British Library Board (Power to Borrow) Bill

Matt Warman Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Friday 12th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab) [V]]

I commend all those involved in the Bill. I will just say, on behalf of the Opposition, that we fully support it and agree with the comments just made by the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami).

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I am pleased that we are at this point with the Bill promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami). As he said, it is absolutely the case that the Bill seeks solely to put the British Library on the level playing field that it deserves to be on.

My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) raises two points. Putting an expiry date on the powers proposed in the Bill would risk taking up further parliamentary time, which we all know is valuable, but it would also entrench the inequality that we are trying to resolve. The idea that the British Library’s power to borrow would be subject to review when none of the other arm’s length bodies are subject to the same review does not seem to me to be in that spirit of fairness. Of course my hon. Friend raises entirely reasonable points about the burden on the public purse of any borrowing, but it seems to me only fair that we take that as a whole rather than trying to impose separate conditions on the British Library.

The British Library is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden said, absolutely enthusiastic about the powers that the Bill would give it, it is enthusiastic about the opportunity to use them, and it is enthusiastic about the practical developments that that might bring, be it broader access digitally to its own artefacts or broader engagement with the community. That is currently constrained by the inequality that we see today. That is not fair on the British Library, but more to the point, it is not fair on the British public. It is important that we try to address the legislative barrier that currently and inexplicably prevents the British Library from having the same freedom to borrow that its fellow national museums and galleries enjoy.

Operational freedoms introduced in 2013 have given our national cultural institutions, including the British Library, greater autonomy to make decisions independently and greater flexibility over their income, helping them to innovate and continue their expert work. Flexibility and innovation will be more important than ever as we recover from the effects of the pandemic.

The British Library is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch accepted, subject to a host of scrutiny already. The Bill does not propose to subject it to any greater scrutiny than exists already for other arm’s length bodies. While I agree with him that we should pay close attention to those conditions, I hope that he will agree that imposing further specific conditions on the British Library when we would like, I think, to have the efficiency of dealing with all arm’s length bodies as one is not a sensible approach. While I understand the sentiments behind his amendments, I hope—

[Sir Christopher Chope]

My hon. Friend talks about the other arm’s length bodies. My understanding is that they have the power to carry over surpluses from one year to the next. Is that power now being made available to the British Library? Will the borrowing that it will be able to make under this power be out of the same capped fund that is available for the other departmental arm’s length bodies? Or will this be in addition? If so, how much will the addition be each year?

[Matt Warman]

The Treasury allocates a pot of £60 million per year that can be loaned out to all cultural organisations given the freedoms I mentioned. The responsibility for allocating that pot is with the Treasury. To my knowledge, there is currently no proposal to change the size of that pot, but of course all of these things are under review in the usual way. On that point, and on my hon. Friend’s first one, I hope he understands that we are not proposing anything here that it is in any way unusual, and that this is putting the British Library on a fair and level playing field. Unless he wants to intervene again, I hope that that clarifies the points he has made. In the probing spirit that he mentions, I hope the Government have been able to provide him with sufficient information so that he does not press his amendments to a vote and he allows the British Library to flourish in a way that will benefit all of our constituencies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

It is a great moment for libraries across the country to see the United Kingdom’s flagship British Library put on this level playing field. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) for getting his Bill this far. I thank him and all those who have worked on this Bill, and indeed all those who have scrutinised it in this House today.

Automatic Computer-based Decisions: Legal Status

Matt Warman Excerpts

Wednesday 10th March 2021 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I congratulate the Chair of the Select Committee on securing this important debate. He is absolutely right to say that the potential of technology to enhance the decision-making process, in the public sector just as much as the private sector, is something that this Government are absolutely committed to not only getting the maximum out of, but getting right as well. He is also absolutely right to highlight that legislation from decades ago is perhaps not 100% where we would wish it to be.

First, let me say that I share the concerns raised by him and other Members about the specific example he has raised and the treatment of postmasters, who are vital members of the community, in this whole affair. I also acknowledge that it highlights essential legal issues. I will address those shortly, although I should perhaps start by saying that he has been comprehensive in his own circumnavigation of the issues at hand.

On Horizon, the Government recognise that the dispute has had a hugely damaging effect on the lives of the affected postmasters and their families. Its repercussions are still being felt today. Over the years, the Horizon accounting system recorded shortfalls in cash in branches. At the time, the Post Office believed that those shortfalls were caused by postmasters, leading to dismissals, recovery of losses and, in some cases, criminal prosecution. Many hon. Members, me included, have listened to the stories of the postmasters affected and have been deeply moved by the impact on their livelihoods, their finances and often their health.

A group of 555 of those postmasters, led by former postmaster Alan Bates, brought a group litigation claim against the Post Office in 2017. In the findings of Mr Justice Fraser, it is clear just how wrong the Post Office was in its relationship with postmasters and that there were clear failings in the Horizon system. As I will explain, the Government are taking steps through an independent inquiry to ensure that lessons are learned and that a full analysis takes place.

The Post Office reached a full and final settlement with the group litigation claimants in December 2019 and apologised for its failings. That settlement was an important step towards addressing the wrongs of the past, but it was only the start of a long journey for the Post Office to repair and strengthen its relationship with postmasters.

As part of the settlement, the Post Office agreed to set up the historical shortfall scheme, open to current and former postmasters who may have experienced and repaid Horizon shortfalls but did not participate in the group litigation. That is an important step in ensuring that all those who were affected have the opportunity to seek resolution.

A number of postmasters with criminal convictions have applied to the Criminal Cases Review Commission to have their cases referred for appeal. To date, the commission has referred 51 cases either to the Court of Appeal or to the Crown court. The Government welcome the decision made by the Crown court in December 2020 to overturn six of those convictions.

However, a number of cases—42 in total—are still to be heard in the relevant Appeal Court at the end of March. It would not be appropriate for the Government to comment on those cases while the courts are still considering them, but I assure hon. Members that the Post Office is co-operating with the commission to the fullest extent.

More broadly, we must ensure that such a situation can never be allowed to occur again. In September 2020, therefore, the Government launched the Post Office Horizon IT inquiry, an independent inquiry led by Sir Wyn Williams. Sir Wyn’s inquiry will work to understand fully what happened, gather available evidence and ensure that lessons have been learned so that this cannot occur again. The inquiry will look specifically at whether the historical shortfall scheme is being delivered properly. The Government look forward to receiving that report in the summer.

In recent years, however, a lot has changed on standards and ethics relating to the management of algorithms and data in general. The hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) rightly pointed out the work of the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. Crucially, that centre has not only “data ethics” but “innovation” in its title—those two things go hand in hand.

The centre was established by my Department in 2017, but that is not the only area in which we have implemented change. Substantial steps have been taken to consider and address deficiencies in the application of algorithms where that lies within the remit of the DCMS and, crucially, beyond. I am confident that we are in a much stronger position than when the worst excesses of the Horizon affair took place, but there is more work to do.

If an automated decision is based on personal data, the UK general data protection regulation already applies. It provides regulatory tools to safeguard data subjects and identified or identifiable persons in automated decision making. Organisations processing personal data must also adhere to strong transparency requirements. Organisations, including public authorities, should ensure that the algorithms they deploy and procure, where based on personal data, generate sound and impartial decisions, and that that should be considered before such algorithms are used.

The UK GDPR contains provisions for protecting the interests of data subjects and their data. In particular, data protection impact assessments are mandatory for data processing that is high risk and require organisations to weigh up the impacts on privacy of data processing activities, including automated decision making.

In addition, the Government have introduced non-legislative tools that will be important as we move towards a world where not just algorithms but the ability for computers to amend algorithms—artificial intelligence—become more commonplace. Let me run through some of them. We were the first Government to publish a data ethics framework, which is a set of principles to guide the design of appropriate data use in the public sector, aimed at anyone working with data in the public sector. We published an ethics, transparency and accountability framework for automated decision making, and we have commissioned the Government Digital Service to deliver the review of artificial intelligence adoption in the public sector. We have also published an AI guide for Government.

There are also published guidelines on AI procurement in collaboration with the World Economic Forum’s Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It will inform and empower buyers in the public sector, helping them to evaluate suppliers and then confidently and responsibly procure the right AI technologies for the benefit of citizens. We have also published, along with the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Alan Turing Institute, “Explaining decisions made with AI”. This guidance gives organisations practical advice to help them explain the processes, services and decisions delivered or assisted by AI to the individuals affected by them. That is a crucial action that the hon. Member for Bristol North West mentioned.

Those various documents are updated with new thinking and insight from our public sector, civil society, industry and academic partners. We have also launched the new AI dynamic purchasing system, which is a framework that offers public sector customers a direct route to AI services in an emerging market, addressing ethical considerations when organisations buy AI services for use in the public sector.

The new and independent Regulatory Horizons Council has been appointed to scan the horizons for new technological innovations and provide the Government with impartial, expert advice on the regulatory reform required to support their rapid and safe introduction. More broadly, the Government are always monitoring how algorithms and data affect people’s lives. As they grow in importance in all our lives, we will consider what more we can do. That is why we are active in the international debates on algorithm and artificial intelligence regulations at the Council of Europe and, beyond that, at the OECD and in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence.

The hon. Gentleman specifically asked whether the status of algorithms in the courts might be referred to the Law Commission, especially given the role played by the commission in first adjusting the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on this topic. It is a suggestion worth very serious consideration, and my colleagues in the Ministry of Justice and I are grateful for it. He will know that it is not in the Law Commission’s current three-year plan of work, and it will take considerable time to establish the necessary work in order to address the underlying legal issue.

While we consider that route, the Government are also investigating whether there may be faster methods that we can use to address the legal status of algorithms in a court of law—the hon. Gentleman mentioned that himself. For example, once the Court of Appeal has made a determination in respect to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the judiciary Criminal Procedure Rule Committee could consider making changes in this area. The courts are expected to make their determination shortly, after which I look forward to taking up the matter with the Ministry of Justice and the Lord Chief Justice, the chair of that committee.

To close, I thank you, Mr Hollobone, and the hon. Gentleman. This is the beginning of the next phase in an ongoing debate. It is a hugely important issue, and seizing these opportunities for the benefit of citizens and everyone around the world is in all our interests. It will be a complex and involving conversation, and I look forward to having more conversations with the hon. Gentleman.

[Darren Jones]

rose—

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Matt Warman Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu of Lords amendment 1.

Lords amendment 2.

Lords amendment 3, and Government motion to disagree.

[Matt Warman]

At the time of the Bill’s Second Reading in the House in early January 2020, it would have been impossible for any of us to foresee the challenges that this country would endure over the following 12 months.

Throughout the pandemic and the lockdowns, this nation’s telecommunications network has provided information and enabled education; it has allowed businesses to operate, children to continue to learn and those in isolation to continue to speak with their families. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the UK’s digital infrastructure providers, our internet service providers and our mobile network operators. They have stepped up and worked with us to bridge gaps in provision, be that through whitelisting websites, providing data to struggling families or connecting the Nightingale hospitals. They have done Herculean work, and we should all be grateful.

--- Later in debate ---

Proceedings resumed.

[Matt Warman]

Members will be aware, none the less, that despite the importance of that connectivity, there are barriers facing infrastructure deployment, and there is no panacea. But there are steps and then strides and then leaps in the right direction, and this Bill is an important one of those steps.

