Armed Forces: Resilience

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this important debate and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, for securing it. Like many others, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hintze, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, on their maiden speeches.

The resilience of our Armed Forces is a topic to be considered seriously at all times but there are two significant overarching factors making it even more pertinent at present, which I would like to set out before looking at various areas in more detail. One is the uncertain European security situation stemming from Russia’s aggression; the other is the weakening of the foundations of our Armed Forces since 2010. When it comes to resilience, these two aspects tie perfectly together. According to the Government’s own UK Defence Doctrine, which outlines the broad philosophy and principles underpinning our military, the key aspect of resilience

“is the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances”.

We have new circumstances with Russia and Ukraine.

What we also have are policy and investment decisions, in the longer term and the immediate future, that reduce our ability to change to meet these new circumstances. That is, at its very core, a lack of resilience, and any way you look at it, maintaining resilience will always be more difficult with more than 40,000 fewer troops, 80% of the number of ships in the Royal Navy, and many fewer aircraft in the Royal Air Force. The most recent regular Armed Forces continuous attitude survey showed overall satisfaction with service life at only 45%. In 2009, it was 61%. Furthermore, the MoD has wasted at least £15 billion in taxpayers’ money since 2010 and £5 billion since 2019.

The foreword to the Defence Secretary’s Command Paper 411 states:

“If this Defence Command Paper is anything, it is an honest assessment of what we can do and what we will do.”


To be honest is to look at the damage that has already been done and is continuing. The Government are proceeding with a further cut of 10,000 troops and a £2.3 billion real-terms cut in day-to-day MoD spending, meaning less money for forces’ pay, equipment, recruitment, training and families. These decisions have weakened us at a time when we need to be strongest—for ourselves and our NATO allies, who have our unshakable commitment—in standing up to Russian aggression.

It is not just His Majesty’s Opposition making these arguments. The Defence Committee in the other place published a report examining the integrated review, Command Paper 411 and the industrial strategy. Among other things, it highlighted how the Ukraine conflict undermines the MoD’s conclusion that mass is no longer important. The chair of that committee rightly highlighted that today’s threats are arguably more dangerous and unpredictable than those faced in the past, and described the MoD’s meeting all its integrated review obligations as “simply impossible” given the cuts to capability.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has quite directly called for an update

“in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.”

Our own International Relations and Defence Committee highlighted a significant number of challenges that all three branches of the Armed Forces are facing in making the Government’s defence ambitions a reality, not least how the Ukraine conflict has exposed the inadequacy of equipment supply.

I understand that these updates are coming, but unless they come with a quite unexpected change in approach from the Government, I suspect the same question will remain. The Defence Secretary perhaps gave us some room for optimism when he said last November that

“as the threat changes, so must the size of everything”.

None the less, I shall turn to a few specific elements of the Command Paper in more detail. Despite the broader picture hindering its efficiency, there are a number of interesting aspects, and I certainly cannot be as critical of its intent to modernise and adapt as I have of the implementation and factors surrounding that possibility.

The four objectives from the integrated review are the basis of the Command Paper and are admirable. Chapter 7’s focus on modernising our forces through science and technology, coupled with necessary R&D investments, provides a number of opportunities, not least the obvious strategic advantage in an increasingly digital landscape, which we are all aware extends deeply into security issues. Recognising the importance of maintaining traditional elements of the Armed Forces should never mean that we cower from adaptation. If we did, we would be just as guilty of lacking the flexibility to change to face new circumstances. It is welcome that the Government are taking that seriously. The promise of

“one of the most integrated, digital, and agile forces in the world”,

and the implications of cyberspace and space adding to the three more traditional elements of the Armed Forces, is welcome. However, I again emphasise that the traditional does not become less important just because of the presence of modern challenges.

In chapter 5, there is also a very welcome awareness of the importance of defence’s contribution to global Britain, and of properly contributing to NATO and beyond:

“In an era of global competition and security threats, we must be ready to bring military support to our allies and partners wherever that might be needed.”


Of course, we have seen this in action in the support and leadership we have offered Ukraine over the last year. Deterrence through collective security with our allies will always be one of the most effective ways of counteracting threats before they exist. When this is not enough, collective action, as we are now seeing in Ukraine, is the only way we can face the more unpredictable threats of the 21st century.

There is of course one collective that we have dropped out of recently. I hope that any forthcoming update to the integrated review and other documents comes with an intent to form a new UK-EU security pact, as the Opposition have committed to doing, which would complement our unshakeable commitment to NATO and seek new co-operation across foreign policy through regular EU-UK summits and structured dialogue, in order to tackle Europe’s shared threats in areas such as cyber, energy security and organised crime.

The conflict in Ukraine is also depleting our stockpiles, and Ministers have been moving too slowly to replace them. It took 287 days from the start of the invasion for the Defence Secretary to sign a new contract to replace the NLAWs for our forces and for Ukraine. We of course want to know whether the Government are responding to this in the shorter term by ramping up production of ammunition and equipment, and how many more contracts have been signed to replenish our supplies. In the longer term, given the ongoing concern about maintaining resilience, there is another question about what bearing these developments will have on the coming refresh of the integrated review.

Turning to a slightly more personal approach, my experience in the military consisted of being taught to fly by the RAF while at university and being promoted to an officer rank so low that it has now been abandoned. Subsequently, I served as a non-executive director of the Defence Logistics Organisation, the Defence Procurement Agency and the merged Defence Equipment and Support. I was taught by officers that, when you have finished all your planning and you get down to the actual fighting, you have to get three things right: kit, training and morale. I am afraid there are questions over all three areas, and I hope the new review will answer them. Kit has to be sufficient and appropriate, but there is a hidden danger: it has to be serviceable and you have to have the right reserves. Hollowing out is an insidious process that vastly underuses equipment and creates a lack of capability.

Training we hear less about, but, having been with the military, I believe that, when faced with making efficiencies—I deplore that term because it really means cuts—training has to come into its sights, and I am sure it does. If one could put military leaders under the appropriate pressure, I am sure they would say that training has suffered from the cost pressures.

Morale comes from all sorts of sources. It comes leadership—from above. Properly trained people with the right working equipment will have better morale. But we should also take account of other things. We must make sure that pay levels are sufficient to recruit and retain. We must make a real leap in accommodation, particularly married quarters. If you are going to get married people to go overseas and fight, they need not to be worried about what is happening at home. Finally, one has to have a positive approach to veterans, so that people who have devoted their lives to defending our country and serving our allies know that there is a future after they leave the Armed Forces.

I hope that the Minister, not necessarily in replying today but certainly when reviewing and rebooting the integrated review, will make sure that all the issues that have been drawn together today are considered, and particularly that we get ticks in those three important areas.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Robathan for enabling this important, constructive and certainly timely debate. There are surely few places in our country, outside of MoD headquarters, that are likely to boast as much defence expertise and experience as is gathered here under one roof.

I thank all who have spoken, including former Defence Ministers and former heads of our armed forces; every contribution has added an extra dimension to our understanding of the grave issues we are facing. Among those contributions, we were privileged to hear the maiden speeches of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, of Grantham, and my noble friend Lord Hintze. I think your Lordships would agree that the calibre of their speeches whets our appetite for hearing much more from them, and sooner rather than later.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is inevitable that there will be those who argue that the Command Paper, Defence in a Competitive Age, released in 2021, is effectively obsolete following President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine illegally. However, the main thrust of that document was correct, and it remains so today, because it identified Russia as our most acute threat. It noted that we are living in a more adversarial, multipolar and transactional international era. It committed the United Kingdom, despite tough economic times, to maintain its position as a leading NATO partner in Europe. Indeed, combined with the biggest increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War, it set a tone that other nations would later follow in the wake of the Ukraine invasion.

It is also fair to say that the Command Paper did not anticipate, as no nation did, the sheer speed of change, nor did it predict how the impact of Russia’s invasion would send shockwaves around the world, impacting global energy and global food supplies and precipitating a severe financial crisis. Separately, we are also aware that China is watching events closely as it escalates tensions with Taiwan, while states such as North Korea and Iran continue to pose complex regional challenges. Violent extremism has not gone away; terrorists continue to stoke the fires of instability across Africa.

