Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2019

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, unlike my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I have not been involved in any of the Armed Forces Bills going back to 2006 or before, nor indeed to the equivalent statutory instrument last year. However, last year the equivalent debate was in Grand Committee in the Moses Room, where I listened to my noble friend Lord Campbell speaking on behalf of the Liberal Democrats.

When I went yesterday to get the draft statutory instrument, the Printed Paper Office was a little overtasked. In the end, I was given six copies of a draft that said “2018”. I thought that did not seem quite right, but I read the draft. I went in this morning to see whether that was really what I was meant to be reading, and got the draft defence statutory instrument for 2019. The phrasing of the two statutory instruments is almost equivalent, but two paragraphs have been added to the Explanatory Memorandum. There is paragraph 8, to which the noble Lord, Foulkes, has already referred, and paragraph 9, which says, under the heading “Consolidation”:

“This instrument does not amend any other legislation so no consolidation is needed”.


However, paragraph 8 on the EU, headed “(Withdrawal) Act/Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union”, says that it does not relate to this—and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said “Hallelujah”. If one looks very closely at the Explanatory Memorandum, the footer indicates that it is from DExEU. I assume that this is simply because the Civil Service is so overwhelmed by statutory instruments at the moment that the assumption is that nothing can come as a statutory instrument that does not relate to Brexit. It says “DExEU/EM/8-2018.2”. I assume that DExEU is not really involved with this statutory instrument, and that it is the normal MoD statutory instrument and Explanatory Memorandum.

We have already heard that whether the Armed Forces, starting with the Army, can go forward requires the consent of Parliament. This year, of all years, it is essential that Parliament gives its consent to ensuring that the Armed Forces can move forward. If we are to believe some of the preparations for Brexit and a no-deal Brexit, we are led to understand that Her Majesty’s Armed Forces might be brought into some sort of action to ensure stability, not just of the realm externally, but within the United Kingdom.

Since this order appears to be being used a bit like a Christmas tree Bill, to enable noble Lords to talk about various defence issues, clearly it is important to stress, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Judd, our support for and gratitude to the Armed Forces for everything they do in the service of our country. On this occasion, however, I should also like to ask the Minister whether the Armed Forces are being prepared for action in the event of a no-deal Brexit, and what work Her Majesty’s Government are doing to ensure that the Armed Forces have the resources that they require.

The Minister has told us that the statutory instrument and these rules allow for command, disciple and justice, all of which are important, but it is also important to think about the well-being of our Armed Forces, and ensure that they are able to do their job as effectively and efficiently as possible. If we are thinking ahead to the need in due course for another Armed Forces Bill in 2021, what work is the MoD doing to think about the future, and is there some way in which your Lordships’ House can assist the Minister and the MoD to ensure that the Armed Forces have all the resources they require?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. The Labour Party supports Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, and I am sure that support goes across the whole House. My boss in the other place, Nia Griffith, used this order to comprehensively review the present position of the Armed Forces. I will restrict myself to quoting two paragraphs of her speech, the first on,

“forces numbers and the alarming downward trend across each of the services. When Labour left office in 2010, we had an Army of 102,000 … an RAF of 40,000 and a Royal Navy of 35,000. Now they are all substantially smaller. The Army and RAF have been cut by 25% each and the Navy is down by nearly 20%”.

The second paragraph states:

“The steady decline in service morale is a significant worry. The proportion of Army personnel reporting high morale in 2010 was 58% for both officers and … other ranks, but that fell to 46% for officers and … 36% for other ranks in 2018”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/2/19; cols. 1229-30.]


I have never had the privilege to serve full-time in Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, but I have been involved with them over the years. I was taught that effective armed forces come from good equipment, good training and good morale, and the drop in morale since 2010 is sapping away the capability of our Armed Forces. I hope the Minister will agree and give some indication of how this will be addressed in the future.

I have just two specific questions about the law.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, that is not a question for me but for the Minister. What it brings out, given some of the contradictory statements by Her Majesty’s Government, is the need for a proper Armed Forces debate in the not too distant future—I think that is the view across the House.

I move on to my narrower questions. First, what happens if we do not pass this instrument? The Minister has anticipated that question substantially in his opening speech, but the one area he did not cover is what would happen to military personnel if it is not approved. What happens on simple issues such as whether they are paid and whether their accommodation is still available? The information he gave us earlier was all about the maintenance of discipline, which we can all understand. But we also have to recognise that we may be unabling the continued proper employment of personnel by passing this order.

The order and the Act that we are keeping alive are about the law. The one area that I have never really managed to understand is this: by what authority does a member of the Armed Forces use lethal force? To put it more directly, when that person kills someone, why is that not murder? Is the explanation different when war has been or has not been declared? In particular, what is the legal position if they kill someone supporting the civil authority in the United Kingdom?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I will of course do my best to answer all the questions that have been raised. I start with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who gave us a most interesting exposition of his long experience, not only in relation to the Armed Forces but also as a law officer. Not unnaturally he homed in on the service justice review, which is being undertaken by His Honour Shaun Lyons, who, I am sure noble Lords will agree, has an excellent knowledge of criminal law and procedures, as well as having served in the Royal Navy as Chief Naval Judge Advocate. The review is covering all aspects of the service justice system, including court martial and the types of cases that it deals with, the summary hearing process, the service police and the Service Prosecuting Authority.

The policing aspects of the review are being led by Sir Jon Murphy, a former chief constable of Merseyside Police. The noble and learned Lord asked whether it was possible to see the conclusions of the report. The answer is, “Not yet”. The review is due to report in the spring. That will give us time to consider it and, if necessary, make plans for any legislative changes before the next Armed Forces Bill in 2020. As for consultation, there is no public consultation on the process, but Judge Lyons is consulting a wide range of stakeholders with an interest in the service justice system. Of course, he can be contacted by interested parties through the head of the review secretariat.

