prosecutors simply have not applied for receivers at all.
The amendment would be to make receivers’ costs payable out of central funds. There may be a way to ameliorate the problems that one might have with the Treasury. I do not know whether you know about ARIS, the asset recovery incentivisation scheme, but with that up to half of the recoveries are hypothecated back to the investigating and prosecuting authorities, but they must use them within particular accounting periods. The answer, rather than sending it all back, might be to put a portion into a fund that could be used for those special expenses. That would not cost the Treasury a single penny.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Paddy Lillis, general secretary of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers; Paul Gerrard, campaigns, public affairs and board secretariat director for the Co-op Group; and Helen Dickinson OBE, chief executive of the British Retail Consortium. We have until 3.05 pm for this panel. Please could you all introduce yourselves for the record?
Paddy Lillis: I am Paddy Lillis, general secretary of USDAW, the shop workers’ union.
Helen Dickinson: I am Helen Dickinson, chief executive of the British Retail Consortium, the trade body for many retailers in the industry.
Paul Gerrard: I am Paul Gerrard, public affairs director at the Co-op Group, the world’s oldest co-operative society.
Alex Norris
Q
Helen Dickinson: Thank you for the opportunity to come and talk to you today. We are not technical experts on the Bill, but we are happy to talk about the scale of the issue and an amendment that we think could help to address the situation, at least in some instances.
You will hear various bits of data about the impact of violence and abuse on people who work in the retail industry. We compile data. Many businesses, such as the Co-op, have their own data. USDAW has data, as does the charity that looks after many employees who work in retail. All the different sources of data show a significant trend: an uptick in shoplifting, organised crime, and violence and abuse against shop workers and wider retail workers.
For me, there has been a big turning point this year. Businesses such as the Co-op and other frontline convenience stores are often on the receiving end when they ask a customer about age-related sales or something, but it is now many different types of businesses, including clothing, fashion and beauty businesses. It is a much more prevalent issue right across retail, rather than being concentrated on food.
The scale of it is much higher than it was pre-pandemic. The number of incidents of violence and abuse against retail workers has nearly doubled since before the pandemic, from around 450 per day across the country to around 850. I am sure that Paddy and Paul will share some specific statistics from their point of view, but that gives you an idea of the scale. It is an increasingly worrying trend that has a big financial impact on businesses, which we are all paying for in terms of inflation, but most significantly on the people who work in retail, and on customers and their families as well.
Paddy Lillis: Thanks for the invite to the Committee. As part of our Freedom From Fear campaign, we have been surveying our members for 20 years about violence and abuse towards retail staff. The idea that this thing is a victimless crime is far from the truth. Shoplifting has cost £1 billion in the last year—£1 billion for employers for security measures. That is one side of it.
The other side, which I will concentrate on, is the number of incidents of abuse, threats and violence towards retail staff. Do not lose sight of the 3 million retail workers in the UK. They deserve to have the protection of Parliament, the police, the judicial system and ourselves. We have seen an explosion of shoplifting and violence towards staff over the last 12 months. It nearly doubled during the pandemic. The sad part is that these people are working in the community, living in the community and serving the community, and they do not deserve this sort of abuse, but we are seeing an increase. I think 62% of the people we surveyed have been abused—verbally abused. About 56% of them have been threatened and 5% have been assaulted. We had a member who lost his life last August in Andover in a Tesco store, and that is the worst side of it.
We would argue that the Bill is missing a trick here in the sense that it represents an opportunity to include a statutory offence to tackle the violence towards retail staff. It is horrendous when you listen some of the stories, as we have to do every day. It is heartbreaking—from people being spat on, threatened or abused, to being assaulted, having their cars damaged, and being followed at night when leaving their stores. It is just horrendous.
I would say there are three elements to this. We have had the historical issue for many years in terms of drugs and alcohol, with people stealing them. They are probably the most dangerous. On top of that, with the cost of living—I am not condoning this, by the way—people are shoplifting. We have also seen over the last number of years that criminal gangs just see retail as an easy target, because the likelihood of being caught is minimal. If you are caught, the chances are you will probably just get a slap on the wrist. For us, this really is important. We look at the Scottish Bill that came in in 2021. There have been 6,000 additional investigations of retail crime by the police in Scotland, so it does work when there is a specific offence out there.
The other thing I will finish on is this £200 levy, where it is a summary offence—that is, it cannot go to a magistrates court. In reality, the police cannot be bothered—it is not so much that they cannot be bothered, but more because of a resource issue. If they do stop them, it is a fixed penalty notice, and that sends all the wrong signals to the criminal fraternity: “It is probably a fine more than anything else.”
There is an opportunity here, I think, to send a message out from Parliament, from yourselves and from ourselves as employers and trade unions, that this is unacceptable and appalling behaviour, and that we are all on the side of retail workers. Retail workers are in every postcode in the country, and in every constituency in the country, and they do deserve our support.
Paul Gerrard: Thank you for this opportunity. At the Co-op Group, we run 2,500 small-format convenience stores across the country. We have seen a 44% rise in incidents of crime in our stores, a 36% rise in incidents of violence, and a 38% rise in incidents of abuse.
What does that look like? Speaking to some colleagues over the last couple of days, just to get a live sense of that, I heard that a store manager was attacked by a customer “with a knife who went for his throat. Fortunately, the assailant missed my colleague’s throat, but hit him in the collar.” He had to be hospitalised. The individual got a £200 fine. There are two individuals in and around Manchester who are stealing in excess of £180,000-worth of product a year, and by the time they have sold it for a third of the price, they have a pre-tax income of £30,000 each—I am not sure whether they are paying a lot of tax on that. As a former His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs officer, I can guarantee that they are not paying a lot of tax on that. In truth, there is a quite terrifying level of lawlessness out there.
There is another thing worth noting with the current situation. We very much welcome the retail crime action plan, which is a good step forward, but we are a long way away from what it outlines. At present, the police do not turn up to 70% of the incidents that the Co-op reports. We only report serious incidents. We do not report someone nicking a ham sandwich and a can of Coke. We report the serious, prolific offenders, and 70% of the time the police do not turn up. More than that, when we use citizen’s arrest powers to detain the individual offender and call the police to complete the arrest, the police do not turn up on 80% of occasions, which means we have to let them go.
There is desperate need for a reset of society’s view of what happens in shops. If Parliament is going to give responsibility for upholding the law to individual groups—many of these offences are to do with age-related sales—it should give them protection for upholding the laws that it passes.
Alex Norris
Q
Paul Gerrard: I gave evidence to the Scottish equivalent of this, when Daniel Johnson MSP’s Protection of Workers (Retail and Age-restricted Good and Services) (Scotland) Bill was passed. Our sense is that it resulted in the police in Scotland taking incidents far more seriously. It is quite hard to come by data, but the data that I see tells me that for attendance at the scene when we report incidents, Police Scotland is one of the five best forces in the country.
Paddy referenced this: when a report is made of violence in stores in Scotland, the individual is arrested 60% of the time. England and Wales are nowhere close to that; here, it is penny numbers. I do not pretend that this is empirical, but our sense as a business is that the protection of workers Act in Scotland increased the importance of this for the police, and the police have responded. If we could get to the position of 60% of reported violent offences resulting in an arrest, my colleagues would be very grateful, as would Paddy’s members, and all the members of the British Retail Consortium.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
Q
Helen Dickinson: It was like a practice for today.
Chris Philp
I will certainly continue to work with you all, regardless of the details in the Bill, to get the retail crime action plan fully implemented and bring into force a zero-tolerance approach. I think we all agree that that is necessary, and I will do everything possible to ensure that the police deliver that operationally. Thank you for your work in this area, and I look forward to keeping on working with you.
Alex Norris
Q
Helen Dickinson: I agree completely with that comment. The reason why over 90 chief executives signed the letter to the Home Secretary from right across different parts of retail was that they are concerned about the fact that they are doing all they can, but feel that there is nothing more they can do. Paddy mentioned some statistics.
How do I describe it? It has two big impacts: one is financial, on the bottom line, how the profit of companies will be impacted unless they do everything that they can to address what could impact their business; and the second impact is on their biggest asset, which is their people, whether that is in absenteeism, morale or motivation to do their job well. Those two motivating factors, from a business leader point of view, mean something to every single business leader that I talk to. Literally, that is probably the thing that comes up most in the chief executive conversations that I have, because they feel that they have done everything that they can and that they are running out of road in terms of things that they could do.
The Minister asked about facial recognition, and I know that that is being explored by a lot of people. There have been various announcements about body cameras. People pay money into business improvement districts and regional partnerships. We have the Pegasus Project, which is trying to get better co-ordination across different parts of the police, specifically focused on organised gangs. That is being funded by retail businesses. They are not handing it all back and going, “It’s someone else’s problem.”
That is my answer to whoever it was. I am very happy to put them in front of any retail business, and I am sure they will be given lot of reasons. Paul, I do not know if there is anything you want to add.
Paul Gerrard: The Co-op is one of the businesses that is funding Operation Pegasus. Over the past four or five years, we have spent £200 million on security measures in our stores. That is four times the sector average. If you go into some of our stores, you will see state-of-the-art CCTV, body-worn cameras and headsets. We have increased our guarding budget by almost 60% from pre-covid days. We are constantly investing. We have had a problem with kiosks, where people jump behind the kiosk counter, often armed, terrifying colleagues who are still in the kiosk. We have just invested heavily in new kiosks to stop people from doing that.
Helen is absolutely right: the retail sector takes this really seriously. We consider the first responsibility to be ours, which is why we invest as much as we do to keep colleagues and shops safe, but we are getting to the point with some stores in the Co-op estate and across retail where it is increasingly hard to work out how to run a store that keeps colleagues safe and can make a commercial return. That will mean that shops will close, and we all see what happens when shops close: communities face tough times.
I have heard the police express that idea that we are not doing anything. They have had a similar, less-than-polite response from me when they have said it, because it is patently untrue.
Paddy Lillis: It is 21st-century Britain, and we have retail workers with body cams on—it sounds like a war zone. At the time, we are trying to get things right and get people back into the towns and city centres, but we are helpless. It is a societal problem, something we all need to work towards addressing. We must put the support we need behind retail staff and businesses. I have worked with them. Security measures just last year cost £1 billion, with more and more going in, but somewhere along the line we all pay for that. It is a massive problem that has to be addressed.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
The reason why the Government—rightly—responded to proposed changes for emergency workers was that we had seen a huge increase in activity: attacks on vehicles, on people, and everything else associated with that. Helen, would you like to talk a little bit more about that, and just clarify that it is also your understanding that it has soared in the retail sector, whereas some of the other categories that the Minister referred to have, in fact, remained relatively static?
Helen Dickinson: I think Paul summed it up. I cannot comment on behalf of other industries, because I am not close to what might be happening. I engage a lot with my peer group across different sectors, and it does not come up in the same way as it does when engaging with my members.
Paddy Lillis: Retail is an easy target for people. It is an easy way to make money, as Paul outlined earlier. In today’s climate, as I said, there are three areas: the cost of living, addiction to alcohol and drugs, and now the criminal gang element. The retailers rightly told me that this is a golden quarter. It is a golden quarter as well for the criminal gangs, because they are in there robbing the shops under the cover of thousands of people shopping every day.
Paul Gerrard: If you were to ask people who have been in retail for decades, nobody would say they have seen anything like this, even during covid. No one has seen this scale of crime and the—often weaponised —violence and abuse that goes with that. It is out of control. We released CCTV footage earlier this summer, and it is like a riot trying to get into some of our stores, because people are intent on stealing and causing violence and abuse. I do not think anyone in retail—Paddy has been in and around retail for much longer than me—has seen it like this before.
Helen Dickinson: Businesses such as the Co-op—in convenience— have often been at the frontline, because there is that proof of age required when somebody is buying alcohol or cigarettes or whatever else it might be. He is seeing that escalation, but there are other sectors that would never have raised this as an issue now bringing it up as the most significant thing impacting their business. One of my members is a beauty business with only one or two staff members in its stores. It has the same organised gang turning up, week in week out, using abuse and violence to basically get the staff to step back so that they can literally just sweep the whole stock. A business like that is potentially going to shut up shop, because it is not worth it in terms of loss. I do not know if we have quite answered your question.
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Fifth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsThursday 11th January 2024
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 January 2024 - (11 Jan 2024)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings—sorry about that, but those are the rules. Officials in the Gallery should communicate electronically with Ministers.
Today we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list for today’s sitting, which is available in the room, shows how the clauses and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order they are debated but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment and on whether each clause should stand part of the Bill are taken when we come to the relevant clause.
A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments in the group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate, so to that extent the process is much more free-wheeling than in the more formal parts of the Chamber downstairs.
At the end of the debate on a group of amendments, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or whether they seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment in a group to a vote, they will need to let me know in advance so I know to call a vote.
Clause 1
Articles for use in serious crime
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out subsection (3).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 55, in clause 1, page 1, line 20, at end insert,
“, or it is not reasonable to assume that the accused possessed or had control over the item”.
This amendment would clarify that people living in shared accommodation would not be held liable for offensive articles which do not belong to them and which they are unaware of.
Amendment 52, in clause 3, page 2, line 39, leave out subsection (3).
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Angela. I hope to follow your instruction to be free-wheeling as far as I physically can.
As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), said on Second Reading, we support this legislation. This is likely to be the final chance during this Parliament for us to legislate in the area of crime, policing and criminality, and there is much to do. There are very many good things in this legislation, so the bulk of my contributions on the initial clauses, and my amendments more generally, seek clarity and will give the Minister a chance to put certain things on the record, rather than challenging the principle of the Bill.
As we start line-by-line consideration, it is important to recognise that the public expect more from the Government and this place on crime. Ninety per cent of crimes go unsolved and the charge rate has dropped by two thirds. That means that a person who commits a crime is less than half as likely to be caught as they were in 2010, and the public feel that very significant change. Of course, that is before we get to the woeful backlogs in the court system, and what they mean for victims and the likelihood of successful prosecution. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North will no doubt cover that issue in due course.
To that record is added low confidence in policing, the disastrous legacy that we still feel of the cut of 20,000 officers, 10,000 fewer police on the frontline, and the fact that 50% of the public—a number that has doubled—say they never see a uniformed presence in their community, so there is clearly much to do. Restoring policing and justice in this country must be a national priority. We welcome in most part what the legislation offers, and most of our discord lies with what is not in the Bill and the missed opportunities. We will seek to add those things in due course.
Clause 1 relates to articles for use in serious crime. Serious and organised crime is a growing menace in our country. Organised crime is often left out of the debate about community safety. The way crime is counted pushes organised crime, and particularly fraud, to the fringes of the debate, but it is a growing enterprise and it has to be tackled head on. By its nature, it is fast moving and shapeshifting. We are in the fourth industrial revolution—an era of significant technological change at breathtaking pace—and it is crucial that we seek to keep pace. Given the nature of law and legislation, that is hard, but we have to keep pace as best we can. We know that the tools that criminals, particularly violent criminals, use to conceal their work are ever changing, so we must change to meet that need.
Clause 1 criminalises the possession of items that can be used in serious crime, and my amendments relate to that. Without pre-empting the clause 2 stand part debate, the sorts of items we are talking about include 3D printer firearms templates, tablet presses and vehicle concealments. We heard in the evidence sessions that such items are being used by some of the most serious criminals in this country and those who facilitate their work, and it is right to address that.
I turn to amendment 51, which stands in my name. Clause 1(3) says:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with any serious offence.”
Basically, if the police arrest someone and want to charge them with possession of one of the items specified in clause 2, the person can say, “I didn’t know it was going to be used in this way.” My amendment would delete that provision. It is of a probing nature—I do not intend to put it to a Division—but I want to hear from the Minister why the clause has been written in such a way. It is not without precedent, but we would not routinely specify on the face of a Bill the defence that a person facing a criminal allegation could use; that would be a matter for them.
Crucially, the burden will be on the prosecutor to prove that a crime has been committed. We know from clause 1(1) that a successful conviction for the offence requires prosecutors to prove to a criminal standard that, first, the person facing the charge possessed the article in question and that, secondly, they did so in circumstances that could reasonably give rise to suspicion that it would be used to commit a serious offence. The burden is on the prosecutor to prove that, so I am keen to understand why we need to specify on the face of the Bill that a defendant could make the defence that they
“did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with any serious offence.”
Is subsection (3) not just subsection (1) turned inside out? On that basis, is it necessary? If subsection (1) describes the alleged crime, surely it is axiomatic that the defence would be the opposite. Does subsection (3) need to be on the face of the Bill? Could the Minister explain that? We are in danger of asking people to prove negatives, which is harder. Specifying that defence may well be relied on by authorities in the future, and if an individual struggles to prove intent, which can be quite hard, or a lack of intent, which, frankly, is even harder, it could be challenging for the justice process further on. I am keen to understand the Minister’s perspective.
Amendment 52 would have the same effect on clause 3(3) as amendment 51 would have on clause 1(3): it would remove clause 3(3). The arguments for doing so are the ones I have just made.
The final amendment I have tabled in this group is amendment 55 to clause 1. Clause 1(1) relates to possession, and subsection (4) explains what “possession” means in this context. It says that
“if it is proved that a relevant article—
(a) was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or
(b) was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which the accused habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public,
the court may assume that the accused possessed the relevant article”—
that is how possession is proven, and I would argue that is quite a broad definition—
“unless the accused shows that they did not know of its presence on the premises or that they had no control over it.”
That is what my amendment seeks to test, because I do not think the intention of the clause is to sweep up people for being in the presence of an article that was not theirs.
My concern relates particularly to shared accommodation. I lived in shared accommodation for a couple of years before I met my wife, and for a period of time it was with people I did not really know: I did not know what they did for a living; I did not know their personal characters; and, to be honest, I did not have an awful lot of engagement with them. Many came and went, and the communal areas were largely not used, but it would not have been out of the question for someone to leave work equipment around. It would not have been impossible for someone acting in bad faith to have one of the items detailed in clause 2 in a communal area, and then to have said that it was another person who was living there or that another person at some point had touched that item in order to move it and put something else next to it. Whose article it was—and therefore who is responsible and who may well have committed an offence under clause 1—could then become quite a challenging question. There needs to be more clarity that, in such circumstances, an individual would not have committed a crime.
That is what amendment 51 seeks to add. I do not intend to labour the point all the way to a Division, but I hope the Minister will put on the record that that is not how he sees the provisions working, and that he will give the Committee some degree of comfort on how such circumstances will be avoided.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a huge pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Dame Angela, as it will be in the Committee’s sittings in coming days.
I will not try to respond to the shadow Minister’s opening remarks in any detail, as we debated the wider issues on Second Reading, but I will observe in passing that we have record numbers of police officers, and overall crime, measured by the crime survey on a like-for-like basis, is 56% lower today than it was in 2010.
Chris Philp
The fine city of Stockton.
I thank the shadow Minister for the thoughtful, reasonable tone that he adopted in discussing the amendments and in his opening remarks. I am sure that tone will characterise the exchanges throughout the Committee’s proceedings.
As the shadow Minister mentioned, clauses 1 to 4 criminalise the possession, importation, making, adaptation or supply of certain specified articles, where they can be used for serious criminal purposes, including items such as pill presses used to manufacture illegal pills and the templates for producing 3D firearms, about which the National Crime Agency and others are increasingly concerned.
As with strict liability offences, these offences entitle a prosecution to start with the assumption that the accused would have known what the articles were concerned with. I have mentioned a couple of those articles; there are very few, if any, legitimate uses for them.
The shadow Minister posed a reasonable question, asking why we have constructed the burden of proof in the way we have. Why say it is for the defendant to demonstrate that they had a legitimate purpose, rather than the other way round? The reason is because these articles have pretty much no legitimate uses other than for criminal purposes. Why would someone have a template to construct a 3D firearm other than for criminal purposes? There is no innocent use for that article that I can think of. The situation is similar for pill presses, unless it were a pharmaceutical company. To answer the shadow Minister’s fundamental and foundational question, that is why the burden of proof has been constructed as it has.
Amendments 51 and 52 would remove the ability for the defendant to expressly advance as a defence that they did not know about the purpose of the article, and did not know they were possessing it and so on. If the amendments were agreed to, those defences would not be available and the clause, as amended, would make these strict liability offences, with no defence that could be offered. The effect of the amendments would actually be to make the clause less favourable to the defendant.
Amendment 55 addresses items found on a premises. As the shadow Minister pointed out, at the end of clause 1(4), there is a defence that the person did not know about the item’s presence on the premises or they had no control over it; it can be one or the other, and does not have to be both. I will take the give example of shared accommodation, where people share a flat or a house. Clearly, if someone’s flatmate possessed one of these illegal articles and the flatmate did not know about it, or even if they knew about it but did not have control over it—it can be one or the other; it does not have to be both—that would then be a defence available to them. I can certainly give the assurance that he requested.
At the bottom of page 1, the clause provides that where flatmates are sharing accommodation, if one of the flatmates possessed the articles, and another flatmate had nothing to do with any offending and either did not know about the articles—or, even if they knew about them, had no control over them—that second flatmate would not be guilty of an offence, because the defence set out would be available to them. I hope that that gives the shadow Minister the assurance that he wanted.
Dame Angela, shall I save my wider remarks about the clauses for the stand part debate in the second group, or would you rather I addressed them now?
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for his full answer. I am deeply disappointed that I could not draw him on wider issues, but I suspect that on a long enough timeline, he will relent. The Minister must think about the fact that he is tempted to tell us that, on crime, we have never had it so good. That is something that we will test with the general public at some point this year, and he may be disappointed. We are ready on any day of his choosing—the sooner the better.
Alex Norris
That is a very reasonable correction.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, and in particular the comfort on amendments 51 and 52, which relate to clause 1(3) and clause 3(3). I am not 100% convinced that a defendant’s ability to say that an item was not theirs has been removed; they could say that routinely, as they frequently do to police up and down the country in relation to various matters. Nevertheless, we would not want to weaken the defence, and the Minister’s point about that is enough for me to withdraw the amendments.
I am also grateful for the assurance on subsection (4), which it is important to have on the record. This is an issue—perhaps this is not for the face of the Bill—that will have to be thought about in a policing sense. The way the clause draws possession is quite broad: being on the same premises as something that someone used habitually. For example, perhaps a small group of people use a social club routinely and are engaged in a joint endeavour of committing crime. That would be quite hard for the police to identify. Probably the most likely outcome is that all individuals get charged, but there will be challenges. Again, that is probably not for the face of the Bill, but it may be something that the Government need to come back when it comes to its operation as a practical measure. They will need to work with the police to ensure that it is a practical power, because we want it to be used. We do not want the police to think it is too complicated or too broad to use, because it is very important.
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, after “means” insert “—
(a) in England and Wales,”.
This amendment and amendments 15 to 18 extend the offence under this clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for that very good question. These two offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with vehicle theft. The judge or the jury, depending on whether we are talking about magistrates court or the Crown court, have to be satisfied there is a reasonable suspicion that that is what the device will be used for. It is important that the police have the powers to arrest and prosecute people involved in this kind of activity. The offences should help a great deal in stopping these electronic devices getting into criminal hands.
We have talked a little bit about the evidential burden of proof in clause 4, and I will not rehearse those points at great length, in the interests of Committee members’ patience and time. As many of the articles that we are talking about can be used only for criminal purposes, it is reasonable to construct the clause this way. Members of the Committee will recall that we took evidence on this issue from a number of people in law enforcement, including Graeme Biggar, the director general of the National Crime Agency. Law enforcement—both territorial policing and the NCA—strongly welcomes these measures as strengthening the police’s armoury in the fight against organised crime. Through this regulation-making power, Ministers and Parliament will be able to keep up with changes in technology, which is extremely important given how fast technology is moving these days.
Alex Norris
I will start with the Government’s amendments. It is good, in general, for Governments to amend their Bills; it shows that they are still looking at the legislation. We hope to see them show the same flexibility to our amendments in due course. I am grateful for the written explanation the Minister has furnished, although it is possible that my first emotion upon getting dozens of amendments in the week before Christmas may not have been gratitude; I think there might have been a bit of swearing when we got the other set earlier this week, too. Nevertheless, we appreciate the explainer.
As we have heard, Government amendments 14 to 17, 20 to 22 and 41 extend the provisions in clauses 1 to 4 to Scotland and Northern Ireland, which is welcome. A four-nations approach to tackling serious and organised crime is wise. We do not want such activity to be displaced to places that are not covered by legislation, or for areas or indeed countries to be seen as safe havens. That has to be the right thing to do. I hope that the Minister will say a little about the discussions he had with colleagues in Scotland and Northern Ireland to reach this conclusion, and what other work may be done to ensure that the legislation is used effectively.
Having listened to what the Minister said on Government amendments 40, 49 and 44 on proceeds of crime, we are similarly comfortable with the approach being taken with those. As the Minister said, we heard from Graeme Biggar and other witnesses about the importance of the proceeds of crime. These measures would tighten that regime, which is welcome.
I covered most of our views on clause 1 when speaking to my amendments, so I will not repeat them. I will just say that the clause is an important step forward, and something on which we are keen. Clause 2 defines what is meant by “relevant article”. The articles in scope today are 3D printer firearms templates, encapsulators, tablet presses and vehicle concealments. [Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. We cannot have non-Members of Parliament coming into the Committee in that way. I hope we do not see that again.
Alex Norris
During the evidence sessions, we heard about such articles and the fact that they are being used by serious criminals. It is right that we send a signal from this place that those who use or make such things for others to use cannot do so without risking serious punishment. Again, we welcome Government amendment 18, which extends the provisions to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Clause 2(3) gives the Secretary of State powers to vary these articles—to add or subtract from them—through regulations. I will break the habit of a lifetime here, or certainly the habit of the past six and a half years—I promise I will get spicier than this. Over the past six and a half years, I have made countless speeches on the excessive use of Henry VIII clauses in Government legislation. If we added up all the speeches that Labour Members have made over the past six and a half years on that subject, it would be an extraordinary number. Such clauses became a defining feature of legislation relating to Brexit, and their use has become epidemic. Pushing measures that ought to be in a Bill into secondary legislation, so that they are decided on with less scrutiny —for Government convenience, frankly—is generally a bad idea. However, there are contexts where Henry VIII clauses are actually necessary, and I think that this is one of them. [Interruption.] Exactly: we have found the one example.
