Defence: Expenditure

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 17th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord, and can tell him that resilience is one of the priorities of his successor, the current Chief of the Defence Staff. We are acutely aware of the need not to run down munition stocks and a programme is in train to ensure that those matters are addressed.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday the Defence Select Committee report found that MoD expenditure has been cut by an eye-watering 25% since 2010. The former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs said that during this time there has been,

“a steady decline of Britain as the partner of first choice for the US military”.

Does the Minister accept that austerity has undermined the UK/US defence partnership and that ultimately you cannot do security on the cheap?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, no, I do not think it has undermined the partnership. It is true that defence expenditure has declined as a proportion of GDP since the 1980s, but we have seen total defence expenditure steadily increase again since 2014. I would add only that, when we look at defence spending, it is not necessarily appropriate to try to compare like with like, because the nature of defence spending changes year by year, particularly the nature of operational spending. As I said, the core defence budget has been increasing and is currently £39 billion.

Royal Navy: Frigates

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

As I am sure my noble friend would expect, we keep our fleet deployments under constant review to adapt to evolving security situations around the world. That is the case with the current situation in the Gulf. Having said that, the recent actions of HMS “Montrose” demonstrate that we have the right assets in the right places. I stress that our priority now is to reduce tensions in the region.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, can I build on that point? Does that incident in which HMS “Montrose” was involved indicate the probability that more frigates will have to be deployed in the Gulf and, if so, what tasks elsewhere will be left uncovered?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I understand why the noble Lord should ask that question, but it is hypothetical. At the moment, we think we have the right assets in the right places but, as I said, we keep our deployments and our tasking under review.

Schools: Cadet Expansion Programme

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, for obtaining this debate. I particularly commend his praise of Ofsted and its renewed interest in and emphasis on the whole child. This wider emphasis on the whole child, in which the cadets can play such an important part, is really good for our society in the broader educational sense and in this sense.

The Cadet Expansion Programme was launched in June 2012 and aims to open 500 cadet units in state schools across the country. Labour strongly supports this work, as it continues to offer new horizons for young people. Children and teenagers often learn important skills such as teamwork, resilience, confidence and self-esteem which can prepare them for the future, whether or not they end up having careers in the forces.

According to the 2018 Ecorys report into the cadet experience, kids in cadet forces better engaged with peers, got stuck in to their school work and liked being at school. For example, 59% of cadets learnt new skills, and 69% of RAF cadets achieved high GCSE results when compared to other pupils.

The Cadet Expansion Programme allows schools to build better links with the local community. The same report found that the presence of cadets at community events such as Remembrance Day often provided a tangible way to raise the profile of the school within the surrounding area. One respondent added that the link with the local community was,

“much stronger, and mutually beneficial”.

We on this side of the House rightly recognise those benefits.

The report concluded with various recommendations, including increasing publicity about cadets, enabling schools to develop longer-term strategies for their units, and further research into the programme’s outcomes. Can the Minister update the House on any progress on these recommendations, as well as confirm that the Government are on course to meet the target of 500 units by March 2020? Will the Minister also consider introducing a review of awards for cadets and adult volunteers to make them equivalent to recognised skills and educational standards such as the Duke of Edinburgh awards?

According to government figures published in April, there were 14,540 Sea Cadets, 37,670 Army Cadets and 32,850 Air Cadets—over 85,000 in total. However, these figures sadly revealed an almost 2% decrease, as well as a decrease in the number of adult volunteers for the Combined Cadet Force of almost 7.5%. While we wish to express our enormous gratitude to adult volunteers who give up their precious time to take part, the fall in their overall number is concerning. Can the Minister explain why there has been such a large fall in the number of adult volunteers? We should ensure that these people are recognised in the honours system, as they believe they are often overlooked.

The figures also showed that female representation in the Community Cadet Forces has increased slightly from 30.8% in 2015 to 33.4% in 2019. However, the Government stated that,

“the rise in the proportion of female cadets can be partly attributed to the decrease in the number of male cadets.”

Can the Minister explain how the MoD is to encourage girls, as well as those from BAME backgrounds, to take part in cadets? Funding too remains a key constraint for many. While the MoD covers some costs, schools have to meet others costs of employing a co-ordinator for the cadet unit and providing cover for teachers who are acting as adult volunteers. Can the Minister confirm how much funding has been awarded to schools through the Cadet Bursary Fund?