The noble and learned Lord asked in particular about the ability of the service justice system to deal with serious offences. As he will be aware, the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious offences, and has done so over the course of history. It has been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, both for investigations and prosecutions within the UK and abroad, where the civilian police do not have jurisdiction. We are, however, keen for the review to take a strategic look at all key aspects of the service justice system, and this is one of the issues being explored.

The noble and learned Lord referred to the use of majority verdicts under the current system. The Government, as he will be aware, have been successful in establishing, both in the European Court of Human Rights and in the civilian courts, that the court martial system is in principle safe, independent and impartial. The current system has been considered twice by the Court Martial Appeal Court in the last five years and was on both occasions held to be fair and safe. Noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, will know that the Court Martial Appeal Court is made up of the same judges as sit in the civilian Court of Appeal. That Appeal Court has held that there is no ground for deciding that a verdict by simple majority is inherently unfair or unsafe. I am advised by my noble and learned friend Lord Keen that in Scotland a majority verdict of eight to seven in a murder case, for example, would be sufficient to convict an accused person. However, the Government recognise that there are differing views about the system of majority verdicts, and this is another issue that will be covered by the review.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for the compliments he paid me over the recent Written Answers that I was able to give him. I am glad that he found them helpful. He referred to the dreadful accident that I am sure we all remember involving the deaths of two RAF pilots in Scotland. I will take away the suggestion he made about the possibility of encouraging the process to move forward in Scotland. I would not wish to give a firm undertaking to that effect, because I do not want to do anything improper as regards undue influence on the Scottish Executive, but I undertake to take the point away.

The noble Lord asked me about Gibraltar and the jurisdiction over Gibraltar in relation to this order. The Armed Forces (Gibraltar) Act was passed by the Gibraltar Parliament on 8 November 2018—very recently. It came into law on 10 December 2018. The Act gives effect in Gibraltar law to certain provisions of the Armed Forces Act 2006, and Gibraltar wishes to make its own provisions in relation to that Act. Of course, we continue to work with Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar on the inclusion of the Royal Gibraltar Regiment within the Armed Forces Act 2006 service discipline regime to ensure that a discipline system is put in place that meets the needs of the regiment. The noble Lord also asked whether there had been any consultation on the order. There has been no public consultation but, as a matter of routine, the Armed Forces are consulted in relation to legislation that affects the service.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked what point we had reached in relation to an issue that he has very effectively championed in this House on more than one occasion: the vexed issue of the challenge in recent years to the principle of combat immunity. This has created considerable legal uncertainty about liability in combat situations and the risk that we may be moving towards the judicialisation of war, if I can put it that way. We want to introduce better combat compensation for those injured in combat operations and for the families of those killed. The public consultation closed on 23 February 2017. Therefore, we have consulted and are still carefully considering the views expressed during the consultation and will be publishing a response.

The proposal that we are advancing is that compensation would be paid at the same level as court damages, which can often be substantially greater than awards under the Armed Forces compensation scheme. Our aim is to ensure that those who have risked their lives in the most challenging of circumstances should be put in the best possible financial position quickly. That last word is one of the operative words, because some of these cases have a tendency to drag on and it is immensely upsetting to the individual or their family—and many times to both. The vast majority of compensation paid in these circumstances currently is not as a result of MoD negligence. These proposals are aimed at providing combat compensation to those who have suffered in the most extreme circumstances. We will announce further proposals in due course and I hope to have further news before too long on that front for the noble and gallant Lord.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked what arrangements involving the Armed Forces are being considered for the case of a no-deal Brexit. She will remember, I am sure, that on 18 December last year my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced that approximately 3,500 service personnel would be held on standby to ensure that defence resources were available to support the wider Government to implement their no-deal Brexit contingency plans, if required. In headline terms, the prudent standby package will comprise approximately 3,500 personnel at varying levels of readiness, including niche capabilities such as military working dogs. No defence estate is ring-fenced at this time as it is anticipated that there will be spare capacity available during spring 2019 to provide a warehousing/storage function, if that is required. Similarly, it is judged that in extremis a request for defence strategic transport capability could be accommodated by existing capacity.

In addition to the prudent standby package, defence has also been making available military planning expertise to support other departments with their Brexit contingency plans. To date, we have provided 28 military planners to a number of departments across Whitehall. I hope that that outline is helpful to the noble Baroness.

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[Earl Howe]

I assure the noble Lord that we are only too aware of the point he has raised. I think there is common to us all an antipathy to seeing large numbers of Armed Forces personnel on our streets, so to the extent that that can be avoided, it will be. However, it is prudent nevertheless to have the kinds of contingency plans that I have outlined.

The noble Lord, Lord Judd, asked me, very properly, about the training that Armed Forces personnel receive before they are deployed to a combat zone. I can tell him that such training as he asked me about does take place; that is, training in international law, international humanitarian law and the law of armed combat, which of course governs all that we do, and indeed those key provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. We are as mindful as he would wish us to be of the need to maintain the kinds of standards that set an example to other nations in how our Armed Forces personnel should behave in such circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to the fall in Armed Forces morale, as evidenced in recent surveys. It will not surprise him to hear that we take this extremely seriously. There is no single reason for that fall in morale, but we are aware that a number of factors play into it. That is why the chief of defence personnel is leading an important work strand in the Ministry of Defence known as the people programme, which involves looking at the terms and conditions of service—that is, pay and pensions—and accommodation arrangements for personnel; flexible service is another strand. A proposal is also being explored to use the early departure payment resource more effectively and efficiently, which, it is hoped, will address part of the issue we face over the retention of trained people. Therefore, we are not sitting back and doing nothing. However, it is true to say that at a time when the Army in particular is not deployed on an overseas operation in large numbers—although we are overseas in modest numbers—morale tends to suffer. Young men like an exciting challenge, and if they are sitting in barracks and simply training, there is a tendency for morale to dip. That is not to sound complacent, but I am advised that we have seen that in the past.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me by virtue of what law a soldier or serviceperson is empowered to kill. Of course, UK military personnel are always subject to UK law, even on overseas deployments, under the Armed Forces Act. As such, they have the right to use force in self-defence in accordance with UK domestic law. In the context of overseas armed conflicts, personnel may also use offensive force in accordance with their rules of engagement, which reflect the position under both domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict. I hope that those answers will have been helpful to noble Lords. To the extent that I have not covered everything, I will of course write.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I wonder whether the noble Earl could be a bit more specific in the answer to the last question—not now, obviously, but I really would value a letter, because this is a key question. As we know, when it goes wrong, the alternative is that the person involved is indicted on a murder charge. When we give people the responsibility to use lethal force, it would not be unreasonable for them to know that there is a very solid background for them to do as they are ordered.