As we have debated, the nature of serious and organised crime is fast-moving, and the threat is ever changing; we have to be nimble and able to keep pace. It is therefore right that items can be added with a degree of speed. On that basis, we support this measure, although there are other uses that I will challenge significantly later on.
I hope the Minister might be able to give us a little comfort, as we are giving the Secretary of State significant power. Perhaps he could give us a little clarity on how he envisages the power being used. Who would the Secretary of State consult? Is there a commitment to consult? How would decisions taken be reviewed, once they were taken in one of these upstairs Committee Rooms? Is there anything on the watchlist at the moment that may be in scope for this Parliament, or is it not anticipated that this power will be used for the rest of this Session? It is crucial that the power be used effectively and safely, and that the Government engage and are transparent. We welcome the fact that Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland will be consulted before its use—that is a good balance for the devolved settlement—but again, I would like to hear a little more from the Minister on that.
Chris Philp
That sort of interception and insertion is not addressed by this clause, which is about SIM farms and the almost industrial-scale transmission of thousands of messages. What the hon. Lady is describing is a little different. It can happen to emails as well. For example, if someone is about to buy a house, they may be corresponding with their solicitor. When the solicitor tells them to transfer the funds to X bank account, a criminal can insert themselves into the email chain, pretending to be the solicitor, and put in a message telling the client to send the funds to their own bank instead of the solicitor’s client account. Inserting messages into an email chain happens quite a bit, but that is not what this clause is designed to address. The Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), is very aware of the issue because it falls into his portfolio rather than mine. Perhaps I could ask his officials to write to the hon. Lady to update her on the work he is doing with law enforcement on that point, because this clause just does not address it.
Turning back to the group of clauses, it is worth saying that these offences will make it difficult—I hope impossible—for criminals to access and use SIM farms for the purposes of fraud, and the police will be given the tools that they need to disrupt them. Clauses 5 and 6 ban the possession and supply of a SIM farm. However, as I have already said in response to the hon. Member for Bootle, if a person has good reason or lawful authority, obviously that is not criminalised. We have talked a bit about the legitimate use issue already, and there are some examples provided in clause 5, as we have discussed.
I will turn to amendment 47 to schedule 1. Schedule 1 confers powers of entry, search and seizure in relation to these offences. There is an offence of intentionally obstructing a constable when they are carrying out a search—the search is to be unimpeded, obviously . That offence also needs to apply in the case of people who are exercising the power of a constable, such as designated National Crime Agency officers, who are not necessarily constables. Amendment 47 to schedule 1 is a technical amendment that makes sure that all the relevant people can exercise this power of search: not just constables, but any person who is exercising the power of a constable. It is a technical amendment, making sure that it applies to everybody undertaking those searches to hopefully find and prosecute criminals who are using SIM farms. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.
Alex Norris
Fraud is an everyday, large-scale fact of life in this country. According to the crime survey, there were 3.7 million instances of fraud in England and Wales in 2022. Fraud now represents 40% of all crimes. It is an everyday peril that all of us face and from which vulnerable people are clearly at risk.
Furthermore, the National Crime Agency estimates that 86% of fraud goes unreported. That means that victims are unsupported and vital evidence that could break some of the fraud rings goes uncollected. We have to do better and build confidence among the public that fraud is not just a fact of life but that, if they report it, something will happen.
We have to push back on the idea—I hope that the Minister will be very clear about this in his response—that, to some degree, fraud is a lesser crime. When citing the statistics on crime reduction that the Minister cited in his opening speech, about which people say, “Yes, but you have not counted fraud in that”, we have heard other Ministers say—although I do not think we have heard this Minister say it—“Well, fraud is not quite the same as those crimes. It is a lesser crime. It doesn’t feel quite as bad”. That is wrong, and I hope that the Minister will say, on the record, that that is not the view of the Government.
The Chair
I am getting my Alexes mixed up. My apologies to Alex Cunningham; I now call Alex Norris.
Alex Norris
If I were to open my social media accounts now, I think that I would find myself called an awful lot worse than Alex Cunningham, so I have no problem with that at all.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North is absolutely right, though. That sort of action can ruin lives. And it can destroy a business. I probably should not be relying on “Coronation Street” for my arguments, but there is a good storyline about that at the moment. It can ruin a business. We know that there is vulnerability there. For an individual, losing that sort of sum of money—£6,000—could ruin their life. It could jeopardise their housing situation, and it can jeopardise relationships, too—we have seen that happen in the past—so it is very serious. It knocks people’s confidence as well; it makes people not want to engage with others. This is just as important as other crimes, and it is really important that we send out that message.
Part of the reason for the success that criminals have is that they can do mass-scale phishing. That means that, while there are things that we all receive and think, “Well, that’s a pretty crude scam. Who is going to fall for that?”, we know that trying crude and rudimentary things over and over again on a mass scale can, on a long enough timeline, succeed.
That is before we get to the incredibly sophisticated methods that my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle mentioned, and I welcome the response that the Minister gave on that. There is a difference. The Minister mentioned his constituent and Royal Mail. Most of the time, I would look at the link and say, “Well, that’s not Royal Mail.” I would ignore it and move on. But, if I was expecting something from Royal Mail, I cannot tell you with 100% certainty that I would do that. That is the case not least because we always want what is coming: “Where is it? Come on, I’m ready for it.” I can easily see how that mistake can be made, and that mistake could have a profound and long-term impact on someone’s life. It is only possible to do that because of technology that allows relentless and repeated communication attempts, and we know that so-called SIM farms are the way that that is done.
We support the aim behind clause 5 of making an offence of the possession of a SIM farm. I have reservations about the utility of subsection (2), but we have probably tested that debate to destruction. The point that was made about “good reason” was really good. I am slightly uncomfortable with the Minister’s response that the court will set that; I think we could do that. There are legitimate, although deeply irritating, marketing purposes for that degree of communication—it is for others to say how effective it is. Even political parties engage in it sometimes, so bulk text messages are not without precedent. It feels like we can tighten up the clause to specify who can use these things and to what purpose. Again, there will be edge cases that fall between the marketing of a bad product and the marketing of a fraudulent product. There is a difference between those things. People have a right to advertise a product that is not very good. We would not want to consumer it, use it or buy it, but they can do that. That would be at the edge of the cases we are talking about here, so we need greater clarity, and perhaps the Government can tighten that up before Report.
Clause 7 introduces schedule 1, which is amended by Government amendment 47. The schedule relates to the offence of obstructing a person in their endeavours to investigate possible offences under clauses 5 and 6. The effect of the amendment is that a person cannot obstruct someone other than a constable as that search warrant is being executed. Again, we do not have a problem with that—people need to comply with the provisions of the law—but we need a bit more clarity. I do not say this to be smart; I just want to understand it. The Minister characterises this as a technical amendment, which is a term of art in this place. Was there a drafting error or does it genuinely not change the substance of this provision? I do not think the intention is for lots and lots of people to have the ability to exercise these powers. It is tightly defined, and those who are not constables who can do this will be accompanied by a constable, but we could do with a bit more clarity.
Finally on this topic, part of the challenge we face is that although some of these enterprises will be set up in this country, they can also be set up and executed from other nations that have weaker arrangements than we will have, assuming this legislation passes. Will the Minister tell us about the conversations the Government are having with European and global partners about this, and give us some information about where the hotspots are so that there is greater public awareness?
Chris Philp
Let me respond to one or two of the issues that the shadow Minister quite reasonably raised.
Fraud makes up about 40% of all criminal offences—the figure I have in my mind is 41%. The hon. Gentleman is right that it is incredibly serious, and I have certainly never suggested anything to the contrary. It can devastate people’s lives. People who have worked hard over a lifetime building up their life savings to fund their retirement or their children’s education can suddenly have them taken from them in very distressing circumstances, so there is no question but that fraud is an extremely serious crime. The Government take it extremely seriously, which is why there is a fraud action plan, backed with investment—we recently provided over £100 million of extra money.
I was one of the Ministers through whose hands the Online Safety Act 2023 passed during its extremely lengthy gestation. It will have a significant effect by requiring the large social media platforms to proactively take steps to prevent fraud. Some of them have already done that voluntarily, and there have been big reductions in the amount of online-originated fraud, so this is a huge priority.
The simple reason we do not include fraud when comparing the overall crime figures to 2010 is that it got picked up by the crime survey for England and Wales, alongside computer misuse, only in about 2016. If the figures going back to 2010 existed, we would obviously include them. When we talk about a 56% reduction in crime since 2010 to on a like-for-like basis, which I am sure I will be referring to once or twice in the next year, it excludes fraud and computer misuse only because they were not in that series of figures.
Chris Philp
I will in a moment. When we compare the crime figures since 2016, we see that overall crime has fallen. For example, overall crime including fraud and computer misuse has fallen by 10% in the last year, which I am sure the shadow Minister is about to stand up and welcome.
Alex Norris
I gently say that, in their attempts to create a picture of community safety—which is not what people feel—there is a problem in Government Ministers relying on statistics that they know to be incomplete. There should be some reflection on the numbers cited. I understand the like-for-like point—that is true—but it is problematic to tell the public how much safer they are if that argument relies on excluding a significant and growing type of crime. That must be wrong.
Chris Philp
It is not reliant on that. It is simply that the data does not exist. The chief inspector of constabulary Andy Cooke said in his state of policing report last June that we are arguably safer than we have ever been before. If we look at the crime types for which we do have continuous data going back to 2010 and before—such as burglary, robbery, the vehicle theft figures that the shadow Minister himself quoted recently, violent and seriously violent crime—we see that all of those individual crime types have fallen dramatically.
Chris Philp
We have already discussed that technological change can be very rapid, and that criminals, including fraudsters, are quite technologically literate and very often embrace emerging tech capabilities to attempt to defraud the public. Just as we previously discussed in relation to articles used for serious and organised crime, so here, in clause 8, we are proposing to create a power by regulations for the Secretary of State to make a list of new items that might be prohibited where they can be used for the purposes of committing crime by way of electronic communications.
As the shadow Minister has said, one has to be a little cautious about conferring regulation-making powers too freely, so there are constraints on this. For example, the offences created using these regulation-making powers can only create summary offences of possessing or supplying technology to be used in connection with fraud facilitated by electronic communication. It is very specific and very narrow.
The shadow Minister previously asked about consultation. I said that there was no statutory requirement to consult on those extensions—outside of the devolved Administrations, of course—but that the broad intention was to do so, unless there was a very good reason otherwise, such as an emergency. Here, however, we do have a statutory duty to consult. Members will find it in clause 8(5), which states that
“the Secretary of State must consult such persons appearing…to be likely to be affected by the regulations”.
There is therefore a statutory obligation to consult here, which I hope provides the shadow Minister with the assurance that he is probably about to ask for.
Alex Norris
I am afraid that clause 8 deeply frustrates me. I do not think it is in any way the same as clause 2(3). That provision allows the Secretary of State to add items to and remove them from an established list concerning an offence that is established in law on the face of the Bill. This is slightly different. Clause 8(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations create a summary offence of possessing or supplying an article specified in the regulations.”
That is making a law, not monitoring a list. This is an example of a Henry VIII power used badly. The provision should be in the Bill, and if the nature of the networks is likely to change over time, there should be a mirroring power, similar to that in clause 2(3), that enables us to change the list. We would have supported that. This puts us in an invidious position. Of course, we want this to be in legislation and we want there to be regulation and control over electronic communications networks or services being used in a dangerous way. However, we are being asked to jump into the abyss and to choose between either voting against including in the Bill something that we think is broadly a good idea, or allowing the Government to do an incomplete job and leave a placeholder. Even as I stand here, I am not sure which is the right answer.
I welcome the fact that consultation is on the face of the Bill. That gives us some degree of safeguard. However, accepting the clause would mean accepting that a significant offence would be created and decided upstairs, rather than in the white heat of the legislative process. I do not think that is right. I am not sure if the Minister is able to say anything that will give me slightly greater comfort. If we were able to see what the offence looked like between different stages of a Committee, that would probably be enough to salve my pain. I do not think that will happen, but I will listen to what the Minister says.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his question. I point to the way the clause is constructed. Clause 8(2) is narrowly defined, in that is says:
“An article may be specified only if the Secretary of State considers that there is a significant risk of the article being used for a purpose connected with fraud that is perpetrated by means of—
(a) an electronic communication network, or
(b) an electronic communication service.”
Clearly the Secretary of State’s decision would be amenable to judicial review if it were unreasonably exercised. The scope of the ability to create a new criminal offence is highly circumscribed and it has to fit within that narrow box in the Bill.
Alex Norris
I accept that that is circumscribed; it is not narrow. However, electronic communication networks constitute an exceptionally broad area of British life, touching us every minute of every day, and that does not feel very narrow at all.
Chris Philp
That is only part of the circumscription, because prior to that the clause says,
“being used for a purpose connected with fraud”.
If we think about that as a Venn diagram, the shadow Minister is right to say that electronic communication networks and services represent an enormous field. However, that is not where the power is created. It is created in the intersection between that bit of the Venn diagram and the bit where the article or technology is being used for a purpose connected with fraud, and that intersection is a lot smaller.
I do not think that any member of this Committee or any Member of Parliament, of either party, would object to criminalising technology being used for a particular fraudulent purpose. In addition to the protection afforded by the statutory obligation to consult, there is also the fact that this can only be a summary offence, which severely limits the maximum penalty that may be applied.
Alex Norris
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is being very generous. I completely agree that there is not a person in this building—including, I suspect, the mice on the Terrace—who think that it is a bad idea to have powers that restrict fraudulent use of electronic communications. The problem is that in the previous debate the test for that was good reason and then we would rely on the court. In the eyes of Government, therefore, it is clearly not black and white whether it is fraud and they may well rely on others to define that. In order to get through the blockage, perhaps the Minister could think about that in the context of the assurances he gave on good reason to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. That would probably be enough for me at this point.
Chris Philp
I can certainly confirm that where someone possesses technology for a good and legitimate reason, by definition it would not be getting used for a purpose connected with fraud. I can also confirm that where someone possesses communications technology for a legitimate purpose and not for use in connection with fraud, we would not expect that to ever be criminalised, either through offences created via this clause or in any other way. I hope that assures the shadow Minister.
Subsection 4 says:
“The regulations may—
(a) contain exceptions or defences”
of exactly the kind that we have created in clauses 1 to 4 already.
I hope that the assurance I have given, which will be in Hansard, combined with the narrow nature of this, the narrow scope of the ability to create offences, the statutory duty to consult, and the fact that it is a summary offence, meaning that the maximum term is six months at the moment—all those things taken together—will give the shadow Minister assurance on the questions that he is raising.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Possession of weapon with intent to use unlawful violence etc
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 53 in clause 9, page 6, line 24, at end insert—“(c) a sword.”
This amendment would make clear that the bladed articles in scope include swords.
Alex Norris
Clause 9 introduces a new offence of possessing an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent to use unlawful violence. Knife crime is a scourge in this country. It devastates communities and families. It feels that we have a steady drumbeat of tragic cases, which, as I say, have a devastating effect, and it is right that we are taking action to do something about it. We should want to take action. This is not new; it feels to some degree that we have been spinning our wheels on action, but we are here now, so let us take that on its face.
The Government consulted in April last year on restricting the possession of so-called zombie knives and have announced on multiple occasions that they plan to enact such restrictions. I hope the Minister will give some clarity but, from the explanatory notes, I think that this is an attempt to make good on that. Paragraph 45 of the explanatory notes says:
“Following the closure of the consultation in June 2023, the Government published its response in August 2023. In that response, the Government committed to implementing all the proposals.”
Those are the proposals relating to restrictions on so-called zombie knives.
“Clauses 18, 10 and 9 give effect to those requiring primary legislation”.
I hope the Minister will be able to say whether this is the final stage of the ban’s implementation. Previously, we have been expecting secondary legislation in this regard.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for that commitment. Currently, it is an offence to carry an article with a blade or point of over three inches, with the exception of a pocket-knife, in a public place. It is also an offence to threaten somebody with an offensive weapon and to carry in public any article intended to be used as an offensive weapon. As we understand it, the introduction of this new offence bridges the gap between threatening someone with a bladed article and being in possession of such an article.
Again, we support the intention to close the gap and ensure that we crack down on this scourge. Sharp instruments or knives are currently responsible for 41% of homicides, so clearly the police need stronger powers to deal with that. However, we think that the Government could go further and be clearer about what blades or weapons should be covered by the new offence. That is the effect of my amendment 53. Secondary legislation may be the place for that, rather than the Bill, but I do not want to miss the substance of amendment 53.
In recent years, there has been progress on banning certain weapons used in violent attacks. We have debated measures, for example, on adding knuckledusters, sword-sticks and now zombie knives to the list of offensive weapons. That progress is welcome, but again it does not go far enough because with increasing frequency supposedly decorative blades, such as ninja swords, are being used in violent knife attacks. It is vital that we update legislation again to include blades such as those.
The impact of my amendment would be to add swords to the list. I am perfectly aware that the Bill may not be the most elegant place for it, but what I am trying to get from the Minister is a commitment to extend the ban to swords. Recently, I met the family of Ronan Kanda and their Member of Parliament, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). They told me their story and about their campaign for justice. Ronan, a beloved son and brother, was just 16 years old when he was walking back to his home in Wolverhampton after picking up a PlayStation controller from a friend’s house. Just a few yards from his front door, Ronan was attacked from behind by two 16-year-olds carrying a machete and a ninja sword. Ronan was stabbed twice, suffering wounds to his back and chest. Tragically, he died at the scene.
It was later revealed that the perpetrators of this heinous act had mistaken Ronan for someone else and that he was not the intended target. The weapons used in the attack had been bought online by the perpetrators—just 16 years old themselves at the time—using another person’s ID, and had been collected from a local post office by them on the day of the attack. In July this year, they were sentenced to 18 and 16 years in prison for their crime.
When I met Ronan’s family recently, it was clear that what happened had shaken them to their core. It has had a devastating impact on their lives. I commend their unspeakable bravery in campaigning to try to create change as a result. I felt very guilty—this will happen with many others, too—that they had to tell their story yet again when I met them; there is that process of telling the story all over again in the pursuit of change. The family campaign now for ninja swords, the type used in Ronan’s murder, to be taken off the streets so that other families do not suffer such a loss. I again commend their extraordinary bravery.
The test that I will apply to the Government’s changes on zombie knives, and on broader knife crime, is whether they would take off the streets a weapon like the one that killed Ronan; if not, the changes will fall short. Existing legislation does not cover ninja swords, and nor does the Bill. From the Government’s response to the consultation on knife crime, I understand that they intend to stop short of ninja swords. I believe that to be a mistake, which will be compounded by other restrictions.
Leaving the ninja swords loophole in place will push sales and marketing towards ninja swords—if people cannot buy a zombie knife but can buy a ninja sword, that will displace activity and make the swords more likely to be carried. That risks more lives being lost, due to the lesser consequences for carrying.
Amendment 53 would add ninja swords explicitly to the Bill. We think the clause is good and important, but the amendment would enhance it. I know that an issue has been raised about ninja swords for decorative purposes, but I do not think that it is beyond us to have arrangements for when that can be managed. Again, the clause is not about possession—it is narrower: about the intent to cause unlawful violence—so I do not think that issue should be a concern, although there could be some sort of licensing scheme to address it.
I am very much looking forward to what the Minister says. This is not a criticism, but I just do not understand why in his plan he stopped short of ninja swords. I hope to get that clarity. Even if not today, the Government need to move on this. I hope to hear that that process is starting.
Chris Philp
It may be helpful to clarify the two different kinds of provisions that apply; the shadow Minister was conflating the two slightly. The first area, the one that we are debating, is to do with the existing offence of possessing any bladed article in a public place without good reason. That can include a legal kitchen knife. That carrying is a criminal offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998. That applies to every bladed article, even ones that are legal, such as a kitchen knife or anything else. It also applies to swords, including ninja swords, because they are bladed articles with a sharp point.
At the moment, the possession of any such knives, including so-called legal knives, carries a maximum sentence of up to two years if someone is caught in possession. For a second possession offence, the mandatory minimum is six months in prison, absent exceptional circumstances—we tightened that up in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That is the law for possessing blades in public.
The clause states that when someone possesses any bladed article—including a legal kitchen knife—with intent to cause damage, the maximum sentence will not be two years, as currently, but four years, if that person intends to cause harm. For example, they might put a video on TikTok saying, “I’m going to stab X”. If there is intention to cause harm, that doubles the maximum sentence. That is what the clause does. The amendment to include swords is not necessary, because every bladed article, including swords, is already included.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North was actually talking about a different set of provisions, which were included in our consultation and our response: banning certain kinds of knives. When a knife is banned, it cannot be sold, imported or possessed even in private. Something such as a zombie knife was covered in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, where it has threatening writing on the blade. Such knives cannot even be held in someone’s home. Having banned knives at home or selling them to anyone is an offence; a kitchen knife can of course be sold and had at home, but even a kitchen knife cannot be carried down the street without a good reason.
In our consultation, we were talking about the knives that people cannot even possess privately at home; they cannot be sold or imported, and they are completely prohibited. The measures we announced in the Bill will simply increase the list of things on the completely prohibited list. For example, a loophole in the 2019 Act meant that threatening words on the blade were required for the zombie knife to be illegal. We are removing that provision, so that any zombie knife, even with nothing on the blade, will still be illegal—common sense, really.
Those changes—widening the range of knives that will be completely illegal—will be made not through the Bill, but through secondary legislation that will be laid before the House in the near future, by which I mean a small number of weeks. I do not wish to provoke the ire of the Chair, so I should say that the place to debate what should be in and out of that list is probably in the Delegated Legislation Committee that will come soon, in a small number of weeks.
I thank the shadow Minister for mentioning the case raised by his right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). I have also met Ronan’s family, who were brought into Parliament by the right hon. Member. We obviously both heard the same account of their story. It was extremely moving and tragic that such a young life was lost. I think it was a case of mistaken identity—as the shadow Minister said, Ronan was attacked from behind. I add my tribute to the family, and to Ronan’s mum and sister in particular, who have recounted the terrible, traumatic event to try to improve law enforcement in this area. We are mindful of that case, and I look forward to debating what is on and off the list when we come to it.
For complete clarity, I repeat the point that the possession of any bladed article, including swords and even kitchen knives, in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of two years. When a knife is possessed with intent, as in the attack on Ronan—the two youths obviously intended to go and kill someone, although it was someone else—the clause increases the maximum sentence from two years to four years. In that case the youths clearly committed homicide, which obviously has life as a maximum sentence.
I hope that I have provided clarity about the purpose of the clause and explained why the change is necessary, because it is included already, and that in secondary legislation we are altering the law on completely prohibited weapons. That will happen in a small number of weeks. I hope that addresses both the hon. Gentleman’s amendment and the substantive provisions in clause 9.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the clarity on what will be covered under the provision. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment. I must say that I am a bit frustrated: it was not clear from the explanatory notes whether this was the full ban. Clearly, from the answer that I have been given, it is not. However, it is a shame that the change will come in secondary legislation, because we are here now—we have legislation in front of us—and we cannot amend secondary legislation.
There will be a big debate in the Delegated Legislation Committee on the point about swords. We will be put in an invidious position, because of course we will not vote against the secondary legislation, but we will not be able to get the change that we really want and we will continue to miss out. The Government’s approach is slightly frustrating. The commitment that the secondary legislation is coming shortly is good, but I hope that the Minister will use the time to reflect on my point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question accordingly agreed to.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Sixth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsThursday 11th January 2024
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 January 2024 - (11 Jan 2024)
The Chair
I thank the Minister for that point of order.
Clause 10
Maximum penalty for offences relating to offensive weapons
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 10, page 7, line 28, at end insert—
“(2A) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019—
(a) In section 39(7), omit paragraph (a) and insert “on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both)”
(b) In section 42(10), omit paragraph (a) and insert “on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both).”
This amendment would increase the penalty for delivering bladed products or articles to someone under 18 from just a fine.
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Bardell, and to resume proceedings. They were very good-natured this morning, and I am sure they will be similarly good-natured this afternoon.
Clause 10, like clause 9, relates to the Government’s consultation on banning or restricting sale or possession of knives. As we did this morning, we support that important venture. Clause 10 increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of importation, manufacture, sale and supply, and possession of a weapon, flick knife or gravity knife. This is a welcome change that we support. We must send a clear message that those who commit such offences, whether to supply offensive weapons or to profit from them, are not beyond the reach of the law.
It is also welcome to see that these offences will be triable either way, and therefore to provide the police more time to investigate alleged offences without the pressure of the current time limit of six months for prosecution. It is right that we give the police the flexibility to ensure that they can gather the necessary evidence to secure convictions and ensure that the full impact of these changes can be felt. Clause 10, taken with clause 9, is very much a step in the right direction.
I want to use this opportunity to press the Minister, through amendment 54, on an area that I think is missing from the Bill: proper age checks for those who are buying bladed products. Again, similar to the debate we had on clause 9, it may be that the Government want to look at this issue in a different way. As it stands, age checks must be carried out on delivery of bladed products to ensure that those receiving such items are of the correct age, but too often we hear of incidents where that has not happened, and the consequences can be fatal. This is an area worth revisiting.
I refer back to the case that I raised this morning: the tragic murder of Ronan Kanda. During the trial of those convicted of Ronan’s murder, it was revealed that the weapons used in the attack had been bought online by the perpetrators. They were just 16 years old, so they should not have had those products. They used another person’s ID and collected from the local post office on the day of the attack. Those are breaches of the law in and of themselves, which led to a devastating breach of the law later that day. The age verification process clearly failed there, and just hours later there were tragic consequences. This is just one incident, but it is part of a wider problem, which, if we do not have really good controls on, could mean knives and blades falling into the hands of children who cannot have, or have not, thought of the danger to themselves and others that comes with such weapons. We know that a failing process creates that vulnerability. It is a weakness in the legal framework.
Amendment 54 therefore seeks to raise the penalty—from just a fine—for those who deliver bladed products or hand over bladed products or articles to someone under 18. It would increase that penalty, which I believe would create more rigour in the age check. That in turn should help prevent knives from falling into the wrong hands; it could address that weakness. This issue is perhaps a good reminder of the challenges that our shopworkers face, although we have tabled new clauses that I suspect might give us the chance to discuss that matter, so I will not do so today.
