Royal Bank of Scotland (FSA Report)

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Monday 12th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The approach taken by the hon. Gentleman, who seeks to try to blame everybody for the crisis, overlooks the key role that the shadow Chancellor—who is not in his place today—played in the design of the regulatory system that led to the problems we saw at RBS. That design—driven by the shadow Chancellor, who took great credit for it—meant that no backstops were in place when RBS took those decisions.

The other point that the hon. Gentleman should bear in mind is that only three politicians are named in the report as having put pressure on the FSA to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime. One was Tony Blair, one was the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), and the third one—the person who is missing from the Opposition Front Bench today—is the shadow Chancellor, the person who in his first speech as City Minister called on the FSA to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime, a regime that, when confronted with the challenge of RBS, turned from a light touch to a soft touch. It is, of course, the taxpayer who has picked up the bill for the fundamental flaws in Labour’s regulatory regime.

The hon. Gentleman talked about disqualification of RBS directors. It is a pity that the previous Government did not think about that issue in the aftermath of the financial crisis. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has referred the report to counsel to see whether it is possible to disqualify the directors of RBS.

The hon. Gentleman talked about approval for acquisition. We will look carefully at the proposal Lord Turner made, but the reality is that the FSA had powers to intervene, but chose not to use them—partly as a consequence of the light-touch regime foisted on them by the previous Government.

When the hon. Gentleman talks about bonuses, let us not forget that it was under the previous Government that bonuses could be paid out in cash and taken straight away. Under the regime in place now, bonuses are deferred, paid out in shares and can be clawed back. Let us not forget that the moment that it was possible to exercise the maximum leverage on Sir Fred Goodwin—the banker Labour knighted—was the moment when it gave away his pension scheme. So I will take no lessons from the Labour party on the way in which we should deal with the problems of RBS.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the Bank of England and seemed to question whether it was able to take on the additional responsibilities. I thought he was moving away from his party’s position of supporting the package of reforms that we have put forward. Let me remind him that it was the Bank of England that identified the problem of the mispricing of risk in the financial markets. The problem was that the regulatory structure it had to deal with meant that the Bank did not have the power to tackle the problem—nor, indeed, did the FSA. What we are faced with is a problem of dealing with the regulatory regime left to us by the previous Government. They chose not to make these reforms when they were in government; we are taking action now to ensure that we have the right regime in place to tackle those risks and ensure that we have a stable, but successful, financial services sector.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Powerful institutions do not leap forward to explain themselves when they make mistakes, and neither did the FSA. The fact is that the almost 500 pages of this report would never have been written had it not been for the unremitting pressure from the Treasury Select Committee. I would like to thank my colleagues on that Committee for helping me to secure this report from the FSA. Furthermore, to make sure that the report was of adequate quality, we took the unprecedented step of sending our own specialist Committee advisers into the FSA with full powers to examine papers and personnel in order to check that the papers underlying the compilation of this report were fairly reflected in it.

Is it not now crucial that the new regulators—the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority—are subjected in future to far more vigorous parliamentary scrutiny than the FSA has been in the past? Will the Government commit in the draft legislation to secure a much higher level of parliamentary scrutiny of these powerful quangos than we have had hitherto?

[Mr Hoban]

I, too, commend the work of my hon. Friend and his Select Committee, along with the work done by Bill Knight and Sir David Walker in scrutinising the FSA’s report and making consequent improvements to it. One of the challenges we face is, as my hon. Friend said, to ensure that there is proper scrutiny. He commented on the fact that it took the pressure of his Committee to produce this report. The reality is that the existing powers in section 14 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to require a report to be produced where there is regulatory failure have never been exercised. One measure we have put in place in the Bill is to enable such reports to be produced on a more regular basis—not at a Minister’s request but in response to objective triggers to ensure that reports are published in a timely fashion so that we can learn the lessons from past mistakes. I think that is a helpful way of enabling Parliament to hold the regulators to account. We look forward shortly to responding not just to my hon. Friend’s Select Committee report, but to that of the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee.

The Economy

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Tuesday 6th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

I will not try so much of the party political stuff that we have just heard, but I will make a short point about the central fiscal judgment, a point about the forecasts and, if I have time, a point about the supply side.

