Defence: Continuous At-Sea Deterrent

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had a richly informed but short debate. I am sure all Members who have taken part would have wanted more time, and I have no doubt that the Minister will, like me, bring that to the attention of the usual channels on both sides.

In August 1945, the Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, set up a Cabinet committee to examine the feasibility of Britain acquiring the atomic bomb. When, in October 1946, the Americans ended their nuclear co-operation, the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, said:

“We’ve got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs … we’ve got to have the bloody Union Jack flying on top of it.”

In 1947, the final decision was taken to go ahead. In one sense, therefore, the Labour Party, on behalf of the British people, has ownership of the policy to have an independent nuclear deterrent. Our commitment to this policy remains steadfast today, despite some twists and turns over the past 70 years.

Maintaining Britain’s nuclear deterrent is the policy of the Labour Party, as my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe said at the start of the debate. It was a Labour Government who, in December 2006, published a White Paper. Noble Lords will remember those things called Green Papers and White Papers, and perhaps the Government will take note, because they would be of great value. The White Paper was on reviewing our nuclear deterrent. It set out the conclusions of a series of studies into whether Britain should still have a nuclear deterrent, and if the answer was yes, how that nuclear deterrent could best be provided.

The White Paper concluded that, while there was no nation with both the capability and intent to threaten the independence of the UK, we could not dismiss the possibility that a major nuclear threat might emerge. Having considered options for different ways of providing a nuclear deterrent, it finally concluded that the most effective system was a further class of submarine carrying ballistic missiles. In March 2007, the House of Commons voted 409 to 161 to endorse the conclusions of the White Paper. Work started immediately on assessing the different options, to determine how best to set up an affordable ballistic missile submarine capable of providing a credible deterrent capability well into the second half of the century. This culminated in a successful initial business case, and in April 2011 the Treasury approved the initial gate decision, which was announced to Parliament the following month.

Ernest Bevin said that we had to have the nuclear deterrent no matter what the cost. Many people would say that that was then, and that the cost now runs to tens of billions of pounds. But what is the cost of not having the deterrent? The true cost of conflict cannot be measured in money; it is measured in lives lost. Some 60 million people were killed in the Second World War—perhaps three times the number who lost their lives in the First World War, and most of them civilians. The plain fact is that resisting tyranny never comes cheap. If the possession of a nuclear deterrent helps keep the peace and saves lives, for me that is the better measure of the true cost.

I accept that many others will argue that the possession of nuclear weapons is morally wrong, and even if they could be justified on moral grounds, the scale of destruction that would be unleashed if they were used is too appalling to contemplate. But over the last seven decades, Britain’s foreign and defence policy has sought to prevent a nuclear holocaust by leaving an enemy in no doubt that the cost of aggression would be a price too much for it to bear also. Like it or not, in today’s world, in order to deter we have also to threaten.

I have heard people argue that we should scrap the nuclear deterrent. They say we should put our trust in human goodness and the determination of humanity to survive, no matter the challenges. But the key word here is trust. Recently, I read a very interesting paper written by Professor Nigel Biggar entitled Living with Trident. In it, he comments on a Church of Scotland report in 2009 which exhorted people to “trust in God” instead of placing people in a position “of fear or threat”. He writes:

“It may be true—as I believe it is—that we should always trust God. But it really doesn’t follow that we should always trust Vladimir Putin or Islamic State”.

He was right on this. My friend and colleague Kevan Jones MP, in a paper entitled Trident Myths and Facts, states, “Definitions of deterrence vary” but quotes a very good definition put forward by the prominent scholar and political scientist, Kenneth Waltz, that,

“nuclear weapons dissuade states from going to war more surely than conventional weapons do”.

On Monday, we considered the Statement following the NATO summit in Warsaw, where it was agreed that we will deploy troops in Estonia and Poland. NATO is another example of the Labour Party’s commitment to the defence of our country, as it was set up in 1949 with the help of the then Labour Government. We also considered on Monday the probable Russian response, and it will be interesting to see whether this was considered at today’s NATO-Russia Council meeting. Although we must be—and want to be—sensitive to the Russian point of view, we must make it clear that we will support our NATO partners in that region.

What do we know of Russia’s nuclear programme? We know that Russia will continue to maintain a robust and capable arsenal of strategic and non-strategic weapons for the foreseeable future. We know that, to support this policy, the Russian Government are making strong investments in their nuclear weapons programmes. We also know that priorities for their strategic nuclear forces include force modernisation and command and control facilities upgrades.

I said on Monday that on these Benches we are proud of NATO, an organisation which is the defender of our freedoms and way of life, and in an uncertain world a source of security for many around the globe. Britain’s nuclear deterrence is a key to NATO’s strategy. That strategy is deterrence, based on the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons. NATO is committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will maintain itself as a nuclear alliance. This was reaffirmed at the Wales NATO summit in 2014. The Nuclear Planning Group provides the forum for consultation on NATO’s nuclear deterrence. The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area.

As outlined in the 2006 White Paper, nuclear deterrence plays an important part in NATO’s overall defensive strategy, and the UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial contribution. If the UK were to unilaterally disarm but wished to remain a member of NATO, it would still need to accept that nuclear weapons are integrated into the whole of NATO’s force structure.

Britain, throughout its history, has always punched above its weight in the world, and most often for good. We have continued that role in NATO. If we ceased to possess a nuclear deterrent, our ability to influence the United States and others would greatly diminish—and the knock-on effect would greatly reduce NATO’s ability to defend. Therefore the United Kingdom would still be covered by the overall NATO nuclear umbrella, and would have to remain in the decision-making processes relating to the deployment of nuclear weapons.

In the more than seven decades since the world first came to terms with nuclear weapons after the end of the last war there has been no direct military conflict between the major powers, and no state covered by another state’s nuclear umbrella has been the target of a major state attack. I am the first to admit that it is impossible to prove that this situation has arisen because of nuclear deterrence. But it is also impossible to prove otherwise.

I have not yet reached my threescore years and ten, but I am not far short of it. And unlike my parents’ generation, which saw two world wars and the deaths of untold millions of people, all my life I have lived in a country where I am free and safe. I want that for my children and my grandchildren too—to live in freedom and safety. I believe that the possession of a nuclear deterrent has helped keep this country safe for the last seven decades, and I believe it will keep it safe in the future.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, one of the greatest British leaders of all time, writing between the two terrible world wars of the last century, left us this cautionary reminder. Winston Churchill wrote:

“Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events”.

That is a fair epitaph for the Iraq war that Sir John Chilcot was asked to investigate, along with telling us what lessons should be learned.

At the outset I pay tribute to Britain’s Armed Forces and their families who loved and sustained them during the conflict, and especially to the 179 of our service personnel and 23 civilians who lost their lives. Our thoughts and prayers are with them. For my part I can only imagine the pain they are enduring even now. We remember, too, those who suffered physical and mental injuries as a result—what a price they have paid for doing their duty.

My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon spoke for many in both Houses when she said in response to last week’s Statement that the decisions about when our Armed Forces are deployed are not theirs. As we faced war in Iraq, for the first time in our history the House of Commons was invited to vote yes or no to military action. The decision was made there. I voted for it. Again, my noble friend spoke for me, and, I am sure, many others, when she said that no MP who voted for action took the decision lightly. In my experience of that time, there was mutual respect for all who took a different view. We cannot and will not forget the thousands of Iraqi civilians who have lost their lives in the conflict and since.

The Chilcot report has been a long time coming but we must thank Sir John and his team for taking on this mammoth task. Sir John said that the two key questions for the inquiry to consider were whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in 2003, and whether the UK could and should have been better prepared. Politicians, commentators and historians will ponder the answers to those two questions for decades to come but for me, and I suspect for many others, the big question to consider now is: what lessons can we learn from the war and from the process of decision-making that led us into it?

I welcomed the Prime Minister’s Statement last week when he said he was taking on board the question of how decision-making across government can be improved. We all know from the report that Britain urged President Bush in 2001 not to take hasty action in Iraq, and we continued beyond that to seek a settlement and work with the UN before finally concluding that war was the only course left. We know that by April 2002 the Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without invasion, and that by then our Government believed that Iraq posed a threat and had to disarm or be disarmed. Sir John concludes that this implied we would use force if Iraq did not comply.

I do not intend to rehearse in detail the conclusions reached by Sir John in his report. His key criticisms are well known and must be addressed. However, I recognise the importance of his criticisms about process and procedure. He also raises questions about proper analysing and decision-making, and about planning and preparation. However, I note that Sir John did not conclude that the Government acted in bad faith. I paraphrase the comment made last Wednesday by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who is in his place. He said that the Prime Minister and his colleagues were seeking to serve the national interest. Even though he had opposed the war as an MP, he did not believe the Government were actuated by ignoble motives.

