(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise briefly to support Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. In passing, I still am rather confused by this Bill, which covers Scotland but not Crown Estate Scotland. That seems a bit of a contradiction, but it is clear there is a degree of overlap between the two. There certainly is an overlap of opportunity—we have heard about Great British Energy et cetera.
It is also clear that, while devolution must be respected and that is extremely important, Crown Estate Scotland and the Scottish Government want to have the same levels of flexibility. This simple amendment keeps the matter on the table and that is the key here, so I hope the Minister will be able to accept it.
My Lords, I rise very briefly to speak to Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. This is an entirely sensible proposal that I cannot imagine for a moment the Government would wish to resist, and which respects the autonomy of the devolution settlement. If I were a commissioner on the Crown Estate in England or the Crown Estate in Scotland, I would very much welcome this provision, and I congratulate the noble Earl on his ingenuity in tabling an amendment that would enable us to deal with this lacuna. I entirely understand why the Liberal Benches would not want to be accused of doing anything that undermined devolution. The noble Earl has found an elegant way of dealing with this, and I very much hope that the Government will support it.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, throughout the passage of this Bill, the issue of the size of the bank for which this new mechanism can be used has attracted significant comment and debate. In a letter to all noble Lords introducing the Bill, the Minister stated: “This Bill enhances the resolution regime to respond to the failure of small banks”. Yet that is not what the Bill does. The regime in the Bill is not restricted to small banks or even to small and medium-sized banks; it can be used for all banks, even the very largest. Despite the letter from the Minister on introduction, the Government have maintained their position that the mechanism should be available for use for the resolution of a bank of any size, including the very largest.
Using this mechanism in those circumstances would be astonishingly costly for banks and their customers, not only in the year in which the levy is first implemented but for many years thereafter, adding to a long-term and significant burden on the banking sector and its consumers. I concede that the Government clarified in a policy statement that the mechanism would be used for the largest banks only in exceptional circumstances, but the mechanism being given a statutory footing by the Bill will only ever be used, on a bank of any size, in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, I take only a small amount of comfort from the published statement.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said in Committee, there is no differentiation in the Bill on bank size. It should be limited by a defined measure. My amendment, supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, seeks to deliver that definition by making it clear that the Bill does not apply to banks that have reached end-state MREL—that is, the very largest banks in the UK. It would mean that only small and medium-sized banks, and those on the MREL glide path, can be supported by the mechanism. I believe that was the Government’s original intention.
My amendment is fairly simple. It does what it says on the tin. I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say when he comes to wind up.
My Lords, I add my support to Amendment 2 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. From the outset of this process, the Bill was intended to cover only small banks. That was made clear in almost the first paragraph of the original consultation. It was then extended and now covers all banks, regardless of size. I thank the Minister for making sure that the draft code of practice was published by the Treasury before Report; it has been incredibly helpful in this process, and we are all very grateful for that. The draft code of practice is clear that the resolution mechanism is designed primarily to support the resolution of small banks and that the Bank of England will not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and the corresponding MREL requirements of a large bank.
So why does the Bill cover large banks? The argument from the Government seems to be along the lines of, “Well, it might be useful to have this flexibility”. That does not seem a very strong argument. As we have heard, larger banks are required to hold additional capital resources, known as MREL, effectively to ensure that they are able to bail themselves out—a process known as bail-in. If the Government are not confident that the MREL regime is sufficient for those larger banks, they should be looking to strengthen that regime rather than extending a measure that is designed specifically for smaller banks whose failure would not create systemic risk, to act as a further insurance policy for the big banks.
I am afraid that unless the Minister can come up with a stronger argument than he has so far, I will be minded to support the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, should she decide to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I add my support to my noble friend’s amendment.
If the power were used on a bank that had already achieved the MREL set for it, that use of the mechanism would raise questions about whether MREL and the minimum capital requirements had been set correctly—and whether there had been a regulatory failure. In either event, the Bank is conflicted, whether through the setting of MREL in its capacity as a resolution authority or through setting capital levels through its PRA arm. I am clear that the Bank should not have the power to cover up regulatory failure, which this unconstrained provision allows. There is no way for the Treasury to stop the Bank using the power other than by using the power of direction that exists but has never been used in the existence of the Bank since nationalisation. Unconstrained powers are unhealthy. That is why I support my noble friend’s amendment.
My Lords, this group covers reporting and accountability to Parliament on the use of the resolution mechanism, which was probably the greatest area of discussion in Committee. The Bill gives significant rights to the Bank of England to impose costs on the banking industry. It can only be right, therefore, that the Bank should have to explain the reasons for its decisions and the outcome to both the Treasury and Parliament.
A number of concerns have been expressed throughout the process, and again today, about how the Bank might use the mechanism. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court, said:
“I can foresee circumstances where the Bank will choose to recapitalise a small bank rather than put it into a bank insolvency process, less because it is in the national interest and more as a way of minimising the reputational damage of regulatory failure”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 914.]
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said something similar earlier today. The noble Lord and others have pointed out that there is nothing in the Bill that would incentivise the Bank to control the expenses of the process; again, we discussed this to an extent earlier. Those expenses will be picked up by the FSCS, by the wider financial services industry and, ultimately, by the customers of that industry.
As we have just seen, the Government have tabled amendments to clarify that last point, which we have already discussed—but the point remains. Fears, which I share, have been raised that this resolution mechanism could become the default, rather than insolvency. I believe—others share this view, I think—that, in principle, a failing institution should be allowed to fail unless it is in the public interest for it to be bailed out. The draft code attempts to deal with this but the concern remains.
For all these reasons, it is essential that the Bank should have to explain its decisions and that Parliament should have the ability to scrutinise those decisions. For that reason, I have tabled Amendment 5, which would require the Bank to make a report to the Chancellor that must then be laid before Parliament every time a recapitalisation payment is made. The amendment sets out some minimum requirements for what the report should cover, including why the Bank chose to make a recapitalisation payment rather than allowing the institution to go into insolvency; the costs that will be incurred; and how those costs compare to the costs the FSCS would incur in an insolvency situation. It would also require a final report explaining what actually happened—and, if different, why—at the end of the resolution process.
Since I tabled Amendment 5, I am pleased to say that the Government have issued the draft code of practice—for which we are all grateful, as I said—and tabled Amendment 8. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for his constructive approach on this. Given that the two together deal with most of the areas covered by my Amendment 5, I will not push that.
However—there is always a “but” in these things—there is one important omission in the Minister’s Amendment 8. Although it requires the Bank to report within three months of any recapitalisation payment, it does not require a final report on what actually happened at the end of the resolution process. Although the resolution will happen quickly in many cases—the example of Silicon Valley Bank, where it happened over the weekend, is a good one—that may not always be the case. Under these rules, a bank can be put into a bridge bank for up to two years, which can be extended further. We can have multiple recapitalisation periods during that period, so the process can last a number of years. If the Bank reports within three months of each payment, we may never see a report on what actually happened at the end—for example, if the failing institution is put into insolvency two years later.
It is essential that the Chancellor and Parliament have an opportunity to review how the resolution worked out and, most importantly, to ensure that any relevant lessons are learned. So I have tabled Amendment 9, as an amendment to the Minister’s amendment, to cover that point. I think that this may have been the Minister’s intention all along, but I cannot agree with him that his amendment, as drafted, actually achieves this. On the report it requires, his amendment says:
“The Bank must report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about … the exercise of the power to require a recapitalisation payment to be made, and … the stabilisation power and the stabilisation option to which the payment relates”.
Nowhere does it talk about what happened at the end, which could be a number of years later.
I am alive to the concern that we should not have too many potentially repetitive reports, so my amendment would have effect only if the reports published by the Bank, in accordance with the Minister’s amendment, do not cover the final resolution results. I hope that this is not controversial and that the Minister will be able to accept Amendment 9 to his amendment. However, as I say, it is essential that the final outcome of any resolution is made transparent and open to scrutiny.
If the Minister is unwilling to accept my proposal, or accepts the principle but does not like some of the detail—he has mentioned to me that he is not terribly keen on the three-month timeframe—perhaps he could commit to coming back at Third Reading with his own version of the amendment that satisfies the guaranteed requirement to report on the final outcome. He can tweak it as he likes on timing and things—I cannot get too excited about that—but, if he is not prepared either to accept it or to do that, I will be minded, I am afraid, to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9 when the time comes.
The other amendments in this group relate to notifying the relevant committees of both this House and the other place of the use of the recapitalisation power. The amendments tabled by the Minister, as well as the amendments to his amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, arose from amendments that the noble Baroness put down in Committee. I am pleased that the Government have accepted those amendments. However, all the amendments do is say that the committees must be notified. Those committees need something to look at; it makes it all the more important that we have the reports we are talking about, both on the use of the recapitalisation power and on what finally happens, at the end of the day. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have Amendments 11 to 13 in this group; they are amendments to the Government’s Amendment 10, to which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has referred. Before I address those amendments, I shall refer briefly to the reporting amendments in this group. I certainly praise the Government for bringing forward their Amendment 8, as well as for beefing up the code of practice on reporting. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that the issue of the final report made by the Bank of England is outstanding; I therefore support his Amendment 9.
On Amendments 10 to 13, I start by thanking the Minister for listening to the case, made in Committee, that parliamentary committees should be notified of the use of the bank recapitalisation power. I had tabled an amendment that named the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House; this was supported in Committee by fellow Members of the latter committee, as noble Lords might imagine. I retabled my amendment for Report—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, added their names—but the Government then tabled Amendment 10, which was similar in principle to my amendment but drafted using the language of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. That Act did not refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee for the simple reason that it did not exist at the time—indeed, it was that Act that led to creation of that committee. So, following the helpful meeting that we had with the Minister, I was told that the Government were happy to refer directly to the Financial Services Regulation Committee. They suggested that this be achieved by my tabling amendments to the Government’s amendments. So I hope that, when the Minister gets up to speak to his amendment, he will confirm that he accepts my Amendments 11 to 13.
Noble Lords who have joined the House in the past eight years might be mystified by the reference to the Chairman of Committees in my Amendment 13. Although the House has not used the title since 2016, the post to which we now refer as the Senior Deputy Lord Speaker technically remains the Chairman of Committees. One learns something every day in Parliament.
Let me conclude by saying that I hope the principle of requiring notification to the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and your Lordships’ Financial Services Regulation Committee is now regarded as a precedent for any future creation of significant or unusual powers granted to the Bank of England or any of the other regulators in future. The strength of parliamentary accountability for those bodies, with their massive powers, must always be maintained—and, indeed, enhanced.
My Lords, this large group includes a number of the Government’s proposed amendments to the Bill. I begin by responding to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is intended to ensure that there is transparency about the Bank’s use of the new mechanism. It does this by creating a requirement for the Bank to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within 28 days on certain matters where a recapitalisation payment is made, and for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay these reports in Parliament.
I assure noble Lords that the Government recognise absolutely the importance of transparency and accountability regarding the new mechanism and appreciate the strength of feeling in the House. The debates at Second Reading and in Committee were helpful and constructive and have informed the Government’s approach. The Government therefore agree that there should be an explicit requirement for the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor when it uses the new mechanism. To that end, government Amendment 8 means that the Bank of England must report to the Chancellor about the use of the mechanism in any circumstances where it is used.
The Government’s amendment outlines two elements to reporting. First, it would require the Bank of England to produce a final report at a time to be specified by the Treasury. This is intended to be a comprehensive account of the use of the new mechanism and to include an assessment of the relative costs to insolvency. Secondly, the amendment would require the Bank to provide an interim report within three months of using the mechanism in the event that a final report has not been provided within that time. This would ensure a prompt initial public justification for the use of the new mechanism, even if further details would follow later.
Government Amendment 14 would require the code of practice to include guidance on what should be included in the reports. Taking these points together, the Government’s approach has a broadly similar intent to that of the noble Lord’s amendment. However, there are some points of detail where the Government have taken a different approach in order to avoid unintended consequences. In particular, while recognising the importance of clear reporting arrangements, the Government believe that it is critical that the timing and content of any reports do not complicate a successful resolution.
I would highlight two challenges with the approach set out in Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government believe that requiring an initial report as soon as 28 days after using the mechanism is likely to be too soon. As noble Lords know, the complexity of firm failures mean that they may not always be fully resolved within a short period of time. This is particularly the case when using the bridge bank tool, which is anticipated to be an interim step before an eventual sale. It is possible that a resolution process remains ongoing 28 days following a firm failure. It is therefore important that sufficient time is allowed so that the Bank can focus on its primary function of maintaining financial stability through managing the failure of the firm, before turning to the process of reporting. The Government therefore believe that providing an interim report within three months is a more proportionate approach to take, allowing the Bank more time to ensure that an interim report is as meaningful as possible while still ensuring that the Chancellor and Parliament are updated on use of the mechanism in short order.
This takes me to my second point, which is that disclosing certain information too early in the resolution process, especially information relating to the relative costs of different options such as insolvency, risks complicating a resolution because such information is either incomplete or highly sensitive. Regarding the noble Lord’s proposal to require an initial report to disclose certain costs, it is worth noting that when conducting the resolution conditions assessment, the Bank of England would make an assessment of the costs that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may incur if the firm was placed into insolvency. However, by virtue of necessity, this would be only an initial assessment based on the information available at the time. It is therefore important that the Bank of England’s assessment of relative costs is reported on only once the resolution is fully complete. This will ensure that the Treasury, Parliament and industry are provided with a comprehensive and accurate account.
In addition, if the firm was in a bridge bank, as it may well be after just 28 days, the early disclosure of this interim financial information could complicate negotiations regarding a sale, especially if it was subsequently revised. It may also be market sensitive and increase speculation about the failed firm during a period of heightened sensitivity. Ultimately, therefore, the Government see risks in requiring the Bank to report too early and in too much detail during a highly unpredictable and sensitive situation. This is in part why the existing reporting provisions within the Banking Act in relation to resolution require reports as soon as reasonably practicable only after a year has passed.