First—we did not hear much of this in the previous speeches—I want to emphasise the backdrop against which the autumn statement was made. It was undoubtedly the most difficult backdrop since 1981, with a huge inherited budget deficit, a dysfunctional banking sector and an economy in which far too much is taken and spent by the public sector, as a result of which the private sector is having trouble leading the recovery. All parties were agreed on that before the election and all had plans to reduce public spending as a proportion of GDP. On top of that, we have a severe eurozone crisis, which is our most important market.

I will not be popular on either side of the House for saying this: despite the clash of cymbals we have just heard, fiscal policy would not be so different whoever was in power. There would be a little less deficit cutting and probably a bit more tax and spend under Labour, but the market discipline in the world at the moment is severe and biting, and the markets would demand roughly the same strategy, which it would get from any rational Government. That is an important basic point to have in mind.

My second point concerns the forecast. The Treasury Committee had the OBR before it earlier today. It has radically adjusted its estimate of the output gap—that was discussed a bit in earlier exchanges, although it was difficult to spot—and its estimate of productivity growth compared with its spring forecast. That radical adjustment in eight months has in turn obliged the Chancellor to adjust policy for the later years of the forecast period, as he pointed out, in order to meet the fiscal mandate.

A good number of my Committee colleagues—from both sides of the House—were a little sceptical of the OBR’s decision. Frankly, when we look at the OBR documentation, we do not find a great deal of evidence to support it. There is some evidence, and the Committee might well return to the issue when it reports on the autumn statement.

This morning’s Treasury Committee sitting brought home to me and to other colleagues a couple of important points, the first of which is that the OBR forecast is an independent one—nobody can claim that it has been cooked up by politicians—which in itself can add confidence to markets. Secondly, the difficulties that the OBR has had in supporting specific points on which the Committee challenged it this morning flags up the perils of all economic forecasting. The one thing we can say with some degree of certainty is that this forecast, like all others, will almost certainly turn out to be wrong.

I do not have very much time. I shall end with a few words about supply side reform. The financial crisis exposed the structural weaknesses in the public finances and the structural deficit now appears to be much bigger than was originally thought. But the financial crisis also exposed structural weaknesses in the real economy. As businesses struggle to recover, the full scale of the web of complicated taxation, excessive regulation and much else is being exposed to view, and that is getting in the way of businesses doing better.

The coalition Government assembled a fully worked up agenda for action to deal with the deficit, but until this autumn statement, we did not have a fully worked up strategy for improving long-run economic performance —the supply side of the economy. I was critical of the Government’s earlier proposals that were published a year ago. They reflected the fact that they were dealing with an inheritance from the previous Government and also with policies that had been thought up and planned at a time of economic abundance before the crash. The obvious truth is that supply side reform is extremely difficult to accomplish. Raising the long-run growth rate is a very big and long-term job. The Thatcher Administration did not even start to implement their major reforms in that area until their second term.

This autumn statement has taken a huge step forward in the right direction. It sets out a more consistent and coherent agenda to support enterprise. It recognises the crippling burden that is being imposed on energy-intensive industries by climate change regulation and by the need to improve transport and to do something about the planning system. There is a good deal else. The phrase “supply side” has also been rehabilitated.

However, we must bear in mind the fact that so far this is largely just an agenda; it now needs to be implemented. It also needs to be complemented by reforms to bring greater simplicity and certainty to the tax system, which is in a huge mess, thanks largely to the previous Government and that is what I hope the Budget, in only 17 weeks’ time, will be all about.

Autumn Statement

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

As far as I can tell, the shadow Chancellor complains that we are borrowing too much—and then proposes that we borrow even more. It is completely unconvincing and a reminder to Government Members why we are so pleased that he is in the job that he is doing, for he is a constant reminder of everything that went wrong with Labour’s economic policy—a permanent advertisement for why we should never trust Labour with our money again.

Let me answer the right hon. Gentleman’s specific questions. He welcomes the fact that we have open and honest figures from the OBR. When did we never get them when he was at the Treasury? He complains about the bank levy. He was the City Minister, so why did he not introduce a bank levy? It will raise £2.5 billion a year. In the Labour policy document on the bonus tax that he proposes, his party costs its measure at £2 billion a year. That is less—a tax cut for banks, if can I put it like that.

