Russia’s Grand Strategy

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of Russia’s grand strategy.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate again, because I secured a debate last year about the same topic. Then, I outlined Putin’s global policy and I set out how Russia was threatening Ukraine as part of a campaign of blackmail and hybrid warfare directed at the Americans and NATO. I explained how Russia’s grand strategy was being conducted across the whole spectrum of foreign, defence, security and domestic policy. I discussed Russia’s warlike strategic headquarters at its national defence management centre at the old Russian army staff HQ on the Moskva river. Today, I make the same fundamental point as I made last year: Russia has a grand strategy, but we do not.

The idea of global Britain demands a global strategy, which means grand strategy and must be a whole-of-Government enterprise. It is fair to ask, “If Russia has an effective grand strategy, why has it not done better in Ukraine?”, because when the war started, all the assessments predicted that the Russian army would be much more successful. The answer is simple: Putin’s decision bypassed the usual strategy process and went against the views of his general staff.

This is about the difference between policy and strategy. Policy is the aim—the political objective—and strategy is the interactive process by which that policy objective might be achieved. Putin was driven by his obsession to subjugate Ukraine. He overrode the general staff’s strategy process and disregarded the limitations of the army. It could be considered odd that he did that, but he had used lethal force before with great success. In Georgia and Crimea, surprise and speed brought him a quick victory, although on those occasions the general staff were behind him; in Ukraine, they advised him against going to war.

Of course, Putin is not the first to override his general staff in pursuit of an obsessive policy; the same was Hitler’s undoing. It seemed, until a week ago, that it might also be Putin’s, but he has learned from his mistake and has rediscovered strategy. Last week’s appointment of the chief of the general staff Gerasimov as the overall commander brings the general staff back into the planning and command chain. Other commanders, warlords and private military companies will be brought under his authority. As Gerasimov gets a grip of things, I am afraid that we must expect to see Russian performance in Ukraine improve considerably.

Russia is not giving up, so Ukraine’s survival will now depend on western military and economic help being delivered a lot more rapidly and in far greater quantities than it has been so far. Unfortunately, the approach of the UK’s current foreign and defence integrated review refresh process is underpinned by an explicit but premature assumption that Russia will lose in Ukraine and will then prioritise investment in maritime, particularly sub-surface, as well as space, cyber and special forces. It argues that Russia will not invest meaningfully in land forces, but our eastern European and Nordic colleagues do not share that view.

The integrated review refresh risks over-optimism that would allow us to tilt our posture and capabilities away from the most immediate threat in Europe and, instead, towards long-term gambles on technological superiority and a focus on the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific are certainly policies, but they are not backed up by any strategy process to determine if they can be achieved with the limited ways and means that we have available.

The policies of global Britain and AUKUS are admirable and, conveniently, cheaper, but they are not enough on their own. Painful though it is, we need much stronger land power as well. We must still gear up to defend the UK and to deter a war in Europe against a peer enemy. Of course, Russia will invest in sub-surface, space and cyber, but it shows no sign of dispensing with large-scale ground forces, heavy armour and artillery. If anything, the Ukraine war has convinced the general staff of the need to reinvest in their army.

The Nordics and the Poles know that Russia is a land animal. Strategic missile submarines excepted, Russia sees its navy as flank protection for a land war and its air force as the third dimension of that land war. Despite evident lack of progress and perceived weaknesses, Putin shows no signs of intending to stop, of scaling down his demands, of looking for a way out or of making serious proposals for peace. In fact, Ukraine is expecting a new all-out assault in the spring or even sooner.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

In the debate last year, I made the point that I felt that we were already in a cold war, which some disagreed with. Does my hon. Friend think that our European allies have changed their position on that or is there still a resistance to accepting that a new cold war is well and truly under way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I think that we are in denial of not just a cold war, but a hot war. The hot war that is being conducted in Ukraine is laced with rhetoric and invective about NATO being the threat and about the United States of America provoking that threat, so NATO and the United States must somehow be defeated in this war. If we do not understand that Putin is now conducting a hybrid and political war against Europe and NATO, backed by a hot war in Ukraine, we are not yet living in the real world.

If the process of reinvigorating Russia’s armed forces and preparing for a further assault on Ukraine is not derailed and Putin is successful, by 2024, the west will face a more formidable Russia that believes that it can establish its place in a future world order by force of arms. This is a long-term strategic challenge that requires a long-term strategic response from the UK Government, all European Governments and NATO.

Putin’s strategy depends on time. We all admire Ukraine’s bravery and agility, which have left the Russian army in something of a quagmire, but it would be an epic tragedy if we now allowed Russia the time to mass its forces, so that its brutal war of attrition could become overwhelming. It is crucial for the west to increase the tempo of its supply of weapons systems to Ukraine, so that Ukraine, rather than Russia, can be first to develop the mobile formations necessary to break the current battlefield deadlock. The reality is that Russia’s whole grand strategy is on a knife edge and the next few months could be crucial.