So in this age of constant competition, the open international order on which our values have come to depend is under threat as never before—all that while rising costs are putting a sustained squeeze on defence budgets. Resilience has rocketed to the top of our agenda, and, in the short term, our first priority must be to continue to help Ukraine win back its sovereignty—I reassure my noble friend Lord Robathan and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, on that.

In the past few decades, war has only been a theoretical possibility, but now conflict is actually taking place on this continent. We should be crystal clear—the Lord, Lord Robertson, painted this in stark terms—that our safety and that our allies depend on Ukraine winning and Russia losing. Since the start of the conflict, the United Kingdom has been a leading supporter of Ukraine. We were the first European nation to supply it with lethal aid, providing £2.3 billion of military support and £20 million of humanitarian assistance in 2022. Already in 2023, we have committed to repeating that £2.3 billion of support, and we have underlined that we are in this for the long haul.

Recently, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence has announced that we will send Ukraine a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks with armoured recovery and repair vehicles, as well as AS-90 guns, more uncrewed aerial systems, more ammunition and another 600 Brimstone missiles. That package is designed to help Ukraine to go on to dominate the battlefield and to move from resisting to expelling Russian forces from Ukrainian soil. However, while the tanks and guns are coming directly from our stocks, a significant number of the other donations are being purchased on the open market or supportive partners. Indeed, we continue to play a leading role in hosting and participating in donor conferences to encourage other nations to keep supplying Ukraine with the support it needs. Last week’s Ramstein conference, for instance, was another opportunity to galvanise western support, with a number of significant pledges made. In particular, I laud and thank Germany for its recent decision to send 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and to authorise partner countries to send theirs in turn. That is a historic move, which we hope will have a decisive impact.

It is also vital to ensure that we act rapidly to replace the capabilities we lose; this point was raised by a considerable number of your Lordships. In December, the Defence Secretary announced a £229 million order for thousands more anti-tank weapons to replenish our stockpiles. Even as we give Challenger 2 tanks, we will be reviewing the number of Challenger 3 conversions following early lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

We will also build on the Army’s modernisation programme under Operation Mobilise. The Army will accelerate its modernisation, the rebuilding of its stockpiles and the delivery of new tools, including Long Range Precision Fires and electronic warfare. Specifically on artillery, the Defence Secretary has announced the acceleration of our Mobile Fires Platform programme. It was earmarked for delivery in the 2030s. That will now happen earlier and, subject to commercial negotiation, an interim artillery capability is to be delivered.

Beside the short and medium term, we are giving thought to our longer term resilience. The mantra of the Defence Secretary throughout his tenure has been that as threats move, we must move to meet them. The aim at the heart of the Command Paper was to create leaner and more agile Armed Forces, which could be adapted to meet threats as they arise. Today we have a clearer picture of the more serious threats, as well as a renewed understanding of the vital importance of traditional war-fighting capability. That is why in the next couple of months we will refresh the integrated review and Command Paper.

One would have had to be dwelling in outer space during this debate not to hear the recurring theme, which I noted characterised every contribution. That, of course, is in relation to resource. I thought that it might be helpful just to provide a bit of backdrop. The Government recognise the vital importance of defence, as our record investment in 2020 and our unwavering support for Ukraine have shown. The 2022 Autumn Statement reconfirmed the Government’s commitment that defence spending will not fall below 2% of GDP, and the Government recognise that further investment in defence will be required to meet the threats that we face and will consider that as part of the integrated review refresh.

In the 2020 review, when the MoD secured a £24 billion uplift in cash terms to its budget over four years to increase defence spending, that was the biggest investment in the UK’s Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. I have no doubt that a number of the distinguished contributors to this debate will reflect that, in their time of being in senior office, they might have wished that that facility had been offered to them. Our defence budget is currently the largest of any European ally. With that uplift of £24 billion in cash terms over four years, our participation in every NATO operation and mission and our declaration of the UK’s nuclear deterrent to the allies, the UK will remain NATO’s leading European ally.

I listened very carefully to noble Lords’ observations. The defence Command Paper is ordered by the Secretary of State for Defence; it recognises what we need to do, responding to the changing threat environment and how we propose to do it. I have heard the explicit and clear messages: from my noble friend Lord Robathan, that “hard power is necessary”; from my noble friend Lord Hintze, that “soft power without hard power is no power at all”; from the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that we must “restore hard power”; and from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, that “size of capability does matter, and more resource is needed”. The noble and gallant Lord added, colourfully, that there are no parsnips. There may be no parsnips, but I think that there are other vegetables in the larder worth mentioning. He is aware of the very solid investment programme and of really exciting opportunities for our three Armed Forces.

I was interested in the relatively sparse reference made in the debate to the critical domains of cyber and space. One of the absolutely fundamental tasks that the MoD is undertaking is that we have the digital backbone and we are recognising the need to respond to and be part of this digital age. We are engaged with our Cyber Defence Academy, and we are taking the steps that we need to take to ensure that in these new and for many people unfamiliar domains we are in there with our allies and partners, understanding what they mean, recognising the threats that they may pose but also exploiting the opportunities that they offer.

I listened with particular interest to the ideas from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, for the Baltic and far north, and expanding the JEF. I am sure that that is a view that will resonate within the MoD.

The noble Lord, Lord West, repeated the plea for more resource, as did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, and my noble friend Lord Attlee. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, referred to a communication that he had previously issued in his “clearest Yorkshire”. Let me reassure him today that I hear his clearest Yorkshire message. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, reprised the theme, as did the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Alton. It was also reaffirmed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. So I do not think that there is any doubt about the consistency, constancy and unanimity of the message coming from your Lordships. It is my job to ensure that it is relayed to where it matters, and I undertake to discharge that responsibility.

With reference to the integrated review and Command Paper, noble Lords will understand that I am not at liberty to pre-empt any potential announcements, but it would not be giving away any trade secrets to say that this will be an opportunity to create a credible and sustained force—a force ready for strategic state competition sooner, leveraging integration to make best use of our assets, and credible in our ability to deter our adversaries and respond to threats. It will also be about ensuring that we have the agile Armed Forces that we need for our brave men and women. I reiterate the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and others. Our personnel, our Armed Forces men and women, are our most precious asset; we know that and we do value it. We acknowledge that there have been challenges for them; we are cognisant of the challenges and are constantly trying to find ways of addressing them.

In relation to service family accommodation, your Lordships will recall an earlier statement on that—I think it was the day before we broke up for Christmas Recess. I think that I was able to reassure your Lordships that there has been seismic change in how we are offering helplines and immediate and swift support, and taking steps to relocate personnel if accommodation is not habitable.

We need to be sure that we can deploy at pace to a range of threats and seamlessly transition between operating and fighting. Critically, the review and the Command Paper will be about creating a truly global force, collaborating alongside allies and partners to better counter threats and lever our economic, diplomatic and military might to pack a greater combined punch.

Let me now deal with some of the specific points raised by noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Attlee raised the matter of deployable divisions. My understanding is that, as directed in the defence strategy and defence plan of 2022, we have two deployable divisions: 1st (United Kingdom) Division, which provides a wide range of capabilities at home and overseas; and 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, which is the Army’s primary armoured war-fighting division. War-fighting capability, let me reassure noble Lords, remains the cornerstone of deterrence and the bedrock of a world-class British Army. I just want to reassure my noble friend Lord Robathan and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, on that.

Noble Lords will also be aware of the Future Soldier programme, which set out an exciting future for the military and a recognition that we are not necessarily dealing with mass numbers of people, but working out how, by combining the skills of our people with the technological advances we now have, we can do things better with fewer people and do them more safely. Very often, we can use technology to deploy in operations where people previously were at risk; with the deployment of technology, that risk disappears.