The right hon. Gentleman complains about off balance-sheet borrowing. That is from Mr PFI. He says that we should have kept the future jobs fund, but 50% of all people who left that scheme were unemployed within 12 weeks, which is in part why we have an unemployment problem.

Yes we are committed to real increases in the health budget, and yes the OBR confirms that we will meet our fiscal mandate and our debt target—[Interruption.] In the terms set out by me in the emergency Budget.

The right hon. Gentleman told the House this extraordinary thing—that the OBR forecasts that growth in the UK will be less than in the euro area. That, I am afraid, is simply not true. I am not going to use unparliamentary language, but it is in the OBR document in black and white: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015—every single year, growth unfortunately is slow in the eurozone and slower than in the UK. That is one of the problems we are facing.

Let me respond to the three arguments that the right hon. Gentleman advanced in his reply. First, he said that we should try to borrow our way out of a debt crisis; he talked about extra borrowing. His plans—the plans of the previous Government—would have led to an additional £100 billion on top of borrowing over the course of the Parliament. Let us look at the facts. There is not a single credible political party in the entirety of Europe that is proposing more spending at the moment, apart from—and it is not credible—the Labour party. This is what Tony Blair said this morning on the radio—[Interruption.] Go on—have a go at booing him! Tony Blair said on the radio this morning:

“frankly whatever government is in power it is going to be pursuing a pretty tough programme at the moment”.

Blair or Balls—I think the British public made their mind up on Labour politicians long ago.

The second astonishing argument that the right hon. Gentleman deployed was to say that low interest rates in Britain were a sign of failure. Presumably that means that he wants interest rates to be higher in Britain. Presumably the fact that Italian interest rates are over 7% is a sign of success. Presumably the fact that Greek interest rates are 30% is an economic miracle. His policy for higher interest rates would put families’ mortgage bills up, increase debt interest charges for taxpayers, increase the cost of loans for small businesses, and put people out of work. Now people know—you vote Labour, you get higher interest rates.

The third and final argument that the right hon. Gentleman advanced is that the events happening in Europe will have almost no impact on anyone in Britain or on the British economy. [Hon. Members: “That’s not what he said.”] He mentioned it once in passing. That flies in the face of what the Bank of England says and what the OECD said yesterday. He quoted the IMF. The IMF supports our deficit reduction plan. It explicitly asked itself the question, “Should Britain change course?”, and said no. He quoted the independent OBR’s numbers, but he refuses to accept its analysis. Anyone who turns on the television and listens to the news knows that his argument is completely absurd, so we have to ask ourselves why he advances it. Why does he alone advance the argument that Britain is not affected by what has been going on in the world—by the external oil shocks, by the size of the financial crisis, by the eurozone crisis? There is a very simple reason: because if he admits that we are in a debt crisis, then he has to admit that we borrowed too much when he was in office, that the crash here was deeper than anywhere else, and that the effects were longer lasting. It would be an admission of his personal failure.

The right hon. Gentleman was the City Minister who let the City explode. He is the author of the golden rules that failed. He does not have the excuse of the Leader of the Opposition that he was only photocopying orders: he gave the orders; the orders came from him. Labour’s economic credibility will never recover while he remains the shadow Chancellor.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

The whole country, I think, will welcome the supply-side measures announced today, which are an essential counterpart to the deficit reduction plan. Britain’s recovery depends on thousands of small businesses in our constituencies that need the confidence and the cash to invest and grow. That is why the credit easing package that has been announced today is so welcome. Does my right hon. Friend agree, though, that the recovery can be secured in the long term only when we have banks that are operating normally —when we have a return to more normal lending conditions? Does not that reinforce the need for him to work extremely closely with the regulators and the banks to achieve this?

[Mr Osborne]

I agree with the Chair of the Treasury Committee that the impact of the financial crisis and the deleveraging in the British financial system and other financial systems are having a huge impact not just on our recovery but on recoveries around the world. I completely agree that we need to try to clear the impaired balance sheets of the banking system. We need to try to get new lenders on to the high street. That is why we took the decision we took on Northern Rock—to get Virgin Money out there on the high street. I will have more to say on the banking system next month when I respond to the Vickers report and to the very good report from the Treasury Committee.