Saddam Hussein was a murderous, evil tyrant, who slaughtered tens of thousands of his own people and caused the deaths of countless others in a war with Iran and through the invasion of Kuwait. Sir John's report makes clear that both we and the Americans had an “ingrained belief” that he had the ability to produce chemical and biological weapons. He had done so in the past and certainly wanted his neighbours and the rest of the world to believe he still had such weapons. We believed it, and this is where the Americans and we stood at the start of the conflict.

Perhaps I may share with the House an American analysis of how the USA saw the conflict. The analysis says that the key assumptions—that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, that,

“Iraqi reconstruction would pay for itself, that the majority Shiite population would welcome coalition forces as liberators”,

that Iraqi tribal structures could be ignored, that only a small military footprint was necessary, that large-scale de-Baathification of the country could be carried out without a problem and that there would be,

“a rapid transfer to Iraqi control”,

—all proved wrong.

The distinguished authors of the report write:

“The failure to plan adequately and comprehensively for the postconflict period ushered in a new, dangerous, and intractable phase that saw a rapid descent first into insurgency and then into intense sectarian violence”.

The plain fact is that post-conflict planning in the US was minimal and it was no better here in Britain. That is the key lesson we must learn. But are we learning the lessons?

The Prime Minister stated that he was taking on board the question of how decision-making across government can be improved. The Minister has given us some indications of what the Government have in mind and have already put in train. In paragraph 409, Sir John says that,

“there should have been collective discussion by a cabinet committee or a small group of Ministers on the basis of inter-departmental advice”.

Do the Government accept that and, if they do, can the Minister say how the Government will respond to this aspect of the report? Sir John goes on in paragraph 410 to say that,

“a Cabinet committee or a more structured process might have identified some of the wider implications and risks associated with the deployment of military forces to Iraq”.

Do the Government agree with Sir John on this? Indeed, can the Minister say whether the Government intend to respond to Sir John’s report as a whole, setting out how we might do things better in the future? Having said that, I appreciate that the Minister has started to advise the House on this already.

One further point is that the Department for International Development has a humanitarian unit for failed states to help them rebuild, yet no equivalent exists for post-conflict states to assist in post-conflict planning. I suggest that there is a role for such a unit within the Ministry of Defence. Indeed, we could look at post-conflict planning with our closest ally, the United States.

NATO has held many joint exercises over the last year, but they were all about war fighting. Should we not initiate with equal vigour joint exercises in post-conflict planning? Such exercises would reveal weaknesses in our planning processes, force allies to agree decision-making structures and familiarise individuals with peers in allied nations—particularly the United States—in terms of how we each operate. This would mean that, if it looked as though a post-conflict situation might be emerging, planning could be smoothly and effectively initiated.

The major failure post the Iraq invasion was that no one felt it was their responsibility to take the lead on this. The Iraq conflict has proved divisive and contentious in this country. It has divided families and communities, and we can all understand that. But it must not be allowed to undermine our determination to protect British interests, and our best interests, by making us resolutely opposed to interventions of any sort in the future—a point made, I think, by the Minister.

There will be times ahead when we face a decision about whether to intervene—whether militarily or for humanitarian reasons—in some situation or another. The Iraq conflict has left many painful scars on the body of our country, but we must not—we cannot—turn our back and fail to intervene when it is needed. Let us remember our successful intervention in Sierra Leone and the benefits it brought to that country, but let us not forget that we did not intervene in Bosnia and Rwanda, or the grave consequences that befell those countries as a result. Regardless of the strong views held on all sides about this conflict, let us all agree that there is one thing on which we should be united: following the Iraq war and the publication of the Chilcot report, we should be determined to learn the lessons of the failure of post-conflict management.

NATO Warsaw Summit

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement on a summit that was of considerable significance. Paragraph 40 of the summit communiqué makes it clear that NATO is determined to show its commitment to our partners in the Baltic states and Poland by establishing an enhanced forward presence to demonstrate unambiguously as part of our overall posture,

“allies’ solidarity, determination, and the ability to act”,

by triggering an immediate allied response to aggression.

I was at NATO headquarters at the end of May and found that our partner representatives from the Baltic states and Poland who met me and my colleagues wanted to be reassured of our support. Every desire was expressed by the people whom I met to maintain and encourage the friendliest relations with their neighbour Russia, but there was an underlying nervous tension following the annexation of Crimea and the incursions in Ukraine. They also expressed worries about the potential Russian build-up in and around the enclave of Kaliningrad.

The Warsaw summit agreed that British forces will from next year be part of an enhanced forward presence with 500 troops in Estonia and 150 in Poland. We are also committed to training 4,000 Ukrainian troops by March next year. There will be consequences as a result of NATO taking this decision and we must be prepared for that.

The summit took place in Warsaw where 25 years ago almost to the day the Warsaw Pact was officially dissolved. The Russians of course will clearly be sensitive, very sensitive indeed, about NATO’s decision. What assessment have the Government made of the expected Russian response? My NATO briefings highlighted the importance of the NATO-Russia Council which was established in 2002 in Rome. Following Russian military intervention in Ukraine, NATO suspended all practical co-operation with Russia and the council ceased to meet, although channels of communication were still maintained. It was agreed only in early April this year to convene a formal meeting of the council and that meeting, the first in two years, took place on 20 April. I understand that the council will meet again in two days’ time, on Wednesday. Can the Minister confirm that NATO’s decision will be discussed at that meeting?

As last weekend’s summit took place, we in Britain were digesting the Chilcot report on the Iraq war, which we will be debating tomorrow. Sir John Chilcot’s report makes much about the process of taking the decision to commit to war in Iraq; paragraph 410 of the Executive Summary states that,

“a cabinet committee or a more structured process might have identified some of the wider implications and risks associated with the deployment of military forces to Iraq”.

Can the noble Earl say whether that did in fact happen before Britain decided to commit troops to this NATO deployment? My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon, in response to the Chilcot Statement last week, suggested the creation of an ad hoc Cabinet committee to consider matters in such circumstances in the future. Will the Government consider this idea?

Now that we are heading for exit from the European Union, will Britain continue to oppose an idea favoured by some in France and Germany of the creation of a European army? Will we use our leading role in NATO to resist this notion? There is concern in Germany, which I certainly found in my meetings with representatives of other NATO partners, about our decision to withdraw our troops from Germany. Do we still intend to press ahead with this? Can the Minister also say something about the programme of training activity planned for our forces deployed in Estonia and Poland? I am aware of concern at all levels that our deployed forces could be cooped up in a barracks deep in a forest with nothing much to do.

The Statement reaffirms that the Government are accepting advice from the Chief of the General Staff that women are capable of engaging in close combat roles, and we welcome that. NATO’s defence capacity-building role, first enunciated at the Wales summit, continues to provide significant support to Georgia, Iraq and Jordan. The deployment of HMS “Mersey” in July to the Aegean will underpin our support for NATO’s efforts to counter illegal migration. All these decisions are welcome and underline Britain’s continued commitment to NATO as the lasting bulwark of our defence. As the party which helped to create NATO when in government in 1949, we on these Benches are proud of an organisation which is a defender of our freedoms and way of life, and in an uncertain world a source of security for many around the globe.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, noble Lords on these Benches welcome the Statement and I echo some of the words of the noble Lord, Lord Touhig. We welcome the commitments made to the Baltic states and to Poland, but would ask the Government what thought has been given to the situation with Russia and its possible reactions. Clearly the commitment to NATO is welcome, especially at a time of such global and regional geopolitical uncertainties, and therefore the commitment to our colleagues in the Baltic states and Poland, as well as an increased role in countering illegal migration, are both important.

The Statement by the Prime Minister and the communiqué refer to the UK’s nuclear deterrent and the fact that the UK’s and France’s nuclear deterrents have a deterrent role of their own. I do not wish to pre-empt the debate we will have on Wednesday prior to the Motion to be debated next Monday in the other place, but can the noble Earl give us some reassurance regarding defence expenditure? Assuming a decision is taken to approve a successor on Monday, that will be a considerable defence commitment. Both the NATO summit and the Prime Minister’s Statement recommit us to spending 2% of GDP on defence, a commitment made at the Wales summit in 2014 and affirmed by the Government after the general election last year. However, if there is a recession, either as a result of the decision taken on 23 June to leave the European Union or the actual fact of Brexit, 2% of a smaller GDP would presumably mean less money going to defence. Has money been set aside and are there contingencies to ensure that, if there were a recession, we would still be able to meet our commitments on F35, the aircraft carriers and a successor, if that decision is taken?