We should not be deterred by Putin’s so-called red lines. In war and crisis, red lines are political and flexible. We proved that when Russia’s build-up to the invasion last year crossed several NATO red lines, and we did nothing. Likewise, Putin’s incorporation of Donbas into the Russian Federation was intended to set up a red line of Russian territory being attacked, but when Ukraine attacked, it turned out there was no red line.

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[Sir Chris Bryant]

Yes. I do not do this very often but I was saying “Hear, hear” earlier in agreement with a point the right hon. Gentleman made. I am reluctant to be too down on the Germans, however, for the simple reason that they have had to make a very dramatic and sudden about-turn in their whole understanding of their defence policy, but they do have to get over this hurdle. Many other countries in Europe want them to and are eagerly pressing them to, and the time is long past for them to do so. Perhaps we need a European security treaty to deal with some of these issues and get that materiel to where it is most needed and in a way that it can be readily used.

I want to talk about something slightly different: how we can help Ukraine rebuild. So far, along with many other countries in Europe, we have frozen but not seized assets. On 9 September 2022 a joint statement by the World Bank, the European Commission and the Government of Ukraine estimated that the current cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine was $349 billion. That is now a four-month-old estimate and the sum will grow exponentially as the war continues. We have all seen the pictures of what has happened in Dnipro; we know of the railways, roads and bridges that will have to be reconstructed, let alone the schools, the housing and the rest. Ukraine is going to need a very substantial amount of money.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly was in Washington in the first week of December, and at that time 42% of residential properties in the whole of Ukraine—not just on the frontline—were uninhabitable. That serves to put some flesh on the hon. Gentleman’s point.

[Sir Chris Bryant]

That is very helpful and when the Foreign Affairs Committee was in Ukraine last February, just before the second round of the invasion, we were visiting villages which were being reconstructed, and we were wondering whether that was a wise policy, but of course people need homes. So there is a very significant need: Ukraine estimates Russia has caused $1 trillion-worth of damage since the start of the full-scale invasion last February and that is not allowing for the costs in Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Under international law Russia will owe Ukraine reparations at the end of this war—I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that—as was recognised by a United Nations General Assembly resolution passed on 14 November. About $350 billion-worth of Russian central bank reserves have been frozen by democratic countries around the world, and £26 billion of that is frozen in the United Kingdom. Those figures come from the central bank annual report. Based on the estimates of the World Bank, the European Commission and the Government of Ukraine, the amount that will be owed to Ukraine by Russia as reparations at the end of the war—we could argue it is already owed now—is likely to be several times greater than the central bank reserves theoretically belonging to the Russian state presently frozen worldwide. So it is safe to assume that the central bank reserves we have frozen in the UK are already owed to Ukraine under international law. I would argue that it is a question of when, not if, they will be spent on and in Ukraine. On 30 November 2022 the European Commission President confirmed plans to use €300 billion of frozen Russian central bank reserves as well as more than €19 billion of Russian oligarchs’ funds for the reconstruction of Ukraine, and I applaud that decision.

The UK has so far provided £3.8 billion in aid to Ukraine in the first eight months since the second invasion, but the central bank reserves we are holding in the UK are six times that amount. It is time that the UK Government passed legislation to repurpose frozen Russian state assets so they can be used to aid Ukraine during and after the war; if the Government do not do that, perhaps some Back-Bench MP will bring forward a ten-minute rule Bill on 7 February to do it.

On the whole I do not like Governments seizing other people’s assets; on the whole it is a bad idea, but there are situations in which we choose to do it, such as when the assets are clearly unexplained wealth that has almost certainly come from corruption. In essence, the UK can find money from three places to support Ukraine. It can come from taxpayers, but taxpayers have funded £3.8 billion already so there is not much spare cash in the bank so far as I can see. Secondly, it can come from frozen oligarch funds. There is a difficulty with that as those are the assets of private individuals and seizing them is likely to be a costly and drawn-out process. The legislation necessary to seize such private assets would necessarily involve a court supervision—because we believe in the rule of law—in order to protect the oligarchs’ rights to their property under the European convention on human rights, or for that matter under normal British law. I am sure these cases will also be defended by some of the richest, most legally savvy and deep-pocketed people on the planet, and the resources available to the Government agencies tasked with confiscating those assets would inevitably be very modest. So I think both those routes are pretty much exhausted at present.

On the other hand, seizing state assets of the Russian Federation will be quick. It is a political decision and there will be no lengthy lawsuits. Unlike oligarch assets, these are state assets, specifically the £26 billion of central bank reserves clearly belonging to Russia, a nation deemed an aggressor by the United Nations, that has been ordered by the UN General Assembly and separately by the International Court of Justice to withdraw its troops from Ukraine, and which has failed to do so and continues its aggression against Ukraine. These funds could be made immediately available to Ukraine should we adopt the legislation to do so. Canada already has similar legislation in place.

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[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on once again bringing this important debate to the House. I also congratulate all the Members who are attending it, many of whom were here for the previous debate a year ago.

“Russia’s grand strategy” is an interesting title, which leads to the question of what constitutes the counter-strategy. As was said a year ago and as has been said by several Members today, where the current actions have come from has been laid out along the line by Putin, whose actions are pretty clear. If you are a citizen of Lithuania, probably Belarus, east Poland or the Caucasus, you will notice that you are mentioned in Putin’s essay of 20 July, and you will certainly not sleep easily if you think that we will step back and let Russia win the battle in Ukraine.