The noble and gallant Lords, Lord Stirrup and Lord Craig of Radley, my noble friend Lord Robathan, the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Robertson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, all raised the issue of replenishment. In relation to replenishing stocks, the Ministry of Defence continually manages and reviews its stocks of weapons and munitions and these considerations inform what we give in kind to the armed forces of Ukraine. There are regular strategic supplier conversations throughout the ministry and we regularly fully engage with industry, allies and partners to ensure that all equipment and munitions granted in kind are replaced as expeditiously as possible. We are absolutely clear that we will never go below the safe line that we require for the security of our own nation.

A number of noble Lords asked specifically what we have been ordering. I can confirm that a number of substantial contracts have already been placed to directly replace our stockpiles. These include the replacement of the Starstreak high-velocity missile and the lightweight multirole missile. The next generation of light anti-tank weapons, NLAWs, are currently being built, and several hundred missiles will be delivered to UK stockpiles from 2023 onwards. A contract for further NLAWs was signed on 7 December 2022.

A number of noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lord Robathan, the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, raised the matter of accommodation. As I said earlier, we are very cognisant of this. We have made investment and have developed structures so that nobody in our Armed Forces suffering unacceptable conditions should be left without help or a source of advice. I cross-examined officials to be sure that that is a robust system and was assured that it is.

I have some figures on recruitment, but in the interest of time I am going to offer to write to those noble Lords who raised issues of recruitment and, under that, I shall deal with the issue of reserves that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raised. There is perfectly positive and, I think, encouraging information in there.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, and my noble friend Lord Attlee asked for a debate in this House. I am very pleased to be able to confirm that that debate will happen on 9 February. It has probably not yet been tabled in the bulletin of parliamentary business, but noble Lords can look forward to the perhaps dubious pleasure of me opening it and my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon winding it up.

On dealing with propaganda and misinformation, an issue of concern and interest to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, we have used our own intelligence, in conjunction with the United States and the armed forces of Ukraine and Ukrainian intelligence sources, to start being a little more free handed about disclosing intelligence. We think that is the best way to neutralise the poison of lies and misinformation, and it has proved to be very effective. In a previous debate, I referred noble Lords to a recent survey that had been carried out in Russia. It indicated that public support for the war is dropping in Russia, and that is very welcome.

On defence resilience and industry, which concerned many noble Lords, not least the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, along with a number of others, we have made major changes within defence. If we work on from the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, published in March 2021, as a step change in our approach to industry, we now think about defence industries as strategic capabilities in their own right. The noble and gallant Lord is quite correct: we cannot do this on a feast and famine basis. That was something we discovered with shipbuilding. In fact, the national shipbuilding strategy, refreshed recently, has been very much welcomed by the shipbuilding industry, because it is giving it predictability, visibility and a sense of what lies ahead in the future. The noble and gallant Lord is quite correct that that is what we want to achieve across our relationship with industry.

The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, raised issues about our Armed Forces people. I absolutely emphasise how important they are. He asked about veterans, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I can confirm that we now have a Minister for Veterans, Mr Johnny Mercer; we have an Office for Veterans’ Affairs; and very recently, in the Armed Forces Act, we had explicit provisions for the first time in relation to the covenant, to introduce a new legal duty in relation to health, housing and education. When these services are sought, wherever they are being sought, by veterans throughout the United Kingdom, there will be better support, making sure they can get the services they need.

The question of whether we can do more for Ukraine was on the minds of many noble Lords. I reassure them that we work closely with the armed forces of Ukraine. We analyse with them what they think their needs are, and I have said before in this Chamber that we do not do that in a silo of our own: we consult with our allies and partners so that we ensure that our singular contributions achieve the best aggregate output in terms of impact and effect. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that the Indo-Pacific tilt is still a very important part of HM Government strategy. That is exercised through various conduits, including diplomatic and trade engagement, and of course defence is an essential part of that integrated offer to the region.

I am slightly over my time, but this has been such an important debate. I thank your Lordships for your indulgence and draw my remarks to a conclusion by saying that we are, in Defence, changing and adapting, we are learning from the lessons of Ukraine, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that we support Ukraine to secure victory, and ultimately build up a more robust resilience so we are ready for whatever strategic threat comes next. On the broader front of our defence capability in the present and the future, my right honourable friend the Secretary State for Defence has a reputation for honesty, tenacity, bluntness and leadership, and he will be a doughty advocate for Defence in his engagement with the Prime Minister and the Treasury. In that endeavour, he will certainly have an important weapon at his disposal: the contributions of your Lordships to this debate, a cogent augmentation of MoD arguments for which I thank your Lordships profoundly.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, could I urge her, in this electronic age, to copy any letters to everybody who has participated in the debate?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I will be delighted to do that. As your Lordships will have realised, such was the breadth and scope of questions that I could not possibly address them all in this debate, but I will certainly look at Hansard and undertake to deal with as much as I can by correspondence, and that will be placed in the Library, probably in electronic form, for access by anyone who wants it.

Pensions Appeal Tribunals (Late Appeal) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 17th January 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, often in your Lordships’ House—and I mean your Lordships’ House, not Grand Committee, as I have not forgotten where I am—we spend a lot of time looking at primary legislation and saying that we need better scrutiny, that we should not have Henry VIII clauses, that we do not want framework legislation and that we need to be able to scrutinise statutory instruments very closely. The assumption is that the Government, on occasion, are perhaps trying to pull the wool over our eyes.

We do not get framework legislation with lots of Henry VIII clauses from the MoD, but we do from other ministries, so we will perhaps exonerate the MoD from this. Here we have a statutory instrument that looks so straightforward that one almost wonders why it needs to be here, other than that we had agreed in the Armed Forces Act 2021 that we should scrutinise such a statutory instrument. In asking whether this should be considered debated and approved, it is a straightforward statutory instrument, as it is only right that service personnel and veterans who are seeking to appeal, whether they are from Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, are treated in the same way. The basic principle seems straightforward: everyone in the four nations of the United Kingdom should be treated the same.

I have a similar question to one from the noble Lord, Lord Jones, about the number of appeals we are thinking about—not necessarily in 2021 or 2022. Are we talking about very large numbers or is this seem primarily as a tidying-up exercise? It would be useful to know that and have a sense, looking back 15 years from 2008 to 2023, of whether many people have been done a disservice because they were in Scotland and Northern Ireland and were not able to appeal between months 13 and 24, whereas they would have been able to in England or Wales.

I like the idea of the Lord Chancellor’s steering group but agree that it would be interesting to know more about its basis and whether it is intended as a long-term body.

I have a final question. We have occasionally had other tidying-up amendments. Is the Minister sanguine about the fact that other tidying-up legislation might need to be brought forward if there are other disparities that could be doing a disservice to service personnel or veterans from one part of the United Kingdom compared to those from other parts?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. It seems simply to bring appeals in Scotland and Northern Ireland into line with those in the rest of the United Kingdom, which is a good thing. I am curious, because this anomaly presumably sprang up in 2008, which was 15 years ago, about why it has taken so long to alight upon it and address it. That is the first of my two questions.

Secondly, the hierarchy for whether an appeal is allowed involves a step at which the Secretary of State may choose not to allow it. Does the Secretary of State have to respect any criteria in making this decision or is it absolutely at his discretion? I cannot see any guidance on the criteria in the instrument, but there may be a general criterion. I recall some discussion of this in the past and the requirement of Secretaries of State to behave reasonably, but I cannot see any criteria. Clearly, the stopgap—the thing that makes this reasonable —is that the tribunal may override the Secretary of State in the interests of justice, so it is not that important a point, but I am curious.

Just to make sure I have not got this completely wrong, would the Minister confirm that this measure is favourable for appellants in Scotland and Northern Ireland?

Military Personnel: Strike Action Cover

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I indicated earlier, we exercise a robust test when we get a MACA request from another government department. Strict principles have to be observed, and we would never willingly offer help if we felt that it was available elsewhere in government or, indeed, from the commercial sector.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, MACA requests—that is, military aid to civil authorities—are being used routinely, when guidance states that military assistance should be used

“responding to emergencies or in maintaining supplies and essential services”.