We expect these provisions, which will affect some 10 million people in the UK who live in flats and apartments, to make a real difference to the vital roll-out of better broadband to which the Government remain totally committed. I trust that Members will have seen that a consultation on further potential changes to the electronic communications code has now been published. We will carefully consider whether further legislative changes are necessary as a result of what we learn from that consultation. Crucially, these measures will take into account the interests of those needing greater connectivity, balancing the interests of landowners as well. Just as with the Bill, that balance is crucial to ensuring that we continue to bridge the digital divide.

The House is here to debate three Lords amendments. I will deal with Lords amendment 1 first. The purpose of Lord Clement-Jones’s amendment on Report in the other place was to clarify that people who rent their flat can make use of the policy in the Bill. Earlier this year, when the Bill made its way through this House, hon. Members felt similarly to Lord Clement-Jones, and that sentiment was subsequently shared in the other place. It remains the case that the Bill has always applied to people living in a flat under the terms of any lease. The most common form of tenancy in the UK, assured shorthold, is a lease, and it has never been our intention to provide otherwise. However, we are aware of the strength of feeling, and while, as drafted, Lords amendment 1 would create an inconsistency with the rest of the electronic communications code, the amendment I am moving clarifies that people who occupy a property under a lease are able to make use of this policy, and it does so in a way that avoids legal ambiguity by clarifying the definition of the lease in the electronic communications code to ensure that that definition includes, for example, any tenancy.

I also encourage the House to agree with Lords amendment 2, tabled in the name of the Minister, Baroness Barran, on Third Reading in the other place in the light of concerns that have been raised there—and, indeed, here—regarding anti-competitive behaviour. It protects competition in the market and ensures that those installing infrastructure do not do so in a way that would prevent a subsequent operator from installing their own apparatus.

I now turn to the main business, which is really in Lords amendment 3. This amendment would add a new clause to the Bill requiring the Secretary of State to commission a review of the impact of the Bill on the electronic communications code, including an assessment of whether the code is sufficient to support 1 gigabit broadband roll-out to every premises by 2025, and further requiring that separate assessments be made of whether the code should be amended to introduce a number of rights, which I will come on to in a minute.

I am grateful to members of the other place for bringing forward the amendment, which the Government understand aims to provide transparency, but those good intentions would none the less introduce some impractical and unnecessary measures to the code that fall outside the purpose of the Bill and, indeed, the code itself. The code is a framework for regulating agreements between landowners and telecoms operators for the installation and maintenance of communications equipment on public and private land. The code is technology-neutral. It is simply not possible to judge whether the code supports access to 1 gigabit broadband because it is not designed to facilitate solely gigabit-capable connections; it is about access to land to facilitate installation, maintenance and upgrading.

That said, while it is logical to assume that, with the market currently deploying those connections, the provisions in this Bill will be used for deployments of those connections, they may equally be used for superfast, ultrafast or other services. The only basis on which to judge the code is to examine the availability of all types of connections. That is why Ofcom, the independent regulator, publishes its annual “Connected Nations” report, which provides a wealth of information on fixed and mobile connections. Should Ofcom raise questions, the Government continue to provide answers in the House and the other place. The report shows progress in 4G and 5G.

Furthermore, there are also other established means of scrutiny through Select Committees. In the past three months, there have been a number of reports from various Select Committees. Hon. Members can rest assured that the Department’s feet are being firmly and regularly held to the fire. Ministers, of course, always relish that process.

The amendment moves on to matters relating to the powers of gas, water and electricity suppliers. The Government recognise that further changes to the code may be required if it is to support the achievement of our coverage and connectivity targets effectively. Shortly before the Bill’s Third Reading in the other place, the Government published a further consultation on possible changes. I encourage Members to respond to that consultation. I am sure they will appreciate and understand the importance of respecting a person’s right to enjoy their property peacefully, so any intervention that seeks to interfere with property rights must be proportionate and justified. The new consultation seeks those reports until 24 March.

Additional permitted development rights are a planning matter and an issue not for this Bill or the electronic communications code. I am sure that many Members know that telecoms operators are afforded significantly more flexibility in how they install their infrastructure. That includes, for example, permitted development rights and exemptions from a number of requirements to request planning permission. That is why my Department continues to work very closely with colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. In August 2019, we launched a joint consultation with MHCLG regarding potential reform of permitted development rights. The Government published our response in July 2020, and, subject to a technical consultation, we will take forward proposed reforms. We expect to publish that consultation in spring this year.

Encouraging telecommunications operators to undertake infrastructure works alongside other works was another issue raised. It relates to the co-ordination of streetworks to promote greater collaboration between telecoms providers, local authorities and the suppliers of gas, water and electricity. My Department has worked closely with the Department for Transport on a number of areas of mutual interest, and it will continue to do so.

In 2020, the Government released a new street manager digital service—the largest update to streetworks in a generation—that has already helped to simplify and improve the planning and co-ordination of works throughout England. That is vital for the deployment of broadband. I hope that hon. Members recognise that streetworks are a transport issue, and not a matter for this Bill or the electronic communications code. It should be noted, furthermore, that roads are a devolved matter and therefore should not be considered in legislation that relates to the reserved matter of telecoms, as this Bill does.

Although we absolutely appreciate and understand that this is a well-intentioned amendment, it is, as I have outlined, none the less impractical. It seeks details on matters outside the code’s competence to provide, such as gigabit connections, and improved planning and streetworks. I hope hon. Members are none the less reassured by the recent publication of the Government consultation, which seeks responses on whether further changes are required to the electronic communications code. I also hope they trust that the Government stand ready to look at the evidence that is made available and act where the need to act is demonstrated. We are hopeful that, once the responses are received and considered, we will have an even more informed idea about the way forward to support the delivery of connectivity and the role that the Government should play in relation to that. I ask the House to disagree with amendment 3.

I thank all hon. Members who are down to contribute for taking an interest in this vital issue. Parliamentary scrutiny is an important part of our commitment to rolling out the broadband that all our constituents deserve across the country. I look forward to hearing the subsequent debate.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

I begin by thanking colleagues in the other place who have worked so hard to improve the Bill—and for longer than many would have expected, as the Government delayed the Bill until they thought they could resolve their Back Benchers’ concerns on the human rights amendment. That continues to ping-pong as part of the Trade Bill, but I hope we can now move quickly and decisively to resolve the matters of telecoms infrastructure.

The pandemic has shown us how important good fast stable broadband is, with so many people currently depending on it to work from home and stay in contact with friends and family. It is just over a year since I stood at the Dispatch Box for the Second Reading of the Bill and argued that broadband was a vital utility. The pandemic has proved that beyond doubt. I join the Minister in paying tribute to the infrastructure providers who have supported our connectivity at this difficult time, while recognising how much still needs to be done to close the digital divide. I am pleased that the Lords amendments we will be discussing today reflect the issues that Labour has been raising consistently at every stage of the Bill.

The first amendment removes ambiguity over the definition of a lessee and expands the scope of the Bill to be more inclusive with regard to tenants. The amendment would ensure that introductory or probationary tenancies in local authority housing, flexible or joint tenancies and demoted tenancies were all covered. Labour first raised this as amendment 2 on Report, and the Liberal Democrats tabled an amendment in the Lords. This has been replaced by the Government amendment in lieu, with parts (a) and (b) making technical changes to avoid contradictions between this Bill and the Communications Act 2003. We welcome that, but we are concerned that the Government missed this issue, leaving it for others to raise. The interests of tenants as well as those of leaseholders must be kept in mind.

The Government’s amendment, Lords amendment 2, is based on Labour’s amendment 3 on Report. Labour is the party of business, and we are keen to remove barriers to competition and interoperability, and to encourage a competitive market. However, we feel that the Government’s changes to this amendment mean that it does not go far enough.

As the Bill stands, one operator can technically “capture” a building, locking the residents into its service. The Government amendment seeks to ensure that this cannot happen, and the option for diversification is left open. However, it does not encourage deployment and inter- operability. Labour is pleased that the Government have offered concessions on competitiveness and inter- operability, so we will not oppose this amendment as we consider it a gesture in the right direction. However, UK businesses and consumers deserve more than gestures. They need real action to promote competition, and the Bill was a chance for the Government to do that.

Finally, Lords amendment 3 is Labour’s new clause. This has been designed to provide accountability and transparency via a review of the impact of the Bill and the sufficiency of the electronic communications code to support gigabit roll-out. Labour believes that this is vital to ensure that the mechanisms in the Bill are robust and well resourced enough to ensure that legislation does not fail when it makes contact with reality. We do not want to be back here with further legislation after more wasted years for our telecoms infrastructure. This amendment provides the mechanisms to empower the Government to meet and assess their roll-out targets. The Government tell us that the Bill is just about freeholders, but it is clearly part of a larger puzzle. Indeed, the noble Lord Parkinson confirmed that, stating that the Bill was

“one discrete instrument in the Government’s overall strategy”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 June 2020; Vol. 803, c. 1331.]

We must know, first, what that strategy is and, secondly, how this Bill is contributing positively or negatively to the telecoms landscape. The Minister said that this would undermine technology neutrality, which is somewhat rich, given that the gigabit ambition was a technologically neutral downgrading of the Prime Minister’s original fibre ambitions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

I will address the number of interesting points that have been raised.

The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) raised a number of interesting points. She talked about satellite broadband and a broader strategy for this Government’s vital gigabit ambitions. The Opposition are right to raise those issues, but I humbly suggest that they also know that this Bill is not the place to put a wide-ranging review of the Government’s gigabit strategy. They will get that strategy in short order, but I think they know that this is not the place to insert that review. I hope that they will not seek to turn the Bill into a Christmas tree, as has previously happened, but I have huge sympathy with the hon. Lady and look forward to providing her with the detail that she craves.

A number of Members made points on broader connectivity. Whether it is the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Bury South (Christian Wakeford) raised in his maiden speech or the communities that my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West (Shaun Bailey) mentioned, people have been held together in a way that we had not envisaged before the pandemic, and now we realise that connectivity is essential for that sense of community.

The hon. Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan) raised issues around definitions. The drafting of the Bill and our consultation on the electronic communications code are specifically to address those legitimate issues he raises, but we do not envisage them arising in practice. The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) is absolutely right that the USO does not function perfectly; Ofcom is investigating it. He is absolutely right that the emergency services network is a core part of the ambitions of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to deliver a shared rural network, and we are engaging intensively with the Home Office on that. I remember being involved in an incident myself at the top of Scafell Pike, where we had to descend the mountain in order to get mobile phone signal to call a helicopter, which thankfully came rather quickly, but would have come earlier had we had a signal on the top of that mountain.

Finally, let me address the international issues that were raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood). The global role of the UK’s potential as a leading digital economy is well documented, and Bills such as this are part of our ability to make the very most of those ambitions. We will use this as a small piece in the puzzle, and it is a part of that broader strategy that we will be delivering to the House as soon as we can. He also tempted me to talk about broader tech monopolies, but because this is a small and tightly drawn Bill, I will resist that temptation.

I thank the Bill team and all the officials across many Departments who have worked so hard over the past year to reach this stage. It will help people up and down the country to access the digital services that they need, and I commend it to the House.

Lords amendment 1 disagreed to.

Government amendments (a) and (b) made in lieu of Lords amendment 1.

Lords amendment 2 agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 3 .

Oral Answers to Questions

Matt Warman Excerpts

Thursday 4th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)]

16. What recent steps he has taken to tackle the digital divide.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

Now more than ever it is obvious that the value of closing the digital divide is great. That is why we have worked with industry to provide the connectivity for vulnerable users that they need, why we will continue to encourage providers to offer social tariffs, and why, to boost digital skills, adults can undertake specified digital qualifications up to level 1 free of charge.