Defence and Security Public Contracts (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 4th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for introducing this statutory instrument. On the other hand, that is not really true: the facts of life are that I would rather not spend my weekend studying SIs for a scenario that is deeply absurd and the Government should have ruled out many months ago. It is, however, forced upon us.

Initially, I tried to read the Explanatory Memorandum while applying the test that I have been using so far—that there is no new policy except what is necessary to smooth the transition. That is essentially the test of the withdrawal Act. He has already said, however, that this SI goes beyond what is allowed in the withdrawal Act. I noticed that the SI also prays in aid the infamous—as I would call it—European Communities Act 1972, which must have the grandest powers of any piece of primary legislation. Since, therefore, this is quite important—that the Government are seeking to mix the two—I would be grateful if he could give a little more detail on where the 1972 Act has been used and where he is praying in aid the 2018 withdrawal Act.

I found the Explanatory Memorandum difficult to understand because it requires considerable previous knowledge. I can find only one area of concern. In general, the references to the requirement for a new organisation—for new parts of government to take over what is happening in the EU—all seem to make sense.

Essentially, I think the Minister has said that this SI leaves the situation unchanged. Does that mean that the requirement to put defence procurement up for both domestic and international tender is unchanged, except where derogated under provisions similar to Article 346, which I assume is written into the regulations? Does the derogation for national security reasons remain unchanged? Has it been decided that it should not be enhanced, as many of us would argue it should, to include wider, more long-term considerations, such as the preservation of UK sovereign capability by favouring UK firms in some circumstances? This measure seems to create a situation where the rest of the world can bid for UK contracts except where derogated. Does that mean that UK firms will be able to bid for foreign contracts, particularly opportunities in the EEA?

Finally, can the Minister indicate what will happen to these regulations in the event of a deal? Do they die in total or in parts? How will the deaths be managed?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, once again I thank the noble Lords who have contributed to this debate for their questions, which I will do my best to answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, both asked a similar question about the coming into force of these regulations and the circumstances in which they might not come into force. These amending regulations apply only in a no-deal scenario, other than the changes being made under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was slightly unclear as to how we could avail ourselves of powers under that Act if we are not a member of the community. The answer is that we are still a member of the European Union and we can avail ourselves of the powers under the 1972 Act until such time as we cease to be members. The very minor adjustments we are making will come into force regardless of whether there is a deal or no deal. If the withdrawal agreement enters into force, the UK, with certain specific caveats, will be treated as an EU member state for the duration of the implementation period. Therefore, the current DSPCRs will continue to apply for that period, albeit with the updates and corrections made in Regulation 2.

The noble Baroness and the noble Lord asked about those changes. They are very minor. They are, in the main, changes required to resolve outdated references and to correct an omission arising from an amendment to the European Economic Area agreement. There is an amendment to the definition of “member state” to add Norway and Iceland, ensuring that economic operators from those two EEA states are covered. Again, that amendment is required regardless of whether the exit-related changes come into force. There are various other minor changes that I can read out, but I think it would be tedious if I were to do so.

The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about the effect of the coming into force of these regulations on UK companies and what the benefits to UK industry are likely to be. The main benefit for both UK and Gibraltarian suppliers will be stability and continuity of working regulations, which are well established, understood and practiced. Importantly, UK and Gibraltarian suppliers will continue to enjoy legal rights to participate in UK defence and security procurements. Other non-UK economic operators, save for those in Gibraltar, will not have these rights under the amending regulations. I make it clear that that is not to say that only UK or Gibraltarian suppliers can bid for defence and security procurements. As noble Lords will know, the UK has a long-standing practice of allowing overseas suppliers to participate in defence and security procurements where there is no need for restrictions on who can bid in some way—for example, on national security grounds.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked whether UK companies would be disadvantaged regarding their access to the EU market. As a matter of EU law, EU member states will no longer be legally obliged to open their defence and security procurements to UK suppliers, as the EU defence and security directive will no longer apply to the UK after exit day. However, it has to be said that our UK suppliers are recognised as world class. They offer extraordinary experience and expertise in defence. Individual EU member states therefore may choose to give UK suppliers access to their competitions to maximise the effectiveness of their procurements in the same way as the UK does. There is a strong case in terms not only of value for money but of other considerations, such as interoperability and cutting-edge capability.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I feel that I have lost my place. Is the Minister saying that non-derogated invitations to tender will be restricted to the UK suppliers and Gibraltar, or will they be available to worldwide competition, with certain exceptions?

[Earl Howe]

It will depend on the procurement. If it is determined that the procurement rate relates to an issue necessitating the protection of UK sovereign capability, as in the case of the construction of warships, we would restrict the tendering process to UK-based suppliers. However, the generality of defence procurement is opened up to the widest market possible, although, as was pointed out, we make clear in certain procurements that we will not entertain bids from certain countries. Each procurement has its operational basis made clear at the outset.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked whether we will give state aid to suppliers. We have no intention of providing state aid to UK suppliers, which is incompatible with our state aid regime. I am sure she will not be surprised to hear that. Having said that, it is important to understand that there are ways we can alert our home-based industry to forthcoming procurements to enable them to prepare their bids in good time and understand our needs. That process is already under way; we are clear that the entire procurement process needs to be smoother than it perhaps has been. That is not the same as state aid, however.

