Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAlex Davies-Jones
Main Page: Alex Davies-Jones (Labour - Pontypridd)Department Debates - View all Alex Davies-Jones's debates with the Home Office
(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending.
Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.
Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence.
Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria.
The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.
Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard.
Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups.
What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. He asked me about the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision; if a Secretary of State decides that, for the purpose of extending polygraph testing, an offence was an act of terrorism or was committed for the purpose of terrorism, but a court does not reach the same decision, the Secretary of State will review their decision in the light of the court’s findings. That is an important backstop. Guidance will be produced on the process of the Secretary of State designating terrorist connections and for the court for the different management changes in the Bill.
Polygraph testing is one of many tools available to the Probation Service when managing offenders in the community and when they are out on licence. It is not the only tool available in its arsenal to ensure the public are kept safe.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 104 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 105
Duty of offender to notify details
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal.
The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias.
We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams.
Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable.
Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 106
Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 107 to 109 stand part.
New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—
“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or
(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”
This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.
New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—
“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—
(a) the officer fails vetting, and
(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.
(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—
(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and
(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”
This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.
The clause will bring the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order, under paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, known as TORER.
TORER was emergency legislation passed in 2020 following the horrific terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, committed by terrorist offenders on licence. TORER restricts the eligibility of terrorist prisoners for release on licence. It ended the automatic early release—in other words, release without Parole Board approval—of individuals who have committed a terrorist offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment, and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point.
The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is not currently covered by TORER, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and being a terrorism-specific offence, and despite offences for breaching other terrorism-related orders being within scope of TORER. The clause will add breaching a foreign travel restriction order to TORER, ensuring greater consistency.
Since the introduction of TORER in 2020, a number of other changes have been made to the counter-terrorism legislative framework to strengthen the risk management of individuals who commit a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years. We are seeking to apply those changes to this offence too, in order to ensure that consistency remains.
Specifically, we are ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is capable of attracting a sentence for offenders of particular concern, and the equivalent sentence in Northern Ireland and Scotland. We are also making the offender eligible for certain specialist management on licence, including eligibility for personal search conditions, which will be UK-wide, and a polygraph condition, which will be for England and Wales only. We will also ensure that the offence is incapable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, on the basis that it is in fact a terrorist offence. Given that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order applies UK-wide, the clause also makes the equivalent changes for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
This change will ensure that sentencing and release arrangements are commensurate with the risk that the individual is considered to pose, and that eligibility for terrorism management conditions is consistent with other terrorist offences. I commend clause 125 and schedule 17 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 125 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 126
Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 126 makes a minor amendment to ensure that sentencing for terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland remains consistent with that in England and Wales. The sentencing and release regime for terrorists who commit offences attracting a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment is designed to be consistent throughout the United Kingdom.
However, as currently drafted, the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland—the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, and specifically article 15A—makes it possible for judges to hand down incommensurate sentences. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure consistency, so that where a sentencing court in Northern Ireland hands down such a sentence, known as the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period, the length of the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. That will then be comparable to the equivalent sentence in England and Wales, namely the sentence for offenders of particular concern.
Action is necessary to ensure consistency and fairness across UK jurisdictions. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 16 and 17 agreed to.
Clause 127
Implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.