[Andrew Gwynne [V]]

Coronavirus and lockdown has sped up society’s reliance on online services, but 42% of those aged 75 and above do not use the internet and Age UK says that

“there is little evidence that the pandemic has led to significant numbers of those previously digitally excluded getting online”,

so what are the Government doing to help older people access the equipment and training they need to get online, and to ensure that essential services such as NHS services and banking continue to be delivered equally to those who remain offline?

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to highlight the need for that equality of access. The Department continues to work across government to make sure that, whether for supermarkets or banks, there is that equality of access, and of course the NHS makes all the efforts it can, as it has recently in the vaccination programme, to ensure that people are contacted in a way that suits them. But the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to highlight the issue, and it is why the Department will also work with organisations such as Citizens Advice to tackle what is a perennial problem.

[Rob Roberts (Delyn) (Con)]

What steps his Department is taking to tackle anti-vaccination content online.

Electronic Communications Code Consultation

Matt Warman Excerpts

Wednesday 27th January 2021 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

The Government have ambitious plans to achieve nationwide roll-out of future-proof, gigabit-capable broadband and 5G networks as soon as possible to unlock the huge economic and social benefits this will bring. As we emerge from the covid-19 pandemic, ensuring the whole country has access to world-class digital infrastructure will be critical to our economic recovery.

We are working with industry to target a minimum of 85% gigabit-capable coverage by 2025 and to get as close to 100% as possible. We are also aiming to ensure that 95% of the UK’s geographic landmass has 4G coverage from at least one mobile network operator by 2025 and that the majority of the UK population has 5G coverage by 2027.

My Department is making significant progress, through the implementation of the recommendations made in our “Future Telecoms Infrastructure Review” published in 2018. However, in order to accelerate this work it is important that we deliver the changes that are needed to speed up commercial and public investment in gigabit-capable networks.

The electronic communications code (“the code”) is the legal framework underpinning the rights of telecoms operators to install and keep electronic communications apparatus on public and private land, and to carry out other activities needed to maintain and improve digital communications networks. The code was substantially reformed in 2017. Those reforms specifically recognised the increasing importance of access to fast and reliable digital services for society and the economy. While there have been no substantive changes to the policy underpinning the 2017 reforms, feedback from a wide range of stakeholders suggests further changes may be needed.

I am pleased to inform the House that we have today published a consultation to examine the scope for further legislative changes to the electronic communications code. If we decide changes to the code are needed, these will be focused on supporting our digital networks and ensuring the aims of the 2017 reforms are realised.

Telecommunications policy is reserved and the electronic communications code applies and extends across the UK. As with the 2017 reforms, we will work closely with the devolved Administrations to develop the finalised policy.

I have placed a copy of the consultation in the Libraries of both Houses.

Attachments can be viewed online at: http://www. parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2021-01-27/HCWS739/.

[HCWS739]

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Matt Warman Excerpts

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

[The Chair]

[Matt Warman]

Question put and agreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

[Matt Warman]

[Christian Matheson]

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Christian Matheson]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Christian Matheson]

[Matt Warman]

[Christian Matheson]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Christian Matheson]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Christian Matheson]

--- Later in debate ---

I know that the Minister is reluctant to add to the duties of Ofcom. He will probably say that Ofcom could do this if it wanted to. I reiterate that Ofcom has a lot of things that it could or should do, and would do, but it does not have as a principal duty ensuring the forward-looking security of our networks. The new clause will ensure that that is regularly considered by Ofcom and that Parliament can exercise adequate and effective scrutiny. It would also contribute greatly to the ability of Ofcom and the National Cyber Security Centre to work together effectively, as they would to produce such a report. I hope the Minister will support the provisions of the new clause.

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

--- Later in debate ---

A decade of neglect of our telecoms infrastructure has left us vulnerable and created the need for this Bill. We support the Bill, but it is clear that to protect our national security now and in future we must have an effective network supply chain diversification strategy, plan and implementation. New clause 6 would ensure that this vital aspect of our telecoms security is regularly reviewed and scrutinised, so that the UK is never again forced to choose between technological progress and national security.

[Matt Warman]

At this stage, there is a limited number of suppliers in the global market—a smaller number that are capable of providing equipment suitable for the UK market. It is a global challenge that requires a global solution, which is why it is an integral part of the diversification strategy that the hon. Lady mentions. Our primary objective has to be to grow the supplier base and give operators more choice about the vendors that they use.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

Committee rose.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Matt Warman Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 19 to 23 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

It is a pleasure to be back under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe.

I will try to rattle through these as quickly as I can. Clauses 18 to 23 cover monitoring and enforcement, and further provisions relating to non-disclosure and information requirements. Clause 18 gives the Secretary of State the power to give Ofcom a monitoring direction, requiring the regulator to obtain information relating to a public telecoms provider’s compliance with a designated vendor direction and to provide that information in a report to the Secretary of State.

The clause also includes requirements about the form of such reports and the procedures around their provision, but it does not create any new powers for Ofcom, which already has them under section 135 of the Communications Act 2003. The provisions in the clause are an integral part of the compliance regime. The power to give a monitoring direction to Ofcom is necessary to ensure that the Secretary of State has the ability to require it to provide the information needed to assess compliance with designated vendor directions.

Clause 19 provides Ofcom with the power to give inspection notices to public communications providers. The provisions will apply only where the Secretary of State has given Ofcom a monitoring direction. Inspection notices enable Ofcom to gather information from communications providers in relation to their compliance with a direction. The notices are a tool for Ofcom to give effect to its obligations under a monitoring direction.

Clause 19 also sets out the new duties that inspection notices can impose, the types of information that they can be used to obtain and how the duties in an inspection notice will be enforced. Ofcom may only give inspection notices in order to obtain information relating to whether a provider has complied or is complying with a direction. The notice power cannot be used to obtain information relating to whether a provider has complied or is complying with a direction. The notice power cannot be used to obtain information relating to how a provider is preparing to comply with a direction. Ofcom can instead use its other information-gathering powers under section 135 of the Communications Act 2003 to obtain such information.

Clause 20 provides the Secretary of State with the powers necessary to enforce compliance with designated vendor directions, as well as with any requirement for a public communications provider to prepare a plan setting out the steps it intends to take to comply. It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to issue directions where necessary in the interest of national security. Clause 20 is essential to ensure that the Secretary of State can carry out this role effectively and enforce compliance with any directions issued. New sections 105Z18 to 105Z21 will be inserted into the Communications Act 2003 for this purpose. The provisions set out the process that the Secretary of State will follow in instances where an assessment is made that a public communications provider is not acting in compliance with the direction or with the requirement to provide a plan. The process encompasses giving a contravention notice, enforcing it and imposing penalties for non-compliance. The clause is essential in ensuring that the Secretary of State can carry out the role effectively and deters and penalises instances of non-compliance.

Clause 21 provides the Secretary of State with the power to give urgent enforcement directions. Provisions to enable urgent enforcement are needed in cases where the Secretary of State considers that urgent action is necessary to protect national security or to prevent significant harm to the security of a public electronic communications network, service or facility.

Clause 22 creates a power for the Secretary of State to impose a requirement on public communications providers or vendors not to disclose certain types of information without permission. The provisions are necessary to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of information, which would be contrary to the interest of national security.

Finally, clause 23 creates a power for the Secretary of State to require information from a public communications provider or any other person who may have information relevant to the exercise of the Secretary of State’s functions under clauses 18 to 21. For example, the Secretary of State can require information on a provider’s planned use of such goods or information relating to how a network is provided. It can also include information about the proposed supply of goods or services. The ability to gather such information would ensure that the Secretary of State is able to make well-informed decisions when considering whether to issue designation notices and designated vendor directions. Information obtained through the use of this power can also be used to support the monitoring of compliance, with directions supplementing information gathered by Ofcom through its information-gathering and inspection notice powers.

To summarise, new sections 105Z18 to 105Z21 together establish the power and processes that outline how the designated vendor regime will be monitored and enforced. The provisions in clause 22 are needed to manage the disclosure of information, the unauthorised disclosure of which may be contrary to national security, and clause 23 will ensure that the Secretary of State is able to obtain the information necessary to make assessments to determine whether to give a notice or direction and to assess compliance.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mr McCabe. I will not detain the Committee long with a consideration of the clauses, and I thank the Minister for so ably setting out what the clauses aim to achieve. Indeed, we on this side recognise the importance and the necessity of clauses 18 to 23 in establishing the process and ensuring the powers to obtain information and enforce direction as part of that process.

We only reiterate a small number of important points to draw attention once again to the breadth of the powers, which enable the Secretary of State to require information to an almost unlimited extent. Given the breadth of the powers, the information and progress on the telecommunications diversification strategy is, once again, notable by its absence. Given the breadth of the requirements, it is notable that there is nothing on progress on the diversification strategy. Nor, if my memory serves me correctly, does the impact assessment reflect the potential costs to either the network operators or Ofcom in exercising these powers. The clauses do not set out the impact and they emphasise once again the importance of Ofcom having the appropriate resources to enable it to carry out the requirements effectively. I hope that the Minister will bear those limitations in mind in his ongoing review of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 19 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Further amendment concerning penalties

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 25 stand part.

[Matt Warman]

Clause 24 enables higher penalties than those currently set out in the Communications Act 2003 to be issued by Ofcom, and clause 25 makes two necessary consequential amendments to that Act. The penalties under clause 24 can be imposed for contraventions of requirements to provide information to Ofcom for the purpose of its security-related functions. That includes when providers do not provide information requested by Ofcom for the purpose of providing a report to the Secretary of State.

Penalties can be set at a maximum of £10 million or, in the case of a continuing contravention, up to £50,000 a day. These maximum penalties are a marked increase on the existing ones, which are capped at £2 million, or £500 a day. This clause ensures that the maximum penalties are the same as those in clause 23. The size of these penalties is appropriate given the potential impact of the situation described. Proposed new section 139ZA(5) of the 2003 Act, inserted by this clause, gives the Secretary of State the power to change, by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure, the maximum amount of the fixed and daily penalties. That will help to future-proof the framework by ensuring that penalties can be adjusted over time—for example, because of inflation.

In summary, clause 24 enables Ofcom to issue the financial penalties necessary to ensure that providers supply it with the information that it needs. Clause 25 contains the consequential amendments to that, which are necessary because the Bill creates a number of powers to make regulations and some of those regulations will amend primary legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 27 stand part.

Government amendments 1 to 4.

Clauses 28 and 29 stand part.

[Matt Warman]

I will be brief, but it is important to cover the Government amendments. The clause provides that any increase in expenditure attributable to the Bill is paid out by Parliament. Clause 27 covers the extent of the Bill and clause 28 provides for the commencement of the Bill’s provisions.

I turn to the small set of amendments that the Government deem necessary, given that the Bill will be carried over to the second Session. The Bill creates new national security powers for the Secretary of State to address the risks posed by high-risk vendors through the issuing and enforcement of designated vendor directions in clauses 15 to 23 and 24. Amendment 1 enables clauses 15 to 23 to come into force on the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent. Amendment 2 ensures that the higher penalties also come into force. Amendment 3 removes the subsection of clause 28 providing for sections to come into force at the end of the two-month period. Finally, amendment 4 ensures that the provisions of clause 24 that are not commenced early come into force via commencement regulations on a day determined by the Secretary of State. Without the amendments, the provisions relating to those powers would come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent, which could put at risk the timely implementation of this important policy.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Commencement

Amendments made: 1, in clause 28, page 46, line 19, leave out “section 14” and insert “sections 14 to 23”.