The noble Baroness also asked whether the Government have modelled the impact of the change on UK defence exports. As I said, defence suppliers will lose their legal rights to participate in procurement in the EU 27, but the quality of our companies should ensure that many EU member states will still wish to entertain bids from our defence industry. As the noble Baroness knows, the UK defence industry participates in co-operative defence projects, such as Eurofighter; that will not change either.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I am sorry to ask the same question over and again, but it is important: putting the derogated areas covered presently by Article 346 to one side, do the regulations—noble Lords must realise that I cannot read them; it took all my time to read the Explanatory Memorandum and try to understand it—require the UK to put non-derogated opportunities to international tender, or is that a matter for the United Kingdom Government’s discretion on a project-by-project basis?

[Earl Howe]

It is important to understand that competition remains at the heart of our approach to defence procurement. Currently, we routinely allow bids from suppliers outside the EU, although the current legislation provides a legal right of access only for suppliers based in EU member states. Where we restrict who can bid in some way—for example, on national security grounds, as I have mentioned—we would make that clear at the outset in the advert or in any pre-procurement documentation.

That position will not change after exit day. Suppliers in the EU and elsewhere will still be free to bid for procurements where no limitations are specified. What is changing is that bidders from the remaining EU member states will not have a legal right to bid for defence contracts; this is the same position as for suppliers currently based outside the EU. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.

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[Earl Howe]

For UK Government defence procurements, the process from the point of view of an EU supplier will be no different. What it will experience is the need to bear in mind two separate portals or bidding channels; one is the UK e-notification system, which I mentioned earlier, and the other is OJEU. It will need to keep an eye on both if it wishes to participate in the Europe-wide market; in using that phrase, I include the UK as still being a European country, even if not a member of the EU.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

The noble Earl says there will be no changes. I understand that at the moment, in non-derogated areas, EU suppliers have a right to bid and we have an obligation to take their bids seriously. I think that under the new situation they do not have this right and that whether they are allowed to bid will be a matter of policy. That policy could change year by year or Government by Government.

[Earl Howe]

That is technically right. It is our policy to maintain access for EU member states—and indeed, non-EU states—in many, if not most, instances of procurement. A good example might be the fleet solid support ships. We invited tenders from all over the world to build those ships and that should provide the best value for money. We all hope that UK suppliers will feel confident in bidding for that contract, but we wish to benefit the taxpayer as well as the Royal Navy and the process will be an open one.

To answer one point which the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, alluded to, there will of course be opportunities to reform the defence procurement rules after we leave the EU. The current rules are generally seen as out of date, compared to the PCR 2015. We have the opportunity to take a fresh look at what is needed for defence procurement—

Army: Divisional Manoeuvre and Deployment Training

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend makes an extremely important point, and we in the Ministry of Defence are always very conscious of the point he has stressed. But it is also important for all three armed services to look at the resources they have to see how they can use them even more effectively. The SDSR in 2015 and the modernising defence programme recognise the changed threat that faces us, and as a result the Army will be able to generate a more capable war-fighting division, at higher readiness, as part of the Joint Force 2025 programme.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that it is not the intention of the Government to deploy and manoeuvre at a divisional level, but I assume it is a capability we believe we have. Is that a capability we have? Do we have the logistics capability and the trained staff necessary for the complex task of manoeuvring large bodies of troops?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, yes, the Army is already prepared to deliver a division, albeit at best effort. As I have just said, it is working towards its Joint Force 2025 structures that will deliver a more capable force at higher readiness. The point the noble Lord makes about enablers and logistics is well made. The exercises in which the Army has participated recently have been a very good test of those enablers.

RAF: Operational Conversion Unit

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we recognise the utility of Belize as a training area, and it is indeed one of the options we are looking at.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

While we recognise that we have had to live without aircraft carriers, and then with aircraft carriers but without aircraft, when will the carriers be optimally equipped? The Minister seemed to imply in an earlier answer that that would be when 24 aircraft could be embarked and fully crewed. When will that be, how does that compare with the original plan, and what is the critical path: fully trained pilots or aircraft deliveries?

[Earl Howe]

With regard to whether the critical path is aircraft or indeed pilots, we clearly need both, and we are on track and within budget to deliver both in accordance with the planned rollout. For example, this will see initial operating capability for carrier strike—one squadron consisting of 12 frontline F35s and 18 pilots—in December 2020. Full operating capability, consisting of two squadrons, will be achieved in December 2023.

Modernising Defence Programme

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. When I first read it, I thought it was the sort of statement Pepys might have made—and probably with better reason. It is essentially a classic “We will try harder” statement. Let me illustrate. I was reading through it and trying to find something substantial, and I tripped over the phrase,

“the MDP has identified three broad priorities”.

I thought, “Well, that is different”. I went on to see what they were:

“We will mobilise, making more of what we already have ... We will make the most effective use of them … We will improve the readiness and availability of a range of key defence platforms”.


The noble Earl’s party has been in power for eight years. What has he done in the previous seven years, if not these sorts of motherhood-type things? It does say something tangible: namely, that,

“we will reprioritise the current defence programme to increase weapon stockpiles”.

I feel that “reprioritise” must have a specific meaning: to take from somewhere and give to somewhere else. One can hardly criticise increasing weapons stockpiles to more sensible levels—but can the Minister tell us where the money is being taken from to be reprioritised in weapons stockpiles?

Later in the Statement is the sentence:

“And, where necessary and appropriate we will make sure we are able to act independently”.


We are in the gunboat business again. What sort of independent missions does the noble Earl have in mind? To make that statement, defence must have developed a series of scenarios. Where does the noble Earl feel that acting independently would be a sensible thing for the United Kingdom to do?

Turning the page, the Statement says that,

“we will modernise, embracing new technologies to assure our competitive edge … targetting priority areas”.

This is 2010. Surely a good Administration who have been in power for eight years should have been doing that all along.