Further to that, while it is clearly welcome that the Government do not envisage any reduction in the UK’s commitment to European security in the light of the decision to leave the European Union, how will that commitment be played out? Will it be solely through the multilateral framework of NATO or might the Government consider—I realise that the Minister may not be able to give us an answer pending Wednesday evening—continuing links with the common security and defence policy of the European Union? How far does the UK envisage ongoing links with the EU and how far does it envisage bilateral links, particularly with France but also with the Netherlands? Clearly, the ongoing British commitment to European security is important, but an indication of how we envisage that going forward would be welcome.

Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill [HL]

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Friday 8th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, I have lost count of the number of times we in this House have considered matters relating to the unwritten constitution during the short time of six years that I have served here. As someone who believes that constitutional affairs, no matter how important, are a major turn-off for the British public and an electoral cul-de-sac for politicians, why do I think this particular piece of constitutional fine-tuning is so important?

The main reason is that I believe that the first duty of any Government is the care and well-being of the British people, and that includes the defence of our country. The deployment of British forces into conflict must always be a major concern for the people, for Parliament and for Government. In the many debates on matters constitutional that I have already mentioned, the one theme that is most common to all is the ability of this House in particular, and Parliament in general, to hold the Executive to account.

In the 20-plus years I have served in both Houses of Parliament, there has been a drift, although it is sometimes not immediately obvious, towards adding more and more powers to the Executive at the expense of Parliament and therefore at the expense of the rights of the British people to hold their elected Government to account. This small Bill is worthy of our support, because it attempts to place a check on that drift.

From the earliest times of structured government in these islands, the Executive—as embodied first in the Crown and now in the elected Government—have on so many areas been able to exercise authority over the people without the people or their elected representatives in Parliament being consulted. The Bill is a step towards reversing that. It underpins the need for the Government to show that they draw their powers from the people, through Parliament. In any democracy, the flow of power from the people to the Government should be balanced by the ability of Parliament to hold the Government to account. However, when the Executive rely on the powers of the royal prerogative—powers where the Government act on the monarch’s authority—it is difficult for Parliament to scrutinise and to challenge the Government’s actions.

If voters do not believe that the Government are wielding their power appropriately, or that they are properly accountable, then public confidence in the accountability of decision-making risks being lost. The Bill could start to strengthen our democracy by codifying the power of the Prime Minister, and thereby the Executive, and making the Prime Minister come to Parliament when seeking to commit British troops to conflict. It is important that the key decisions that affect the whole country, such as the decision to send troops into armed conflict, are made in the right way and with Parliament’s consent. The Bill does just that.

My own party, when last in government, planned a piece of legislation just like this. One does not need a long memory to look back at the time when the present party of government also wanted such a piece of legislation. In March 2011, the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, now the noble Lord, Lord Hague, said that the Government planned to,

“enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/3/11; col. 799.]

Since then, we have seen a change of heart on the Government Benches. The Defence Secretary, Mr Fallon, said that the Government in 2011 acknowledged that a convention had developed in Parliament that before troops were committed, the House of Commons should have the opportunity to debate the matter. The Government pledged to observe the convention, except where there was an emergency and such action would not be appropriate. But Mr Fallon then said:

“After careful consideration, the Government has decided that it will not be codifying the Convention in law or by resolution of the House”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/4/16; col. 698WS.]

The Defence Secretary said that this was to retain the ability of Governments and Armed Forces to protect the security and interests of the United Kingdom in circumstances that cannot be predicted. That is eminently sensible, but the Bill retains the Government’s ability to protect Armed Forces operations. It sets that out in Clause 3(2) and Clause 4.

On these Benches and in other parts of the House, there has been growing concern about the use of embedded forces: British forces committed to a potential field of conflict and, as embedded forces, placed under the command of the armed forces of the country in which they are operating or a coalition operating in that country. Mr Fallon said that, in those circumstances, the convention would not be observed at all. This is in danger of prosecuting war by stealth.

On these Benches, we recognise that there are occasions when to protect the safety of our forces and for reasons of national security it would not be right to come to Parliament, but our worry is that this is now becoming the rule, not the exception. That is why we need a Bill such as this. In a statement published in December, I think, last year, the Ministry of Defence told us that there were 147 of our troops in embedded forces in various parts of the world—the large majority of them, 94, in coalition HQs. We do not even know where they are, yet they are under the command of the power of another country who can commit them to conflict and Parliament has not even been told. This is not the way we should be going.

As I mentioned, in July 2007, in a document entitled Governance of Britain, the then Labour Government stated:

“In most modern democracies, the government’s only powers are those granted to it by a written constitution or by the legislature. A distinguishing feature of the British constitution is the extent to which government continues to exercise a number of powers which were not granted to it by a written constitution, nor by Parliament, but are, rather, ancient prerogatives of the Crown”.

It also stated:

“It is important that Parliament is strengthened to ensure that its own powers—whether ancient or more recently acquired—continue to be exercised effectively within appropriate limits and in a way that means the people whom it serves understand its work and have faith in its decisions”.

That is why we need a Bill such as this.

Counter-Daesh: Quarterly Update

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and join him in paying tribute to our service men and women and their families, whose support and affection is constant and much needed.

It is important that Parliament is not ignored and is kept up to date by the Government when our forces are in action, wherever that is in the world. For some years now our democracy has benefited from the convention that government should consult Parliament when planning to send forces into conflict, and testing the opinion of Parliament in a vote in the other place. On top of this, we have come to demand that the Government keep Parliament informed whenever our forces are engaged in conflict. After all, has not Parliament just passed the Armed Forces Act, without which there is no legal basis to maintain an army in this country in peacetime?

Having said that, we recognise, of course, that at times there is a need for very tight security surrounding some operations. The war waged against humanity by this evil ISIL has shocked people around the globe. Britain, like many other nations, has joined battle with the evil in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, and it is right that we have done so. The Government, for their part, have published considerable detail of our air strikes and are to be congratulated on their transparency.

In answer to a Written Question I tabled in March, the Minister said:

“Between 2 December 2015 and 14 March 2016 there were 36 UK airstrikes in Syria and 236 in Iraq”.

He went on to say:

“Among the targets successfully engaged by UK aircraft were oil facilities, which Daesh used to generate revenue to fund their campaign, and command and control centres”.

This is welcome news, but throughout our exchanges going back months on this matter, the Minister will remember that on this side we have pressed strongly for our air-strike capacity to be deployed to destroy ISIL’s oil-exporting capability.

The Statement today gives some detail of our successes in attacking oil fields in eastern Syria, but can the Minister say more about the extent to which our air strikes have degraded, and indeed destroyed, ISIL’s oil-exporting capability? More than that, is it true that ISIL is exporting oil through Turkey and through Syria in areas controlled by the Assad regime? If the former claim is correct, have we raised the matter with the Turkish Government? If the latter is correct, what steps have we taken, both militarily and diplomatically, by raising the matter with the Russians, whose influence on Assad is as strong as ever?

During our debate on Syria on 2 December last year, I said that tracking money around the globe is more of a challenge. Since then, we have seen the publication of the Panama papers. That issue, together with last week’s anti-corruption summit, which it is hoped will lead to greater transparency in global financial dealings, must afford an opportunity to do even more to cut off funds for ISIL. The Statement reveals that we have destroyed an estimated $800 million of ISIL’s cash stockpiles, presumably located in Syria. However, London is the world’s chief marketplace for financial transactions. I understand the need for caution here, but can the Minister say, even in the broadest terms, what success we have had in cutting off ISIL’s international funding for its evil exploits?

At the time of the SDSR, the Government announced massive increases in spending on cyber. Have we had success in employing cyber intelligence to track and cut off ISIL’s money and investments? I accept the need for caution here so as not to impede operations already in place, but can the Minister say what success we have had in discovering which organisations are being used to move ISIL’s funds around the globe, especially through London?

At the start of our debates on action in Syria, we were told by the Prime Minister that there were some 70,000 fighters not infected by ISIL or some other terrorist group, waiting to join us and our allies to defeat ISIL on the ground. What success have we had in engaging, collaborating and working with these fighters? I have no doubt that the defeat of ISIL will not be achieved by air power alone; it will need ground forces.

Finally, will the Minister say a little more about the peace talks? When my noble friend Lady Smith opened the Syria debate on this side, she stressed the importance of gaining a peaceful outcome for Syria and its people. The Statement today rightly describes Russia as Assad’s protector. Will the Minister say more about Britain’s role in trying to bring all sides together, especially in engaging with the Russians, without whom there will be no peace in Syria?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his comments and questions. He asked a number of the latter, the first of which was about access by Daesh to oil. We have no evidence that Governments in the region are buying Daesh oil, with the exception of the Assad regime. Regional countries, including Turkey, have increased their efforts to counter smuggling. The majority of Daesh oil is sold internally, within Daesh-held territory. There is no doubt that our international efforts, including sanctions, have made it harder for Daesh to trade oil. Our military effort with coalition partners has successfully targeted Daesh oil facilities and infrastructure. We have destroyed or damaged over 1,200 oil infrastructure targets and reduced Daesh oil production by around 30%.

