(1 day, 15 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to have you with us, Ms Jardine, and I look forward to this first of many Committee sittings. I am pleased to begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, beginning with clause 1 and the Opposition amendment tabled in my name.
The clause is a helpful place to start our considerations because it cuts straight to the core of our concerns and criticisms, many of which are similar and run through our opposition to many of the other clauses. The clause will amend subsections (2) and (9) of section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to remove the requirement for the defendant to consent to their case remaining in the magistrates court for summary trial. In effect, that will remove the ability of a defendant charged with an either-way offence to elect trial by jury in the Crown court.
This is one of the key changes that add up to reforms that represent an unprecedented erosion of our right to trial by jury, which is, without doubt, one of our oldest and most important traditions. It has been with us for hundreds and hundreds of years, bordering on the amount of time one might typically consider to make it an ancient right, as some people refer to it.
No wonder that right has become so valuable when we compare it to what went before. For about 500 years before the beginnings of what became the jury trial system, we had trial by ordeal. Guilt was determined by God through his unseen hand in the outcome of events, unrelated to considering in any way what happened or what we might consider evidence. The two main forms this took were trial by fire and trial by water. For trial by fire, the accused had to carry a red-hot iron bar and walk 9 feet. If the wound healed within three days, they were innocent, but if it festered, they were guilty.
For trial by water, the accused was plunged into a pool of water on a rope with a knot tied in it a long hair’s length away from the defendant. If they sank to the depth of that knot, the water was deemed to have been accepting of them and their innocence, but if they floated, the water was rejecting them, rendering them guilty. There was of course also trial by combat, or wager of battle, a fight between the accused and the accuser, which was introduced by the Normans in 1066.
Although they were invested in the wisdom of God and the Church, it was actually the gradual withdrawal and ultimate banning of the participation of the Church that brought an end to such practices. But that is not to say that even within those practices there was not some sense of allowing the views of others to play a role. Dr Will Eves, a research fellow at the University of St Andrews’ school of history, said that the key to the ordeal was the interpretation of the result. The community would probably have had some idea whether someone had actually committed the crime and would interpret accordingly. He said:
“In trial by hot iron, the issue wasn’t if the iron had caused a wound but rather how it had healed. So that’s a much more nuanced issue, much more open to interpretation. Whether the wound was festering was a judgment which could be influenced by the community’s knowledge of the individual involved and their awareness of the broader circumstances of the case.”
The wider involvement of the community then took the form of testaments to character, rather than a careful examination of the facts, as a basis for determining guilt.
On 26 January 1219, King Henry III issued an edict, and trial by petty jury was born in England, but it was its precursor that introduced the idea of 12 individuals that is still with us today. In 997, King Æthelred issued the Wantage code, which determined that 12 noblemen—of course, it was just men—be tasked with the investigation of a crime. It is an extraordinary testament to the legacy and enduring nature of such proposals that a core element of that kernel of an idea, with 12 individuals at the heart of the system, remains more than 1,000 years later.
Prior to the petty jury reforms, there were other forms of jury—for example, to investigate land disputes—but guilt was still determined by trial by ordeal. The reforms made by King Henry III are rightly considered one of our most important cultural, and we might even say civilisational, inheritances. The concept and approach has, in some form, been spread around the world to more than 50 countries. In 1956, the legal philosopher Patrick Devlin said:
“For of all the institutions that have been created by English law, there is none other that has a better claim to be called…the privilege of the Common People of the United Kingdom”.
Committee members may have noted that the 1219 edict came after the often quoted Magna Carta declaration of 1215. That declaration was a precursor to the fundamental idea behind what became jury trials and the 1219 edict: the idea that the judgment of an individual should be made by their peers. The barons had in mind the importance of protecting people from the heavy hand of the King, but their instincts are reflected neatly in all those who now have concerns about the power of the state in all its forms, including the judicial system that collectively holds the power that then sat with the King. The Bill asks us to consider reforms to ideals and protections hard fought and won for us, for very good reason, many hundreds of years ago. That fact alone should give us reason to tread carefully.
Of course, as we have heard in earlier debates and the Committee’s evidence sessions, the use of jury trials is not absolute. The form a jury trial takes varies across the countries that adopted it, and our system has undergone reform. It is fair to say that the debate is not absolute or black and white. The majority of criminal cases in this country are decided by magistrates, whose role and importance were solidified in the modern era by the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Although the Government and their supporters might say it, we are not arguing that we should turn back the clock, or that all those currently seen by magistrates should be seen by jury trials instead, but let us consider the nature and manner of the reforms made in the modern era that remain in place today.
Changes were made during world war two. At a time when our nation faced one of its greatest threats, when our continued existence as a free state was uncertain and when every effort was turned toward winning the war, what did we do? Did we radically cut down on jury trials? No. The number of jury trials and what cases would or would not be considered by them remained completely unchanged. The change was made to the number of jurors, which was reduced from 12 to seven. What did the Government of the day do as soon as the Nazi threat was defeated? They put it back up to 12.
In more recent memory we had the covid pandemic, a challenge sometimes equated in seriousness to world war two. When every aspect of our society, public life and freedoms were massively curtailed in a way that was completely unprecedented, did we permanently get rid of jury trials? No. There was cross-party consensus that we should do everything we could to maintain jury trials. We invested millions of pounds in Nightingale courts, alongside other measures, to allow jury trials to continue as soon as they could, without making any permanent change to the law and individuals’ right to access jury trials.