It is really only on the second page that there is anything new. We are going to have a “defence innovation fund” and a “transformation fund”. Can the Minister set out in detail what these funds are intended to do and what the difference between them is? The Statement reads:

“I will ring-fence £160 million of MOD’s budget to create this fund”,


and then talks of further funding. Previously, it speaks about “£50 million” in the “next financial year”. That is £210 million—a little over 0.5% of the defence budget. This is nothing like the amounts of money required to make a significant impact. Later, it says:

“We will embrace modern business practices”.


What are they? Why have they not been embraced before? I like this phrase:

“We will develop a comprehensive strategy to improve recruitment and retention of talent”.


Is that code for, “We are going to fire Capita?” It comes from such a low base that surely getting rid of it and having the MoD doing its own recruitment would be the way to go. Is it not true that, with Capita’s help, we are losing net numbers of trained personnel?

The Statement goes on to say something that might actually be meaningful—that a permanent net assessment unit will be established. That could mean a radical change in how the MoD makes its decisions. It could mean a movement towards the centre or it could mean that it is just some unit that passes comments. Can the Minister spell out what structural changes will be made to make this net assessment unit meaningful?

Earlier, the Statement reviews how the threat has become more significant in a whole series of areas and talks about £1.8 billion of extra money. I think that all this money has been announced before—I will be happy to be corrected on that. But can the Minister set out in some detail where and when the money will be spent? I have an uneasy feeling that it is just about enough to keep up with the increased threat.

The only glimmer of hope in the Statement is in the last paragraph:

“There is more work to be done as we move towards next year’s Spending Review”.


I hope that that is code for defence setting out to try again to get some more resources. The programme hinted at in the Statement—let us it call it “SDR 2015-plus-plus”—is unaffordable without cuts or more money, or are we going to muddle on yet again overpromising and underdelivering?

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for repeating the Statement. I share many of the observations that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made in the last moment or two. This is the second time that I have heard the Statement, because I took the opportunity to go and hear it when it was first delivered in the other place. I have to confess that hearing it twice has not improved it, in spite of what I anticipated being the mellifluous tones of the noble Earl, for whom I have the greatest respect. Looked at in the round, the Statement could easily have been made at any time in the course of its nine months of gestation. It contains a whole list of promises but is largely silent about how the promises are to be delivered.

When we examine some of those promises, we see that they reflect things which the Ministry of Defence should be doing now as a matter of course. Surely we are currently enhancing,

“efforts with our allies and partners”.

Indeed, one would think that the very possibility of Brexit would surely make that an even more urgent requirement. Are we going to “act independently”? For example, if independent action in defence of an overseas territory were required, surely we would be capable of doing that at the moment. Why are those two issues focused on in that way that they are in the Statement?

Nor is there any mention of the immediate challenges that face the Ministry of Defence, such as the gap of billions of pounds in the equipment budget—an issue that the noble Earl will recall I have raised with him on two recent previous occasions. How will that gap be filled? I will return to the question of financial support in a moment or two, because the Statement contains a couple of sentences that justify careful reading and interpretation.

There has already been reference to the fiasco of Army recruitment. How will that be remedied? Is the company that has responsibility simply to be sacked? Why not go back to the previous system, which, as far as I recall, was effective? Was the idea of letting it out designed to save money? If it was, it has certainly not been successful in the sense of producing the promises that were made in respect of it.

Finally, there is the question of the continuing fall in and erratic nature of the value of the pound. How is that affecting the ability of the Ministry of Defence to continue with its programmes of acquisition? What steps, if any, has the Treasury offered in order to assist if necessary because of these fluctuations?

Perhaps the most important passage is the one to which I referred a moment ago and said that I would come to. Two consecutive sentences say:

“We also need to create financial headroom for modernisation. Based on our work to date, we expect to achieve over the next decade the very demanding efficiency targets we were set in 2015, including”—


here there is a typographical error—

“through investment in a programme of digitally enabled transformation”.

I know of no government programme of “digitally enabled transformation” in the recent past that has proved anything other than more expensive than intended and with delivery several years after it was originally projected. It is a pretty optimistic tool to use in the issue of finding headroom in defence spending. I suspect that that tells us that the Ministry of Defence is not expecting any more increase in expenditure.

In advance of today’s Statement and the publication of the report, there was an apparently well-sourced leak that the Secretary of State for Defence was going to announce that one of the ambitions would be to raise defence expenditure from 2% of GDP to 3% annually. That did not appear in the Statement. When the question was put to him specifically in the other place by the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, he very neatly sidestepped it. I suspect that that might well be an ambition of the department—but I equally suspect that the Treasury has made it pretty clear that that ambition is not capable of being resolved.

It is also a pity that we have had the Statement and that the publication of the report did not take place in sufficient time for it to be considered as a whole. I very much hope that the noble Earl will, through the usual channels, be willing to commit to endeavour to have a full-scale debate on the terms of the report. That is a much fuller indication of what the Government’s intentions are—albeit, so far as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and myself are concerned, that the report and the Statement leave a great deal to be desired.

Veterans Strategy

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 15th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for introducing this debate. We have been discussing the challenge of veterans for a decade now. When I saw the title of this debate, I thought, “Well, let’s see where we’ve got to in actually achieving things”. The core achievement to date has been the Armed Forces covenant, which has had pretty widespread approval. It is therefore useful to measure how the Armed Forces have fared under its care.

It is important to realise what the covenant says. It is on one page and begins:

“An Enduring Covenant Between”.


The language is all quite flowery—there are three paragraphs—but right in the middle is a paragraph which, if it does not have teeth, has clarity. I fear that I have to tell noble Lords that it is not only not the best, it is almost the opposite. In fact, this paragraph says two things: that veterans “should face no disadvantage” and that in some circumstances there should be “special consideration”. It is against those tests—unless we want to change them—that we have to judge how well the Government are doing. So let us look at some areas.