Northern Rock

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

That was a lame response to my statement. The previous Government presided over the failure of financial regulation and an irresponsible banking culture that led to the collapse of Northern Rock. Now we have to deal with their legacy, and that includes the agreement that they struck with the European Commission requiring Northern Rock to be sold by 2013. Given the hand we were dealt by the previous Government, we had to do three things: get the best deal for the taxpayer, for the consumer and for Northern Rock and the north-east. The deal that we announced last week did just that.

The hon. Gentleman asked about proceeds. As we have said, this is a one-off transaction, and the proceeds will go towards paying down the debt. He asked whether it would have been better to hold on to Northern Rock longer. The reality is that Northern Rock is currently loss-making, and it is expected to make losses in the first part of next year. The best outcome for Northern Rock is to be acquired by somebody who wants to use the base in Gosforth to expand the business and offer a better deal to consumers and the staff of Northern Rock. David Fleming, the Unite trade union official, said:

“The treasury’s decision to sell Northern Rock to Virgin Money marks a significant moment in the history of this north-east based financial institution. After three years of turmoil and upheaval for the workforce at Northern Rock, Unite hopes that today will be the start of a secure future.”

Let me deal with Virgin Money’s capital position, which the hon. Gentleman raised. Virgin Money has clearly set out to be a strong and dependable partner. Its core tier 1 capital ratio is 15%, which is much higher than that of many existing high street banks, which averages about 10%. Of course the FSA will approve the capital structure and will have to give its approval of the transfer of ownership, and hon. Members should welcome that support.

On mutualisation, I made it clear, as did the Chancellor, that we were open to offers from existing mutuals to buy Northern Rock for a stand-alone remutualisation, but no firm bids were made in the final round. No one came forward with a well worked-out plan on how Northern Rock could be remutualised on a stand-alone basis, and that is why we took the decision we did. It was in the best interests of the taxpayer, the consumer, the north-east and Northern Rock to sell the business to Virgin Money.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

In the Treasury Committee’s recent report on competition in retail banking, we argued strongly that competition, and not just short-term revenue maximisation, should play a major part in the sales of the nationalised banks. Have consumer interests influenced the Treasury’s decision to sell Northern Rock now, and does the Minister agree that increasing competition should be central to future divestments?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We have studied the Treasury Committee’s reports on competition carefully. We agree with him that competition is vital to improve outcomes for consumers, whether they be business or personal; and, to the extent that divestments of banks help to deliver improved competition, that is something to be welcomed and borne in mind. There are other areas where we can look to improve competition in the banking sector. The Independent Commission on Banking has made its proposals, and we will respond to them in due course.

Eurozone Crisis

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

Let me first tackle this issue of who kept us out of the euro. The fact that a previous Conservative Government secured an opt-out from the Maastricht treaty meant that we were not going to join the euro. Also, one of the things that we did when we came into office last May was to close down the euro preparations unit in the Treasury. We are taking action on contingency planning for a whole range of outcomes, and that work is under way in the Treasury.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether work would be put on hold on the three legs of the deal that was agreed last week. It is important that the euro area continues to work on those three legs, particularly on the ring fence and on the recapitalisation of the banks. They are important parts of the package, and they are needed to ensure that the eurozone is stabilised. He talked about the various European mechanisms that are in place to support finance. He will remember that the Greek bail-out was originally paid for purely by the eurozone; the UK did not contribute to it and has not contributed to subsequent parts of the bail-out package for Greece. We have negotiated that when a permanent mechanism is put in place to replace the one that the previous Government signed us up to, which we do have to contribute to, that permanent mechanism will not require UK participation. That is an achievement of this Government, getting us out of the mess that the Labour Government put us into in May last year.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the IMF. He will have to remember that it was he who led opposition to increasing our subscription to the IMF—[Interruption.] He says that that was to safeguard Britain’s subscription to the IMF, but it would in fact have marginalised the UK in international debates on tackling the global economic problems that we face today. Labour should think very carefully about its repudiation of the legacy left to it by the previous Prime Minister, who agreed to a trebling of resources for the IMF. We need to take action to stabilise the situation in the eurozone. The uncertainty is casting a chilling effect on the UK economy, and it is important that those issues are tackled as soon as possible.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