The Government have sought to reconcile these different issues in our proposed amendment, while recognising the important substantive point of principle raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government have proposed an interim report to be provided within three months. While it is possible that a resolution process may not have concluded by this point, as the FSCS is likely to levy firms within this timeframe, it seems reasonable to expect the Bank to provide a public justification of the decision to use the new mechanism by this point. I note that, alongside the notification requirement covered in government Amendment 10, which I will turn to shortly, this will ensure that the Treasury and Parliament have a prompt explanation of why resolution has been undertaken.
Secondly, the Government’s amendment means that the Bank of England must provide a separate final report, in the event that this has not already been provided within three months of using the mechanism. This final report is where the Bank would outline its assessment of the relative costs of different options. This reflects the points that I have already made, namely that the Government believe that the key reporting obligation should fall once the resolution process has concluded. This reduces the risk that disclosure frustrates that process and ensures that any report can be meaningful.
To support this approach, the Government have also tabled an amendment requiring guidance on the content of such reports to be included in the code of practice. This will ensure that there is clear public understanding of the key issues that any interim or final report is expected to cover. As I have noted, both interim and final reports would be expected to provide a justification for the use of the mechanism, and as set out in the current draft of the code of practice, the final report would need to set out an assessment of the costs if the firm had entered insolvency. The current draft updates to the code of practice also make clear that the Government expect to require the Bank of England to provide an explanation of why ancillary costs were considered reasonable and prudent.
I am grateful for the helpful engagement that I have had with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who has rightly emphasised the importance of the Bank of England providing a comparison of the expected and actual costs in its final reports. I am happy to reassure the noble Lord that the Government intend to request that the Bank of England include this in final reports and will ensure that the final updates to the code of practice reflect this.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has also tabled Amendment 9 to require the Bank to produce a report three months after the resolved firm has been sold or otherwise closed. I understand that the intent of this similarly reflects a desire to ensure that the Bank of England is compelled to report after a resolution process has fully concluded and provide an assessment of how the expected impacts of its actions compared to the actual events that took place in resolution. The Government of course appreciate the importance of the Bank of England reporting promptly. Reflecting on the noble Lord’s proposal, the Government intend to further update the code of practice to make clear that, where feasible and appropriate, the Treasury would expect the Bank of England to report soon after the sale or closure of the resolved firm.
The Government believe that it would be preferable not to put this expectation into legislation. This reflects the point I have already made: that the Bank of England should be required to provide final reports with the more detailed assessments only at the appropriate moment. While the Government do expect, as I have said, the Bank of England to be in the position to report soon after the end of the resolution process, this cannot always be guaranteed. For example, in the case of selling a firm, it may not have been possible in all cases to complete the full post-resolution independent valuation process within three months of a sale. I believe the Government’s approach still captures the intent of the noble Lord’s amendment, which is to ensure that full reports following the conclusion of a resolution process are presented expediently, with some discretion for the Treasury to ensure that reports are still provided only at the right moment.
I hope that, taken together, the Government’s amendments address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and the content of reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the specific additional point raised by the noble Lord’s Amendment 9, I agree of course with his intention and I will be happy to update the code of practice to this effect. However, the Government believe it would be preferable not to put this into legislation. I would be happy to consider this matter further and discuss it with my honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, but I cannot give any firm additional commitments at this stage.
Turning to government Amendment 10, on notifying Parliament when using the power, I note that both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the Government tabled similar amendments on the theme of parliamentary scrutiny. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this issue and for her engagement on the matter; I am especially grateful to her for agreeing to withdraw her original amendment. The Government’s amendment reflects the point made by noble Lords in Grand Committee concerning parliamentary notification and the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House as a result of passing the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.
Building on that innovation in parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, the Government’s amendment seeks to harness the role played by that committee, as well as the Treasury Select Committee. It requires the Bank of England to notify the chairs of both committees as soon as reasonably practicable after the new mechanism under the Bill has been used. It includes provisions to future-proof this requirement following use of the new mechanism, such that if the names or functions of those committees change, the requirement for the Bank of England to notify the relevant committees by which those functions are exercisable would still stand.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has rightly argued that the Government’s amendment requires some tweaking, in particular to refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee in the House of Lords by name. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention, and I note her amendments to the Government’s amendment—Amendments 11, 12 and 13—which attempt to address this point. I am of course very happy to agree to those amendments being made.
I hope that the Government’s approach across all the issues debated in this group demonstrates that the issue of accountability to Parliament is being taken seriously, ensuring that there will be transparency in use of the new mechanism. In particular, I hope that the Government’s amendments on the new reporting requirements address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and content of the reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the basis of these points, I hope noble Lords will be able to support both the Government’s amendments and those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and the Minister for his constructive approach to it. I take on board everything he said about Amendment 5, which is why, as I have already indicated, I do not intend to push it to a vote.
However, I take issue with the Minister’s thinking it is appropriate that the relative costs of the recapitalisation process versus the insolvency process are looked at only after the event, at the very end of the process. It is quite important that we see why the Bank made decision it made at the time it made it, and that it has not reverse-engineered the results and facts to justify what it did. So I am not totally sure that I fully agree with the Minister on that point. Be that as it may, I am not going to push Amendment 5, because Amendment 8, along with the code of practice, covers most of what is needed.
However, as to Amendment 9, I am afraid that I did not hear anything particularly new there. The Minister has confirmed that his intention is that the reporting should cover the final result of the resolution process, which, as I say, could be a number of years later—but that is not what government amendment 8 says. The amendment specifically refers to
“the exercise of the power to”
recapitalise and
“the stabilisation power and stabilisation option to which”
it
“relates”.
It does not refer anywhere to what happens at the end. It is all very well saying that it might go in the code of practice and that there is an expectation that this will happen, but this is a really important issue.
We must know what actually happened, to be able to see how that compares with what we were told was going to happen, and to be able to learn the lessons arising from that. With the best will in the world, it may not be the Minister who is at the Treasury whenever this is used. I absolutely believe and trust that he would do exactly the right thing, but whoever comes next might not. It is important that this is in the Bill.
I am afraid that I intend to divide the House when the time comes, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have Amendment 16 in this group and added my name to Amendment 7, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, just spoke. As she indicated, the two amendments are related in that the imposition of unnecessary costs, which is the target of my Amendment 16, will do nothing to help the financial sector grow, be competitive or, indeed, support the real economy.
I fully supported the growth and competitiveness objectives introduced for the PRA and the FCA in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and I am very glad that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given her support to those. But I hope that the Government will want to go further and make all regulators, and indeed all other public sector bodies, pay attention to growth and competitiveness. Extending this to other organisations is important, particularly in the financial services universe, as they were not included within the competitiveness and growth objective in the 2023 Act.
One of those omitted at that time—perhaps we should have spotted it during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act—was the Bank of England in its capacity as a resolution authority. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has had to confine her amendment to the use of the bank recapitalisation power because of the Long Title of the Bill. But the competitiveness and growth objective ought to apply to the Bank as the resolution authority in toto, not simply when it exercises the new bank recapitalisation power but also when, for example, it is setting MREL levels.
My Amendment 16 adds a special resolution objective to the seven already listed in Section 4 of the Banking Act 2009, and it requires the Bank to consider the minimisation of costs borne by the financial sector when the recapitalisation power is used. It is not an absolute requirement, as it would be just one of eight objectives, and it is for the Bank to determine, under the 2009 Act, how to balance those various objectives.
When it is using the power, the Bank is playing with other people’s money. Ultimately, it is the money of those of us who are customers of the banks, because at the end of the day the money that flows through the banks will end up being borne by customers, and it is only right that the Bank should have regard to the minimisation of costs that are ultimately borne by the banks’ customers.
In Committee I tabled an amendment that focused on the costs being borne through the FSCS not exceeding the counterfactual of the bank insolvency procedure to which the Bank should be paying regard in any event. My amendment today is a less complex test and is simply designed to act as a reminder to the Bank that it should treat other people’s money as carefully as it treats its own. If it does that, it should also help to keep the sector competitive and to help it grow. I hope that the Minister will agree that this amendment is right in principle and that it responds to a number of concerns expressed by several respondents during the consultation on the power over the last year or so.
My Lords, I support both the amendments in the names of the two noble Baronesses who have just spoken. I probably have a slight preference for Amendment 16 on the expenses—it is more direct—but we need something in the Bill that reminds the Bank of England that it is spending other people’s money, and that it needs to do that carefully and with care. These amendments are aimed primarily at that end, so I support them both.
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 7 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Noakes and Lady Vere, but I am not as minded to support Amendment 16 for the following reasons. Some in this House will know that I dislike intensely the competitiveness and growth objective that has been attached to the PRA and the FCA. If you were going to set out a pattern to repeat the crash of 2007-08, those two objectives would be essential paving stones on that route, so I do not look to attach that particular amendment to the Bank of England in its overall resolution role in, for example, setting MREL. It should be setting MREL to reduce risk, not to follow the lowest common denominator in the international banking arena.
Ironically, if you take the growth and competitiveness secondary objective and just apply it to recapitalisation, it turns on its head and becomes a risk-reduction tool, because it basically limits the ability of the collapse of one bank to then infect all the other banks within the system. That seems to me to be a risk-reduction strategy, so I am very much in favour of the way in which it has been crafted under Amendment 7. I say that to reassure others in this House who may be afraid that playing fast and loose with the competitiveness and growth agenda is always a risk-increasing agenda rather than a risk-reduction agenda. In this narrow role, it works in the opposite direction.
My Lords, I have had the opportunity to consider further, based on the discussions that we have had. The Minister made some helpful commitments to discuss the matter further with his boss back at the Treasury and that the issue would be covered in the code of conduct going forward. On that basis, I will not press my amendment.
My Lords, we come to the end of this process; I am sure everyone will be relieved. I rise to speak to my Amendment 15, which is a somewhat technical and perhaps even slightly nerdy amendment, but it deals with an important wrinkle within this Bill.
When a failing bank is recapitalised under this Bill, the money is paid, by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, partly to the Bank of England to cover the costs of the Bank and other parties, and the rest is then injected, as equity, into the failing bank by the Bank of England. In the case of the Bank putting the failing institution into a bridge bank, the recapitalisation is intended to cover the likely costs of the bridge bank for a full year. This has some quite important unintended consequences.
To give a simple example, if it is expected that the bridge bank will be sold quickly, but this does not happen for some reason, and, shortly afterwards, the Bank of England decides to put it into insolvency, it would still have a year’s worth of Financial Services Compensation Scheme money injected into it. We could then have a situation where that money gets used to pay off the liabilities of the bridge bank; these would be liabilities that, had it gone into insolvency in the first place, would not, and should not, have been paid.
This has two consequences. First, creditors who would otherwise have received nothing may get paid out just because of the recapitalisation. That is not the intention of this Bill, but it is the consequence. Secondly, it becomes highly unlikely, if not impossible, that the FSCS could ever recover any of its money in such a situation; it would be last in line to receive the money, after everyone else has been paid off, because its money would have been turned into the equity of the bank. Again, that does not feel right.
Clause 2 sets out that the Bank of England must reimburse any part of any recapitalisation payment that is not needed to cover the costs and expenses of the resolution. However, what I have just explained means that in reality Clause 2 is, in effect, redundant. There is no realistic chance, as it is structured, that any money could ever be recovered for the FSCS. It would go to pay off the creditors who should not otherwise have been paid off.
My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, seeks to give the Financial Services Compensation Scheme rights with respect to the recapitalisation payment, in the event that the firm in resolution is subsequently placed into insolvency or wound up, by then requiring it to be treated as a debt. It also seeks to grant the Financial Services Compensation Scheme super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy with respect to that debt, enabling it to recover that claim in an insolvency process before other unsecured creditors, uncovered depositors and shareholders.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for the constructive engagement that I have had with him on this matter prior to this debate, and I am especially grateful for his time and expertise on it. I assure him that my officials and I have spent considerable time considering the concerns that he raises, and I shall set out the Government’s position.
The Government’s concern about the amendment is that it could frustrate the primary intention of the Bill to achieve recapitalisation in a way that restores financial stability and, as such, could potentially result in the resolution failing. The Government’s view is that the amendment could create uncertainty as to how such a payment would be perceived by the market when a firm was operating, rather than only in the unlikely circumstance of the firm winding up.
The effect of the amendment would be to create a shadow claim on the recapitalisation. Potential purchasers, investors and unsecured lenders to the firm would be aware that in the event of insolvency a new debt would materialise above them in the creditor hierarchy. Indeed, the shadow claim would follow the firm in perpetuity for as long as it was a going concern, even after the resolution was complete and the firm had been sold to a buyer.
It would also follow the firm even where the original shareholders and creditors were no longer involved with the business, creating a series of risks. That raises a number of potential issues. First, it could inhibit the sale of the firm in resolution. While the insolvency position would not be a primary consideration for potential buyers, it would naturally be part of the potential purchaser’s due diligence to understand the risk to its investment in a subsequent failure. That risk may be substantially greater with the existence of this debt, which may in turn impact potential interest in purchasing the firm and any purchase price.
Secondly, both while the firm was in the bridge bank and once it had been sold, current and potential future creditors and investors in the firm could be deterred from investing in and engaging with the firm for similar reasons. That would frustrate a key goal of the resolution, which is to maintain continuity. For example, uncovered depositors would have an additional incentive to withdraw deposits as they may perceive a potential risk to the seniority of their claim in insolvency. Thirdly, it could potentially undermine restoring market confidence in the resolved firm.
As a result of the issues that I have outlined, the amendment could make it more expensive to run the firm, putting it at a competitive disadvantage. It may perpetuate the circumstances that the resolution is intended to address; namely, uncertainty around how and to whom potential future losses would fall. It may also make it difficult to secure the agreement of directors, who may not be comfortable running a firm under such a shadow while it was in a bridge bank.