To close, I reiterate Labour’s support for the cadet programme and the benefits young people can gain when they take part. I hope the Minister is able to answer my questions, and that the Government will take positive steps to encourage the growth of cadet units across the services and across the country.

Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz: Merchant Shipping

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend is entirely right in everything he has said. That is exactly why my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in the other place that our efforts would be focused on a diplomatic solution. We are working actively to that end.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, building on the theme of accidental escalation, following reports that the UK is sending additional marines to the Strait of Hormuz, can the Minister give us an overview of the rules of engagement for British forces in the area? If he is minded not to do so, can he at least assure us that specific rules of engagement have been issued and inform us which member of the Government approved them?

[Earl Howe]

I should correct the noble Lord on one point. Contrary to some media reports, we have not deployed any additional forces to the region as a result of the latest attacks. I completely understand why the noble Lord asked about rules of engagement, but I hope that he does not expect me to set out what those rules are. However, I can assure him that appropriate force protection measures are in place and are subject to regular review as the situation evolves.

Afghan Interpreters: Security Clearance

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Cabinet Office policy contains guidelines for appropriate nationality and UK residency periods for prospective applicants, but they are not absolute requirements and should be considered on a case-by-case basis for each individual. It is important to understand that the process of security clearance is a matter of assessing not simply an individual’s trustworthiness but the degree of risk to that individual in the circumstances of the employment that they seek, and the security measures that would be needed to protect that individual and potentially their family as well.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the way in which the Government have treated Afghani interpreters is an absolute travesty. During the UK’s 13-year mission, they risked their lives in support of our Armed Forces, but have since been forced to work in low-paid jobs as well as struggling to secure security clearance and family visas. It has been reported that vacancies remain for interpreters with NATO forces in Afghanistan, so does the Minister accept that the Government’s decision not to speed up the security clearance process has hampered NATO’s continuing mission in that country?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I hardly accept anything that the noble Lord has just said. I do not believe that the Government’s scheme for previously employed interpreters is a travesty. I was glad to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, endorse the quality of the scheme because uniquely in the world it is there to provide for our former staff and their families, who have played such a generous role in supporting UK and NATO staff in Afghanistan. In total, through our ex gratia redundancy scheme, around 500 former staff and their families have relocated to the UK, which represents around 1,295 individuals in total. In June last year the then Defence Secretary announced that the criteria had been even more generously expanded. We are the only nation with a dedicated investigation unit in-country to investigate and provide solutions to intimidation.

Defence: Expenditure

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 11th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness speaks wise words, as ever.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether we could build on that point, as I am a little confused. In the good old days, when a Secretary of State made a speech, one had reasonable assurance that he was speaking the policy of the Government. That is not so clear at the moment. Have the various statements by the Foreign Secretary been more in his role as a candidate for Prime Minister than as a representative of the Government?

[Earl Howe]

As I said earlier, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary was suggesting that it is right for the Government to ask themselves the question of how much they should be spending on defence. That is the question we are asking ourselves, or will shortly be doing, in the spending review that faces us this year.

D-day: 75th Anniversary

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 4th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for introducing this debate, and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Reay, on his maiden speech.

I was going to read the excellent speech that my adviser prepared for me, but I realise that it is not valid. I have no relations who were involved in the Second World War; my father was a hospital worker throughout that period. Little bits of the story have been so well told this afternoon that I will limit myself to commenting on what came out of the quite extensive reading I did in preparation for this debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for reminding me how useless it is preparing speeches.

The first thing that comes across to me is particularly relevant given the present visit of the President of the United States: the role of America in the 20th century, in particular its great President, Franklin D Roosevelt, and how he managed that presidency. The decision to enter the Second World War, in a country that had been isolationist for many years after its experience in the First World War, was enormously difficult for Roosevelt, who had seen that it was going to be necessary to gradually move to that decision. Fortunately for Europe, it was aided by first the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, and then by Hitler declaring war on America two or three days after that event—a tactical and strategic error of enormous proportion.