This amendment would cause clauses 15 to 23 to come into force on Royal Assent.

Amendment 2, in clause 28, page 46, line 19, at end insert—

“(ca) section24, so far as it relates to section18;”.

This amendment is consequential upon Amendment 1. Clause 24 provides for higher penalties to be available for certain contraventions of information requirements, including contraventions associated with section 105Z12 of the Communications Act 2003, which is inserted by clause 18.

Amendment 3, in clause 28, page 46, line 25, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment is consequential upon Amendments 1 and 2.

Amendment 4, in clause 28, page 46, line 30, at end insert—

“(ba) section 24 (so far as not already in force by virtue of subsection (1));”.—(Matt Warman.)

This amendment is consequential upon Amendments 1 and 2.

Clause 28, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 3

Duty of Ofcom to report on its resources

‘(1) Ofcom must publish an annual report on the effect on its resources of fulfilling its duties under this Act.

(2) The report required by subsection (1) must include an assessment of—

(a) the adequacy of Ofcom’s budget and funding;

(b) the adequacy of staffing levels in Ofcom; and

(c) any skills shortages faced by Ofcom.’.—(Christian Matheson.)

This new clause introduces an obligation on Ofcom to report on the adequacy of their existing budget following the implementation of new responsibilities.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Christian Matheson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

As always, my right hon. Friend raises a good point. Having worked for a quango, I had clear insight into the line between independence and dependence, and into the importance of the political will of the Government, regardless of supposed independence. Equally, I saw how any regulator or supposedly independent organisation can be used as a shield for Ministers who do not want to take responsibility.

My right hon. Friend also raises a good point about the hollowing out of capacity in Government Departments. A consequence of 10 years of austerity and cuts is that DCMS and other Departments do not have the capability, capacity or resources that they previously might have enjoyed. I will point out to the Minister the example of the Government’s misinformation unit. It has no full-time employees and is supposed to exist using resources already in the Department—for something as critical now, with the vaccine roll-out, as disinformation.

My right hon. Friend is right to emphasise that given the relationship between the Government and Ofcom, which is an independent regulator, and given the increase in responsibilities that the Bill represents at a time when other responsibilities are also being added to Ofcom, the Minister cannot have it both ways. He cannot have no visibility when it comes to Ofcom’s resources and capacity while giving it yet more responsibility. In fact, this seems to be responsibility without accountability. I hope the Minister will take on board the suggestions in new clauses 3 and 7.

[Matt Warman]

I thank the hon. Lady for her contributions. To address her central point, it would not be possible for Ofcom to meet the duties Government have tasked it with without addressing the foundational issue of security. It is important that we bear in mind that that is not an exhaustive list, but security will always be a foundational point.

The new clauses would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament within 12 months of Royal Assent. New clause 3 would require Ofcom to publish an annual report on the adequacy of its budget, resourcing and staffing levels in particular.

As the Committee is aware, the Bill gives Ofcom significant new responsibilities. Ofcom’s budget is approved by its independent board and must be within a limit set by the Government. Clearly, given the enhanced security role that Ofcom will undertake, it will need to increase its resources and skills to meet these new demands. As such, the budget limit set by the Government will be adjusted to allow Ofcom to carry out its new functions effectively. This is of a piece with the direction of travel we are going in. In 2012, Ofcom had 735 employees. Last year, it had 937 employees, so as its remit has expanded, so has its headcount. That will continue to be reflected in the level of resourcing that it will be given.

[Christian Matheson]

Budget allocations can go down as well as up and there might be a future Government who are not quite as generous as past Governments have been. What guarantee can the Minister offer us that without some kind of reporting, such as that we propose, Ofcom’s budget will not be frozen or, indeed, reduced?

[Matt Warman]

Ultimately, a mechanism already exists by which Parliament is able to scrutinise Ofcom’s resourcing. Ofcom is required under the Office of Communications Act 2002 to publish an annual report on its financial position and other relevant matters. That report, which is published every March—I am sure the hon. Gentleman is waiting with bated breath for the next one—includes detail on Ofcom’s strategic priorities as well as its finances, and details about issues such as its hiring policies.

[Mr Jones]

I am intrigued. The Minister says Ofcom already has over 900 people, and it is obviously going to have to grow. How big is DCMS? We basically have a mini-Department here.

[Matt Warman]

The right hon. Gentleman asks me a question that I may be able to answer in a moment, depending on a number of factors. As for the thrust of his question, Ofcom is ultimately a serious regulator that has the resourcing to do a serious job. The right hon. Gentleman would be criticising us if it had fewer people, so he cannot have his cake and eat it by criticising the fact it has enough to do the job—but I think he is going to have a go.

[Mr Jones]

Quite the opposite. This just reinforces my point about quangos. If we reach a situation where quangos are bigger than the sponsoring Department it is perhaps best to keep things in-house rather than having arm’s length quangos and the nonsense behind which we hide in this country about so-called independence.

[Matt Warman]

The reality is that the relationship between Government Departments and regulators is very often incredibly close, but independence is an important part of regulation. Although the right hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point about the optimal size for in-house expertise versus external expertise, it is getting the balance right between Ofcom, the National Cyber Security Centre and DCMS that this Government and the reporting measures we already have are fundamentally committed to providing.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about Ofcom’s resourcing. Ofcom will not be making decisions on national security matters, as we have said repeatedly, but it will to be responsible for the regulation around these issues. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the Intelligence and Security Committee has shown great interest in how Ofcom is preparing for its new role.

As for the point about disclosure and resources, I would be happy to write to the ISC to provide further details in the appropriate forum about Ofcom resourcing and security arrangements. This could include information that cannot be provided publicly, including information about staffing, IT arrangements and security clearances of the sort that we have discussed. I hope that Opposition Members understand that that is the appropriate forum to provide reassurance and to satisfy the legitimate requirements of public scrutiny on this issue.

[Chi Onwurah]

rose—

[Christian Matheson]

rose—

[Matt Warman]

How to choose?

[Christian Matheson]

My hon. Friend is the shadow Minister.

[Matt Warman]

I give way to the hon. Lady.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for giving way and for the tone of his response to the different points we made. I will leave the reassurance about writing to the ISC to my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. Does the Minister recognise that that does not address the issue of Ofcom’s resources and reporting more generally, particularly lower down the pipeline, when it comes to national security? We have emphasised again and again the breadth of powers. The Minister has said that Ofcom will have the discretion, for example, to require an audit of all operators’ equipment—an asset register audit. It will take significant resource to understand the audit when it comes back. There are significant resource requirements involved that do not necessarily require security clearance but are nevertheless essential to effective security, and the Minister does not really seem to be offering reassurance on those.

[Matt Warman]

I would say that there is a sensible place to put some of that information, which is the communication to the ISC that I have offered, and there is a sensible place to put other information, which is the annual reporting that already exists. Hopefully the hon. Lady can find some comfort in the fact that both the information that cannot be shared publicly and the information that can will be subject to an appropriate level of parliamentary and public scrutiny.

[Christian Matheson]

I simply want to welcome the Minister’s comments, and the fact that he has recognised that the Intelligence and Security Committee is the appropriate place to discuss these matters, which, of course, cuts across other clauses that the Committee has already considered. He might bear that in mind on Report.

[Matt Warman]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I hope that now that I have given those various reassurances, hon. Members are appropriately comforted.

Everyone is waiting for the headcount of DCMS; I am assured that it is 1,304 people, some 300 more than that of Ofcom. I do not know whether that makes the right hon. Member for North Durham happier or more sad.

[Mr Jones]

According to the website that I have looked at, the figure is 1,170, so it has obviously increased slightly. Still, it makes Ofcom with its new responsibilities nearly as big as, if not bigger than, the sponsoring Department.

[Matt Warman]

We can discuss the optimal sizes of quangos and Departments outside this room. However, the right hon. Gentleman is obviously right that Government Departments and regulators need the resources they require to do their job properly. I hope that by describing the various mechanisms I have provided hon. Members with the reassurances they need to withdraw the new clause.

[Christian Matheson]

First, I owe you an apology, Mr McCabe; so keen was I to crack on with the consideration of the Bill that I did not say how great a pleasure it was to serve yet again under your chairmanship. I should have done so at the outset and I apologise.

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I am looking to the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, for a little guidance. It could well be that we might want to serve a little bit longer under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, by testing the views of the Committee on new clause 3, if we may.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

I know that the Minister is reluctant to add to the duties of Ofcom. He will probably say that Ofcom could do this if it wanted to. I reiterate that Ofcom has a lot of things that it could or should do, and would do, but it does not have as a principal duty ensuring the forward-looking security of our networks. The new clause will ensure that that is regularly considered by Ofcom and that Parliament can exercise adequate and effective scrutiny. It would also contribute greatly to the ability of Ofcom and the National Cyber Security Centre to work together effectively, as they would to produce such a report. I hope the Minister will support the provisions of the new clause.

[Matt Warman]

As the hon. Lady said, we have addressed various issues relating to the new clause in previous debates. It is important to stress that Ofcom has the resources that it needs. She talked about its ability to face the future, but in our evidence sessions, we talked to Simon Saunders, the director of emerging technology. I know she does not wish to suggest that Ofcom does not do this already, but demonstrably it is already proactively engaged in horizon scanning.

[Chi Onwurah]

Speaking as someone who was head of technology at Ofcom, I am aware that it engages in horizon scanning. I am sure the Minister will come on to this, but while there might be horizon scanning to understand how markets evolve and what level of competition may be seen in new markets in the future, the new clause deals specifically with horizon scanning for security and security threats. I am sure the Minister will focus on that.

[Matt Warman]

It is important to say that we have amended section 3 of the Communications Act 2003, to which the hon. Lady alluded, so that Ofcom must have regard to the desirability of ensuring the security and availability of networks and services, so that should be incorporated into the horizon scanning work.

[Chi Onwurah]

This is an important point. I do not think the 2003 Act has been amended, since I had it reprinted a week ago. We were talking about the principal duties. Under section 3, Ofcom has about two and a half pages of duties that it needs to carry out, but only two principal duties. Those principal duties do not mention security.

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Lady is right, but as of 31 December 2020, section 3(4) states:

“OFCOM must also have regard, in performing those duties, to such of the following as appear to them to be relevant in the circumstances…the desirability of ensuring the security and availability of public electronic communications networks and public electronic communication services”.

It is absolutely there, but I fear we are getting into a somewhat semantic argument.

[Chi Onwurah]

The Minister is generous in supporting this back and forth in debate. I will close by pointing out that the duty to which he refers is one of 13 duties, so it can hardly be considered a priority. To put it more fairly, to ensure that it is a principal priority, it would need to be elevated.

[Matt Warman]

I think an organisation of 937 people can cope with 13 priorities. On one level, however the hon. Lady makes a reasonable point, and it is not one that we disagree with. Security has to be absolutely central to the work that Ofcom will do.

I will not restate the points I have made about how seriously we take the Intelligence and Security Committee and how seriously we will continue to take it. We will continue to write to the Committee on topics of interest as they arise and we are happy to continue to co-operate in the way that I have done; however, as I said in the debate on amendment 9, the primary focus of the ISC is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies, and its remit is defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013. Amending the Bill to require regular reporting to the ISC, as proposed by the new clause, would risk the statutory basis of the ISC being set out across a range of different pieces of legislation.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Matt Warman]

Earlier, the right hon. Gentleman was suggesting that it was the memorandum of understanding that he would like to see amended. Now he seems to be suggesting that we should insert the new clause, which will not change the memorandum of understanding.