Being able to verify someone’s age and deny someone a knife they are trying to buy seems like a friction point to me, so it is right that there should be counterpart legal support, but that that really good quality verification must happen, or there is real danger. My attempt to have age checks carried out diligently is one way of doing it, but it is not the only way. Campaigners rightly want this change. If it is not to be this change on the face of the Bill, I hope we might hear from the Minister about how it can be strengthened and how we can ensure really good confidence in that verification process.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out his amendment and his views, as he did this morning in such a thoughtful and considered way.
I turn first to the substance of the clause. It increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of possessing, importing, manufacturing, selling or supplying prohibited offensive weapons when they are sold to those under the age of 18. We take seriously the sale of knives to under-18s, so the increase in the penalty from six months to two years is important.
We do not want people under 18 to be sold knives; we have heard about all kinds of tragic examples of them using knives to commit homicide. On 27 September, a tragic case in my own borough, Croydon, involved a 15-year-old schoolgirl, Elianne Andam, who was brutally murdered with a knife at 8.30 in the morning. The alleged perpetrator was himself only 17 years old. Preventing such knives from getting into the hands of young people is critical. That is the purpose behind the clause.
The clause relates to selling knives to those under 18, but the amendment speaks to a slightly different point: delivering knives to those under 18. Delivering something is obviously different from selling it. If someone is selling it, they are a shop, a retailer, and the person responsible for the transaction. Acting as a delivery agent—whether the Post Office, FedEx, UPS or some such—means delivering a parcel on behalf of someone else, which is a slightly different responsibility. That is why the law as it stands sets out in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 some measures to address the issue. The delivery company must have arrangements in place, together with the seller, to ensure that the items are not delivered into the hands of someone under 18. The penalty for delivery is an unlimited fine.
Some new guidelines have been set out by the Sentencing Council. They came into force on 1 April 2023. Organisations now face fines with a starting point of between £500 and £1 million. That is a starting point, so they can be very substantial fines indeed when applied to a corporate body. Individuals can, of course, be fined as well. It is important to make it clear that corporate bodies can be liable for such fines, as I said a second ago, because they are obviously capable of paying much larger amounts of money than an individual.
Amendment 54 raises an important issue. The case that the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred to is relevant—I completely accept that—but I think that the changes made in the Offensive Weapons Act and the Sentencing Council guidelines that came into effect less than a year ago strike the right balance on the delivery of such items. For the sale of items, however, we are increasing the custodial maximum up to two years.
In addition, the provisions of the Online Safety Act, which will be commenced into full force once the various codes of practice are published by Ofcom, will place duties on things such as online marketplaces, which historically have not been regulated. Online marketplaces have been facilitating, for example, the sale of knives to young people or the sale of illegal knives—the kind of knives that we are banning. Those online marketplaces will fall into the remit of the Online Safety Act, so the online space will get clamped down on a great deal.
Chris Philp
On the sale, it could be either an individual who makes a sale and/or the business. A defence of coercion is available generally, however—I am not sure whether it is in common or statute law. If a shop worker were coerced into selling something, or compelled to do so in some way, that might be a defence if they were accused. Coercion certainly would be a defence in that case.
The increase in the maximum sentence up to two years makes a lot of sense. I have referred to the provisions in the Online Safety Act. On delivery—when someone is simply delivering as opposed to selling—the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 broadly strikes the right balance, but I certainly agree with the shadow Minister that anyone involved in the supply or delivery of knives has a very strong moral obligation, in addition to the legal ones I have set out, not to supply under-18s, because we have seen very tragic consequences, such as the cases in Wolverhampton and Croydon, and tragically many others as well.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the Minister’s answer, which has given me a significant degree of comfort. The point we will hold under review is the nature of delivery companies and the nature of their employment. Some of that is third party and some involves self-employment, which has been a matter of debate in this place on many occasions. I fear that that weakens to some degree the chain of accountability. Nevertheless, very significant fines are in place, as the Minister said. I wonder whether a custodial sentence backstop would strengthen the provisions a little further, but given that the current guidelines are relatively new, as the Minister said, we ought to give them time to work.
The point about online marketplaces was important and has been of interest to the shadow Home Secretary. We are very keen that that should happen as soon as possible. We are grateful for that assurance from the Minister. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Encouraging or assisting serious self-harm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 11, page 8, line 23, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”.
This amendment and amendments 24 and 43 extend the offence under this clause to Northern Ireland.
Jess Phillips
The Minister and I have had some back and forth on this. I rise really to hammer home the point regarding the good intentions of the clause, but the need to think about it in the context of a domestic abuse, grooming or sexual violence situation. It is undoubted in any professional’s mind that one of the consequences of violence, abuse and coercion against an individual, specifically in young women, is self-harm and suicide.
As the Minister rightly says, it is important that we recognise that in the vast majority of cases self-harm falls short of suicide. There is a huge amount of self-harm going on across the country, genuinely encouraged as a pattern of domestic abuse, and we need to ensure that this piece of perfectly reasonable legislation, which was designed for those on the internet trying to get people to be anorexic and all of that heinous stuff, which we are all very glad to have not had to put up with in our childhood—I look around to make sure that we are all of a relatively similar age—also covers that.
There is one particular risk: how does the clause interact with institutions? Perhaps the Minister could assist me with that. The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, a Home Office Minister, is sat in front of me. I was a few minutes late for the sitting this morning because I was in court with one of my constituents in a case—I am afraid to say—where we were on the other side from the Home Office. My constituent literally had to take medication during the court proceedings, such is the mental health trauma that has been caused to her by the Home Office. I wonder how this piece of legislation might be used. I suppose I worry that there is too much opportunity for it to become useful, in that there are so many ways in which institutions and individuals cause people to end up in a self-harm and suicidal situation. I seek clarity on that, unless Ministers wish to be found wanting by the Bill.
Alex Norris
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley for offering a powerful dose of reality about what is happening and the risks. We know that abusers will find every possible gap and try to use them to perpetrate their abuse and these heinous crimes. We must follow them and close those gaps the best we can—or, even better, get ahead.
Clauses 11 and 12 make good the recommendations of the Law Commission in its 2021 “Modernising Communications Offences” report. The Minister described that as important and I echo her comments. The clauses also finish what was started during consideration of the Online Safety Bill. We supported it at that point, and the Bill was well scrutinised, so I will not rehash that debate.
The Government amendments extend the provisions to Northern Ireland. I wonder whether there is a different story about Scotland, because most of the Government amendments expand provisions to Scotland as well as to Northern Ireland. I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on that.
I will finish on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about institutions. Throughout my time in Parliament, the issue of conversion therapies has been at the forefront. We wish that we were getting on with banning them today—goodness knows how much longer we will have to wait—but we know that very harmful self-harm practices can be part of those therapies. Will the Minister say, in responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, how accountability will fall in cases like that? That is important; if there is a gap for a certain organisation, perhaps we need to return to this. It might be that we will be assisted by the provision in clause 14 that, where a significant senior person in an organisation commits a crime, the organisation can be held accountable. Perhaps that is the way to close the gap—I do not know. I will be interested in the Minister’s view.
Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)
My hon. Friends the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Minister have made excellent points. Once we go into this, we start to find that there are areas we need to think out a bit more clearly. We may have to come back to this in due course, potentially in future legislation.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley prompted me to think about the headteacher who committed suicide following an Ofsted inspection. The coroner’s court directly attributed that—partly, at the very least—to the institutional impact that that organisation had on her. Does my hon. Friend the shadow Minister agree that these are very important matters that we have to think through? Once we have let this issue out of the bag, so to speak, we have to very carefully consider the implications further down the line in terms of institutional abuse, because that is what it amounts to.
Alex Norris
I am really grateful for my hon. Friend’s contribution. I think that is exactly right. We will hear from the Minister in her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley where the Government settle on that point. Certainly on the face of the Bill, institutions are left out. I do wonder whether clause 14 would give us the opportunity to reconnect institutions. I suspect that is not the motivation behind that clause, but it may work in that way. Those are pertinent questions that I am sure the Minister is about to address.
Laura Farris
A number of very good points have been made and I will try to respond to all of them. On Scotland, the offence relates to devolved matters, but Scottish Ministers have decided that the broader offence should not extend to their jurisdiction. They are sticking with section 184 of the Online Safety Act for now. That is why the amendment does not extend the offence to Scotland.
Let me turn to the point that the shadow Minister and the hon. Members for Birmingham, Yardley and for Bootle all made about the ambit of clause 11(1). If I may recap what I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, I think it is absolutely possible that some forms of domestic abuse will fall under the provisions of clause 11. She gave a good illustration of where that might occur. As I have said already—I hope I satisfied her with my answer—I think there is almost no circumstance where the clause would not be read or even pleaded in tandem with the Domestic Abuse Act. It will be a compound offence, and the charge sheet will have more than a section 11 offence if it occurs in the context of an intimate relationship or a former relationship. Conversion therapy was raised, and I think it is possible that that could fall within the ambit of clause 11 too. It is quite obvious how that could be the case.
Alex Norris
Clause 13 is right and is a welcome addition, so I do not have much to say about the two lines that form it. I will keep my powder dry for my amendments to the schedule that the clause introduces, which is where the action is.
New clause 20 is a welcome addition to the debate and would be a welcome addition to the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley says, some people get forgotten in our discussions. The point of having a diverse Parliament that represents the country that we serve is that we try to work that out, but we all have a responsibility to step up and meet the moment. I will be interested to hear what the Minister says about the new clause. When we talk about intimate photos or films, the question is: to whom is it intimate? The new clause—and we—say that it is intimate to the person who has suffered that photo or filming, and who is being threatened with the sharing of those images. It is intimate to them, rather than to the perpetrator. Nothing could be clearer than that in the horrible case that my hon. Friend raises. We support the new clause, and I hope that the Minister does, too.
Laura Farris
I am very sensitive to the issues that have been raised and will respond to them, but I will also explain why we do not accept the new clause.
We have steered very close to the course recommended by the Law Commission in what we have defined in law as an intimate image. It includes anything that shows a person who is nude or partially nude, or who is doing anything sexual or very intimate, such as using the toilet. It is a wider definition of “intimate” than was used in the revenge porn provisions under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. We have expanded it, but we have confined it to what we think anyone in this country would understand as “intimate”.
One of the challenges in adopting a definition of “intimate” that includes, for example, the removal of a hijab is that we are creating a criminal offence of that image being shared. It would not be obvious to anyone in this country who received a picture of a woman they did not know with her hair exposed that they were viewing an intimate image and committing a criminal offence. The Law Commission has made very similar points in relation to showing the legs of a woman who is a Hasidic Jew, or showing her without her wig on. This would be grotesquely humiliating for that victim, but that would not be completely obvious to any member of the public who might receive such an image of them.
Laura Farris
I have probably gone as far as I can. There are no circumstances in which Georgia Harrison’s case would not be covered by the provision that we are discussing. The other person can be a current partner or an ex, or there can be no relationship. [Interruption.] I know that the hon. Lady is talking about a different category of case. I wonder whether one of the problems in the case that she raises is the adequacy of the police response, rather than whether an offence exists for it. It is difficult, in drafting legislation, to create a category of offender when an image would not be recognised as being intimate by everybody in the United Kingdom. On that basis, with great respect, I am afraid that we would have to reject her new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 82, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained intimate photograph or film
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A publishes, hosts or makes viewable a photograph or film of another person (B) which has been obtained (1) unlawfully under sections 66A, 66AA, 66AC or 66B, subject to the provisions of sections 66AB and 66C.
(2) For the purposes of this part, “publishing, hosting or making viewable” includes—
(a) physical or online publication, and
(b) uploading to a user-to-user service,
(c) in relation to owners or administrators of a user-to-user service, allowing public access to a photograph or film uploaded by another person, and
(d) maintaining or providing for the presence or availability of a photograph or film by any other means or in any other place, whether or not such service or access is conditional on the payment of a fee.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make it an offence to make publicly available, either through publishing or online hosting, intimate photographs or videos which have been obtained unlawfully.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 57, in schedule 2, page 82, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Faking intimate photographs or films using digital technology
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A intentionally creates or designs using computer graphics or any other digital technology an image or film which appears to be a photograph or film of another person (B) in an intimate state for the purposes of—
(a) sexual gratification, whether of themselves or of another person;
(b) causing alarm, distress or humiliation to B or any other person; or
(c) committing an offence under sections 66A or 66B of the Sexual Offence Act 2003.
(2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) A had a reasonable excuse for creating or designing the image or film, or
(b) that B consented to its creation.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make the creation of ‘deepfake’ intimate images an offence.
Alex Norris
Clause 13 and schedule 2 are important steps forward in tackling the abhorrent practice of taking intimate photographs without consent. As we have heard, the Bill introduces new offences to criminalise taking or recording intimate photographs or film without consent, and as the Minister said, an offence of installing equipment to enable the taking or recording of intimate photographs or films with the intention of committing an offence. As we have heard, these measures build on the progress made by the Law Commission’s review of legislation on the non-consensual taking and sharing of intimate images; we should thank it for its important work.
As the Government have said today and previously, their intention is that the provisions will put in place a clearer and more comprehensive legal framework that will broaden the scope of intimate image offences, so that all instances of intentionally taking or sharing intimate images without consent are criminalised, regardless of motivation. We very much support that. My amendments are an attempt to improve that and to ensure that the police and courts have the right tools at their disposal to bring the perpetrators of such terrible acts to justice.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
I am very sympathetic to the hon. Member’s point about deepfake intimate images, but I wonder why he does not extend the provision further to what might be embarrassing images. We are in a room full of politicians who are about to go into a general election. Deepfake images of prominent politicians at rallies, for example—such as a leading left-wing politician being seen at a far-right rally in a deepfake—would be just as damaging to people in public positions, without necessarily being intimate. Does the hon. Member feel that the amendment could extend to that?
Alex Norris
The hon. Member for Wyre Forest makes a very good point. The reason that I stopped short of doing that is that I was trying to stay within the “intimate” framing, but he is absolutely right. As we go into an election year, we will see, both in the States and over here, that being a real challenge to our democracy and to how we conduct campaigning. This provision would certainly not be right for it, but a new clause might be. That is good inspiration from the hon. Member, and I am very grateful for it.
The Committee heard about this during the evidence sessions for the Bill. Dame Vera Baird, the former Victims’ Commissioner, made the point very powerfully. She said that this use of deepfakes
“needs making unlawful, and it needs dealing with.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 62.]
Indeed, she said she could not understand why they had not been banned already, and I agreed with her on that point. Amendment 57 is designed to address that. It will make it an offence for someone to intentionally create or design
“using computer graphics or any other digital technology an image or film which appears to be a photograph or film of another person...in an intimate state”,
whether that be for “sexual gratification”,
“causing alarm, distress or humiliation”
or offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The amendment is an important addition to what we have. Some important progress was made with the Online Safety Act 2023, but I think this finishes the job. I am interested in the Government’s view on whether where they went with the Online Safety Act is where they intend to finish, as opposed to going that little bit further. I will close on that point, but I will be very interested in the response.
Jess Phillips
I rise to support both amendments, and, in fact, what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said as well. No one should have the ability to host an image of a person that they did not want out there in the first place. Unfortunately, what people tend to get back is that it is very difficult to place these things, but all sorts of things around copyright are traced on all sorts of sites quite successfully. We put a man on the moon 20 years before I was born, and brought him back. I reckon we could manage this and I would really support it.
Turning to the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the issue of faking intimate images, I am lucky enough to know—I am almost certain that most of the women in this room do not know this about themselves—that deepfake intimate images of me exist. As I say, I am lucky enough to know. I did not ever once consider that I should bother to try to do anything about it, because what is the point? In the plethora of things that I have to deal with, especially as a woman—and certainly as a woman Member of Parliament in the public eye—I just chalk it up to another one of those things and crack on, because there is too much to be getting on with. But on two separate incidents, people have alerted me to images on pornographic websites of both me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner); they have a thing for common women, clearly. There is nothing that even somebody in my position can do about it.
The first time I ever saw intimate images of me made on “rudimentary” Photoshop, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North called it, if I am honest, like with most abuses against women, I just laughed at it. That is the way we as women are trained to deal with the abuses that we suffer. They could only be fake images of me, because, unlike my children, I do not come from an era where everybody sends photos of everybody else naked. As a nation, we have to come to terms with the fact that that is completely and utterly normal sexual behaviour in the younger generation, but in that comes the danger.
The reality is that this is going to get worse. Rudimentary Photoshop images of me were sent to me about five years ago, or even longer—we have been here for ages. Covid has made it seem even longer. The first time I saw fake images of me, in a sexualised and violent form, was probably about eight years ago. Over the years, two, three or four times, people have sent me stuff that they have seen. I cannot stress enough how worrying it is that we could go into a new era of those images being really realistic. On the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I have heard, for example, two completely deepfake recordings of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that were put out and about. To be fair to Members on the Government Benches, they clearly said, “This is fake. Do not believe it; do not spread it.” We must have that attitude.
However, it is one thing to stop something in its tracks if it is the voice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras saying, in that instance, that he did not like Liverpool, but that is nothing compared with the idea of me being completely naked and beaten by somebody. It is like wildfire, so I strongly encourage the Government to think about the amendments and how we make them law.
Alex Norris
Now I have to work out something to say. There was certainly a degree of bravery in saying to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that there is a belief that there is a robust regime in place— I thought I could hear steam coming out of her ears. It is a given that we all share a view, but that does not mean that that is necessarily reflected in output at the moment. [Hon. Members: “Keep going!”] It is very important that what is in the Bill reflects what we are trying to solve, and I am concerned that at the moment it does not, but the Minister clearly takes a different view.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his forbearance. Just to pick up on that point, I think he is right to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on the commencement of the Online Safety Act, because it is all very well having these provisions in law, but if they are not actually operational, they are not doing any good to anyone. I accept that tacit criticism as it may be advanced. I recognise that implementation now is critical; commencement is critical.
I will disclose the question that I put to officials. I was interested in the question of what happens if, for example, a schoolboy creates a deepfake of another pupil and does not share it, so that it is not covered by the Online Safety Act but is none the less an offence. I am told that that is covered by two separate bits of legislation. One is section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which includes making indecent images of a child, including if that is a deepfake, which would be covered by the statutory language. The second provision is section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is possession of any indecent image of a child and would include where it had been superimposed.
I am satisfied that the current law, including the Online Safety Act—I have already accepted that there are commencement issues—deals with deepfakes. I am sensitive to the prosecutorial difficulties that I have identified and I think that these are covered, particularly by the Online Safety Act. We accept the Law Commission’s very careful work on the issue, which was a detailed piece of research, not just a short paragraph at the end. On that basis, I very respectfully urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw or not press the amendments.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. She is making very, very good ones, as she always does. That is a legitimate challenge. I just would also ask her to bear this in mind. She has heard our answer. First, we are accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation for now. Secondly, we think the Online Safety Act covers what she has described in terms of sharing. The third point that I draw her attention to is the pornography review launched today. That is a critical piece of work, and she made the good point that we focus extensively on children. There is a really important element of that.
First, we know that there is a dark web element where a lot of online pornography is focused directly on child pornography. We also know that adult pornography not only contributes to the pubescent nature of abuse that we see in the violence against women, but also violence against women much more widely. I have spoken about this; the hon. Lady has spoken about this—we have been in the Chamber together numerous times talking about it. I hope that that review will get on top of some the issues that she is raising today. I hope she will accept our gentle refusal of her amendment and maybe consider withdrawing it.
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point about copyrights, which was absolutely bang on the nose. We should not give any succour to any platform telling us that this is too hard to do. All we need to do is, on Saturday, sit with our phones at about 3.15 pm and wait for someone to score in the premier league. We will be able to see that goal for about 90 seconds—someone will share it because it is watchable in other countries. Within 90 seconds, however, we will no longer be able to watch it and it will say, “This is no longer available due to a breach of copyright”. That is how quick it is—no more than 90 seconds. This absolutely can be done when the stakes are considered high enough.
I am grateful that my hon. Friend was willing to share her personal experience—I did not know whether she would choose to or not. Again, what she has to put up with is extraordinary and would test any human being. I am often amazed by her strength to carry on, but those people do not know the person they are taking on. But that is no excuse and gives no cover. This penalty is being exacted on her for a supposed crime: yes, it is for being a prominent person in politics and yes, it is for holding strong views on the left of politics. But the real crime, at root, is that she is a woman. I do not have a public platform like my hon. Friend’s, I am absolutely delighted to say. If I did, my treatment would be entirely different because I am white and I am a man. This again has to be seen through a gendered lens, and we have a responsibility to protect women in this regard.
I will refer to a couple of points that the Minister made. First, on hosting, we will see about this robust regime. I would be keen to know either today or at another point how soon these provisions are going to be turned on. They need to be turned on and used, otherwise they are of absolutely no use to anyone. We will see. It is reasonable for her to want that regime to have its chance to operate. I accept that and withdraw amendment 56 on that basis. But we will see and we will certainly come back.
Similarly, on deepfaking, I know the Law Commission chose not to go into this space, but its report was not carved on tablets of stone. We are allowed to go further if we think that the case is there. [Interruption.] I do not share—my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley is going to have steam coming out of her ears soon—much of a concern around overcriminalisation in this space. That just does not connect to reality. [Interruption.]
The Chair
—informative and important. I would be very grateful if she could save them up and use them in her interventions so that we get them on the record, rather than overhearing them from a sedentary position, if she would be so kind.
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend is not operating “Weekend at Bernie’s”-style—I promise. That is a dated reference. She talked about people being the same age, so maybe that will be the test of that.
We will welcome the point around children, but it must be seen in the context of what my hon. Friend said. The Minister has said she is satisfied on both points. We say, “We will see whether that holds”. We need those provisions to be enacted and to see the laws on the statute book used properly on deepfakes, otherwise we will have to return to this point. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
A mendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 48 in schedule 2, page 85, line 32, at end insert—
“Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)
1 In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 177D insert—
‘177DA Photographs and films to be treated as used for purpose of certain offences
(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under section 66AA(1), (2) or (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (taking or recording of intimate photograph or film).
(2) The photograph or film to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 177C(3) (and section 94A(3)(b)(ii)) as used for the purpose of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring).’”
This amendment amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the amendment to the Sentencing Code made by paragraph 19(2) of Schedule 2 to the Bill.
Chris Philp
I hesitate to say that these are technical amendments; given the shadow Minister’s comments this morning, I do not want to unduly provoke him. However, this series of amendments simply extends some of the measures within the Bill to the service police —the military police—of all branches of the armed forces and to the service justice system. The relevant measures are: the power to seize bladed articles, contained in clause 18; the power to enter property to seize stolen goods without a warrant, contained in clause 19; the power to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing, contained in clause 22; and making grooming a statutory aggravating factor for sexual offences against a child, contained in clause 23.
Amendment 48 to schedule 2 also ensures that the offences relating to intimate images provided for in the schedule also fully read across to the service justice system. Our armed forces do incredible work, of course, but we must ensure that the law applies to those serving in uniform as much as to members of the public. That is why we are proposing these important—although also technical—amendments.
Alex Norris
We are getting to the witching hour on a Thursday, but the Minister tempts me around technical amendments. The point that I was making earlier was merely about whether we were using the same definition. I would also perhaps dispute that a technical amendment could be “important”, because I think that, at that point, it would cease to be technical. However, as I say, I think that that is a distinction of classification rather than substance, and that these are sensible amendments—although I would not say that they were technical. There are other issues that will come up in those later clauses that the Minister mentioned, but we will debate them, I am sure, in due course.
Amendment 48 agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14
Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The identification doctrine is a legal test used to determine whether the actions and mind of a corporate body can be regarded as those of a natural person. The concept has existed in common law since 1971, but, since then, companies and corporations have grown in size and complexity, which has made it more difficult to determine who a controlling mind might be. That means that employees of large corporations with significant control over business areas are none the less not considered sufficiently controlling under that common-law legal test originally dating from 1971. Therefore, the corporations for which they work might not be held criminally liable where we think they should be.
Substantial progress was made to address the issue in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, which put the identification doctrine on a new statutory footing, making provisions to ensure that corporate liability can exist where a senior manager commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority. However, because of the scope of that Act, it only applied to economic offences.
During the passage of that Act through Parliament in the last calendar year, the Government committed to expanding the statutory identification doctrine that I have just described—the expanded version that applies to large companies and the many senior managers in them—to all kinds of crime. Clause 14 makes good on that Government commitment by repealing the relevant sections of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and replacing them with the identification doctrine applying to all crime and not just economic crime.
I am sure that all of us here want to make sure that when large corporates commit offences, they are held to account and prosecuted. The common law provisions, dating back to 1971, are too restrictive. They do not go wide enough or reflect the fact that modern-day corporations have quite a few senior managers taking decisions. The clause takes what has been done already for economic crime and applies it to all criminal law. On that basis, I hope it commands the immediate and enthusiastic assent of the Committee this afternoon.
Alex Norris
I am not sure what “immediate” means in that context—must I instantly print off clause 14 and staple it to my back? Nevertheless, we support the clause. We supported similar provisions in the passage of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and this finishes off the job. It is actually very pertinent to the week we have had in Parliament, because it is safe to say that this week has been dominated by the outrage about the Post Office/Horizon scandal. There is a legitimate expectation among the public and in this place that when such things happen, individuals and entities will be held accountable, so I do not think we will find much to disagree with. Obviously, the provisions will not apply in the case of the Post Office/Horizon scandal, but they will do so in the future.
The Post Office/Horizon scandal is exceptionally important. There will be others that come through and find their moment, for whatever reason—whether they relate to Hillsborough, Primodos, sodium valproate, surgical meshes or anything covered by the Cumberlege review. We need much quicker action. The Post Office/Horizon scandal is ongoing, presumably because the major elements of perpetration have already taken place. They would not be in scope of the Bill, so I would be interested in the Minister’s views. Other than that, I am happy to give the clause our support.