To me, there is no obvious reason why the Americans then committed themselves to a Europe-first strategy. They had an enormous threat in their own back yard—the Pacific—but they decided that the best way to face it was to commit to Europe. That commitment, not just in the Second World War but in the peace that followed and with the Marshall plan and the creation of NATO, has been the bedrock of the very privileged peace that we—particularly our generation—have enjoyed. When an unfortunate person, in my view, becomes President, we must not lose sight of just what western democracies owe to the commitment of Americans—both in blood and treasure—to that peace.

We also lose sight of the importance in this story of the Russians. Hitler once again helped there by not reading his history. Had he studied Bonaparte more carefully, he might have worked out that attacking Russia had never been a successful enterprise. But he did not do that, and he declared war on Russia. That drew the Russian people into the war, whether they liked it or not. One cannot do other than admire their enormous fighting retreat. The Germans got within artillery range of Moscow, but they fought back at enormous cost, in people and resources. By the time of D-day, they had stopped the advance at Stalingrad and effectively won that battle. The battle of Kursk, the biggest tank battle of all time, had taken place, and the Germans were effectively in retreat and devoting a substantial part of their military capability to the eastern front. D-day and the campaign that followed it would have been very different if the Germans had been able to focus their total military effort on the second front.

Today of course has to be a commemoration, but to a degree it also should be a celebration. D-day was one of the most brilliant pieces of logistics in all history. The bringing together of the resources—the men, the machinery, the supplies and the training, all working together to get the procedures right—was so successful; anyone who, like myself, was involved in bringing things together will know that. It was an exercise that was not, I am sure, on budget, but it was certainly on time. It is not an easy thing to assemble 2 million people, ready to attack. Things must have gone wrong, but the machine barely paused. The extremely clever, in-depth logistics had self-amending built in, so that when things went wrong they were corrected, and everything came together on time. It was also a magnificent example of co-operation, between nations and between senior people and those working at all levels of the machinery. There was interaction between the three Armed Forces—the Navy and the Air Force and the Army—and between those of different nations, coming together. It was a brilliant piece of logistics.

Sitting alongside it was an incredible deception. It started with the code breaking, but the security services were able to ensure that every spy that the Germans tried to infiltrate into this country was caught. As far as we know from the records, no German spy was successful in England. They were caught and executed or turned. The successful turning of those agents meant we were able to build this tremendous deception, which carried on many days after D-day—forces actually turned back to Calais again. The Royal Air Force made a brilliant contribution by dropping pieces of foil in its progress across to Calais which looked on the German radar as if there really was an invasion about to happen.

One of the few things that I know a bit about, having been an aviator, is the contribution of Group Captain Stagg. People do not notice how good modern weather forecasts are. If we think back, we would not believe it. We get a very good picture now of the weather about seven days ahead with only relatively minor variations. The world was nothing like that in 1944. There was not even an agreed allied way of doing forecasts. There was a very clear difference between the American view and the British view. Because of his eloquence and his ability to explain things, Stagg’s view prevailed. He and his team had one advantage. A book by John Ross states:

“The Allies had a much more robust network of weather stations in Canada, Greenland and Iceland; of weather ships and weather flights over the North Atlantic and observations by secret agreement from weather stations in the neutral Republic of Ireland … Those weather stations, in particular one at a post office at Blacksod Point in the far west of Ireland, proved crucial in detecting the arrival of a lull in the storms that Stagg and his colleagues believed would allow for an invasion on June 6”.


It had been a dreadful summer and the weather on 6 June was crucial. The invasion would have failed on 5 June or 7 June because of the weather. The next slot in terms of the moon, tide and those sorts of things was 14 June, when the worst summer storm for years destroyed one of the Mulberry harbours. The contribution of Stagg and his team would not have been easy. One has to admire Stagg, who would have had to stand up to considerable debate, and the bravery of Eisenhower backing him to go on 6 June that made it possible. I am just in awe that all these things worked. I wish things I have planned had gone so well and I bet that the Government do too—imagine if they could have done universal credit like D-day. But we put that to one side.

If I were of the age then I suppose I could have had a go at the logistics. If I had done the training I could have had a go at the meteorology. But I cannot understand the raw courage of those young men, many of them conscripts and most of whom had never been in combat before, who knew in the first wave that they may lose half of their people. I do not how they got into those boats or how they got out of the landing craft. I cannot look at myself and be sure that I could do it. There were very ordinary people who had the raw courage and selflessness to do it. It is impossible to express my awe and admiration for them and the leadership that made it a success.