Housing has been a real problem, particularly the way that local authorities behave, and the Government have worked hard on it. The progress report on the covenant is contained in an annual report, the last of which was published in December 2017. It said, talking about how local authorities had been instructed:

“The package included: ensuring Veterans with urgent housing needs were always given priority for social housing; encouraging councils to take account of the needs of the Armed Forces Community in their policy making, and introducing regulations to ensure councils did not disqualify Service personnel who had recently left the Services and did not meet the local connection test”.


We had a debate about a year and a half ago, in which I said that my test of this is Rushmore. Rushmore, for those who do not know, is Aldershot and Farnborough under a fancy new name. Its housing policy 18 months ago did not refer to veterans. I have looked it up and it now says precisely the things that the covenant calls for: the Government get a tick for that. There is a problem though. It says that veterans effectively have fair access to social housing. The problem is that there is no social housing. The problem with fair access to very little is that it is very little. It is the basic housing issues in this country, especially social housing, that we have to get right for all our citizens, including veterans.

Veterans are also part, sadly, of the scourge of rough sleeping. The data suggests that the incidence is about the same as in the general population, but I agree that there should be no rough sleeping, for any of our citizens. If we can tackle that issue then we will indeed do the right job for veterans.

The next area I looked at was training. There are lots of references in various bits of literature to how wonderful service personnel are, how well adapted to exciting jobs in the real world, but the individuals who illustrate this are frequently reasonably senior people who have done well. Does the system look after the private infantryman who has done four years and comes out at the age of 22 or 23? I fear not, and I hope that the Minister can disabuse me. Where would that individual traditionally have looked to in order to get some qualifications, because it is perfectly reasonable that people with life experiences do not have qualifications? He would have looked to adult education. Adult education has had its funding cut by £3 billion in recent years. There used to be 5.2 million people in adult education: the figure is now down to 1.9 million. Again, I am sure that service veterans are getting fair access to this, but they are getting fair access to one-third of the provision they would have received but a few years ago.

I then went on to look at mental health, which is a very interesting area. There have been clear improvements in recent years, making access to mental health services fairer and making sure that the transition between the military and the NHS is good. However, let us not kid ourselves that this is anything other than “not disadvantaged”. Indeed, the 2017 report on the covenant talks of,

“access times and outcomes at least as good (and sometimes better) than for the general population”.

It is commendable that it is being achieved, but it is all that is being achieved.

Let us move on to the second promise in the covenant. The precise words in that extremely powerful paragraph are:

“Special consideration is appropriate in some cases, especially for those who have given most such as the injured and the bereaved”.


We have talked about the bereaved and those injured, in the physical sense, but are there other senses of injury? If we look at mental health in the total population, the incidence of mental ill-health in veterans is not grossly dissimilar to that of the general population but—and it is an important but—on PTSD, the picture is different.

A press release from Kings College London has said:

“New research from Kings College London suggests the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have led to an increase in the rate of probable Post Traumatic Stress Disorder … among members of the UK Armed Forces”.


It went on to say:

“The higher rates of probable PTSD is primarily seen among ex-serving personnel who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Among those who deployed to the conflict, the rate of probable PTSD for veterans was 9% compared to 5% for veterans who did not deploy. The rate of probable PTSD among currently serving personnel was also 5%, which is close to the rate … in the general population … Among ex-serving personnel who deployed in a combat role to Iraq or Afghanistan, 17% reported symptoms suggesting probable PTSD compared to 6% of those deployed in a support role”.


It is clear that this illness is related, at least statistically, to combat experience. That seems to fall in the general territory of special consideration. When one looks at what PTSD is all about, it is terrifying. I looked it up on the NHS website and I am not sure how people survive it, with their,

“Re-experiencing … flashbacks … Avoidance and emotional numbing … Hyperarousal … Angry outbursts … depression … Drug misuse”,

et cetera. Here, surely, is the case for special treatment.

Unfortunately, according to the Defence Committee, the situation does not really seem to come up for special treatment. The committee said in its report:

“We are particularly concerned that the Armed Forces Covenant principle of priority treatment when a condition is service-related is not being consistently applied across the UK. The Department of Health and Social Care considers that the NHS founding principles on equality and clinical need constrain how it can provide priority treatment to veterans. This difference in interpretation is confusing not just to veterans but also to clinicians; this may add to veterans’ perception that the health service is failing them”.


It seems to me that this area falls classically into the second part of the covenant’s promise and that the Government are failing in not addressing it directly.

In many of the areas where service veterans suffer, the problem is that the general population is suffering, be it housing, training or mental health. I accept that the Government have achieved their objective of not disadvantaging veterans in many areas and have made good progress in recent times. We have to address the fundamental supply of those areas and be much better at being sensitive to the second promise, where special consideration should apply.

Trident

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I understand the noble and gallant Lord’s point. There is a £31 billion budget for the Dreadnought programme and we are currently confident that that estimate is robust. It is quite separate and distinct from other procurement budgets. We do not consider that it impacts upon them adversely—but we are conscious of the risks that he articulates.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the BASIC report says that the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which rates government projects,

“has rated Dreadnought Amber/Red, meaning that the IPA assesses that: ‘Successful delivery of the project is in doubt, with major risks or issues apparent in a number of key areas’”.

It goes on to say:

“Worse, the linked Core Production programme, which will produce a new submarine reactor core production facility … is the … only Red rated project”,


in the Ministry of Defence. Given this sorry state of affairs, what faith can we have in anything the MoD says about these programmes?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the amber/red rating for the Dreadnought programme in 2016-17 recognised that the programme was unaffordable at that time against the required profile, and that there were significant risks in the design-to-build transition. Since 2016-17, funding has been approved for the second delivery phase, the design has matured and governance has improved. The red rating for the core production capability reflects scope changes and associated delays and cost increases. We have to recognise that this is a very complex programme—probably the most complex engineering programme that any Government have undertaken—hence the caution in those risk ratings.