Chris Philp
In common with most legislative provisions, these provisions are prospective, rather than retrospective; we legislate retrospectively only rarely. I understand that some Post Office-specific measures may be brought before Parliament. There will be ample opportunity to debate them and to seek to right the very grave injustice that has clearly been committed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Seventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Seventh sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsTuesday 16th January 2024
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 January 2024 - (16 Jan 2024)
Chris Philp
As I just set out, drug testing might be done, particularly if the inspector thinks that drug abuse might have contributed to the offending. If someone is on drugs that are causing them to commit domestic abuse, I am sure we would all want that identified so that action can be taken.
On the hon. Lady’s point about homicide versus manslaughter, that is not in the scope of this Bill—we are not making any changes in that area. I do, however, share her concern about the cases of people who murder their partners. We should not be somehow excusing their behaviour or seeking to diminish their culpability by saying, “Oh, they’re on drugs,” and getting the charge dropped from homicide to manslaughter. Although that is not the topic of this Bill—the Bill makes no changes as far as that is concerned—I share the hon. Lady’s concern. I hope that the legal community have heard the point that she has just made, with which I have enormous sympathy. I think it sounds reasonable.
The safeguards for the new power include that it can be used only by approved constables; that the statutory PACE codes of practice must include provision about how the new drug testing power is to be exercised; and that the sample may be taken only for the purpose of a drug test. That is to ensure that the power is used proportionately and only by those with appropriate experience.
The individual being tested must also be given a notice setting out why, when and where they were tested, and the result of the test. Following a positive test, a person can be required to attend an assessment with a drug-support worker, as is the case with the current drug testing regime. Non-attendance without good reason will itself be an offence. We will probably debate Opposition amendment 133 later; that tries to go further on this issue.
The trigger offences and specified controlled drugs will be set out in secondary legislation. The Secretary of State will, in line with the regime for drug testing in police detention, have the power to specify in regulations those trigger offences within the scope of drug testing in locations outside of custody, and the controlled drugs to be tested for. Such regulations will be subject to the affirmative and negative procedures respectively. That will ensure appropriate parliamentary scrutiny and allow for the regime to be varied if circumstances require.
The amendments also make various—I hesitate to use this term after the comments from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, last time—technical and consequential amendments; I think we should excise the word “technical” from our discussions in future to avoid triggering the shadow Minister. The amendments make various important and consequential changes to ensure that the drug testing regime outside of custody has the same legal effects as drug testing in police detention.
In talking through the amendments, I have explained the intent behind clauses 15 to 17. I will rest my remarks there and reply later to any further points raised in the debate.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
As we have heard, clauses 15 to 17 expand police powers to test for drugs in suspects who have been arrested and are in police detention. Drug testing on arrest was originally introduced as a police power under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, which inserted sections 63B and 63C into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That legislation gave the police the power to drug test those arrested if aged 18 and over, or charged if aged 14 and over, for the presence of specified class A drugs if arrested or charged either for a trigger offence or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has reasonable grounds to suspect that specified class A drug use has caused or contributed to the offence and authorises the test. Trigger offences include theft, handling stolen goods, going equipped for stealing and possession of a controlled drug if committed in respect of a specified class A drug. We know that such offences have a significant link to substance misuse. Clause 15 expands police powers to test not just specified class A drugs but any specified controlled drug.
We were very keen on such measures 23 years ago in relation to class A drugs, and we support their expansion to include any specified controlled drug; my anxiety stems from the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned, we heard in the evidence session and we know from engagement with our local police forces that there is not likely to be the capacity to do this effectively.
The Minister said that there are record police numbers, but he knows that there are 10,000 fewer police in neighbourhood settings. His pushback to that in previous debates has been to classify response police as neighbourhood police, but they would certainly not be able to do this type of activity. The burden of proof is on the Minister and the Department to show where the capacity will come from. We have real doubts, although we hope the measure will work.
Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the measure seems to be in contradiction to the position that many police forces are in? Because they lack resource capacity, they are withdrawing from dealing with issues relating to mental health and are saying, “We don’t have the capacity to do it.” Does my hon. Friend agree that this measure will put more pressure on police forces at a time when they are having to withdraw from some operational interventions?
Alex Norris
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Routinely or in extremis, demand pressures can push officers to do just the basics—keeping people safe and putting people in detention—rather than dealing with the broader issues, as we want them to. That problem creates further issues, and that is a challenge for us all.
Chris Philp
On that point, it is important to clarify the reason we are introducing the national partnership agreement, which applies Right Care, Right Person across the whole of England and, we hope, Wales too. Following a successful pilot in Humberside, it was found that in many of the mental health cases that the police were dealing with there was no criminality and no threat to public safety, so a police response was not right for the person suffering the mental health crisis. Not only was that taking up lots of police time that should have been spent doing other things, such as dealing with drug offences, but the person suffering a health episode was not being properly treated. It was found in Humberside that it is better for everyone, including the patient, to get a medical response in those circumstances. That is the motivation for the national partnership agreement, which the hon. Gentleman just referred to.
Alex Norris
The evidence from Humberside was strong and gave us encouragement to expand the scheme nationally; the challenge will be whether we see the same level of thought in its implementation across the country as we saw in Humberside. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle said, the risk is that forces will apply the scheme by simply not responding or turning their phone off, and displacing the activity. Humberside is a really good example of something done thoughtfully and well, but we should not assume that we will see that nationwide.
Peter Dowd
On the point that the Minister made in his intervention, does my hon. Friend agree that the issue is circuitous? The reason why the police were involved in mental health interventions in the past, although they are pulling away from them, was that there were such strains and stresses on the health service and local government that they had to fill the gap. Does my hon. Friend agree that this is getting to the farcical stage, with gaps in resources left, right and centre?
Alex Norris
Sadly, it has been a defining feature of the past nearly 14 years that we have been left dealing with significant issues such as substance misuse at the latest and most expensive stage, and that is particularly pertinent in policing. We deal with mental health issues, to the degree that we do deal with them—certainly for children and adolescents, that is definitely not the case universally—at the point of crisis. We do not have earlier interventions.
My amendment 133 seeks to add a little bit of that back in. It is a point of agreement across parties that, if individuals are in custody for crimes that they are alleged to have committed and they test positive for substances in their system, then that support is necessary—it is critical—to stop their drug use and hopefully change their life. My amendment refers to that, and I will get to that in a second. Currently, under the Drugs Act 2005, an individual who tests positive for a class A drug may be required to attend an individual assessment relating to their drug use and possibly a follow-up assessment. I think that we can go a little further than that, as my amendment does.
Chris Philp
No, it would not count. For the police to exercise the proposed power, they must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the item is likely to be used for an unlawful purpose. I do not think there would be any reasonable grounds to suspect that kitchen knives hanging on the wall of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley would be used for an unlawful purpose. By contrast, if the police were in the residence of a known prolific drug dealer and gang member, drugs had been recovered from the premises and they had been arrested or convicted for previous violent offences, that would be an instance where a quantity of knives—perhaps different knives beyond kitchen knives—would meet the threshold that I just set out. I hope that sets out the rationale.
In his evidence to the Committee on 12 December, Chief Constable Gavin Stephens, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, said that giving the police this power is
“a very important preventive measure.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 11, Q18.]
That is why are seeking to introduce the provision, justified in the way that I have set out. If somebody believes that their property—their knife—has been seized in error, they will be able to make a complaint to the police, as with any other police matter. In addition, we are providing a right of appeal in court to have the item returned, if the court agrees. If somebody did unreasonably seize the kitchen knives of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, she would be able to complain to the police in the first instance. If they did not address her complaint and return the knives, she would then be able to go to the court and get them returned.
It is also important to say that there is no additional power of entry associated with the new power. The police would need to be in the property lawfully, which, presumably, would also not be the case in the hon. Member’s house. For example, they would need to be there as part of an investigation into an unrelated matter or invited into the property. We will amend code B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to ensure that the codes of conduct reflect the new power, so that it is used in a fair and reasonable way.
Finally, amendment 32 is a minor technical amendment —we must not forget that—which clarifies that for the purposes of clause 18(8)(b), the final determination of an application includes the determination of any appeal. This provision will help the police to take dangerous knives off the street, or out of people’s houses, even if they are legal, where they are suspected of being used for unlawful violence. It is a useful additional power. The police asked for it in their evidence to the Committee, and I hope that it will command cross-party support.
Alex Norris
This provision is to some degree the less controversial—though not unimportant—counterpart to clause 19, so I will keep some of my arguments for the next debate. The Minister wants cross-party support and he will secure it on this matter. The consequences of the clause will be that if a constable is lawfully on a premises and they find a bladed or sharply pointed item that they think might be connected to unlawful violence, they can seize the article. It passes an important test, which I think about quite a lot: if I had to explain to my constituents that the reverse were true, would they think I am an idiot? In this case, I think that the test is passed. If bladed or pointed weapons that might be used for unlawful violence are found during a lawful visit relating to another purpose, they absolutely should be seized. It is in the public interest.
We will discuss this point in the next debate, but it is important that the principle of search warrants is upheld, and that they have a definition; they cannot be used for fishing trips or exploratory trips. Nevertheless, when these sorts of items are found, we must be able to take them out of use. I am interested in whether the Minister thinks there is a need for training or awareness among officers. We could apply a Phillips test quite easily: if someone has a knife but they do not have any food or a kitchen, that is probably a bad sign. That in itself is possibly not the quality of regulations a Secretary of State might wish to set, so I would be interested to hear how the Minister thinks that might work.
I am grateful for the clarity that clause 18(1)(a), which states,
“is lawfully on the premises”,
means that the power applies on any visit, for whatever purpose, whether that is a search warrant or a response call. I do not disagree with that, but it is important that we state that. It is important that it is understood. It must be demoralising for staff to visit for a certain purpose—say, on a search warrant—and then to have people there laughing at them because they cannot withdraw from circulation some dangerous weapons. I think, therefore, that the provision will be welcomed by officers as well.
Chris Philp
I will briefly reply to a couple of the questions. We propose to use the same processes already in place for property that is seized. There is a very standard form and process that the police routinely use, and the same would apply here. The hon. Gentleman asks about subsection (7), on the basis on which a court might hear an appeal, and about paragraph (b) in particular, which appears towards the top of page 14. The subsection states that the court may make an order if it appears to it that the person is the owner and that
“it would be just to make the order”.
The hon. Gentleman askes what that means. I think the meaning is that the test set out in subsection (1)(c) is met—that is to say, there are
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant article would be likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence”
were it not seized. I think the test of whether the decision to seize and retain the blade is “just” essentially refers back to the test set out in clause 18(1)(c). It would seem reasonable that if that is the statutory test that the police officer applies when deciding whether to seize the knife, one would expect the court to apply precisely the same test, and that is how, therefore, I would expect the court to apply the term “just”. I hope, should there be any ambiguity, the transcript of this answer will assist the court in interpreting the use of the word “just” in what will be section 18(7)(b).
Amendment 32 agreed to.
Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Stolen goods on premises: entry, search and seizure without warrant
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(8) A constable may search a specified premises for specified items without obtaining authorisation under subsection (1) if the constable believes that the search is necessary for the effective identification of stolen goods.
(9) If a constable conducts a search by virtue of subsection (8), they shall inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector that they have made the search as soon as practicable after the completion of the search.
(10) An officer who is informed of a search under subsection (9) shall make a record in writing—
(a) of the grounds for the search;
(b) of the nature of the items sought;
(c) confirming that the officer would have given their authorisation under subsection (2) had the constable sought it.”
This amendment aligns the power given under Clause 19 with that in section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and enables a police constable to undertake a search for stolen goods without a warrant without obtaining authorisation from a superior officer.
Clause 19 is one of the more significant clauses. It introduces very significant new powers of entry, search and seizure without a warrant. That is not without controversy, as I think we will cover in the next three debates. Amendment 2, which proposed to leave out clause 19, has not been selected for debate, but it is worth noting that it received quite a lot of signatures spanning a very broad range of parliamentarians across the Conservatives, the Lib Dems and the Democratic Unionist party. Clearly, a significant range of colleagues with significantly different world views are discomforted by these provisions. That is always an interesting and important sign that we should get something right.
Again, I subject this to what my constituents think and the conversations that I have had with them in the past. So many items are now fitted with a GPS or geolocation tracker, but it is a matter of considerable frustration and no little confusion that the fact that we know where an item is does not provide appropriate grounds for a constable to retrieve it. That is deeply frustrating and, as we have seen in the explanatory notes and heard in the evidence sessions, is a problem that the clause seeks to solve.
The clause inserts into the Theft Act 1968 proposed new section 26A, which confers power on a police officer to enter and search any premises for stolen goods without a warrant. Under the current provisions in the Theft Act, a warrant would have to be issued by a magistrate before such a search could take place. Given the nature of the enterprises that pinch digital technology or expensive bikes, or that may even be stealing cars to order, we know that that delay involved could mean that our response is far too late and that the moment for retrieval, for detection and perhaps for breaking up an organised group of criminals has been missed.
Clause 19 goes on to state the parameters for the new power whereby the need for a warrant can be bypassed—namely, that a police officer of at least inspector level must authorise a constable to enter premises and search for the specified items, in this case stolen goods. It also sets out the conditions—namely, that the police officer of at least inspector level must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the items have been stolen, that they are on the premises and that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant without frustrating or prejudicing the search—and that authorisation can be oral or written. Again, this process seems reasonable, given that the crime that it is concerned with often involves the rightful owner having that degree of tracking information and being able to provide it to the police, showing the precise location of the stolen goods, but at present the police cannot do anything about it.
There are certain checks and oversights. A uniformed constable must conduct the search; it must happen within 24 hours of authorisation, although I suspect that such searches will take place much more quickly than that; and it must be done at a reasonable hour. Again, in principle we support these measures; without wanting to prejudge the stand part debate, I need to establish that context before I can turn to my amendment.
The current process for obtaining warrants to search properties for stolen goods with tracking information can be an inefficient use of police and magistrates’ time. It hampers investigations and allows criminal enterprises to benefit from their activities, using the slowness of the authorities to do things much more quickly, and obviously we know that that can have a knock-on effect for further crimes as well.
An interesting point was well made in the evidence session when we heard from Superintendent Nick Smart of the Police Superintendents’ Association. He challenged the Committee about why the Bill appeared to sit differently from existing powers set out in section 18 of PACE. Amendment 61, which I have tabled, sets out to probe that issue.
Section 18 of PACE allows entry and search without the prior authorisation of a more senior officer, provided that it is after an arrest and the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that there is evidence on the premises being searched relating to the offence that has been committed, or to a connected offence. Therefore, there is precedent in current legislation for entry and search without a warrant or prior authorisation, and section 18 of PACE allows for consent to be sought afterwards, with a senior officer at the rank of inspector or above having to sign off on that, saying that they would have authorised the search if they had been there in that moment. That is also an important caveat.
Amendment 61 merely seeks to align the powers in clause 19 with similar powers in section 18 of PACE. The reason I think that would be quite helpful is that it would be more consistent from an officer’s point of view. I do not think that we would want officers to think, “Ah, am I using section 19 of the Criminal Justice Act or section 18 of PACE?” and therefore asking, “Can I, or can’t I?” The possibility for error is quite clear there.
More importantly, however, I think there would be some clarity for the public, too, because, once again, just as it would be challenging but not unreasonable to ask for officers to be very conscious of the different sections of the powers that they are using—of course they need to know that, although there are times in the heat of the moment when mistakes could happen—I do not think it is reasonable to expect members of the public to hold such things in their minds.
Therefore, consistency in the regime used is important; I think that was the point that Superintendent Smart was making, which is probably a good one. I want to press the Minister as to why that approach was not taken and why his approach is better.
Peter Dowd
Amendments 61, 58 and 59 are linked, but I will speak first to amendment 61, a thoughtful amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North.
I want to address an issue relating to the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European convention on human rights into UK law, with particular reference to section 6, “Acts of public authorities”, which came into force in October 2000. I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am concerned, for the purposes of the amendment, the right to respect for private and family life informs the relevant police powers and sets them in context.
Article 8 of the convention states:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
As paragraph 2 above sets out, it is unlawful under the Act for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with the convention right, unless it is compelled or permitted by statute to do otherwise. There is an excellent lecture by Robert Walker entitled “The English Law of Privacy: an Evolving Human Right”, which is well worth a perusal. I am sure that everyone in this room agrees, notwithstanding the current debate among some Government Members in relation to the ECHR more broadly, that article 8 is pretty uncontentious. What is perhaps more contentious is where it is breached. It is important that we keep that in mind.
Chris Philp
I very much welcome the Opposition’s support for the principle behind clause 19. As the hon. Member for Nottingham North mentioned, some people—a small number, I would add—have expressed reservations, but I am glad that we agree on the principle that the clause will help police officers to retrieve stolen goods; our constituents will welcome that. Amendment 61 aims to fine-tune the detail of how that is done. In fact, it goes a little further in its drafting than the Government are proposing. The hon. Gentleman referred to section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, noting that in some circumstances constables can enter premises without a warrant or prior authorisation from a more senior officer. He seeks to implement the same thing via his amendment.
The difference, however, is that under in the PACE provision the police must either suspect that a person is on the premises or be in pursuit of a particular person, whereas clause 19 is about stolen goods. Of course, individuals are a little more mobile than stolen goods: a stolen mobile phone, iPad or car can be moved, but that requires a person, whereas if the police think a person is in the premises, they can leg it pretty quickly. We do not need prior authorisation from an inspector under section 18 of PACE, because that relates to a person the police are after, whereas in this case we are talking about stolen goods. If the police think that there are both stolen goods and a person, the PACE provisions will apply and they can enter the premises without a warrant and without prior authorisation. The reason that we have built in the little extra step of prior authorisation by an inspector is that we are talking just about stolen goods, not about a person.
I can assure the shadow Minister that inspectors are used to authorising the use of various police powers—that is relatively routine—and inspectors are always available in each relevant area 24 hours a day, so there should not be any particular delay. We think that the clause is ECHR-compliant, and of course on the front page of the Bill there is a statement under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act that in the view of the Secretary of State, its provisions are consistent with our ECHR obligations—a topic that may be debated on the Floor of the House today and tomorrow.
It is very welcome that the Opposition support the clause in principle. I do not think that the calibration of the inspector’s prior authorisation will cause any delay practically. Because we are going after goods and not people here, I think the balance is right. While welcoming the Opposition’s support for the clause in principle, I therefore gently resist their amendment.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. His points about human rights are really important. In this Committee, and during the Bill’s remaining stages in this place and down the other end of the building, we will have to fine-tune—I think that is the phrase he used—the balance of these provisions.
The Opposition certainly do not support routine warrantless searches, just on spec, of people’s lives, premises or property. We have to find a balance; that is why we have a warrants regime. If there are cases—I think that the clause provides us with one—in which it is reasonable to set that to one side, we must do so in a tightly defined and clearly understood way. I do not want to start the next debate prematurely, but that is very much my view, and I will be pressing the Minister further on it.
I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation, which is enough to give me comfort. It is slightly strange to hear conversation about the ECHR up here in Committee, given what we will hear downstairs on the Floor of the House this afternoon, but that is for others to debate. For the purposes of this debate, what the Minister said is a helpful caveat. What I offer perhaps would go further, and given that we are moving gently into this space, perhaps it is not wise to go the whole way. I suspect that this might have to be kept under review. The Minister talked about property not being fast-moving. Perhaps that will be tested by time, but at this point I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 58, in clause 19, page 16, line 24, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must, as soon as is practicable after a period of two years from the date of Royal Assent to this Act, lay before Parliament a report on the implementation and utilisation of the police powers introduced by this section.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the police’s use of the new powers of entry, search and seizure.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 59, in clause 19, page 16, line 24, at end insert—
“(4) The College of Policing must exercise its powers under section 39A of the Police Act 1996 to issue a code of practice in relation to the use of powers introduced by this section.
(5) In drawing up the code of practice under subsection (4), the College of Policing must consult with such individuals or bodies as it sees fit.”
This amendment would require the College of Policing to publish a code of practice on the use of the new powers of entry, search and seizure.
Alex Norris
There are considerable concerns about clause 19, as colleagues have demonstrated by tabling amendment 2. As far as amendments to Bills tabled by people who are not Committee members go, the range of signatories to amendment 2 is interesting. It shows that there is interest from a wide range of colleagues with a wide range of world views, so it is important that we take the time to look at the matter properly.
We should be honest that allowing warrantless searches is a significant change. Search warrants are a well-established and well-understood part of our law and policing processes. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North mentioned how all-pervading they are in media and on television. There is a widespread acceptance and understanding of “You’re not coming in if you don’t have your warrant,” and that sort of thing. It is important that we in this place provide clarity and leadership, and that if we want to set that regime aside we explain how we will do it and what it will mean. We have to balance that against the public’s very reasonable expectation that we should use new technologies to get their things back.
I hope to hear from the Minister that the Government’s view is that this is a very narrow power for a narrow set of circumstances, that it is not a significant change to the search warrant regime in this country, and that people should understand that warrants are the default, primary and most important way for law enforcement agencies to enter their property. I hope to hear that this is a de minimis power that will be utilised in a targeted way for a specific purpose. I believe that to be the case, and I think that that is what came out of the evidence sessions, but I hope that the Minister will put it on the record.
Amendments 58 and 59 are designed to give the powers some shape, assurance and guardrails so that members of the public and interest groups watching our debates know that we are not just signing off on the Bill and forgetting about it, and that Parliament takes an active interest in seeing how and whether it works.
Amendment 58 would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report on the use of the powers within two years of the Bill’s Royal Assent. That would give us in this place a chance to have some oversight and scrutiny of what has happened. It would get the Government to state on the record, in an indisputable way, whether they feel that the powers have or have not worked, so that there can be an assurance of ongoing parliamentary interest. It would perhaps give us a jumping-off point to change direction if needed. Again, I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views. If he is not minded to accept the amendment, how will the Government keep track? How will Parliament get the chance to have its say about the effectiveness or otherwise of the new provision?
We will file amendment 59 under no good deed going unpunished. We heard typically excellent evidence in our session with Chief Constable Andy Marsh, the chief executive of the College of Policing. He said that there is an issue with the provisions in the Bill: the technology is not perfect. If someone has lost their phone or tablet and finds out that it is in their house, pinpointing it becomes quite the scavenger hunt, because the technology is not that accurate. Some of the inbuilt technology might be better than some of the trackers that are appended to an item, which can have varying ranges and be imprecise. There could also be challenges if someone is living in shared accommodation, because it might not be clear which room or dwelling an item is in or, if the building has multiple enterprises, which one is holding it. The technology is not so good that those concerns are removed.
My suggestion, which mirrors one of the Government’s ideas in clause 73, is that we ask Chief Constable Marsh and his College of Policing to issue a code of practice on the use of the new powers of entry, search and seizure. We should be very clear about what it is for and what it is not for, which would give confidence to colleagues and the wider public. This is primarily a conversation about technology, but not exclusively so. Again, there will be frustration if someone comes to us and says that their distinctively designed guitar is in the window of a pawn shop. It is deeply frustrating that the police have very little power to recover that item, so providing some shape through a code of practice would be helpful.
The code of practice ought to state—perhaps the Minister will say this himself in his response—that the purpose of the clause is not to change our warrant regime, but to ensure that a stolen item has some degree of locator or physical differentiator, so that it is known to be in a certain vicinity and it is not reasonable to think it could be anywhere else. That is the narrow circumstance under which the power should be used. That is certainly our view on how broad it should go. I think it is probably the Government’s view as well, and I hope to hear that from the Minister. Either way, my amendments seek to give the powers guardrails. I hope that they will be agreed to on that basis, but if not, I hope that the Minister will tell us what guardrails the Government have in lieu to ensure that the power is effective and retains public confidence.
Chris Philp
Let me respond briefly on amendments 58 and 59. Amendment 58 asks for review. Members of the Committee will know that review and scrutiny of statutory powers happens on a regular basis. The Home Office collects and publishes more data on the use of police powers than it ever has before. There are plenty of opportunities for Members to scrutinise the use of powers both via written questions, oral questions, the Select Committee, and so on and so forth, but critically the normal post-legislative review of the Act will happen three to five years after Royal Assent, as is usual. The scrutiny of how this works in practice will happen through those mechanisms, particularly through the post-legislative review that always happens three to five years after Royal Assent. A range of scrutiny mechanisms exist beyond that. The police are not under-scrutinised.
On amendment 59, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee, particularly the shadow Minister, that we intend to update PACE code B, which covers police powers of entry, search and seizure, to give a clear statutory guide—even stronger than the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice—on how best these powers should be used. Under section 66 of PACE, there is a requirement for us to do that. We are of course happy to do it, but we do not actually have any choice; it is a statutory requirement under section 66. That will include the new powers covered in clause 19 of the Bill. We will work with the college to ensure that any supplementary guidance it issues on these new powers reflects the wording of updated code B, but updating code B is compulsory; we have to do it. It is statutory, and I can confirm that we will comply with our statutory obligations. I hope that addresses the issues raised by amendments 58 and 59.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for colleagues’ contributions. My hon. Friend the Member for Bootle raised a couple of points. We must always hold in our head how things will operate in practice. What is in the Bill is in the Bill but often what happens in that moment—perhaps a moment of challenge or conflict at 11.30 on a Friday night—can feel very different from what is in the Bill. We ought to hold practical operations in our head, which is what we have been seeking to do.
The Minister addressed my hon. Friend’s point about stepping back and scrutiny to some degree, which was very welcome. I feel a certain degree of risk saying in an election year—obviously, I aspire to swap places with the Minister by, say, this time next year—that this may come back with a degree of interest. In this place in general, we are getting better at pre-legislative scrutiny, but I do not think that has been the norm. Notwithstanding what the Minister said about post-legislative review, I do not think that we do that very well, certainly not in Parliament. In fact, it is largely something we do not do.
We are lawmakers, and the temptation to make law and fill the parliamentary time will always be there, but very rarely do we go back and ask of something we tried three to five years ago, “Did it work? And if it didn’t, why? Did we need to do more law? Was it right to have done this by regulation rather than primary legislation?” It could be that people like me, who by nature are perhaps more interventionist than other colleagues in the room, might think, “Perhaps that was the wrong time to intervene.” It is about all those things. I do think we do that process very well, because we basically do not do it at all.