Broadly, the military operation has enabled us to drive Daesh out of territory from which it takes tax revenues. We are militarily degrading its ability to earn revenue from oil and we are using international sanctions to cut it off from external sources of revenue. The issue of countering Daesh finances is regularly raised at meetings with officials and Ministers around the region, including at the recent Coalition Counter-ISIL Finance Group, the Financial Action Task Force meeting in Paris in February, and the Chatham House counterterrorism funding conference on 8 February.

I mentioned Turkey a second ago. We regularly engage the Turks on the issue of Daesh’s finances. I say again: there is no evidence that Turkey is purchasing Daesh oil. In fact, Turkey has taken very active steps to tackle oil-smuggling across its border with Syria, including by greatly increasing the number of border guards. The Turks have reported that 79 million litres of smuggled oil were intercepted in 2014. In the period January to October 2015, that had dropped to 1.22 million litres. So it appears that they are making a very considerable difference.

The noble Lord asked about our support for fighters in the region. Subject to parliamentary approval, the MoD is planning to provide the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq with more than £1 million worth of ammunition to equip the Peshmerga. The UK is providing significant support to the Kurdish Peshmerga to assist them in the fight against Daesh. We have already provided them with more than 50 tonnes of non-lethal support, 40 heavy machine guns, nearly half a million rounds of ammunition, and £600,000 worth of military equipment. To date, we have trained more than 3,300 Kurdish Peshmerga.

As regards the negotiations to bring about a peace in Syria, UN Special Envoy de Mistura has conducted three rounds of talks with the parties in Geneva, and this pattern is set to continue. We never expected the UN-brokered negotiations to deliver instant results. We are clear, however, that a negotiated political settlement is the only way to end the conflict, and we are working with our international partners to help to create conditions on the ground that are conducive to negotiations continuing. In its statement of 17 May, the ISSG reaffirmed its determination,

“to strengthen the Cessation of Hostilities”,

and,

“to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access”,

so that the parties can return to negotiations to reach agreement on political transition. We hope the parties will resume negotiations soon.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had quite a debate today, with some very powerful and well-informed contributions, which show this House at its best. Anyone who has any doubts about the role of the House of Lords—and one or two doubts were expressed in the debate today—only needs to read Hansard tomorrow and they will see what a considerable contribution noble Lords bring to our national life.

I start by congratulating my noble friend Lady Jowell on her maiden speech. It was a powerful, well-argued and moving speech. It shows that she served with distinction as an MP and a Minister in the other place and was someone who had the vision to see that the Olympics could be a success. We look forward to her future contributions.

I am sorry that the speech given by the noble Baroness, Lady Perry of Southwark, was a valedictory speech. It was clear, concise and well argued. Right at the beginning, she spoke about education changing lives. As someone who was born and brought up in a mining valley in south Wales, I know that to be a fact. Education was a pathway out of poverty and she, throughout her life, has ensured that more people have benefited from education and had a better life as a result. I had the honour of serving on the Liaison Committee with the noble Baroness, who is slight of stature but formidable in marshalling her arguments. To be honest, she was pretty good in getting her own way, certainly when pitted against me.

It is right for us to consider three key policy areas together in this debate because foreign affairs, international development and defence are linked, especially if you believe, as I do, that our foreign policy is the signpost we need to point us in the right direction for the other two. The debate comes within weeks of the British people being asked to make a momentous decision on future relations with the European Union. Faced as we are with the economic and military superpowers of the United States, Russia and China, Europe needs to be united, at least economically. I am firmly in the stay camp, believing that, both economically and in our long-term defence, Britain is stronger and safer in the European Union.

My noble friend Lord Collins of Highbury developed themes for foreign policy and spoke about international development. I do not propose to take those arguments further, preferring to deal with the third element of this trinity, defence. But before that I will say a few words about soft power, which is a theme that runs through all three policy areas.

During the 2013-14 Session, the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, chaired a committee of this House which produced a report entitled Persuasion and Power in the Modern World. I believe that it was a landmark report which reminded us that Britain over the generations has amassed a great deal of soft power, but the committee concluded that this has been neglected, particularly in our relationship with the Commonwealth. The report called for new approaches, pointing out that the employment of soft power aids our national security, but to achieve that we need to change the mindset among those who shape our international role. Some of the Government’s response to the report was positive, especially recognising that military force alone is insufficient in defending our interests. But then, as so often, the Government rejected a key recommendation urging them to do a lessons learned exercise on post-conflict reconstruction and co-operation between the FCO, DfID and the MoD in Afghanistan. In all my time in the other place, both as a Back-Bencher and as a Minister, I have been frustrated by the reluctance of Governments to do lessons learned exercises. I wonder whether that will ever change.

In the gracious Speech, we were told that the Government will use the opportunity of the new parliamentary Session to strengthen national defences and continue to safeguard national security. We were told that the Government will invest in Britain’s Armed Forces, honour the military covenant and meet the NATO commitment to spend 2% of our national income on defence. We have also been promised a decision to secure the long-term future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

On the last point, there are many who would say, “About time, too”. Many ask why the Government have delayed taking this important decision for so long. Some commentators have said that the decision will be delayed until the party conferences, so that the Prime Minister can gain the maximum party advantage from Labour’s defence review, which will include looking at the question of replacing Trident. I hope not, but the Prime Minister has form on such things, too often thinking tactically about tomorrow’s headlines rather than strategically about the big picture. But surely he cannot be prepared to play party politics with Britain’s defence—some short-term tactical gain for long-term strategic planning. In the debate on the Queen’s Speech in the other place, the Prime Minister said that,

“we will hold a vote in this House to secure the long-term future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/5/16; col. 32.]

I am sure I am not alone in waiting with bated breath for that vote to take place. It is long overdue.

Every gracious Speech tells us that other measures will be laid before us, so perhaps when he replies, the noble Earl can tell us what other measures are meant by the phrase,

“will invest in Britain’s Armed Forces”,

because they certainly need investment. Our Army is smaller than the one we put in the field against Napoleon, while our Navy is reduced to 19 ships and our Air Force reduced to a handful of combat squadrons. We have no maritime patrol aircraft at a time when the Russians are increasing submarine patrols. We have no aircraft carriers and the frigate replacement programme referred to by my noble friend Lord West—I used to call him First Sea Lord when we worked together in the MoD—has been subject to constant change, updating, confusion and delay.

We on these Benches are not alone in expressing concern at the cutbacks in defence pushed through by this Government and the previous Tory-Lib Dem coalition, but the Government appear to be in denial about this—so much so that the most senior Cabinet ministers will go to extraordinary lengths to suppress any discussion of the impact that Government-imposed cuts have had on our Armed Forces. Indeed, if press reports are to be believed, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Hammond, when he was the Defence Secretary, wanted to court-martial General Sir Richard Shirreff, NATO’s deputy supreme commander for Europe, when he said that the Government were taking “one hell of a risk” by cutting the Regular Army and relying on reserves. Now to be fair, the MoD appears to have disputed the court martial threat story, and Mr Hammond has every right to defend his reputation, but did the Foreign Secretary have to go over the top in his response to Sir Richard? Did we need to be regaled this weekend with stories in the press of Mr Hammond saying that Sir Richard has a book to sell and probably a big mortgage to pay? It is a bit beneath the dignity of a Cabinet Minister, especially one holding one of the most senior offices of state, to indulge in this sort of abuse, but there is no accounting for taste.

Setting aside the ephemerality of the court martial story, what is really worrying is the claim by Sir Richard, who said:

“There is and has been a hollowing out of, a cutting away at muscle and damn well nearly at the bone, frankly, in UK defences which puts us now in a very, very different position from where we were even ten … years ago”.

He added:

“I would question whether the UK could deploy a division for war. I think that’s highly unlikely. The notion of deploying a division for war as the UK did in Iraq in 2003 … is frankly almost inconceivable”.

Is he right? Is it inconceivable that we could now deploy a division in 2016, as we did in 2003?

I turn to the reserve forces. They do a fantastic job for Britain and we would be less secure without them. We owe a very considerable debt to the men and women of our reserve forces for their commitment and dedication. However, our wholehearted admiration for them should not prevent us asking questions about the Government’s policy on reserves. In the past year, noble Lords on the Government Benches, as well as on other Benches across the House, have expressed concerns about the policy of replacing fully trained professional regulars with reservists.

The Ministry of Defence’s own Major Projects Authority Annual Report 2014-15, covering Future Reserves 2020 has revealed that the programme has gone from amber red to red. The much-heralded purpose of that project was,

“to increase the UK’s Reserve forces in line with the commitment set out in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, however the project has not, thus far, met its published recruitment targets, in particular for Army Reserves”.

Can the Minister say when that will be achieved and what steps have been taken to meet that target?