Armed Forces (Terms of Service) (Amendments Relating to Flexible Working) Regulations 2018

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, it seems a long time ago that we debated the Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Act, partly because it was introduced into your Lordships’ House before it went to the House of Commons. I went back to my files and noted that I had talked about the devils in the detail, although I did not come up with that idea first; several Members of your Lordships’ House had talked about that. In particular, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Walker of Aldringham, said that,

“the devil is going to be in the detail of the regulations drawn up to operate the system”.—[Official Report, 11/7/17; col. 1187.]

It would be fair to say that while on balance your Lordships’ House was supportive of the ambitions of flexible working, some concerns were articulated across the House—I suspect even by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. In particular, the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, raised one of the concerns that has just been raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, about whether flexible working would be imposed rather than chosen voluntarily. While it may appear this evening to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that somehow this is a simple Act and that these regulations look straightforward, the reason for wanting them to come through the affirmative procedure was precisely because there were concerns that the devil could be in the detail. There were slight suspicions that the regulations would lead to a situation where flexible working could be required of people in circumstances where perhaps the Regular Forces seem overmanned—that might seem unlikely, but that was the sort of concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt—which was why we thought this needed to come through the affirmative procedure.

The regulations as we see them look straightforward, although I am delighted to see that the Explanatory Memorandum is rather clearer and in ordinary English, for those of us who are not used to reading legislation regularly. I hope that the advice that will be given to service men and women will be even clearer than what we see in the Explanatory Memorandum. The rules look slightly opaque, and to put them into some sort of citizen’s English—even if it includes lots of three-letter acronyms that are much more familiar to the RAF or the Royal Navy than perhaps to the rest of us—would ensure that the information given to service men and women will make them want to look at using these provisions, and would be welcome.

The regulations look straightforward and very much in line with what the Minister outlined to us at various stages during the passage of the flexible working Act. That is perhaps not surprising, because, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, essentially we expect the Minister to listen and to respond. But we do not always know whether Secretaries of State or Chancellors of the Exchequer will manage to do likewise. While it is important that these regulations are discussed this evening, I do not see a reason to do anything other than affirm their progress.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we will, of course, support these regulations. I fear the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has in many ways the wrong challenge. The requirement that these be subject to an affirmative order has an effect that one comes across again and again in complex organisations: the knowledge that something will be scrutinised at the highest level produces very high-quality work. One of the key factors noticeable in these regulations—I take them together with the notes for the service personnel who will use them—is that virtually every question left unanswered in the primary legislation has been answered in them. Therefore, I welcome and support them. I have only one question related directly to the regulations, which is about the reporting procedure: will the frequency of their use be reported in the public domain, and if so, where?

The problem of being a Minister in your Lordships’ House is that nobody is here to enforce the rules. Accordingly, I looked at the Explanatory Memorandum to see if I could find something to say. I noted that one reason for these rules was to improve recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces. Essentially, it was an important piece of morale-boosting, which this Government certainly need. Total outflow from the Armed Forces has exceeded intake every year since 2011. I looked into this a little bit further; the way to find out what morale is like in the Armed Forces is to go to the regular Armed Forces continuous attitude survey. It is a brilliant document in terms of information—and a deeply depressing one for anybody who reads it. I will quote one or two statistics from it: satisfaction with pay has gone from 52% in 2010 to 31% now; satisfaction with service life in general has decreased—among both officers and other ranks—from its peak of 61% in 2009 to 41% now.

Dissatisfaction has been particularly acute in the Royal Marines. Members of this House have fought a little battle to keep ships retained for the use of the Royal Marines, yet we find that service morale among officers—that is, ratings for high morale—has gone from 64% two years ago to 23%; for other ranks, it has gone from 32% two years ago to a staggeringly low 9% now. I would defend the right of the Minister not to respond to this, but I hope he will rise to the occasion and give us some indication of how this crisis is being addressed. I put it to him that one of the reasons is leadership—I am not talking about people in uniform; I am talking about the politicians. SDSR 2015, which was published on 23 November 2015, promised annual reviews. That was a good thing, as I think it has emerged that the SDSR was underfunded.

The Government met their commitment and, roughly a year after that publication, they produced an annual review—the first annual report. The second annual report should have been published on 23 November 2017 but it was overtaken by, of all things, a review by the Cabinet Office. There must have been some squabbling because that metamorphosed into something called the Modernising Defence Programme. We were told that its main points would be published by the time of the NATO summit of 2018, and indeed we got a letter from the noble Earl. As ever, it read brilliantly the first time—these letters are always well drafted—but the second time you read it through you realised that it said absolutely nothing. There was not a single concrete piece of action in it.

If the noble Earl wants to rise to the occasion, I hope he will say when we will see real progress on the review and when the Armed Forces will recognise that they have a serious morale problem, with a programme to address it directly. Although I have served in the VR, I am not a military man in the sense that I have not served full time or been presented with any hostile forces, but I have talked to a lot of people who have. My summary of what they have said to me is: if you want effective forces, you have to have leadership, equipment, training and morale. These are not additives; they are multiplicities, and if any of them is at a low level, that affects all of them and you have wasted your money. We are not at all happy with the equipment area or the training area, and now we are not at all happy with the morale area, and I hope that the Minister will be generous enough to provide some answers.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in response to the introduction that I gave. Beginning with my noble friend Lord Attlee, whom I thank for his supportive comments, I think it is fair to say that Ministers felt duty-bound to respond to the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee to make these regulations affirmative. One reason that the committee felt as it did was that there would be a great deal of significant detail and that would really matter in the way that the arrangements were rolled out. I hope that, in common with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, noble Lords will feel that, having read the statutory instrument, the devil is absent from the detail. Indeed, I hope that the Archangel Gabriel has exercised an influence on it, not least in the way it is expressed, which, as the noble Baroness helpfully said, is designed to be as clear as possible.