Labour Members will no doubt point to the changes on triable either-way offences, similar to the proposals in clause 1, that were made in the 1980s, but done differently, via offence reclassification. The changes covered common assault where no one was injured, joyriding and lower-level criminal damage, and research shows that they led to a 5% drop in the number of cases that headed to the Crown court. These are questions of gradation, and the reforms in the Bill are unprecedented in their impact and completely incomparable with those changes. The Government’s own analysis says that they will result in a halving of the number of jury trials.
Who else might we turn to in support of our view that labelling the erosion of a right as a reform and realigning the dial further and further away from where we are now cannot be seen as a minor act? We can turn to many members of the Government, and the Prime Minister himself, to support our view. On limiting jury trials, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards) said:
“Instead of weakening a key constitutional right, the government should do the hard work.”
The Justice Secretary said:
“The right of an individual to be punished only as a result of the “lawful judgement of his equals” was enshrined in Magna Carta of 1215. Yes, this right only extended to a certain group of men, but it laid the foundation of a principle which is now fundamental to the justice system of England and Wales.”
He also said:
“Jury trials are fundamental to our democracy. We must protect them.”
Finally, he said:
“Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.”
That is what the Deputy Prime Minister, Justice Secretary and lead proponent of the reforms has said.
Finally the Prime Minister has said that the
“general and overriding presumption should be jury trial, with very, very limited exceptions”,
and that
“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”
There we have it. They all understood that these are questions of balance. The Government are simply on the wrong side of that balance with the reforms in the Bill, including clause 1. That is not just because of the scale and gravity of the changes, but because of the other ways forward and other approaches, as yet untested but available to them.
The Opposition’s approach in Committee, on this clause and others, is therefore straightforward. We will test whether the Government have correctly diagnosed the problem, whether the evidence supports the proposed solution, whether the safeguards being removed are proportionate to the gains claimed, and whether other options are available. Those are the fundamental questions. Of course, we will not forget that, despite everything else Government Members said previously, the reforms were born of necessity and that the Minister believes they are positive improvements to our justice system regardless.
The Government have estimated that clause 1 and other clauses will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. They think the provisions will reduce the open Crown court caseload by around 14,000 cases, and cost £338 million between 2024-25 and 2034-35. However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and models that the Government used to produce the estimates, particularly in respect of how much time jury-only trials would save.
Cassia Rowland of the Institute for Government has said that the total impact of the Government’s proposals on court demand is
“likely to be around a 7-10% reduction in total time taken in the courtroom”.
She therefore considered that improving court efficiency,
“an alternative which enjoys broad support across the sector and which could begin much faster”,
provided “opportunities for meaningful improvements”. She said that implementing such efficiencies
“alongside more moderate proposals to handle some more cases in magistrates’ courts…would be less likely to provoke backlash.”
I could not agree with her more.
The Criminal Bar Association has criticised the “over-optimism” of the impact assessment, describing the Government statement that the Bill would only increase magistrates court demand by 8,500 days as “astonishing”. It says:
“The assumptions are that magistrates will complete each of these trials within four hours and guilty pleas/sentences within 30 minutes. Is there is an expectation that magistrates will be dispensing rough justice when they have these more complex, more serious cases allocated to them? Or are the assumptions in the Impact Assessment simply wrong?”
I think they are. Let us be clear: the Government would have us believe that 27,000 crown court sitting days can simply be converted into just 8,500 magistrates sitting days.
Clause 1 represents a fundamental shift in the balance between the citizen and the state. At present, a defendant in an either-way case has the right to elect trial by jury. The clause removes that right entirely, with the decision resting solely with the magistrates court, depending on likely sentence length. We object to the clause in its entirety, but we have also sought to put forward meaningful changes through amendment 38, which would simply allow the defendant to demonstrate that, in the particular circumstances of their case, trial without a jury would breach the principles of natural justice.
What current examples of violations of natural justice do we envision and hope this safeguard can protect against? Let us consider two theoretical cases of offenders, both facing trial for theft. This may be an opportune moment to point out that some of the examples used by Government Members to demonstrate the irrationality of Crown court time being frequently taken up by theft offences betray a lack of understanding of what happens in terms of the likely disposals in such cases. Nevertheless, as it seems such a popular example, I am happy to use it.
In the first example, we have an accused who has never been in trouble with the law before. He or she has a clean record and the offence was not aggravated in any way. In fact, he or she gives an account of a misunderstanding. No harm came to the victim, and the value of the goods they are said to have stolen was considered to be medium—between £500 and £10,000. But the impact of a guilty finding on his or her life would be enormous, because the accused is a practising solicitor. It would almost certainly lead to the loss of their employment and significant damage to their reputation.
The sentencing guidelines suggest that if the accused is found guilty, they might expect just over a year in prison. They are determined to have their case heard by a jury, because they believe their account of events would be believed by a jury, but under clause 1 as it stands, that would be denied them. Because they are clear of their innocence, they will not take a police caution, an out of court disposal, or make an early guilty plea.
Let us consider another accused. They are very far from being a person with a clean record. They have been convicted of multiple offences of theft, and other offences alongside those in the past—for example, criminal damage and common assault. They have been convicted of theft more than a dozen times. Those of us who have had an interest in criminal justice for some time will know that those sorts of offenders regularly appear before the courts.