Such requests create increased domestic pressure on our Armed Forces at a time when the Government are pushing ahead with cutting a further 10,000 troops from the size of the Army. Will the Minister confirm that the Government’s refresh of the integrated review will take account of this and halt any further cuts?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

To reply to the first part of the noble Lord’s question, it is the case that a proportion of our Armed Forces have been identified to be deployed to MACA tests—the figure I have at the moment is a total of 1,455. That is a relatively small proportion of our combined Regular Army and reservists. As I said earlier, we are comfortable with offering that help in terms of not compromising national security and not in any way impacting on our ability to do our fundamental task, which is the security of the realm.

As for the integrated review refresh, we are always vigilant about the nature of the threat, the character of the threat, and what we think we need to respond to it. We will be flexible and open-minded as to how to we submit our views to that integrated review refresh.

Mali: UN Peacekeeping Mission

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for being here to respond to questions on the Statement.

I commend the 257 British personnel who have been deployed in Mali as part of the mission. It is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission to date, with 281 peacekeepers of the 12,000 on the mission sadly losing their lives. RAF air and ground crew have also been deployed in Mali. Their bravery and dedication will rightly be commended by both sides of the House.

The withdrawal of French troops from Mali was announced in February, and of Swedish troops in March. Can the Minister explain why this Statement is being made in November, given that the reason given for the withdrawal of our troops is the following of European allies? When were UN partners informed? Does this also signify an end to discussions on an alternative mission in Mali, which the Armed Forces Minister said was under consideration in July? In this time, there has been nothing but silence from Ministers. Is this because the Government have simply taken this long to work out what to do?

What has happened in this time, however, is the mandate of the mission being renewed by the UN Security Council, with British support. That begs a number of questions as to how the mission will proceed given that it would have expected both our personnel and expertise, particularly in long-range specialised reconnaissance? How do Ministers expect our decision to impact the mission’s continued progress and the region’s future, particularly with recent rises in terrorism across the Sahel region and neighbouring countries and the continued presence of the Russian mercenary Wagner Group? The latter has been accused of massacring civilians in a region of Mali where extremist Islamist factions have sought to recruit. What recent assessment has the Minister made of the Wagner Group’s activity in Mali, and its ability to foment further uncertainty in the region? I understand that UK officials were expected to meet counterparts from the EU, west Africa and the UN in Accra today and yesterday for talks on its potential to move on to Burkina Faso, which has suffered two coups in the last eight months. Have these talks taken place, and can the Minister update us?

At the end of the Statement, the Chilcot report is mentioned. One of Chilcot’s key mantras is that action should be taken only if the next step is already determined. When we entered Mali, did we have clear criteria as to when we should leave, and if so, have these criteria been met? The need for this strategic approach applies to the next steps too. France has already outlined its plans for working with African countries for the next six months. Can we expect a similar plan from the UK Government shortly, or will we have to wait another nine months? A lack of clear thinking for the Sahel region was also evident in the integrated review, which hardly mentioned it. Can we expect a more thorough strategic overview in the upcoming update?

Finally, turning to Thursday, it may be a coincidence that this withdrawal comes at the same time as we are expecting government cuts. Is the withdrawal connected to cuts to the defence budget? Clarity on defence spending is vital, especially when looking to maintain our NATO commitments. We know that a real-terms cut was agreed in the 2020 settlement. Its negative impact has been significantly exacerbated by the recent rise in inflation.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, for a decade now, the people of Mali have suffered the consequences of war, the multiplication of violent extremism and the ensuing violence. This has led to a state of crisis, with people facing refugee migrations and food insecurity, and to the suffering of, primarily, women and children. This in turn has led Mali to be ranked 131st of 163 countries for peace, and 137th of 145 countries for gender equality. I therefore support and commend the British personnel who have worked with others to try to create an opportunity for some stability. It is regrettable that there has been a move back from this because of the Mali Government. I hope that the Minister will be able to outline the Government’s policy for continuing the vital work of supporting NGOs, civil society groups, and women and children in Mali after this draw-down.

I declare an interest: I chair the UK board of peace- building charities, Search for Common Ground. It has been operating in Mali with the British Government’s support, trying to combat the sources of the problems there. I hope that this kind of support can continue. Will the Minister outline the Government’s development priorities? How is it seeking to use the Accra talks to progress them? What mechanisms will we use for our development ambitions in Mali?

Will the Minister also outline the role that the UK will play with ECOWAS, the AU, the United States and others to try to return Mali to a constitutional order? Of course the country’s future is in its own hands, but the UK has played a role: it has committed forces. A full draw-down should not bring about a full withdrawal of UK interest. On that, could the Minister explain why UK development assistance is planned to fall dramatically from the £22 million provided in 2019-20 to just £500,000 in 2023-24? Would the draw-down of military personnel not be exactly the right time to review development priorities so that a development vacuum is not created by UK personnel leaving?

Finally, I wish to return to the issue of the Wagner Group. I am on the record on a number of occasions pressing the noble Lords, Lord Ahmad and Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park, for the UK to move on the proscription of the Wagner Group. I will now press the Defence Minster on this. The Wagner Group is acting directly against the interests of the United Kingdom and our allies. Commons Minister James Heappey referred to the human rights atrocities that it is carrying out. The UK has no interest that is not being undermined by the Wagner Group, and there should be consequences for UK relations with countries that seek to use the Wagner Group not only against their own people but against the UK’s national interests. I repeat my call for the Government to prepare and bring forward mechanisms that would see the Wagner Group proscribed. So far, the Government have not made any moves on this. When answering questions, the Minister in the Commons said that he would engage in discussions with the Home Office on this issue, so I hope for a suitably positive response from the Minister today to me on this issue, so that we send a very strong signal that, whether in Mali or elsewhere, the UK will act against groups such as Wagner—and particularly against the Wagner Group by proscribing them.

Armed Forces (Tri-Service Serious Crime Unit) (Consequential Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2022

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I intervene out of order, encouraged by what the noble Baroness just said. One point that attracted my attention is that the regulations apply to all parts of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

“and the British overseas territories (except Gibraltar).”

Is there something particular about Gibraltar that means they do not apply there? It would be interesting to know why Gibraltar should be excluded. I am sure it is not an oversight, but the Explanatory Memorandum does not explain and it would be interesting to know the reason.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this narrow and consequential SI, which of course we totally support. It gives us an opportunity to have hopefully a final look at this gaggle of legislation that has been necessary to introduce these reforms.

I worry about whether there will be problems deciding what a serious crime is. One can see how it might become defined within a single service, and I am totally in favour of the tri-service unit, but this will involve single-service police forces designating a crime as important for the tri-service specialists. What criteria will be used to decide that it should go to the tri-service specialists? Who will make that decision? To what extent do the criteria differ from those presently used by the single-service specialist units? On personnel, how will the tri-service unit ensure it has the specialist technical capability to investigate serious crimes?

In the Minister’s introduction she touched on civilian involvement. Can she repeat that, for clarity? Does this mean that people recruited from civilian police forces or other specialists will have operational capability? In other words, will they be able to serve alongside military operational police? In those circumstances, will they still be civilian in character?

Having asked those questions, I repeat our total support for the reforms, in respect of which this is one of the last consequential amendments.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions. As all have observed, this is a fairly narrow field of activity; none the less, the questions are predictably penetrating and searching. I will try to deal with them.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked what sort of crimes the serious crime unit will be investigating. I can give some degree of detail, which I hope will be helpful. I should say that it will be generically responsible for the investigation of all serious crimes committed by those subject to service law. It is worth noting that the MoD working definition of “serious crimes” is not the same as that contained in the Serious Crime Act, which I think was at the heart of the question posed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig.

So to clarify, serious crime for the purposes of the DSCU is an offence listed under Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006, an offence committed in proscribed circumstances, or an offence under Section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 for which the corresponding offence under the law in England and Wales is indictable, or any other offence which may not be dealt with at a summary hearing by a commanding officer. This essentially captures most criminal offences, which are triable only by a court martial, and some military offences such as the ill-treatment of personnel in initial training.