I wonder how much we can reasonably learn from the Minister, given that the negotiations are taking place in Cannes and that he is here with us today. Anyway, there are one or two questions that we might ask. What assurance can he give us about the UK banks’ exposure not only to Greece but to other eurozone countries at risk? What confidence does he have that the eurozone banks have the capital strength required to withstand a eurozone default?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend asks some interesting questions. I think that I would rather be here in the House than in Cannes at the moment—[Interruption.] It is important that Parliament should hold Ministers to account on these matters, and I am here to answer its questions. On my hon. Friend’s first question about the strength of the UK banks, there has been a process with the leadership, through the European Banking Authority, which is based here in London, and it concluded that the UK banks did not need to be recapitalised. That is partly a consequence of the measures taken over the past two or three years to increase banks’ holdings of capital and highly liquid assets, which have helped to ensure that they are to an extent insulated from the problems in the euro area.

On my hon. Friend’s wider question about the strength of the European banks, I can tell him that, in calculating the amount of additional capital that banks should hold, the EBA determined that they should hold 9% core tier 1, and that, crucially, their holdings of sovereign debt should be marked to market rather than held at face value. That led to the calculation that banks across Europe need to hold an additional €100 billion of capital.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

We shall see the 17 members of the euro attempting to co-ordinate their budget policies better, and more mutual surveillance, with sanctions, for those who do not do what has been agreed. I have to say that the confusion, if there is any, is in Labour’s policy, because it is now holding open the prospect of membership of the euro, which would be the ultimate fiscal and monetary integration.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Does the Chancellor agree that it is wholly unacceptable that the rest of Europe should be held to ransom by Greece? What would be the consequences for the UK and the eurozone of a no vote in a Greek referendum?

[Mr Osborne]

There is no doubt that the decision by the Greek Prime Minister has added to the instability and uncertainty in the eurozone. We can see that today. We are trying to create stability and certainty in the eurozone. Ultimately, it is up to the Greek people and the Greek political system to decide how they make their decisions, but I believe that it is extremely important for the eurozone to implement the package that it agreed last week. I said at the time that that was crucial, as did everyone else involved. We need to get on with it, sooner rather than later.

Eurozone Crisis

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Thursday 27th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

I thank the hon. Lady for some of her questions. Of course, we miss the constructive and consensual approach of the shadow Chancellor. We are talking about the Bretton Woods institutions, and it turns out that he is at a place called Buttonwood, which adds to the pantomime feel of Labour’s economic policy.

Let me deal directly with the hon. Lady’s questions. First, of course we keep the capital and liquidity positions of the British banks under constant review. We would do that in the absence of any European agreement, but of course we have also participated in the recent work by the European Banking Authority. We thought it was important that that was done at EU level rather than eurozone level. I repeat what I said in my statement: the EBA and our own authorities confirm that no British bank requires additional capital, which of course is very good news for us all.

On the hon. Lady’s question about getting private sector involvement in the write-down of Greek debt, that is of course one of the key unresolved issues from last night. We now need to see whether the headline agreement reached on behalf of the private sector can be implemented in practice. I am confident that it can, but that is one of the crucial next steps that need to be got on with.

The hon. Lady asked about the exposure of the UK banking system and the UK economy to various peripheral economies of Europe. Those figures are published regularly by the Bank of England. I do not propose to repeat them today, but they are available for everyone to see.

On the question that the hon. Lady asked about the overall fund, €1 trillion is the number that the eurozone has put on its firewall. Of course, some said it should be larger, but it is very significantly larger than what we had yesterday, which we should welcome. As with private sector involvement in the Greek deal, we now need to see the details of how the eurozone will create that leverage. It has set out two options that can work side by side. One is a kind of first loss insurance on newly issued debt, and the second is the special purpose vehicle, by which it hopes to get external private sector investment. Of course, it is openly speculating about getting Chinese money into that.

