Voyeurism (Offences) (No. 2) Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAlex Chalk
Main Page: Alex Chalk (Conservative - Cheltenham)Department Debates - View all Alex Chalk's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI refer back to the evidence of both the Assistant Commissioner and the CPS. The Assistant Commissioner was clear that he could not imagine a circumstance other than the two purposes that are set out. If people take a picture that they think is funny, but the obvious reason that it is funny is that they are humiliating someone or laughing at the humiliation, it does not really matter whether the victim knows about that humiliation. The person is taking the picture because it is humiliating and people laugh at the picture because it is humiliating.
Does the Minister agree that in this offence, as with so many offences, it is possible that there is a blend of motives? Even if the principal motivation is a laugh, the fact that there might be a subsidiary or subordinate motive that involves humiliating, alarming or distressing the victim would be enough in and of itself to make out the offence under the proposed formulation.
Yes, my hon. Friend is right, and I am grateful to have his expertise in Committee as a criminal barrister who is used to prosecuting offences. There is no need to show a primary motivation; it just has to be a purpose, and there may be many purposes. Equally, that would apply to commercial gain.
I rise briefly to oppose the amendments, although I recognise that they have validity and force. I am not suggesting that they are misconceived, but, on balance, the Committee should vote against if necessary, and I will explain why.
The first point is one that has already been made. We should not lose sight of the fact that almost everyone who has spoken about these matters recognises that the overwhelming majority of offending would comfortably have been caught. Although a point has been made about the Director of Public Prosecutions, it is worth considering precisely what she said in paragraph 2.6 of her written evidence:
“The Bill introduces purposes for which such activities are committed. We anticipate that most offending will fall comfortably within these categories.”
That is important—it is worth underscoring the point—because while one can imagine some individuals in court saying, “This was just for fun, wasn’t it? We were having a good time and it was just larks,” or equally a journalist saying, “My motivation was to get money,” it is always open to the Crown to say that that was a subordinate motivation that comes within the scope of the Bill. Therefore, it will be vanishingly rare, I suggest, for any defendant credibly to argue—with emphasis on the word “credibly”—that no part of his or her motivation fell within the scope of the Bill.
It is also worth considering the representations that were made in a wider context. Ryan Whelan, the lawyer representing Gina Martin, said in written evidence:
“However, most if not all of these cases”—
referring to other suggested motives—
“can be caught by the Bill as it stands. There is no requirement that the prohibited motive be the only motive and the offender who acts to humiliate, distress or alarm the victim is not somehow given a defence because he does those things for financial gain, a laugh or to exert power.”
The point I want to make is that, often, in life and with respect to the Bill, people do stupid and illegal things for a blend of motives. It is no good them standing in court and saying, “My primary motive is not within the Act. Therefore, I should walk out of this court scot free,” because most juries would give that short shrift.
This is a very interesting conversation. The only person who has mentioned how consent might influence such a decision was the Minister, in a very narrow context. The hon. Gentleman’s comments are all about the offender. If this is a victim-centred Bill, it does not matter whether somebody was having a laugh or was sexually gratified. It matters whether the person whose photo was taken said, “Yes.” Where does that come in his hierarchy?
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. Ultimately, we are trying to prevent offending so that victims can get justice. One aspect of victims getting justice is ensuring that something is put on the statute book as quickly and efficiently as possible. The key evidence, if I may say so—the centre of effort that came from Gina Martin’s evidence—is that she wants to see this on the statute book. For it to mirror the situation in Scotland has an added advantage.
The second point, over and above the inconsistency, is about the sexual offenders register, which is critically important for this reason. If someone is put on the sexual offenders register, that is major deal, because if they act in breach of that they will go inside. It is absolutely right, by the way, that that happens. If somebody commits an offence such as this for a sexual motive, it is quite correct that they should go on the sexual offenders register. Indeed, the overall tenor of the evidence is that the Bill is right to draw a distinction between those who commit the offence to humiliate or degrade and those who commit it to achieve sexual gratification.
I will give way to the hon. Lady in a moment.
Most people recognise that only people in the latter category should go on the register. Let us imagine for a second that this amendment were carried. The defendant would say, “I’m not guilty of this crime. I want to have a trial, please.” He would go before a judge and jury and say, “My phone was operating by accident. I didn’t mean to do it,” and the jury would say, “Pull the other one. Guilty.” At that point, who would decide whether that person went on the sexual offenders register or not? The jury would not have been able to give any kind of verdict on the individual’s purpose when he took the photo. In other words, the judge might sit there and say, “I’ve no idea. It wasn’t really relevant to the offence. Am I, the judge, going to make the decision about what his motivation was?” How does that serve justice?