I have a concern that many have touched on which is that a certain amount of hubris is starting to develop among western nations when they say, “We will win in Ukraine.” I very much hope that that is true, and we are doing everything we can to do so, but it does not seem to take into account the way in which Russia is now regrouping, restrategising and re-energising, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said in his opening speech. We have to take a strong look at how we are going to supply Ukraine and how it is to move forward.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) has already made the point about Leopard tanks. European defence as a whole needs to take a long, hard look at itself. There can be no excuse for countries to say, “We will supply the tanks that are needed, but we need Germany to approve it” and for Germany to say, “Well, it’s up to the US.” It really is not up to the US. It is really up to nations within Europe. What concerns me, and Putin will be well aware of this when we are looking at the grand strategy, is that he will see that article 42 of the Lisbon treaty—the permanent structured co-operation, or PESCO, commitment—and where that leads to could spell a real problem for NATO.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I reflect on the irony that one of the reasons why some of us wanted to leave the European Union was that it was insisting on having its own defence policy and armed forces, ostensibly in order to be independent of the United States, because of course it is NATO that guarantees peace in Europe and the EU would be incapable of doing so on its own. So it is a bit of an irony that Germany is now saying that it cannot send tanks to Ukraine until the US approves. It rather gives the lie to the idea that the EU is capable of even thinking independently of American defence policy.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. I do not seek to raise an EU Brexit issue here. I want to highlight where I think there is a real concern about the future of NATO, what Putin will be looking at and why it is so important that we do not allow Russia to be victorious.

The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord) made a good speech, and I congratulate him on researching the speeches that we all made last year in this debate. It is important to know the context. He said that the Budapest memorandum was not worth the paper it was written on. That is an important statement to make because with Putin, nothing is worth the paper it is written on. When people talk about moving towards a negotiated settlement, what does that actually mean? If we get commitments on paper from Putin, it is frankly a waste of everybody’s time. The only way this conflict will be resolved is by winning it militarily.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that reaching a negotiating settlement with Putin risks his doing exactly what he did last time? He negotiated a settlement and that just gave him time to regroup and come back stronger with yet more violence.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I totally agree. I think a negotiated settlement is a form of appeasement because I just do not believe that it will work in the long run. I genuinely believe that if we say, “OK, however it may be; we will look over that section of it”, it will just give him time to regroup and rearm and decide what he is going to do next.

The war that is now taking place represents a huge threat to the European nations because, some would say, of the ambitions and ideology of article 42—PESCO— “What is wrong with that?” It says that you would procure as a whole; that there would not be replication of procurement, with countries buying the same equipment rather than focusing on where it will go.

When I talk to our American allies at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, they certainly think developing the European defence fund is a good thing that will up spending to 2%. As we are seeing now, one of the biggest risks to NATO in its history as a military alliance is that a country such as Germany—the only country that has the equipment, or that can manufacture the equipment, needed for an operation—is able to say, “Sorry, no,” or, “We are not going to do it.”

Article 42 exists and PESCO has been established, so NATO needs to work out its protocols before these issues become prevalent in a procurement generation or two—in 20 or 30 years’ time. It has to be addressed now because, fundamentally, it is Russia and Putin’s strategy to probe the strength of western military capability.

I am very worried about Germany’s attitude of waiting to see what the US does, because it is not President Biden’s core instinct to make such decisions. When he was Vice-President, he and Obama had a big falling out over the surge in Iraq. And when he was a Senator, he wanted less American intervention. Intervention is not his natural instinct. I praise the Americans for the amount of money President Biden is signing off, but a situation is developing in which other European countries are hiding behind a delaying tactic, and that delay is a problem because Putin needs time to rebuild and restrengthen.

As the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) rightly said, the rebuilding cost is getting bigger and bigger, probably exponentially. I have cited some of the statistics, and the cost directly reflects on our citizens. He said taxpayers have already paid about £3.2 billion, but the cost is much greater in the price inflation we have seen for energy, fertilisers, food and crops. We all know the reasons, and it will not be resolved while this continues.

Upping military capability and spending in this country, and in Europe, is vital because it will improve our taxpayers’ long-term cost of living. Drawing on my experience as a procurement Minister, industry needs a far longer commitment to armament manufacturing than the sporadic increases and decreases we have seen. Industry cannot make the commitment needed to manufacture armour, weaponry and other capital equipment on a continuing basis if it is not sure how long the contract will last. That is straightforward business sense, and it is why we have to make a long-term funding commitment, and we need to encourage Europe to do so, too.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

I agree with everything the right hon. Gentleman is saying. Unfortunately I missed last year’s debate, but this is an honest, simple question. Back in 2017-18, when I was new to this place, were we having debates about the request from Ukraine to help it arm itself? I do not know that we were. If we were not, why not?