The accusation the second person faces is of another order of seriousness. They are accused of having stolen a piece of jewellery worth more than £100,000. In fact, the loss of that item led to the collapse of a small business, as the owner was an elderly lone female, who is now living in constant fear and simply cannot face customers again. She trusted the accused on their visit to the business, and does not feel that she can trust anyone else. The accused faces up to six years in custody, so they will retain their right to a jury trial. They have no reputation to lose as a serial and convicted offender, and no employment to lose either.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
The shadow Minister is making an articulate argument about how the criminal justice system might deal differently with different types of offenders, but would he not agree that someone’s background should not determine their guilt? They have either done it or they have not. Actually, someone’s good character and previous clean record is taken into account at sentencing. Will the shadow Minister remind the Committee how sentencing is dealt with in the Crown court—is it by jury or by a judge sitting alone?
The hon. Gentleman’s question articulates the gap between what the Opposition and the Government think about these issues. Actually, for a case like the first example, the sentence passed will be almost irrelevant to the person. If they are found guilty and convicted of an offence, they will suffer all the consequences that I have talked about whatever sentence they are given. Such consequences do not exist for the individual in the second example; they do not have employment or a reputation to lose.
The Government also often portray the assumption that people are guilty—if they are accused, they are guilty. The whole point of the jury trial system is to allow what we have all agreed, at some point and in some ways, is the fairest and most balanced way to determine guilt. The Justice Secretary himself has talked in detail about how it is the fairest way to determine guilt. When someone’s decision is going to have huge consequences for the accused’s life, it is perfectly reasonable for people to want the fairest mode of determining that guilt.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to see you in the Chair today, Ms Jardine. I oppose clause 1 and its many implications for justice. It takes away the defendant’s right to elect a trial by jury for all either-way offences, which, according to the Bill’s impact assessment, will reduce jury trials by half. That is no minor thing, and I agree with the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle that clause 1 must be removed from the Bill, as well as clauses 2 to 7, which we will debate later.
Compared with the removal of half of jury trials, there would be a highly contested and—in the Government’s own estimates—much smaller impact on efficiency in the courts. There is also the potential for the workload in the magistrates court and the Crown court to increase beyond what is estimated. As Emma Torr from APPEAL highlighted during our oral evidence session, this will include new allocation processes and new multi-step processes for considering appeals, and the need for judges to spend time outlining reasons for their decisions, which juries do not have to do. The chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales also told us about the impact on confidence in the system, stating:
“Overall, the jury system is seen as the only part that still works, so why are we focusing on that? We want to focus on all those aspects that will reduce delays now, rather than hacking at a constitutional cornerstone, which also reflects community participation.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 40, Q72.]
This cutback in jury trials is not the measure promised to victims of sexual and domestic violence in the Labour manifesto, and later we will consider amendments that would what was promised. This cut is not a measure that will, under the current system, help victims through more compassionate and better trained court processes, or by improving outdated buildings where they currently risk contact with their abusers. The lack of legal support for magistrates court processes could, as we heard from the head of JUSTICE, lead to more victims being cross-examined by their own abusers.
We heard clearly from the leaders of the circuits that those working in criminal justice day in, day out have not yet been able to employ the real efficiencies that could come with more investment and innovation, and that would bring down the backlog without the measures in the clause. Those include the better user of technology, more sitting days, blitz courts and improvements at the investigation stage. I believe that we must act on the backlog, but that must start with those measures and the increased investment that is needed to correct what the chair of the Bar Council told us about investment under successive Governments. She said:
“We saw a rapid cutting of MOJ funding between 2009-10 and 2022-23: it declined by 22.4%. We are about 30% below where we should be.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 41, Q75.]
The main point I want to express today is my concern about the motivation behind the choices that the Government have made in these proposals by taking up, and deviating from, the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts in a particular way, and about how the severe erosion of the principle of jury equity can apply to certain types of defendants and certain offences in a way that I suspect this clause is aimed at. That really eats away at a constitutional cornerstone in a truly historic way. It eats away at the principle of jury equity.
We know that jury trials are more often chosen by black and other minority defendants, and that public confidence in a jury of their peers to see through institutional biases is real. We know that defendants whose crimes have been protests, motivated by the public interest and committed to expose or impede powerful corporate or corrupt organisations and practices, also feel this way.
Tim Crosland’s oral evidence on behalf the campaign group Defend Our Juries, which was set up before this Bill was proposed in anticipation of an attack on jury trials, told us about key recent protest cases where juries have chosen acquittal and applied the principle of jury equity in practice. Those included:
“In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 89, Q192.]
Tim Crosland told us how the principle of jury equity is there to apply to cases of conscience in which people’s actions were motivated by the public interest. He told us about the High Court’s 2024 judgment in the case of 69-year-old retired social worker Trudi Warner, who had displayed information about the principle outside a court hearing a protest case. It is worth our listening to more details of what was said in that judgment. Paragraph 16 discusses how the principle of jury equity is well established in our common law and recognised across the common law world. The judge gives several examples from Canada, New Zealand and the United States of the principle being applied. The judgment also talks about how its origins lie in Bushel’s case, from 1670, which
“arose out of the prosecution of two Quaker preachers for holding an unlawful assembly. The Recorder of London, presiding at the trial, directed the jury to convict. The jury refused. They were fined and imprisoned until payment. It was this imprisonment that the jurors successfully challenged by habeas corpus, on the basis that juries have a right to find facts and apply the law to those facts according to conscience and without reprisal.”