[Mr Jones]

No, I said in an earlier contribution that if it were done by the memorandum of understanding, I would be quite happy. I know the Minister is limited in the number of civil servants he has beneath him compared with Ofcom, but will he go away and read the Justice and Security Act 2013? It talks about Departments, but it also talks about intelligence more broadly, which is covered by the memorandum of understanding. I do not know why he is pushing back on this issue; it may be because of the Cabinet Office, which has more civil servants than he has. I suggest that we will win this one eventually.

[Matt Warman]

That may well be the case, but the right hon. Gentleman is not going to win it here—that is the important point to make. It is right not to try to address this issue in the new clause, but the Government will continue to take very seriously the work of the ISC, as he would expect.

Additionally, the new clause is designed to require Ofcom to provide annual reports to the ISC, which would, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, be particularly unusual in the context of the work of the Committee, as Ofcom will not be making judgments about the interests of national security under the Bill, or as part of its wider function. Ofcom’s role as regulator seems not to be something that comes under the purview of the ISC, even if I understand the broader point. As I said earlier, however, the NCSC is very much under the purview of the ISC, and there are plenty of opportunities for the Committee to interrogate the work of that excellent agency. I am sure the Committee will continue to take up such opportunities with vigour, but as I have said before, it would not be right to seek to reframe the remit of the ISC through the new clause. I ask the Opposition to withdraw it.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his comments and for engaging so readily in debate. I have to say that we feel very strongly about the new clause, both for parliamentary scrutiny and for ensuring that Ofcom is looking forward and assessing future threats. With bated breath, I wish to test the will of the Committee on the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

A decade of neglect of our telecoms infrastructure has left us vulnerable and created the need for this Bill. We support the Bill, but it is clear that to protect our national security now and in future we must have an effective network supply chain diversification strategy, plan and implementation. New clause 6 would ensure that this vital aspect of our telecoms security is regularly reviewed and scrutinised, so that the UK is never again forced to choose between technological progress and national security.

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Lady raised an important issue. Fundamentally, however, the issue of diversification is twofold. The Government want to see greater diversification within our telecoms supply chain. The £250 million allocated for the first three years of that programme to support the diversification strategy is a hugely important part of it.

As we are already seeing in the increased use of open RAN, whether with Vodafone in Wales or the NeutrORAN project with the NEC, there is already significant progress. I think that demonstrates that the industry does regard this—whether the hon. Lady wants to call it as an incentive or a carrot—as something that is making things happen to a greater extent. The Government cannot legislate for the diversification of the market; that is something that we can incentivise and work with the market to do.

We can monitor the diversity of networks, as Ofcom has the powers to do. We can set requirements on what the minimum standards might look like. For instance, NCSC guidance already says that two vendors should be the minimum, rather than one, for a telecoms network. That gives you an indication of what we will be monitoring and looking at, potentially, in codes of practice in the future. The hon. Lady is right to focus on this important issue, but it is wrong to pretend, important though Secretaries of State are, that any Secretary of State could legislate in the way she describes for the greater diversification that we all seek.

The focus of the Bill is on setting clear and robust security standards for our networks that telecoms providers must adhere to, and they must be met regardless of the diversity within any of those networks. To be fair, the diversity within a provider’s supply chain, in and of itself, does not offer the guarantee of network security. A provider using a diverse supply chain needs to be held to the standards set out in this Bill, so that the provider is able to offer the security standards that we need, regardless of the number of suppliers that they have available.

It is important to reassure hon. Members that Ofcom will have the ability to collect information relating to the diversity of suppliers’ networks under section 135 of the Communications Act 2003, as we have discussed. I do not think it is necessary to specify the need to collect information relating to diversification, as that is just one set of information that Ofcom may collect; it is just as important as several others in monitoring and reporting the security and resilience of networks. It is also important to clarify that, although greater diversity is critical in ensuring that we reduce our national dependence on a small number of suppliers, it is part of a broader approach to building security and resilience across the global supply chain that sits outside the Bill, important though it is. Diversification is an issue broader than the make-up of supply chains for UK providers alone, as the hon. Lady knows.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

On a point of order, Mr McCabe. I put on the record my gratitude, and that of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham and my hon. Friend the Member for City of Chester, to you and your colleague, Mr Hollobone, for the way in which you have expertly chaired proceedings in the Committee. I also sincerely thank all House staff who have supported our work here, including those representing Hansard, and particularly the Clerks, who have been absolutely invaluable in setting out our desires to improve the Bill in clear and orderly amendments and new clauses.

I also thank all members of the Committee from both sides of the House. This detailed, technical Bill is critical for our national security, coming at a time of national crisis, when we are braving—all of us: staff and Members—a pandemic in order to be here. We have had an orderly and constructive debate.

[Matt Warman]

Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. What fun we have had! It is a pleasure to come to this point in the Bill’s passage. I echo the hon. Lady’s thanks to the House staff and to yourself, Mr McCabe, and Mr Hollobone. I also reiterate her point that this is a crucial Bill—one that I am glad enjoys cross-party support. I look forward to debating its further stages in the House.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Matt Warman Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. I remind Members about the importance of social distancing. Spaces for Members are clearly marked. I also remind Members that Mr Speaker has stated that masks should be worn in Committee. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to [e-mail].

Today we continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order they are debated, but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates.

Clause 6

Powers of OFCOM to assess compliance with security duties

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

It is a pleasure to be back under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. As we discussed during the debate on amendments to this clause in our previous sitting, clause 6 inserts proposed new sections 105N to R, providing Ofcom with strengthened powers to assess whether providers of public electronic communications networks and services are complying with their security duty. These powers are vital to enable Ofcom to fulfil its expanded and more active role, giving it the tools to monitor and assess providers’ compliance with the new telecoms security framework and providing the basis for commencing any enforcement action.

Proposed new section 105O provides the power to give assessment notices to a provider. Assessment notices may impose a duty on a provider to do a number of different things, which I will briefly summarise. First, providers can be required to carry out, or arrange for another person to carry out, technical testing in relation to their network or service. Secondly, they can be required to make staff available to be interviewed, enabling Ofcom to gain insights into how a provider’s security practices and policies are implemented.

Thirdly, providers can be required to allow an Ofcom employee or an assessor authorised by Ofcom to enter their premises to view documents or equipment. I recognise that that is a significant power, but it is necessary. It is subject to certain restrictions to protect legally privileged information and to limit entry to non-domestic premises only. To provide clarity for telecoms providers, Ofcom will also publish guidance setting out how and when it will use the power. Importantly, providers have a right of appeal.

The powers of assessment set out in the clause are key to enabling Ofcom to carry out the effective and extensive monitoring and assessment of providers’ security practices that is necessary.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone, and to come back to this important Bill. I thank the Minister for writing to me and reassuring me on certain matters relevant to the clause. We accept the need for Ofcom to have powers to require information from vendors, but we would like a specific requirement whereby Ofcom can ask vendors for information on the diversity of their supply chains. I will leave further discussion on that for our new clauses. I will support this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Powers of OFCOM to enforce compliance with security duties

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 8 stand part.

Clause 9 stand part.

Clause 10 stand part.

[Matt Warman]

I will seek to move relatively rapidly through these four clauses.

Clause 7 provides Ofcom with enforcement powers in relation to providers’ security duties. The Bill gives Ofcom new powers to impose tough financial penalties on providers who breach their security duties. The penalties range to a maximum fine of 10% of a provider’s annual turnover, which is in line with the maximum fines available for breaching other regulatory requirements. For continuing contraventions, Ofcom can levy a daily penalty of up to £100,000. Penalties that are generally lower than that but still significant will also apply for contravening information requirements, which are subject to a maximum penalty of £10 million or, for a continuing contravention, a penalty of up to £50,000 per day. These penalties ensure that there will be a real financial deterrent to poor security practices. I should also say that, in the most serious cases, or in cases where a provider repeatedly contravenes its security duties, Ofcom would be able to use existing powers to suspend or restrict the provider’s entitlements to provide a network or service. Clearly, that is a step that we hope the regulator will never need to take.

The clause also gives Ofcom an important new power to take action where security is being compromised or is at imminent risk of being compromised. Proposed new sections 105U and 105V of the Communications Act 2003 would enable Ofcom to direct a provider to take interim steps to secure its network or service while Ofcom investigates or pursues further action. This power recognises that contravention of a security duty could result in a security compromise that causes real damage to users of that network or service. Where Ofcom uses that power, it will be required to commence and complete the enforcement process as soon as is reasonably practicable. The clause gives Ofcom the tools it needs to effectively enforce compliance with the new security framework.

Clause 8 sets out the position for bringing civil claims against providers who breach their security duties, which is a matter we touched on in earlier debates. It enables providers to be held accountable not just by Ofcom but by service users, such as members of the public, in cases where loss or damage is sustained by those users as the result of a breach of a duty. Providers owe a duty to any person who may be affected by a contravention of their security duties to take security measures, to comply with specific security duties in any regulations and to inform users of security compromises.

This clause allows any affected person to take legal action should providers breach those security duties. However, any affected person can bring legal proceedings against a provider only with the consent of Ofcom, which may be subject to conditions relating to the conduct of the legal action. This reflects the existing position in the Communications Act 2003 and ensures that providers face legal action only in appropriate circumstances. The clause also makes providers responsible to their users, providing another source of accountability. It allows users to bring legal claims for any losses they have suffered, which is only fair and reasonable.

Clause 9 addresses the interaction between provisions in the Bill and other legislation, specifically national security, law enforcement and prisons legislation. The security duties created by the Bill do not conflict with duties imposed on communications providers by other legislation via these clauses. Equally, we do not want the Bill to affect adversely the important work carried out by our law enforcement agencies, criminal justice authorities and intelligence agencies. The clause gives that clarity to providers about their responsibilities.

Finally, clause 10 requires that Ofcom publish a statement of policy about how it will fulfil its general duty and use specific powers to ensure that providers comply with their security duties. This will provide welcome clarity to industry about the expected use of important new powers. I beg to move that these clauses stand part of the Bill.

[Chi Onwurah]

I will not detain the Committee long, as we are cracking on through the clauses. I will only emphasise that these clauses give Ofcom broad powers—very broad powers—and measures of enforcement, as well as placing duties on the network operators to all users of their network services. We support these broad powers, but it is incumbent on the Minister and indeed on the Committee to consider whether those powers will receive sufficient scrutiny, and sufficient oversight and input from our security services. We anticipate debating those particular questions in more detail later today. In the meantime, we will not stand in the way of these clauses standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 8 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Reporting on matters related to security

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

I welcome the spirit of the amendment. I think that the hon. Lady and I share the same ambition. I know that she wants to have the proper debate later, so we look forward to that.

Clause 11 inserts into the Communications Act 2003 proposed new section 105Z, which deals with Ofcom’s reports on security. It requires Ofcom to produce such reports within two years of the Bill receiving Royal Assent and every 12 months thereafter. As the hon. Lady said, amendment 14 is similar to the amendment to clause 6 that we discussed previously. Ultimately, when considering Ofcom’s role and specifically its reporting function, we should note that proposed new section 105Z(2) requires Ofcom security reports to include such information and advice as Ofcom considers may best assist the Secretary of State in the formulation of policy on telecoms security. That could go beyond the list in proposed new subsection (4) to include other relevant information, such as that related to diversification. The Secretary of State can also direct Ofcom to include information that goes beyond that list.