I have a degree of confidence. I am grateful for what the Minister said about post-legislative review, but I suspect that will be more of a departmental and less of a public exercise. There is something about being willing to own our errors in our proceedings that is good for public confidence—when we are willing to do it. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Similarly on amendment 59, what the Minister has offered in lieu on PACE code B is better than my proposal, so that is a very good deal indeed. On that basis, I am happy and willing not to press my amendment.
Perhaps the Minister, being a diligent student of Parliament, is saving his powder for the stand part debate, which is probably right given the gusto with which I entered the stand part debate during the debate on amendment 61. I really hope to hear in the stand part debate clarity from the Government that this is seen as a tightly-defined variation of the search warrant regime under a very tightly-defined set of circumstances. We have not yet heard that. We are about to debate the clause, and although I dare say we have covered most of it, so it may only be a short debate, we really need to hear that message.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We have touched on many of these issues already, so I will not speak at great length on clause 19 stand part. Suffice to say, our constituents expect the police always to follow up leads where they exist, particularly to retrieve stolen goods, whether mobile phones, e-bikes, cars or whatever it may be. As members of the public and as parliamentarians, we expect the police to always follow those leads. Just a few months ago, the police made a national commitment to do precisely that. An important part of that is the ability to retrieve stolen goods where their location is known or reasonably suspected. With technology now, many items—mobile phones, cars, and so on—have tracking devices, and the public are rightly frustrated if the police do not always follow them up.
This power enables the police to respond quickly to retrieve stolen goods where they have reasonable grounds to believe they know the location. Quite often, those stolen goods move very quickly indeed. For example, the thief may take them off to sell them, and therefore there is often not enough time to go through the process of getting a warrant. The police may want to act in a manner of minutes or hours. In investigatory principles, there is the concept of the “golden hour”, talked about by Chief Constable Andy Marsh, now chief executive of the College of Policing. That first hour is really important. Even the best magistrates court in the world will not be able to respond in an hour to authorise a warrant, but a phone call to an inspector can be done within that golden hour. That is why we are making these changes.
This is only one part of the police commitment to always follow all reasonable lines of inquiry. For completeness, I will mention the use of facial recognition technology. Where there is a photograph of somebody committing a crime on CCTV, Ring doorbell, dash cam, or someone’s phone, we expect the police to always run that through the facial recognition database, but that is a separate element of their commitment.
It is important to ensure these stolen items are recovered. It is more than irritating to our constituents when the police do not always follow them up. This legislation will give them the power to act quickly and decisively where needed, and I think it is balanced and proportionate. Historically, we have required warrants—unless the police are in pursuit of a particular individual, as we debated previously—but we think this strikes the right balance.
On the commitment the shadow Minister asked for around the scope of this provision, the circumstances in which this power can be used are clearly set out on the face of the Bill. I draw the attention of the Committee to clause 19(2); subsection (2) of proposed new section 26A of the Theft Act 1968, sets out very clearly when this power can be used. The conditions are that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that, first,
“the specified items are stolen”,
secondly, that
“the specified items are on the specified premises”,
and thirdly, that
“it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant…without frustrating or seriously prejudicing its purpose”
—that is, a concern that the goods may be moved on before a warrant can be obtained.
The scope of this power is very clearly defined on the face of the Bill, and I think strikes the right balance. The evidential test the police have to meet is that they have reasonable grounds to believe that those three things are met. The wording uses the formulation “and”, so it is not just that any one of them have to be met; all three have to cumulatively be met before the provisions of this clause are engaged. There is a very clear need for this provision, as it will help police to recover stolen goods. The public will welcome it, and it is very clearly defined in clause 19(2).
Alex Norris
Just briefly, what the Minister has said is in the Bill is welcome. I still think that a stronger signal on tightness may yet need to be furnished. The rubber will meet the road at subsection (2)(b) of proposed new section 26A—that the specified items are on the specified premises. If that was seen to be done on an intelligence basis or possibly a word-of-mouth basis, that might discomfort colleagues. The compelling case for this generally is the new and novel technology element. Nevertheless, we support the principle.
I will not labour the point any further, not least because the colleagues listed under that amendment are an admirable group, who I know will pursue the Minister on it. Never mess with people from Derbyshire, I suspect you might say, Mrs Latham. There may yet need to be a little more comfort given on this, but we do not object to the principle. The provision is important, and the public demand for it is there. We think it can be used effectively, so I will not encumber us any further.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
If illegal activity were taking place, which would include illegal gambling, then the provisions of the clause would apply. As to whether the Gambling Commission can make the application or whether it would have to be the police, to answer that question we will have to refer to schedule 3 on page 91 and look at the list of entities. The hon. Member will see that paragraph 12(2)(e) does include
“a member of staff of the Gambling Commission of at least the grade of executive director.”
Indeed, paragraph 12(1)(a)(v) also expressly references the Gambling Commission, so I hope that answers the question about the Gambling Commission’s powers. I obviously prepared that in advance, anticipating her question—as Members of the Committee could surely see!
That is very helpful and will strengthen our hand with overseas entities that might not respond to a polite request but are willing to act when there is a court order. I hope that is something that we can all get behind. It will help protect our constituents from online crime, particularly fraud, but other forms of illegal activity, including illegal gambling. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Swansea East for her work combating gambling harm, which I saw at first hand during my time as Minister for technology and gambling a couple of years ago.
Alex Norris
Given the time left in this sitting, I thought there was a degree of optimism when the Minister stood up on a matter related to some degree to illegal gambling and thought it would be quick; I will try to bring my remarks in under the wire, but I may fail, when I assume I will be cut off in my prime.
Much of our discussions so far have had a digital and online dimension: the sale of knives and bladed articles, the posting of intimate images, the sale of stolen goods, and the digital online element of fraud. This is a very live, shape-shifting part of the debate. It was feature of the Online Safety Act 2023 discussions and is an important part of this Bill. Our basic principle is that we must give our police and broader enforcement agencies the best tools possible for them to stand half a chance of keeping up. This clause and schedule 3 fit with that approach and, as such, we support them.
For all the creative and direct uses that criminals can exploit modern technology with, there remains a basic staple: a website, a domain name and an IP address. That can be used in a variety of ways: selling illicit goods, selling stolen goods, pirating live events, pirating software or content, scamming or illegal gambling. It is right that enforcement agencies can close such sites down. Although this is a modern venture, I suspect it is today’s version of the 1975 classic Whac-A-Mole, as we chase scammers, fraudsters and thieves around the internet. I dare say that is frustrating but it is important for enforcement agencies to do.
The provisions in the schedule allow for the suspension of IP addresses and domain names for up to 12 months, following an application to a judge. In doing so, four criteria must be met. Three are relatively simple: condition 1 is that the address or domain name is being used for serious crime; condition 3 is that it is necessary and proportionate to shut the site down to prevent crime; and condition 4 is that the address or domain name would not be shut down by another route. The industry picture can be good, as the Minister says, but I do not think it is always good. That is the nature of the type of crime. We talked previously about pirating a premier league game—that would go pretty quickly. If the site is hosting an intimate image that was unlawfully obtained, that tends to take an awful lot longer, or indeed does not happen at all; that point has been debated.
Conditions 1, 3 and 4 seem clear to me, but I want to press the Minister on condition 2. That is met under four scenarios, although I believe the use of the word “or” means any one of the four scenarios, including,
“(a) that a UK person is using the IP address for purposes of serious crime”,
which is very similar, if not the same, as condition 1. The other scenarios are: (b)—that a UK person is a victim of the serious crime that the site or domain name is used for; (c)—that the IP address is being used for unlicensed gambling, which goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East; or (d) —the IP address is allocated to a device located in the UK. I think only one of those four tests needs to be met in order for condition 2 to be met. Given that (a) is essentially the same as condition 1, but with the proviso that the person is UK based, how does that operate in practice? Is that not a degree of duplication? The Minister can mull that one over while having his lunch.
I will move on to the heading
“Inclusion of non-disclosure requirements in suspension orders”.
As in the Bill, as part of a suspension order, a judge can require that the individual deprived of their domain name or IP address does not tell anyone that that has happened to them.
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Tenth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsThursday 18th January 2024
(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 January 2024 - (18 Jan 2024)
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
As always, Dame Angela, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Clause 32 introduces schedule 4 to the Bill, making reforms that are more than technical: they are significant reforms to the confiscation regime in part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to which I suggest we refer henceforth as POCA. That Act was passed over 20 years ago. The measures that we are introducing apply only to the regime in England and Wales contained in part 2 of POCA; there are separate confiscation regimes that apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland in parts 3 and 4 of POCA respectively. We are discussing with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice whether the reforms introduced by the Bill should also be applied to the regimes in Scotland and Northern Ireland. If they so wish, no doubt there will be amendments in due course.
In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations. The commission’s report was published just over a year ago, in November 2022. It contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in this Bill; essentially, we are implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations.
Reform is necessary to ensure that the confiscation regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible, prevents criminals from retaining the ill-gotten gains of their criminality, and makes it clear to offenders and victims that crime does not pay. We will achieve that in schedule 4 by streamlining processes, creating realistic confiscation orders and expediting enforcement.
The Government have consulted extensively on the measures for reform, which benefit from over 20 years of operational insight. These reforms will support the delivery of key objectives in the economic crime plan 2 and the fraud strategy to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery. The 10 parts of schedule 4 contain a number of reforms, which, broadly speaking, do what I have set out; I would of course be happy to go through them in detail should any Committee member so wish.
I note that the hon. Member for Nottingham North has tabled amendment 62. I propose to respond briefly to that amendment once the hon. Gentleman has spoken to it.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Angela. I rise to speak to amendment 62.
Clause 32 and the weighty schedule that it introduces deal with confiscation orders and the regime that governs them. As the Minister says, they are not technical; they are substantial and important. It is safe to say that it is a matter of unanimity across the House that where people are convicted who have benefited, and in many cases made huge sums, from crime and its attendant misery, that money should be recovered from them where possible. Convicted criminals should not make out ahead as a result of their crimes. They should always know that that is what we believe in this place—perhaps they should have priced it in as a cost of doing business that they will not benefit from the misery that they bring.
It is no great surprise that we believe strongly in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, but it is important to ensure that it remains effective, two decades on, and that gaps are closed wherever they may exist. The Law Commission work commissioned by the Home Office was very valuable. Its 119 recommendations will help us to improve the process by which confiscation orders are made, ensure that orders are made realistic and proportionate, and improve the enforceability of orders. Those are noble goals, and we are grateful to the commission for its excellent work. We welcome and support clause 32 and schedule 4.
There is only one small change that I would suggest, and I am interested in the Minister’s views on it. I am grateful that he is letting me make my case first; sometimes with groups of amendments we get the case against what we are about to say before we have said it, which always seems a little unkind. I would like to see what he thinks about my amendment 62.
The Committee took evidence from Kennedy Talbot KC that dissipation was a material factor in delaying or preventing restraint orders. He suggested that we take it out. His evidence was of great interest:
“I am sure that the Committee is familiar with the power for the court to make restraint orders preventing people who are suspected of crime, and then charged with crime, from dealing with their assets. At the moment, a statutory proposal in the Bill is that the risk of dissipation factor—such risk needs to be established for an order to be made under case law, not under statute—should be specified. The answer, in my view, is to scrap the risk of dissipation, so that it is not a requirement.
In many cases, what prevents prosecutors from applying for restraint orders is that they feel they cannot meet that test. Normally, that is because the case is brought to them some time after an investigation first started. The defendants are often aware that they are being investigated, and the case law more or less establishes that unless you can show that a defendant is on the point of selling his house or moving £100,000 to the UAE or whatever it may be, you cannot get a restraint order. Scrap the risk of dissipation.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 102, Q44.]
The challenge put to us by Kennedy Talbot KC is that although the risk of dissipation factor is well meant and was designed to find a fair balance as to effectiveness and proportionality between the individual and the collective, it is acting as a perverse incentive not to pursue confiscation orders or pursue assets. I do not think that that is what we want.
I must say, my amendment is possibly not the most elegant way of making that a reality. It would simply delete paragraph 25 of schedule 4, which relates to the risk of dissipation. There may be—in fact, there doubtlessly will be—other ways in which that could be done, and we would be very interested in that.
I am interested in what the Minister has to say in response because, if he is not willing to accept my amendment, I think it is incumbent on him to say whether he shares Kennedy Talbot KC’s concern. If he does, how else might we clear that test? But if he does not share it, why not, because that seemed a pretty reasonable point to me?
On Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Minister pre-empted a question that I was going to ask. This seems like another area where a four-nations approach would be desirable, so that there are no parts of the Union where someone is treated differently, or where it is better to base oneself to exploit differences in regimes. The Government have tabled an awful lot of amendment for this Committee stage. I would hope and expect them to slow down that approach over the rest of this Bill’s stages—in this and the other place—but we would very much welcome it, and they would have nothing to fear, if they tabled an amendment. Perhaps the Minister will say whether any further conversations are planned. Clearly, very effective conversations have taken place on the rest of the Bill, but I wonder whether conversations on this have ground to a halt. Could the Minister tell us whether this is an ongoing process?
Chris Philp
I will first respond to the questions about amendment 62, to which the shadow Minister just spoke. I agree with the concern that he is raising. We must ensure that the barrier is not set too high, and that these orders can be made so that, where there is a risk of dissipation, the assets can, essentially, be placed under control so that they cannot be sold—or “dissipated”, as the Bill puts it.
As the hon. Gentleman said, there is already case law that the court has developed. It cannot be done arbitrarily. The court is essentially freezing someone’s assets, or preventing them from disposing of them at least, and there should be some sort of test before that draconian—but, of course, sometimes necessary—step is taken. That is currently in case law; all we are doing here is putting it on to a statutory footing. Law enforcement partners have welcomed that, because it provides clarity where currently there is simply case law.
Therefore, the Committee could reasonably ask itself whether the way in which this is drafted is reasonable and whether the test is set at the right level. The relevant part is part 8 of schedule 4, which starts at line 18 of page 119 and sets out exactly what the test is. As we would expect, the first test is that the first to fifth conditions in this section of POCA already apply. Secondly, the critical phrase is in paragraph 25(2)(a):
“there is a real risk that relevant realisable property”—
meaning stuff that someone can sell—
“held by any person will be dissipated unless the Crown Court exercises the powers”.
Therefore, the test is set as there being a real risk that the relevant property may essentially be sold off. That is where the threshold is: “a real risk”.
Chris Philp
I will in just one moment. Then, to determine whether there is a real risk, the schedule sets out towards the end of page 119 what the court may have regard to. That includes the nature of the property and the extent to which steps have already been taken, which is only one consideration, not a determinative consideration. Other items include the circumstances of the person and evidence of their character, which means that, if they are a crook, the court would take extra care. It would also have regard to the nature of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Are they a fraudster? Are they into money laundering and moving cash around? It will also take into consideration the amount of money involved and the stage of proceedings. Presumably that means that the further advanced the proceedings, the more sensitive the court will be. None of those different factors is individually determinative, but they should all be considered. On page 119, line 24 of the Bill, schedule 4 inserts in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the critical phrase,
“there is a real risk”.
I would be interested to hear the shadow Minister’s view on that point, and not on any other points he may wish to intervene on.
Alex Norris
The Bill defines many terms, and I hope that “crook” will become one such term at a later stage. It is a great phrase.
In previous debates, the Minister has said that putting things on the record may be valuable to future court interpretation. What I am hearing from the Government is a clear message that by “risk of dissipation”, we are talking about not acts of or in the throes of, but a much broader definition. That would be enough comfort to me on my amendment.
The Chair
Order. It is my fault—I started it—but let us concentrate on the Bill. I call the shadow Minister, Alex Norris.
Alex Norris
It is absolutely right that we do that, Dame Angela.
The clause and the schedule govern suspended bank accounts and, more pertinently, what happens to the money in those accounts. We should say on the record that it is right that banks are vigilant to the possibility of fraudulent activity and, when they suspect that it is taking place, that accounts are suspended. We know that that sort of regime and the culture of the industry have changed significantly in recent years. We could argue that there is a commercial disincentive to doing that, but banks clearly understand that being a trusted part of a system that does not want fraudulent activity or to have money washing around is good for everybody. That work and its creative use should be recognised, because, as the Minister says, if we held strictly to a criminal standard, there would be all sorts of reasons why that money would not be stopped. We know that good uses of terms and conditions for holding an account have been employed by the industry, which is welcome.
It is important to have a suspended account scheme in place so that those funds have somewhere to go. We support this clause and schedule. Earlier this week, I was getting very excited about the use of regulations rather than putting things in the Bill. This is a case where that is the right approach, and we look forward to good engagement while that is being developed.
Paragraph 114 of the explanatory note says:
“For the past…15 years, organisations in the financial sector (and to a lesser extent in other parts of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulated sector) have been suspending accounts and transactions where criminality is suspected. Organisations have been doing so on a private law basis taking into account their terms and conditions and threat analytics.”
Clearly, this has been going on for a while, and we are now catching up with a regime so that we can give some shape for releasing that money. It is sensible that the funds have somewhere to go, and of course we would support the purpose of that money being to go back into tackling economic crime. That is a good, virtuous loop.
I hope that the Minister will address this. We know that there has not been a scheme to release this money. Are we to understand from that paragraph of the explanatory note that there are 15 years’ worth of suspended funds just sat there? I do not see anything about that in the Bill, and I wonder whether the Minister can make it clear whether he anticipates there being anything in regulation that would mean that funds that predate the legislation would be out of scope of the scheme. I do not read anything about that in the Bill; as I said, my reading is that they are in. That gives rise to a very obvious question: how much money is there? That will be an issue of great interest for colleagues.
The beginning of schedule 5 says that financial institutions “may” take part in this scheme. I wonder whether the Minister got a sense from the consultation responses and the conversations that he has had with the industry of how widely he expects financial institutions to participate in the scheme and of whether there is a degree of risk—or any anxiety in the Home Office about there being a degree of risk—of displacement to financial institutions that are known not to take this action. Again, I suspect that most of the major players are doing this activity and therefore would wish to be part of it. I would be interested to know how widespread the Minister expects take-up to be.
It is right that there is a compensation mechanism for individuals who have their fund suspended and taken away, because mistakes can and doubtlessly will be made in this sort of scheme. Paragraph 5(1)(c) of schedule 5 governs that this ought to be part of the regulations, and we support that. I presume that that would be a liability against the scheme in its aggregate. Paragraph 5(2) states that it is possible to cap the amount of compensation money that the scheme can pay an institution. What is the reason for that? Clearly, there are institutions that are not being careful, so I presume that the measure covering the money they pay to the scheme is an incentive for them to be more careful in how they handle and freeze accounts. However, is there not a risk that shareholders or executives decide to cap the contribution at the compensation sum, so that they do not inadvertently create a liability on their balance sheet? The Minister might say that that will be covered by regulations, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that once a financial institution is part of the scheme, it must always be part of it, or that, for every account it suspends, it must send all of the money, in full, to the suspended accounts scheme.
The Government may not know the answer to that yet, but they must have thought about it because they have set up a compensation cap. If someone has had their account frozen incorrectly and they have not engaged with it for a number of years, that money is going to a suspended accounts scheme. If they then come back and say, “Hang on a minute, I’d like my money back,” it is not unreasonable—in fact, it is very reasonable—to think that they should get it back in full. The Government have chosen to cap that. That might be because they want to encourage good behaviour, but I am keen to get an explanation from the Minister. I really look forward to having, hopefully to a pounds and pence level, a sense of how much he thinks will go into this scheme when it is opened on day one.
Chris Philp
I mentioned this in my introductory remarks. It will apply to all the balances currently held, which includes all those balances accumulated over the last 15 years. The estimation is that that adds up to £200 million. We estimate that the inward flow each year will be £30 million or more. I hope that gives the shadow Minister a sense of the quantum.
We expect wide take-up across the whole financial services industry. Obviously, financial institutions are already suspending accounts, to the tune of £200 million up to date and, we think, £30 million or more a year going forward. Our engagement suggests that there will be wide take-up.
On the shadow Minister’s point about the limit to the compensation, the last words of paragraph 5(2) of schedule 5 are “in any period”, which I presume is to ensure that the scheme remains solvent. He is right to say that any compensation will be paid from inside the scheme and not subsidised by the wider taxpayer, so it will be internally financed, not creating any wider financial liability. It may be the case that, if there is one big claim, the “in any period” caveat would allow for the compensation to be paid over more than one period.
The shadow Minister also asked whether this might inadvertently create a perverse incentive for financial institutions to only make transfers up to the limit of the cap. Clearly, where that cap is set requires some thought. That is a very good question to dig into when these regulations are brought forward and debated. I will make sure that colleagues in the Home Office designing these regulations do so with that concern in mind. When we bring the regulations back, the shadow Minister or his colleagues can have a look at how that is designed. He has made a good point, and we will make sure it is reflected in the way in which the regulations are designed in due course.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 34
Electronic monitoring requirements
Criminal Justice Bill (Eleventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsTuesday 23rd January 2024
(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
indicated assent.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 12 December 2023 be amended in paragraph 1(f) of the Order, by substituting “3.00 pm” for “2.00 pm”.—(Chris Philp.)
Clause 38
Nuisance begging directions
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 38, page 39, line 23, at end insert—
“(c) any interference with the person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or places of worship.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 139, in clause 38, page 39, line 36, at end insert—
“(10) The Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions introduced by this section.”
Clause stand part.
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Robert.
Clause 38 brings us to the provisions that concern nuisance begging. This clause, and subsequent clauses on homelessness, are closely tied to the repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The 2022 Act will repeal the Vagrancy Act once the relevant provisions have been commenced, but the Government have said that they will commence those provisions only when replacement legislation is in place. For better or for worse, the clauses in front of us are that replacement legislation.
The repeal of the Vagrancy Act was a momentous victory for campaigners, because it effectively decriminalised rough sleeping and begging. The repeal had cross-party support, and many in the House shared the view that those who are destitute and living on the street should not be criminalised or threatened but offered support and assistance. Subsequently, the Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act and set out new offences and powers regarding, for example, the prohibition of organised begging, which is what we are discussing and which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, and the prohibition of begging where it causes a public nuisance, such as next to cashpoints or in shop doorways.
Clause 38 gives effect to some of the Government’s proposals by introducing the power for a constable or local authority to issue a move-on direction to a person if they are engaging in, have engaged in or are likely to engage in nuisance begging. In this context, it is important that we differentiate between nuisance begging and nuisance homelessness, which we will come to. We strongly object to the provisions on nuisance homelessness, but the issue of nuisance begging is more nuanced. We know that some organised criminal gangs use begging for their own ends. They often use begging strategies that are aggressive and antisocial, and they often exploit challenged people to gain illicit private profit off the back of the characteristic kindness of the British people. That is wrong, and we therefore support powers that can tackle organised nuisance begging, but we think the provisions require greater humanity to protect those who are being exploited and those who are genuinely destitute.
The risk is that clause 38 and related clauses will target anyone, regardless of the nature of the harm. As Crisis has said, an effective blanket ban on begging risks pushing vulnerable people into dangerous places where they may be subject to greater abuse or violence. Someone simply sat alongside a cap or a cup could fall foul of the definition. That would be a mistake and risk harming some of the most vulnerable people in society. Many people become homeless and resort to begging through no fault of their own but because of situations such as trauma or family breakdown. They should not be doubly punished for falling through the cracks of a welfare system that is creaking under the strain of widespread poverty in our society. We are concerned that the Government have not quite landed the provision right.
Clause 38 allows for an authorised person—in this case, a constable or someone from the relevant local authority, which is defined in clause 64—to give a nuisance begging direction to someone over 18 who they think is engaging, has engaged or will engage in nuisance begging. The written direction will require the person to leave a certain place and not return for up to 72 hours. We do not, in principle, object to the police or local authority having tools to disrupt highly organised nuisance begging operations, which we know are active, but we fear that the provision will sweep up others along the way.
Amendments 139 and 140 seek to introduce safeguards. Amendment 140 seeks to ensure that, where nuisance begging directions are used, they should not interfere with a person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or their place of worship. Clause 38(5) states that a direction cannot interfere with a person’s work, their education or a court order. That is wise, but adding substance abuse support services, health services and someone’s place of worship would complete the picture. The amendment is straightforward and reasonable. Its intention is to protect the support and assistance provided to people who might be forced into begging, and to ensure that the Government’s nuisance begging directions do not cut across or undermine that support.
The nuisance begging powers are significant and could have unintended consequences, and amendment 139 is an attempt to maintain some parliamentary oversight. It would require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions in clause 38, which we think would be an important check to ensure that they are not causing unintended harms, to give Members a mechanism to raise concerns, and to give a degree of parliamentary accountability. I do not think the amendment is particularly onerous. I would like to think—I would be concerned if this was not the case—that the Government will be monitoring the application of the powers and have a sense of how they work and whether they are dealing with the problem that they want them to deal with.
If that is not the Government’s approach, I hope that the Minister will talk a little about what assessment has been made of the possible risks, particularly for those who are facing genuine destitution and may fall foul of the legislation. For example, what will be the impact of imposing a one-month prison sentence or a £2,500 fine on someone in breach of these provisions, when they are already almost certainly in severe financial difficulties? We will get to appeal provisions, but will those who are facing these challenges be likely to be able to use those provisions? Is there not a risk of rather unequal justice? Further, having made such an assessment, what steps will the Government take to introduce mitigation?
My amendments suggest a way to put in some safe-guarding. I hope that the Minister can give us assurances, at least, about the Government’s understanding of how they will differentiate between the genuine, criminal, organised nuisance operations and people who are just in a dire personal situation. It is important that the Committee is mindful of that.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert—I think for the first time, though I hope it is the first of many. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for explaining his two amendments to clause 38, which provides for nuisance begging directions. Before I respond to his amendments, let me provide a little wider context for clauses 38 to 64, which the Committee will be relieved to hear I do not propose to repeat at the beginning of our debate on each clause.
These clauses will replace the Vagrancy Act 1824, which was prospectively repealed by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, as the shadow Minister said. The hon. Member for Stockton North and I fondly remember our extensive debates on that subject some years ago. This package includes directions, notices and orders where someone is nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping; offences for nuisance begging and for facilitating organised begging; and a replacement offence for being found on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose.