The judgment also quotes Lord Bingham, in another landmark judgment, on the principle’s history. He states that
“the acquittals of such high-profile defendants as Ponting, Randle and Pottle have been quite as much welcomed as resented by the public, which over many centuries has adhered tenaciously to its historic choice that decisions on the guilt of defendants charged with serious crime should rest with a jury of lay people, randomly selected, and not with professional judges.”
He added:
“I know of no other real checks that exist today upon the power of the executive.”
In my speech on Second Reading, I pointed out that a number of offences created recently to react to successful direct action protests now sit in the triable either-way category. They include, in the Public Order Act 2023, new offences about interference with key national infrastructure, including blocking roads, and specific offences about causing serious disruption by tunnelling; and, in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the offence of causing public nuisance, which replaced a common law offence and applies a higher penalty for acts that create serious annoyance or inconvenience, such as noisy protests.
Importantly, Tim Crosland pointed out to us in his oral evidence that the choices the Government have made in how to implement this measure will serve to virtually eliminate jury equity in practice. He told us that, of the more than 200 people jailed in the past few years for peaceful protest, only one has been jailed for more than three years. In that light, it is suspicious that the Government have chosen three years as the threshold in the Bill, despite the Leveson report’s recommendation of two years. Sir Brian also recommended raising the financial threshold below which criminal damage—often how direct action protests are charged—is charged as a summary offence and kept in the magistrates court, where sentences are limited, but the Government are not raising that threshold. Sir Brian also said that restricting the right to elect for jury trial was
“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current…12 months”,
but the Government propose powers to increase them instead. He also recommended that the new bench division should sit with a judge and two magistrates, to maintain a lay element in these Crown court cases, but the Government have chosen to ignore that, too.
As far as the recent examples of cases in which jury equity has been applied are concerned, all those deviations from the recommendations point in the same way. In the light of evidence that other measures would be more effective at backlog reduction, it therefore seems to me that at least one motivation for adopting this measure is to stop the embarrassment of jury equity. I did not get the chance to ask the Minister about this during the oral evidence, but has she discussed with colleagues, companies or other interests targeted by protesters the implications and impact of the Bill and this clause, in deviating from the Leveson recommendations in the way that it does, on the important principle of jury equity?
Finally, on Second Reading, I raised the question of whether these measures are yet another part of a package of the Government’s wider attacks on civil liberties. I have described this package as a “toolkit for tyrants” that includes
“digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities…and dissidents.”—[Official Report, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 249-250.]
I would like the Minister to reflect on the potential future impact of this attack on jury equity under a much worse Government.
Alex McIntyre
While we are on the subject of British values, is the Green party in Westminster’s position that criminals should go to jail? A Green party candidate in Scotland has said that they should close all the prisons in Scotland. Can she clarify the Green party’s position on that for the Committee?
Siân Berry
The Scottish Green party is a separate party from the Green party of England and Wales, so I cannot vouch for its policies. However, the Green party’s justice policies look in the round at what is effective in reducing crime, rehabilitating offenders and improving society, based on evidence. I am sure that the Scottish Green party have those principles in mind with any policy it puts forward.
That is the end of what I was planning to say, and I hope we will hear more from the Minister about the erosion of jury equity and what Tim Crosland, in relation to the Bill, called its complete elimination. This will be an important effect of what is being proposed, and it has not had enough debate as yet.
(1 day, 15 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
Sarah Sackman
I heard the evidence from Tim Crosland. I put to him that some of the cases he mentioned, including the Elbit Systems trial, which the hon. Lady mentioned, contained an indictable-only charge, meaning that the case would receive a jury trial, as that one did in fact. Some cases will go to the Crown court bench division and will therefore be heard in front of a judge.
The point is that the seriousness of the offence and the likely sentence make up the applicable test under the Bill, rather than who the defendant happens to be, their past history or the particular type of offence. The objective test is the same, regardless of whether the defendant is a young person from a working-class background, a young person of colour from a particular marginalised community, a practising solicitor or an environmental campaigner. Under the processes, they will all be treated equally. We are not creating carve-outs for particular types of offences or particular kinds of defendants; the seriousness of the case is determined by the court through the application of the test, and that is what determines the mode of trial.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
This morning, we heard a passionate and important contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington about monitoring the proposals’ impact on minority communities. She has tabled an amendment so that we can discuss that question, and I look forward to debating it. Although I understand what the Minister is saying about jury equity, can she assure the Committee that the Government are committed to reviewing it in the light of my hon. Friend’s argument?
Sarah Sackman
Absolutely; the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington was really important. In fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate also made the point about the equality impacts. The way that the measures in the Bill, and indeed our current justice system, impact on different communities in differential ways rightly concerns the Government. It is precisely why we committed to an independent statutory review, and it is why too I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling her amendment, so that the Committee will have an opportunity to discuss those important issues on a cross-party basis.