As the Committee and, indeed, Ofcom will be well aware, the Government have recently published a targeted diversification strategy, which will deliver lasting and meaningful change in the 5G supply chain and pave the way for a vibrant, innovative and dynamic supply market. We heard widespread support for the strategy from witnesses during the oral evidence sessions. The strategy demonstrates our commitment to building a healthy supply market and is backed by a £250 million initial investment.

We have publicly announced that the Government will be funding the creation of a UK telecoms lab to research and test new ways of increasing security and interoperability, and we are already partnering with Ofcom and Digital Catapult to fund the industry-facing test facility SONIC—the SmartRAN Open Network Interoperability Centre. Both of those will play a key part in our investment in diversification and demonstrate Ofcom’s existing part in it.

As already mentioned, amendment 14 would require Ofcom to include in its security reports

“an assessment of the impact on security of”

any

“changes to the diversity of the supply chain for network equipment”.

As that requirement is already essentially covered by Ofcom’s existing powers, the amendment is not necessary. The inclusion of any such information is already within Ofcom’s discretion, but I am sure that we will discuss it more later on, as the hon. Lady said.

Clause 12 expands Ofcom’s information-gathering powers for the purposes of its security functions and enhances its ability to share the information with the Government. It enables Ofcom to require a provider to produce, generate, collect or retain security information, and then to analyse that information. Any information sought using this power must always be proportionate to how Ofcom will use it.

Clause 13 makes provision in connection with the standard of review applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal in appeals against certain of Ofcom’s security-related decisions. Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are subject to a right of appeal to the tribunal, and that will also be the case for most of Ofcom’s decisions relating to the exercise of its regulatory powers conferred by the Bill. This clause makes provision to ensure that the tribunal is not required to modify its approach in appeals against relevant security decisions, and should instead apply ordinary judicial review principles.

I hope that I have sufficiently explained to the Committee why amendment 14 is unnecessary and why clauses 11 to 13 as drafted should stand part of the Bill.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his comments. Although we agree on many things in many areas, I think that in this case he is trying to have his cake and eat it, inasmuch as he is saying that amendment 14 is not necessary because Ofcom already has the powers, but he is reluctant or is refusing to specify that those powers will be used for the objective of reporting on the progress of diversification of the supply chain. It was good to hear the Minister reiterate the importance of diversification of the supply chain, but I remain confused about whether he agrees with the evidence and, indeed, with his own Secretary of State that diversification of the supply chain is a prerequisite of the security of our networks and, indeed, our national security—that is what we are discussing with regard to our telecoms networks. If diversification is a prerequisite, why is the Minister so reluctant to refer to it? If he is so confident in the plan to diversify our supply chains, why is he so reluctant to insert any requirements to report on the progress of that diversification?

I listened intently: the Minister said that Ofcom has the powers to report on whatever it considers to be relevant to security. During the evidence session, we heard from Ofcom itself, very clearly and repeatedly, that it is not for Ofcom to make decisions on national security. It will not make national security decisions. That is not within its remit and responsibilities; the witnesses from Ofcom stated that repeatedly and clearly. I would be happy to read from Hansard if that point is in question. Given that Ofcom will not make security decisions and that the diversification of the supply chain is essential for security, I am at a loss to understand why the Minister will not accept a reference to reporting on the progress of diversification. Although, unfortunately, the pandemic means that we are not at full strength on the Opposition side of the Committee, I wish to test the will of the Committee on the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

The next five years will be key to the maturation of the technologies about which the Minister has so many hopes to help with the diversification of our supply chain and in terms of the global security and geopolitical environment and landscape, yet we have no requirement for reporting or accountability during that time. That is what the amendment is designed to change.

[Matt Warman]

I listen with interest to the points that the hon. Lady makes, and to the assertion that she is a member of the party of national security. I welcome her to this side of the House, if that is the case. [Interruption.] Thank you, but no.

As the hon. Lady says, clause 14 is a review clause requiring the impact and effectiveness of clauses 1 to 13 to be reviewed at least every five years by the Secretary of State. The review report must be published and laid before Parliament, but it is by no means the only source of parliament scrutiny, as she knows. Her amendment would increase the frequency of these reports to every year for the first five years after the Bill is passed and then every five years thereafter.

Increasing the frequency of the reports would bring its own challenges for a number of reasons. First, the framework is considerably different from the previous security regime in the Communications Act 2003. It seems to me that we will not be able fully to assess the impact and effectiveness of the new security regime instituted by clauses 1 to 13 until all parts of the framework, including secondary legislation, codes of practice and other things, have been in place for a reasonable period of time. The code of practice that will provide guidance on the detailed security measures that telecoms could take is intended to set clear implementation timelines. Some measures may require significant operational change, as we heard in the evidence sessions for telecoms providers, and we are aware that that may be costly. For that reason, we cannot reasonably expect all changes to be implemented instantly or, indeed, all necessarily at the same time.

There is a further practical difficulty with the amendment. If the first report is to be produced 12 months after Royal Assent, it will require the review to be undertaken well in advance of that deadline. That means that the report will represent an incomplete picture of the Bill’s impact, even at its very first production. Some measures will not even have been implemented by telecoms providers.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hyndburn was exactly right that the current requirement for publishing reports is at least—rather than at most—every five years. We have been deliberate in our choice of this timeframe because five years is the reasonable point by which we expect the majority of telecoms providers to have implemented most, if not all, changes. It is therefore considered appropriate to require a report on the impact and effectiveness of the framework by that time. I recognise that five years is a long time. That does not mean that the framework will be free from scrutiny in the intervening period. As clause 11(3) sets out, the Bill amends section 134B of the Communications Act so that Ofcom’s regular infrastructure reports will include information on public telecoms providers’ compliance with the new security framework. Ofcom publishes the reports annually, rendering the amendment unnecessary.

[Chi Onwurah]

On a point of clarification, I have the impression that the Minister anticipates that the first report under the Bill would only happen once all the requirements had been implemented. I think that that implies that it would only happen once a high-risk vendor, specifically Huawei, had been removed from the network.

[Matt Warman]

No is the short answer, because while this is a progress report, five years from 2021 is 2026—the deadline is 2027, even at the most extreme end, which is not where we anticipate it will end up—and it would be before the point that she identifies.

The infrastructure reports from Ofcom will help to provide Parliament and the public with a view on how telecoms providers are progressing with compliance with the new framework. As I alluded to earlier, they are not the only means of parliamentary scrutiny. We have the Intelligence and Security Committee and we have Select Committees. I suspect that there might be one or two debates on this matter over the next five years as well. To pretend that this is the only method of parliamentary scrutiny is not accurate.

[Chi Onwurah]

If the Minister will give way briefly, he may find it saves time. To clarify: for the first report we will not necessarily have to wait until all the provisions of delegated legislation associated with the Bill are in place. As for the infrastructure reports that Ofcom publishes, to which he refers as a form of alternative scrutiny, will they, might they or will they not reflect progress in the diversification of the supply chain?

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Lady asks me to predict what is in a report that has not been written yet by an organisation that is not a Government Department. I agree with the principle of what she is saying. This is an important aspect and one would reasonably expect it to be reflected in the reports that we have talked about. It is, however, important overall to say that Ofcom’s own regular infrastructure reports will, as I have said, include information on public telecoms providers’ compliance with the new security framework, which is the broadest interpretation and gives a huge amount of latitude for the sorts of information that she seeks. I hope that those infrastructure reports will help to provide Parliament with the kind of scrutiny that she seeks, and the public with the kind of scrutiny that we all seek. [Interruption.] For those reasons I hope that she will withdraw the amendment.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham for an exciting intervention from his phone, and I thank the Minister for his comments. As I think I have said, I spent six years working for Ofcom with the Communications Act 2003 on my desk. I know the importance that our independent regulator places on the words of the Minister during such debates as this. As he has indicated that the reports would do well to include reference to everything that appertains to security, including the diversification of supply chain, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Designated vendor directions

--- Later in debate ---

The Secretary of State should have access directly to the security information and should not have to go through the filter of the Cabinet Office or Ofcom. I accept the assurances that the Minister gave about Ofcom’s ability to give advice and work closely with the security services, and these are probing amendments. I am interested in what he says about how we can ensure that when the Secretary of State takes a decision, national security is at its heart, and that he or she got it straight from the horse’s mouth—in other words, from the security services—rather than its being filtered through the membrane that sometimes exists in Whitehall.

[Matt Warman]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution to the debate. He has talked so much about my impermanence that I felt lucky to come back today, never mind any time in the future. He makes a reasonable point, with which I broadly sympathise. As this is a broad grouping that covers clauses 15 and 16 and the amendments to clauses 15, 16 and 17, I will discuss the policy intention behind the clauses in sequence, and address the amendments.

As the right hon. Gentleman said, it is obviously an opportune moment to pay tribute to the heroic work of our national security services. The Bill emphasises the importance of their advice, and it empowers the Government to manage the presence of high-risk vendors in our networks. The report to which he refers is important, but it is also important to say that it was published, as he said, in 2013. It related almost entirely to events that took place under Labour, and it predates the existence of the National Cyber Security Centre, so we are dealing to some extent with a different world. I will go into a bit of detail on that.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Government announced in January last year that new restrictions should be placed on the use of high-risk vendors in the UK’s 5G and full-fibre networks. In July 2020, the Government worked with the NCSC to update the guidance following action taken by the US Government in relation to Huawei. Clauses 15 to 17 provide the principal powers that the Government need to manage the risks posed by high-risk vendors. Without such powers, the guidance issued to industry will remain unenforceable and therefore present a risk to national security.

[Mr Jones]

I accept what the Minister says about the report, but its key point was that civil servants basically decided not to tell Ministers. On his explanation and the way forward, or what has changed since, how can we avoid a situation whereby Cabinet Office civil servants take the decision not to tell Ministers? How can we ensure that that will not happen again?

[Matt Warman]

In short, the right hon. Gentleman is challenging the fundamental effectiveness of Government and the judgments that were made by officials at the time. I simply say that it is the duty of Government to ensure that such errors are not made in future. That cannot be done solely by legislative means; it must be done by custom and practice. The right hon. Gentleman understands, through his work on the ISC, that the role of those close working relationships is in some ways far more important in the day-to-day security issues that we are dealing with. Perhaps we can return to that point later.

The Bill will allow the Secretary of State to issue designated vendor directions, imposing controls on the use of goods, services or facilities that are supplied, provided or made available by designated vendors. The Secretary of State may issue such directions only where it is necessary to do so in the interests of national security and proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved.

Amendment 16, which would amend clause 15, seeks to place a statutory requirement on the Secretary of State to take into account advice from our intelligence services when considering whether to issue a designated vendor direction. Amendment 17, which would amend clause 16, seeks to place a similar requirement when considering a designation notice.

I should reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows, has every intention of seeking the advice of our security and intelligence services, as would any Secretary of State, in particular the NCSC, when considering whether to issue a designated vendor direction or designation notice.

It is also worth saying, from a scrutiny point of view, that the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport maintains an excellent relationship with the NCSC. We are scrutinised by the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and I have appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. There are many examples in the Bill where the NCSC’s expert advice has been taken into account.

The UK telecoms supply chain review, on which the Bill is based, was the product of the close working relationship between the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the NCSC. In a sense, that close working relationship demonstrates that matters have moved on substantively since 2013.

I draw hon. Members’ attention to the illustrative notices that we published in November last year. The NCSC was closely involved in the drafting of those illustrative notices. It will also be involved in the drafting of direction and designation notices once the Bill has been enacted . Given the demonstrable success of our collaboration with the NCSC thus far, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with that explanation, although I appreciate that he introduced a probing amendment.