In addition, existing legislation means that instruments may currently be classified only as common equity tier 1, the highest form of capital, if they are not subject to any arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that enhances the seniority of claims in insolvency or liquidation. The noble Lord’s amendment would mean that a capital injection arising from a recapitalisation payment under the Bill may not count as the highest form of capital, as it creates a seniorised claim for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the event of a subsequent insolvency. That brings into doubt whether it would have the desired effect of restoring market confidence in the firm.
Overall, the effect of granting the Financial Services Compensation Scheme a super-preferred claim over the recapitalisation payment, even if only at the point of insolvency, would be to increase the risk of the resolution not achieving its objectives. Therefore, while the Government absolutely understand the noble Lord’s concerns, we have concluded, for the reasons I have outlined, that the amendment may end up doing more harm than good.
I appreciate that this is a matter that the noble Lord feels extremely strongly about, but I hope this explanation has provided some clarity over the risks attached to the amendment and that as a result he feels able to withdraw it.
My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this short debate. It is a fairly nerdy and technical subject, and the Minister has just described very well why it is a complicated situation. I am sorry that he was unable to say that the Government would keep it under review —to keep an eye on the situation—because there is a problem. This process could lead to creditors being preferred unreasonably over the FSCS money in some circumstances, and that is not desirable. It comes back to some of the moral hazard points that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, made earlier as well, albeit in a different context, so I am sorry that the Minister was unable to say anything on that front.
I agree with the Minister that it is complicated and that there probably are unintended consequences to my amendment. I again urge him to keep this under review and to look at whether anything might be done on it under the code of conduct. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe answer to the noble Lord’s question is no, because the assumptions underlying that report are incorrect. We expect that a large number of private schools will take steps to absorb a significant proportion of this VAT liability, so the majority of that fee will not be passed through.
My Lords, 3,000 military families take advantage of the continuing education allowance and send their children to private school. In previous answers, the Minister has said that no decision will be taken on how the impact of the VAT rise will be dealt with for those families until the spending review. The Armed Forces are facing a retention crisis, as is well known. Why does the Minister think that leaving those families with this level of uncertainty is going to help with that retention?
The core answer to the noble Lord’s question is that very many private schools will take steps to absorb a proportion, if not all, of the new VAT liability, so there may actually be no increase in fees in such circumstances, which is why it is right that we leave it until the spending review. It is worth pointing out that very many military personnel send their children to state schools and want them to benefit from the improvements that will happen in those schools.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, very briefly, I support the noble Baroness’s amendments. Perhaps I would say that as a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—as one of the majority of us in this Room, I should say, who are members of that committee.
I see this as working closely alongside the reporting amendments that we discussed on Thursday. When we were talking about the reporting requirements the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, mentioned that it is all very well issuing reports, but not if there is no one to read them. This gives us somebody to read them. It is a fairly light-touch requirement: it is an obligation to notify but does not give any obligation on anybody to do anything with it, unless they feel they need to and that it is important. I hope that this simple measure, alongside the reporting discussions we had last week, will be something that the Minister is minded to accept.
My Lords, perhaps I might suggest that it would be wise of the Minister, if I may be so bold, to look warmly on the amendment. Discussions around the accountability issue were a persistent theme in the debates on what is now the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and led as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, to the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House, charged with the responsibility for maintaining parliamentary accountability of financial services regulators. I can assure him that if the Treasury does not accept this amendment, he will become weary of the number of times that it will come back again and again—the reason being simply that the committee feels strongly that its role is now a crucial part of the regulatory framework in the UK and that the reports to the committee effectively establish the groundwork of its role in pursuing the accountability agenda.
My Lords, this amendment is simply intended to try to obtain some clarification on how a recapitalisation payment that has been made by the FSCS to the Bank of England will be treated if the failing bank eventually gets into insolvency. This could occur if the bank is transferred to a bridge bank, the buyer is not found and the bank’s financial situation does not improve. There is a two-year deadline for the bridge bank although that can be extended in certain circumstances but, eventually, the process can end up with the bank being wound up.
If that happens, the recapitalisation payments should be treated as a debt of the bank and should rank ahead of all other liabilities, debts or other claims other than the fees of the official receiver when it comes to distributing any value that might be left in an insolvency situation. This is related to other discussions that we have already had and partially to Amendment 23, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which we will debate later.
The principle should be that the shareholders, lenders and other creditors should not be put in a better position as a result of the recapitalisation. To put it another way, the industry-funded compensation scheme should not, in effect, be bailing out the losses of shareholders and creditors other than the depositors who will be compensated under the scheme should their deposits be lost in the insolvency. However, that is not clear in the proposed Bill, although it is entirely possible that I have missed something in the interplay between the various Acts that apply here. I would therefore be most grateful if the Minister could explain exactly how the amount provided by the FSCS would be treated in such a situation. It might most easily and clearly be dealt with by including it in the worked example that the Minister agreed to consider providing during our discussions on Amendment 1 on Thursday.
I should say that I suspect that my amendment as it is currently drafted probably does not work, and that it may require some changes to be made to insolvency legislation to work properly if there is an issue. Rather than worrying about the specifics of the amendment, I hope that the noble Lord will concentrate on the principle and explain how the recapitalisation payment would be treated in an insolvency process, as it stands, in particular in making sure that it does not advantage shareholders and lenders, and ideally point me to the relevant clauses of the relevant legislation. If I am right that the situation is unclear, we can sort the details out on Report. I beg to move.
I support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has put forward, and in particular the request for worked examples, preferably with numbers in, because the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are accountants and we like looking at numbers rather than words. Having read the proceedings of the first Committee day in Hansard, I realised that I did not know how some of these things work in practice, so I think that it is important to have those worked examples.
My Lords, I am about to write to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on the matter that he raises in his Amendment 17, following a commitment that I gave on the first day in Committee. I will also happily reflect any points raised in this debate in that letter, if helpful. In the meantime, I will set out some of the content of that letter, while providing some additional clarity on the points he raises. Again, I hear the request for worked examples that we discussed on day one.
The Bill extends the role of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to include providing funds at the Bank of England’s request, which the Bank of England could then use to recapitalise the firm in question. As I have set out previously, the intention would be to achieve that recapitalisation by injecting equity into the failed firm, helping to restore it to viability. In the event that the Bank of England places the failed firm into a bridge bank, the Bank of England would become the sole shareholder for that bridge bank.
It is therefore possible that the Bank of England would receive recoveries in a subsequent winding-up of the bridge bank if all other claims were met, reflecting its position in the creditor hierarchy as a shareholder. The Bill provides for any such recoveries to be returned to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The Government consider this to be an appropriate method for dealing with funds used in a resolution and in keeping with the existing principles of the creditor hierarchy. I note four further important points.
First, by ensuring an injection of equity, it achieves the core purpose of the new mechanism, which is to restore the firm to solvency. By contrast, if such a payment were classified as debt—even if that had a more favourable ranking in the creditor hierarchy— there is a risk that it would not restore the firm to the necessary level of balance-sheet health.
Secondly, I note that the primary intention in deploying resolution tools using the new mechanism would be to sell the firm. It is therefore the Government’s expectation that a sale should be the outcome in the majority of cases, rather than placing the firm into insolvency and winding it up from a bridge bank.
Thirdly, I point out that, if the firm entered insolvency from a bridge bank and there were still eligible depositors, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would pay compensation to those depositors and take on their position in the creditor hierarchy, as it usually does. That of course is the right approach, ensuring depositors maintain their super-preferred status in an insolvency. It is important to note that changes to the creditor hierarchy must be considered carefully to ensure there is clarity for investors and market participants as to how they would be treated in a failure scenario. Treating the funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme as a debt only at the point of winding up the firm, and not prior to that, might create uncertainty as to its interaction with insolvency law more broadly.
Finally, I note that the super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme currently enjoys in insolvency reflects a different set of objectives. In those circumstances, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is standing in the shoes of depositors and that preferred status is seeking to protect depositors’ interests. That is different to the intent of the mechanism delivered by the Bill, which is to provide a source of resolution funding to recapitalise a failing firm.
I appreciate the Committee’s interest in what is a technical but important matter. I hope that I have been able to clarify the intent of the Bill and that the noble Lord is able to withdraw his amendment as a result.
I understand what the Minister says about the equity of the original shareholders being effectively written down to zero, but what happens with, for example, lenders who are transferred into the bridge bank? It cannot be right that they probably lose everything in the event of an insolvency situation, but if the FSCS, via the Bank of England, has injected a load of money into the failing bank and it then goes into insolvency, there is more money there and therefore those lenders will receive a share of their cash, if there is enough, which they would have lost in an insolvency situation. However, the FSCS gets nothing back because there is nothing to recoup as it has gone to the lenders. In effect, in certain circumstances the lenders to the failing bank may be bailed out by the FSCS through the Bank of England. That does not seem right to me. Those lenders took a risk in the first instance that was not predicated on being bailed out. I think there is something here that needs to be followed up. Have I got that right?
In the letter I will write, we will set out exactly what would happen in the example that the noble Lord gives.
I thank the Minister for that explanation and look forward to receiving the letter with the details and, I hope, a detailed worked example. However, an issue remains. The principle must be that a recapitalisation of the bank by the FSCS will not, in effect, bail out the existing shareholders—which it seems it does not do—or existing creditors, with the exception of the depositors, who are protected separately. There is something that needs looking at quite carefully here. I think we will come back to this on Report, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I have mixed feelings about this amendment. I am grateful for the comments of the noble Baroness on why it was an objective; I understand that. Very definitely, the costs should not be disproportionately larger, but, if it was a relatively small amount larger than an insolvency and there was a good public interest case, I would not want to bar it. I am not quite sure whether the words used and having it as an objective necessarily convey that; if we were to proceed further with it, we could somehow make it a little more explicit in that regard. It needs to be in the same order of magnitude, not hugely more. With that caveat, I am probably in the same position as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
I was not going to speak on this amendment, but I am also slightly in two minds. One hesitation is that it is very hard to know on the day you do the recapitalisation payment what the cost of an insolvency situation would be. However, I understand where the noble Baroness is heading with this, and there is a lot of sense in the sentiment behind it. This gives more ammunition to the question around reporting—we need the Bank of England to give a very clear explanation as to why it has chosen recapitalisation over insolvency. That might be my preferred way of going about it, but I understand absolutely what the noble Baroness said and support the sentiment behind it.
I also support the sentiment in the amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I think all noble Lords here, including the Minister, would agree that this has the right intention but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned, there will be edge cases which we cannot foresee at this time. The question is: should such a statement of intent be in the special resolution objectives and, if not, where should it go? I do not know—perhaps in a code of practice, or perhaps not. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, on this amendment I agree with every word that the noble Baroness has just said. Like most noble Lords, I have an inherent preference that things should appear in a Bill, rather than relying on slightly woolly statements of Ministers that this is what they intend to do. There are circumstances when that is appropriate but in a case like this, where the code will be so important, there should be an obligation that the code is updated to take account of the recapitalisation process.
To repeat what I said on Thursday, and what the noble Baroness has said, it is deeply unsatisfactory that the Minister seems to be relying on the existence of the code and its updating to avoid detailed amendments being put down on Report and pushed through. If that is the case, it is surely important that we get a chance to look at the revised code before then, or at least a draft of it—or, at the very least, clear details of what Ministers are expecting to include in it. I urge the noble Lord to see what we can do to achieve that. Otherwise, he will face detailed amendments to deal with the issues that we have discussed, because we have nothing else on which to base our position.
I agree with what both previous noble Lords have said. We cannot rely just on the fact that something is going to be revised. It is the same old problem that we have with primary legislation a lot of the time: it lays out something that could be good or bad, but it says, “Trust me, we will get it right when we come to secondary legislation or something else down the track”. That is not satisfactory and, in the absence of some more detail, we have to see something about the code of practice or similar—whatever one calls it—in the Bill, just to make sure that there is an understanding of the direction of travel for the sort of detail that we are asking about.
My Lords, I will be brief. The noble Baroness raises some important issues in her amendment. I think the Minister confirmed earlier that shareholders would disappear because the Bank of England would take over their share capital, so they could not benefit from the use of the recapitalisation, but if there is any suggestion that the recapitalisation amount will excuse the bail in of some of the bail-inable liabilities, that would be pretty unacceptable. I hope that the worked examples that I hope the Treasury will enjoy working on while we are on Recess can illuminate how all this is going to work.
My Lords, I find my head spinning a little about some of this. It comes back to the confusion about how the various flows here work, so that worked example is becoming more and more crucial. I come back to the principle that I raised before: recapitalisation by the industry should not bail out those who should be at risk in the case of a failure. MREL capital et cetera must surely be used up first before we take recourse to the industry. It is similar to, but slightly different from, the point we made in Amendment 17 that, again, people who are creditors of the failing bank should not be bailed out by the recapitalisation in the event that it all goes wrong. It seems rather confused, so I look forward to the worked example, and I wish the Minister good luck with getting something that covers all the aspects.
The noble Lord has just confirmed the point that we talked about in Amendment 17, that there are situations where the use of the recapitalisation payment can, in effect, bail out some types of creditors. Indeed, he referred to unprotected deposits as being one area that might make sense. This is quite complex and I suspect that when we have seen the worked examples and so on, there is going to be more to discuss. Would he be prepared to meet with officials and Members of the Committee to go through these things prior to Report, so that we can make sure that we all really understand in what circumstances that that could happen and in what circumstances it cannot?
Yes, absolutely; I will very happily meet. I will write a letter setting this out in greater detail, provide the worked examples, and then perhaps we can meet on that basis.
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments, including my Amendment 10, probes the reasons for including all banks in the scope of the Bill, rather than just the smaller banks, as originally envisaged in the consultation that started in January. The first sentence of the consultation was very clear:
“This consultation sets out the government’s intention to enhance and keep up to date the UK’s Special Resolution Regime … providing a new mechanism to facilitate use of certain existing stabilisation powers to manage the failure of small banks”.
But, as we have heard, it is not restricted to small banks. Most of the amendments in this group would remove from the scope of the Bill those banks that are required to hold MREL and would be subject to bail-in procedures using those MREL resources. I think the number of separate but similar amendments that we seem to have is probably down to the fact that this all happened in recess, and we did not have the opportunity to get together. I am sure that if the Minister is not able to satisfy us, we will be able to coalesce around something in common.