We need to ensure not only that we have the right safeguards, monitoring and data collection, but that the reforms in the Bill do not entrench a status quo that has sometimes fallen short of our collective aspirations for justice and equality, so that they can command the confidence of all communities as we implement, monitor and refine them in future, if needed.
Those aspects link directly, because I am discussing particular disclosure issues occurring in the magistrates court. As I will go on to explain, these are specific problems that Jonathan Fisher has identified as being a particular problem in the magistrates court rather than the Crown court—yet we are going to send more cases to the magistrates court.
We have to be clear eyed about exactly what we are doing. The issue is relevant because every time Opposition Members say, “Things are not the same in the magistrates court. You do not get quite as fair a trial; it is not comparable to a jury trial”, Government Members say, “That’s nonsense—they are all the same. If you believe that, get rid of magistrates courts.” It is important to understand this clear example of where the magistrates courts are delivering a less fair service than the Crown courts. I will carry on.
HMCTS data suggests that in 2023, a total of 311 magistrates court cases were ineffective because the prosecution explicitly failed to disclose unused material. In the same year, 746 magistrates court cases were deemed ineffective due to defence disclosure problems. Between October 2014 and September 2023, disclosure accounted for almost 7% of all ineffective trials in magistrates courts.
The issue is also extremely important from a victims’ perspective. The debate today has been about the defendants, but if we take the argument that in some of these cases the defendant would have been found guilty, who loses out the most if we send a case to the magistrates court and it collapses because of particular challenges with disclosure? The victim loses out, because it is over and done with and they do not have the opportunity to recorrect.
Alex McIntyre
I want to correct the record. This morning, I understood the Conservative party position to be that we are not allowed to call them victims at that point.
Sometimes I wish that Government Members would pay more attention to what is being said. I mentioned “some” cases and “some” of these people. That is the difference in how we tackle these issues. We do not get up and talk about “every victim” and I specifically did not say that. I went out of my way to say that among hundreds and hundreds of accusations, some people would inevitably be guilty. That is completely different from what, some of the time, some Government Members have been doing: assuming that everyone who claims to be a victim is one. That is very particularly what I did not do.
I finish this particular point with something else Jonathan Fisher said:
“Notwithstanding the vital need for further quantitative analysis, I am not convinced that, regarding the Crown’s duties, the disclosure regime is working as intended in the magistrates’ courts.”
That is an extremely serious consideration. He is not convinced that the disclosure regime is working as intended in the magistrates courts; he did not make that point about the Crown courts. I ask Government Members to reflect on that and then say there is no rational reason why some people might be concerned about more cases—and more complex, serious cases—being heard in the magistrates court. What that report alone says about our magistrates courts gives plenty of people a rational and reasonable basis to say that what happens in magistrates courts is less fair and potentially less effective than what happens in the Crown court. Government Members would do well to concede that important point.
I finish with a pretty extraordinary exchange with the Minister about the figures on the backlogs themselves. Let us remind ourselves of the central premise and argument: we all agree that the backlogs are too high. The Government say that they cannot be brought down to historic levels without the erosion of our jury trial rights. Opponents of the Bill are varied in their views, but perhaps most common is the view that other things can, and should, be done instead. What is happening right now with the backlogs is extremely important to this debate. If the backlogs are coming down in some places without these changes being introduced, it is vital to know and understand that.
Joe Robertson
I am not sure to what extent it is relevant, but I should probably declare that I used to be a practising solicitor, regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society.
The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail.
Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea. Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny.
The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure. Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final.
The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object. The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made.
Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption. Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve.
We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency. However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.
Alex McIntyre
As a former solicitor, I appreciate the hon. Member’s commitment to being paid at an hourly rate, given the speed of his contribution his afternoon.
One of the points the Secretary of State made in support of this measure at the Dispatch Box was that the changing nature of our criminal justice system and the added demand that will flow through the system in the future, added to the increasing complexity of cases, mean that jury trials are taking longer through the very nature of the additional evidence that is being gathered. That means that even if the immediate backlog is brought under control, there will still be a need for system reform in the long term, because otherwise we will not be able to keep it under control in perpetuity. Why does the hon. Member disagree with that?
Joe Robertson
I should clarify that I no longer get paid on an hourly rate—I am paid by the taxpayer, as the hon. Gentleman is, on the same terms.
I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.
Alex McIntyre
The hon. Member is giving a rather elongated speech this afternoon, which we are all enjoying. On the subject of the Criminal Bar Association, I seem to recall it rallying against the removal of the ancient right of double jeopardy, which it said would deny people a fair trial and ruin our criminal justice system. I am pretty sure his party was in favour of that removal back in the noughties. Those predictions have not transpired; it actually led to justice, for example, for Stephen Lawrence. Does he agree that the CBA may be wrong in some of its views?
Joe Robertson
I thank the hon. Member for paying attention to my speech and staying with me on this. Fairly obviously, I do not think that the Criminal Bar Association is always right, but I do in this case.
The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers.
The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions.
I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition. Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.
The point I am making is that we actually do not know that, because we do not know how many people used to practise who could now practise again. I absolutely agree with the Minister that there might need to be a further wave of people that will potentially exhaust the people who could be succinctly brought back into practice, but we have time in that regard. We might find that we bring sufficient professionals back into the profession for the next few years, at the same time as the Minister is investing in the future.