Prior to the DSCU standing up, the single services all have a different threshold for how they determine serious crime; as such, getting clear statistics on the full range of serious crimes is challenging. Official statistics for the most serious offences of murder, manslaughter, sexual offences and domestic abuse in the service justice system are published annually. In 2021, there were 239 service police investigations into these offences.

The rank of single service provost martial differs in each service and, as your Lordships will be aware, each is independent from the other and each has no ability to compel the other. But on 5 December, all single service SIB personnel will transfer under the direct command of the provost marshal of serious crime, who will investigate serious crime independently of the three single services and be answerable to the Chief of Defence People and Vice Chief of Defence Staff for the execution their duties. There are agreements that the single service provost martial will assist the provost marshal of serious crime in responding to serious crime in the first instance.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, also asked about governance arrangements. I have alluded briefly to what the line of accountability is. On the matter of governance, options relating to the strategic policing and governance board are being developed to ensure the most appropriate and effective governance mechanism is created for the DSCU and the wider service police.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, rightly pointed out that a lot of this is now tied in with the various reviews—such as by his Honour Shaun Lyons and Sir Richard Henriques. These have been very important contributions to the development all of this. I hope that we are now reflecting the important recommendations and sensible suggestions provided in these reviews to ensure that the system is fit for purpose to deal with these serious crimes, and that we will have the necessary specialisms. I think I indicated in my speaking notes there is now a healthy cross-transfer with the Home Office police forces, the College of Policing and the guidance offered by the Police Council. So there is very good cross-fertilisation of training and professional standards.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, asked specifically about Gibraltar. I did find an inquiry but the situation is a little complicated. I will read out this note only because the question was asked by a lawyer; others will struggle to follow it, but here goes:

“The Armed Forces Act of 2006 originally extended to all the British Overseas Territories and was part of local law but that expired in 2011 in the British Overseas Territories including Gibraltar as a result of a drafting error when the Armed Forces Act 2006 was renewed for the first time by the Armed Forces Act of 2011.”


The Armed Forces Act 2016 corrected this error—I am letting a noble Lord take his seat, as I see that the noble and learned Lord is listening with rapt attention to this—by extending the Armed Forces Act 2006 to the British Overseas Territories once again. But, and this is interesting, Gibraltar was not included because it had instead asked to deal with the issue using legislation passed by the Gibraltar Parliament. Under UK law, the Armed Forces Act 2006 continues to apply to the UK’s regular and Reserve Forces when they are in the British Overseas Territories, including Gibraltar, even if it does not form part of local law, just as it applies in any foreign state where UK Armed Forces are deployed. UK law therefore allows those in the UK Armed Forces who commit service offences in Gibraltar to be charged with those offences. The Armed Forces (Gibraltar) Act 2018 recognises that the Armed Forces Act 2006 applies in Gibraltar, so there is an application but by a rather circuitous route.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I congratulate the Minister on being so very well prepared.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down—she probably deserves a round of applause for that last answer—can I press my two points a little further? First, I have this vision of the military equivalent of Constable Plod coming across a crime. Somewhere there must be a process where that crime goes up the chain of command and gets to somebody who says, “This is a serious crime and it has to go to the specialist unit”. Who would that be? The Minister can write to me if it is too difficult to answer now. Secondly, on the use of civilians, will they have operational powers? In other words, when they are working with the military will they have the power of arrest?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. I was not forgetting him and was going to endeavour to address those points. It is the provost marshal of the Defence Serious Crime Unit who is in overall charge, and who will therefore expect to assume jurisdiction over the sort of crime that I detailed to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. I will endeavour to find out more about the mechanics of the structure to see if I can satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, about how this works in practice, but I understand that there are clearly understood lines of communication and information to ensure that the system works smoothly.

On civilians, the DCSU will be staffed and led by service police because, unlike civilian police, they can investigate offences wherever they are committed and use their powers overseas. They are trained and ready to deploy wherever the Armed Forces operate, including in operational theatres. Importantly, the DCSU will have access to civilian expertise by embedding reservists who are police officers in the Home Office police forces. Sir Richard Henriques recommended that the deputy provost marshal be a civilian but, due to restrictions on jurisdiction and operational deployment requirements, there is a need for the deputy provost marshal to be military. However, the DCSU will optimise the use of our skilled and experienced Reserve Forces, many of whom are serving civilian police officers within the Home Office police forces. They will be embedded within the new unit and play a significant role.

Perhaps I can provide further reassurance: the new unit will be independently inspected by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, so there is an overall independence of monitoring. I think that has dealt with the points that were raised, so I thank noble Lords for their contributions.

Armed Forces (Court Martial) (Amendment) Rules 2022

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this SI. We totally support it, because we believe it to be consequential. I have two questions, although she may have answered both, but, for the avoidance of doubt, are the numbers in this SI the same as the numbers from the Lyons review? I think they are but I would value the Minister saying so. I also wanted to ask what an OR7 rank was, because it is not clear from the Explanatory Memorandum. One rule of Explanatory Memorandums is that they are supposed to be legible and understandable by a reader who does not have prior knowledge. It fails on that point, but we now know who it is.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for recognising—it has sometimes been a difficult argument to advance—that the service justice system operates for a specific purpose in a very different environment. I welcome her acknowledgement of that. As she rightly said, we have been trying to ensure that the service justice system draws on the best practice and experience of the civilian justice system and Home Office police forces, to ensure that we are using the best examples and templates that we can find. I am grateful to her for highlighting that.

The noble Baroness asked a fair question about women. I guess that the nub of the question is whether they will have to work harder, as there are fewer of them, and it could place pressure on them. That is a very perceptive question. The change is being introduced in a way that means any impact on women is limited and proportionate. She will remember that the change we have already agreed is that there should be one woman on each board. Because it will impact only on ranks of OR7 and above of women in the Armed Forces, since service personnel below that rank are not eligible to sit as lay members, it is a manageable working proposal. There will be a 12-month exemption for women who have already sat on a court martial board for more than five working days, to prevent women repeatedly sitting on boards. We think we have reached a manageable proposition, but we will monitor the impact of the change—I reassure noble Lords about that—for at least 12 months. If we identify any adverse impacts, we will then decide what action we need to take to address them. I hope that that reassures the noble Baroness.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked specifically about OR7 ranks. I gave a generic description in my speaking notes, but paragraph 2.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum states that

“chief petty officers, staff corporals, staff sergeants, colour sergeants Royal Marines, flight sergeants and chief technicians (‘OR-7 ranks’) can sit as lay members.”

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

I apologise to the Minister— I should learn to read more carefully.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord is very gracious. Not reading things carefully is not a charge that I would ever level at him; it has been my uncomfortable experience to find that he reads things very carefully indeed.

The final question that the noble Lord posed was about whether these numbers reflected the Lyons recommendations, and I am told yes—this statutory instrument is as His Honour Shaun Lyons recommended.

I hope I have dealt with the points raised and I commend the instrument to the House.

Ukraine: Weapons

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 16th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to the noble and gallant Lord that, as previously indicated, the department is fully engaged with industry, because we want to ensure that all equipment granted in kind to the Ukrainian armed forces is replaced as expeditiously as possible, but also that, by continually managing and reviewing our own UK stock of weapons and munitions, we ensure that while we meet that commitment to Ukraine, our UK Armed Forces’ stocks are sufficiently maintained.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I have but modest experience, having worked in the logistics department of the Armed Forces, but I get closer to my noble friend Lord West’s experience that stockpiles were always brought down to the minimum credible level rather than having any serious surpluses. Those stockpiles are being used up, but surely they need to be brought to the pre-war levels. Let us be realistic: the world will be a less safe place at the end of this war. We will almost certainly have an expanded NATO with a Russian border, so, if anything, surely the stockpiles should be expanded. The Government should have made these decisions by now, so will the stockpiles be brought to pre-war levels, and will they indeed be expanded in light of the new threat?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am unable to provide anything more specific to the noble Lord in addition to what I have previously said. I cannot offer a detailed inventory of what is currently in storage in terms of stockpiles for the UK, or a complete inventory of what is being released to Ukraine. What I can reassure the House about is that the department is constantly engaged in reviewing these stock levels, having regard to both our commitment to support Ukraine and our obligation to make sure we can defend the United Kingdom. As the noble and gallant Lord asked earlier, we are fully engaged with industry.