The Government and, I think, the House as a whole take the view that nobody should be criminalised simply for being destitute or homeless. That is why we are committed to bringing into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, using regulation-making powers under the PCSC Act—a Henry VIII power to which I presume the shadow Minister does not object. We have put in place a substantial package of support for people who are genuinely homeless, sleeping rough or at risk of doing so. Engagement and offers of support must continue to be the starting point in helping those who are begging genuinely or sleeping rough to move away from a life on the streets and into accommodation. However, we have heard from frontline local authority partners and police that there is still a role for enforcement where that engagement does not work.
It is important not to conflate begging and rough sleeping—although of course the two can be linked—which is why we treat them separately in the Bill. The Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act in 2022 and the majority of respondents were in favour of introducing replacement begging offences, recognising the harm that it causes. We set out our plans in more detail in the antisocial behaviour action plan, published in March 2023.
Accordingly, clause 38 provides that where an authorised person, defined in subsection (7) as a police constable or the relevant local authority, is
“satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage, in nuisance begging”,
they can issue a direction to move on. We will come on to the definition of nuisance begging, which is set out in clause 49. Such a direction will require the person to leave the specified location and not to return for up to a maximum of 72 hours, giving respite to those who are negatively impacted by the nuisance. It can also include a requirement for the person to take their belongings, and any litter they have been responsible for, with them. The direction must be given in writing, and it is an offence not to comply with it. The penalty for failing to comply is up to one month’s imprisonment or a level 4 fine, which is up to £2,500, or both.
Chris Philp
I am looking forward to repeating it.
There are many parliamentary mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of Bills, not least parliamentary questions, scrutiny by Select Committees and, critically, the normal process of post-legislative review, which takes place between three and five years after Royal Assent. I hope on that basis that the shadow Minister will forbear from pressing amendments 140 and 139. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and for saying that the Government believe that, for nuisance begging and nuisance rough sleeping, support is the starting point. That is an important message. I also share his view that they are not the same thing, and our treatment of the two are different for that reason. I also agree that there is a place for enforcement, particularly for nuisance begging, although I think the case is weaker for rough sleeping. However, he also said that this is not about just any begging. Although I do not want to pre-empt our discussion of clause 49, which we will debate in due course, the way it is drawn up means that there will not be much left, frankly.
One theme that I will return to—particularly when we come to the homelessness provisions and the point my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether someone looks “likely”—is that this will be in the eye of the beholder. That will be a challenge, particularly for rough sleeping, but also in this area, so it is right that there should be anxieties.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on amendment 140. As he says, the list is probably not comprehensive, but I am glad that he said it was reasonable in spirit, which is definitely the kindest thing he has said to me in our four months together so far—I will take that as the strongest affirmation that I am likely to get. He has committed to address this issue through guidance, which is perhaps a better way to do it, so I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis.
Similarly, on amendment 139 and this point about post-legislative reviews, that is obviously not something we feel in this place. I suspect it is something that is more internal to Departments. There is a point here about how well we do or do not monitor the impact of legislation three or five years after we have passed it. We do not—we move on and do not really learn anything from it. However, we have had that argument on previous clauses, and I will not rehearse it again. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Nuisance begging prevention notices
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 39, page 40, line 12, leave out “3 years” and insert “1 year”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 138, in clause 39, page 40, line 31, at end insert—
“(9) Where a person has been served a nuisance begging notice the serving authority must refer that person to their local authority who must provide guidance relating to welfare rights or any other associated issue the person faces.”
This amendment would require the local council to offer support for people given nuisance begging notices.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 141, in clause 40, page 41, line 5, at end insert—
“(c) any interference with the person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or places of worship.”
Clause 40 stand part.
Clause 41 stand part.
Clause 42 stand part.
Alex Norris
Clauses 39 to 42 relate to nuisance begging notices, which will be a step up from the nuisance begging directions discussed previously. Clause 39 sets out new powers for an authorised person to give a nuisance begging prevention notice to a person appearing to be aged 18 or over if satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person is engaging, or has engaged, in nuisance begging. This is a notice that will prohibit the person from engaging in a specified behaviour for a specified period of time, or require them to do specific things, within specific times and in—or not in—certain places. Clause 39 (3) provides that the maximum duration of any requirement is three years. That is a significant period of time. Subsections (7) and (8) make it an offence to fail to comply with a nuisance begging prevention notice without reasonable excuse, the maximum penalty being one month imprisonment—I would be exceptionally surprised if that is how it is intended to be used—or a fine of up to £2,500, or both. That is a punishment that is likely to be difficult to enforce.
The powers contained in these clauses are substantial. They place stringent requirements on individuals not to engage in certain behaviour. Of course, that can also be used positively to ensure an individual engages with support services. As in clause 38, an authorised person is defined as a police constable or someone from the relevant local authority. We know that police officers up and down the country already contend with heavy workloads and are not necessarily experts in nuisance begging or homelessness. I would be interested to hear from the Minister about how that might be covered in guidance, but there is a real risk that these new powers send the signal that begging is a criminal justice issue and that it is the police’s job to sort. In some cases it might be, but in many if not most it will not be. I hope to hear the Minister say that he does not think this is an issue we can police our way out of. Yes, we need to break organised criminal gangs, but beyond that the reasons for people ending up destitute and begging for money are service failure or their engagement with services across the piece all the way to the final stage of sitting next to a cap or a cup. It is wrong to say that that is simply a criminal justice issue.
Alex Cunningham
We had this problem in Stockton with nuisance begging, with people aggressively approaching customers sitting outside a café having a coffee. The local authority and the police force worked together on a solution and have put the resources in, but I am concerned that it could become just a police matter, as my hon. Friend has outlined. Can he think of any way we can get round that, such as resources for local authorities?
Alex Norris
I am grateful for that intervention. The case for resources for local authorities is one that we cannot make enough. My hon. Friend gives a good example of partnership working that has not just turned to criminal justice outcomes and told the police, “Well, this is now your problem to deal with.” We need that good faith partnership working and I hope that my amendments help to promote that to some degree.
Amendment 138 seeks to mitigate those challenges by inserting a new subsection so that
“Where a person has been served a nuisance begging notice the serving authority must refer that person to their local authority who must provide guidance relating to welfare rights or any other associated issue the person faces.”
The amendment seeks to ensure that someone who receives a nuisance begging notice is referred to the right support services and can liaise with the right qualified individuals on the matter. That would move away from criminalising the person and towards making sure that they get support to make a change in their life. My amendment is one way to do that and I would be interested in hearing about other ways from the Minister. In a previous debate, the Minister said it would be “support first”, and this is a way to make that real.
Clause 40 governs what can and cannot be required in the prevention notice. I have sought to amend that with amendment 141, which mirrors what I said in the previous debate. I will not repeat those arguments or press this to a Division, on the basis of what the Minister offered.
Amendment 142 would reduce the period that a prevention notice may be in place from three years to one year. Three years is a lengthy period for which—we will discuss this in relation to clause 49—someone could be told that they cannot attend their local town centre or high street. That could be based on the judgment of quite a junior officer, with minimal oversight, on pain of a month in prison or a fine of £2,500. Setting to one side those who are in genuine destitution, who I cannot believe we would want to banish from their town centres, part of the risk is that criminal gangs will cycle through the vulnerable people that they are exploiting. It will not matter a jot to those gangs that that person has to deal with a very difficult consequence for their life; they will move on to someone else. Amendment 42 would reduce the period of the notice down to one year. I hope that the Minister can explain the rationale for choosing three years.
Clause 41 is about the appeals process. We support an appeals process being included in the Bill, but I have significant concerns, which will be mirrored in the debates relating to homelessness, about access to justice and about whether the most destitute will be able to engage with the magistrates court to try to get a notice lifted. I would not challenge the power in clause 42 to vary notices, as I suspect there will be moments when they will be revised down.
Those are some ideas to try and soften some of the provisions. I am interested in the Minister’s views.
Chris Philp
As the shadow Minister explained, his amendments are to clauses that provide for nuisance begging prevention notices. The notices are a further tool that would be made available to police and local authorities to tackle nuisance begging, where it arises. The nuisance begging prevention notices that are set out in this and subsequent clauses follow the structure of existing notices such as community protection notices, which the police and local authorities are already familiar with using.
The nuisance begging prevention notice builds on the move-on direction in clause 38, allowing for an escalated approach, and can be tied in with relevant offers of support. The notice will prohibit the relevant nuisance begging behaviours and help to direct the person into the relevant support where it is necessary to do so in order to prevent the nuisance behaviour. For example, the notice may state that the individual must not beg close to cashpoints or that they must not approach people to ask for money, and also that they should attend a drug treatment centre so that their support needs can be assessed. In that way, the public would be protected and any relevant underlying drivers causing the nuisance begging could be addressed.
In relation to the point that the shadow Minister raised, I can confirm that the intention is absolutely to support people. We want to help address the underlying causes of begging and rough sleeping, which may be related to mental health problems or drug problems. I will give the shadow Minister a sense of the thinking on this. In drafting the Bill, there was extensive debate about whether we could go further and actually require people to have drug treatment, mental health treatment or whatever, or to attend a refuge or a shelter. There is evidence that people do not always want to accept those offers of help, so we considered whether we could introduce a power to essentially require them to do it. Having taken legal advice, it was suggested that that would not be lawful, and that is why this is constructed in the way it is. However, hopefully that illustrates that the Government’s thinking is that we want to offer more assistance and to get more people who are sleeping rough or begging into mental health treatment, drug treatment and alcohol treatment. We thought of going further, but for legal reasons that are principally connected to the European convention on human rights, we were not able to do so. Hopefully that illustrates the thinking on these issues.
Amendment 142 seeks to reduce the maximum duration of a nuisance begging prevention notice from three years to one year. I should start by stressing that the three years provided for in the Bill is the maximum period over which the notice can be enforced, and, naturally, where appropriate, a shorter timeframe can be specified. It is for the authorised person, which will very often be a local authority officer, not just a police constable, to consider the individual circumstances—all the relevant information about the person’s circum-stances—to decide what is appropriate, reasonable and proportionate.
Chris Philp
If someone is given a nuisance begging prevention notice, the expectation will be that they comply with it. If there is any prosecution for a breach, it may be that the protections in the Modern Slavery Act would apply. Again, if a police officer or local authority officer thinks there is a problem with trafficking, it may well be that they think it inappropriate to make the prevention order. It is a power, not an obligation; they do not have to give the notice. We would expect the officer to have regard to the circumstances of the individual, which might include those the hon. Lady described. The national referral mechanism can take quite a while, although it is speeding up, but it may be that other support is available much more quickly than the support that follows an NRM reasonable grounds decision.
To repeat the point, the expectation is that support is made available where it is necessary, but support could be provided hand in hand with a nuisance begging prevention notice. The authorities could seek to prevent nuisance begging, which is bad for the wider public, by using the notices and other powers, while at the same time ensuring appropriate safeguarding. The two are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to do both at the same time. I also draw the Committee’s attention to clause 39(7), which is relevant to the intervention. It says it is only an offence to breach the conditions “without reasonable excuse”. For example, if someone has been coerced into behaviour that results in a breach, that coercion could—it would be for the court to determine—be a reasonable excuse, and therefore a defence.
I hope that that explains the purpose of clauses 39 to 42. Although I understand and agree with the spirit of the amendments, they are not necessarily the right way to achieve the objectives that the shadow Minister set out.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. The “reasonable excuse” provision in clause 39(7) gives a degree of comfort, but the reality is that, particularly in the trafficking cases mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, individuals will not say that they have been coerced into nuisance begging. Instead, they will take the punishment; they will not be able to proffer what would be considered a reasonable excuse. That is our concern.
The debate on amendment 141 mirrored previous debates, and I am happy not to move it on the basis of the answers I have had. On amendment 142, I hear what the Minister said about the three-year duration being a maximum, not a target, but I fear that because it is in the Bill, it will become a magnet. With regards to police constables, we know about their training and codes of practice, so we can be confident about the criteria that they are expected to apply, but we are concerned that the Bill is—for good reason—drafted in such a way that very junior local authority officers could be making that decision.
Alex Norris
Who do not know anything about the national referral mechanism and have no criteria to make a judgment against. Frankly, an authorised person who works frequently in a town centre or on a high street might just really not like someone. This power would be available to them, with minimal oversight, and there would be little recourse against it, which is why I think that three years is too much. I will push the amendment to a Division as a result.
I am grateful for what the Minister said about amendment 138 and support first; I completely take him at face value, and that is clearly what he said. My anxiety, as we enter the final year of this Session of Parliament, is that I have done lots of these Bills, and Ministers change. I thought that I had a really good concession from a Minister on the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, and the next day the Minister changed; I have learned from that. What is in the Bill is important, and I am really keen that that message be in it, so I will also push amendment 138 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Norris
I will not repeat a lot of what I have said so far. Clause 43 concerns nuisance begging prevention orders, the most severe of the three tiers of powers that the Bill covers. I think it makes sense to align these tiers, as the Minister said in a previous debate, with other civil-type powers, so that they are easy to understand. As defined in clause 43, an authorised person can obtain the order on application to a magistrates court. If the court is satisfied that someone aged 18 or over has engaged in nuisance begging, and has failed to comply with the move-on direction and a notice, this seems like a reasonable escalation of the process for them to face.
My concern is mainly with the duration of such orders; clause 45(4) states that their duration may not exceed five years. That is quite a long period. Is that a proportionate response to the challenge that we are trying to tackle, which is serious and organised nuisance begging and aggressive and antisocial nuisance begging? Is a five-year exclusion the right thing to do, or, again, will it harm vulnerable people? We know that gangs will move on to new people, and the others will be left with the consequences.
There is a degree of comfort in the fact that we are talking about magistrates courts, so I have less anxiety about the measures than I did about the previous provisions, in which case I really think that three years will become a magnet. We can have confidence that a magistrates court will look at the full picture when considering an order of up to five years, but I am keen to know why the five years is being written in sand. Through amendment 143, I seek to reduce the period to one year, as a way of finding a balance between protecting vulnerable people and disrupting organised activity. An appeals process is set out in these clauses, and although this issue is of greater concern in the next part of the Bill, I think there is an access to justice issue for the people we are talking about. How well will they be able to use the legal processes that are there to protect them, and what support will they get to do so? I will stop there, but I am particularly keen to know why five years was the chosen duration of the orders.
Chris Philp
Briefly, five years was chosen—an increase from the three years in the previous provisions—because, as the shadow Minister said, the order is supervised by a court. That duration is a maximum, rather than a target. Courts are very well used to dealing with maximum durations, particularly in the context of sentencing. For example, the prison sentences handed down are often a great deal shorter than the maximum set out. As a matter of evidence and practice, courts often go a long way below the maximum—although we in Parliament might wish they went closer to the maximum in some cases. The duration is set at five years because courts have discretion and are used to working with maximum durations; but the court does have to look at all the relevant information and evidence before deciding. Description of person Time when order takes effect A person who has been remanded in custody, or committed to custody, by an order of a court From the beginning of the day on which the person is released from custody A person subject to a custodial sentence Immediately after the person ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence”
Finally, in relation to the positive requirements imposed, we have offered further safeguards, in that nuisance begging prevention orders can be varied or discharged, should circumstances change during the period. I hope the shadow Minister accepts that giving a court that flexibility is reasonable. We do it the whole time with criminal sentencing, and there is evidence that courts use that power with a great deal of restraint sometimes. I hope that explains the Government’s thinking on the issue.
Amendment 70 agreed to.
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Duration of nuisance begging prevention orders
Amendments made: 71, in clause 45, page 44, line 8, leave out “on the day” and insert
“at the beginning of the day after the day on which”.
This amendment provides for a nuisance begging prevention order to take effect at the beginning of the day after the day on which it is made.
Amendment 72, in clause 45, page 44, line 9, leave out “subsection (2)” and insert “subsections (2) and (2A)”.
This amendment and amendments 74 and 76 provide that where a nuisance begging prevention order is made in respect of certain offenders, the order may take effect from a later time described in the table inserted by amendment 74.
Amendment 73, in clause 45, page 44, line 12, leave out
“be made so as to take”
and insert “provide that it takes”.
This is a drafting change.
Amendment 74, in clause 45, page 44, line 13, at end insert—
“(2A) If a nuisance begging prevention order is made in respect of a person described in the first column of the following table, the order may provide that it takes effect as mentioned in the second column.
See the statement for amendment 72.
Amendment 75, in clause 45, page 44, line 16, leave out “not exceed” and insert
“be a fixed period not exceeding”.
This amendment clarifies that the specified period for an order must be a fixed period.
Amendment 76, in clause 45, page 44, line 19, after “section” insert
“—
“custodial sentence” means—
(a) a sentence of imprisonment or any other sentence or order mentioned in section 222 of the Sentencing Code or section 76(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, or
(b) a sentence or order which corresponds to a sentence or order within paragraph (a) and which was imposed or made under an earlier enactment;”—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 72.
Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 46 and 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Offence of engaging in nuisance begging
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Norris
Again, I will not speak in great detail, because we have covered most of the arguments under previous clauses. Clause 48 creates an offence of nuisance begging, with a punishment of up to a month in prison or a fine up to level 4 on the standard scale. I just want to understand a little more why the Minister thinks that the crime is needed as well as the three orders—the three different civil powers—in the legislation. Presumably, he would assume that those steps would be taken before this measure would be used and someone would not be sent straight to prison. It is really important to say that we do not think, particularly in the case of people with substance abuse or mental health issues, that a merry-go-round of short-term prison sentences is likely to prove effective, because it never has done previously.
Clause 49 is a particularly interesting one, because it gives the definition of nuisance begging and tests the Minister’s point that the intent or the effect of the legislation is not to criminalise or prohibit all begging. That is a challenging argument to make, because if we look at subsection (2), on the locations where nuisance begging is engaged, and if we take those 10 locations together—in aggregate—that is a huge winnowing of the public space; indeed, it is virtually the entire town centre or high street. I think that that is by design rather than by accident. I think that if we talked to the public about those locations, they would think that they are the right ones. This is not an argument against it, but it is about understanding that the effect of the decision being taken here will be a prohibition on begging in the entirety of an amenity, because all that is left after 5 metres is taken from the entrance or exit of a retail premises is just a little bit of curtilage or carriageway—but, actually, the carriageway itself is excluded, as the Minister said, so after that there really is not very much left.
Alex Norris
As my hon. Friend says, there would just be fields.
I am keen to understand from the Minister that subsection (3) is an “or” provision to subsection (2) and not an “and” provision—[Interruption.] The Minister nods. Subsection (3) is therefore a significant increase, in the sense that the locations cease to matter quite quickly so long as the nuisance begging
“has caused, or is likely to cause”—
has yet to cause, but may well cause—harassment, possible harm or damage, or a risk to health or safety. This is a very broad and subjective test. I understand what training we could give to a constable, but I am interested to hear from the Minister about what training we can give to local authorities, or at least what guidance he intends to produce regarding the application of this subjective test. We do not intend to oppose this clause but, combined with the clauses before it, the total effect will be that the distinction between begging and nuisance begging, about which the Minister made a point, will not exist in any practical sense. The provisions are drawn broadly enough to apply in virtually any case where an individual wants to beg. We need to know what criteria the authorities are supposed to be working against, so I am keen to hear the Minister’s answer.
Chris Philp
In relation to the first question about why the offence is set out in the clause when we already have the notices, orders and directions—three interventions—that we have discussed already, there may be some particularly egregious or persistent cases where the criminal sanction is necessary.
Of course, it is for the court to decide what is appro-priate. We have already discussed that there is now a presumption—or there will be shortly, once the Sentencing Bill passes—against short sentences for those people not already subject to a supervision order from the court, so a custodial sentence is very unlikely to occur for a first conviction in any case. For offences of this nature, it is open to the court to impose a non-custodial sentence, even for subsequent offences where there is already a supervision order from the court in place. That might include a mental health or alcohol treatment requirement, a drug rehabilitation requirement and so on. It does not follow that the court having the power to impose custody will mean that it will necessarily choose to do so. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. It is a last resort power, but it is important that the police have that available to them.
In relation to the definition of nuisance begging—to which no amendments have been proposed—we want to make sure that people are able to go about their daily business; the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley set out in her intervention how nuisance begging can cause intimidation. The list of locations is based on feedback received from local authorities, business improvement districts, and retail associations and their members, based on their own practical experience. That feedback came from the consultation we conducted in 2022 and subsequently, and it is why the list of locations has been constructed in that way that it has.
Chris Philp
I hope that the clause is relatively uncontentious and commands unanimous agreement across the Committee. It creates a new criminal offence for any person to arrange or facilitate another person’s begging for gain, relating to the kind of exploitation that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley referred to in an earlier intervention. Organised begging is often run by criminal gangs, sometimes with links to trafficking and other serious crimes. It exploits vulnerable individuals, causes nuisance to others and undermines the public’s sense of safety. It benefits no one, and it exploits the vulnerable by making money off them.
The clause outlaws this despicable practice, making it unlawful for anyone to organise others to beg for gain. That can be anything from recruiting vulnerable people to take part in organised begging to driving them to places for them to beg. I am sure we have all seen, read about or heard about people getting dropped off to beg and then being picked up in luxury cars or vans later in the day. None of us wants to see that activity tolerated. It helps to gather funds that not only arise from the exploitation of vulnerable people, but can be used to support organised criminal gangs and their other illicit activities. The offence rightly helps to shift the risk to the criminals who are organising the begging and exploiting the most vulnerable. To reflect the severity of the activity and the role it plays in criminal gangs, the maximum penalty upon summary conviction will be six months in prison, an unlimited fine or both.
Alex Norris
This is the best of all the clauses that we will debate today, so the Minister will have the unanimity that he seeks. The real criminals are the ones who cause or arrange for people to beg on our streets in order to extract money for themselves. Those are the real villains, and it is right that there is an offence and a sanction. We hope to see it used, although I have slight anxiety about that. I am also glad that it is more severe than the sanction facing the individuals who themselves have been forced to beg. That is the right balance.
I am keen to understand one point. It is certainly my belief, and I think also the technical definition, that forced begging is a form of modern slavery. Therefore, presumably the Government’s point is that this offence is not covered, or insufficiently covered, under modern slavery legislation. I am interested in the Minister’s rationale there.
Similarly, we have to see it in that context. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley knows well from her work, there has been a retrenchment in recent years of the focus on modern slavery. The important provisions in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, particularly the referral mechanism, obviously have not worked as intended. People who are supposed to be waiting for 45 days for a decision are actually waiting closer to 600 or 700 days in many cases, and certainly multiple hundreds in virtually all of them. There has also been a sign from the Home Office, and from the Prime Minister himself, that in some ways modern slavery provisions are not compatible with the public’s desire for a controlled migration system. That is not our view; we do not believe that that is right, but there is a slight disconnect between this provision and the 2015 provisions, and some of the national rhetoric. I am keen to understand the Minister’s view on the interrelationship between this clause and the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Chris Philp
I shall respond briefly to the question about the interaction of this clause with the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The Modern Slavery Act applies where someone is coerced, forced, tricked or deceived into labour of some kind, whereas people who are engaged in organised begging might sometimes do so voluntarily. This clause covers the cases where either they have agreed to it voluntarily or it is not possible to produce the evidence that they have been coerced, so it fills those two lacunae.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Nuisance rough sleeping directions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Norris
This part of the Bill, on nuisance rough sleeping provisions, is certainly the most contentious part, and probably the most interesting to the public as well. I rise to speak with a degree of sadness. I agreed with so much of the first half of the Minister’s speech; the problem is that the first half, which set out the Government’s intent, belief and policy, was not the right counterpart to the second half, which simply is not in service of those goals. We therefore oppose these measures and will, I am afraid, oppose every group of this debate.
The nuisance rough sleeping directions in clause 51 give an authorised person, which, according to subsection (7), is a police constable or someone from the local council, the power to move on a person if the rough sleeping condition, which we will debate at clause 61, has been or, indeed,
“is likely to be, met.”
That is a significant phrase. Subsection (2) sets out what that will mean: that person will be moved on and not allowed to return to that area for 72 hours. Subsection (3) states that that person will have to pack up and take all their belongings and any litter with them. If they fail to comply, they will have committed an offence and may go to prison for a month or be subject to a £2,500 fine.
As I say, we oppose these provisions. I take the same view as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley: I understand that nuisance rough sleeping is different from nuisance begging, which can have its roots in organised crime, but even where it is solely a venture by individuals, it can often be intimidating, disruptive and not fair on either businesses or individuals going about their daily lives. It is, of course, right for local authorities and the police to have some degree of power and control over nuisance begging, but rough sleeping is different. There is certainly no evidence that anyone is sleeping rough for profit. As a result, the Government’s rationale for these provisions does not hit the mark.
The repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 was a landmark moment for campaigners, including many Members of this House who had worked towards it for a long time. The same people who were elated at that success are now rightly shocked that the Government are opting to pursue this path. We heard on Second Reading—although not from the Minister, I do not think—that it is contingent in law, and certainly in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, that there must be some replacement for the Vagrancy Act lest those provisions cannot be ended. First, I am not sure that is true beyond a de minimis meeting of that legislation, and secondly, that is not a case for what is in this Bill. We have heard that there must be a change, but we do not hear why this change is necessary—why private property laws or health and safety laws cannot be used.
On Second Reading, a Member—possibly a member of this Committee, though I dare not mention the name in case I get it wrong—raised an instance of dangerous rough sleeping in their constituency, where a fire exit was being blocked. The Government cannot tell me that either there are not the right powers on the statute books or we could not have drawn narrow powers to meet that case. Under those circumstances, we would have supported them.
I have drawn significantly on the explanatory notes throughout the considerations of the Bill, and I think it is telling that the policy background element, which is detailed on everything else, essentially gives up on homelessness. I do not think there is a very strong case to be made for these provisions. We should not lose sight of the fact that rough sleeping is a symptom of other failures, particularly Government failures on housing, poverty and mental healthcare provision. I am not sure how criminalising those who then end up with the sharpest repercussions of those failures will in any way move us closer to resolving their individual circumstances or the collective ones.
Chris Philp
I did set out the Government’s commitment to ending rough sleeping and the £2 billion being invested to achieve that objective. The shadow Minister is setting out why he does not agree with these provisions as drafted. He is, if I hear him correctly, implying that no replacement statutory provisions are needed at all. Does he accept that, if customers will not go into shop because a large number of people are camped or sleeping rough outside it, which happens in some areas, to the point that the business is being undermined, there should as a last resort be some hard-edged sanction to protect the business owner in those circumstances? The argument that he advances seems to suggest that there should be no protection at all for that business owner.