Again, I would welcome the Government publishing an analysis seeking to interrogate in detail how many people are out there who could and would come back, and what it would take. The Minister could then get up and say confidently, “We have looked at this and we know that there are this many people who previously practised criminal law, or could come back to criminal law, and this is what we expect them to do over the next few years. We think we need this many people. We think we will train x number, and that still leaves us with a gap.”
As with so many of these issues, the Minster has a case with her argument and interpretation of things, but if we are going to do something as profound as introducing a whole new way of determining guilt by way of a single judge on their own—something that has never been done in this country—then the evidence threshold on which the Government need to deliver their arguments is so much higher than what we are getting. That is the case on this and so many other issues.
Alex McIntyre
I have some experience in this, having changed my practice when I was a solicitor from being a banking lawyer to being an employment lawyer. It takes time to build up a level of expertise, and if I were to return from this place to being a solicitor, it would take me some time to re-educate myself and get up to speed with developments in the law to be able to practise again. I accept the shadow Minister’s point that there are some barristers who change their specialty as often as MPs change their parliamentary constituencies—
Alex McIntyre
And parties, which seems to be happening at an increasing rate on the Opposition Benches. Does the shadow Minister not agree that, at the very least, it will take time for those barristers to reskill, retrain and update their knowledge to be able to take on those cases, and that therefore the premise that the Minister is putting forward is the right one?
I am afraid that we are again at violent agreement and disagreement at the same time. The principle that hon. Member is talking about is absolutely fair. There will be a period of time in which we have to retrain people; but as I said, the Committee has had barristers before it who were very clear that they thought there would not be insurmountable obstacles. The hon. Member may question their credibility on that front, but it is perfectly legitimate for them to say that they question the Government’s credibility and the arguments they are making.
The hon. Member for Gloucester, the Minister and I are all missing a proper attempt to study, define and measure these things. Without that, the Government cannot expect us to move forward with a massive erosion of jury trial rights, in a way that has never been done before. We are not talking about triable either-way offences going from magistrates to Crown, which has been done, but not on this scale; rather, we are introducing a whole new way of determining guilt in this country, which will have profound implications, and we are supposed to decide it on the basis that the hon. Member and the Minister think it will take too long to do otherwise—nor, conversely, should we just take the barristers’ word for it. What we really need is a proper, exhaustive study of the issue, as we do with many other issues that we will come to where the same things apply.
The hon. Member for Gloucester did a good job—from his perspective—of pointing out that the Criminal Bar Association of course has its own interests and angle. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East pointed out, the Opposition are not saying that the Criminal Bar Association is sacrosanct and cannot be questioned or grilled. However, it is also in the camp of those who want to see more information and more details. When the Minister put it to the Criminal Bar Association in Committee that it had not put forward its modelling or proposals, it was made very clear that it had sought the same data and analyses that would allow it to demonstrate these things, and the Government had not allowed it to do so. We cannot on the one hand say that it is a loaded jury, in the American sense, and we cannot take its word for it, but at the same time criticise it for not having alternative opinions, when we will not help it to further elucidate those measures that might make a difference.
(3 weeks ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
Order.
Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not at all disrespectful. Natalie Fleet, who has also been abused, takes the opposite view. She does not want to be weaponised, Kieran, and that is a very sound point. None the less, her example is appalling, and nobody could doubt her. The man was acquitted, but a judge believed her, so what is your argument now? Judges are not fair.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Q
To bring it back to victims—you referred to this, Claire—the Bill makes changes to the bad character evidence. Can you go into a bit more detail on what that is like from a victim’s perspective to have to go through a line of questioning about bad character evidence? Why is it so important that we are changing it?
Claire Waxman: These are important safeguards that need come in to better protect victims during the cross-examination process. I have to say that most victims I speak to who have gone through the cross-examination process—and this is not just rape victims—describe it as “brutal”. That is their word, not mine. They feel that it is often an experience to try to undermine their credibility at every point.
We have seen the use of past sexual behaviour or past sexual allegations to somehow undermine credibility. We have also seen it with compensation: as I said, it is a right under the victims code to be told about compensation, yet victims trying to access compensation is being weaponised and used as a way to undermine credibility. Many victims feel like they are the ones on trial, and they are being scrutinised. Putting in these important safeguards will help to improve that experience, so that they do not feel like they are under attack.
As I say, you are going to hear from victims shortly, one of whom has gone through that very experience, and I urge you all to listen to them. That is really important, because they are the ones with lived experience—they are living and breathing this delayed criminal justice system. Delays are not the only issue for victims; it is also about the treatment that they experience throughout the criminal justice system. Both need to be dealt with to really reduce victim attrition and improve victim satisfaction.
Alex McIntyre
Q
As victim-survivors, how would you feel if the Government adopted the Opposition’s proposal, which is to only do two of those three things and leave one on the table that might speed up the delays in the criminal justice system? Do you think the Government would be going far enough if they left options on the table?
The Chair
Last word, witnesses—over to you.
Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: I think we need to go full force. Now is the time for change. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to—I am not going to swear—get stuff done. If we do not do it now, it would be a missed opportunity. It is about centring lived experience: all these rippling changes being put forward will have trickling effects on the wider justice system, including support services. Centring victims’ voices in that is pivotal.
Charlotte Meijer: Agreed.