[Alec Shelbrooke]

We were having those debates, not least in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. There was a Rose-Roth seminar of the Parliamentary Assembly in Kyiv in June 2016. The Ukrainians could not have been clearer to the allies who were there about what the invasion of Crimea meant, and it was brushed aside because there were too many vested interests in the way energy policy was going at the time and, quite frankly, because there was disbelief that anything like this would happen.

[Sir Chris Bryant]

As I understand it, when Foreign Office officials made that point to the then Foreign Secretary, who subsequently became Prime Minister, he pooh-poohed the idea of arming Ukraine.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

We can find examples from across Government over that period of time. When the invasion happened just under a year ago, many conversations took place, and still take place to this day, along the lines of, “Well, Putin is terminally ill.” “Look at Putin’s face, he has a terminal disease.” “This is the act of a dying man.” People were trying to make excuses for him to understand why he did it. They should just accept that the man is a fascist dictator who is trying to expand the Russian empire. There is the answer; it is as simple as that. But still our natural instinct says that this is so far beyond what anybody would expect that there must be another reason behind it.

The hon. Member for Rhondda is correct that people, whoever they were—in this case, it was the then Foreign Secretary—simply did not believe that this would happen. That was true among many of our European allies, but given what we now know, we must be aware that it will go beyond Ukraine. There is no point in saying that Putin would not dare to move into NATO territory. If he wins in Ukraine, then, yes, he will. It is not just Putin, but the Russian set-up—the Russian leadership. There are people beneath Putin who will carry on this war if he were to go. This involves not just one person, but a regime.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for setting the scene. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) clearly warned this House on many occasions about the situation in Crimea, but hesitation led the day on that occasion. With this debate on Russia’s grand strategy perhaps what we are really looking at is where we are today and the strength that we have through NATO and the US all standing together. That is the positive attitude that we want to send out from this debate, so that Russia understands that, today, we will not take any more and that this is the line in the sand. Clearly, Ukraine’s battles are our battles as well.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but the point that I make is this: Putin will observe this situation today with Germany and the tanks and he will also observe the European direction in defence policy. He will then start to think, “Well, how much will they push back?” The allies will sit there and say, “He won’t dare to invade NATO territory.” But it was only a year ago when I thought that he would not invade Ukraine. I can stand here and say that; I just did not think that he would. I thought that he was probing to see how the west would react. I thought that he was seeing what our reaction would be, but that his attention was on another part. I think at the time I was saying Azerbaijan, Armenia—mineral-rich areas. I think he thought that if we did not react to Ukraine, we certainly would not react in the Caspian sea. I just did not believe that he would do this in Ukraine. Why did I not believe it? It was because, rather than looking at what was staring me right in the face, I decided not to believe it.

We must accept right now that we need to enter into solid, long-term contracts. We need to do that with support from all parts of the House. Her Majesty’s Opposition must be in lockstep with the Government in our support for Ukraine and in recognising European defence policy. The Opposition have moved on from where they were a few years ago. There is no question about NATO support now, which should be welcomed across the House. It is very important that this country, this Government and this House have the same views. Therefore, there should be no reason not to invest.

I shall be drawing my remarks to a close soon, but let me just say this before I do. We know that it is important that we do everything that we can, but let me explain why. When I was Minister for defence procurement, I went to North Yorkshire and met the troops and the Ukrainians being trained by our armed forces. I was lucky to be there on day one when a batch of people came in. They all came from different aspects—one was 65 and one 18—but what did every single one of them have in common? They all said, “I am not losing my country.” That strength of feeling for a country is worth a huge amount, but it still needs to be backed up with equipment.

Russia’s strategy is clear: it will carry on expanding beyond Ukraine. It will take no notice of any treaty that is put in place. Only military capability will stop it. Europe must know that this is not the end, and it must ensure it is moving in lockstep on manufacturing and recognising—as I said a year ago, and I was pooh-poohed—that the cold war has started. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said, we are also in a hot war, but there is a cold war along an entire border, and that costs.

As I said last year, we must get back to spending the sums we spent at the end of the cold war, when we were spending 5% of GDP on defence. How we do that is a matter for different budgets and different questions, but the reality is that we will have to, and we will have to bring other countries along. If we are to defeat the Russian grand strategy, we need a Europe-wide strategy, and that starts with ensuring that we have the commitments in place for funding, for the military and for the equipment that others need, as well as for our own defence.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

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[Dave Doogan]

Is that it? I thought it was going to be a hard one. As he and I agree, nuclear weapons are an appalling weapons system that we hope will never be used. They are a deeply troublesome weapons system, but they do exist. In so far as they do, I am not certain that the 150-odd warheads—sorry, weapons packages—that the United Kingdom will invest in will make much difference to the polar threat of nuclear armageddon that is presented by the 3,000 warheads that Russia has and the 5,000 warheads that the United States has. These are the polar dimensions. The United Kingdom spending billions and billions of pounds in the middle is not going to change anything.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