We are commemorating and, as I said, in a sense celebrating D-day because it is crucial that we remember it. I am not a historian, but my vague feeling for the history of Europe is that, broadly speaking, over the last 1,000 years, Europe has either been at war, recovering from a war or preparing for a war. That may be a slight overgeneralisation, but the 70-plus years of peace that we have enjoyed since the Second World War is a very special period in European history. It is so dangerous to forget what it came from. We must remember how to avoid war. We must spend our time preaching that and of course deterring war. Commemoration is essential so I applaud the work of the Royal British Legion and of the Government in their co-operation in the commemorations. D-day and the subsequent campaign was a brilliant success. Things went wrong, but it was a brilliant success. It was born and persisted out of selflessness, courage, sacrifice and co-operation. If only we could show more of those qualities today, the world be a better place.

Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the useful report by the European Union Committee on the common security and defence policy. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Horam, for introducing the report and am grateful for the contributions of other noble Lords.

The CSDP dates back to 1948, when five countries, including the UK, signed the Brussels Treaty, which envisioned a collective defence effort to keep the continent safe after the Second World War. It is also seen as a proud achievement on this side of the House, because it was one of the steps pursued by Ernest Bevin to provide the security on which the reconstruction of Europe could be built. Since then, the Labour Party, along with EU partners, has played a defining role in establishing the framework for EU peacekeeping, crisis management and conflict-prevention missions.

When I read the committee’s report, I was reminded of how, during and after the EU referendum, the leave campaign often claimed that collective EU defence policy undermined the UK’s priorities. Defence was toxified during the debate, and fears of an EU army were enhanced to question whether the UK’s sovereignty would survive further co-operation. The EU was blamed for sapping our military might.

Helpfully, the committee’s conclusions, as well as to some extent the Government’s response, allow us to debunk such myths. The report found that CSDP missions and operations have made a significant contribution to a number of UK foreign policy priorities, including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacekeeping in post-conflict situations. For example, the UK-led Operation Atalanta contributed to a dramatic fall in piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, and was overseen here in Northwood.

The Government’s response to the report highlights Operation Althea in the western Balkans as supporting,

“the UK’s foreign policy priorities”,

by bringing security and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also states that, even after Brexit,

“UK priorities for European security are unlikely to change”.

This, of course, reveals the great Brexiteer myth of EU defence—that it has somehow been imposed upon Britain.

The report also shows how the UK was only a modest contributor to EU crisis management and missions overseas. It states that UK personnel contributions have been “very limited” and equal 2.3% of total member state contributions. Of the 35 past or current CSDP missions, the UK has provided 25, with an average of 16 personnel per mission—hardly a great drain on our resources. Britain’s main contribution was strategic guidance during the planning and review of missions and operations. Claims that the EU, rather than government cuts, was to blame for the UK’s diminishing Armed Forces are shown to be unfounded.

Since the report was published last May, we now have the withdrawal agreement, which has been defeated in Parliament three times, and the political declaration, which confirms how the UK faces a new future as a third country in terms of defence co-operation. It may participate in CSDP operations and missions, but without any leading capacity; the UK’s Defence Minister will no longer be able to take part in meetings; and the UK has the possibility of participating in the European Defence Agency, but without any decision-making role.

Perhaps one of the biggest failures of the Government’s botched negotiations is the fact that the UK will no longer have access to the Galileo satellite navigation system. The political declaration is incredibly vague on this point, stating:

“The Parties should consider appropriate arrangements for cooperation on space”.


It appears that the Government are lost in space. Why have they failed to secure continued participation in Galileo? Can the Minister confirm the Government’s plan for influencing the shape of EU defence and security policy after we leave the EU? This report also called for the UK to continue to sit on the Political and Security Committee, but this is not included in the political declaration. Does the Minister believe that observer status for the committee can be achieved?