(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberI am hugely grateful for my hon. Friend’s continual advocacy in the Chamber on behalf of victims. She is absolutely right. If we do nothing, we head to a backlog of 200,000, and many, many victims sitting behind that backlog. If we do as Opposition Members suggest, we head to a backlog of 133,000. That is why we have to do these reforms and why I am very pleased to put forward a Bill that also does more, in particular for victims of sexual crime and rape.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Under the previous Conservative Government, criminal justice funding was cut by 23%, we lost 42% of our magistrates, half of our magistrates courts were closed and the number of sitting days in our Crown courts went down. That is the record of the Conservative Government. The only thing that went up was the number of victims waiting for justice. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the crocodile tears from the Conservative party today just show why the public should never put trust in arsonists to put out the fire?
One hundred per cent. That is why the shadow Justice Secretary, when he stands up, should apologise. He was sat in the Home Office while that was happening.
(1 month ago)
Commons ChamberNot yet.
We must have a serious discussion about why that is. It was disappointing for those who sought to put forward a credible analysis of what has happened that the Justice Secretary and most Labour Members did not mention the word “covid” once. In reality, the backlogs in the Crown court under this Government before covid were lower than those we inherited from the previous Government.
It is fair to say that for many years—25 years, as we heard from the hon. Member for Congleton (Sarah Russell)—it has been accepted that not enough political attention has been paid to our justice system. The question is, what do we do about it? There is no single answer to that question, because there is no single problem. A whole variety of things are going wrong in our justice system. We are seeing late pleas because of insufficient early advice, faulty courtrooms, a lack of reports from probation services, and problems with prison transport. All those problems, and others, cause the delays and other issues.
The central recommendation of the Leveson report was for more sitting days— 130,000—and that will require more venues, more court staff, more prosecution staff, more solicitors and more barristers. However, as I have mentioned, there are simpler things that we can do ahead of that, and we need look no further than Liverpool Crown court under the leadership of Andrew Menary. At a time when the national average wait from charge to trial is 321 days, that court manages an average wait of 206 days. As far as I am aware, neither the Justice Secretary nor any of his team has visited Liverpool Crown court to speak to the judge and hear how he does that. In fact, he achieves it partly through the use of early guilty pleas. Nationally, we lose court time because too many people—31%—plead guilty on the day of a trial. In Liverpool, the proportion is just 6%. Those are not bold reforms. They are not measures that allow a Secretary of State to give a grand speech and consider himself a great reformer. It is just hard work, or what one Member described as “pretty boring” stuff that gets the job done.
As was pointed out by the hon. Members for Warrington North and for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), these reforms will not only fail to achieve what the Government claim they will; they will be an overbearing, destructive distraction from that sort of hard work. And what will the Government gain? Certainly not what they claim in the impact assessment, which is full of assumptions and fantasies, and certainly not anything that might be described as modelling. The Government want us to believe that 24,000 Crown court days will simply be converted into 8,500 magistrate days, but they have no evidence for that claim. They want us to believe that trials without juries will be 20% shorter, but they have no evidence to support that claim either.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Has the shadow Minister seen today’s statement from the Institute for Government, which has backed the Government’s modelling and overturned its previous position? He might want to reflect that in his comments.
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman read the entire statement. What the institution actually said was that the modelling
“relies on several assumptions—some of which are highly uncertain.”
Did he read that part of the statement? I do not think he did, because it claims that there will be reductions of only 2% in trial time as a result of these reforms.
What are we being asked to give up? We are being asked to give up 800 years of English legal history. A sledgehammer is being taken to the cornerstone of our system, and to fundamental rights. Thousands of accused people risk spending years in prison, losing their livelihoods, losing their families, losing their homes, and not being able to make the simple request for a forum of their peers to make that decision—a part of the justice system that is trusted and supported more than any other. That is perhaps why it is being defended so robustly by those within it. Just today, thousands of retired judges and retired and working legal professionals asked the Justice Secretary to think again. What has been the Government’s response to that? It has been to denigrate the role of jury trials.
We have had the appalling sight of the Lord Chancellor comparing three years in prison to a scraped knee. We have heard the Minister for Courts say that being accused of an offence of sexual assault, which could be considered either way at the moment, was not serious—an accusation that, if proven, would lose someone their livelihood. It is shameful and desperate stuff from a desperate Government. In contrast, what did the Prime Minister say? He said:
“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”
Now he asks us to upend that balance in a historically unprecedented way.
Of course, we can talk about the facts and figures, as woeful and thin as they have been, but at the end of the day, these decisions come from political instinct and a deep sense of what is right and wrong. That is not shallow; it is based on knowledge and years of experience —the sort that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) have. That experience told them, before they saw the figures, that the Government’s approach was not going to work. They have been proven right by the figures.
Is it any surprise that the Prime Minister does not understand this? Time and again, we have seen that he is absolutely devoid of any sort of deep political instinct. His only instinct is to chop and change his mind as it suits him on any particular day. No wonder he has been, more than any other Prime Minister in recent history, an agent of the civil service. He has forgotten the golden rule that civil servants advise and Ministers decide. The Conservatives have said yes to more resources, to efficiency and to the hard work of getting things done, but we have said no to eroding a fundamental right, no to more overbearing state power, and no to gutting and scouring away the mechanism by which all of us watch the watchmen.