It is worth quoting from paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes:
“This means taxpayers are exposed if a small bank failure is judged to require resolution action but the firm in question does not possess sufficient MREL resources to provide for recapitalisation, unlike larger banks that do possess these resources”.
If larger banks possess those resources, as they are required to do, why do we need them to be subject to the process envisaged by the Bill? The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, talked about the glide path situation where a bank has not quite got there—yes, I see that point—but for those that are there, does this not imply that we are not confident that the existing MREL scheme is sufficient? If there is a problem with the MREL scheme, surely it would be better to fix that rather than adding a new process on top of it.
So could the noble Lord please clarify under exactly which circumstances he sees the recapitalisation process in the Bill being used for a failing MREL bank? Is there a concern that the MREL resources are insufficient? Other than glide path situations, that is the only logical reason I can see to include big banks in the scope of the Bill.
Secondly, not having the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I do not really understand how the two processes would work together. Is this an either/or situation; is it either a bail-in using MREL resources or a recapitalisation? If that is the case, surely there is a risk that the industry would be required to fund the recapitalisation of banks with large balance sheets instead of the costs being borne by the failed bank’s shareholders and subordinated debt holders. That would create a potential moral hazard. Or is it a combined process where the MREL resources would be used first and, if insufficient, the recapitalisation would follow on top? If that is the case, it implies that there is a concern that the MREL funds are insufficient. The best way forward would be to fix that problem rather than add another process, as I said before.
So could the noble Lord please clearly explain how he sees the two processes working together? I am drawn to the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, of a worked example between now and Report to help us see how that could work. In particular, can he clearly confirm that the recapitalisation process can never be used to reduce the losses of a failing bank’s shareholders or creditors?
In the absence of a strong explanation of why, contrary to the originally stated intention, the scope of the Bill has been extended to larger banks, I would be minded to support amendments on Report that restrict its scope to exclude MREL banks.
My Lords, my Amendment 11 also—I think rather neatly—confines the Bill to what are defined as small banks. However, my concern is somewhat different from those voiced by noble Lords until now. It is that the whole approach to the resolution regime suggests that banks fail one at a time and not all together. Anyone who went through the experience of 2007 to 2009 knows that, in a systemic crisis, it is possible for all the banks in the country to be suffering major problems at the same time. In the circumstances of a systemic crisis, I fear that the mechanism proposed in the Bill could be a source of contagion, in the sense that the cost of the collapse of a bank, or of many banks together, would be seen by the market as imposing costs, which are now unbearable, on other parts of the banking sector.
This comes down to two issues—that of contagion and, I am afraid, that of persistent complacency. The Treasury and the Bank of England refuse to face up to the fact that, in the end, it is the taxpayer who will pay in a systemic crisis.
I will deal first with contagion. The levy links the financial failure of a bank or number of banks to the banking sector as a whole. Does this create a contagion effect? It must be remembered that much of contagion is created by the expectation of a cost, not just the reality. Expectation then becomes the parent of reality. It can reasonably be expected that the failure of a small bank would be manageable under the resolution regimes set out by the Bank of England and discussed in this Bill and its explanatory documents.
However, there are two fundamental problems where one could have significant contagion. One would be multiple failures, an issue I will address in a moment. The other is the potential failure of a big bank, because the Bill and the Explanatory Notes explicitly refer these mechanisms to big banks as well as small ones.
I will take the issue of the failure of multiple banks or a big bank. I wrote to the Financial Secretary about this and he very kindly wrote back a very valuable explanation. I presume that his letter has been circulated to the people who took part—no, I see that it has not. Well, I will quote a bit of it, because it seems to reveal the problem that I am identifying. He refers to multiple bank failures, but I would apply the same thing to a big bank failure. He says that there will be levies when the bank fails and adds:
“These levies are subject to an affordability cap”—
I did not know that—
“by the Prudential Regulation Authority based on how much the sector can safely be levied in a given year. This cap is currently set at £1.5 billion. If multiple firm failures resulting in a recapitalisation requirement is under £1.5 billion, the Government would expect the FSCS to borrow from its commercial borrowing facility and be able to safely levy from the banking sector and repay that commercial borrowing within 12 months. However, if the amount exceeds £1.5 billion, or if it is below £1.5 billion and the PRA has determined that the FSCS is unable to raise the levy on affordability grounds, the Government would expect levies to repay any borrowing from the National Loans Fund to be spread out over multiple years”.
But, no, you do not have multiple years in a systemic banking crisis; you have to operate now.
The cap of £1.5 billion is worth comparing with the measures that the Government had to take in 2007-08—Lloyds Bank, £20 billion and NatWest, £45 billion. So the failure of one of those banks could be somewhat above the affordability cap, as set out in the Financial Secretary’s letter to me. Indeed, today, those numbers could be multiplied by a factor of roughly five.
Even when MREL is taken into account, the £1.5 billion cap seems to me to expose the fact that this scheme is not applicable to large banks. For example, if we look at the largest MREL plus required capital, it is that of Barclays, which is 30% of risk weighted assets—the largest of all the major banks. That leaves 70% of risk weighted assets to which the taxpayer is exposed. There would not be a collapse of all of those, but there can be very large numbers very quickly. So the idea that with an affordability cap of £1.5 billion, one could handle the Lloyds Bank situation or the NatWest situation as the Government confronted them in 2007-08 is, it seems to me, fanciful.
This brings me to my final related point. There is a persistent reluctance in all the documents concerning the resolution regime to admit that the resolution of a large bank will always fall on the taxpayer. Given the need for the maintenance of confidence in the banking sector, this persistent reluctance and the pretence that MREL has eliminated the taxpayer from exposure is damaging to confidence. It would be valuable for the Purple Book to make clear that, in extremis, Bagehot’s rule comes into effect, the Bank lends without limit and the Treasury will step in to resolve those banks that are “too big to fail”. My amendment clears away a dangerous ambiguity in the Bill. The threat of multiple small failure will continue to exist, but it takes away the ambiguity that this could be involved in the resolution of a big bank in the circumstances of a systemic crisis similar to that which we have faced in the past.
Just to clarify, is there anything in the Bill that changes the effect on shareholders and creditors compared with if it had been done by just the bail-in approach?
I only need to say briefly that I am in agreement with the noble Baroness. This is drafted too widely. Part of me thinks that some of this should be covered by the ordinary banking levy, and that the PRA and the Bank of England have to manage their budget, as anybody else would have to, in expectation of sometimes having adverse effects, rather than there being some bottomless pit, or pool, of money into which they always have access. The truth of the matter might need to be somewhere half way in between, but it is too open at the moment.
My Lords, I briefly add my support to what the noble Baronesses have said. This is drafted extraordinarily widely. The words
“another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation”
could theoretically include the legal costs of the shareholders of the bank that is going bust, for example. We have to find some way of reducing that scope. I had attempted to deal with this in Amendment 12 on reporting, but having heard what the noble Baroness said I do not think that does it. We need to find some way of narrowing it.
I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment and I added my name to it. I am also grateful for the comments made by my noble friend Lord Moylan. He is not in his place but he raised this issue during Second Reading and set people thinking about it.
I do not have a huge amount to add. I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I would also say that this will have to be a double-edged attack. Not only must we potentially do something on this but the reporting of it will have to be clear and go into great detail.
When it comes to expenses, all noble Lords will be aware that the costs of financial lawyers and other professional financial advisers are not de minimis. The total cost of expenses may well exceed the cost of the recapitalisation of the bank, so it is important that we ensure that there are some guard-rails around this, recognising as ever that these costs will end up falling not on the banks but on the people who bank with the banks.
Does the Minister have any view as to roughly how large an expense bill might be? I do not even want to guess, because I hope that he will be able to give me some idea of what we are looking at.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, mentioned the expenses incurred by another person. I think that all noble Lords who have spoken so far agree that that is extraordinarily broad, and we will need to consider what we might do about that. Potentially, one could put something in the code of practice but, again, is that sufficient? We might also protect ourselves by requiring Treasury consent—who knows? Again, we might want to think about that. Going back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, it is tempting to think about these things as a single event, and we might be talking about £10 million-worth of expenses, but if a whole bunch of such events happened at the same time, we could very soon be talking about real money. We need to get to the bottom of this. I look forward to the comments from the Minister.
My Lords, it is me again, I am afraid. That is the trouble with getting enthusiastic about amendments during recess—you pay for it when you get back.
Amendment 3 is a probing amendment to find out the Government’s approach to using the recapitalisation power on more than one occasion. The amendment uses the technique of requiring the Treasury’s consent to the use of the recapitalisation power more than once in respect of the same financial institutions. My purpose in this amendment is not to debate the formal involvement of the Treasury, as I will return to that broader topic in a later group. I am using the amendment as a technique to find out whether there are any constraints at all on the use of the recapitalisation power on multiple occasions.
When the Bank of England decides to use the recapitalisation power, it works out what sum of money it needs to put the bank in a position where it can be sold on. We discussed in our debate on the previous amendment the kinds of expense that can count as recapitalisation costs for the purposes of the power. My own view is that the Bank must try at the outset to reach as clear a view as possible on the amount of the whole that the recapitalisation payment is designed to fill because, if the Bank does not do that properly at the outset—making a good, honest assessment of what the total cost will be—it cannot reach a realistic judgment about whether to proceed with a bridge bank or to initiate an insolvency process.
So I find it disturbing that the drafting of new Section 214E seems to allow the Bank to double-dip into the FSCS without any other process or consideration. If the Bank runs out of recapitalisation cover, it probably means that it did its sums wrong in the first place or that additional facts have emerged, increasing the costs in ways that were not anticipated at the outset. In either event, that can call into question whether the initial decision to use the bridge bank instead of the bank insolvency procedure was the correct one. It may also raise the question of whether the bridge bank strategy should be continued or replaced with the bank insolvency procedure.
It also brings into question the nature of the additional hole in the finances of the failed bank, which is covered in part in the previous amendment. It may not be clear that the incentives are in the right place for the correct judgments to be made about whether any additional costs arising from regulatory action or litigation should be accepted or challenged. If the costs are down to PRA action, there are clear conflicts of interest involved.
I completely understand the need for flexibility in legislation. I hope that the Minister will also appreciate that the open-ended nature of the Bank’s powers in the use of the recapitalisation payment technique carries particular problems when a second or subsequent attempt is made to obtain a recapitalisation payment. I hope that the Minister can explain how the Government see this power being used, if it is to be used more than once, and whether—including to what extent—there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the way in which the Bank uses that power is fair to the banking sector.
The Bill makes the banking sector pick up the costs. The sector itself will probably have had no involvement whatever in the failure of a bank yet it has to pick up the tab, ultimately borne by its own customers; that is whenever the Bank decides to use the recapitalisation powers. So it is only fair and reasonable that there should be some checks and balances in return. I hope the Minister can reassure the Committee that there are checks and balances and that, when the Bank uses the power in what has to be quite an unusual situation—for example, it has got the sums wrong or something else has caused a requirement for more to be put in—it raises the need for additional safeguards in order to satisfy the banking sector that the costs that will be loaded on to it are reasonable.
I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise again briefly. The noble Baroness has made some really important points. Once again, I have attempted to deal with this as a reporting question in Amendment 12, which states that a report would be required each time a recapitalisation payment was made; that should stand anyway.
This can become quite significant if, for example, there is a situation where the Bank of England expects to be able to sell a bank immediately but that falls over and then goes into a bridge bank for two years—or, indeed, more—and picks up all those costs along the way. One can see a situation where you could have, for example, an annual payment covering the costs of the bank until the Bank eventually decides to put it into insolvency. The critical factor must be that, any time a recapitalisation payment is being considered, whether it is the first one or a subsequent one, the insolvency route is reconsidered at each point and this does not become an open-ended default drag on costs—but the reporting point, which we will come on to later, stands as well.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made a good point. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said.
I raised double-dipping at Second Reading and got the answer, “Well, yes, you could double-dip”. Of course, if you go from thinking that you are going to do the bridge bank or whatever to having to move into insolvency, there will be another dip if there are deposits to cover; I have a later amendment on that but it is all part of the same conversation. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, knows a lot more about this than I do because he is an accountant, but things always get worse than you expect. How is the Bank going to deal with that? Initially, it is probably going to have to ask for more than it thinks it could possibly ever need.
Some kind of structure around this, with points at which it is revisited and good reporting, appears to be the only solution. I initially thought, “Yes, maybe HMT intervention is the solution”, but I take the point that the Minister made earlier on about HMT intervention and independence. The fact is that, really, they are all in it as a club taking the decisions together already, so I am not sure that that would necessarily be the decisive factor one would want. It is about what the procedures are; the way things are being done and being understood; and how the reviews and reporting happen so that, when the worst happens and another dip comes along, one is not totally taken by surprise.
My Lords, I note that this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is one of several concerning whether Treasury consent is needed when the Bank of England is exercising its powers—in this case, when the mechanism is used more than once for a particular institution.
Addressing the specific case of the amendment, although I think we can agree that it would usually be desirable to have to use the mechanism only once in respect of a particular institution, this may not always be the case. As an example, if a failed bank is transferred to a bridge bank, there is a risk of further deterioration in its balance sheet over time. It is foreseeable that, if that were the case, the Bank of England may need to use the mechanism again in order to recapitalise the institution; this would allow the Bank of England to maintain confidence in the firm, promoting financial stability.
The Government believe that it is important for the Bank of England to have reasonable flexibility to do so, reflecting that the full implications of a bank failure are hard to anticipate in advance. In addition, if further approvals are required, this may undermine market confidence in the original resolution action given that such approvals cannot be presumed in advance.
However, I note a few important pieces of context to this broader position. First, as required by statute, the Treasury is always consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions assessment. In practice, there is also frequent and ongoing dialogue between the authorities. Therefore, the Government are confident that there are proper and robust channels by which it could raise concerns if it had any.