The Government recently published a paper updating us on the work of the reserves. It contains some very interesting articles covering reservists in operations, reservist training, the employer recognition scheme and pictures of Ministers, including the Defence Secretary. These articles are all very interesting, but on the question of the strength of the reserves there are two lines and a link to a website. What does it say about recruitment? I am afraid that that does not get a mention at all. I wonder why that is.

On cybersecurity, the SDSR 2015 raised the issue of tackling this issue and our ambition was set out that Britain would be a “world leader” in doing so. However, there is concern that the Armed Forces will not have the capacity or the expertise to achieve this. The Chancellor pledged a massive increase in spending on cybersecurity, and the Government pledged a full spectrum of military cyber capability. George Osborne, speaking at GCHQ, said that the Government would protect Britain from cyberattack, if necessary by going on the offensive. This is important if we are to counter the work of people such as ISIL and other terrorist organisations around the world. We were told that we would develop an offensive capability. Can the Minister update us on progress?

Finally, I shall say something about the new doctrine of not telling Parliament when we embed our forces in a conflict situation and place them under the command of a foreign power. We might call it the Fallon doctrine. In March 2011, the then Foreign Secretary William Hague—now the noble Lord, Lord Hague—promised that the Government would enshrine in law the necessity to consult Parliament on military action. In April this year, Mr Fallon said that this policy was now abandoned and the convention whereby Parliament would be consulted on any military action would not apply where our forces were embedded in the Armed Forces of another power and under the command of that country’s military. This is a dangerous doctrine.

In a reply to a Question from me asking about the location of embedded forces, the noble Earl the Minister said that he was,

“not able to provide location details as their disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces”.

No one on these Benches will do anything to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of our Armed Forces. While proclaiming transparency on the matter of embedded forces in a Statement on 17 December last year, the Defence Secretary was less than forthcoming when he said that there were 147 British service personnel in embedded locations. He identified 53 locations, but 94 were not revealed. Some 64% of our embedded forces are in locations which Parliament has not been told about.

[Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon]

I am listening to the noble Lord very carefully, and he is making a very important statement. May I take it as read that he does not include in the requirement to publish the details of our Armed Forces abroad the disposition and deployment of Special Forces?

[Lord Touhig]

No, I would agree with the point made by the noble Lord. Indeed, for the benefit of the House, if there is any doubt, before I tabled the Question to the noble Earl, who was away at that time on a very important visit to Korea, I asked the MoD whether I would cause any embarrassment to our national security by tabling the Question—through the help of his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton. I did not get a response, so I tabled the Question. I took steps to try to ensure that I was not in any way threatening our security by asking such a Question.

While I recognise that there are cases for effective security, this dangerous doctrine is now becoming the rule, not the exception. I hope the Government will review this policy of deliberately keeping Parliament in the dark. The first duty of every Government is the well-being of our people. That begins with the defence of the realm, which is best achieved when there is consensus and agreement across the board on how best that can be done. But, while working with the Government as much as possible, the Opposition—not just the Opposition, but all Members—would be failing in their duty not to raise concerns where we see deficiencies and shortcomings. The criticisms we have made today are meant to be constructive and achieve a better outcome.

I say only this. I learned a long time ago in politics that it is not sensible to reject a good idea simply because somebody else thought of it first. I rather think that the noble Earl would agree with that. His big task now is to persuade the rest of the Government.

Yemen

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Wednesday 11th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it is too soon to say what involvement we might have, should a peace agreement be reached. The talks are facilitated, as I mentioned, by the United Nations, and we are working closely with it to encourage the parties to engage in good faith without preconditions and to respect the ceasefire which began on 10 April.

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords,

“Information is power. It lets people hold the powerful to account”.

Those were the words of the Prime Minister on 6 July 2011, when he said that his Government were,

“creating a new era of transparency”.

The Defence Secretary, on the same theme, said in December last year that the Government were committed to transparency in the operations of troops embedded in other nations’ armed forces. Why did the self-same Defence Secretary say on 18 April this year that in future, Parliament will not be told when the Government commit British forces to conflict where they are embedded in and under the command of the armed forces of another country? Why is Parliament being bypassed?

[Earl Howe]

Parliament is not being bypassed. It has been the practice of successive Governments not to comment in detail on embedded personnel who are under the chain of command of the nation with which they are serving. However, we are transparent and publish figures on the numbers of our personnel who are embedded, so the transparency exists.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Thursday 5th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, in moving that the Bill do now pass, I express my appreciation to all noble Lords, noble and gallant Lords, and noble and learned Lords who have taken part in what have been some very well-informed and constructive debates during the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House. I shall refrain from singling out any noble Lords by name, if they will forgive me, but I thank them all for their support for the Bill’s provisions and for the positive engagement that we have had on a range of issues of central relevance to the well-being of the Armed Forces and the service justice system. I also express my gratitude for the advice and support provided by my Bill team, which has at all times been first class. Finally, I pay tribute to our Armed Forces. We are immensely proud of their work, their courage and their dedication. This Bill is for them.

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sure that the entire House will join the Minister in his last remarks. We are always indebted to the Armed Forces of our country: we are free people because of their dedication and commitment.

I will be brief. When I spoke at Second Reading on February 11, I said that I had a feeling of déjà vu, having taken the 2005 Armed Forces Bill through the other place. I have to confess, as I did then, that I never saw the Act through to its completion because the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, phoned me and awarded me the DCM—“Don’t Come Monday”—and I was no longer a Minister. So in one way I feel a sense of achievement having seen this Armed Forces Bill through all its stages in your Lordships’ House. We have had some first-class debates and many powerful arguments on the Bill, with notable contributions from distinguished Members too numerous to mention.

The Government have shown throughout our deliberations that they were willing to listen to the arguments on all sides. More than that, thanks to the Minister and his excellent Bill team, the Government have been willing to engage in discussions, and for that all noble Lords are in his debt. I believe that our discussions aimed at improving it mean that the Bill leaves this House better than when it arrived with us in February. That has been achieved not by contests, votes or amendments but by frank and open exchanges on all sides, involving colleagues all around the House. The undertakings given by the Government on a range of issues, from publishing statistics on sexual assault and rape to a review of support for those who have mental health problems as a result of serving in our Armed Forces, have made a real difference to the Bill.

On this side, we would have hoped for a similar undertaking on the matter raised by my noble friend Lord Judd in relation to providing an annual report on military service by those aged between 16 and 18, but I feel sure that we will come back to that at some time in the future, and we on this side of the House wish the Bill well.

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches I also want to pay tribute to our Armed Forces. It has been a small and not quite perfectly formed Bill, but a very interesting Bill on which to work and I thank the Minister and his team for being ready to talk to us and to listen to our proposals and our views. I also thank the Opposition for a certain amount of joint working and collaboration on some issues. Indeed, it has been a very good-spirited and incredibly well-informed Bill. There will be another Armed Forces Bill in five years, but in this one we looked at the usual government tidying-up, the issue of child soldiers, the issues of courts martial and justice, mental health and sexual offences. The Government resisted the amendments very effectively, but I rather feel that they will be revisited in five years’ time and I look forward to discussing them in future with the noble Earl. In the mean time, we on these Benches are more than happy to support the Bill.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Touhig]

5: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Removal of Commanding Officer’s discretion to investigate allegations of sexual assault
In Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 (“Schedule 2 offences”), in paragraph 12(at), omit “except one under section 3, 66, 67 or 71”.”

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment would remove a commanding officer’s discretion to investigate allegations of sexual assault. Here, as is so often the case, there is a temptation to repeat many things that were said in Committee. I intend to resist that, but I recall that the amendment caused some concern among noble and gallant Lords and I want to assuage their fears about this if I possibly can.

In Committee, the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, who is not in his place, gave us the benefit of how he sought to resolve these matters as a commanding officer. It was very important that he did so because we were able to better understand how a commanding officer can act in such circumstances. I felt then that his fears that the integrity of the chain of command was put at risk by this amendment were ill founded, and I still am of that opinion. What is at risk is the reputation of the Armed Forces if we continue to place a duty of deciding whether or not to investigate a complaint of sexual assault on the shoulders of officers who, in the overwhelming number of such cases, will have no experience of dealing with such matters. Far from diminishing the role of the chain of command, this amendment will give it full support by involving highly trained investigative officers who are knowledgeable about dealing with complaints of this nature.

Having had the opportunity of speaking to the Minister since Committee, I am hopeful that his reply will show us a way forward. My own view is that if the Government took a long, hard look at this issue and held a review before coming back at a later stage with some conclusions, this would be the way to reconcile the right and proper concerns expressed by colleagues, such as the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, and those of us on these Benches who want to see change.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I fully understand the concerns that lie behind these amendments but I hope that my response will explain why we do not think it necessary or appropriate to press them.