As the Government continue to bring forward no-deal SIs, we can assume that they believe no deal remains a possibility, perhaps if the country is faced with a Boris Johnson Brexit. This would be disastrous for our collective security. We would have to withdraw from all common security and defence policy missions, we would be permanently shut out of the European Defence Agency, and our defence industry would be hit by crippling tariffs and delays at the border. When will the Government see that no deal is not an option?

Labour supports continued UK-EU co-operation on defence, and our priorities remain peacekeeping, crisis management and conflict-prevention missions. We will also continue to champion EU-NATO collaboration to promote and support European and global security effectively, especially on cyber warfare and artificial intelligence.

However, austerity has badly damaged our ability to co-operate internationally on defence. Budget cuts have led to sharp reductions in troops, equipment and investment. The Ministry of Defence faces an affordability gap of between £7 billion and £15 billion, and recruitment across the board is in free fall, with the Army standing at 75,880, well below the Government’s target of 82,000. Uncertainties over the UK defence budget could erode our standing, not only in Europe but with NATO and other key allies.

As the report shows, our modest contribution to the common security and defence policy acted as a significant force multiplier for the UK. Close defence co-operation between the EU and the UK makes us all safer, and I hope the UK will continue to participate in CSDP missions after we leave—whenever that may be. But the Government still have many questions to answer about post-Brexit defence co-operation with our closest partners.

NATO

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for introducing this debate and the many noble Lords who have participated in it. It has been wide-ranging, and it is therefore inevitable I will repeat some points.

I am honoured to take part in today’s debate on the 70th anniversary of the founding of NATO. Over the past 500 years, the average lifespan of a collective defence alliance has been 15 years. That is why NATO’s anniversary is so impressive, and why it has been described as one of the most successful defence treaties in history. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Brexit chaos, the alliance remains the cornerstone of the UK’s defence policy and our collective security, and will become even more important as we leave the European Union and face new threats in the years to come.

For the Labour Party, NATO’s 70th anniversary is an extra special celebration. It was the leadership of Clement Attlee, and his Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, that was so instrumental in setting up the alliance in 1949. When Bevin moved the Motion in the other place to approve the North Atlantic Treaty which established NATO, he called it,

“one of the greatest steps for peace”.

He went on:

“In co-operation with like-minded peoples, we shall act as custodians of peace and as determined opponents of aggression, and shall combine our great resources and great scientific and organisational ability, and use them to raise the standard of life for the masses of the people all over the world”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/5/1949; col. 2022.]


Bevin stressed that the purpose of this pact was to act as a deterrent. It sent a message to potential adversaries that NATO’s members were not,

“a number of weak, divided nations”,—[Official Report, Commons, 12/5/1949; col. 2017.]

but a united front, bound together in the common cause of collective self-defence. To this day, this common cause is sought through peaceful settlement and collective responsibility for action. Article 1 strongly articulates the need for peaceful resolution to disputes, while Article 5 underlines how an armed attack against one,

“shall be considered an attack against them all”.

Today, the original 12 NATO members have grown to 29. Along with its central role of ensuring the security of the North Atlantic area, NATO also supports global security by working with partners across the world. In non-combat missions in Afghanistan it provides advice and training to security forces, while Operation Active Endeavour seeks to deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. More than 800 members of the UK Armed Forces are also stationed in the Baltic states as part of a NATO mission to reassure allies and deter aggressors.

NATO allies are committed to spending a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence, and it is right that we encourage all allies to meet the NATO guidelines, as the 2014 Wales summit communiqué made clear. However, the UK is barely scraping over the line when it comes to its own level of defence spending. In recent years, the UK’s defence expenditure to NATO has included several items that had not been included previously, such as the addition of pensions to the 2% target; Labour did not include them when we were in government.

We must recognise that years of government cuts have severely affected the UK’s military capability. Recruitment across the board is in free fall, with some front-line British Army battalions down by one-third. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards is 34% below its workforce requirement, while the 2nd Battalion The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment is 31% below its target strength. This is unsurprising since the National Audit Office found in December that Capita, which has managed recruitment for the Armed Forces since 2012, has consistently missed Army targets, with a shortfall ranging from 21% to 45% each year. The Government’s decision to outsource recruitment to the company has been a total failure. Morale across the Armed Forces has also declined during the past decade, dropping from 66% to 51% for Royal Marines officers, and the Ministry of Defence has said that its equipment plan faces an affordability gap of between £7 billion and £15 billion.