National Shipbuilding Strategy

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the latest iteration of the Government’s shipbuilding strategy is overdue. Funding contained in it was first announced two years ago. However, it is welcome, and I am grateful to the Minister for coming to the House this evening to answer our questions.

The Defence Select Committee’s report last December highlighted how stretched the Navy’s capabilities are, with a danger that it will not be able to cope with the increasingly complex international security environment. It warns that an unexpected crisis could break it. It is vital that the Government do what is needed to avoid that dire outcome. The report urges collaboration with the UK shipbuilding sector by providing an assured pipeline of work and actively intervening to support the modernisation of yards to support the delivery of new vessels into an expanded fleet capable of fulfilling the ambition of the integrated review.

However, the strategy does not confirm the total number of ships the Royal Navy will receive. Can the Minister confirm today how many Type-32 frigates and multi-role support ships will be built and delivered? Does the “more than £4 billion” of government investment over the next three years cover any of the cost of the 150 ships in the 30-year pipeline to which the Statement refers? How much of this is new money?

Beyond this, there are two major problems with the strategy. First, why does the strategy not promise a British-built by default approach to procurement? This, as the GMB and Unite have highlighted, will kill investment and put UK jobs and skills at risk. A commitment to ensure that ships are built in UK yards, with targets for using UK steel, would build resilience in our supply chains and protect our security.

Steelmaking is a crucial component of our national security and our ability to act in our own interest. What steps will the Government take to improve the public procurement of UK-made steel in shipbuilding in order to preserve and promote jobs that are of vital importance to steel communities and the UK’s strategic independence? What is more, with foreign bidders supported by their own Governments, British shipyards are not even able to compete on a level playing field. None of this feels in line with the Government’s levelling-up strategy.

We know that a British-built by default strategy would create more jobs, but frankly, we do not know how many new jobs there will be a result of the strategy as it is. Can the Minister tell us? The Government seem to keep updating their excuses as to why we continue to procure from elsewhere, such as with a £10 million contract awarded to a Dutch yard last week. No other shipbuilding nation would act in this way. What the Defence Secretary has said is that fleet solid support vessels will be built by “British-led teams” following the decision to award the competitive procurement phase design contracts earlier this year. How is “British-led” defined? What percentage of the construction and manufacture of fleet solid support vessels will take place in British shipyards?

Secondly, the strategy does not tackle long-lasting issues of mismanagement and delivery at the Ministry of Defence. As it stands, no major shipbuilding programmes are rated on time or on budget by the National Audit Office. The number of projects rated amber or red is increasing. We know from previous experience how easy it is to underestimate both the resources and time needed for large contracts to be delivered. Can the Minister tell us what specific initiatives will be put in place to achieve on-time and on-budget outcomes? Moreover, while on the subject of contracts, I am curious about the minimum 20% weighting for social value that the strategy says will be applied for MoD shipbuilding competition. Can the Minister explain what this means in more detail? How will social value be assessed?

On a wider point, the strategy assumes a level of investment from the private sector into research, development and manufacturing. The mood seems to be that a forward-looking strategy providing a glimpse of the future to the sector will be enough to generate investment. I find this optimistic. Can the Government confirm their belief that the private sector will invest at the levels necessary without direct funding from Government? As I mentioned earlier, not having a British-built by default strategy makes this optimism even more farfetched. Is the Minister not concerned?

Those are my two main areas of concern, but I have some further questions on other aspects of the strategy. The strategy establishes the Maritime Capability Campaign Office within the Department for International Trade as the export arm of the National Shipbuilding Office. This will supposedly turbocharge UK shipping exports. Given that this has such a prominent role in the strategy, it is neither unexpected or unwelcome, but without a commitment to using UK materials and shipyards, it seems hollow. Can the Minister therefore indicate what role she expects exports to have in maintaining our shipbuilding industry? Without a commitment to using British materials, does she see the UK as simply a processing centre, to import materials from abroad and sell them on as finished vessels; or perhaps the idea is to contract foreign shipyards and then sell their finished products elsewhere, with the UK acting only as an intermediary?

Finally, with the Spring Statement now only eight days away, can the Minister confirm a big boost for defence funding, both to fulfil the ambition of the integrated review and to respond to the growing threat of Russian aggression?

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with many of the comments and questions from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. It is obviously welcome to have this refreshed National Shipbuilding Strategy, but one might wonder what has happened to the ships.

We recently looked at the Type 45s. Before we get to the actual shipbuilding, ship maintenance and repair perhaps need to be thought about, so I have one very direct question for the Minister. How many of our Type 45s are currently at sea? How many are in dock? How many are seaworthy? It is surely important for the UK’s position in the world that we have ships available now, not in many years’ time.

In particular, I wonder whether this shipbuilding strategy is as ambitious as it needs to be. The Statement says:

“We have committed to procuring a formidable future fleet including up to five Type 32 frigates”—


as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked, how many are envisaged?—

“alongside the Type 31 and Type 26 programmes. We will be growing our fleet of frigates and destroyers over the current number of 19 by the end of the decade.”—[Official Report, Commons, 10/3/22; col. 505.]

What does that actually mean? Will we have 20 ships by the end of the decade—an additional one? What sort of message do the Government think that sends to the international community? The Prime Minister currently says that he will lead activity against Russia. If we have only 20 ships by 2029—or does that mean 2030?—I am not sure that is terribly credible.

We have a quotation in the strategy from the Prime Minister:

“If there was one policy which strengthens the UK in every possible sense, it is building more ships for the Royal Navy.”


That is clearly welcome—as would be increasing the number of our troops—but, realistically, what are the projections for the size of the Royal Navy? How far do the Government plan for these to be British-made ships with British steel? How far do they really think any defence expenditure settlements will enable us to deliver on time? As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, pointed out, it is very rare for defence procurement to arrive on time and on budget. With the current rates of inflation, given that defence inflation normally rises much faster than ordinary inflation, what is the realistic prospect of our increasing the number of ships and doing so on time?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for their observations. Although their questions, quite rightly, are penetrating, I think there is an understanding that this is an exciting document. It is not empty, vacuous flim-flam, but a very serious, holistic approach to how within the United Kingdom we sustain and grow a prosperous indigenous shipbuilding industry. I remember that one of the first tasks I had as a Defence Minister, back in 2019, was to present to your Lordships the review by Sir John Parker of the 2017 shipbuilding strategy. I remember thinking at the time that the review document was exciting and visionary.

Coming from Glasgow—or coming from Renfrewshire, near Glasgow—and having personally visited Upper Clyde shipbuilding yards when they were on the brink, I do wish to pay tribute to the trade union movement operational at the time for its assiduous work in making sure that politicians understood what the threats and challenges were. They were well informed and persuasive and I thought they did a splendid job in persuading the political process that, back then in the early 2000s, we had to make a better job of how we approached shipbuilding. I know noble Lords will remember Kvaerner on the Clyde, which was completing one order when there was no certainty about where the rest of the work was coming from. As I say, I pay tribute to the trade union movement for its determined and resolute work to try to get greater sense to prevail.