Secondly, given that the new mechanism is ultimately funded by industry, we would expect the Bank of England to consult the Prudential Regulation Authority on any additional request to use the new mechanism. This is important as the Prudential Regulation Authority determines what is considered affordable to be levied on the sector in any given year.
Finally, if additional use of the mechanism had implications for public funds, such as requiring use of the National Loans Fund, provision of this additional funding would be subject to Treasury consent. Overall, the Government believe that this strikes the right balance in preserving the Bank of England’s freedom of action while ensuring the appropriate level of Treasury input into decision-making.
I hope that this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and respectfully ask that she withdraw her amendment.
The one thing the Minister did not cover there was the question of whether, on a second or subsequent recapitalisation payment, the Bank would have to look again at whether the insolvency route is the one it should go down, rather than a secondary payment.
It would always look at the situation at the time and make each individual decision on that basis.
My Lords, this is another probing amendment. In this, I want to probe the circumstances in which the Treasury believes it would be appropriate for the UK banking industry to stump up for the recapitalisation of a foreign-owned bank. This amendment uses the technique of Treasury consent, as some of my other amendments do, but this is not what I am trying to talk about in this amendment. I am trying to probe the substance of using the recapitalisation power for the subsidiary of a foreign company.
Of course, I know that SVB UK was a foreign-owned bank and the simple answer to my question might be that this gives the Bank another way of avoiding what happened in that case: SVB was gifted to HSBC with the additional present of permanent exemptions from the ring-fencing regime. If we accept that we should avoid being held over a barrel by HSBC in future, this would be a good use of the power. So can the Minister say whether, if presented with the same facts as those relating to SVB UK, the Bank would have preferred to recapitalise SVB via a bridge bank and then sell it on a timescale consistent with achieving better value for money from the UK? The heavens are opening as we are discussing these important things.
More broadly, is it not the case that the Bank should satisfy itself that the foreign subsidiary banks are either adequately capitalised in their own right or parts of groups that are expected to be resolvable via bail-in-able capital, in line with international expectations? In general, the regulatory system for banks following a financial crash is designed to ensure that they hold capital or bail-in liabilities, which avoids the need for extraordinary support. When a UK bank subsidiary of a foreign company fails and requires money to keep it going, there has been at least a prima facie case that there has been some element of regulatory failure, either in the UK or elsewhere. There should not be an expectation that the failure of a foreign bank would impose costs on the UK banking sector—nor, indeed, the UK taxpayer, if that is the alternative.
It would be helpful if the Minister could explain in what circumstances the Government would consider it appropriate for the Bank to use the recapitalisation power in relation to foreign-owned banks and, perhaps more importantly, when the Government would not consider it appropriate to use the power. Can he also say whether any of this is likely to be covered in the code of practice? I beg to move.
My Lords, this weather sounds like the reason I ended up tabling a load of amendments in south-west Scotland: I had nothing better to do for a few days.
Again, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raises a really important point. I have tried to attack it in a different way in Amendment 16, where I look at the recovery of money from shareholders. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I had in mind the sort of scenario where a foreign company sets up a bank in the UK, it does not go very well and it decides just to walk away from it, having perhaps removed all the assets in the meantime. Clearly, it does not seem fair that the costs of sorting that out should fall on the industry or, indeed, the British taxpayer. It would be really interesting to understand how we can ensure that foreign shareholders behave properly and how, when it does go wrong, we can recoup the money from them.
My Lords, I am somewhat puzzled by the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this case. Surely, under the Basel accord, the UK regulator is responsible for the regulation of a subsidiary that is legally established in the UK. If “subsidiary” were changed to “branch”, the foreign regulator would indeed be responsible for regulation in that case. It seems to me that this particular amendment would violate the Basel accord to which His Majesty’s Government are committed.
My Lords, Amendment 9 deals with moral hazards, which, if anything, are multiplying. The amendment seeks to restrain excessive risk-taking by imposing possible personal penalties on bank directors.
The recent legal developments have actually multiplied financial moral hazards and the related risks. For example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 reintroduced the secondary regulatory objective to promote the growth and international competitiveness of the finance industry. In effect, it dilutes the regulator’s remit to protect customers. On 12 August, the Chancellor said that she and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury were constantly asking regulators, “What are you doing in practice to meet that secondary objective?” The meeting of that secondary objective will necessarily increase moral hazards.
Secondly, further deregulation is coming in—reforms of Solvency II, for example—with the claim that this will somehow conjure up an additional £100 billion of investment by reducing capital requirements. There is no pot of gold sitting in a corner in any bank boardroom that people can simply empty and get £100 billion out of. All of that is underpinning bank resilience and insurance company resilience. All of that is invested in some safety buffers. All of that will have to be liquidated. Yet the consequences for how the directors might behave have not really been outlined.
The cap on bankers’ bonuses has been lifted, so there are now economic incentives for bank directors to be reckless and take excessive risks, as that would maximise executive pay and bonuses—all done in the full knowledge that the bank would be rescued, restructured, recapitalised or bailed out, be it through the mechanism of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme or, eventually, some reconstruction. There are no great pressure points on bank directors to be risk-averse and prudent or to act in a responsible manner.
The risk-boosting effects of moral hazards are ignored by this Bill, yet they are highly relevant to any form of stability. We have a whole history showing how this happens. In the 2007-08 banking crash, attention was drawn to moral hazards or conflicts of interest between the interests of shareholders and managers, debt holders and the public purse. Bank directors took on excessive leverage because the state incentivised them to do so. It continues to incentivise them to do so, for example by giving tax relief on interest payments, which reduces both the cost of debt and the weighted average cost of capital while increasing shareholder returns, providing a justification for greater executive bonuses and remuneration.
Numerous studies have shown that shareholders were, and remain, focused on short-term returns. In any case, they still do not get good-enough information to invigilate directors; perhaps at some point, when we are discussing the world of accounting, I will point out how almost useless company accounts are in enabling shareholders or anybody else to invigilate directors. Back at the time of the last crash, directors accepted excessive risks from not only financing the organisation but risky investments. For example, numerous varieties of derivatives and complex financial bets were made because of explicit guarantees about depositor protection, central banks providing liquidity and support, and, ultimately, publicly funded bailouts.
If the bets made with other people’s money paid off, directors got mega payoffs; if they did not, somebody else picked up the loss, leading ultimately to rescue bailouts—now we are using the term “recapitalisation”. This Bill adds another string to publicly funded bailouts—though it likes to use different language. Yes, the cost of the FSCS levies is borne ultimately by the people, as has already been pointed out, and not necessarily by other banks.
If the Government succeed in persuading the banks to lend more to facilitate additional investment, as they are trying to do, that will add to the risks and strain the capital adequacy requirements of those banks. In boom times, banks tend to lend more freely, because they do not want to miss out on the opportunity to make more profits, and they relax credit standards, but there are inevitably consequences, as we saw with the last crash. Directors are rarely held personally liable, and that remains the position today.
Amendment 9 would address this gap by requiring the Bank of England and the scheme managers to consider a clawback of directors’ pay and bonuses paid during the previous 12 months. In case the Minister might refer to other clawback arrangements, let me pre-empt those. Paragraph 37 of the UK Corporate Governance Code states:
“Remuneration schemes … should include … provisions that would enable the company to recover and/or withhold sums or share awards and specify the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so”.
That is of no help whatever, because such codes do not apply to large private companies, of which Wyelands Bank, which came to an end recently, is a good example. The codes are also voluntary and cannot be enforced in the courts. They do not empower stakeholders in any way; they do not require the clawed-back amounts to be handed to regulators or to be used for recapitalisation of banks.
The FCA handbook also has a section on possible clawback, but it applies to what it calls “variable remuneration”, which is generally taken to mean bonuses. It states that in certain circumstances the clawed-back funds need to be handed back to the institution. This does not cover entire remuneration; it does not require that the clawed-back amounts be used for the recapitalisation and reconstitution of banks. So, in the interests of clarity and certainty, a statutory approach to clawbacks is needed, not a mishmash of voluntary arrangements. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 16, which would do a certain amount of what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, would do, but in a slightly different way. It is intended as a probing amendment to obtain clarification on what ability there would be to recover all or some of the costs of failure from either management or shareholders of the failed entity when it is recapitalised rather than being put into insolvency—there seem to be two different things there.
It is possible to imagine a situation where members of the management team responsible for the failure are paid large bonuses or dividends prior to that failure. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, that is more possible now that the cap on bonuses has—rightly, in my view—been lifted. Can the Minister clarify in what circumstances it would be possible to recoup those bonuses or dividends to offset the recapitalisation costs? In an insolvency situation, where there is fault—for example, in cases of wrongful trading—it may be possible to recoup those payments, but I cannot see how that would work if the bank was recapitalised. To me, it must make sense that management should not see the risk of having to repay bonuses or dividends as being lower than it would have been if the bank had been put into insolvency just because the bank has been recapitalised.
My Lords, I turn first to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which seeks to ensure consideration is given to a clawback of executive pay and bonuses from a failed firm before using the new mechanism. I note that while the bank resolution regime does not set out powers allowing the Bank of England to claw back money from shareholders or management, it does provide an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders and management of a failed firm in resolution.
First, on placing a firm in resolution, we expect that any existing shareholder equity would be cancelled or transferred. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners must bear losses in the case of failure. In many circumstances, this will affect directors and management who hold shares or other instruments of the failed firm.
In addition, the Bank of England has the power to remove or vary the contract of service of its directors or senior managers. The Bank of England exercises its discretion in deciding whether to use this power. However, as set out in the Government’s code of practice, the Bank of England generally expects to remove senior management considered responsible for the failure of the firm and to appoint new senior management as necessary.
Finally, as reflected in the code of practice, it is a key principle of the resolution regime that natural and legal persons should be made liable under the civil or criminal law in the UK for their responsibility for the failure of the institution. This is delivered by Section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which provides for a criminal offence where a senior manager of a bank has taken a decision which caused the failure of a financial institution, if the conduct of the senior manager
“falls far below what could reasonably be expected of”
someone in their position. Overall, this ensures that, as appropriate in the circumstances, there are material consequences for shareholders and senior management when a firm goes into resolution.
More broadly, I can further reassure the noble Lord that the Government recognise the importance of high standards in financial services regulation. The senior managers and certification regime supports high standards by ensuring individual accountability for senior individuals within firms, and by promoting high standards of conduct and governance. The Prudential Regulation Authority sets rules on remuneration and applies these to medium-sized and large banks, ensuring they are proportionate, and there are clear requirements in the PRA’s rules for firms to ensure they have policies on malus and clawback in place to align management incentives with that of the bank.
I should also note the intention of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to ascertain under what circumstances the Bank of England may be able to recover all or part of remuneration to management and shareholders, or require a shareholder to cover all or part of the recapitalisation costs. If recoveries were made from management or shareholders of the failed firm, the amendment would make it clear that these types of remuneration could count towards these recoveries.
I hope I have addressed the broader point about the treatment of shareholders and former management in my earlier remarks. As a point of detail, I would add that the Government expect any recoveries not otherwise specified in the clause to be covered already by the catch-all phrase “or otherwise” at the end of proposed new subsection (2)(a). I hope that addresses the points raised and I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I think the Minister has answered the point about management, and I recognise that the words “or otherwise” are at the end of the new subsection. Where I am not sure that he has answered the point is on the inappropriate dividends paid to shareholders beforehand—the Thames Water situation, and how that would be dealt with. Just saying that the equity would be written down makes no difference; in this situation, the equity is already worthless. We are talking about recouping the costs of the recapitalisation rather than the fact that the worthless company is worthless.
I have managed to get through several groups without promising to write, but on this occasion I will write to the noble Lord.
My Lords, as we have heard several times already, the area of accountability around financial services Bills seems to always come to the fore, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out. She referred in a recent group to the weak accountability that exists in the Bill. My Amendments 12 and 24 in this group aim to improve that.
One of the main concerns raised at Second Reading was to ensure that the Bank of England explains why it has decided to follow a recapitalisation process rather than allowing a failing bank to fail and go into insolvency, which was the previous default. In particular, several respondents to the consultation raised concerns that the costs of the recapitalisation should not be greater than those that the FSCS would face under an insolvency process. Concerns were raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that recapitalisation might become the default approach to a failing bank, rather than insolvency. At Second Reading, the Minister then referred to the strong expectation that
“any reports required under the Banking Act to ensure ex-post scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions when using the new mechanism would be made public and laid before Parliament ”. —[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 933.]
My Amendments 12 and 24 aim to strengthen the required reporting and to make it a requirement that those reports will be made public and laid before Parliament. Amendment 12 adds some detail around the contents of the report. In particular, it would require the Bank to explain why it chose recapitalisation over insolvency; to provide a breakdown of the expected costs, which we talked about in an earlier group; and to provide a comparison of the expected recapitalisation cost with what would have been expected to have been the cost under an insolvency situation. It allows the Treasury to stipulate other matters but, importantly, it also sets a shortish timetable for that report of 28 days. This really does have to be done on a timely basis.
Also, importantly, the requirement to report—again, we discussed this earlier—will apply to any subsequent recapitalisation payments made to the same failing institution. Again, this overlaps with Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which we have already debated. As I said at the time, it is critical that, any time we further recapitalise, we look again at whether that is the appropriate thing to do or whether insolvency is the appropriate option.
To cover the ex-post scrutiny that the Minister referred to at Second Reading, the amendment also requires further reports to be issued and laid before Parliament once the resolution process comes to an end, whether that is through a sale or through an insolvency process. The whole process could be two years after the resolution process starts—indeed, it can be extended beyond two years—so it is important that what actually happens is scrutinised after the event and that any differences to what we were originally told was going to happen are explained.
Amendment 14 laid by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, does something similar but leaves the detail of what must be included in the report up to the Treasury. I would be keen to provide the Treasury with some minimum requirements for the report; what I have laid out are the important aspects.