Clause 15 would create the new power for the Secretary of State to issue designated vendor directions to public communications providers, in the interests of national security. Although clauses 15 and 16 are distinct, they are complementary. Directions cannot be issued without identification of a designated vendor and designations have no effect unless directions are given to public communications providers. Clause 15 inserts new sections 105Z1 to 105Z7 into the Communications Act 2003 and amends section 151 for that purpose.

The clause will enable the Government’s announcements in 2020 on the use of high-risk vendors to be given legal effect. Those announcements include advice that require a public telecoms provider to exclude Huawei from their 5G networks by 2027, and stop installing new Huawei goods, services or facilities in 5G networks from September 2021. It will also enable the Government to address risks that might be posed by future high-risk vendors, helping to ensure our telecoms networks are safe and secure.

Proposed new section 105Z1 sets out the direction power. It would allow the Secretary of State to give a designated vendor direction to a provider, imposing requirements on their use of goods, services or facilities supplied by a specified designated vendor. Proposed new section 105Z2 provides further details on the types of requirements that may be imposed in a designated vendor direction. Proposed new section 105Z3 sets out the consultation requirements and expectations for public communications providers. Proposed new section 105Z4 sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to provide a copy of a direction to the designated vendor or vendors, specified in a direction and, hence, affected by it. Proposed new sections 105Z5 and 105Z6 set out when and how the Secretary of State may vary or revoke a direction. Lastly, 105Z7 enables the Secretary of State to require a public communications provider to provide a plan setting out the steps that it intends to take to comply with any requirements set out in a direction and the timings of those steps.

Although the Government have made specific announcements on Huawei, the high-risk vendor policy has not been designed around one company, country or threat. The designated vendor direction power, as set out in these provisions, is intended to be an enduring and flexible power, enabling the Government to manage the risks posed to telecoms networks both now and in the future.

Clause 16 includes a non-exhaustive list of matters to which the Secretary of State may have regard when considering whether to issue a designation notice. Amendment 18 seeks to amend that clause by adding a person’s control of data flows to the list of matters to which the Secretary of State may have regard. However, nothing in the clause prevents the Secretary of State from considering control of data flows before issuing a designation notice already, if the matter were deemed relevant to the assessment of national security. It is already covered and so is not required as a stand-alone measure.

The clause creates a power for the Secretary of State to issue a designation notice, which designates a vendor for the purposes of issuing a designated vendor direction. Proposed new section 105Z8 is the principal measure of the clause, and sets out the power for the Secretary of State to designate specific vendors where necessary in the interests of national security. A designation notice must specify the reasons for designation unless the Secretary of State considers that doing so would be contrary to the interests of national security. The proposed new section also lists the primary factors that may be taken into account by the Secretary of State when considering whether to designate a vendor on national security grounds.

Finally in this group, amendment 19 would require the Secretary of State, when laying a designation noticed before Parliament, also to lay before Parliament a report detailing the impact that the designation notice might have on the diversity of the UK’s telecoms supply chain. The effect of the amendment would be to require the Secretary of State to lay a report purely on the impact of the designation notice, but a designation notice simply notifies vendors that the Government consider them a risk to national security.

Only when the designation notice is issued alongside a designated vendor direction are controls placed on the use of a designated vendor’s goods, services and facilities by public communication providers, so it is those controls that might have an impact on the diversity of the supply chain. I can reassure the Committee that the Government will consider the diversity of the supply chain before issuing designation notices and designated vendor directions. A lack of diversity is in itself a risk to the security of a network. I hope that answers the question that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central asked in regard to an earlier amendment. It is right that the Government consider that risk before deciding whether to issue designation notices and designated vendor directions.

To conclude, clauses 15 and 16 provide us with the ability to improve the security of our telecommunications networks and to manage the risks relating to high-risk vendors, both now and in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

Thank you for the clarification, Mr Hollobone. I see that we are discussing whether clauses 15 and 16 stand part. I support those clauses and look forward to the Minister’s response to the amendment.

[Matt Warman]

I pre-emptively covered a lot of the hon. Lady’s questions, but I will say two brief things. She talked about consolidation in the cloud sector. While the Bill is very much a national security Bill, the National Security and Investment Bill would cover consolidation in that sort of sector, rather than this one. Obviously they do work together.

[Chi Onwurah]

The point I am making—clearly, I did not make it effectively—is that that sector is becoming this sector. The cloud sector is becoming the telecoms sector. The reason we need this Bill in addition to the National Security and Investment Bill is to address the security concerns of the telecoms sector specifically. The cloud sector is becoming part of the telecoms sector, yet the Bill does not address those concerns.

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Lady is not wrong, obviously, in the sense that there is a potential conversation to be had about when a cloud provider is a telecoms provider and vice versa, if I can put it like that, although it is not the most elegant way of doing so. However, the point is that the reason we have comprehensive coverage of the landscape is because we have both the National Security and Investment Bill, which she debated recently, and this Bill. The broad powers that she described are intended to provide precisely that sort of coverage.

Similarly, the hon. Lady referred to the length of the list in clause 16 of matters that can be taken into consideration. That relates to the point I made previously, namely that the sorts of issues that she is talking about, such as data flows, are already covered in the long list. The list is as long as it is because it is intended to look to the future. Therefore, being prescriptive in the way that she describes is fundamentally unnecessary. We are not excluding what she wants to be on the list. A matter is already very much there if it is pertinent to national security. For that reason, I do not think there is a compelling case to add that single topic to the list, both because it is already there and because if we start going down that route, we could make the case for adding a host of other things that are already covered but that people might want to be mentioned specifically.

As I said earlier on the convergence of the two sectors, the point is that we have comprehensive coverage through both Bills. It will be for the NCSC, Ofcom and the Government to make a judgment as to whether any consolidation in a sector poses a national security risk.

[Mr Jones]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Laying before Parliament

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

Thank you, Mr Hollobone. It is sometimes confusing to know exactly what is being discussed at what point. With that, I ask the Minister to respond to our concerns about the scrutiny of the powers in the clause.

[Matt Warman]

I welcome the second salvo in the campaign to address this matter by the right hon. Member for North Durham. He said it would be an ongoing campaign.

This group of amendments would require the Secretary of State to provide information relating to a designated vendor direction or designation notice to the ISC. The amendments would require the Secretary of State to do this only where directions and designation notices had not been laid before Parliament, whether in full or in part, as a result of the national security exemptions in clause 17. It will not surprise the right hon. Member for North Durham or other Opposition Members that some of these short remarks will overlap with the conversation that we had earlier on a similar matter.

Amendment 20 would require designated vendor directions or designation notices to be provided to the ISC. Amendments 22 to 25 would require the Secretary of State also to provide the ISC with copies of any notifications of contraventions, confirmation decisions and so on. Although I recognise some Members’ desire for the ISC to play a greater role in the oversight of national security decision making across government, including in relation to this Bill, the amendments would, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows, extend the ISC’s role in an unprecedented way. None the less, I thank his welcome for my unprecedented appearance.

As I said in the debate on amendment 9, the ISC’s primary focus is to oversee the work of the security and intelligence agencies. Its remit is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013, and the accompanying statutory memorandum of understanding, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. I do not think he thinks it is my place to take a view on that role, and I do not think this Bill is the place to have that debate.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, but I would ask the Minister’s civil servants to read the Act before they write this stuff for him. The Act refers to “intelligence”. Our remit is not fixed by a Department. I know the Minister sympathises with this and that we will get there eventually, but I say to his civil servants, please read the Act.

[Matt Warman]

I will come on to that. Accepting any of these unilateral amendments to this Bill is not the appropriate place to achieve an overall enhanced role for the ISC—

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry to say to the Minister that it is not looking for an enhanced role at all. It is actually doing what it says in the Justice and Security Act 2013. It is about scrutinising intelligence. A lot of the information, which will be used by him and others in these orders, will be derived from the same decisions that we oversee .

[Matt Warman]

Absolutely. Members of the Committee should note that in exercising the powers created by this Bill, the Secretary of State will be advised by the NCSC on relevant technical and national security matters. The NCSC’s work already falls within the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, so the right hon. Gentleman has found his own salvation.

In that context, the amendment seems to duplicate that existing power, while also seeking to do something that is better done in reform of a different Act, if that is what the right hon. Gentleman seeks. I am sorry to disappoint him again. I think he knew already that I would do that, but I look forward to his third, fourth and fifth salvos in his ongoing campaign.

[Christian Matheson]

I hear the Minister’s explanation, which we have been over before when considering other amendments. He talks about other salvos by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. I go back to the statement that my right hon. Friend made last week, which is that he expects that at some point something will happen and we will move forward.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Matt Warman Excerpts

Tuesday 26th January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

[The Chair]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

--- Later in debate ---

The next five years will be key to the maturation of the technologies about which the Minister has so many hopes to help with the diversification of our supply chain and in terms of the global security and geopolitical environment and landscape, yet we have no requirement for reporting or accountability during that time. That is what the amendment is designed to change.

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

--- Later in debate ---

The Secretary of State should have access directly to the security information and should not have to go through the filter of the Cabinet Office or Ofcom. I accept the assurances that the Minister gave about Ofcom’s ability to give advice and work closely with the security services, and these are probing amendments. I am interested in what he says about how we can ensure that when the Secretary of State takes a decision, national security is at its heart, and that he or she got it straight from the horse’s mouth—in other words, from the security services—rather than its being filtered through the membrane that sometimes exists in Whitehall.

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Mr Jones]

[Matt Warman]

[Christian Matheson]

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Matt Warman Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

I agree. The issue with both Ericsson and Nokia is that they will have Chinese components in their hardware. This is an incredibly complex situation, as my hon. Friend said: we are talking about not just one piece of kit that most of us have in our pockets, but hundreds of thousands of components, pieces of software and other things. What I am trying to put on the record, and what I want the Minister to respond to, is the question of how we get an understanding of any risks that are involved in that, and how the regulator and the Government are going to look at ways in which national security could be compromised, not by the main company being owned by a Chinese state entity, a Russian state entity or any actor that we feel is a threat to us, but by a key component.

I have not yet really understood how the regulator will look at that issue further down the supply chain, and whether it will ask a supplier of kit to the telecoms network, “What is the level of threshold or security that you need?” That is hard enough with hardware, but with open RAN and software—we are talking about bits of code—it is going to be incredibly difficult. One of the issues is around vulnerabilities, and various things have been said about the vulnerability that Huawei poses to our telecoms network. However, I suggest people read the Huawei assessment centre’s annual reports—I am rather sad, because I read such documents. One thing sticks out every single year, and it is not that the Chinese are doing anything nefarious. The reports are highly critical of Huawei for its shoddy workmanship and engineering, but that type of shoddy engineering and a lack of attention to security will lead to security concerns in our telecoms network.

Amendment 7 is designed to tease out from the Government their thinking about the supply chain. We do not want to be over-burdensome on it, because we want to get innovation in the supply chain. We do not want to suddenly give researchers and other people in the supply chain huge regulatory hurdles to jump over, because that would stifle the development that we are looking for. It is about how individual components and the overview of the supply chain will be regulated. I have tabled a later amendment about Ofcom, but again it comes back to the point I made yesterday about the National Security and Infrastructure Bill. What has to be at the heart of it all, every single time, is not to stifle innovation and prosperity, but what has to come first every time is national security.