The IMF can only lend directly to countries, and countries with programmes or agreed and negotiated flexible credit lines, which will remain the case. It cannot lend into that special purpose vehicle. That is also the UK position. We do not think that Britain, with its deficit, can contribute to the special purpose vehicle. If we were to do so, we would add to our debt, and we do not think that that is appropriate. We have had to use our own resources to deal with our own problems in this country.

It is of course crucial that the IMF remains a central economic institution in dealing with the world’s problems, and I urge the hon. Lady, newly appointed as shadow Chief Secretary, to reconsider Labour’s position—[Interruption.] I know that the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) led the Labour party in Committee to vote against the increase in IMF resources, which the last Labour Prime Minister negotiated at the London 2009 summit. Whatever I have said about the right hon. Gentleman—and I have said quite a few things—I do not think that anyone would doubt that the highlight of his premiership was the negotiation of the London 2009 G20 deal. It is completely astonishing that the Labour party voted against that agreement.

As we discuss over the next few months increasing the IMF’s resources to deal with all the countries of the world, I urge Labour Members to reconsider their position on that, and also their rather odd position on the euro. They seem to be holding out membership of the euro—[Hon. Members: “No!”] Well, that is certainly what the Labour leader was doing at the weekend. To be in the euro but out of the IMF strikes me as a rather bizarre economic policy at the moment.

That brings me to my final point. Britain has been arguing consistently for months that a solution to this crisis requires recapitalising the banks, reinforcing the firewall and resolving the Greek crisis. We have insisted that the appropriate issues are discussed at the level of 27, which is why there have been two European Councils this week, and an ECOFIN. We will continue to argue for Britain’s national interest as we enter the difficult discussions ahead on the potential treaty change, on making the euro work, and above all on getting the growth and jobs that the hon. Lady talks about across Europe and in this country, by making this continent far more competitive and stopping Britain and Europe from pricing themselves out of the world economy.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Following on from the Chancellor’s final remarks, I am sure he would agree that without a restoration of growth in the eurozone, the debt crisis simply cannot be resolved. He has been with his counterparts quite a lot in the past few days. What evidence has he seen in discussions with them that the EU has the will to implement the necessary reforms on the supply side of the economy to restore Europe’s global competitiveness?

[Mr Osborne]

There is increasing evidence that people are focused on the structural issues facing the European economy. Indeed, when my hon. Friend looks at the agreement issued by the eurozone last night, he will see that when it refers to Spain and Italy, it stresses the importance not just of getting their budget deficits down, but of plans to increase the pension age and make labour legislation more flexible and competitive—all the sorts of things that this Government are pursuing here in Britain, although every one of those measures has been opposed by the Labour party.

Jobs and Growth

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

This debate about growth contains three distinct components, although, of course, there are close connections between them: the strategy to stabilise the public finances, the strategy to secure recovery, and the strategy to raise the long-run growth rate. I want to say a little about each of those.

There has been a fair amount of partisan politics around today, and I do not intend to add to it unless severely provoked. As I have said in the House a number of times before, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) deserves considerable credit for his March 2010 Budget, with its plans for sharp cuts in spending and borrowing. Equally, the coalition deserves credit for its own plans. Our present low debt service costs speak for themselves. They reflect the credibility invested by markets in the deficit reduction strategy and the belief that the coalition will stick with it, and the country will be the beneficiary of that.

As for policies to secure recovery, we can all agree that, given the eurozone crisis, the international economic outlook is much worse than forecast either by the right hon. Gentleman in his Budget 18 months ago or by the Office for Budget Responsibility this spring, and I am sure more surprises will follow. However, it is not true that the Government are doing nothing in response, as the right hon. Gentleman implied. They have rightly adapted to the situation, and the recovery strategy has changed. The Bank of England has adapted by announcing the second tranche of quantitative easing, and the Chancellor will adapt by announcing credit easing in his autumn statement.

I strongly endorse the Chancellor’s decision to favour monetary policy as the short-term tool rather than tinkering with tax changes, which is what is proposed in the five-point plan. I am sure that the Treasury Committee will want to examine exactly how the Government have changed their policy on the recovery strategy and whether QE2 and credit easing are the best tools, but I think everybody can agree that it was timely to take action. We can also agree that British taxpayers should not be asked to contribute to any further eurozone bail-out.