Amendment 24 in my name simply tries to fix an anomaly, as I see it, in the Banking Act 2009. Under Section 80 of that Act, if a failing bank is transferred to a resolution company, the Bank of England must make a report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and that report must be laid before Parliament. However, rather oddly—the Minister referred to this previously—according to Section 79A of the Banking Act, if all or part of the failing bank is sold to a private sector purchaser, the Bank of England must still report to the Chancellor but that report does not have to be laid before Parliament.
The eagle-eyed among you in this Committee may have noticed that my initial version of this amendment simply stated that the report had to be laid before Parliament. We are getting to the point of the scope issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, referred to in her opening of the debate. That amendment was, at the last minute, ruled as being out of scope of this Bill. I find that hard to understand, particularly given that I felt that the Minister rather firmly put it in scope in his Second Reading speech, but it was decided that it was too broad to be in scope. I had to change it so that it refers only to the situation where a recapitalisation payment has been made. I ask the Minister to consider seriously whether he can use his influence to change that. It seems mad to do it only in this circumstance and not in the wider circumstance of a bank being sold to a private sector player. The officials have perhaps been a little overzealous with their interpretation of scope in this case—and in this Bill, more generally.
As I said, in his Second Reading speech, the Minister pointed out the importance of Section 79A for scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions. He also referred to the fact that there is no requirement for reports under Section 79A to be laid before Parliament. However, he went on to say that he could
“reassure your Lordships that in any event where the new mechanism was used the Treasury would intend to ensure that any such reports were made available to Parliament and the public”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 933.]
My amendment simply makes that intention a requirement; I hope that I am not pushing at a closed door and that it is not seen as controversial.
However we go forward, it is essential that the actions of the Bank of England are subject to full scrutiny and transparency. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, eloquently described the potential for a conflict of interest in the position of the Bank of England, pointing out that the Bank might choose to recapitalise rather than put a bank into an insolvency process
“less because it is in the national interest and more as a way of minimising the reputational damage of regulatory failure”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 914.]
Any decision to recapitalise should be explained to avoid possible creep to this process becoming the default. The noble Lord also raised his concerns that there is little incentive for the Bank to minimise the costs of resolution—after all, the industry, not the Bank, will pay. He gave the example of the Dunfermline Building Society incurring greater costs than the Treasury incurred in resolving the Icelandic banks.
So I think it is essential that we strengthen the scrutiny of the Bank when it exercises these new powers, to ensure that any decisions it takes are clearly justified at the time and examined publicly once the resolution is complete so that any lessons can be learned. These amendments, or amendments like them, would achieve that. The Minister has said he expects all reports to be made public and laid before Parliament, so I hope he will simply accept them.
Finally, I add my support to Amendment 25 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which is also in this group. We discussed in the first group the concerns around the MREL regime that are raised by the Bill, so it seems entirely appropriate that an assessment should be made of the impact of the Bill on the MREL regime. I beg to move.
My Lords, I fully understand the substantial focus on the reporting requirements that will apply when the new mechanism is used. I shall start by addressing Amendment 12 on this point, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.
The Government agree that, should the new mechanism be used, it is right for there to be a reporting mechanism to hold the Bank of England to account for its decisions, and that this should encompass estimates of the costs of different options. However, the Government intend to achieve the principles of scrutiny and transparency in a different way; namely, through the existing requirements placed on the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009. As set out in their response to the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism. The Government have committed to updating their code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used; I can re-confirm that the Government intend to include in the code confirmation that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England will be required to disclose the estimated costs that were considered as part of these reports.
The Government consider that using the code of practice is an appropriate approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill. The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this is important to ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools. The Government believe that amendments to the code of practice are more likely to be successful in achieving this outcome. As I committed at Second Reading, the Government will share drafts of these updates to the code of practice as soon as is practicable and will provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them.
I acknowledge the further amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—Amendment 24—which would make such reports available to Parliament when the new mechanism was used to facilitate a transfer to another buyer. It is the Government’s clear intention that any such reports required under the Banking Act, following the use of the mechanism, will be made public and laid before Parliament. The Government would not make reports public only if there were clear public interest grounds not to do so, such as commercial confidentiality reasons. This may particularly be the case when exercising the power to sell a failing bank to a commercial buyer. While such cases would hopefully be limited, it is important that they are allowed for.
I appreciate the intent of Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which would require the Bank of England to report to the Treasury more swiftly than under the current requirements. The use of resolution powers is complex; in some cases, the Bank of England may be executing a resolution over a long period, particularly when placing a firm into a bridge bank. It is therefore sensible for the Bank of England to report a reasonable period of time after exercising its powers, ensuring that its report provides a full and meaningful assessment. On reporting more broadly, I repeat the points made in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.
Finally, Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the Chancellor to assess in the light of the Bill the appropriateness of the thresholds used by the Bank of England to determine which firms are required to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, known as MREL. As before, I should start by noting that the Government recognise the important role played by smaller and specialist banks in supporting the UK economy. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Baroness at Second Reading.
The Government have carefully considered the perspective of such banks in developing the mechanism in the Bill, which is intended to be a proportionate solution. On MREL, the Bank of England is responsible for determining MREL requirements for individual firms within a framework set out in legislation; that is an important principle, as the resolution authority, the Bank of England, is ultimately best placed to judge what resources banks should hold so that they can fail safely. I point out to the noble Baroness that, as set out in the Government’s consultation response, the Bank of England has committed to consider the potential case for changes to its indicative thresholds. Specifically, it has noted that it will consider whether any changes are appropriate in light of this Bill and other wider developments.
I hope that these points provide reassurance to noble Lords. On that basis, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I will ask the Minister for one point of clarification. He referred to the reports under the Banking Act that will be provided as covering the costs and expenses. I do not think that he talked about the comparison with the counterfactual of the costs of insolvency, which is a critical aspect of this. Would those reports cover that?
If the noble Lord does not mind, I shall add that to the letter to him.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate and apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for failing to thank her beforehand for signing her name to my amendment.
A number of points were raised. The noble Baroness was right when she discussed the timings. They were put in as a starting point; I would be very happy to look at what is appropriate. I still think that we need to beef up the reporting clauses in the Bill. I am encouraged by what the Minister said about the reports that exist being laid before Parliament, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to, there is more to do on the timings.
There is some merit in trying to put in the Bill at least some minimum requirements on what those reports should include. That will be important because, although I acknowledge what the Minister said about the code, we will not see it before Report. If we were able to see the proposed changes to the code before Report we might be able to take a different view. It happens quite regularly that we are told that something will be in a code of conduct, a future statutory instrument or whatever else, but we do not see it before we have to make the decisions on the amendments themselves. In the absence of that, I feel that we will probably want to come back to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, with his in-depth analysis and huge knowledge of this area. I feel I will probably fall short after that, but I will give it my best go.
This Bill provides the Bank of England with slightly greater flexibility to find a resolution to a bank failure other than insolvency, at a cost to the rest of the banking industry. As we have heard, it follows on from the lessons learned from the insolvency of Silicon Valley Bank. As such, I think that, like everybody else, I am generally supportive of it. But it does beg some questions, so, rather than making points about its merits or demerits, I will ask the Minister a number of questions about how it will operate in practice and some of the potential impacts.
First, the Special Resolution Regime effectively splits the banking industry into two tiers: those larger banks whose failure might create systemic risk, which are required to maintain excess debt and equity over the minimum capital requirements, known as MREL, and smaller banks whose failure would not be expected to create systemic risk, which do not hold MREL. SVB was a small bank whose failure was none the less considered to create some systemic risk because of the nature and concentration of its customer base. The Bank of England therefore decided to follow a resolution procedure, which it felt was better than allowing SVB to go into insolvency, which would have restricted its customers’ access to their funds, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, referred to. SVB was then rapidly transferred to HSBC for £1—a good result all round, I think. Customers retained continuity of access to funds and did not lose any of their deposits and HSBC gained a subsidiary that it said would accelerate its strategic plan by two or three years.
However, this begs the question as to whether we have the classification right for which banks are required to hold MREL. It is currently based primarily on size. Should the PRA be required to do more to ensure systemic risk has been identified before failure? SVB seems to have come as something of a surprise, and its risk profile does not seem to have been recognised in advance, so it appears to me that the current classification should be reviewed and that we should at least consider extending the MREL regime to small banks whose failure would none the less create some systemic risk. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that.
Secondly, and this goes to a point that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raised, the letter that the Minister kindly sent explaining the Bill states in the first paragraph:
“The Bill enhances the UK’s resolution regime, providing the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit to respond to the failure of small banks”.
The Minister said that in his opening words as well, so could he explain why the Bill applies to all banks, including those inside the MREL regime?
Under the Bill, any costs of putting a bank into a resolution procedure, either by transferring it to a private sector purchaser, as happened with SVB, or by transferring it to a bridge bank with a view to ultimately transferring to a private sector purchaser or insolvency, will be met by funds provided by the industry via the FSCS. The Government indicate that in most cases they expect the costs to be lower than putting the bank into insolvency because it should avoid compensating depositors up to £85,000 each. The costs that the FSCS would cover would include the costs of recapitalising the failed bank, the operating costs of the bridge bank, and any costs in relation to the resolution, including legal and other professional expenses, costs of valuation and other associated costs incurred by both the Treasury and the Bank of England.
That raises a number of questions. What cap or limitation is there on the costs? While the Government say that they expect costs generally to be lower than insolvency, and they are probably right, that is not guaranteed. The bridge bank could be run for up to two years, and that is extendable in certain circumstances, so this could become quite a large, open-ended cost. Who controls the level of costs during the period? I think the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, talked about this. It is not those who are going to be paying for it, so there is no direct incentive to keep the costs as low as possible. How is that going to be scrutinised? What input will those who ultimately pick up the costs have?
Under an insolvency process, there is a de facto cap on the liability to the FSCS, and therefore the industry, which is the amount of the deposit protection. Is it right that the wider industry will potentially be on the hook for paying more than that de facto cap? As I understand it, this process will be used only—and I think the Minister mentioned this—if it is in the public interest to do so, where a small bank failure turns out to create systemic risk. That would reflect a failure by the PRA to identify a systemic risk, as I mentioned earlier. If the resolution decision is driven by a public interest test, surely it should be the public purse that pays the excess rather than the banks which have no part in this. As a matter of principle, it is shareholders, lenders and other creditors who should bear the primary risk before the industry is asked to contribute. The industry should not be underwriting any debt or equity or even supplier risk. What is the mechanism for ensuring that the resolution process will not unfairly benefit share- holders or other creditors?
Related to that, if a bank is transferred to a bridge bank and two or even more years later goes into insolvency, where will the FSCS money that has been poured into the bank in the meantime rank in the hierarchy of debts? It should presumably rank above all debts that existed on the day the bank was transferred to the bridge. Is there a mechanism for returning money to the FSCS and to industry if it can be recovered either in insolvency or a sale? To go further than that, any sale to a private sector purchaser in these circumstances is typically under fire sale conditions, so they usually happen at below market price. SVB UK was transferred to HSBC for £1, as I mentioned, and HSBC is widely seen as having got rather a bargain because the failure of SVB was not caused by the UK entity; there was nothing wrong with the UK entity. SVB UK had loans of around £5.5 billion and deposits of around £6.7 billion and in the previous financial year had recorded a profit before tax of £88 million. Its tangible equity was around £1.4 billion, so quite a bargain at £1.
Will there be or should there be a mechanism for clawing back any excess profits made by the private sector purchaser to be refunded to the FSCS if the FSCS has provided the resolution financing? What happens if the failed bank is a subsidiary of an overseas entity? What mechanisms do we have for ensuring that the parent company pays for the costs of such a failure and not the FSCS? Why should the UK banking industry pick up the costs if there is a viable overseas entity? I realise that was not the case with SVB, but there could be a situation where an overseas bank sets up a UK subsidiary that does not go very well so it just walks away from it. It should pick up those costs. Is there a process for clawing back management bonuses and dividends paid prior to the failure?
As a general principle, bad or failing businesses should be allowed to fail, and that may mean that creditors, including depositors beyond the protection cap, lose money. There is a risk that this mechanism could be used to avoid negative headlines or for political or reputational expediency. After all, as was said before, the costs of taking the action will not fall on those making the decisions. Ultimately, the costs will be borne by consumers as the banks pass them on in low savings rates, higher lending rates or higher charges. What safeguards are in place to ensure that the mechanism is used only in appropriate circumstances? I am broadly supportive, but I have a lot of questions and look forward to hearing from the Minister.
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the authorised push payment (APP) fraud performance report published by the Payment Systems Regulator in October 2023.
My Lords, the Government are committed to tackling authorised push payment fraud and stopping customers falling victim to scams. The Government welcome the publication on 31 October by the Payment Systems Regulator of data on the levels of APP fraud and of reimbursement among payment service providers. This will ensure that firms are properly incentivised to combat fraud and explore all avenues to do so.
My Lords, this excellent report allows us at long last to see which banks are behaving best and worst in preventing and reimbursing fraud. One of the best ways to reduce fraud would be to stop fraudsters using UK bank accounts to receive the stolen money. We can now see from this report that Metro Bank, TSB, Starling and Monzo are the banks that receive and process the most stolen money. Smaller payment providers are even worse. For every £1 million received by Clear Junction, for example, more than £10,000 was stolen money, and almost 20% of Dzing Finance’s receipts by number were fraudulent. Now that we have this information, what are the Government doing to ensure that banks take real action to stop their accounts being used by fraudsters? Secondly, I congratulate Anthony Browne on his promotion yesterday, but what does that mean for his essential role as the Prime Minister’s Anti-Fraud Champion?