I question the hon. Gentleman’s statement that the overwhelming tenor of the evidence is in favour of what he is arguing. What has been presented to us, particularly since yesterday, is quite strong, especially if we look at what both the victims lead for the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Director of Public Prosecutions have said. In response to the balance of power in sexual offences, Dame Vera Baird QC, Northumbria’s police and crime commissioner, said:
“We do not regard a specific motive as the important characteristic of this behaviour. More important is that this behaviour is done without the consent of the person being photographed. Its impact is that it is a violation of her/him in an intimate way and is thus more closely related to rape and sexual abuse than might at first be considered. It appears to be based on the concerning notion that women’s bodies are public property over which any one has a right to take advantage, for any motive, if they can find a way of doing so.”
I absolutely accept that the purpose of consideration in Committee is to drill down on such matters and see how they would work in practice. No one should misread my representation on this; of course victims come first—that is why we are here and why the Government have moved so quickly to get the Bill on to the statute book. We recognise that there is a socking great hole in the law that needs to be filled. The question is how that can be done as effectively, efficiently and fairly as possible. Apart from anything else, if the view is taken in due course that we did not think about that in Committee, the people who will be most upset about that are the victims, who will think it bad law.
All of us here, and me in particular, recognise that it is important to get something on the statute book, and I am grateful that the Government have acted so quickly. At the same time, that should not be the overwhelming reason we cannot now consider amendments seriously and see whether we can create very good law. As has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd, we should not have to come back in a year’s time because we have not really considered something enough and have created loopholes. There will be victims for whom justice is not done. Also, if I may say—
Thank you, Ms Buck. On the campaigner’s evidence, it became quite clear when I questioned her that she had not considered how other victims would feel, apart from what she had experienced.
I congratulate the hon. Lady once again on the vigour with which she has pursued this important cause.
With enormous respect, I do not think that anyone has dealt with the issue of the sexual offenders register. If we accept that not everyone should automatically go on it, the key problem with the amendment is that it does not answer the question of how a court is supposed to decide.
At the moment, the prosecution will say, “You, Mr Bloggs, are charged on an indictment with upskirting pursuant to section 67A(3)(a)—that is to say, sexual gratification.” The jury will consider the evidence that a photo was sent to a pornographic site, or about where it was stored on the defendant’s computer, or about what was found at his home, or whatever it is. They will convict the defendant, and the judge will say, “We will put you on the sexual offenders register and give you a sentence of 18 months in prison,” or whatever it is—simple.
If the amendment were made, what on earth would the judge be supposed to do? All the jury need to find is that the defendant intentionally used his phone to upskirt, so they would reject his ludicrous defence that somehow the phone operated automatically, but the poor old judge would raise his hands and say, “What am I going to do now? I have to make a decision that will be incredibly significant for protecting the public, potentially, and in changing this man’s life,” as he might be an idiotic criminal with no previous convictions and lots of personal mitigation. The judge would say, “All right, I will put him on the sexual offenders register.” But should a jury not decide that? The only way they can sensibly decide that question is if the Bill allows them to. I am concerned that judges will ask, “What on earth has Parliament done here? It has not assisted us, as judges, to do justice in the cases before us.” For those reasons, I oppose the amendment.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Buck, this fine Thursday morning. I rise partly in response to the hon. Member for Cheltenham. I apologise for being unable to listen to the second set of evidence. The Committee will have to forgive me; I am afraid I had a rather unpleasant medical emergency. Members will be pleased to see that I am back on my feet and trying to respond.
The amendments matter because of a couple of concerns that I want to put on the record. I understand the case set out by the hon. Member for Cheltenham from his experience. Let us take it as a given that everybody on the Committee wants the legislation to pass and be as good as it can be. The challenge and the difference is about whether it will meet that second test. The amendments address a concern that many of us have and that, if I am honest, the hon. Gentleman set out very well in how he talked about the crime and how he believes, given his experience as a criminal barrister, the legislation would be enacted. He did not at any point, even when I prompted him, say that the courts would consider the fact that the victim said, “No, I didn’t consent to this.”