The first amendment in the group, Amendment 5, concerns four offences: sexual assault, exposure, voyeurism and sexual activity in a public lavatory. The amendment would require a commanding officer to refer to the service police for investigation every allegation which would suggest to a reasonable person that one of these offences may have been committed by someone under his or her command. It would therefore remove from commanding officers the ability which they currently have in very limited circumstances to ensure that an allegation or circumstances are appropriately investigated without involving the service police.

It is the first of the offences covered by the amendment—sexual assault—and how allegations of that offence are investigated and handled within the Armed Forces which has been the main focus of attention in this debate. For the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that a commanding officer does not have any role in investigating allegations of almost all the sexual offences on the statute book, including rape and assault by penetration. Allegations or circumstances which indicate to a reasonable person that any of these offences may have been committed by someone under their command must always be reported by a commanding officer to the service police. That is an absolute rule.

I also make it clear that commanding officers are already under a statutory duty to ensure that all allegations which indicate that a service offence may have been committed, including the offences covered by this amendment, are properly investigated. This means that, where a commanding officer becomes aware of an allegation of any of the offences covered by this amendment, he or she must consider whether it would be appropriate to report it to the service police. If it would be appropriate to report it, it must be reported.

The statute, however, should not be our only source of reference. The manual of service law makes it very clear to commanding officers that if there has been an allegation of one of these offences, they must take legal advice about whether it would be appropriate to call in the police. Access to legal advice is available 24 hours a day and seven days a week. The manual also makes it clear that there is a presumption that allegations of such offences will normally be reported to the service police. This duty on commanding officers to ensure that allegations are investigated appropriately means that it will rarely be appropriate—I stress rarely—for the commanding officer not to report an allegation of sexual assault to the service police.

The reason why the Armed Forces Act 2006 did not go further and require commanding officers to report to the service police every single allegation of sexual assault, or the other offences covered by this amendment, is that those offences cover such a wide range of conduct. For example, the offence of “sexual assault” makes any sexual touching without consent a criminal offence. “Sexual” can include conduct that may not in some circumstances be sexual but which, in the particular circumstances of the case, a reasonable person would consider sexual; for example, an arm around the shoulder may fall within the offence. The provision in the 2006 Act recognises that, given the width of these offences, there may be cases involving the most minor infringements that may be better handled other than by automatic police investigation. The 2006 Act recognises that this may also be the case for offences other than those covered by this amendment. For example, an investigation other than by the service police will in many cases be appropriate for disciplinary offences under the 2006 Act.

I hope that noble Lords will therefore understand that it is because of the very wide range of conduct that these offences cover that it may be appropriate, in limited circumstances—I underline that phrase—for commanding officers to investigate allegations. Those circumstances are, in practice, further limited by the fact that the service police can and do act on their own initiative—for example, where they are approached by a victim or a witness, where they come across an offence while patrolling, or where the civilian police have been involved and pass the case to the service police.

Other proposals in the Bill, in Clauses 3 to 5, will mean that in future, where the service police investigate an allegation of, for example, sexual assault, they will have to refer the case straight to the Director of Service Prosecutions for a decision on whether to bring charges and, if so, what those charges should be. That is a change from the current position, under which charges are instead referred back to the commanding officer. However, I recognise that, for some, our existing policies and procedures do not go far enough. They argue that we should use the opportunity presented by this Bill to amend Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 so that all allegations of sexual assault, and the other offences covered by this amendment, must be referred to the service police. In fact, the 2006 Act provides a mechanism for amending Schedule 2. Section 113 of the Act provides that the Secretary of State may amend Schedule 2 by secondary legislation, subject to the affirmative procedure, so primary legislation is not needed to make the change proposed in the amendment.

Against that background, I inform the House that the service justice board, chaired by the Minister for Defence Personnel and Veterans, has decided that the time is right for a fresh look at this issue, taking on board the arguments for the existing position and the views expressed in both Houses and by external organisations such as Liberty. The necessary work has been set in hand. My noble friend Lord Attlee made some very valid observations, and I assure him that the points that he raised under this heading will be addressed in the review. Any changes to Schedule 2 that may be needed can be made through secondary legislation, subject to the affirmative procedure. The review is likely to take until the end of the year, and I will report the outcome to the House in due course.

The second amendment in this group, Amendment 6, would create a legal obligation to publish data about allegations of sexual assault and rape. It would impose an obligation which is not currently imposed on other civilian authorities—although they publish such information on a regular basis. As noble Lords may be aware, in Committee of the whole House in the other place, the Minister spoke on this subject and made it quite clear that he wanted improvements in the data that we publish and that he was considering how best to publish the data as an official statistic. That is very definitely the Government’s intention. Given that commitment, I reassure noble Lords that the work to achieve this is well in hand. I have recently written to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, on this subject, and it may be helpful if I share the information in that letter with the rest of the House.

In my letter, I explained that the Government aim to publish, by the Summer Recess, statistics about sexual offences that have been dealt with by the service justice system during the 2015 calendar year. The statistics will cover those cases where the service police have been the lead investigating agency and where the service justice system retained jurisdiction of the case throughout. To meet the standard for formal publication of these statistics, we clearly must put in place the necessary policies and procedures to ensure that the data are robust and consistent as we move forward. That work is in hand and encompasses three main components of the service justice system: the service police, dealing with the investigation of the crime; the service prosecuting authority, dealing with the cases referred; and the military court service, which lists the cases and reports on outcomes.

With regard to investigations, the crime statistics and analysis cell within the Service Police Crime Bureau will provide information on all sexual offences investigated by the service police. This will be broken down by service and will further detail the offence type, the gender of the victim or suspect, the location by country and the outcome of the investigation, such as whether the suspect was referred to the service prosecuting authority. To ensure greater consistency with Home Office police forces and assurance of data, the service police will have a crime registrar. The responsibilities of that post will include the development, implementation and monitoring of crime-recording policies, procedures and programmes and their application, to ensure high standards of data integrity and accuracy.

On prosecutions, the service prosecuting authority will provide data relating to the numbers of referrals that it has received for all sexual offences, which will again be broken down by service and offence type. The service prosecuting authority will also provide information on the numbers of those then charged with the offence referred, whether the person was charged with an alternative offence, or whether the case was discontinued.

Finally, the military court service will be responsible for providing information on the numbers of cases heard at court martial which involve sexual offences. This will again be broken down by service and will include both pleas and findings.

We intend to publish all these data on an annual basis. They will be supported by explanatory information to provide the reader with an understanding of the SJS and some context for the information. As mentioned earlier, we aim to produce the first set of these statistics by the Summer Recess, and they will be posted on the GOV.UK website in a format that is easy to read and print.

In the light of this and my assurance to return to the House on the matter raised in Amendment 5, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, will feel comfortable about withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Touhig]

My Lords, we have had a short but very good debate, with some very well-founded comments. The comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, about confidence were very important. In my view, the best way to get confidence is transparency. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, raised wider issues about the complaints covered by the amendments. He is right, and the Minister has indicated that the review that will be carried out will cover the kind of things that he is concerned about. We certainly welcome the Minister’s response to this debate. It has showed, from Committee to Report, that the Government have listened, taken on board the views of colleagues all around the House, and are prepared to act. They should have our full support, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Touhig]

9: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Special provision for sufferers of mental health conditions
(1) Part 3 of the Armed Forces and Reserve Forces (Compensation Scheme) Order 2011 is amended as follows.(2) After article 28 insert—“28A Special provision for sufferers of mental health conditions(1) In the event of a diagnosis of a mental health condition that has been caused by serving in the armed forces, an immediate lump sum payment shall be made, as defined under article 17 (amount of lump sum and supplementary award).(2) Upon commencement of treatment of a mental health condition that has been caused by serving in the armed forces, retrospective payment of the determined compensation shall be made, dated back to the date on which the diagnosis was made.””

[Lord Touhig]

My Lords, Amendments 9 and 10, covering the special provisions for sufferers of mental health conditions and the Armed Forces covenant report on mental health parity of esteem gained a degree of support in Committee and, for that reason, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and I believed it was right to come back with these matters on Report. I shall confine most of my remarks to Amendment 9 as I know that the noble Baroness will cover Amendment 10.

I am especially grateful to the BMA for the advice and case studies that it has provided to me in support of this matter. Amendment 9 would ensure that, in the event of a diagnosis of a mental health condition that had been caused by service in the Armed Forces, an immediate lump sum payment would be made to the individual affected. Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, with our full support, would create a specific obligation on the Government to have particular regard to parity of esteem between mental and physical health in the Armed Forces covenant. Again, we have had some very useful discussions with the Minister since Committee, and he wrote to me on 15 April setting out the Government’s thinking, for which I am most grateful. The letter refers to the Armed Forces compensation scheme and the tariff system, specifically the table of injury types. I share the BMA’s view that mental health should be further up the tariff table, in the sense of more compensation being awarded for mental health illnesses. Perhaps the Minister could respond to this point in his reply.