NATO Accession: Sweden and Finland

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

While I support the hon. Gentleman’s sharing our joint approach to accession by Sweden and Finland and his approval of the fast-track process we are laying in exceptional circumstances, I do not treat our national security as a joking matter, and it is not the time to be cracking jokes when we are talking about our national security. I am very pleased that the Scottish nationalists have just said that they support NATO, although how they can say that they support our national security when they do not support our nuclear deterrent is deeply questionable.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Of course this is a hugely welcome announcement and one of the more significant moments in the history of the NATO alliance, not least because Sweden and Finland bring a huge military contribution to the alliance, so this cannot in any way be seen as a one-way street. Does my hon. Friend agree that, as important as it is to talk about hardware—Finland and Sweden are able to supply several icebreakers, with climate change and the high north’s opening up—cyber-defence is one of the biggest issues? It is very difficult to identify where cyber-attacks come from. It would probably be quite easy to make one appear to come from this place, and who would we retaliate against? Does she agree that the offer that Finland and Sweden can make to the NATO alliance is vital, but also that the position and power we have in this country to help to stop cyber-attacks and defend those nations is equally important in this long-lasting, world-beating defence alliance?

[Vicky Ford]

I know my right hon. Friend makes an important contribution in the discussions he often has with NATO colleagues. He rightly points to one of the many reasons why it is so important that Finland and Sweden should be enabled to accede to NATO as quickly as possible. That is why the UK is going to push a faster approval process than is normal, and why we encourage our NATO allies to also ratify as quickly as possible.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The UK should be rightly proud of the support that we gave to the Ukrainian armed forces over a number of years through Operation Orbital and through the early deployment of NLAWs, or next generation light anti-tank weapons—the anti-tank missile systems that have proven so effective—and we will continue to provide support to the Ukrainians in their self-defence. The Secretary-General of NATO has made it very clear that it would be wrong for NATO to engage directly in the conflict with Russia that is the inevitable by-product of a no-fly zone. Putin is desperately trying to paint this as western aggression against Russia. We must not do anything that will allow him to perpetrate that perverse distortion of reality.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend having conversations about contingency plans for what will happen if, God forbid, Russian forces start to deliberately attack nuclear facilities near the western borders? Those plans would need to lead to a mass movement of the refugees already in that area. Would he also agree that that would pretty much constitute an attack on NATO allies?

[James Cleverly]

We take attacks, or the threat of attacks, against nuclear facilities very seriously. Nuclear safeguarding remains a priority for this Government. I will not be drawn on the conditions of what might be defined as an attack on NATO, but nevertheless we have made it absolutely clear that NATO is a defensive organisation. It has never expanded by force or coercion. Our support to the Ukrainians is steadfast, but there is a clear dividing line between an attack on one of our good friends—Ukraine—and an attack on a NATO member state.

Sanctions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

Like the right hon. Lady, I welcome BP’s divestment. We are working closely with the overseas territories to make sure that Putin’s oligarchs have nowhere to hide.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the sanctions regime must stay in place until every inch of Ukrainian territory is back in Ukraine’s control, including Crimea?

[Elizabeth Truss]

Yes, I completely agree with my right hon. Friend.

Russia: Sanctions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

As I said, I am not going to talk about the individuals or entities that could be targeted, but it will be anyone who is of strategic or economic interest to the Russian state. The hon. Gentleman can imagine that that is quite a broad list of people and entities.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend will know well that Kyiv was the original capital of Rus, and was an area of fabulous wealth and education until invaded by the Khans. The Russians and the Rus called them the Tatars. Many reports have come out that tens of thousands of Tatars have disappeared from Crimea. That human rights atrocity cannot be properly investigated. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we must try to find out exactly what has been happening to the Tatar population?

Equally, for those who do not feel it is important or that we should somehow let Russia have the Russian empire, as President Putin outlined in his essay last year, that goes against every principle of freedom and democracy of standing up to fascist Governments who want to ethnically cleanse people over centuries of hatred.

[Elizabeth Truss]

My right. Friend is completely right. Let us remember that Russia signed up to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the 1994 Budapest agreement. It signed up to that, and what it is seeking to do is renege on its commitments, stoke aggression and seek to undermine Ukrainian democracy in a variety of ways, whether by false flag operations or cyber-attacks or by trying to install puppet regimes in Kyiv.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the undermining that Russia is seeking to do of European democracy, including Ukraine, and Russia’s activities through Belarus and its activities in the Balkans. That is why we have appointed Sir Stuart Peach as our envoy to the Balkans and why I hosted a meeting of all the Balkans Ministers to discuss this issue. We need all our allies to step up. The UK is providing defensive weapons to Ukraine, we are supporting Ukraine economically and we are helping to train its armed forces. We need all our allies to get behind that, because ultimately, we do not want to see a Russian incursion into Ukraine, which would lead to huge loss of life and a huge quagmire, and we need to make Russia absolutely clear about that.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

To build on my right hon. Friend’s answer, what assessment has her Department made of Russia’s other surrounding nations and their territorial and sovereign integrity? I am thinking especially of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Are the actions going on in Ukraine being assessed in respect of whether the west would take any intervention on Russian invasion in those areas?

[Elizabeth Truss]

My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. We are working with allies and partners across the world because this is a threat not just to Europe, but to broader global stability. I was at a meeting of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in November where many of those countries were represented, and I saw very strong statements against further Russian action in the region.