The Courts Minister tells us that the Bill has been introduced on a point of political principle, whereas other Members have argued that it is a matter of necessity and resource. Too often, Labour Members have said yes to a Prime Minister to whom they should have said no. They have an opportunity tonight to say no to the Prime Minister when it counts. Let us hope they have the courage to do so.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I welcome the questions from the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. To reassure the House, offenders who are serving a life sentence or an IPP sentence for public protection will be approved for a transfer to open conditions only in response to a recommendation by the Parole Board. Before making that recommendation, the Parole Board conducts a thorough risk assessment of the offender’s risk of harm and risk of absconding, taking into account all those assessments provided by qualified HM Prison and Probation Service staff and other agencies. The Secretary of State does have the ability to reject a recommendation from the Parole Board, but to do so they would need evidence to dispute the board’s assessment of risk. Officials, on behalf of the Secretary of State, concluded that there were no grounds under the published policy to reject the board’s recommendations for any of these three individuals.
On absconding more generally, it is important that I state categorically to the House that there were 57 absconds in the year ending March 2025, which is a 2% decrease from 58 the previous year. The number of absconds is falling year on year, and has fallen from 143 in the 12 months to March 2020. It is coming down substantially due to a sustained focus on this area. Open prisons work; they are a key part of the programme of rehabilitation and of reintegrating offenders into society. However, sometimes prisoners abscond and it is important that all steps are taken to bring them back into custody when that occurs.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
I must have a bit of amnesia in the new year, because I cannot seem to recall any circumstances in which the shadow Secretary of State raised in the House the 143 abscondments that happened on his Government’s watch—perhaps it is only when a leadership bid is in the offing that he cares about this issue. Will the Minister set out what steps she has taken to ensure that these prisoners are returned to custody and what measures are in place to deter prisoners from absconding in future?
I welcome my hon. Friend’s question. He is right: amnesia seems to be going around the Opposition a lot faster these days. In July last year, as well as refreshing internal security frameworks, the Government published a new policy framework that sets out definitions, reporting expectations and response requirements. We are working with all relevant agencies, including the police, and the public, following the public appeal that went out on 3 January to get everyone behind bringing these prisoners back into custody and putting them into closed conditions.
(3 months, 4 weeks ago)
Commons Chamber
Sarah Sackman
The right hon. Member raises a really good point. Such delays are depriving our businesses of productivity and the ability to resolve disputes sooner. The successes we are seeing on small money claims under £10,000, which tend to affect small and medium-sized enterprises, show the progress that can be made. The other thing I will point him to is the launch of our English law promotion panel, which is looking at competitiveness with other jurisdictions.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Before entering the House, I was an employment solicitor, and I saw the impact that judicial mediation had in our employment tribunals. Will the Minister agree to meet me to discuss the role that expanding judicial mediation could have in bringing down the backlog in our employment tribunals?
Sarah Sackman
I welcome my hon. Friend’s experience in this area. I would be happy to meet him to discuss that important subject.
(5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Member will know that the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025 gives the water industry regulators new powers to take tougher and faster action to crack down on water companies that are not delivering for customers and the environment. She will also be aware that the victims code covers victims of crime, who are persons who have suffered harm as a direct result of being subjected to or witnessing a crime at the time that it occurred. In the vast majority of cases of the type she raises, criminal conduct in relation to sewage and waste water would be committed against the environment, not directly against the person. However, where someone has been affected as a result, they are able to access services, via the NHS for example, to seek support.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Environmental crimes such as fly-tipping blight cities such as Gloucester, leaving victims across my city unable to enjoy the place they love. Will the Minister confirm what discussions she has had with colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government about how we can give local councils the powers and resources to enforce action on fly-tipping?
(5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point. The truth, however, is that because of the complexity of the various early release schemes, the numerous pieces of guidance that exist and the many different thresholds, the prisoner himself is often not completely aware whether he should be released on Monday or Thursday. It is sometimes possible when a prisoner has been released in error that it is by a matter of days, and not a significant period. I recognise why the right hon. Gentleman says what he says—we do have to make sure that there is an obligation on the prisoner. It is something that I will ask Lynne Owens to look closely at.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
The shadow Secretary of State seems to have kicked off panto season. His comments reminded me of my favourite character, Buttons, who longs to be Prince Charming. If only his colleagues would write into the 1922 committee so that he can formally start his leadership bid. In the spirit of panto season, I wonder whether the Deputy Prime Minister will join me in reminding the shadow Secretary of State that if he is looking for the reasons why our prisons are in this state, they are behind him!
My hon. Friend puts it beautifully. I suspect that it is why the shadow Justice Secretary said last week that the state of the Prison Service has been unacceptable for a very long time, including under the Conservative Government. I suspect it is why William Hague, a former leader of the Conservative party, said that the Government failed to grasp this—they did not build more prisons, and they did not have enough people in our prisons—and that this has been a long period of real failure.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI direct the hon. Lady to the statute book and to the case law that has evolved around that phrase. If the courts, this Government or our previous Government did not think it was a meaningful distinction, I do not know why we would have it on the statute book. It was introduced to provide the greatest possible benefit to those using force, in terms of legal protection and understanding that they would not be unfairly or unduly judged as a result. As I said, it has been on the statute book for quite some time. It is a legally recognised phrase, as distinguished from “reasonable force”.
Alex McIntyre
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the short answer for his response to the hon. Member for South Devon is no?