Perhaps I may turn to the questions put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. First, on whether and to what extent we will publish the statistics relating to take-up after the scheme is launched, initially and going forward we will capture this type of data on our internal systems for analysis purposes and make adjustments where necessary. We do not plan to report publicly on the numbers who take up flexible service in the early years following the launch of these new opportunities. As we have said previously, a more valuable measure of the effectiveness of flexible service will be the long-term effect on recruitment and retention. That is the principal aim of these new policies.

The numbers who initially take up these opportunities will be modest. I have no doubt that they will grow over time but I think they will grow slowly. We envisage that it is unlikely that they will account for more than 1% of individuals—approximately 1,400—so we want to avoid undue focus on numbers for numbers’ sake. We feel that regular collating of external reporting information on such a small cohort would not be particularly beneficial. Having said that, we have pledged to report on the introduction of flexible service in the Armed Forces covenant annual report. If in future we have meaningful data on take-up, we will include it. We will of course provide information in the normal way in response to external ad hoc requests.

Armed Forces (Specified Aviation and Marine Functions) Regulations 2018

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the Armed Forces have come a long way on this issue of alcohol and drugs. The railway industry faced this challenge some 20 years ago and the position that the Armed Forces have reached is very similar. I sense that there is an ongoing significant challenge in the military. I do not have statistical data but if one wanders through Google and looks at the events there was certainly the tragic event of the submarine that highlighted these cultural problems.

The Minister’s speech tonight was a great deal better than the EM, because I think that I understand the regulations now. It seems to me that this statutory instrument is virtually identical to another one that covered the suspected offence side of it, and this is really just a matter of writing it across—I do not know whether there are any detailed differences.

The regulations essentially state that if one is doing any of these activities one must have alcohol levels below the specified limits. That leaves me with one question, which we wrestled with in the railway industry but is a good deal more acute in the military. That is a situation where an individual is not performing one of these activities—the most obvious example is the captain of a ship—because he is not the officer on watch. He is actually in his bunk asleep after an interesting night out. His subordinate drives the thing into another ship. There is instantly an incident, at which point, presumably, the captain would take command. There must be parallel situations in the Army, and perhaps, although less likely, in the Air Force. Are we clear about our expectations of these individuals who are on duty but not actively performing a task? Do we expect them at all times to maintain their lifestyles so that they are below the appropriate limits?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their comments and I am glad that they are supportive of these regulations, which I hope they will agree are fairly uncontroversial in their content.

The particular question that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, posed, is an interesting one. It is one that I have discussed with my officials. The short answer is that it would very much depend on the circumstances of the situation as to whether the captain of a ship would be tested for drugs or alcohol after a particular accident took place and he or she were away from the bridge when the accident occurred. The key point, however, is that the powers commit a commanding officer to order a test if he or she has reasonable cause to believe that a person was carrying out a safety-critical function or duty at the time of the accident or had carried out a safety-critical function or duty before the accident.

In the example that the noble Lord suggested, the captain will still have command of the ship and he or she may have given orders for the control or navigation of the ship before repairing to their cabin—let us imagine that situation. It would largely depend on the circumstances of that order and whether the person to whom the order was given was a fit and responsible person and in a fit condition to accept the responsibility. However, I can imagine a situation where a captain was away from the bridge following an accident and was not, so to speak, in the line of fire when it came to taking a drug or alcohol test, but where a commanding officer might feel that it was prudent for the captain to take such a test. It would be very much back to the test that I have just articulated if a commanding officer has reasonable cause to believe that any given individual was involved in a safety-critical function.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I will explain my point just a little more. I am concerned not so much about the test as about what the Navy’s expectation is of a commanding officer. It seems to me that there is an implication that he should, in all circumstances, maintain a lifestyle whereby he is under the limit. Certainly in my organisation—fortunately, we did not have the same commanding officer situation—we did have a level of management where we ran a roster to make sure that we always had a sober general manager to handle any situation. The noble Lord probably cannot answer now, but I would have thought that there was an implied moral obligation that the senior person at sea, the captain, should maintain a situation below these limits.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. He will see that in the regulations officers may be tested—they are one of the groups of people who can test. The alcohol limits for prescribed safety-critical duties have been set at two levels, higher and lower. The limits will not be amended by these changes. The majority of safety-critical duties correspond to the higher alcohol level for testing of breath, blood or urine; the lower levels apply to safety-critical duties that require a heightened speed of reaction in an emergency situation, such as aviation or carrying a loaded weapon.

I would not dissent from the noble Lord’s statement. He is absolutely right that the captain of a ship, to take that example, bears responsibility for the safety of the ship and its crew in all circumstances, which is why we have seen captains—on rare occasions—court-martialled for an accident that has occurred, even though the captain has sometimes not personally been on board the ship. I come back again to the point I made at the beginning: it would depend on the judgment of the person investigating the accident immediately after the event as to who was tested or not.

I hope that is helpful. If I can amplify those comments in a letter in any way, I shall certainly do so. In the meantime, I beg to move.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigate

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 6th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend speaks with considerable authority on this matter. The modernising defence programme is about making our Armed Forces more capable, against the harder threats that we now face, and it is looking at how best we can use our growing budget to that effect.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this Question prompted me to look at the National Shipbuilding Strategy, whose first birthday is today. When it was published a year ago, it was meant to be a solid basis for industry to develop. It is interesting to see how it is starting to erode. Paragraph 56 said of the Type 31e ships:

“The first will be in service by 2023”,


but “by 2023” means during 2022. The Minister has just answered a similar question by saying that it will be by the end of 2023. This is the first incremental crumble in the strategy. In paragraph 61, the strategy said:

“We have set a maximum £250 million per ship price for the Type 31e”.


Are either of those statements still sound, or is this one year-old strategy going to crumble incrementally, like all the strategies before it?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, our target dates have not changed, as I have already said, and we still believe that industry can deliver all five Type 31e frigates at a price of £1.25 billion. The national shipbuilding strategy is an overarching strategy for the future of naval ship-building in the UK over the next 30 years, and is much wider than the procurement of a particular class of ship. Type 31e is a pathfinder project for a new way of procuring warships, and we are learning beneficially from those challenges.