The concern about setting out specific motivations is that it takes the power away from the victim to be the one who defines what happened, and that it is wrong. When we start to include particular categories, we take the conversation away from whether a woman such as Gina Martin, or a man who had a camera put up his kilt, said, “No,” or, when they found out what had happened, said, “That was not something I consented to.” Instead, we start quibbling about the motivations of the perpetrator. We all want to ensure that victims come first in the law.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right that victims should be in charge of their own bodily integrity, and that includes whether they are upskirted or touched intimately. However, on either formulation—the Government’s or that in the amendment—that is taken as read. In other words, it is a key part of the offence that it has to be shown that the victim did not consent. Of course, if the victim says, “Oh yeah, absolutely—I’m perfectly happy,” that is taken as read. It is the same in the Government’s formulation and in the amendment.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but he and I disagree on that. By putting in notions about the motivation of the offence, we automatically start queering the conversation away from that very simple point—whether we can prove that the person consented—and we start saying, “Hang on a minute; was it about sexual gratification?” or, “Hang on a minute; can we prove it’s a third, or indeed a fourth, party?”
If only this was about pornographic websites. We live in a culture in which people will take such pictures and engage in that behaviour not just to humiliate, but to entertain. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is a regular reader of Heat magazine, and magazines such as Closer. He will have seen such pictures being used to entertain. The risk of setting out the motivations is that we create loopholes and take the focus away from consent. He and I agree that consent should be the primary focus. Saying it is taken as read is not the same as making it the primary, defining factor.
The right hon. Member for Basingstoke has been brilliant about identifying some of the challenges. By removing these requirements, we take the focus back to the victim. I worry, and I suspect that other Committee members worry too, that there will be a case in which somebody says, “It wasn’t for sexual gratification; I was making money, but doing so to entertain.” That is the world we live in now. We have voyeurism for the sake of voyeurism. There is no sexual element to it; there is simply the pleasure of seeing somebody else in an awkward position. It is not necessarily about humiliation or distress. Again, setting bars for what has to be proved would create an environment that none of us want.
If an individual who said, “I’m selling it to Closer magazine,” turned up in court and said, “Do you know what? I had no idea that it might humiliate, alarm or distress the victim”, does the hon. Lady really think that he is likely to be believed by a jury?
We are going to come on to some of the broader questions underpinning the offence. The sad truth is that this is not the first time that people have tried to humiliate, and to humiliate mainly women. This is not the first time that there has been a sense of entitlement to see, to judge and to talk about the privacy of a woman’s body. Do I have confidence that there would be people on the jury who would think, “Well, fair play”? Sadly, that is the society that we live in and we are making legislation in that society. I wish I could be with the hon. Gentleman in having confidence that in the 21st century people would recognise that treating women as pieces of meat for their entertainment is no longer acceptable, but, sadly, both case law and modern society tell us that we still have a long way to go.
The risk for all of us is that we create a loophole in the legislation, where people quibble about whether it was entertaining or not, rather than ask the simple question: did she say yes? Did she say she was happy for it to happen, because it was something she was doing for her career, or whatever? I wager him that we would have a case where we would have that kind of discussion, and ask him to think what it would be like for the victim in that circumstance to have motivation pored over in court, rather than the simple question of whether she said yes or no.
We are not pushing these amendments to a vote today, but we have to recognise that there is a risk that there could be a loophole. There is a risk that we are sending a message from this place that our focus is going to be all about the ins and outs of motivation, rather than on saying that, in 2018, consent and equality are what matters in our legislation and we will introduce legislation accordingly.
The hon. Lady raises an interesting and broad issue. It is a conversation that we need to have and that it is good to have, but the question before us today is the legislation and the appropriateness of the measures we are putting forward in this Bill, which is about upskirting. It is a narrow issue. I recognise her frustration and desire to raise the issues she cares about in a broad sense in a narrow Bill, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent said earlier, as legislators—the Government, the Opposition and Parliament—we have an obligation to ensure that the legislation we are putting forward, debating and voting on is appropriate.
Although I have a significant amount of sympathy for the points made by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, is the point not that the law would be made to look extremely foolish if sex was a statutory aggravating factor in respect of an offence of upskirting, but not in respect of rape or sexual assault? In those circumstances, the inconsistency would bring the law into disrepute. Does the Minister agree?
That is a good point to make, as my hon. Friend’s points generally are. When we legislate, it is important that we do so with care. We should legislate when we have done a proper review of the issues we are legislating on and bring in appropriate measures within the confines of the Bill under discussion.