That is why, stepping forward to what Sir John Parker did in 2019, I drew a deep breath of fresh air and thought that this was really going somewhere. I have to say to your Lordships that I think this shipbuilding strategy really does pick up the baton and run with it. What I see in here are the components for a serious, well-funded, well-researched, well-supported, buoyant, competitive shipbuilding industry within the UK, and we should all be heartened and encouraged by that.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about the size of the Navy. As they are both aware, there are good things happening. For the first time in 30 years, unbelievably, we have two different types of frigate being built simultaneously. We are satisfied that the number of Royal Navy frigates will be sufficient, and we do not anticipate that number dropping below 10 this decade. That is because, in addition to the Type 23s currently serving, we will have the first Type 26s coming in, and we will start to see the Type 31s being delivered, which will all be delivered by 2028. I would observe to your Lordships that the level of shipbuilding investment by the MoD is hugely significant and puts flesh on the bones of this strategy. MoD shipbuilding will double over the life of this Parliament and rise to over £1.7 billion a year. That will certainly allow us to increase the number of frigates and destroyers beyond the 19 we currently have by the end of the decade.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked specifically about the Type 32. That is an exciting project. It is at the moment still at the concept stage, but it will be the first of a new generation of warships, with a focus on hosting and operating autonomous offboard systems. So that is a really innovatory, visionary concept. The early preconcept phase has commenced; the focus is now on developing the operational concept, and the procurement programme strategy will be decided following the concept phase, which has not yet been launched. I can confirm these ships will be UK-built, with the exact shipyard, obviously, still to be determined—that will be subject to commercial competition.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also asked about the Fleet Solid Support. It is an interesting concept. It will be either a sole British build or a consortium, but the predominant interest will be British. The noble Lord asked how that fitted in with levelling up and the union. I would say to the noble Lord that I was very interested to see the graphic depiction of the map in the document itself, because it gave one of the most visual confirmations of just how critical, right across the United Kingdom, shipbuilding is. It is not just the yards building the ships; it is the huge number of small and medium-sized enterprises that are in the supply chain for that activity. All that plays its role in levelling up and in adding value to communities, which can all expect benefit from the fruits of this strategy rolling out.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about the role that the private sector will play. As he will be aware from the strategy, there has been close consultation with the industry, as is absolutely right. We will establish a shipbuilding enterprise for growth, which will be an industry-based organisation, and we will learn from similar approaches taken in sectors such as the automotive, aerospace and space industries how to take that forward. The private sector has an important role to play in this but, as I say, it has been engaged throughout the refresh of the National Shipbuilding Strategy and is absolutely engaged on the vision contained in it.

It is also interesting to look at the definition of “shipbuilding enterprise” because it gives a good encapsulation of what we are talking about. For the purposes of the refresh:

“The term includes the design; build; integration; test and evaluation; repair; refit; conversion; and support of warships; commercial vessels; workboats; leisure vessels; systems and sub-systems.”


That is a huge range of activity, which, as I said earlier, reaches out right across the United Kingdom.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about exports, which are an important component. As he is aware, in relation to the Type 26, we have had an export of design to Canada and Australia. It is important to acknowledge that this is an important departure from the old concept, where you designed a ship and built it so it was solely British and everything remained in the control of the British shipbuilder. The shipbuilding industry has recognised—Sir John Parker identified this back in 2019—that to have resilience and appeal to all sorts of markets, whether they are indigenous markets here or export markets abroad, we need to be able to create things that other people have an interest in acquiring. That is a really exciting development.

The Type 31 has already seen export success, with the announcement in September last year that Indonesia has selected the Arrowhead 140 design for its programme. The UK Government are working closely with Babcock on a number of other export opportunities for the Arrowhead 140; of course, the results of the Miecznik frigate programme in Poland were recently announced, so there is activity there. It is an exciting reflection of what shipbuilding is currently achieving and what the strategy recognises and can build on.

I referred to the defence funding settlement. Both the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, were interested in what lies ahead for defence. We have had the integrated review, the defence Command Paper and what most people regard as a very significant financial settlement for defence. We take nothing for granted. We live in the business of identifying and addressing threat. We have a very engaged Secretary of State who will, I am sure, be alert to how we do that and ensure that the funding is appropriate to whatever we need to deploy to address threat in future.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked whether the strategy is ambitious. Again, I was struck by a section in the document on our ambitions for the shipbuilding sector. I will not read it all out but, when I read through it, I felt as though I had had a good glass of gin—I felt uplifted. Look at the headings: “green technology”; “productivity”; “skills”; “autonomy” —developing a domestic regulatory framework for maritime autonomy so that we can lead the way on international maritime organisation—and “exports”. There are a lot of ambitions in here. Perhaps the more pertinent question is: how do we know that we are achieving them? Again, I will not bore your Lordships with the detail but there is a series of metrics which would be a useful device in measuring how we are getting on.

The noble Baroness asked particularly about Type 45s. The power improvement project has been applied to HMS “Dauntless”. She has moved into the test and commissioning phase of her programme. All three new diesel generators have been run. Initial load trials have been completed successfully, and that is a precursor to the rigorous trials programme in harbour before returning to sea later this year for sea trials.

HMS “Daring” has moved to Cammell Laird. It arrived there in September in readiness for commencement of her PIP conversion, which will be carried out during this year. This is a process whereby, as each ship is done, we learn. The other Type 45s will come in depending on operational activities and commitments. They are hugely capable, much-admired ships and are regarded as significant members of the Royal Navy fleet. I think that is a positive picture, and I am satisfied that there will be a good story to tell.

I hope that I have answered all the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, raised.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Will the Minister use the usual convention of writing for anything that she has missed out?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, of course I shall.

Ukraine

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this new and sensible procedure of not reading out the Statement because we have all read it leaves me with the problem of how to open one’s speech. I will compromise by thanking the Minister for coming to answer our questions.

I do not really have anything new to say. To emphasise that, I am going to read out the first paragraph of the shadow Secretary of State’s reply to the Statement in the other place, because my position will not deviate from it. He said:

“I welcome its contents and make clear Labour’s full backing for the steps the Government have been taking on international diplomatic efforts to de-escalate threats, on defensive support for the Ukraine military, on necessary institutional reforms within the country, and on tough economic and financial sanctions in response to any fresh Russian invasion into Ukraine.”—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/22; col. 63.]


So I do not believe that we differ in any significant way from the Government. However, I have some questions.

I understand that 13,000 Ukrainian citizens have been killed in the conflict so far, and many must have been killed on what I will loosely call the Russian side. The first objective must surely therefore be to stop the killing. Moving into the area of objectives, could the Minister set out what our policy is, first, on direct military engagement and, secondly, on recognising any of the Russian concerns? I hope she will reaffirm that we are overwhelmingly committed to a diplomatic solution; those diplomatic solutions do not look very optimistic but I hope she can flesh out some strands of optimism.

In 1994—I may get these things slightly wrong—the Budapest agreement was signed and Britain is the guarantor of that agreement. As I understand it, although I cannot claim to have read it, it was a comprehensive agreement that settled the future of Ukraine. It settled its boundaries and did a brilliant job of denuclearising the country, and we would all have hoped that that was how it would settle down. The agreement sought to answer all the questions. Now I have to ask the Minister whether it has any relevance today at all.

In 2014 the Normandy format was created—in Normandy, I believe, because it had its essence at the Normandy celebrations. It is a format of four countries: France, Germany, the US and Russia. On 6 January this year, it met. As far as one can tell, there was little progress, but, hopefully, we have some way of getting to the essence of what those conversations were. My simple question is: was there any progress?

A second institution is the NATO-Russia Council, which has been meeting somewhat infrequently. However, it met on 12 January. Reports from the Secretary-General of NATO seemed a bit downbeat, but does the Minister have any more positive interpretation of what happened? Are there any areas for optimism?

Like any Opposition, even when we agree with the Government, we inevitably end up saying, “You should try harder”, and I shall say that they should try harder. Should there be more diplomatic effort? I am not saying that the Government do not grasp this, but the news, for want of a better barometer, does not seem to grasp just how serious the situation is. There have been a number of efforts by UK diplomats and politicians to meet the Ukrainian Government, but should there be more? Should the Foreign Secretary visit Ukraine? Should there be something as innovatory as the Defence Secretary going to Moscow?

My experience of negotiation is somewhat depressing. One of the things that is depressing about negotiation is the success of negotiation by attrition. What I mean is, if you spend enough time talking in concert with your allies and you talk and listen to the other side of a debate, you get closer by sheer volume. Therefore, I encourage the Government to see where more face-to-face contact can take place and where there can be more conversations between different people, or different nuances. I seek an assurance that we are using our best skills to try to understand the Russian position. There must be people in Russia who recognise just how serious and dangerous this is. We have to try to find some common ground and we have to ask ourselves—I know a lot of people are concerned about it—whether we retain sufficient diplomatic capability in the Russian area. Do we have adequate Russia skills?