[John Mann]

History shows that the use of monetary policy has invariably led to an increase in inflation, which has sometimes been a hidden deliberate policy aim. Regardless of whether it is a good or a bad policy, does the hon. Gentleman expect an upward drift of inflation as the conclusion to the way in which monetary policy is currently being used?

[Mr Tyrie]

I will not answer that at any length, except to say that I am of course making my points in a personal capacity, because as a Committee we may comment on growth after the autumn statement. Let me also point out that the Governor gave a comprehensive reply to the hon. Gentleman’s question when he introduced the second £75 billion tranche of measures. He pointed out that money demand was extremely low at present, and that therefore he thought that the risk of inflation over the next two to three years was extremely low.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tyrie]

I will give way for a second time. I will adopt the same policy as the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West, and pick up the maximum injury time.

[Mr Brazier]

As well as monetary pressure being extremely low at present, some of the larger ticket items such as commercial and domestic property which are outside the usually looked at measures such as CPI and RPI have been going down rather than up.

[Mr Tyrie]

I broadly agree with that. There is always a problem with measuring inflation—there is always a dispute about exactly how to capture it best—and we will never get it exactly right. I will not go into any further details now, but I agree with the core of what my hon. Friend has said.

Work on both the deficit reduction plan and the recovery plan have been firefighting to deal with our inheritance—less from the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West than from his predecessor, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown). Let me now deal with the third aspect of the growth strategy, which consists of policies to improve the long-run growth rate and long-run economic performance: what the policy wonks call supply-side reform. The coalition's inheritance needed attention in that regard as well.

A few days ago I made a number of proposals for supply-side reform in a pamphlet, and they seemed to make everyone very excited. The Government growth agenda set out in the spring was a start, but, as the Chancellor said in his party conference speech,

“We need to do more”.

In that pamphlet, in a personal capacity, I made a few suggestions. In a nutshell, we need to work much harder to produce a comprehensive strategy embracing tax, reform of the labour markets, financial regulation, energy policy, transport and competition policy. We have been firefighting so far, but now is the time to start developing that longer-term strategy.

It is worth bearing in mind that it took the Thatcher Administration the best part of four years to get round to doing much of this, and I realise that this type of policy is easy to talk about but difficult to deliver. What matters most is that the creative energies of small businesses in our constituencies are released to increase the long-run growth potential of the economy. That is a big reform job. We have to bear in mind all the time that it involves millions of people—small traders and people working in small businesses—and that it is they who will restore the economy to health, not Governments and not Parliament. We need to make it much easier for them. Let us consider just one area: taxation. The Treasury Committee has flagged up some of the—largely inherited—contradictions and inconsistencies in the tax system, and argues that further tax reforms should be based on a few simple and coherent principles: certainty, simplicity, stability and fairness. We are a long way from achieving that in our tax system and there is a lot still to do. Encouragingly, the Chancellor said he strongly supported tax simplification; he has made that point on a number of occasions and he has created the Office of Tax Simplification.

The Chancellor announced in his speech at last week’s Conservative party conference that he would push ahead with further labour market reforms, and he has mentioned that again today. Of even greater significance could be the Chancellor’s commitment not to push ahead of other European countries on carbon reduction targets. I and many other people have been arguing for that for a long time, all the way back to our deliberations on the Climate Change Act 2008. The rapid pace of carbon reduction will push up business costs and also provoke great controversy, for example in respect of wind farms. Therefore, the Government are right to think again about that policy. It is now crucial that the coming autumn statement gives a decisive push to measures for improving long-run economic performance. It is equally important that that is seen not as a programme for a year, but as a remorseless project for the long term.