I congratulate the noble Lord, because he was a strong advocate for the publication of this data. As he says, it has indeed been revealing, and I assure noble Lords that action has already been taken on the back of it. On 27 October, the Financial Conduct Authority imposed restrictions on Dzing Finance Ltd, which was the worst-performing payment service provider for fraud volumes received. It now cannot on-board any new retail customers or allow any new incoming funds from retail customers for the purposes of issuances of electronic money or providing payment services without the written agreement of the FCA. In March this year, the FCA wrote to all payment firms, highlighting fraud risks and instructing them to take action to address this. Where issues are identified, the FCA will continue to take action. I also congratulate my friend in the other place on his appointment, but I assure noble Lords that his excellent work will continue under the work of the Home Office.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and our international partners, and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. To help respond to these threats, and building on the recently enacted Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act, the Government are currently taking through a second Bill, the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which will bear down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors.
The money laundering regulations provide the legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing, and set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows. Under these regulations, businesses are required to conduct enhanced checks on business relationships and transactions with high-risk third countries. These are countries identified as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes that could pose a significant threat to the UK’s financial system.
This statutory instrument amends the money laundering regulations to update the UK’s list of high-risk third countries. It removes Cambodia and Morocco from the list to reflect changes agreed by the Financial Action Task Force, the global standard setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. The FATF found that both Cambodia and Morocco have made the necessary domestic reforms to improve their compliance with FATF standards, which have been confirmed through on-site visits to both countries.
The Government will pass further changes in due course to add to the UK’s list of high-risk third countries those that the FATF added to its own list in February and June 2023. The reason for passing these changes separately is to give time to complete a full impact assessment for these additions.
This is the seventh SI amending the UK’s list of high-risk third countries to respond to the evolving risks from third countries. This update ensures that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. In 2018, the Financial Action Task Force assessed that the UK has one of the toughest anti-money laundering regimes in the world. The UK was a founding member of this international body, and we continue to work closely and align with international partners, such as the G7, to drive improvements in anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing systems globally.
Lastly, this list of high-risk third countries is one of many mechanisms that the Government have to clamp down on illicit financial flows from overseas threats. We will continue to use other available mechanisms to respond to wider threats from other jurisdictions, including applying financial sanctions as necessary. This amendment will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. It is crucial for protecting UK businesses and the financial system from money launderers and terrorist financiers. I therefore beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing and explaining the regulations. I realise that all they do is follow the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, FATF, to change the list of countries designated as high risk and therefore subject to enhanced due diligence requirements in relation to anti-money laundering, counterterrorism financing and counterproliferation financing. In that respect, so far so uncontroversial.
It has to be said, however, that the list is somewhat surprising—both for those on it and, in particular, those not on it. The changes made by these regulations are also somewhat surprising: they remove Morocco and Cambodia from the high-risk list. It seems rather odd that Cambodia, which is generally regarded as among the most corrupt countries in Asia, is no longer treated as high risk. I am very fond of Cambodia and have spent a lot of time in that country, but that does not change the fact that it is extremely corrupt.
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Cambodia is ranked 150 out of 180 countries on the index. This is a slight improvement on previous years, but still considerably lower than many countries that remain on the high-risk list, such as Albania at 101, Panama at 101, the Philippines at 116, Barbados at 65, Burkina Faso at 77, Iran—which is on the blacklist—at 147, Jamaica at 69, Jordan at 61 and Mali at 137. I could go on. In fact, Cambodia has a worse corruption score than all but seven of the 27 countries that remain on the FATF high-risk list. It is not only Transparency International that ranks Cambodia badly. With perhaps more relevance to this regulation, the Basel AML Index ranks Cambodia as having globally the seventh worst money laundering and terrorism financing score. Despite that, we are reducing the level of due diligence that the regulated sector will have to apply to it. Seriously, is there anybody in this Room who believes that Cambodia should be treated better than, say, Gibraltar, Barbados or even the Philippines? I should like the Minister to look me in the eye and state that she really believes Cambodia is not a high-risk country for corruption.
This starts to beg the question about the value and legitimacy of the FATF high-risk assessment process, known as the mutual evaluation assessment. That value is called into even greater question when we look at the countries not included in the high-risk designation. I will give a high-profile example: until February of this year, Russia was a member of the FATF. In February, the FATF suspended its membership because of the war against Ukraine—somewhat belatedly, one could say. I emphasise “suspended”; Russia has not been expelled. It is evidently a paragon of virtue when it comes to money laundering and terrorism financing because, unlike the British territory of Gibraltar, Russia is not designated as high risk and therefore not subject to enhanced due diligence. It is odd, then, that we have spent so much time passing Bills in this House specifically to deal with the stolen laundered money coming from Russia. Almost unbelievably, in its last review of Russia in 2019, the FATF praised Russia’s efforts to prosecute terrorist financiers and suggested that AML/CFT is afforded the highest priority by the Russian Government. This is a country that finances and supports organisations such as the Wagner Group, while Putin’s Government is generally regarded as a kleptocracy. Other countries not on the list, and therefore not subject to enhanced due diligence, include such famously uncorrupt ones such as Somalia, Venezuela, Libya, Turkmenistan, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, to name but a few. All score worse than Cambodia in the corruption index; all are apparently low risk, according to the FATF. The Explanatory Memorandum refers to the FATF’s “robust assessment processes”; frankly, those do not stand up terribly well to scrutiny, if this list is anything to go by.
It is worth quoting the recently departed FATF CEO, David Lewis, who was very highly regarded. He said the agency structure of “mid-level bureaucrats” means that it does not have the scale to take on the big global financial crime issues. He said that they are
“very comfortable dealing with the finest minutiae of technical detail, but aren’t comfortable or able to have big picture discussions and are often only in their jobs for one of two years”.
He stated that genuine reform of the FATF is difficult to achieve, with typically two to four countries blocking consensus, meaning it is rare that you can get any meaningful change, which probably explains the list we are looking at.
Concerns are often raised about the FATF’s lack of transparency. The minutes of plenary sessions that make these risk designations are not published and it is clear that political horse-trading plays a significant role in the decision-making process. To be fair, there is no doubt that the FATF has had a positive impact on global financial crime since its inception in 1989, but there are growing doubts about its ability to cope with the challenging global situation we currently face. In an article for RUSI, Tom Keatinge of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies makes some helpful suggestions about how the FATF could be improved. He suggests, first, greater transparency: it should provide greater assurance of independence and oversight. Its activities should be overseen by an independent board and its evaluation should be independently reviewed, not subject to the evidently politicised horse-trading that occurs currently. The minutes of the plenaries should be published, or the plenaries themselves could be livestreamed. Secondly, it needs to create a dedicated technical-assistance capability to ensure that unintended negative consequences, such as financial exclusion and the use of the FATF recommendations by autocratic regimes against civil society organisations, are addressed.
Thirdly, he suggests that the FATF needs to show greater ambition. Ultimately, the question is whether it is addressing financial crime effectively. It currently evaluates how effectively its recommendations are implemented, but not the extent to which financial crime is addressed as a result. He suggests an independent review of the FATF’s effectiveness, which seems a simple and sensible suggestion 45 years after it was founded.
Fatima Alsancak, also of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, suggests that Russia is a good
“case study in the deficiencies of the … FATF mutual evaluation process, which allows countries with high levels of institutionalised corruption to complete their evaluations despite the lack of integrity in their AML systems”.
She goes on to say:
“It is essential for the watchdog to revisit its standards”,
and again highlights the need for greater transparency in the decision-making and listing process.
I was going to ask why South Africa, Nigeria, Croatia, Cameroon and Vietnam are not the list, but the Minister answered that in her opening statement. I mentioned earlier that Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory, is on the high-risk list. Will she please comment on that, too?
There are important questions to answer about the value of the FATF evaluation process. We should not rely passively on what are, frankly, flawed recommendations. Do the Government agree that FATF’s procedures and the high-risk list itself appear to have important deficiencies and, if so, what are they doing about it? Do they agree with the recommendations that I referred to earlier?
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who made a probing and persuasive argument about the deficiencies in some of the process. I have two questions for the Minister.
In a debate on a previous instrument, in which I spoke, the Government made the case that, with the new freedom as a result of Brexit, they would immediately make the decision to remove British sovereignty by having an automatic updated list of the Financial Action Task Force. I thought that rather inconsistent with the argument that we had left the European Union to gain freedom: the very first act was to give that freedom away.
The noble Lord highlighted the inconsistencies, and I will add another. The Minister has heard me talk about the Wagner Group and its lack of proscription, and the fact that it operates almost with impunity in many countries. One of the countries in which it has been operating, which is not on the list, is Sudan. It is beyond me that the UK, having done excellent work through our diplomats, development and security operations in that conflict-afflicted country, would not want the ability to act immediately in putting Sudan on the list, whose two warring parties, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, are operating across organised crime, including conflict. Why would that not be a high-risk third country? If the Minister is saying that we have made the decision simply to adopt an external organisation for making determinations of what would be high-risk third countries, what was the point of seeking the sovereignty to make decisions ourselves?
My second question relates to the United Arab Emirates, which maintains its position on the list. I have asked for the text of the UK-UAE investment agreement, but it has not been forthcoming. Why not? If there is an investment agreement that binds the UK into certain preferential market treatment for financial vehicles within the UAE, and the UAE is on a UK list of high-risk third countries, we should, as a matter of good governance, be able to see the text of the UK-UAE investment agreement and to consider what elements in it ensure that we comply with all the elements that would be required of our financial relationship with the UAE. This is even more important given that, in Grand Committee debates on the sanctions regime for Russia, we have raised the joint ventures that operate between the UAE, Russia, the Wagner Group and countries such as Sudan. I hope the Minister will be able to respond by saying that new regulations will be brought forward at pace to ensure that these loopholes are now closed.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I introduced a number of amendments on the subject of authorised push payments fraud in Committee. At the time I said I was broadly happy with the Minister’s responses but would look to return to the reporting question again, which is what Amendment 94 does. I should say at the outset that I support what the Bill is trying to do in respect of APP fraud to make it easier, and in particular fairer, for victims of APP fraud to get their money back. Before I go any further, I remind the House of my interest as a shareholder of Fidelity National Information Services, Inc., which owns Worldpay.
My new Amendment 94 has two elements to it. First, it would introduce requirements on the PSR to report annually on the impact that the reimbursement requirement had had on consumer protection and on the behaviour of payment service providers. Secondly, it would effectively create a league table to enable consumers to see how each bank is actually performing both in preventing fraud and in reimbursing victims.
On the first point, the annual impact report is necessary because the mandatory reimbursement requirement could have unintended consequences that might damage consumer protection. I shall give a couple of possible examples of that. First, there is the possibility of moral hazard. If the mandatory requirement means that consumers start to take less care about protecting themselves because they will be repaid anyway, that could have the undesirable consequence of actually making it easier for the fraudsters to commit fraud and so actually increase levels of fraud. While, as we discussed in Committee, we must not put the blame on the victims, there is a balance to find in this area to avoid making it easier for the fraudsters while improving consumer protection and outcomes. We will know whether we have found the right balance only when we start to see the results.
A second example might be that the banks change their behaviour in an undesirable way. Rather than improving their fraud detection and prevention processes, they might simply decide that the easiest thing to do would be to stop providing services to people whom they see as being at the highest risks of fraud in order to reduce their potential reimbursement liability. I think many Members of this House have seen similar behaviour in respect of PEPs—politically exposed persons—where, rather than undertaking sensible risk-based steps, banks have on occasion just decided that it is too difficult or expensive to deal with PEPs and have refused to open accounts or have even closed accounts. We will come to that later today, but it is a good example of a well- intentioned risk measure having undesirable consequences. In the case of APP fraud, if the banks see it as too great a financial risk to provide banking services to those deemed to be at a higher risk of fraud, then we might see a whole swathe of more vulnerable people unable to obtain banking services.
These are just two examples, but I hope that they demonstrate the importance of the PSR keeping the impact of the requirement for mandatory reimbursement under regular review and amending it if it turns out to have unintended negative consequences. Reporting on this regularly and publicly will ensure that the impact assessment is robust.
Turning now to the second element of the amendment, the requirement to report annually on the performance of the banks, a major criticism of the current voluntary reimbursement code is that it is completely non-transparent. While numbers are published, they are anonymous. Consumers cannot see which banks are behaving best, and which are behaving worst, unless, as TSB does, they tell us voluntarily. The TSB example is encouraging—it is using its 100% reimbursement policy as a selling point. Introducing competitive good behaviour is highly desirable, and this amendment would help achieve that.
The amendment would effectively create an annual league table that would enable consumers to see which banks have the lowest levels of fraud—which will give an indication of how good they are at detecting and preventing fraud—which banks are better and quicker at reimbursing victims when fraud occurs, and, by including the appeal information, which banks make it more difficult for victims. That would allow consumers to take this information into consideration when deciding whether to stay with their existing bank or when considering opening a new account—something that would otherwise not be possible. That would, I hope, provide a real competitive incentive for banks to change their behaviour both in detecting and preventing fraud and in treating victims promptly and fairly.
This would not introduce a significant additional burden; the PSR will have all this information anyway, so reporting it is not a significant job. However, the benefits to consumers of making this information public are potentially significant.
When we discussed this in Committee on 13 March, the Minister stated in relation to the impact assessment that the PSR
“has committed … to a post-implementation review”
and that the Government would also
“monitor the impacts of the PSR’s action and consider the case for further action where necessary”.
That does not go far enough. Fraudsters keep changing their business models in reaction to actions by industry and the authorities, so it is essential that this is kept under continual review rather than only a one-off, post-implementation review. It is also important that the impact assessments are published. Can the noble Baroness provide any greater comfort in those respects?
On the league table, the noble Baroness said on 13 March that the PSR
“is currently consulting on a measure to require payment service providers to report and publish fraud and reimbursement data”.—[Official Report, 13/3/23; col. GC 166.]
It is now nearly three months later, so can the noble Baroness provide an update on whether this consultation has progressed and whether the data will in fact be published? It would be better if such data was published by a single source such as the PSR rather than piecemeal by payment service providers. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support this amendment and I can be relatively brief. It is important not only to collect the statistics but also at times to dig underneath to see how they might be being gamed. From personal experience, I know of instances where banks are treating microbusinesses more strictly than they are treating consumers, saying that a business should know and therefore rejecting them out of hand at the first time of asking, if I can put it that way. I have heard, in a similar case, stories of someone making contact by telephone repeatedly, their inquiry getting lost and the person having to go through the whole story with a case handler multiple times, the strategy obviously being, “Let’s try and make them give up”. That was with a very large bank; I will not name it because I do not have absolutely all the detail. Therefore it is quite important that different criteria are not being used between sole traders and individuals when it has already been determined via the ombudsman that both have a route.