UK Government Recognition of Somaliland

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

On both areas that my right hon. Friend raises, he is absolutely right. One flies into Hargeisa airport, and it is a safe place to visit. One can get a bus to the centre of Hargeisa, as he did. When I visited, I must confess I did not get a bus, but I will endeavour to do so the next time I visit. He is equally right that this is an opportunity. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office so often wants to be led on these issues, but there is sometimes a moment for Britain to lead, as against to be led.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point about leading the world. Throughout the world, where western nations do not get involved, China does, and recently we have had many discussions about China’s influence. Does he therefore agree that when we look at development taking place in Somaliland, we can see that it is in our strategic interests and that of western countries not just to see what happens but to take an active, leading role and not allow that vacuum to be filled with those who, perhaps, we have difficulties with?

[Gavin Williamson]

My right hon. Friend is so correct. If we look to Djibouti, to the north of Somaliland, we see the Chinese investment that is going in. Where there is a vacuum, others do step in. If this country showed the leadership that it can by recognising Somaliland, that would show the Somaliland Government the value that we put on their friendship and partnership.

Russia

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

My hon. Friend is right. We have to defend the hard-won freedoms in the Balkans, in Ukraine and in the Baltic states. She is also right to point out that the issue here is not the Russian people. I am a great admirer of Russia and the Russian people. The issue is the Putin regime, and what is happening and what he is saying, and the false pretexts that he is trying to create. We must be resolute to defend democracy and freedom in Europe, and that is why we are taking this strong stance on Ukraine and working with our allies around the world to challenge Russian aggression.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Let me first warmly welcome my right hon. Friend’s world leadership on this issue, and congratulate her on putting the UK firmly at the heart of it. She mentioned the 1994 Budapest memorandum, to which we were also a signatory. In the light of that, may I urge her to ensure that when we enter the negotiations no false lines are drawn in respect of how far we are willing to go, and that we do not explicitly say that we are not willing to go beyond a certain point? Some worrying statements that have been emerging from the Ministry of Defence might cause my right hon. Friend’s hands to be clamped in the negotiations.

[Elizabeth Truss]

The 1994 Budapest memorandum is very clear. It was done on the basis of Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons and ensuring that it maintained its territorial integrity and sovereignty. That is a very important principle that will absolutely be upheld in the negotiations and discussions taking place next week.

Elections Bill (Tenth sitting)

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is an absolute pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme. I associate myself with all his comments. However, this is, with respect, actually a wider issue than just dealing with the Electoral Commission and the evidence that we have heard about the referendum and Vote Leave.

At the beginning of this process, the Committee heard first-hand oral evidence on the negative impacts of an organisation that provides guidance, sets the rules, and then seeks to prosecute. It is part of a wider problem that we have experienced in just the last couple of years. We only have to look at the Post Office, which is another private prosecuting authority, and its conduct in the Horizon case—the greatest miscarriage of justice that this country has ever experienced—including a sub-postmistress constituent of mine receiving a suspended prison sentence as a result of that miscarriage of justice.

It simply goes to show the issues with these conflicts of interest between investigating and then being a prosecuting authority—or “marking your own homework”, as my colleague just mentioned.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend recall that one of heads of the Electoral Commission was found to be highly political in their online posts?

[Jerome Mayhew]

I was aware of that. I am grateful for that intervention. It highlights the dangers that we tread when we have the Electoral Commission entering into a more politicised role. Furthermore, it is not just the Post Office; I also have a real concern about the Care Quality Commission, which is another private prosecuting authority. It was, to its own surprise—I suspect—given prosecuting powers under health and social care legislation in 2015. Under that legislation, it can prosecute for negligent care that causes harm in a health environment. However, since then, its record has been very poor in the number of prosecutions taken forward. A terrible scandal took place in my constituency over the last two years at the Cawston Park hospital, which was an assessment and treatment unit where, through neglect and at least one case of direct physical abuse, which was caught on CCTV, three patients died over a 27-month period. While I have to be careful what I say, it is certainly the case that currently no prosecution has followed that terrible series of events.

Elections Bill (Ninth sitting)

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Kemi Badenoch]

Yes, I have just referred to that. However, within the UK, there are many who do not pay tax who can still vote. That is my point: the principle is not used universally at the moment. Many of the people who they are claiming do not pay tax actually quite often do. A classic example is full-time students, who do not pay tax but are allowed to vote.

The hon. Member for Lancaster and Fleetwood asked whether the Government have an indication of how many people we are talking about enfranchising. I do not have that information at my fingertips, but I can write to her on that specific point.

On the funding of electoral registration officers, the new burdens doctrine applies. We will not ask people to do things for which they do not have the resources.

The House has debated votes for 16 and 17-year-olds exhaustively. The fact is that 16 and 17-year-olds will eventually get the right to vote. The clause is a completely different issue, and we should not muddle them up. Based on those answers, I hope the hon. Lady feels we have had a sufficient debate and agrees to withdraw her probing amendment. We can have discussions on what else we can do to tighten up the franchise.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ali. I was not going to comment on the amendment. However, while I have great regard for the shadow Minister, as she knows, I was disappointed in the route her speech went down by trying to make the issue about political donations. There is a system in this country for how our political parties are funded, and it is a cheap kick-around to try to say that our system is being corrupted. Donations to the Conservative party are declared through the official lines. Some of the examples the hon. Lady gave would still be eligible to make donations under existing legislation.