It is impossible to suggest that this lack of investment and care for our forces, as well as uncertainty about spending commitments, does not undermine the UK’s role in NATO. How can the UK be a key player in the alliance if questions about the long-term commitment to defence spending remain? If recruitment and morale are failing, and if the Ministry of Defence simply cannot afford the equipment it needs, I urge the Government to address these issues immediately.

As we look forward to the next 70 years for NATO, it is clear that it will need to adapt to new resurgent threats. Despite, at times, the isolationist and unpredictable actions of the US, the relationship between America and Europe remains incredibly important. It constitutes £3 billion a day in trade, and our countries share deep interests and values—especially a fundamental belief in democracy. This relationship provided vital protection for citizens in the face of the actions of the Soviet Union. It will continue to be important in the face of resurgent threats from Russia. In the last few years, Russia’s aggressive stance has repeatedly attacked our rule-based international system with abhorrent disregard and self-interest. This was shown through its disgraceful and illegal annexation of Crimea and Donbass in 2014, and in the reckless poisonings in Salisbury last year. These actions have led to a renewed focus on the immediate security of the alliance and the need to secure NATO’s eastern border.

In government, Labour would engage with NATO to see how it could maximise security and dialogue inside and outside the alliance area, as well as using membership to promote democracy and human rights. We would also want to examine how NATO and the UN could interact and operate together more effectively on conflict prevention and peace operations.

Technology is also opening up whole new dimensions for warfare. Cyber remains a huge task for the alliance, but it has taken some welcome steps. At the Brussels summit in 2018 the allies agreed to set up a new cyberspace operations centre, and cyberattack can now trigger an Article 5 response. As NATO also strengthens its co-operation with the EU on cyberdefence, it represents a key area where the UK must continue to co-ordinate action with our European partners after Brexit. We must not allow the UK leaving the EU to limit our security and defence co-operation with important allies, especially when it is in our interest.

AI will also be at the heart of most future cutting-edge technologies, in both the military and civilian worlds. Machine learning will enable new modes of warfare, including various forms of autonomous and semi-autonomous weaponry. The country that invests earliest and most aggressively may end up in a position of military supremacy. Camille Grand, NATO’s assistant secretary-general for defence investment, said that he viewed artificial intelligence in the broad context of new and disruptive technologies, adding:

“Nobody has fully assessed how much it’s going to change the way we do military operations. Is AI going to be a tool to assist in decisions, or is AI going to allow for more autonomous systems to operate?”


To answer these questions we must explore how NATO and the UN can work together to develop an international governance framework to provide oversight of the use of AI by the military, especially the ethical and moral implications of autonomous weapons. The stronger the position we take now, the more likely that AI will be used as a global public good.

On its 70th anniversary, NATO’s success is undisputed. Having seen it secure seven decades of peace and stability, Labour will ensure that it remains the cornerstone of the UK’s defence policy in the years to come, as it adapts to maximise security, pursue dialogue and promote human rights as warfare changes far beyond Attlee and Bevin’s comprehension.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigates

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness is quite right: in April, the forecast cost of the equipment plan exceeded the allocated budget of £7 billion over 10 years, which is the central estimate. Indeed, if we took no action, the plan would not be affordable. However, based on past experience as well as what we are doing, we are confident that we will successfully deliver the plan within budget, both this year and next year, through effective management, by monitoring and controlling costs as we go, and with the benefit of the additional money secured in the Budget.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, on 20 July 2016, the then chief executive of Defence Equipment and Support, said to the Defence Committee that,

“the eight Type 26 frigates are approximately £8 billion-worth of planning going forward”.

I interpret that as meaning that a Type 26 frigate will cost £1 billion. The Government have consistently said that the Type 31e frigates will cost a quarter of £1 billion each. Just how incapable will these frigates be, or does the Secretary of State have a magic wand?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Type 26 is a high-end specification, anti-submarine warfare frigate; not unnaturally, that specification makes it expensive. The Type 31e is an adaptable, general purpose frigate, subject to completely different procurement processes. However, it should not be inferred from that comparison that the Type 31e will be in any sense a low-grade warship. Of its kind, we intend it to be a world-beater, which other Governments will wish to buy.