Our military support was clearly welcomed by Ukraine, but I do not know what it consisted of. Perhaps the noble Baroness could flesh that out. How many UK personnel were involved? How many are still in Ukraine and are they at risk? There is an interesting phrase in the Statement that I hope the noble Baroness can flesh out. It says that we are supplying Ukraine with anti-armour defensive weapons systems. I guess if you are in a tank with a missile coming towards you, it is a bit difficult to interpret why this is only a defensive system. How does one signal to the enemy that what we are providing to Ukraine is a weapon that is really only usable in a defensive situation? How many personnel are involved in the training to use this weapon? Are any left in Ukraine?

Ukraine recently suffered a major cyberattack. It is not mentioned in the Statement, but I understand that a new cyber co-operation agreement has been concluded between NATO and Ukraine. What role will Ukraine play in this? Is it already active?

Finally, on the reference yesterday to the Indo-Pacific tilt, can the Minister confirm that resources must be centred on Europe and NATO? AUKUS is a great concept, but it must not draw resources from where the threat is greatest.

As I said at the beginning, we have no fundamental criticism of the Government. We face a very grave situation. History teaches us that wars are much easier to get into than to get out of. If war breaks out in eastern Ukraine, many people will die. All efforts must centre on securing peace.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I take no issue with the terms of the Statement, nor with the remarks of the noble Lord who has just spoken, but I think it is helpful if we try to put into context the political objectives of Mr Putin. Put baldly, they are these: to break Ukraine and to intimidate NATO. Mr Putin sees a client Ukraine as essential to Russia’s interests and believes—I believe, falsely—that western capitals will back down in the face of his aggression. The overarching purpose is to create a sphere of Russian interest in eastern Europe—an objective for which, I may say, he was given some encouragement by the sometimes lukewarm support given to NATO by President Trump.

It is clear, in my judgment, that any accession to Mr Putin’s demands would break both Ukraine and NATO itself. The truth is that NATO poses no threat to Russia. If we consider the enhanced forward presence with which the United Kingdom is most closely associated, the deployment of the battle group to Estonia, it consists of some 900 men. That will hardly challenge the substance of the Russian state.

We should not forget, though, that the people of Ukraine have been under considerable stress and strain. They have been under cyberattack in a particularly personal way, and we know now that there is the threat of false flag diversions. However, I am clear in my mind that we are right to support the Government of Ukraine politically and to provide them with defensive weapons. I am clear in my mind that we are right to make it clear that the United Kingdom will be part of severe economic measures against Russia if military action is commenced. The people of Ukraine continue to show their courage and resilience in the face of provocation and imminent threat, but, increasingly, they show that they wish a future in the Euro-Atlantic community, which is their sovereign right, and one that we should be willing to defend.

I have but two questions for the Minister. What discussions have the United Kingdom Government had with other members of NATO and the European Union to ensure unity of purpose in both those organisations? In particular, why was it that RAF aircraft, two C17s, taking defensive weapons to Ukraine, chose not to fly over Germany? Was there a political reason behind that decision?

Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank my noble friend Lady Hayter and her committee for the report and for calling this debate. The committee invites us to look not only at the agreement in front of us but at the broader area in which it fits. It is important to see the big picture.

I am new to this area of treaties, and I always like to see a piece of paper. The first piece of paper that one is likely to come across on AUKUS is Boris Johnson’s speech. I am not entirely comfortable with that as a document of record, so I went on Google, as one does, and addressed the White House website. It has an excellent document which puts the range and objectives of this package, or whatever we want to call it, in a joint leaders’ statement on AUKUS. I would be happier about the statement if it had three signatures at the bottom; nevertheless, it uses very inclusive language. I shall quote some parts of it. The statement begins:

“As leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, guided by our enduring ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order, we resolve to deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. As part of this effort, we are announcing the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called ‘AUKUS’”.


To be clear on what it is to cover, the third paragraph states:

“As the first initiative under AUKUS, recognizing our common tradition as maritime democracies, we commit to a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. Today, we embark on a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability.”


Recognising that the agreement goes much wider than submarines, a later paragraph states:

“Recognizing our deep defense ties, built over decades, today we also embark on further trilateral collaboration under AUKUS to enhance our joint capabilities and interoperability. These initial efforts will focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.”


It is clear from this carefully worded joint leaders’ statement that this is a comprehensive and ambitious initiative.

The Labour Party welcomes the increased co-operation with our allies and supports the AUKUS agreement. Australia and America are two of our closest security partners, and sharing resources and intelligence with them makes Britain safer. Britain must look after our most important relationships, or we will see our influence and security quickly decline. China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific pose risks to UK interests and threaten a stable trading environment, democracy and human rights, and it is important that we deal with those risks.

However—there is always a “however”—it is also vital that the UK maintain a commercial relationship with China and that we work with it on defining global issues of the day, such as tackling climate change. It is also important that this arrangement does not see resources redirected from Europe to the Pacific and that it strengthens our NATO alliance and other strategic partnerships. Finally, this arrangement clearly brings potential economic opportunities for Britain.

My only problem with this grand vision—and this shows my lack of international diplomacy experience—concerns what this statement is. Is it a treaty? Is it an agreement? How will things change as a result of it? Will it develop into a document which has some enforceability?

In addressing this from a UK point of view, I support the concept and focus of the noble Lord, Lord West. As this pact, this agreement—whatever we want to call it—matures, it will need a high-quality individual with a high-quality team to make sure that it goes right. There are a lot of potential problems. One thing we need is a change in the tradition of the political side of our leadership and the Civil Service. We will need people in a stable relationship with this task because the very considerable industrial and manufacturing complexities—there are also people complexities; this point was rolled out by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce—will need to be looked at all the time.

We support the pact, but there is a lot to flesh out before it is meaningful. Frankly, what we have in front of us is a modest part of that picture. As far as I understand it, it is a confidentiality agreement driven by the necessities of US law. The International Agreements Committee has brought out some of question marks, which I hope the Minister will be able to help with. I was particularly seized by paragraph 13 of its report, which states that the agreement

“shall settle any disagreements arising in the implementation or interpretation of this Agreement through mutual consultations and negotiations without recourse to any dispute settlement mechanism”.

That sounds wonderful but you end up asking where its teeth are. How will it actually deliver?

The next paragraph, paragraph 14, talks about

“four automatic extensions of six months each”,

which sounds like 31 December 2025; I do not know why it does not say that, nor what automatic extensions are. This paragraph also states:

“Any Party may terminate the Agreement by giving six months’ written notice to the other Parties.”


So it is a pretty fragile situation. When you think about why this may happen, it depends on trust. I suspect that if you asked the French about trust, they would give you a pretty dire analysis of what they see as trust.

Paragraph 16 of the report has been referred to; it is where all these conversations centre. It talks about the Explanatory Memorandum but really it is talking about the thinking behind the document. It states:

“We reiterate our recommendation made in recent reports that the Government should review its quality assurance processes to ensure that all EMs address whether amendments will be subject to scrutiny under Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010”.


I would go further: we must have mechanisms to supervise this enormous concept—this trilateral relationship —with parliamentary scrutiny.

We support the agreement in front of us, but we must be much clearer about parliamentary involvement, and I thank my noble friend Lady Liddell for bringing this out. The question is: why? There are two reasons. First, the probability is that this will involve lots of money. The Australians have a somewhat patchy reputation when it comes to building submarines and manning them. There is a reasonable possibility—possibly even a probability—that these boats will end up being built in Britain. That sounds wonderful until you look at the record of building submarines in Britain, with pauses, delays, changes in the shape of the programme et cetera.

The second thing that one has to realise is that this is going to go wrong. Things of this complexity go wrong; life is like that. If something goes wrong, it does not mean that it is lost, it means that the “going wrong” process will have to be managed. That management once again comes back to the talent that we put into the process and the extent to which Parliament is informed, to which there is a degree of transparency, to work through what will be a 10, 15 or 20-year relationship.