I make that point because this clause offered the possibility for some probing amendments to try to expand this issue, because it does need a great deal of thought. I am disappointed because the amendment is perhaps not clean enough to go down that road. However, I think that we are doing all of us in this House a disservice when we try to link a political issue to extending the franchise and the reasons behind that.

The Committee may recall that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Sir Roger Gale) gave the example of Harry Shindler and that question is the driving force behind why he feels, despite being a Labour party member, that it is important to try to extend the franchise. Within the thinking—I say this as a former vice-chairman of the Conservative party, the international chairman of the Conservative party—at no time in any of the discussions about the idea was it linked to trying to bring in further funding from abroad.

We can get into a real political knockabout on political funding. We can talk about union funding; we can talk about the lack of tax returns from Unite the union. We can have that knockabout. What I have found over the years is that, yes, political funding can be a problematic thing, and it can be kicked about, but it is still a better position to have it than to have state funding for political parties, whereby people have their taxation used to fund a whole bunch of political parties whose political beliefs are nowhere near their own.

When we probe the clause, I make the plea that we should move away from trying to make out that there is some kind of corruption behind it, and stick to the arguments that many have made over a great period of time. I am sure that there are varying views in my party, even though there was a very clean line in the manifesto on this issue, about how things should go ahead and the implications, including about somebody who has basically absented themselves from this country for a long time—these are issues that are to be debated.

I put on the record my disappointment about how the amendment has been drafted and that it has been brought down to an issue that I do not think does anybody in this House a service—that is, when we try to paint the picture that there is something corrupt underlying legislation. My plea to the shadow Minister, when she sums up, is that she speak more to the amendments, because I am genuinely interested in them, although I do not think they are quite clean enough. My plea would be that we should please not bring this down to a level of, “This is just so you can expand your political funding”.

[Cat Smith]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution. We always have very interesting to-ing and fro-ing in these Committees, as we both have a keen interest in elections and constitutional matters.

I will specifically address amendment 79. I am conscious not to stray too much into wider discussion of the clause, because we are debating the amendment. I am quite pleased with some of the reactions to it from the Government Benches, in exploring the options—not all of them. It would have been nice to have had a little more pre-legislative scrutiny, and maybe a draft Bill, because I think there was common ground on some of these issues.

I am keen not to stray too much into discussing political donations right now, but I am aware that I did set out my broad response to clause 10 to put amendment 79 into context. There is one very easy way of clearing up the matter, which would be basically not to have political donations attached to it, because then of course there would not be a debate at all.

I very much welcome the Minister saying that there was nothing wrong with the suggestion by the hon. Member for Glasgow North that there might be some Government assessment of tax intake from the voters who are likely to be enfranchised by this legislation. I certainly look forward to seeing such an assessment and I also look forward to her writing to me with the estimated number of overseas electors that the Department feels are likely to be enfranchised by the changes that clause 10 makes.

In that spirit, I beg to ask leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Cat Smith]

I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 10, page 16, line 15, at end insert—

“1CA Closing date for electoral registration applications by overseas electors

(1) The Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001 are amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In regulation 56, after paragraph (7), insert—

‘(8) This regulation does not apply to applications by overseas electors.’

(3) After regulation 56 insert—

‘56A Closing date for electoral registration applications by overseas electors

(1) The provisions in this regulation relate to applications to vote by post or proxy by overseas electors in parliamentary elections.

(2) An application by an overseas elector under paragraph 3(6) or (7) of Schedule 4 shall be disregarded for the purposes of a particular parliamentary election and an application under paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 4 shall be refused if it is received by the registration officer after 5 p.m. on the eighteenth day before the date of the poll at that election.

(3) An application under paragraph 3(1) or (2), or 6(7) or 7(4) of Schedule 4 shall be disregarded for the purposes of a particular parliamentary election if it is received by the registration officer after 5 p.m. on the thirteenth day before the date of the poll at that election.

(4) An application under paragraph 4(1) or (2) or 6(8) of Schedule 4 shall be refused if it is received by the registration officer after 5 p.m. on the thirteenth day before the date of the poll at the election for which it is made.

(5) An application under paragraph 7(7) of Schedule 4 shall be refused if it is received by the registration officer after 5 p.m. on the eighteenth day before the date of the poll at the election for which it is made.

(6) An application under—

(a) paragraph 3(5)(a) of Schedule 4 by an elector to be removed from the record kept under paragraph 3(4) of that Schedule, or

(b) paragraph 7(9)(a) of Schedule 4 by a proxy to be removed from the record kept under paragraph 7(6) of that Schedule,

and a notice under paragraph 6(10) of that Schedule by an elector cancelling a proxy’s appointment shall be disregarded for the purposes of a particular parliamentary election if it is received by the registration officer after—

(i) 5 p.m. on the eighteenth day before the date of the poll at that election in the case of an application by an elector who is entitled to vote by post to be removed from the record kept under paragraph 3(4) of Schedule 4, and

(ii) 5 p.m. on the thirteenth day before the date of the poll at that election in any other case.