For much of the last decade, politicians of both major parties talked as if the economy need no longer be the top priority. For it was an age of abundance: it seemed that we could concentrate on how to spend it and quality-of-life issues. We forgot that most politics is hot air unless the economy can afford to deliver on the promises made by politicians. The complacency about growth that infected both parties encouraged the irresponsible lending and borrowing of the last decade. The electorate have noticed that they were led up the garden path, most notably by the absurd claim that Governments could put an end to boom and bust—so my final point is a presentational one. Politicians and Parliament must demonstrate that the public’s No. 1 priority is also their own No. 1 priority. The electorate’s No. 1 priority at present is to protect their living standards and their children’s prospects.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I now have to announce the result of the deferred Division on the question relating to tribunals and inquiries. The Ayes were 309 and the Noes were 20, so the Ayes have it.

[The Division list is published at the end of today’s debates.]

Independent Banking Commission Report

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Monday 12th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

I respect the right hon. Gentleman’s experience of having been through all that he went through as Chancellor. He had to deal with these problems in real time over long weekends, and I have paid tribute previously to the work that he did on behalf of our country in those difficult months. As for his book, I have only just started reading it, but as far as I can see, I get off relatively lightly compared to the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown).

The right hon. Gentleman made a good point about the interconnectedness of the banking system. The Basel rules are significant, and I believe that that process was initiated when he was Chancellor and representing the United Kingdom. New arrangements have been agreed in record time. It took 10 years to come up with Basel II, but about 18 months to come up with Basel III. The international rules are important because they help us to deal with investment banks in foreign jurisdictions, such as Lehman Brothers, and to protect all globally systemically important banks and give them bigger cushions. As he well knows, new proposals are coming down the track for additional capital requirements on the most globally systemically important banks. That is significant. Also, we are putting in place the recovery-and-resolution ideas that, again, he initiated when he was Chancellor in order to ensure that we can deal with the failure of the UK end of an American investment bank. That will ensure that these banks do not just live internationally and die nationally, but that we can resolve any problems.

I would make a broader point, however. Yes, we have to do that at an international level, but we also have to consider regimes that have large concentrations of banking, such as Switzerland—let us, for a moment, leave aside Ireland and Iceland, which were obviously virtually bankrupted by what happened. It is interesting that Switzerland, which, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, is as keen as anyone to remain internationally competitive, has introduced its own domestic regime for its banks. It is wholly appropriate for us to consider doing that in this country while, of course, recommending to other countries changes that we think are sensible for all jurisdictions.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Sir John Vickers has made a strong case both on competition, on which he has endorsed proposals from the Treasury Committee, and on the ring fence, on which the Committee will now be taking evidence from him. On the timing of implementation, however, rather than adding a ring fence to the list of measures in the current Financial Services Bill, which is already long and complex, surely it is sensible to commit now to a separate ring-fencing Bill in this Parliament, while making it clear now that full implementation of the higher capital and debt requirements, which might lead in the short term to lending risks, can be left at least until 2018 or possibly later?

[Mr Osborne]

The Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee makes a sensible suggestion. It is likely—I do not want to say certain—that we will need a separate piece of legislation on some of these specific changes to banking. However, I hope that we can also use the Financial Services Bill to implement other key parts of the reform. That is the case because we want to get this right. The draft Bill is currently being discussed by the Joint Committee chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), and we simply will not be able to produce all that detail in the next couple of months before the Bill is introduced. We have to get this right. As John Vickers said, short-termism got us into this mess, and we need a bit of long-termism to get it right. However, I hope that the commitment to legislate in this Parliament reassures people that it is going to happen in this Parliament. This bunch of Ministers, this Government, will be held accountable if we do not legislate in this Parliament. We have given a clear commitment, and I am sure that the work of the Treasury Committee, which my hon. Friend chairs, in looking at how this report can be put into practice will be very valuable.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the Chancellor. We do not want the slowest growth, but neither do we want the slowest questions and answers.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

The Chancellor has made it clear that he thinks that a monetary union requires a fiscal union. Can a credible fiscal union be put in place without a treaty change?

[Mr Osborne]

I think that we can take important steps towards greater co-ordination of fiscal policy by implementing, as I say, the agreements that the eurozone came up with before the summer. That is the task at hand now. Speculating now about major treaty change is unrealistic. It is not going to happen in the next few years. It would take several years to bring about such a major treaty change and get it ratified by all the national Parliaments, even if those Parliaments agreed to it. The challenge this autumn is to bring greater stability to the euro’s governance arrangement, which is what our colleagues in the EU want to do.