Alex Norris
No, the phrase I used was “de minimis”. I believe that there could be some degree of power in that instance—which, I must say, I am not sure is that common, likely or foreseeable across the country. In those extreme circumstances a lower-level power could be set but that is not what we have in the Bill, which is much broader and risks drawing lots of vulnerable people into the criminal justice system. The idea that we could in some way meet the compulsions for a month in prison or, indeed, that those individuals could meet the £2,500 fine is rather for the birds.
We are likely to see something more like what the Minister said in the previous debate to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley—some sort of common-sense application of the laws as they are, with people being moved on and getting a tap on the shoulder. Actually, how will we then have moved on from where we were? The point was not that the Vagrancy Act was not really being used, but that it really should not have been on the statute book and had to go. We are just going to replace it with a range of measures that, similarly, will not be used—or will be exceptionally damaging where they are used. I direct hon. Members to the joint briefing sent by Crisis, Shelter, St Mungo’s, the YMCA, Centrepoint, the National Housing Federation and many more:
“enforcement is far more likely to physically displace people to less safe areas and prevent them from accessing vital services that support them to move away from the streets, entrenching the issue in a way that makes it harder to solve.”
It goes on to say that that can
“push people into other riskier behaviour to secure an income such as shoplifting or street-based sex work.”
It is a critical failure of the Bill that those who know of what we speak fear that those are the sorts of vulnerabilities that people will be pushed into.
Another point of difference between us and the Government—we will get on to this in clause 61—is that the definition is very broad. The Minister raised a specific case in a small set of circumstances, and the answer to that is a broad set of powers in a broad range of circumstances. That seems unwise, particularly as the issue is not even about sleeping rough; it is about the act of “intending to sleep rough”. All sorts of consequences flow from that definition, which we will talk about in clause 61. However, we have heard concerns from the Salvation Army about feeding existing prejudices about those who sleep rough.
Ultimately, the most vulnerable and destitute need support into suitable accommodation, not criminalisation. Clause 51 and the associated clauses will only exacerbate the problems that they face; it may offer a bit of short-term respite for the community, but in reality it will cause greater issues and solve none of the underlying causes. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the clause is a triumph of hope over experience. For that reason, we cannot support it and will vote against its inclusion in the Bill.
Chris Philp
I will briefly respond by making two or three points. The first is that I hope the shadow Minister and others will acknowledge that the clause represents a dramatic reduction in the scope of the criminalisation of rough sleeping compared with the Act currently on the statute book, which is in force as we speak. It dramatically reduces the scope of people who will be caught by the provisions. The hon. Gentleman did not acknowledge that in his speech, but I hope that perhaps later in the debate he will acknowledge that the Bill dramatically shrinks the range of people caught by the provisions.
I made my second point in my intervention. The hon. Gentleman proposes voting against the clause, but he has not proposed any alternatives to it. He has not put down any amendments, and when I pushed him on what he thought should be done to protect shopkeepers, for example, he did not really have any clear answer.
Criminal Justice Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsTuesday 23rd January 2024
(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham.
The nuisance rough sleeping direction in clause 51 was debated just before we adjourned this morning; it is one of a suite of tools that the Bill introduces to help local authorities and the police to tackle rough sleeping where it poses a nuisance. Clauses 52 to 55 additionally introduce nuisance rough sleeping prevention notices and outline how they will operate.
Although aimed at different behaviour, nuisance rough sleeping prevention notices will operate in a similar way to nuisance begging prevention notices, which we debated this morning. That being the case, I will not go into the detail of clauses 52 to 55, which largely mirror clauses 39 to 42, which we have already discussed. We also discussed at some length the substance of nuisance rough sleeping as part of the debate on clause 51. We may discuss what exactly constitutes nuisance rough sleeping when we come to clause 61, so I will leave my remarks there and simply respond to the shadow Minister or other colleagues as necessary.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
As the Minister says, we gave the issue a pretty thorough airing in the debate on clause 51 this morning. The Opposition are in the same place as we were this morning: we do not think that the provisions are good additions to the Bill and we will not support them.
Having had a chance to reflect on some of the Minister’s arguments, I might test some of them. He mentioned San Francisco frequently. I find it very hard to believe that what is standing between this country’s situation and that of San Francisco, whose challenges are well documented, is the Vagrancy Act 1824—not least because San Francisco never had such legislation, so repeal of legislation could not have led to its problems.
The Minister challenged me on what alternative measures could be used. Actually, I did not detect—certainly not in the debate earlier—much enthusiasm from the Minister for the provisions in the Bill; he was more interested in our view rather than in what the Government were putting forward. Having reflected on that, we will go on to talk about community protection notices—an important civil power, from the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, that the Government are very keen on. The Minister’s question was: if these clauses do not stand part of the Bill, what could be done if an individual sleeping in the doorway of a shop refused to move? I wondered about section 43 of the 2014 Act, which states that an authorised person would have the power to issue a community protection notice
“to an individual aged 16 or over, or a body, if satisfied on reasonable grounds that—
(a) the conduct of the individual or body is having a detrimental effect, of a persistent or continuing nature, on the quality of life of those in the locality, and
(b) the conduct is unreasonable.”
In the case that the Minister discussed, both those tests would be satisfied. They would provide the backstop without the need for any of the provisions that we are discussing. Using those section 43 powers would have the value, on the face of it, of not being targeted at rough sleepers. There would be a general power for use in the locality or amenity that would not require any of this dog and pony show. It would provide enough of a backstop and would pass the test that the Minister set us earlier.
I turn to the clauses themselves. The idea that a rough sleeping prevention notice could be handed, without any sense of adequate follow-up support, to someone sleeping rough, is, to me, for the birds—as if handing it to a person who has so little with them in the world would make any difference. Turning to clause 54, an appeals process would be an important part of such a regime, but we have a duty to be sure that what is written in a Bill in some way reflects the reality that we live in. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has made that point on multiple occasions.
We are talking about some of the most challenged people in society—the people with the fewest assets, and often those living with the most challenging mental health or substance abuse-related issues. I find it very difficult to believe that they will have the resources and support to lodge an appeal against their rough sleeping prevention notice and go to a magistrates court to uphold their rights.
We do not think that these measures are a good addition to legislation. I have given the Minister what is probably a better alternative. On that basis, we will vote against clause 52.
Chris Philp
First, I thank the shadow Minister for giving consideration to the comments I made before the lunch break. That was very helpful and perhaps facilitates a more thoughtful debate.
The shadow Minister referenced the comparison I have drawn with San Francisco and other cities on the American west coast and elsewhere. The point I was making was a slightly broader one. Essentially, some of those cities—Oakland, California is another on the bay—have adopted a very permissive approach to public drug consumption, antisocial behaviour, rough sleeping and things such as shoplifting, which we have debated previously.
A consequence of that very liberal approach has been widespread disorder on the streets of San Francisco and other cities. That has really undermined the quality of life in those places, and I do not think it has done any favours to the people who end up living those lifestyles either. There is no doubt that there is also a lack of treatment and support, but that very liberal approach has led to very bad outcomes. Some of those American cities, which are generally Democrat controlled, as the Committee can probably imagine, are beginning to reverse some of the measures on drug liberalisation, for example, because they have led to such bad outcomes. A complete removal of current laws would be a significant step in that direction, and that would concern me. That was the broader point that I was making.
Chris Philp
Clauses 56 to 60 provide a further tool for local authorities and the police to tackle nuisance—I stress the word “nuisance”—rough sleeping: namely, nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders. The clauses set out how the orders will work, specify the maximum time they can last and how they can be varied and discharged, and provide an avenue for appeals.
The clauses essentially mirror clauses 43 to 47 in relation to nuisance begging protection orders, so I will not repeat what I said about those clauses this morning. Similarly, amendments 77 to 83 mirror for nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders amendments 70 to 76 in respect of nuisance begging prevention orders, which we debated this morning. I will of course respond to any points raised by the shadow Minister.
Alex Norris
The Minister is right that we have already given these issues a run-out, so I will not rehash our earlier debate. With specific regard to these clauses, however, they give us at least some degree of comfort that this regime will be reliant on a magistrates court—an impartial arbiter. There is legitimate concern that a constable who might have had some training but not very much, or someone from the local authority—we will have very little sense of what training they have—could make profound judgments with respect to the first two tiers of powers, relating to directions and notices, with minimal oversight and recourse to justice. At least we will get an airing in a magistrates court. I suspect the magistrates will wonder why they are having to deal with the problem and why it was not dealt with by either an earlier intervention or a more positive intervention to help change someone’s behaviour.
Clause 58 allows a duration of five years for a nuisance rough sleeping prevention order. That is five years of not being allowed to go to a certain place or act in a certain way. There are now actually very few crimes, except the most serious, for which someone would be prevented from doing anything for five years. I wonder what the logic is for that duration. Most of what is in these clauses is a counterpart to what is in the clauses on nuisance begging, and the line drawn there is three years. I am interested in the difference.
Again, we will not support the lead clause in this group, clause 56, because we think that these clauses should not be in the Bill at all.
Chris Philp
That is obviously a fact-specific question. [Interruption.] Well it is, obviously. Every piece of behaviour, to assess whether it is criminal or not, needs to be measured against the relevant statute. It would obviously depend on whether it caused damage, disruption, harassment, distress and so on. But let me try to answer the hon. Gentleman’s question—it is quite a good case study, so let us have a look at it and see whether it meets the test.
First, if we look at subsection (4), does the behaviour cause damage? Well, if the teenagers are simply pitching a tent at the end of a track, it probably would not. On the other hand, if they threw a load of rubbish everywhere and trashed the farm, then it might. It depends whether their behaviour causes damage or not, but, as the hon. Gentleman described it, it sounds like it probably would not.
We then come to disruption, which is defined in subsection (5) as
“interference with…any lawful activity…or…a supply of water, energy or fuel”.
If the tent stopped the farmer bringing farm equipment in or out of the farmyard, that might count as interference, but if it did not, and if it did not interfere with water, energy or fuel, then that would not be disruption.
We then come to distress, the next limb of the test. If the people in the tent used
“threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,”
then the test might be met, but if their behaviour did not include any of those things—no threats, no intimidation, no abuse, no insulting words—then it would not be.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stockton North for intervening, because this little illustration gives us an opportunity to demonstrate that it is only where those tests are met that the provisions of the clause become engaged. I hope that it was clear from the way I talked through that little case study that the measure is relatively reasonable. That is what I think, but I am interested to hear other views. The clause sets a threshold, and only when that threshold is crossed do its provisions become engaged.
Alex Norris
I do think that was a useful worked exercise. The problem is that the Minister only did half of it, because he only applied the test of whether something causes damage, disruption, harassment or distress. He missed the test of whether something is capable of causing damage, disruption, harassment or distress. Will he do the exercise again for the “capable” test?
Chris Philp
The behaviour concerned might actually cause damage, distress or disruption, but it might also be capable of doing so. For example, someone might set up a tented encampment in a place that blocks a business premises. Let us imagine that they set it up at 4 o’clock in the morning, when the business is closed and there is no one coming in or out. At that point, it is not actually causing disruption. Let us say that the business wants to open at 6 o’clock in the morning. Would we want the police to wait until the business opens and the customers or the employees try to come in, when disruption is actually caused and the provisions are engaged? The police might want the power to take action not when the disruption is actually caused, but when it becomes reasonably foreseeable that it will be—in this case, in advance of the business premises opening.
Members can imagine circumstances like the one I just outlined where, although disruption is not being caused at that moment, it is clear that it is capable of being caused, and it is reasonably foreseeable that such disruption will be caused.
Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)
I rise to make a couple of points. The Minister made a very important point: we have to get the balance absolutely right here. We have a case in Harrogate at the moment concerning a pavilion in Crescent Gardens that was used by rough sleepers in a series of tents in September. They were there for two weeks, and it has been fenced off ever since.
I have absolutely no doubt that when the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley says that she and the British public are not distressed by homelessness, she is absolutely correct. People want to see homeless people supported into accommodation and the underlying causes tackled. At the same time, there was a significant number of complaints from local residents about antisocial behaviour coming from that group of tents. Getting the right balance between protecting communities and offering support to homeless people is very difficult. In our case, we have a very impressive homeless charity, Harrogate Homeless Project, which is next door to my office in the middle of my constituency.
I just want to make sure that the Minister is clear that the balance is critical. I have been much reassured by his words, but it is an important balance, and we are dealing with some of the most vulnerable people in our community.
Alex Norris
It has been a good debate, and I am glad to have the opportunity to contribute to it. As we finish this section of the Bill, I have more hope than when we started it, in the sense that I now genuinely believe that we are seeking to do the same thing. The Minister has explicitly said on the record that the Government do not wish to criminalise rough sleeping in general, which is very welcome. I will just say—and this is where the disagreement lies—that that is not reflected in the Bill. The Minister talked about the Bill having a precise, specific and limited definition of nuisance rough sleeping, so that it criminalises only nuisance rough sleeping and not rough sleeping in general. I would argue very strongly that that is not what clause 61 does. It is much broader than that, as I will do my best to demonstrate.
The clause is crucial. It contains the definition, and it makes or breaks whether the Minister’s case holds. The test is in subsection (2). The first limb, in paragraph (a), is that the person must be
“sleeping rough or…intending to sleep rough in a place”.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about stigmatising and subjective language, and there is an issue on the point of someone’s “intending to sleep rough”. What is the judgment that an individual is being expected to make? Is it about someone’s appearance? Is it about what someone is carrying? If I am asked by a relevant person, who might be a reasonably junior member of the local authority, where I am sleeping that night and I cannot answer, am I intending to sleep rough? That test would be applied subjectively by a person who may not have very much training. If I looked dishevelled, would that be enough for me to be intending to sleep rough?
The reality is that we will see edge cases, but how will we test them? As I have said, the people we are talking about often have the least recourse to legal support. I would argue that there is nothing precise even about the point of someone’s “intending to sleep rough”. As the Minister said, subsection (2)(b) goes on to describe a person’s
“doing something that is a nuisance”.
Again, that is very much the crux of the debate.
Chris Philp
Just to make it clear, at the end of subsection (2)(a) there is the critical word “and”. It is not enough simply to be sleeping rough or intending to sleep rough; it needs to be clear in addition that a nuisance is being committed. The clause requires both conditions to be met; one alone is not enough.
Alex Norris
I appreciate that, and I was getting on to that part of my argument, but that does not dilute the impact of the language “intending to sleep rough”, which is a broad and subjective judgment that we will be asking people likely to have little or no training in this regard to make. The Minister says that the definition is precise. There is nothing precise about that.
As I said, subsection (2)(b) refers to nuisance. We are given a definition of nuisance that is not specific, precise or, I would argue, limited. The Minister half-applied his test to the example given by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North of the tent in the field. He was keen, and made a great display of going through the factors that could constitute having caused, or being in the act of causing, nuisance, but he did not address the factors that constituted being capable of causing it; he would not do that half of the exercise.
Chris Philp
Is the shadow Minister saying that if the words “capable of” were deleted, he would support the clause?
Alex Norris
It would be an improvement to the clause, but that is not what is in the Bill, and we would still have problems with “intending to sleep rough”. There are even issues with “causing” in subsection (5), which mean that we cannot support it. That subsection says,
“‘damage’ includes…damage to a place”,
and being capable of causing damage. If I sleep on a park bench, am I capable of damaging it? Well, I am using it for a purpose for which it was not intended, so, yes, presumably there is a risk of causing damage.
Chris Philp
With respect, I do not think that sleeping on a bench would cause damage to it, would it?
Alex Norris
Using anything for a purpose for which it was not intended risks damage, because the possibility of that damage has not been designed out. What if someone is sleeping on the bench persistently over a period? “Damage” could be breaking one of the wooden slats, but it could also be whittling down the paint or varnish. The Minister rolls his eyes. If he gave the commitment today that he personally will make all these decisions every day across the country, well, that might give me some comfort, but he clearly will not apply the test. It will be applied by possibly relatively junior members of staff with very little training. If the test is applied overly officiously, and there is a clear risk of that, then the damage to an individual could be considerable, and their recourse minimal. That is why this point matters, even in an extreme case.
Subsection (5)(c) refers to
“damage to the environment (including excessive noise, smells, litter or deposits of waste)”.
“Smells” is particularly problematic. That is part of the stigma relating to people who do not have a roof over their head. Smelling could be enough to make them a nuisance. That is a real problem. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the stigma test; the provision does not pass that test.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
My hon. Friend makes a very passionate representation. Last November, on a very wet, cold night, I slept in a doorway. I went armed with a tarpaulin, a sleeping bag and cardboard. Homelessness is not a lifestyle choice. There were other people there who were obviously suffering from mental health issues, and some had been victims of sexual abuse. I had gone armed with equipment to be homeless, and to sleep on the streets. Does he not agree that under the rules in the Bill, I could have been arrested?
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend would certainly have passed the test of intending to sleep rough. A subjective decision would then have to be made on whether her behaviour caused damage, or even was capable of causing damage—the damage does not have to occur. She might also be found to have caused “disruption”, which is
“interference with…any lawful activity in, or use of, a place.”
It would not be very hard to pass that test. She is a fearsome opponent, so perhaps she is also a health and safety risk to others at times. So yes, she could in some way fail many, if not all, of the tests. [Interruption.] I think she will probably take that as a compliment.
Alex Cunningham
I am really interested in the sleeping rough bit. There are organisations across the country—business people—who opt to spend a night out, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, to demonstrate their support for homeless people. They sleep in shop doorways and outside factories. It is a deliberate act. They raise lots of money for homeless people, which is great. Are they not criminalised by this law?
Alex Norris
That is an interesting case. I have absolutely no doubt that that is not the Government’s intention, but could this clause be applied to such a case? I would make a strong argument that a member of council staff could say that those people have left rubbish or are capable of it. They do not have to have done it, but by generating rubbish that perhaps blows away, they could cause deposits of waste. Could this clause be used to prevent that activity? Yes, it could. That brings us back to asking whether it is precise, specific and limited, and the answer is no: it fails all three of those tests.
That takes me to the important points made by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It is about finding a balance, because the public are sympathetic and want to see the issue tackled positively.
Alex Norris
As do the Government, as the hon. Gentleman says, but the question is whether that balance has been found. I do not see anything in the real-life example that he used that would not be covered by section 43 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. That notice could be used in that way. When I put that to the Minister in the previous debate, his only quibble, which I found a little hard to accept, was that these notices will give so much more support and that a reliance on section 43 would not provide enough help to homeless people. That does not chime with reality.
I am emerging from these discussions with much more hope than I had thought. I believe, much more than I did when the Bill was published, that the Government want to do something really limited in this space, but there is a significant landing zone for them to do more. We are interested in working on that point between stages. I understand how the mistake—the original sin—has happened. There is an elegance in trying to create a duplicate arrangement with nuisance begging, but actually that misses the point.
We will not be supporting the clause, for the reasons that we have given. Indeed, I am not sure how the Minister can support it, either, because it fails his own tests. We will have to divide the Committee. I think we can do much better than this, and, as I have said, there is a landing zone for that.
Chris Philp
I have made my points already, so I do not want to irritate the Committee by repeating them. The definition is pretty specific. As the shadow Minister has said, it is much more limited—and intentionally so—than the nuisance begging provisions that we debated this morning. However, if there are ways of ensuring that the right balance is struck, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough said, we are always willing to look at them. It is our intention to make this limited, narrow and specific. I think we have done that, but we are always open to ways of improving it.
Chris Philp
Clauses 63 and 64 make supplementary provision relating to earlier clauses on nuisance begging and, I hesitate to say, nuisance rough sleeping. Clause 63 enables an authorised person, defined as a constable or local authority, seeking to issue a direction or prevention notice, or to apply to a court for a prevention order, to require a person to provide specified personal details, specifically their name, date of birth and, if applicable, their address.
Failure to provide those details, or giving false information, will be an offence subject to a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a fine, or both. That is necessary because, otherwise, an individual who does not want to receive a direction notice or order could simply refuse to provide their details. Failure to comply with the process required to make the direction notice or order is a form of non-compliance and carries the same maximum penalty as failing to comply with the direction notice or order itself.
Clause 64 defines the terms “relevant local authority” and “local authority” for the purposes of clauses 38 to 63. In essence, the definition focuses primarily on the area in which the nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping occurred, or the area for which the relevant notice direction or order was given. On that basis, I commend clauses 63 and 64 to the Committee.
Alex Norris
I will be very brief, because I do not want to repeat the arguments that I have already made. Clause 64 defines “local authority” and addresses local councils. I have raised this issue a number of times, but have not asked a direct question. What guidance will be made available to enable local authority staff to apply the provisions in the way outlined by the Minister, as opposed to an overly officious, harmful and unhelpful way?
Chris Philp
Clause 64 relates to which local authority can issue the notice, which is a geographic question. The hon. Gentleman asks a different but valid question about the guidance. I repeat what I said earlier: the guidance will make clear that the first resort, as he and we would want, should always be to help people who are rough sleeping or having issues in their life that cause them to beg, whether that is support with mental health issues, drug treatment, alcohol treatment or support into housing. I reiterate what I said earlier: the guidance will emphasise support, help and treatment, if necessary, as the first action.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Circumstances in which court may attach power of arrest to injunction
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
This is quite a large group of amendments, but I shall try to be concise. Before I turn to new clauses 21 and 22, which I have tabled with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, let me set out briefly why clauses 65 to 70 and schedules 6 and 7 should be included in the Bill.
The Government have a strong track record on tackling antisocial behaviour. In March 2023, we launched our antisocial behaviour action plan, which was backed by £160 million of new funding. The plan sets out a new framework for the Government, police forces, police and crime commissioners, local authorities and other partners, including housing associations and youth offending teams, to work together to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour.
Off the back of the action plan, we launched the community safety partnership review and the antisocial behaviour powers consultation in March 2023. The consultation included a range of proposals to strengthen the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The majority of respondents supported most of the proposals and, as a result, we are taking the opportunity presented by the Bill to back our police, local authorities and other partners to do even more to tackle the blight of antisocial behaviour.
Clauses 65 to 70 make provision for strengthened ASB powers as consulted on last year. Clause 65 provides that a power of arrest can be attached to any civil injunction by the court where it deems it appropriate. Clause 66 extends the period for which a dispersal direction can be in place from 48 hours to 72 hours and, following the issuing of a closure notice, extends from 48 hours to 72 hours the timeframe available to the relevant agency to apply to a magistrates court for a closure order.
Clause 67 amends community protection notices, to which the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred, to lower the age at which they can be given from 16 years to 10 years, bringing them in line with the criminal age of responsibility and the age at which civil injunctions might apply. Clause 68 and schedule 6 give police, in addition to local authorities, the power to issue public safety protection orders. Clause 69 and schedule 7 enable registered social housing providers to use both the closure notice and the closure order to quickly close premises that are being used, or are likely to be used, to commit nuisance or disorder. Clause 70 expands the community safety accreditation scheme so that CSAS officers can impose fixed penalty notices for a wider range of offences, and it increases the upper limit of the value of those FPNs from £100 to £500.
Finally, Government new clauses 20 and 21 build on those provisions by further reforming the dispersal powers provided for in part 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. The powers will help the police and others, including local authorities, to tackle antisocial behaviour, and follow a consultation that we ran last year. On that basis, I hope that the Committee can accept the proposals.
Amendments 144 and 145 were tabled by the Opposition, so it would be courteous and appropriate to respond to them once the hon. Member for Nottingham North has had the opportunity to speak to them.
Alex Norris
Antisocial behaviour is a scourge on communities, and it is right that in legislation of this type we seek to ensure that police and local authorities have the correct tools to combat it. This is an issue about which our constituents have serious concerns and, like all right hon. and hon. Members, I have lots of conversations about this with people locally. Tackling antisocial behaviour is one of their top priorities, so we are broadly supportive of the measures in the Bill, although we might have gone a little further.
We have to ground this debate in a conversation about why we are where we are. We should test the effectiveness of the Government’s action on antisocial behaviour, but the roots of the challenges lie in a diminution of neighbourhood policing: there are still 10,000 fewer on the frontline, and our communities have suffered as a result. A move away from proper problem-solving, problem-oriented policing has led us to a lack of focus on the issue. That is why we have many more challenges than we would like.
Chris Philp
I will briefly reply to some of the points raised by the shadow Minister. On clause 21, and the removal of the requirement for an inspector to make the authorisation, any officer of any rank can make that authorisation to speed things up where necessary. In relation to his points regarding amendment 144, which I think extends the exclusion period from seven to 28 days—
Alex Norris
It is seven days for the second offence and 28 days for a subsequent offence.
Chris Philp
Yes. I understand the thinking behind the amendment, and obviously I have a great deal of sympathy for it, as he can probably imagine. The Government considered it, but we need to be cognisant of the restrictions imposed by various articles of the European convention on human rights, on which views around the House vary, to put it mildly. Clearly, if one goes beyond a certain point, one begins to stretch the ECHR articles, for example, concerning freedom of assembly. There is a balancing exercise between what is permitted in domestic law and those European convention rights, and they can conflict. That is why we have set the boundary where we have.
Alex Norris
That is an important answer, but I am conscious that nuisance begging prevention notices, for example, could mean that someone has to quit an area for a period as long as three years. Surely that could not be the case for people engaged in nuisance begging, but not for those who are engaging in antisocial behaviour.
Alex Norris
I got really excited; I thought we would sneak one through! It would have been a good one, as well. I will be honest: new clause 42 is probably my favourite out of all of them. There is a certain cruelty in the fact that I am yet again to be disappointed.
I start briefly with clause 71, which we do support. I have to say that given the number of reporting requirements that I have sought to put on the Home Office, which, sadly, have been rebuffed on each occasion, I am very pleased and amused that the Minister himself is now putting reporting requirements into the Bill, in this case on local policing bodies.
Alex Norris
Exactly, on someone else. But those are important reporting requirements, actually. Having that evidence will be of interest to local communities. I think that transparency could, at times, be challenging for local policing bodies, but that would not be a bad thing.