As I say, amendment 7 is a probing amendment, and I want to understand where the Government are at in terms of the supply chain, the security they feel they need over the supply chain and, more importantly, the visibility of the supply chain.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I echo the thanks of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central to you and the House staff for facilitating this Public Bill Committee. I also echo her praise for the temperature of the room and especially her commitment to crack on and not fill it with further hot air. That is to be welcomed.

Like the hon. Lady, I will briefly talk about the broader context of the Bill before I directly address this group of amendments. As we all know, security should be the first priority for any Government, and the Bill demonstrates this Government’s commitment to securing the UK’s telecoms networks.

Clauses 1 to 14 raise the bar for security across the whole telecoms sector, and the subsequent clauses—15 to 23— provide the mechanism for the Secretary of State to manage the role of high-risk vendors. The part that telecoms plays in our security is undeniable and has become even more evident in the midst of this global pandemic. At present, the internet provides absolutely everything for workplaces, schools, families and friends, and the Government are committed to improving that through our gigabit programme. New technologies have the potential to be transformative, but they have the opportunity to reach their full potential only if they are secure, and the Bill will ensure that.

Before I explain the Government’s response to amendments 7 and 8, it is necessary to explain briefly how they would interact with clause 1. New section 105A in clause 1 places a duty on providers to take “appropriate and proportionate” measures. Those measures oblige providers to identify and reduce the risks of security compromises and require them to prepare appropriately for those risks. New section 105A also addresses the interaction between the duty and the national security and law enforcement activity, such that these activities are appropriately excluded from the definition of a security compromise. I will return to new section 105A later—I know that will excite the Committee.

Alongside the overarching security duty in new section 105A, new section 105B gives the Secretary of State the powers to make regulations that impose duties to take specific security measures. Clause 1 creates a duty for providers to take “appropriate and proportionate” measures to protect their networks and services from security compromises. “Security compromise” is then defined in new section 105A.

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[Mr Jones]

I would, and this is really a probing amendment to get an understanding of what the Government think, but may I ask the Minister a direct question about the national security bodies—GCHQ and others? If they came across a component or something that a supplier was producing that raised concerns, how would their concerns be translated into saying that a red warning should be put on a certain component in a supply chain?

[Matt Warman]

I simply say that, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the NCSC and others already work very closely with the networks. What he seems to be talking about, in some ways, is a very day-to-day way of talking about security concerns. That happens a lot already, and what the codes of practice and other documents will do is set up the framework by which that is formalised. As he knows, that process of very quick action being taken as soon as something is spotted, both by the networks themselves and by our agencies, is already well established, and the Bill gives considerably greater force to it.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Bill is aimed at ensuring that providers take responsibility for the security of their networks and services in a way that has not happened, in legislative terms, in the past, and it then provides the Government with the powers that we need to enforce that. In so far as any supply chain components give rise to risks to the security of a network or service, new section 105A already requires providers to take appropriate action and proportionate measures to identify those risks. I appreciate that this is a probing amendment, but in a sense what the right hon. Gentleman is seeking to do through it is already there, and it will be enforced in the documents, such as the code of practice, that I have mentioned.

Furthermore, the addition of the presence of a supply chain component as a security compromise would not be consistent with the security framework’s definition of a security compromise, but I do not think that we need to get into too much detail about that in the context of a probing amendment. The concept of a security compromise is used in other provisions in the Bill, and it is important that we are consistent.

More fundamentally, the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment would put the onus on providers, rather than the Government, to determine a national security risk, but, as he implied, it is absolutely down to the NCSC and, ultimately, the Government and agencies to make that definition. Placing the responsibility for determining what does and does not constitute a threat to national security on the shoulders of all individual providers is not the right thing to do, and I think, to be fair, the right hon. Gentleman is not really suggesting that it is, either.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for the way in which he is addressing these important proposals. I think that his concern is that this amendment would put the responsibility on the providers rather than the National Cyber Security Centre, and I understand that, but can he say a little about the following matter, because it is the providers that know their networks? The National Cyber Security Centre is excellent, and we have huge admiration for it, but in terms of the supply chains, changes to the supply chain and new components evolving, how does he envisage that, day to day, working effectively without an amendment of this kind to put this requirement on the providers?

[Matt Warman]

As I have said, new section 105A partly provides the legal basis that the right hon. Gentleman seeks, but in practice no one is suggesting—the Secretary of State talked about this on the Floor of the House—that it is solely the name on the box of a piece of kit that defines international security status. We are not naive to the possibility of the supply chain being another vector of attack. That would be reflected in codes of practice and elsewhere around the legislation.

Public telecoms providers can and should consider the security of the resilience of their networks and services throughout the supply chain in a sensible and proportionate way. National security considerations are inevitably much broader than the issues that can be addressed solely by private companies. I think that is reflected in the distinction drawn up in this Bill.

The amendment would have implications for Ofcom’s monitoring and enforcement of providers’ compliance. The Bill includes provisions for Ofcom to collect information on behalf of the Secretary of State in narrow and specific areas related to national security, but this amendment would require Ofcom more actively to take some of the compliance judgments. In the evidence session the right hon. Gentleman was keen to see that it was not asked to make those judgments.

[Mr Jones]

Clearly NCSC does a tremendous job in terms of education of members of the public and companies —as the Minister outlined, that is a key part of its role. Does he see, therefore, a role for Ofcom as part of that, in terms of ensuring that the supply chain and operators are aware of their responsibility not only under the Bill, but to ask the right questions about supply chains from what might be deemed as high-risk vendors?

[Matt Warman]

In so far as codes of practice will be published by Ofcom, the answer to the right hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. The more nuanced answer is that it is a co-production between Ofcom, the Government, NCSC and others.

To conclude, the Government are immensely sympathetic to the issues that the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Lady seek to probe, but we take the view that this amendment would do something that is, ultimately, already covered in the Bill. I hope that, in that spirit, she will withdraw the amendment.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his response. I am concerned that there is not greater clarity on the role of the supply chain components and the supply chain more generally. We will come to that in further amendments. Given where we are and how we got here, we must take a forward-looking approach to future risks and vectors for risks. This amendment is important in probing that, but I do not seek to put it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Chi Onwurah]

I will not detain the Committee long, given that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham made such excellent points. I will add one point of consideration, which again, his modesty may have forbidden him from making.

The amendment goes to the heart of our concerns about the scrutiny of the provisions in the Bill. I say again for the record that we support the wide-ranging powers that the Bill gives the Secretary of State, but those powers must come with appropriate scrutiny, not because scrutiny is a “nice to have” or, as my right hon. Friend said, because the ISC needs further work, but because scrutiny of the provisions is essential to the good working of the legislation in practice.

Considering specifically the impact of the requirement to remove Huawei at this stage in our 5G roll-out—the economic impact, the cost to the providers and the cost to our economy—we recognise that it is the right thing to do, but we must also recognise the cost of doing it. Back in 2013, the ISC was one of the first parliamentary organisations to raise the issues around Huawei. I truly urge the Minister to accept this constructive amendment to support the appropriate provision of scrutiny.

My other point is more about the working of the clause, which gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that require providers to take specified security measures. As we know, the telecoms security framework and telecoms security requirement, to which all providers must adhere, will be set out in delegated legislation. In his response, will the Minister give us some idea of why the Secretary of State might need to set out additional specified requirements that are not in the draft of the TSR that he has published? Is the intention of the clause to enable him to set out additional specified requirements, or is it to enable him to highlight particular specified requirements that he does not think the providers are meeting quickly enough? In either case, does that not suggest that there are particular security concerns, either about providers or about the circumstances, that require these specific security measures? To come back to my first point, does that not highlight for those concerns to receive parliamentary scrutiny, with the appropriate clearance, which is to say that of the Intelligence and Security Committee?

[Matt Warman]

I start by acknowledging the incredibly important work that the ISC does. Its role in overseeing the work of the UK intelligence community is vital to maintaining public trust, as the right hon. Member for North Durham described, and its members make important contributions to public debates on national security matters of all kinds. The right hon. Gentleman has done that for a number of years. Because he is a member of the ISC, he will know that I have proactively engaged with it on the substance of the Bill. I did so enthusiastically—if any Minister can ever regard a Select Committee appearance enthusiastically—and in recognition of the interest that I knew that Committee would have in the Bill. I will be writing again to the ISC on a number of matters raised in the Bill, and I have instructed officials from my Department to continue to engage with the ISC as the Bill proceeds through Parliament, building on the work that it has already done and on the transparency that we have already demonstrated by publishing the draft of the security framework regulations on 13 January, copies of which have been provided to the members of the ISC and a number of other interested Committees. I hope that all that demonstrates the Department’s commitment to working constructively with the ISC, despite the fact that, as the right hon. Gentleman said, DDCMS does not normally fall within the ISC’s formal remit.

It is none the less important to acknowledge that the ISC is not the only legitimate avenue to scrutinise this framework. We fully intend to make use of all the appropriate parliamentary procedures.

The regulations and the explanatory memorandum accompanying them will all be there for the ISC to scrutinise. There is also further guidance to providers in connection with the measures specified in the regulations that can be provided in the code of practice, which must be published, with a copy laid before Parliament. Also, beyond the usual arrangements for secondary legislation, new section 105Z of the Communications Act 2003 provides for Ofcom to produce security reports. Clause 11 of the Bill enables those reports to be published by the Secretary of State, and clause 13 provides for a review of the effectiveness of the framework, including any regulations, after five years.

It is in that context that I point to the enthusiasm with which we have engaged with the ISC. We will continue to do so and ultimately—this is perhaps the reason why the right hon. Gentleman described this process as an ongoing campaign, rather than something that we should address piecemeal—the ISC is clearly defined in the Justice and Security Act 2013. I do not think it would be right to address the memorandum of understanding that he referred during our consideration of the Bill. We should not go at it in piecemeal fashion. The role of the ISC as set out in that MOU is to oversee the work of the security agencies, to provide oversight of certain intelligence or security matters within Government. Ultimately, if the right hon. Gentleman wants to change the MOU, that is a broader issue for him to take up. I note that he is not the only Member of this House to have made that point, but it is not my place to take a view on the role of the ISC; that should be for the ISC itself.

I am confident that we will continue to engage with the ISC; I personally will certainly do so. I know that the DCMS Committee will continue to take an interest, and I will simply say that we will co-operate as fully as possible. I will set out more in the letter I mentioned, and I look forward to the future salvos in the right hon. Gentleman’s campaign.

[Mr Jones]

I make no criticism of the Minister, because he has been very proactive, as has his Secretary of State. The problem is this: we have two pieces of legislation going through Parliament. We do not have security Bills very often in this place, and now we have two in a very short period of time. Both make eminent sense and I support them, but this is not something that comes up regularly.

In terms of the Minister’s co-operation, I have no complaints about the way he has operated, but he is not going to be there forever and neither is his Secretary of State, so we need to put in place something that will weather the passage of time, and create an arrangement whereby it will be seen that Parliament is scrutinising these measures. I do not know why the Government—I am sure it is not the Minister, or even his Secretary of State—are resisting this. Frankly, I am not really bothered whether it goes on the face of the Bill or in the MOU, but the Justice and Security Act 2013 is very clear that as a Committee, the ISC has the ability to look at this.

I accept that it would be wrong to get into issues around this Bill that are quite rightly, as the Minister said, for the relevant Select Committee—the Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport—to deal with. We would never do that, so I will withdraw this probing amendment, but we will come back to this issue. I am not usually a betting man, but I suspect that by the time this Bill and the other Bill go through, we will have got to where both I and the Minister—I think, privately—think we should be. I therefore ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.