My Lords, the Government and the Payment Systems Regulator recognise the importance of regular, robust data collection. This is crucial for monitoring the effectiveness of the reimbursement requirement and ensuring that firms are held accountable. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for his considered engagement on this issue. I reassure noble Lords that the PSR has committed to half-yearly publication of data on authorised push payment scam rates and on the proportion of victims who are not fully reimbursed.
I can tell my noble friend Lord Naseby that a voluntary system is already in place and the PSR has already begun collecting data from the 14 largest banking and payment groups. The first round of transparency data is due for publication in October this year. The data that the PSR will publish includes the proportion of scam victims who are left out of pocket, fraud rates where the bank has sent customers’ money to a scammer, and fraud rates where the bank has hosted a scammer’s account. That means that, from October this year, the PSR will publish data for total fraud rates, both for sending money and receiving fraudulent funds, and reimbursement rates, on a twice-yearly basis for the 14 largest banking groups. This so-called league table will provide customers with the information they need to consider the relative performance of different banking groups on these metrics, and to factor that into their banking decisions.
Further to this data, once the reimbursement requirement is in place the PSR will use a range of metrics to monitor its effectiveness on an ongoing basis. These include the length of reimbursement investigations, the speed of reimbursements, the value of repatriated funds, the treatment of and reimbursement levels among vulnerable customers, and the number and value of APP scams. Data on appeals will be captured and reported by the Financial Ombudsman Service separately.
More broadly, the PSR will publish a full post-implementation review of the reimbursement requirement introduced by this Bill within two years of implementation. The review will assess the overall impact of the PSR’s measures for improving consumer outcomes. That does not mean it will not also consider the effectiveness of this measure on an ongoing basis. Indeed, more widely, the PSR will consider risks across different payment systems and, where necessary, address them with future action. This includes a commitment to work with the Bank of England to introduce similar reimbursement protections for CHAPS payments, and with the FCA in relation to on-us payments.
The PSR has been working closely with industry to develop effective data collection and reporting processes for its work on fraud. While the Government recognise the intention behind the noble Lord’s amendment, they do not consider it necessary or appropriate to prescribe specific metrics to be collected in primary legislation. I hope that, given the reassurance I have been able to provide today, he would agree with that point.
The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, spoke about the wider impacts of fraud and the duties that go beyond financial services companies or payment system providers in addressing those risks of fraud. That is being looked at through both the Government’s counter-fraud strategy and other Bills. He mentioned the Online Safety Bill. I disagree with his assessment of the measures in there. The measures that we have to tackle fraud in that Bill are a significant step-change in what we expect of companies in this space, and I think they will make a real difference. We are committed to working across all sectors to look at what more we could do in this space once we have implemented those measures and see how effective they are. I hope noble Lords are reassured by our commitments more broadly on this issue, and specifically by the fact that the PSR will be publishing data in this space once we have implemented the measures in the Bill.
My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this debate, particularly the Minister for her constructive engagement on this and the reassurance she has just given. In fact, in one area, she has actually gone further than my amendment suggested, as the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, pointed out: the annual report is now to be six-monthly, which is hugely welcome. It is only for the top 14 payment service providers, which will cover the bulk of the market, but that is something that the Government and the PSR might want to keep under review, particularly as different players come in and out of the market. I thank her very much for her reassurances.
I will make one comment more generally, echoing some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore. It is not only the banks that are players within the fraud chain, it is all those other parties that enable or facilitate fraud, from the tech companies to social media companies, the web-hosting companies, the telecom companies, et cetera. This measure puts all of the liability on to the banks. While it is a simple solution for victims—and that is to be commended—we need to find some way of incentivising all those other players in the fraud chain to behave properly and to stamp down on their services being used by fraudsters. I am hoping that we will see progress on that in the Online Safety Bill, and also in the failure to prevent fraud clauses in the economic crime Bill that is coming forward. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank my noble friend the Minister for again responding to the strong views expressed within your Lordships’ House and for introducing the amendments that she has. I also agree with what my noble friend Lord Holmes said.
I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for the introduction of my noble friend Lord Bridges’ Amendment 64 and the others in that group. I supported his amendments in Grand Committee and am pleased to do so again today. My noble friend set out with his usual clarity, as did the noble Baroness, why we should support these amendments, and I will not waste your Lordships’ time in repeating them.
As my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean said in Committee, in order for Parliament to be able to hold the Treasury and the regulators to account, it is necessary to have an independent source of information. The proposed office would provide that. It is also welcome that the main duties of the office will include a duty to prioritise the analysis of regulations that restrict competition, negatively affect competitiveness and add compliance costs.
I do not believe that the new office would be a regulator of the regulators. Rather, it would be a means to ensure that the regulators really do get on with the job on which they are behind schedule—the promise made in 2016, in the general election manifesto and many times since that we will take advantage of our regulatory freedoms to eliminate or simplify those regulations which do not suit our markets and which place a disproportionate burden on market participants. We should not do this at the expense of standards, but to recast the rulebook in common law style will make it much easier for firms to maintain the high standards on which the regulators, the Treasury and noble Lords will all insist. The proposed office would greatly assist in ensuring that this will happen.
I also note—although we will discuss this in the next group—that, ideally, the office would deal principally with a Joint Committee of both Houses rather than two separate committees which might compete with each other. That would double the work and the costs that the office and the regulators would have to bear in carrying out their duties.
I believe the creation of an independent office such as the one proposed would be more helpful than the creation of a multiplicity of panels, which may be set up by statute but remain panels of the entities of which they form part. These are also duplicated between the two regulators, which doubles the cost and time taken by the regulators, and by the relevant committees of your Lordships’ House, in discussing with them.
I hope my noble friend the Minister is prepared to consider further the creation of something which is truly independent of the regulators. I think we have too much legislation by statute to require entities to negotiate with panels of which they are a part, which conceptually I find rather odd in any case.
My Lords, this is the first of two groups that seek to improve the level of parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Arguably, I think the groups are the wrong way around from a logical point of view, but we are where we are. We had long debates on this in Committee, and it was clear that accountability and parliamentary scrutiny was probably the single biggest issue on which Members from across the House felt that the Bill fell woefully short, particularly given the huge amount that is being transferred to the responsibility of the regulators by the Bill.
We heard in Committee of the need for three legs to the whole process of scrutiny and accountability: reporting, independent analysis and the parliamentary accountability elements. This group is about the second leg—the independent analysis that will support the parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. The Government have listened, and that is welcome, but I am sure I am not alone in finding what they have proposed to be rather thin gruel.
The Government have introduced a number of amendments which enhance the role of the various policy panels, in particular the cost-benefit analysis panel. These are welcome, but I am afraid they really do not go far enough. Other noble Lords, especially the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, have tabled further amendments to enhance and support the role of the panels. Again, that is very welcome but not, I think, sufficient. Despite these improvements, the panels remain appointed by the regulators and are not genuinely independent.
I remain strongly drawn to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges of Headley, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name, to create a genuinely independent office for financial regulatory accountability. As I said, so much responsibility is being handed to the regulators that it must make sense to have a genuinely robust system of oversight over the regulators, not just responding to consultations about proposed changes to regulations that the Government have put into the Bill but a much more holistic oversight of the whole regulatory direction—something that deals with what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to as the multiplicity of panels. We need to draw this all together, and we need to be much more forward-looking about the direction of regulation, rather than backward-looking as to what is proposed.
This is such an important matter and such a huge volume of work that, if we are to scrutinise it effectively, we need to have something such as the proposed office for financial accountability to enable parliamentary committees and others to carry out the meaningful scrutiny. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, talked about the need for resources; we will come on to that in the next group, but she is quite right. This would really help because, if the independent information were available to the committees, it would save them the job of doing all the sifting and all the rest of it, and they would be able to concentrate on the bits that really matter.
Even with the amendments proposed by the Government, I do not think that we get anywhere near that real scrutiny. I am sorry to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, does not intend to push these amendments; I would have liked him to do so and would have supported him if he had. I hope that he will continue to use his influence as the chair of the Economic Affairs Committee to push for a similar approach.
My Lords, I totally agree with what the noble Lord has just said and therefore I will not repeat his words. The office for financial regulatory accountability proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, would become an important part of the whole regulatory architecture in this country. The reason why I have proposed a couple of amendments—I am delighted to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, actually likes my amendments to his amendments—is to enhance the position of the office within that architecture.
We have to recognise that there will be virulent opposition to this in the Treasury. The Treasury’s darkest day in recent years was the day that the Office for Budget Responsibility was established as an independent entity evaluating the performance of the economy. In the same way, having gone through that dark day, I can imagine the horror with which the Treasury observes the possibility of an independent entity evaluating the performance of regulators and the performance of the Treasury in its activity in guiding regulation. It is no surprise at all that we have what the noble Lord has quite appropriately called “thin gruel”, instead of something that would be truly effective and would create both an independent assessor and a sounding board for the industry, consumers and others who have an interest to express in regulation to get their views on to the front line.
With my Amendments 67 and 72 I am again in slight opposition to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, in the sense that I want to remove the lines in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, that specifically focus on the competition objective, because I do not want to second-guess what the office might do. The office could choose to travel over any part of the regulatory countryside. I regard my Amendment 72 as much more important because, as part of the architecture, the office should be funded through the levy in the same way as other parts of the regulatory system; the FCA, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and so on are all financed via the standard levy on the industry. After all, this would be a trivial amount of money because—as has been pointed out—it would be only a relatively small entity. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, liked my amendment to his amendment. I hope that he will be able to carry forward these proposals in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested.
I will comment on Amendments 44 and 47 from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, on the membership of panels at the FCA and the PRA. I support his view that placing practitioners on panels can have a very positive effect. I say this because I was an independent member of the board of the old Securities and Futures Authority, which was a practitioner-run regulatory authority with independent members, of which I was one. I was very impressed by the way that practitioners, when required to be regulators and placed in a regulatory role, assumed the role of regulators—they were not just representatives of their special interests. In fact, their special interests were left at the door; what came in with them was their specialist knowledge. I was sceptical when I first joined the board of the SFA but was won over by the performance of practitioners there. The proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for practitioners will add to the regulatory effectiveness and knowledge of these panels.
My Lords, I will comment briefly on the proposal which has emerged and is contained in Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Penn. It refers to the possibility of parliamentary committees being
“the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons … the Committee of the House of Lords”
or a Joint Committee. It says “and” but I presume that they would be mutually exclusive.
What is extraordinary about this amendment is that it contains a seriously bad idea which might lead to an extremely good outcome. The seriously bad idea is that the two committees, one in the other place and one here in the Lords, would be sitting at the same time and looking at the same material, requiring the same levels of expertise to advise them and the same commitment of time by the regulators—and, perhaps, producing divergent opinions which would lead to regulatory uncertainty. That is a very bad outcome. Why I fully support these amendments, however, is that the seriously bad idea will lead to an extremely good outcome, because people will see that the possibility of having a committee in the other place and a committee here doing the same thing, with all the negative connotations that I have just discussed, will lead to the rational outcome of a Joint Committee of both Houses.
My Lords, I added my name to the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, so I thought I would stand and associate myself completely with his comments. I am delighted that the noble Baroness has effectively accepted the proposal. I will add my voice to say this: the subject of financial services is so huge, complex and important that it really requires a dedicated committee, whether a Joint Committee or committee of this House, not just to be part of, say, the Industry and Regulators Committee or the Economic Affairs Committee. It is much too big a subject to be covered by a committee that is not dedicated to the subject—and, if you have a dedicated committee, it must be properly resourced.
The Government rightly say that this is a matter for Parliament, but let us be realistic: they have huge influence on what happens there. I really hope that the Government and whoever the powers-that-be in this House who make these decisions are—even as the chair of the Finance Committee, this is still slightly opaque to me—are listening. This is so important. We must go ahead and must resource it properly.
My Lords, I strongly agree with what my noble friend Lord Forsyth has said. I also put my name to his Amendment 25 and other amendments, and I think that he is entirely right.
I also thank the Minister for responding to the concerns expressed on all sides of the House and for recognising that the parliamentary oversight of the regulators may need to be done by a Joint Committee of both Houses. Like the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I had also noticed that the amendment says not “or” but “and”, so there is a danger that there might be three committees doing the same thing, which would treble the work required by the regulator and, presumably, by the witnesses and experts who would be called to assist.
Also like the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I had the experience of serving on the 1999 Joint Committee of both Houses. This was established by resolution of your Lordships’ House and another place separately but was effectively driven, or at least strongly encouraged, by the Government at the time. The noble Lord, Lord Burns, was a most effective chairman of the Joint Committee, and it was a pleasure to serve on it under his leadership. An added benefit of that Joint Committee was that it enabled noble Lords with an interest in financial services to work much more closely with Members of the other place and concentrated the expertise of both Houses in one committee. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that it would be a seriously bad outcome were there to be two committees tasked with this huge job.
I also refer to what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said. I was in Brussels at the same time that she was chairman of the ECON, the economic affairs committee of the European Parliament. I often visited the European Parliament at that time. I was struck by the large number of staff and the great facilities available to the committees to carry out their role of scrutinising the legislative proposals brought by the Commission. We have not experienced that burdensome type of work: in the past, under the European model, all our financial services regulation was in primary legislation. It will now be given to the regulators. We therefore need more resources than have been available to us to scrutinise and supervise them properly. This is really important.
Noble Lords should also be grateful to the Minister for restoring equality of involvement between another place and your Lordships’ House. I thought that this was an unfortunate precedent for this type of legislation, particularly as many noble Lords have recent and continuing involvement with financial services firms. I look forward to the Minister’s winding up.