In his letter he also refers to late-onset illnesses but does not set out to what extent the Government believe that this is a problem. We might understand this better if the Government produced statistics demonstrating how long it takes for veterans to receive compensation after a mental health diagnosis. In my discussions with the BMA, it has persuaded me that the Armed Forces compensation scheme does not reflect that mental health is not diagnosed immediately. Again, it would help if the Government considered looking at the commencement point of mental health illness, not simply the point of diagnosis, and awarding compensation on that basis.

I understand that there is to be a further review of the Armed Forces compensation scheme. Indeed, judging by the Minister’s letter it has already started. The Minister has indicated that the review will consider the scheme’s coverage, in particular those seriously injured, including mental health cases. That is a step in the right direction and has once again demonstrated that we have found common ground on how to take this matter forward. I await the Minister’s response. I would feel more supportive if, in that response, he read out the key points from his letter and put them on the record. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jolly]

My Lords, these two amendments had a slightly chequered path to the Marshalled List. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and I sat down after Committee and wondered whether we could somehow incorporate the two ideas into one. We took our resulting amendments to the Table Office, which said that it would not do. They were then split out again. Once marshalled, the two amendments were tabled in Lord Touhig’s name with my support, whereas in fact the first was in his name and the second in mine with his support. The Table Office has apologised, but I felt I should set the record straight.

The Minister has just given the House a very eloquent account of the role of the Armed Forces covenant, and in Committee he brought out the fact that there was no need to worry about parity of esteem for mental health because it all linked in with the Armed Forces covenant, which took into consideration things such as the NHS mandate, and therefore there was no concern.

I had decided that I would do a bit of work to see what the statistics showed. There is a wealth of statistics on the MoD website. I commend the MoD for increasing awareness of, and taking action on, mental health over the last few years. However, when looking at parity of esteem I needed to compare mental health with physical health, and there were no similar statistics on physical health to enable me to weigh one against the other. The Minister said in Committee that parity would not be required because parity was implied in the covenant, as in the NHS mandate, as I have just said. Clearly, however, this is not evidenced and I would like the Minister to reflect on that when we come back for Third Reading. Will the Minister also explain how physical and mental health services are commissioned, in particular where services are not delivered by service personnel, and why this might be deemed acceptable?

I certainly do not intend to push this inclusion in the amendment but fine words butter no parsnips and the evidence is not there. Parity of esteem is not transparent and for the men and women with mental health conditions, it is not good enough—I do not mean the services that they receive but the fact that they cannot be clear whether they are being treated within the same sort of timeframes or scales as for physical health. I would certainly welcome a rethink before Third Reading.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, both these amendments seek to address provision for the care and support of members of the Armed Forces who suffer from mental health conditions caused by service. The health of our Armed Forces community is hugely important to us all and I welcome the opportunity to set out the Government’s position again.

Turning first to Amendment 9, as I said in Committee, the Armed Forces compensation scheme—AFCS—already makes awards for injuries and disorders predominantly caused by service, including mental health conditions. The scheme is tariff-based and aims to make full and final awards as early as possible, so that individuals can have financial security and focus on getting on with life and living. Claims can be made while in service or when the individual has left. In cases where a disorder is not in steady state, prognosis is uncertain or treatment is ongoing or not yet begun, legislation allows an interim award to be paid at the most likely level. This award is then reviewed and usually finalised within 24 months of notification. Where, exceptionally, matters remain uncertain at review, the interim award may continue for a maximum of 48 months. If the disorder has improved and a lower tariff now applies, no recovery of benefit takes place, while if a higher tariff award now applies, the difference between the interim award and the final award is paid.

The AFCS tariff has nine tables of categories of injury relevant to military service—and they include mental health disorders. While the scheme has time limits for claiming, there is also a provision for delayed-onset conditions, including mental health diagnoses. The Ministry of Defence recognises that, owing to stigma and perceived impact on career, people may delay seeking help. The practical effect of this is that if a person who has left the Armed Forces some time ago is diagnosed with a mental health problem as a result of his or her service and makes a claim under the AFCS, a compensation award will be paid as soon as the claim is accepted. As a result of the recommendations made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, in his review of the AFCS, the Ministry of Defence increased the maximum lump sum award for mental illness from £48,875 to £140,000. This was to better reflect the impact of the most serious mental health conditions.

Broadly, the same mental health disorders are found in military personnel and veterans as in the general community—an exception being a lower rate of the most severe and enduring conditions such as schizophrenia.

Evidence-based effective interventions are now available for the common disorders, including PTSD. The treatments apply to both civilian and military contexts, with a high expectation of improved function, including return to work—especially if people are seen early.

In addition to the AFCS lump sum, the most serious conditions with likely limitations on civilian employability receive a tax-free guaranteed income payment—GIP. While in service, regardless of medical employability grading or being on sick leave, personnel retain their military salary. The GIP is paid for life and comes into effect on discharge from the services or from the date on which the claim is accepted. A lump sum of £140,000 attracts a GIP based on 75% of military salary, with enhancements for service length, age, rank and lost promotions.

Also as a result of the recommendations of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, we established the Independent Medical Expert Group—the IMEG. The group—a non-departmental public body—includes senior consultants and academics and UK authorities on specialities relevant to military life, including mental health. It advises Ministers on the scientific and medical aspects of the scheme.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, also identified the need for further investigation into mental health. The IMEG therefore conducted a review that involved literature search and discussions with civilian and military experts and veterans’ organisations. The findings were published in its second report on 17 May 2013. The conclusions and recommendations on diagnosis, causation, assessment of disorder severity and the use of interim awards were accepted by Ministers and subsequently incorporated into the scheme.

The House will be interested to know that this year sees a further planned review of the AFCS, which began recently. The review is currently in the stakeholder engagement phase and has been approaching charities, claimants and other government departments. This quinquennial review will consider the scheme’s coverage and levels of awards, in particular for those most seriously injured, including those with mental health conditions. It is expected to report at the end of 2016.

The second amendment in this group would create a specific obligation on the Government to have particular regard, in their annual report on the covenant, to parity of esteem between mental and physical healthcare. The Government are absolutely committed to meeting the healthcare needs of the Armed Forces community. The Secretary of State has a statutory requirement to include in his annual Armed Forces covenant report to Parliament the effects of membership, or former membership, of the Armed Forces on service people in the field of healthcare under the covenant.

The healthcare we provide to our service personnel, both at home and deployed on operations, is truly world class. Last year, the principles of the covenant were enshrined in the NHS constitution for England. This gives a commitment to ensure that, as well as those serving in the Armed Forces, reservists, their families and veterans are not disadvantaged in accessing NHS health services in the area in which they reside.

Since 1953, priority access to NHS specialist services in Great Britain has been provided for service-attributable disorders, with no-fault compensation awards. In 2009, this was extended to include treatment for any disorder where a clinician recognises a causal link to service. Priority is decided by the clinician in charge, subject only to clinical need.

I should also mention further work on mental health. For mental health disorders, stigma and perceived discrimination in employment can act as barriers to access and engagement with care. This is not unique to the Armed Forces but common among men. In 2004, led by the Health and Social Care Advisory Service, the MoD, UK health departments, NHS and Combat Stress explored features of an effective veterans’ mental health service, piloting various service models in locations across the UK.

The evidence showed that while some veterans were not comfortable with clinicians who had no military experience, others were equally anxious to see only civilian health professionals. What seem to work best are multifaceted services, including healthcare, social support, benefits advice et cetera, delivered in an environment of cultural sensitivity and empathy. The pilots also confirmed that best-practice interventions work, with high rates of improved function and a return to a full life with contribution to family, community and work.

As a reflection of these findings, and of Dr Andrew Murrison’s Fighting Fit report, since 2010, a network of veterans’ mental health services has been established in England and Wales with special arrangements for veterans also established in Scotland. The Armed Forces covenant gives a commitment that veterans should be able to access mental health professionals who have an understanding of Armed Forces culture, and NHS England is currently completing an audit of veterans’ mental health services.

In service, there has also been increased focus on good mental health and well-being, with emphasis on prevention and protection through a chain of command lead. Mental health awareness is part of a through-life training strategy starting at basic training, with self-awareness and with annual refresher courses. There are then specific courses for those with leadership responsibilities. The courses cover: raising stress management; reduction of stigma; building resilience; early detection of problems in self and others; and specific pre-deployment, deployed and decompression measures. Trauma incident management teams and mental health nurses are now considered essential parts of a deployment package, and mental health first aid training to service personnel is being delivered by SSAFA in collaboration with Combat Stress, Mental Health First Aid England and the Royal British Legion.