There are, again, issues relating to antisocial behaviour reviews. We want them to be done properly. We do not want people to get through to the end of the process and feel that they have not been listened to—that would be a double insult, given what they would have already suffered. I do fear that the lessons have never really been learned on the failure of community trigger over the past decade. We do not want to see, particularly with regard to the statistics reviews, a desire to localise blame for failures that often happen at a national level. Nevertheless, that is an argument to have at a later point. We have no issues with the requirements at all.
I have sought to improve the Bill with new clause 42, and I hope the Minister will be minded to show his support for it in other ways, if not directly. If the new clause were to be agreed to, that would be a really important building block in restoring neighbourhood policing for communities across England and Wales, and it would be at the frontline of our battle against antisocial behaviour. As I have said, the diminution and denuding of community policing over 14 years has had a significant impact. That is why half the population now say they rarely ever see the police on the beat—a proportion that has doubled since 2010.
People feel powerless to deal with antisocial behaviour, even though it happens right on their doorstep. That is compounded by the reduction in drug intervention services, as we have discussed in previous debates. Youth service budgets have been cut by £1 billion. Community penalties have halved, and there is a backlog of millions of hours in community payback schemes. We are creating the challenges we face because we are not contesting public space, and we must do something about it. That is what clause 42 offers. It is not a silver bullet, but it would entail rebuilding the fundamentals of good policing: officers serving and protecting their community, which requires the restoration of neighbourhood policing. Communities should know their police officers and be able to approach them directly if they need to.
We know that putting in the hard yards and building relationships makes the difference, and new clause 42 would be the first step towards achieving this. It would introduce a requirement that the
“chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood…to act as the force’s lead on work relating to anti-social behaviour”.
In other words, there should be a named officer leading on antisocial behaviour in every community. No longer would members of the public feel that, when they report antisocial behaviour, nothing is done and it disappears into the ether. Perhaps they do not have any contact with the police, or perhaps they have to ring 101 and get promised a call-back that does not happen. Instead, an officer embedded in the community—a face and name they recognise—would act as the lead on antisocial behaviour.
That is what the new clause would do, and it does not take much to imagine how an officer could work in this way. They could visit schools, community groups and youth clubs, engage with young people, build trust, try to prevent youngsters from being drawn into antisocial behaviour, and build relationships with parents where there are early concerns. That is what policing used to be, and it is what policing could be: policing in the community and serving the community. I know that there is demand among police officers, who want to be doing this sort of policing. The new clause would be a real enhancement to the Bill, so I hope the Minister is minded to accept it.
Chris Philp
Let me respond to the shadow Minister’s comments on new clause 42. I sympathise with the intention behind it, which is to make sure that there is a named officer working on ASB issues, but we have an important principle: the operational independence of policing.
Neither the Government nor Parliament direct the police to operate or behave in a certain way; they are operationally independent. That separation of powers is a fundamental principle, and instructing the police on how to structure their operations probably crosses the line of operational independence. However, I am sure that police and crime commissioners and chief constables will have heard about the Government’s focus on antisocial behaviour via our ASB action plan. They will have heard our debates in Parliament, including this one, and will understand the significance that we attach to this particular issue.
On accountability and local connections, most forces have safer neighbourhood teams, who are typically attached to a council ward. We certainly have them in London, and they exist in many other places as well. Three or four months ago, we extracted from the police a commitment to always follow all reasonable lines of inquiry in relation to all crime, including where antisocial behaviour crosses the criminal threshold. That is a National Police Chiefs’ Council commitment and we expect all forces to deliver it, including for the criminal elements of ASB.
On local accountability, we also have police and crime commissioners. If the public want to make sure that the police are held to account for delivering the commitment to always follow up on criminal offences, including criminal ASB, they can contact the police and crime commissioner, who is elected. Their job is to hold the local police forces to account for doing exactly the kind of thing that the shadow Minister outlined.
Chris Philp
Magistrates courts are, of course, a matter for the Ministry of Justice. I am sure my MOJ colleagues will do whatever is necessary to ensure appropriate arrangements are in place. I know that they labour night and day—“labour” meaning work—to make sure the right arrangements are in place. I fear I may be about to stretch Sir Graham’s patience in terms of scope.
I hope that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, will hear that I am in great sympathy with the spirit of the new clause. However, for reasons of police operational independence and because the police and crime commissioner has a role in terms of accountability, I do not think new clause 41 is appropriate. But I understand and appreciate its intent.
Alex Norris
I understand, Sir Graham, that I can have a second bite at the cherry; I think I am in order. Very briefly—I would not want to stretch your patience either—I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although I think that he is in danger of falling into a trap, as the Home Office sometimes does, when it comes to defending the status quo. Neighbourhood teams at the level of 10,000 people, which would be a council ward—that is not what we are talking about here. That is part of the public disconnect about scale.
Similarly, the point about accountability to the police and crime commissioner is very good; that is an important part of the democratic process. I have a lot more enthusiasm than perhaps others have expressed previously for that role and its importance. However, my police and crime commissioner has nearly a million people in her footprint—her footprint is by no means the biggest—so there is a challenge about operating at the right scale.
On the Minister’s point about all reasonable lines of enquiry—well, we will see. It very much remains to be seen whether that really is going to be meaningful beyond the rhetoric, but I am pleased to hear the Minister say that he thinks that applies more broadly. One of the most pernicious concepts is the idea of low-level antisocial behaviour; all sorts of problems are allowed to develop and a lot of misery is caused by looking at the issue in that way. That should not ever be the view we take.
The Minister’s point about operational independence is a good one and it is probably enough for me to resolve not to push my new clause to a vote. Perhaps I will come back with a different way of addressing the issue.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Thirteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsThursday 25th January 2024
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 January 2024 - (25 Jan 2024)
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your benevolent and wise chairmanship, Dame Angela.
The clause confers a new power on police and crime commissioners and other local policing bodies to make recommendations on the activity of community safety partnerships and, in turn, places a duty on community safety partnerships to consider those recommendations. Community safety partnerships will be duty-bound to consider recommendations, but they are not under a duty to implement them. However, if a partnership does not implement the recommendations, it must share its reasons for not doing so with the relevant local policing body, most likely the PCC.
The feedback from part 2 of the police and crime commissioner review, conducted by the Home Office in 2021, was that while the importance of local partnerships such as CSPs was widely acknowledged, they were not being used as effectively as they could be. Every public service should be accountable to the public, and to the local communities they serve. This provision will strengthen the accountability and visibility of CSPs and improve how they work with the relevant policing body to tackle crime, disorder and antisocial behaviour.
No one single agency can address all drivers of crime and antisocial behaviour, so partnership working between policing, local authorities, local education providers, the prisons, probation service, mental health trusts and so on are all very important. This measure will take a step towards formalising more that kind of collaboration.
I take the view, as I am sure other Members here do, that police and crime commissioners as directly elected representatives of the local people are particularly well placed to convene groups. More often than not, they chair the local criminal justice board. They have a lot of public visibility, convening power and influence, and provide visible public local leadership. The provision helps build on and strengthen the work that PCCs up and down the country are doing together. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Angela.
I am a community safety partnership enthusiast. The partnerships, which were established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, are a crucial forum for leadership, partnership working around crime prevention and reduction, and problem solving. I chaired my partnership in Nottingham a decade or so ago, and saw at first hand the impact of all those partners coming together, with shared priorities and mutual accountability, in a partnership built on trusted, close relationships and focused on solving problems.
It is with a degree of sadness that I say that partnerships have fallen in prominence and impact in recent years. One of the major challenges these bodies have found, and one of the limiting factors to the proposals in the Bill, is that austerity has bitten the partners that formed CSPs, certainly as regards funding, and partners have pulled away. In many cases, we have lost the shared data and insight function, and some of the things that brought partners to the table. Some of the extras done by CSPs are seen as nice-to-haves, rather than crucial functions.
As a result, there is a danger, certainly in some parts of the country, of the partnerships becoming meetings, rather than problem-solving bodies. Of course, whatever saving is made is lost later, through the impact on the criminal justice process. Certainly, if I ever get the chance to sit where the Minister sits, I will seek to reallocate those bodies and use them to their fullest extent, because we know the impact they can have.
In the meantime, we have what the Government have offered us. I probed the issue a little in our evidence session with the police and crime commissioners, and the real impact of this measure is that we are setting the police and crime commissioner or the relevant deputy Mayor as first among equals, and giving them higher status in CSPs. They are clearly to be given primacy. I thought about voting against this clause, but I talked to PCCs and local authorities, and they have fewer concerns than I do. The requirement is relatively light, in the sense that the power is to make recommendations, rather than to direct. That is probably right, so I have not chosen to vote against.
I have some degree of enthusiasm for what the Minister said about public transparency on decisions and recommendations. If recommendations are rejected, at least there will be an explanation why; that is probably enough. We should make it clear—I hope that the Minister will—that circumstances in which this power was necessary would generally reflect a failure. If a PCC needs to direct their CSP, there is no doubt a bigger problem in play.
What we want—I am sure that the Minister does as well—is a family of organisations across sectors in a community. We are talking about principally public sector organisations, but also bodies in the community and voluntary sector and, to some degree, the private sector, coming together on a basis of mutual trust to identify the common challenges for crime prevention and community safety in an area. They should have agreed priorities and plans based on good-quality data, insight and understanding of what each organisation is doing. Those are all parts of the puzzle. They should work to common goals in the interests of their community. That is easy to say, but it can be a difficult alchemy to achieve sometimes. However, that is what makes change, and that is what we need to see from CSPs. It will drive us away from what we have sadly seen in recent years.
There has been a move to counting crimes, and a move away from problem solving and problem-oriented policing. I have to say, there is minimal value to having one partner able to trump the rest. However, in cases of dysfunction, it will be a valuable asset for a police and crime commissioner or a deputy Mayor for policing to be able to say, “Hang on a minute. We have the ultimate mandate in this area. We don’t think things are working. This is how they ought to work.” Every time this provision is used, it will be a sign of failure, rather than success, but nevertheless it probably does add some value, so we will not oppose it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 72 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 73
Ethical policing (including duty of candour)
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 73, page 64, line 36, at end insert—
“(2A) The Code must set out the actions and behaviours which will be considered to constitute ‘acting ethically.’”
This amendment would require the College of Policing’s code to state how police officers are to embody and demonstrate the requirement to act ethically.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 135, in clause 73, page 64, line 36, at end insert—
“(2A) In subsection (2) the reference to acting ethically includes a prohibition on a police officer engaging in—
(a) sexual relationships with members of the public whilst acting in their capacity as a police officer; and
(b) abusive conduct, including domestic abuse or sexual violence, towards any person whether in their role as a police officer or otherwise.”
Clause 73 is amended to make explicit that ethical policing also entails zero tolerance for violence and other forms of abuse against women and girls by police officers and staff.
Amendment 149, in clause 73, page 64, line 36, at end insert—
“(2A) The Code must set out how persons under the chief officer’s direction and control are to act ethically and with candour when discharging their duties in relation to a major incident, including—
(a) their duty to assist with any court proceeding, official inquiry or investigation resulting from a major incident fully, transparently and with proper expedition;
(b) their duty to disclose relevant information related to the discharge of their duties in relation to a major incident which would not otherwise be disclosed under the terms of reference or parameters of the relevant proceedings, inquiry or investigation.
(2B) The duties under (2A) may arise from—
(a) an application by any person affected by the major incident to the relevant court or inquiry chairperson;
(b) an instruction from the relevant court or inquiry chairperson; or
(c) where there are no extant court or inquiry proceedings, a requirement of any judicial review proceedings in the High Court.”
Amendment 136, in clause 73, page 65, line 17, at end insert—
“(h) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner for England and Wales;
(i) the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses;
(j) the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner.”
This amendment aims to ensure that there is independent external oversight to the Code of Practice from bodies which represent the interests of victims and survivors whom this Code seeks to protect.
New clause 48—Duty to investigate suspects diligently—
“(1) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 are amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 2 (standards of professional behaviour), under the heading ‘Duties and Responsibilities’, after ‘Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities.’ insert ‘This includes undertaking diligent searching for, and consideration of, all relevant intelligence related to a suspect.’”
This new clause is a change to Police Regulations. It is designed to ensure that officers diligently consider all intelligence on a suspect, including previous convictions or reports related to that person.
Alex Norris
Clause 73 is a significant clause that many outside this Committee are likely to be paying close attention to. I will resist the urge to pile into the clause stand part debate, but the clause relates to ethical policing, including the duty of candour. The duty of candour is the subject of a very live public conversation, following the brave campaign by the Hillsborough families for many years on this issue. Amendments 63 and 149 are in the service of that debate.
Clause 73 makes real the Government’s response to the report by Bishop James Jones, which details the long and agonising quest for justice by those families. The report, “The patronising disposition of unaccountable power”, is characterised by Bishop Jones as
“A report to ensure the pain and suffering of the Hillsborough families is not repeated”.
It includes 25 recommendations by the noble Bishop, and its title alone should focus colleagues’ minds on the need for legislative change, and what we in this place have a responsibility to do. It includes a recommendation for the establishment of a duty of candour for police officers—that is, a duty for police officers to be open and transparent when liaising with inquiries. As we know, that has not always been the case; in Hillsborough, it absolutely was not the case. The report was published in 2017, and it has taken us a long time just to get to where we are. It has been deeply upsetting for families that things have moved slowly; they have fought for so long, and they deserve the vindication of action in this place. That is why there is a degree of sadness that what is in the Bill certainly falls short of the recommendations in the report and the expectations of the families.
The Bill places a narrow requirement on chief officers; I am keen to understand why that path was chosen. Amendments 63 and 149 seek to improve that, and I am glad to have the support of the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee. There is a limit to what we can do today. The need is for a proper duty of candour that would apply to all public bodies, but an amendment that achieved that would be outside the scope of the Bill, but I seek to introduce that duty at least in the field of policing. Nevertheless, our commitment remains to a wider duty of candour.
First, through amendment 63, I seek an explicit definition of actions and behaviours that constitute “acting ethically”. We are asking the College of Policing to develop a code; it has to be made clear that guidance on acting ethically should explicitly be part of it. I hope that the Minister will say that it will be; I would like that clarity from him in the debate, if not in the Bill. I do not want to prejudge the clause stand part debate, but I hope that he will explain why the code of practice route has been chosen, rather than a straightforward legal duty, which is what we suggested during the passage of the Victims and Prisoners Bill through the Commons; it is now in the Lords. This seems a bit of an indirect way of proceeding, but I am not sure. The amendment at least gives us the opportunity to set out that point.
Amendment 149 sets out what a duty of candour might look like in our eyes. It mirrors a provision that we have pushed in various Bills, and it comes from reflection on the Bishop Jones report, and conversations that my colleagues have had with the families. It gives us much greater detail and clarity on what we mean by a duty of candour with regard to policing, and the subsections relate to different aspects of that duty. It would be a significant improvement on what is in the Bill, because at the moment we are at risk of a double failure. There is a clear failure in that the Government’s plans for a duty of candour are too narrow. Sadly, we cannot rectify that today. However, we are at risk of sending a signal to the public that, although we recognise that the situation is wrong and ought to change, and that there ought at least to be a duty on chief officers, we still feel that we can subcontract responsibility for that to the College of Policing, rather than thinking that we, the democratic body, ought to make our judgment on that duty. The Government have fallen short here. My amendments add that requirement back in.
I am conscious that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, has lots of amendments in the group as well, but in the spirit of the Minister, I will not prejudge them until I have heard my hon. Friend speak about them. I may pop up again, if need be.
Chris Philp
There is obviously a duty to consult various bodies in preparing the code of practice. I know that the College of Policing and its chief executive, Chief Constable Andy Marsh, engages extensively with a number of people. The hon. Lady lists in amendment 136 the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses, and the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. I do not know whether the College of Policing expressly consulted those people in preparing the codes of practice, but I can undertake to ask its chief executive and find out.
I appreciate that the hon. Lady has probably not had a chance to read the documents, because two of them got published only earlier this week. Once she has had a chance to look at them, if, based on her experience and work in this area, which I know is extensive and long-standing, she thinks that some things have not been properly addressed, I am happy to commit to raising them directly with the College and ask that they be addressed in the next iteration of the documents. I am definitely happy to do that whenever the hon. Lady is ready; if she can set down what she thinks is missing, I will raise those issues.
I am told that the three organisations that I just read out, which appear in the hon. Lady’s amendment, actually were consulted routinely on the documents. However, as I said, if, once she has had the chance to read the documents, she finds in them things that are not properly constructed, I will definitely raise them with the chief executive of the College on her behalf. She can obviously do so directly, but I will certainly do so reflecting her advice as well.
I essentially agree with the spirit of all the amendments. However, because of the detail published relatively recently, on 6 December and in just the last few days, my view is that what is being asked for has been essentially incorporated into the documents. As I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, if she especially or any members of the Committee feel that things are missing, I will absolutely take them up with the chief executive, should a view be formed that changes would be useful and appropriate.
Alex Norris
This has been a really important debate, and I am grateful for the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. The Minister’s very full answer was much appreciated by us all. Interestingly, my hon. Friend and I focused on two different issues, but they have the same principle at root: the public must be able to expect that public organisations—in this case, the police—are candid, transparent and making their best efforts to do the best job in all circumstances. That should be obvious, but we know that too often that has not been the case, and Hillsborough brought that into sharp relief. Alongside that, in the cases mentioned by my hon. Friend there is a more numerous although less high-profile drumbeat of mundane failure, which has been almost baked into the system. Those will never be the subject of a high-level inquiry; instead, there are people dying in doorways, unaccounted for, unknown and unseen. We should believe that we can do better than that.
I am grateful for what the Minister introduced in relation to the work of the College. I was going to say this in the next debate when we talk about vetting, but we have full confidence in and we believe in Chief Constable Andy Marsh. He is excellent; he has engaged with us on the Opposition Benches and he is always very good, so no point that I make is against either him or the College. The question, for us, is about the degree to which we are comfortable with subcontracting important judgments about how one of the most crucial public services operates to other organisations that we cannot scrutinise in the same way as the Minister and the Home Office. There are times when that is very much the right thing to do, and when we cannot and should not seek to operate those things remotely from here; we would not have the time and it would not be appropriate.
Chris Philp
We both have confidence in the College and Chief Constable Andy Marsh—in fact, now is a good time to thank him for the work that he and his colleagues at the College have done. On the subcontracting of important things to the College of Policing, I should say that the statutory code must be approved by the Home Secretary prior to its coming into force. That gives not parliamentary approval, but at least some level of democratic oversight on what goes into it.
Alex Norris
If I am honest, that level of oversight might not give much comfort to us in the Opposition, but never- theless that at least gives the code a statutory footing, which is in itself very much valued. We must make the judgment of when we are happy for others to make those decisions and when we believe that it is our responsibility to set a tone. That remains the case, particularly around candour; I will come on to amendment 149 in a second.
I turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. One of the most important things we can say—and I hope that the Minister will say this at some point; I do not think that he has said it yet and it is really important for the amendment—is that we believe that off-duty conduct is relevant to establishing the character and suitability of officers. My hon. Friend’s amendment mentions a couple of cases where standards that we would routinely expect to be met have not been, whether that is in a domestic abuse or sexual violence situation or related to the point around spy cops. We ought to send a stronger signal on that.
I confess that I have not yet had the chance to see the documents that have been published in recent days. I hope that they pass the test that the Government’s own documents often fail around gender. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the Government managed a whole Domestic Abuse Act without mentioning women. We cannot lose sight of what is happening here—it is not exclusively male perpetrators and women victims, but that is largely the case. This is a gendered crime, and we ought to treat our regulation in that way.
I heard the Minister’s point about amendment 136. While we have to admire the College of Policing’s diligence in publishing the code prior to its becoming a statutory requirement, if the consultation has not happened yet there will be a period of time when that work could take place, prior to the Secretary of State signing it off, and for it to be understood that the commissioners mentioned in the amendment would be routinely consulted during the development of the process. The insight that those individuals have on those cases, as we saw in the evidence sessions, is hugely valuable.
I turn to new clause 48. As my hon. Friend said, the public should be able to expect that relevant intelligence is always considered; it is not. The Gaia Pope-Sutherland case is absolutely devastating. If the Bill is not the place for this detail, we need to hear a strong signal that it is what we expect of policing—what the public expect and should be able to expect.
On amendment 63, I think the Minister is right. I am happy to withdraw it as it is covered by the document he mentioned. I cannot quite share his view on amendment 149. We should not misconstrue that what is in the Bill now means that police officers are obliged to act with a duty of candour. What is in the Bill is that chief officers have a duty; what is in the College of Policing’s guidance, at paragraph 4.5, is that that duty to act with openness and—I forget the other word—is then pushed to other officers.
Alex Norris
Openness and candour. But that does not have a statutory underpinning. There is carrot but no stick—that is the point I am trying to make. The code covers chief officers. It will not really cover their staff—not so that we can have confidence that the job has been done with regard to the duty of candour. There is still a gap.
As I have said, I have doubts about whether the Bill is the right vehicle for the change that the Opposition seek on duty of candour, so I will not press that point to a Division yet. But the issue will come back at later stages and in other legislation as well. We certainly do not think that the job has been finished.
Jess Phillips
On amendment 135, the Minister offered to sit down and talk to me about what needs to be in the document. On reflection, I will not press the amendment, in the expectation that that will happen before the Bill goes to the other place. We shall see how we feel about the matter then.
Alex Norris
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
Nevertheless, everyone should be very careful that any of the examples they use do not fall into the sub judice category. I accept the hon. Lady’s assurance.
Alex Norris
I rise to speak to new clauses 35 and 36 in my name, which concern vetting arrangements for the police, particularly in cases involving violence against women and girls.
New clause 35 proposes that all police officers must be re-vetted every five years—it is currently every 10—and that vetting clearance must not be granted to those who have received a caution or a conviction for serious violent or sexual offences including domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, stalking, harassment, sexual assault or abuse, rape and female genital mutilation. Under my new clause, those who fail vetting for such offences would be dismissed.
After so many horrific high-profile cases in recent years, many outside this place would be shocked and appalled to learn that such measures are not in place and that the vetting procedures are poor enough to allow potential threats to the public to wear a uniform that should be a symbol of safety and security. We must tackle this issue head on. We know the police recognise that; chiefs do not want individuals in their forces who have shown through their behaviour that they do not meet that standard. Giving them the tools is important in rebuilding confidence in the police, which is a priority for all of us. The new clause would give chiefs tools to dismiss those people if necessary.
I will make a slight case against subsection (2)(b) of my own new clause on the five years provision. During the evidence sessions, I asked Andy Marsh from the College of Policing what the right period for vetting should be, and he said then, as he has said to me previously, that, if we are not there already, we are on the way towards being able to move beyond timed sweeps of vetting and instead use lifetime interrogation through new technologies. There is often a risk of saying things are AI when they are not AI, but they probably are in this case. Machine techniques can be used to interrogate databases of all sorts, including those that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned, such as the ones in the family courts.
That would make the vetting period moot, because vetting would be up to date. Any time that there is a breach, whether it relates to conduct towards women and girls or broader matters, that would be flagged to a chief straightaway and the vetting could be re-evaluated. That is very exciting, and if the Minister stands up and says that that is where we are going, that would be enough for me, but I want us to be in that place as soon as possible, so I would be interested in his views on that.
New clause 36 is on a similar theme, although there is no high tech involved in it. It would introduce a more straightforward requirement for warrant cards to be removed from officers under investigation for crimes relating to violence against women and girls. To be clear, this is not about prejudging an individual before a full and proper investigation has taken place. They would presumably still be at work doing other duties, or if they were suspended they would still be receiving pay. It is about ensuring high standards and the safety of others. My hon. Friend mentioned life in Parliament. It is rare that we hold better standards than others, but in this place we act differently if a serious allegation has been made, with no presumption of guilt, and I think the public would expect something similar from the police.
The warrant card is both a totem of an officer’s service and a huge factor in how they do their job, but in serious cases—the Sarah Everard case is the most obvious—they can be misused. Individuals at points of stress may act in such ways, so the removal of the warrant card is one way of putting in a restriction. This proposal has the support of Dame Vera Baird and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, who has pushed for the removal of the warrant card in cases of police-initiated domestic abuse.
On amendment 134, in the name of my hon. Friend, I think the public would find it astonishing that that measure is not already in place. Clearly, when it comes to vetting and being secure about who is serving in such important roles, we need full evidence of their character and behaviour. To leave out that proposed measure would be to leave out a huge bit of the fence, so I certainly support it.
On new clauses 33 and 34, I support my hon. Friend’s points about making police-perpetrated domestic abuse a recordable complaint. If new clause 33 is not the best way to do that, I will be interested to hear the Minister’s challenge. New clause 34, which would grant equal rights to make a complaint, makes a lot of sense.
On the new clauses tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), I hope the Minister will talk about how he feels Casey is being implemented. Some of the new clauses, such as new clause 8, overlap with my own. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, and I look forward to hearing my right hon. and learned Friend’s case for them on Report.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Scott Mann.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
Alex Norris ExcerptsTuesday 30th January 2024
(8 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 January 2024 - (30 Jan 2024)
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Latham, for the Committee’s final day.
The new clause is a welcome addition to the Bill. Clearly, experts have identified that the person B knowledge gap is really important and is creating risk with respect to those who seek gratification in this way. It is right that that loophole is closed. My only question for the Minister is about the sort of scale we are talking about. She mentioned a small number of cases. Do the Government have an estimate of the number of cases that the measure is likely to apply to?
Laura Farris
I do not have any indication of the number of cases, but we have heard from the police that there have been problems with getting a prosecution where they cannot prove intent.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 46 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 47
Maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction
“In the following provisions for “6 months” substitute “the general limit in a magistrates’ court”—
section 1(6)(a) of the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 (unlawful sub-letting: secure tenancies);
section 2(7)(a) of that Act (unlawful sub-letting: assured tenancies and secure contracts);
section 30(3)(b) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (breach of certain orders or requirements);
section 339(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act 2020 (breach of criminal behaviour order);
section 354(4)(a) of that Act (breach of sexual harm prevention order);
section 363(2)(a) of that Act (breach of restraining order).”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause provides that the maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences, on summary conviction, is the general limit in a magistrates’ court.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children
‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—
“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and
(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.
(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.””—(Jess Phillips.)
Brought up, and read the First time.