(7) In computing a period of days for the purposes of this regulation, the same rules shall apply as in regulation 56.’

(4) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, amend—

(a) the Representation of the People (Scotland) Regulations 2001, and

(b) the Representation of the People (Northern Ireland) Regulations

so that each closing date in Scotland and Northern Ireland for electoral registration applications by overseas electors moves back by seven days in keeping with the amendments made for England under subsections (2) and (3).”

This amendment pushes back the deadlines to register to vote for overseas voters by 1 week to allow electoral administrators more time to process applications.

Amendment 84 would push back the deadline for overseas electors to register to vote by one week, allowing electoral administrators more time to process applications. The timescale for registration deadlines does not work, as we heard in evidence, and the amendment seeks to improve that situation.

The single biggest concern I hear from overseas voters is that they do not receive their postal vote in time and so are not able to return it in time for their vote to count. Concern has already been raised with the Committee by the sector and more widely about the timescale for postal ballots for overseas voters to go out, which of course is not easy when postal systems globally are so varied. In many ways, there is currently simply insufficient time for an ERO to register and process overseas electors’ last-minute postal vote applications and to send them so that they can be returned in a timely manner. I seek a practical solution for this issue.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

This may purely be my misunderstanding of the amendment, so I stand to be corrected, but would the consequence of the amendment be to extend the election period beyond 25 days?

[Cat Smith]

I do not believe that it would; perhaps I have misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The amendment would make overseas electors’ deadline to register as an elector in a constituency a week earlier than that for domestic voters so that EROs would be able to prioritise getting those postal votes out. In the evidence sessions, I was struck by what EROs were saying. An overseas elector currently has the same deadline to register to vote as a domestic voter. If EROs send a ballot paper to a postal voter in Lancaster who registered on the deadline day, we can be quite confident that our postal system is robust enough that the ballot paper could reach the voter and that the voter could return it. However, when it is going to the other side of the world, we know that they could not. Allowing that extra week would ensure that overseas voters’ votes are more likely to count when they cast their ballots, rather than so many, as currently, being disenfranchised because postal systems do not allow their ballot paper to get back in time.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I understand the point that the hon. Lady is making. What I am unclear about is what happens if the registration deadline is moved further into the election. I am not sure where the hon. Lady is going, because she is talking about the time to return the mail, so we are talking about registration and then the ballot being sent out and coming back. Is there confidence in the timeframe for the ballot itself to come back, if we are talking about delays in the timeframe, or do we need to add more time to the overall short campaign as a consequence of the amendment? I could be entirely wrong on all of this, which is why I am probing the hon. Lady on the amendment.

[Cat Smith]

If I understand the right hon. Gentleman correctly, I think we have identified the same issue, and I am going to go out on a limb here and say that we probably agree it is a problem that so many of these electors’ ballots are not returned. My proposed solution—I would be very keen to hear solutions from any member of this Committee; I do not believe any one of us has a monopoly on knowledge or innovation—is that allowing EROs an extra week on the UK end, at the start of the process of issuing a postal ballot to an overseas elector, would increase the chances of many of these ballot papers being returned in time. I do not see the amendment as changing the electoral timetable for domestic voters or the wider election, which I think is what the right hon. Gentleman is asking.

I hope that the exchange that I and the right hon. Gentleman have just had has not confused the Committee too much. My intention is to give EROs the extra time that they will need to register overseas electors, which takes longer than registering a domestic elector. The aim is for them to be able to issue, post and have returned a postal voting form from overseas electors, thereby ensuring that fewer overseas electors are disenfranchised in future elections.

--- Later in debate ---

[Patrick Grady]

I do not have much to add, because I think the matter has been dealt with pretty well in debates, and in the evidence sessions. I reiterate that UK voters do pay tax if they live here, because they buy things and pay VAT, so there is a point about taxation and representation. I appreciated the Minister’s earlier comments, and I hope for a little more analysis of exactly how people who have lived away from this country for a long time and can now vote will do so.

Engagement with overseas electors is valuable. I have a small number registered in Glasgow North, and they will sometimes offer quite valuable perspectives. Perhaps one of the takeaways from this is that we can all organise Zoom surgeries for our overseas electors. SNP Members will continue to do our best to increase the number of overseas electors in the UK Parliament, largely by making Scotland an independent country, and then people who live in Scotland who want to register as overseas electors for elections to the UK Parliament will be able to do so.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

On that basis, will Scottish residents living in England be able to vote in any possible future referendum?

[Patrick Grady]

I think that may be outwith the scope of the Bill, although I will speak later about encroachment into devolved matters. There was some call for what the right hon. Gentleman suggests, but it would be difficult for the Scottish Parliament to legislate for it. We have a legislative framework here that defines an overseas elector, and that would not apply to people who live elsewhere in the United Kingdom, but I can see from the Chair that this is definitely outwith the scope of the Bill, so I will leave it at that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 11

Voting and candidacy rights of EU citizens

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.