I should add that there is no evidence of an epidemic of mental problems in military personnel—rather, levels of the common mental health problems in regulars and reservists are broadly similar to those of the matched general population, while levels of PTSD in some groups, and in relation to combat, are slightly but not markedly increased. Where service personnel become ill, help is available in primary care with, as required, referral and outpatient support from the 16 departments of community mental health across the UK. When, rarely, in-patient care is necessary, it is provided in eight dedicated psychiatric units, again located around the country.

I therefore assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to meeting the health needs of the service community. We will continue to report on the provision of healthcare in the Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report, and our work to address mental health needs will be an integral part of that report.

The principles of the covenant are to ensure that the Armed Forces community is treated fairly in comparison to the civilian population. Parity of esteem is there to ensure that all health services treat mental health with the same importance as physical health, and it applies to everyone accessing NHS services, not just the Armed Forces community. For this reason, I remain firm in the belief that it does not need to be legislated for under the covenant.

I shall write to the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, on any of her specific questions that I have not addressed. However, given our clear commitment to support those who suffer from mental health conditions, and the tangible steps that we are taking, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Touhig]

My Lords, this has been a short but very useful debate and I thank the Minister for his response. It is positive and is taking us down the right track to try and resolve these matters. He mentioned that the review of the Armed Forces compensation scheme is now at the stakeholder engagement stage, and I am sure he would welcome it if I passed on to the organisations that have been briefing me that they might have an input into this aspect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, was quite right to point out that Amendment 10 was in fact proposed in her name, with me as a supporter, although that is not how it appears on the Marshalled List. I note that the Minister has invited us to his department on 4 May to discuss the Armed Forces covenant. That might be the opportunity to raise the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, brought up. It might also be an opportunity for my noble friend Lord Judd, who is no longer in his place, to come along and pursue these matters further. I do not wish to detain the House any longer. I am grateful for the Minister’s response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, kindly said, I tabled a similar, rather less focused, amendment in Committee on 3 March and we had a useful debate then. I was grateful for my noble friend’s response, and we explored a number of the challenging aspects of this difficult matter. Now we have this more focused and more pointed amendment, redrafted in the light of those discussions and of the subsequent information that has been made available. Unsurprisingly, I am therefore inclined to support it.

In his reply to the debate, my noble friend’s argument for being unwilling to consider the amendment rested, I think, on two major planks: on the one hand, the inflexibility resulting from enshrining this sort of requirement in primary legislation; and, on the other, operational confidentiality. These two arguments were backed by a statement of general good intent on transparency. My noble friend will appreciate that I absolutely accept his sincerity on these matters, but operational confidentiality could become an elastic concept, capable of being interpreted to cover a pretty wide range of situations. When backed only by a statement of intent without any statutory teeth, this elasticity could be increased still further.

My concern about civilian casualties arises from two points. The first is the long-term fabric of the society. If women and children are traumatised by violence, it may take a generation to rebuild a stable society and it must be in this country’s interests to establish and maintain stable societies wherever possible. Secondly, and no less importantly, civilian casualties must be one of the best recruiting sergeants for extremists. If I see my village wrecked and my family and community blown apart, I am unlikely to be sympathetic to the people who have caused my world to be turned upside down.

At the core of my concern are the figures given by the noble Baroness about the discrepancy between what Airwars has said about coalition casualties, excluding the Russian casualties, of which I think there are a great deal more—some 3,000 or more. This leads me to believe that somewhere something must be going wrong. Airwars has got its figures wrong, or the coalition members are looking the other way, or the procedures for identifying and recording civilian casualties are faulty. This country, which has now carried out some 600 air strikes in Iraq and Syria and flown more than 2,000 combat missions against Daesh, should surely have a keen interest in ensuring that the truth is established and publicised. Our international reputation demands no less. This amendment, if accepted, would help in that process.

I conclude by saying that I hope my noble friend will forgive me if I gently chide his department. As a result of the issues raised in that earlier debate in Grand Committee, which I referred to, which are also the raw material of our discussion this evening, I wrote to him raising a series of specific questions. My letter was dated 15 March, and I am afraid that I have yet to receive a reply. Will he be prepared to act as the man from Dyno-Rod? If so, I would be extraordinarily grateful.

[Lord Touhig]

My Lords, I will be very brief. When we considered an amendment very similar to this in Committee, I said that on this side we certainly welcomed the aspirations that motivated it—the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, tabled it at that time—but we certainly had doubts that it was the best way of dealing with reporting on civilian casualties. I fear that although this amendment is much more focused, as he mentioned, those doubts remain.

Of course it is right to report on civilian casualties caused by air strikes, but we should also be made aware of all civilian casualties, including those caused by the actions of ground forces. I can only repeat a key point I made in Committee when I stressed that reporting on civilian casualties is not an Armed Forces role alone but needs to involve the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. This is a matter for a cross-government approach that seeks an agreement on how to report on civilian casualties caused in a conflict in which our Armed Forces are involved. However, it must be done in a way that that gives everybody confidence, and such an approach must also ensure that we maintain operational security. That is important; I am not sure whether the noble Lord who has just spoken feels it is quite that important, but certainly that point was made, rightly, by the Minister in Committee.

We do not need primary legislation to achieve the aims of this amendment, but if the Government were minded to consult on finding a better way to embrace the aims of the amendment and to consult so that we could find a solution which we could all support on properly reporting on civilian casualties, we would certainly want to co-operate with them on that. However, this amendment is not the solution and we will not support it.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I begin by offering my apologies to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. If I have been guilty of failing to fulfil an undertaking to write to her on the questions she raised in Grand Committee, I will certainly look into that as a matter of urgency. I must also apologise to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for the delay in responding to his letter of last month. I can, however, tell him that a reply was dispatched to him today.

This amendment would create a legislative obligation on the Ministry of Defence regarding civilian casualties following military operations, including sharing the details of any investigations with Parliament. This would be inappropriate for several reasons, not least that each military operation is different, so respective arrangements are likely to vary, depending on which forces are involved. It also risks prejudicing the operational and personnel security of our Armed Forces.

First and foremost, I re-emphasise that the Government take the utmost care to avoid civilian casualties when planning and conducting any form of military operation. Every care is taken to avoid or minimise civilian casualties and our use of extremely accurate, precision-guided munitions supports this aim. By way of an example, the authorisation process for air strikes is extremely robust. All military targeting is governed by strict rules of engagement in accordance with both UK and international humanitarian law.

I will make absolutely clear that we will not use UK military force unless we are satisfied that its use is both necessary and lawful. This tried and tested process brings together policy, legal and targeting experts—and, of course, the men and women of our Armed Forces are highly trained, including in the law of armed conflict. After a strike has been carried out, we conduct a full review to establish what damage has been caused, specifically checking very carefully whether there are likely to have been civilian casualties.

The Government have always taken very seriously any allegations of civilian casualties. We have thorough processes in place to review such reports and will launch investigations where appropriate. We will continue to consider all available evidence to support such reviews, and the Defence Secretary has made a personal commitment that the department will review all claims.

In the event of a credible allegation of a civilian casualty, an independent service police investigation would take place. The department has a process in place to inform Ministers on a case-by-case basis, but this has not been necessary to date, given that we have had no confirmed incidents of civilian casualties in Iraq or Syria caused by UK action. We are also committed to updating Parliament with information regarding any confirmed civilian casualty caused by UK military action in Iraq or Syria.

Warships

Lord Touhig Excerpts

Monday 11th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, will my noble friend—

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, following on from my noble friend—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Stowell of Beeston) (Con)]

I am so sorry to interrupt the noble Lord but it is the turn of the Conservative Benches. We will then have time to come through to the Labour Front Bench.

[Earl Howe]

No, I would not. The F35 has been very carefully selected in order to be able to work from the carriers, and it will do so very effectively, as has been proved in the United States on its carriers.

[Lord Touhig]

I apologise to the noble Lord—I was distracted and did not see him rise to his feet. [Laughter.] I know I am not quite as vertically challenged as he is, but I am a bit short-sighted at times.

Following on from the point made by my noble friend Lord Reid of Cardowan, I am sure the Minister and I would agree that Britain needs a secure supply of steel for the construction of warships and other defence platforms. But in the event that we no longer have a British steel industry, and our country becomes involved in a conflict which makes it all but impossible to protect the seas around our island, thus cutting off the supply of imported steel, what is plan B?

[Earl Howe]

There are an awful lot of ifs there, and I do not necessarily subscribe to any of them. Indeed, as I have said, the Government are working very hard to ensure that we have a viable heavy steel industry. We have issued new policy guidance in the MoD to ensure we are addressing the barriers that prevent UK steel suppliers from competing on a level playing field with international suppliers. That emphasises the importance of increased pre-market engagement in particular, which in turn will feed into the national shipbuilding strategy, so I do not share the noble Lord’s pessimism.